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- abdication of the throne of Emperor Nicholas II. Over the 100-year period since February 1917, many memoirs and studies on this topic have been published.

Unfortunately, deep analysis was often replaced by very categorical assessments based on the emotional perception of those ancient events. In particular, it is widely believed that the act of abdication itself did not comply with the laws of the Russian Empire in force at the time of its signing and was generally made under serious pressure. Obviously, it is necessary to consider the question of the legality or illegality of the abdication of Nicholas II itself.

It cannot be categorically stated that the act of renunciation is a consequence of violence, deception and other forms of coercion in relation to Nicholas II.

“The act of renunciation, as is clear from the circumstances of the signing... was not a free expression of His will, and is therefore null and void,”

Many monarchists argued. But this thesis is refuted not only by eyewitness accounts (many of them can be cited), but also by the emperor’s own entries in his diary (for example, an entry dated March 2, 1917).

“In the morning Ruzsky came and read a very long conversation on the phone with Rodzianka. According to him, the situation in Petrograd is such that now the ministry from the Duma is powerless to do anything, since the Social Democrats are fighting it. the party represented by the working committee. My renunciation is needed. Ruzsky conveyed this conversation to Headquarters, and Alekseev - to all commanders-in-chief. By 2.5 o'clock the answers came from everyone. The point is that in the name of saving Russia and keeping the army at the front calm, you need to decide to take this step. I agreed…"

(Diaries of Emperor Nicholas II. M., 1991. P. 625).

“There is no sacrifice that I would not make in the name of the real good and for the salvation of Russia,”

These words from the sovereign’s diary entries and his telegrams dated March 2, 1917 best explained his attitude towards the decision made.

The fact of the emperor’s conscious and voluntary abdication of the throne was not in doubt among his contemporaries. For example, the Kiev branch of the monarchical “Right Center” noted on May 18, 1917 that “the act of renunciation, written in highest degree godly and patriotic words, publicly establishes a complete and voluntary abdication... To declare that this abdication was personally forced out by force would be extremely insulting, first of all, to the person of the monarch, in addition, it is completely untrue, for the sovereign abdicated under the pressure of circumstances, but thus no less completely voluntary.”

But the most striking document, perhaps, is the farewell speech to the army, written Nicholas II March 8, 1917 and then issued in the form of order No. 371. It, in full awareness of what was accomplished, speaks of the transfer of power from the monarch to Provisional Government.

"IN last time“I appeal to you, my dearly beloved troops,” wrote Emperor Nicholas II. - After I abdicated for myself and for my son from the Russian throne, power was transferred to the Provisional Government, which arose at the initiative of the State Duma. May God help him lead Russia along the path of glory and prosperity... Whoever now thinks about peace, who desires it, is a traitor to the Fatherland, its traitor... Fulfill your duty, valiantly defend our great Motherland, obey the Provisional Government, obey your superiors, remember that any weakening of the order of service only plays into the hands of the enemy...”

(Korevo N.N. Succession to the throne according to the Basic State Laws. Information on some issues relating to succession to the throne. Paris, 1922. pp. 127-128).

Also noteworthy is the assessment of well-known telegrams from front commanders that influenced the sovereign’s decision in the memoirs of the Quartermaster General of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s headquarters Yu. N. Danilova, an eyewitness to the events:

“Both the Provisional Committee of the State Duma members, the Headquarters and the commanders-in-chief of the fronts... interpreted the question of abdication ... in the name of preserving Russia and bringing the war to the end, not as a violent act or any revolutionary “action”, but from the point of view of completely loyal advice or petition , the final decision on which had to come from the emperor himself. Thus, one cannot blame these individuals, as some party leaders do, for any treason or betrayal. They only honestly and openly expressed their opinion that the act of voluntary abdication of Emperor Nicholas II from the throne could, in their opinion, ensure the achievement of military success and further development Russian statehood. If they made a mistake, then it’s hardly their fault...”

Of course, following the conspiracy theory against Nicholas II, it can be assumed that coercion could be applied to the sovereign if he did not accept the abdication. But the monarch’s voluntary decision to abdicate the throne excluded the possibility of anyone forcing him to such an action.

It is appropriate in this regard to quote the Empress Dowager's account Maria Feodorovna, mother of Nicholas II, from her “memory book”:

“...March 4/17, 1917 At 12 o’clock we arrived at Headquarters, in Mogilev, in a terrible cold and hurricane. Dear Nicky met me at the station, we went together to his house, where lunch was served with everyone else. There were also Fredericks, Sergei Mikhailovich, Sandro, who came with me, Grabbe, Kira, Dolgorukov, Voeikov, N. Leuchtenbergsky and Doctor Fedorov. After lunch, poor Nicky told everyone tragic events that happened in two days. He opened his bleeding heart to me, we both cried. First came a telegram from Rodzianko, saying that he must take the situation with the Duma into his own hands in order to maintain order and stop the revolution; then - in order to save the country - he proposed to form a new government and... abdicate the throne in favor of his son (unbelievable!). But Niki, naturally, could not part with his son and handed over the throne to Misha! All the generals telegraphed to him and advised the same, and he finally gave in and signed the manifesto. Nicky was incredibly calm and dignified in this terribly humiliating position. It’s like I’ve been hit over the head, I can’t understand anything! I returned at 4 o'clock and talked. It would be nice to go to Crimea. Real meanness is only for the sake of seizing power. We said goodbye. He is a real knight"

(GA RF. F. 642. Op. 1. D. 42. L. 32).

Supporters of the version of the illegality of abdication claim that there is no corresponding provision in the system of Russian state legislation. However abdication provided for Article 37 of the Code of Basic Laws of 1906:

“In the operation of the rules ... on the procedure for inheriting the throne, the person who has the right to it is given the freedom to renounce this right in such circumstances when this does not entail any difficulty in the further inheritance of the throne.”

Article 38 confirmed:

“Such a renunciation, when it is made public and turned into law, is then recognized as irrevocable.”

The interpretation of these two articles in pre-revolutionary Russia, unlike the interpretation of the Russian diaspora and some of our contemporaries, there was no doubt. In the course of state law by the famous Russian jurist Professor N. M. Korkunova noted:

“Can someone who has already ascended the throne renounce it? Since the reigning sovereign undoubtedly has the right to the throne, and the law grants everyone who has the right to the throne the right to abdicate, then we must answer this in the affirmative..."

A similar assessment was contained in a course on state law written by an equally famous Russian legal scholar, professor at Kazan University V. V. Ivanovsky:

“According to the spirit of our legislation... a person who has once occupied the throne can renounce it, as long as this does not cause any difficulties in the further succession to the throne.”

But in emigration in 1924, a former private assistant professor at the Faculty of Law of Moscow University M. V. Zyzykin, giving special, sacred meaning articles on succession to the throne, separated the “renunciation of the right to the throne,” which, according to his interpretation, is possible only for representatives ruling house before the beginning of the reign, from the right to "abdication", which those already reigning supposedly do not possess. But such a statement is conditional. The reigning emperor was not excluded from the reigning house; he ascended the throne, having all the legal rights to do so, which he retained throughout his reign.

Now about the renunciation of the heir - Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich. The sequence of events is important here. Let us recall that the original text of the act corresponded to the version prescribed by the Basic Laws, i.e. the heir was supposed to ascend the throne under the regency of the emperor’s brother - Mikhail Romanov.

Russian history has not yet known the facts of the abdication of some members of the reigning house for others. However, this could be considered unlawful if it was carried out for an adult, capable member of the imperial family.

But, Firstly, Nicholas II abdicated for his son Alexei, who reached only 12.5 years in February 1917, and came of age at 16. The minor heir himself, of course, could not take any political and legal acts. According to the assessment of the deputy of the IV State Duma, a member of the Octobrist faction N.V. Savich,

“Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich was still a child; he could not make any decisions that had legal force. Therefore, there could be no attempt to force him to abdicate or refuse to take the throne."

Secondly, The sovereign made this decision after consultations with his physician, Professor S. P. Fedorov who announced incurable disease heir (hemophilia). In this regard, the possible death of the only son before he reaches adulthood would become the very “difficulty in the further inheritance of the throne” that Article 37 of the Basic Laws warned about.

After the abdication of the Tsarevich took place, the act of March 2, 1917 did not create insoluble “difficulties in the further succession to the throne.” Now great Prince Mikhail Alexandrovich would have headed the House of Romanov, and his heirs would have continued the dynasty. According to a modern historian A. N. Kamensky,

“The manifesto and telegram became essentially legal documents of those years and a written decree on changing the law on succession to the throne. These documents automatically recognized the marriage of Michael II with Countess Brasova. Thus, automatically Count Georgy Brasov (son of Mikhail Alexandrovich - Georgy Mikhailovich - V. Ts.) became the Grand Duke and heir to the throne of the Russian state.”

Of course, it should be remembered that at the time of drawing up and signing the act of abdication, the sovereign could not have known about his intention younger brother(who was in Petrograd in those days) not to accept the throne until the decision of the Constituent Assembly...

And the last argument in favor of the illegality of renunciation. Could the emperor make this decision in accordance with his status as head of state, since the Russian Empire after 1905 was already a Duma monarchy, and legislative power was shared by the tsar with legislative institutions - the State Council and the State Duma?

The answer is given by Article 10 of the Basic Laws, which established the priority of the sovereign in the executive branch:

“The power of administration in its entirety belongs to the sovereign emperor within the entire Russian state. In supreme management, his power acts directly (that is, it does not require coordination with any structures. - V. Ts.); in matters of government of a subordinate, a certain degree of power is entrusted from him, according to the law, to the places and persons acting in his name and according to his commands.”

Of particular importance was also the 11th article, which allows the issuance of normative acts individually:

“The Sovereign Emperor, in the order of supreme government, issues decrees in accordance with the laws for the organization and implementation of various parts government controlled, as well as commands necessary for the execution of laws.”

Of course, these individually adopted acts could not change the essence of the Basic Laws.

N. M. Korkunov noted that decrees and commands issued “in the manner of supreme government” were of a legislative nature and did not violate the norms of state law. The act of abdication did not change the system of power approved by the Basic Laws, preserving the monarchical system.

Interesting psychological assessment this act was given by the famous Russian monarchist V. I. Gurko:

“...The Russian autocratic tsar has no right to limit his power in any way... Nicholas II considered himself to have the right to abdicate the throne, but did not have the right to reduce the limits of his royal powers...”

The formal aspect of the act of renunciation was not violated either. It was sealed with the signature of the “subject minister”, since according to the status of the Minister of the Imperial Court, Adjutant General Count V. B. Fredericks sealed all acts related to the “establishment of the imperial family” and related to succession to the throne. Neither the sovereign’s pencil signature (later protected by varnish on one of the copies) nor the color of the ink or graphite changed the essence of the document.

As for the formal procedure for final legalization - approval of the act by the Governing Senate - there were no difficulties on this side. March 5, 1917 new minister Justice A.F. Kerensky handed over to the Chief Prosecutor P. B. Vrassky the act of abdication of Nicholas II and the act of “non-acceptance of the throne” by Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. As the participants of this meeting recalled,

“having considered the issue proposed for its discussion, the Governing Senate decided to publish both acts in the “Collection of Legislation and Government Orders” and inform about this by decrees to all subordinates to the Senate officials and government places. Both acts were passed by the Senate to be preserved in perpetuity.”

In the context of an ongoing war, victory over the enemy became the most important thing. For the good of the Motherland, essentially, for the sake of this victory the sovereign abdicated the throne. For her sake, he called on his subjects, soldiers and officers, to take a new oath.

The formal legal interpretation of the legality or illegality of abdication did not in any way detract from the moral feat of the sovereign. After all, the participants in those distant events are not soulless subjects of law, not “hostages of the monarchical idea,” but living people. What was more important: keeping the vows given when crowning the kingdom, or preserving stability, order, preserving the integrity of the entrusted state, so necessary for victory at the front, as members of the State Duma and front commanders convinced him of? What is more important: the bloody suppression of the “rebellion” or the prevention, albeit for a short time, of the impending “tragedy of fratricide”?

For the passion-bearer sovereign, the impossibility of “stepping over blood” during the war became obvious. He did not want to retain the throne by violence, regardless of the number of victims...

"In the last Orthodox Russian monarch and members of his family, we see people who sought to implement the commandments of the Gospel in their lives. In the suffering endured royal family in captivity with meekness, patience and humility, in their martyrdom in Yekaterinburg on the night of July 4/17, 1918, the conquering light of Christ's faith was revealed, just as it shone in the life and death of millions of Orthodox Christians who suffered persecution for Christ in the twentieth century"

This is how it was assessed moral feat Emperor Nicholas II in the definition of the Russian Council of Bishops Orthodox Church on the glorification of the new martyrs and confessors of the Russian twentieth century (August 13-16, 2000).

Vasily Tsvetkov,
Doctor of Historical Sciences

Regarding the abdication of the Throne of the reigning Emperor, it is customary to express doubts about its very possibility - in view of the fact that it is not provided for by law. But before Constantine’s abdication, the law did not say anything about renouncing rights to the Throne in general. The point here, apparently, is the traditional private law view of the issue of renunciation. The fact that ownership of an inheritance could be refused seemed too natural to be specifically stipulated.

Concepts relating to the relationship to the Throne, having been passed through the private legal atmosphere of the Middle Ages, were so saturated with its spirit that even in the context of developed state law they often remained some kind of untouched oasis, a reserve of private legal relics, and this was habitually perceived as the norm. This is even reflected in the terminology. The relationship to the Throne is defined precisely as a right, and right and duty are diametrically opposed concepts.

But if we look at the relationship between rights and obligations from a state point of view and remember the “monarchical installation of rights based on obligations”, which L.A. Tikhomirov wrote about, then we will see that the right to the Throne directly follows from the obligation to occupy it.

The very concept of “renunciation” also has private legal content. This term defines the unilateral act of relinquishing one's possession. To give it legal force in public law, it is “turned into law,” i.e. an additional act informs it of its public legal status.

A typical manifestation of private legal consciousness was the reaction of Tsarevich Constantine to the oath taken to him. They say that before taking the oath, they had to ask my consent. And it is very difficult to object to this from the point of view of public law. It is indeed impossible to force someone to reign without consent.

Public law is forced to recognize the reluctance to reign as a sufficient reason for exemption from such an obligation and to give it legal force through its own means. Thus, concepts formed under the strong influence of private legal views are mastered in the context of public law. An interesting example This is exactly what Art. 37 and 38 of our laws. We do not know whether this issue was addressed in the legislation of other monarchies, but it is obvious that most of them leave it in its original, untouched form.

In the fact that the possibility of renunciation was not initially provided for by law, in addition to the remnants of private legal consciousness, one can also find its own public legal logic. The law establishes an obligation, but not a means of evading it. He seems to be waiting for the appropriate incident in order to react to it, but he himself does not model such a “negative” situation in advance.

Likewise, the abdication of the Emperor from the Throne, if it had occurred under normal conditions, might then have been reflected in the law. But, most likely, it would be considered that those articles that already exist are sufficient. Although they are talking about renouncing not the Throne, but the rights to it, they also occupy the Throne on the basis of the existing right. Thus, the concept of renunciation of rights to the Throne includes renunciation of the throne itself, and the second can well be considered as a special case of the first.

The abdication of Emperor Nicholas II indeed cannot be considered valid. And the reason for this is that it was not turned into law. Registration and publication of it by the “reformed Senate” are related only to the “Russian Republic”, but to the laws Russian Empire- not the slightest. In the light of the latter, the abdication of the Emperor could be turned into law only by the supreme authority, namely, by the person next in line of succession, who would occupy the vacated Throne - in direct analogy with the abdication of Tsarevich Constantine.

The analogy here is, of course, not complete. In one case, the reigning monarch abdicates, in the other, the person to whom the right of inheritance directly came, but in no case “Emperor Constantine I.” But both abdications can be turned into law only in one, completely identical way - by a manifesto on the accession to the Throne of the person next in line of succession.

The question may arise: why couldn’t the Sovereign, as the holder of supreme power, turn his will into law? Yes, because here his will would conflict with his duty. To free oneself from one's own obligation, and, moreover, through the powers that arise from this same obligation - this would be the height of legal absurdity.

The reigning Emperor, as the holder of the direct right to the Throne, if he wishes to renounce it, has to act on common grounds, so to speak, with potential bearers of this right according to the prescriptions of Art. 37 and 38, leaving the translation of his will into law to his successor. This ensures one of the most important properties of supreme power - its continuity. The abdication of the Sovereign from the Throne becomes possible only if there is a successor.

In addition, this is how the condition-limitation of Art. 37 ( “when there will be no difficulty in the further inheritance of the Throne”), which in other cases might seem like a legal fiction. Thus, in the absence of a successor, the Emperor’s abdication of the Throne cannot legally take place. That is, if the Sovereign refuses to reign, then, of course, it is impossible to force him to do so. But by virtue of the public law principle, his reign will continue dejure until his legitimate successor accepts the Throne and converts the abdication of his predecessor into law.

As you know, Emperor Nicholas II handed over the Throne to his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. In this regard, it is quite rightly noted that he did not have the right to bypass his son in the line of succession. Mikhail could only take power as a ruler under the minor Emperor Alexei Nikolaevich. But for the convenience of reasoning, let’s assume that Mikhail would be next in line of succession after the Sovereign. Let us admit such a legal fiction, especially since it was unanimously accepted by all participants in those events.

So, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich did not accept the Throne, but did not refuse it either. He agreed to accept the crown only on one condition: “if such is the will of our people, who must, by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish a form of government and new Basic Laws of the Russian State”. It follows from this that he did not agree to accept the Throne by other means. Including according to the laws of the Russian Empire - "by the force of the inheritance law itself".

Here it is appropriate to recall that the Constituent Assembly is nothing more than an organ of democracy, i.e. the supreme power of the people. His idea is that all power belongs to the people, who, through their representatives, establish government bodies and makes laws. In an autocratic monarchy, all this is done by the holder of supreme power - the monarch, but in a people's autocracy, democracy, the people elect special representatives for this purpose.

The idea that the Constituent Assembly could establish an autocratic monarchy is naive. This is, perhaps, the only thing that it could not establish, because... itself belongs to something fundamentally different political system, and can only act within its framework. Moreover, there was no need to establish an autocratic monarchy. It was established a long time ago. The only thing the Dynasty could count on under the “new system” was the establishment of the so-called. constitutional monarchy, i.e. preservation of the institution of monarchy (the position of monarch) within the framework of parliamentary democracy.

The compilers of the text signed by Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich (V.D. Nabokov and Baron B.E. Nolde) also mentioned as a matter of course the “new basic laws” that the proposed assembly was supposed to establish. Of course, the “old” laws, which are based on the autocratic power of the monarch, for “ new Russia"were completely unsuitable. All this is relevant to the laws of the Russian Empire in only one point: according to these laws, Mikhail refused to accept the Throne.

The Swedish republican and expert on the Russian monarchy St. Scott wrote on this occasion that if Michael had abdicated unconditionally, he would thereby have ceded the right to the throne to the next in line of succession - Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. But with his conditional refusal-consent, Mikhail allegedly “knocked the crown out from under” Kirill. Leaving aside the question of the whereabouts of the crown in the view of the Republicans, we only note that by his refusal to accept the Throne according to the law, Michael, in the light of the same law, presented the crown to Cyril on a velvet pillow with gold tassels. All that remained was to give it legal status.

This, as is known, was not done. Kirill Vladimirovich, along with other adult Members of the Imperial House, signed a statement (drafted by Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich), which included the following words: “Concerning our rights, and in particular mine, to the Succession to the Throne, I, passionately loving my Motherland, fully join those thoughts that are expressed in the act of refusal of Vel. Prince Mikhail Alexandrovich".

Of course, a statement about joining thoughts deserves the same legal qualification as these thoughts themselves, but this was not turned into law, and there was no one to do it.

At a superficial glance, the motives for the actions of the Members of the Imperial House can be explained by the desire to preserve the monarchy and the Dynasty in the new “legal field”, in the scope of the “new fundamental laws” - especially since Michael’s statement says this in plain text. There is, of course, nothing wrong with this, but this problem is already beyond the scope of our “old” Basic Laws and goes beyond the scope of the topic under consideration.

If we turn to the legal norms of the Russian Empire, then first of all we will see a number of renunciations, but all of them will be legally void. The next thing that cannot be ignored is the deep loyalty of Dynasty Members to the rights of their predecessors in the line of succession. None of them considered themselves entitled to deprive their elders in line, incl. Emperor Nicholas II himself, the opportunity to take back his renunciations in circumstances that could change favorably.

To Republicans who believe that members of the royal families do nothing but snatch crowns from under each other's feet, this approach may seem unrealistic. But in the history of our monarchy there is a known case when two brothers - Konstantin and Nikolai Pavlovich - ceded the Throne to each other within 20 days.

Be that as it may, not a single one of the renunciations of 1917 was turned into law, i.e. all of them remained legally void, and the reign of Emperor Nicholas II continued dejure until his death.

The highest Act that put an end to the revolutionary turmoil, if not throughout Russia, then at least in the legal consciousness of the remnant of the faithful (in the scope of the Fundamental Laws on the Succession of the Throne), was the manifesto of 1924, in which Sovereign Kirill Vladimirovich announced the assumption of the rights and title of All-Russian Emperor belonging to him by law. There was not a single word mentioned in this document about the abdication of Nicholas II. And this is understandable: legally, renunciation did not exist, and there was no point in turning it into law posthumously.

The only motive for publishing the Manifesto is the final conviction that Nicholas II and those following him in line to inherit the Throne, Tsarevich Alexei and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, are no longer alive. It follows from this that the reign of Kirill Vladimirovich began, according to the law, “from the day of the death of his predecessor” (Article 53).

This article, introduced by Emperor Nicholas I, is even more justified by his personal experience than even articles on renunciation. The concessions of the crown to each other between him and Tsarevich Constantine lasted a little less than a month, but in the manifesto of December 12, 1825, Nicholas I names November 19, the day of the death of his predecessor, Alexander I, as the day of his accession to the Throne.

During the Great Troubles of the twentieth century, the “hitch” with the succession to the throne lasted somewhat longer. The apparent reason for this, named in the 1924 manifesto, has already been discussed. But it also took time to properly understand the relationship between one’s rights and responsibilities.

Emperor Kirill realized his rights completely in the spirit of the laws of the Empire. Not only as a right, but also as a duty. He himself said it best: “I will only say that, according to the law, I am the All-Russian Emperor and that I am aware of my duty. I know that the time will come when Russia will need a legitimate Tsar. I demand from everyone that they fulfill their duty towards the Motherland, and therefore I am the first to do this.”

The circle of persons entitled to inherit the Russian Throne is not limited to Russian subjects. The dynasties of Europe are full of descendants female faces The Romanov houses, which have their place in the line of succession. But they could hardly have been of any use during the events described. But with male Dynasty Members, things are not so simple. In addition to Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, there were several other minors among them. They could not renounce their rights due to their incapacity, and their parents and guardians not only could not dispose of their rights, but were also obliged to protect them.

“The Conversation of the Sovereign Emperor with an English Correspondent” is included in the collection “Russian Foreign Congress. 1926 Paris. Documents and materials", M. "Russian Way", 2006, pp. 265-271.

The book is issue No. 6 of the series “Studies of Contemporary Russian History” edited by A. Solzhenitsyn. The preface to the document states that “a prominent representative of major press organs, Mr. Steinthal,” spoke with the Sovereign; the conversation “was published in many newspapers in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and America.”

ABNORMALITY OF THE THRONE, according to Art. 57 and 58 Basic Laws of the Russian Empire, St. the coronation took place according to the order established by the Church. The special inviolability of the rules about St. coronation followed from the very establishment of royal power; Art. also mentioned him. 39 Basic Laws, according to which the Emperor swore allegiance to the law of succession to the throne. If Art. 25-39 of the Basic Laws were confirmed by the oath of the sovereign, then Art. 62, 63 and 64 about faith were affirmed by the very idea of ​​royal power; without them there is no tsarist power, which was developed not only by Russian history, but also by Orthodox self-awareness. And where we meet with the development of the fundamental principles of the articles of the Fundamental Laws of Faith, or with the principles due to the position of the Emperor as a sacred office, there we meet with the same inviolability arising from the very idea of ​​the institution.

Above the will of the Reigning Emperor are all those articles of the Fundamental Laws that establish royal power as a specific institution - a sacred rank, regulate the order of its succession and establish requirements inextricably linked with the concept of royal power. In all manifestations of his power, the Emperor is bound by the very principle of his power.

The same applies to the abdication of the Emperor's throne. The Basic Laws do not say anything about him and cannot say anything, for since the Basic Laws themselves proceed from the understanding of imperial power as a sacred order, then state law and cannot talk about leaving the dignity given by the Church. Both to withdraw the oath, to leave monasticism, and to remove the royal rank required a decree from the highest hierarchical authority. This is what happened in practice. When it was necessary to swear allegiance to the emperor. Nicholas I Pavlovich after the oath, mistakenly taken by the leader. book Konstantin Pavlovich, then Metropolitan. Filaret previously withdrew that first oath. When imp. Paul I was offered to abdicate the throne, he categorically rejected this and died from the conspirators. When imp. Nicholas I ascended the throne, then declared that “what was given to me by God cannot be taken away by people,” and at the risk of his life on December 14. 1825 personal example courage saved the royal throne from the conspirators. When imp. Nicholas II abdicated the throne for himself on March 2, 1917, then this act is not subject to legal qualification and can only be accepted as a fact as a result of revolutionary violence.

Art. 37 and 38 of the Basic Laws do not speak of abdication, but of renunciation of rights to the throne. Art. Art. 39 says: “Such a renunciation, when it is made public and turned into law, is then recognized as irrevocable.” Although, of course, the Reigning Emperor occupies the throne by virtue of his right to the throne, but in addition to the considerations already mentioned above about Imperial power as a sacred rank that cannot be formed by one’s own will, and other considerations indicate that these articles do not mean Reigning Emperor. Firstly, the articles do not say anything about abdication, and secondly, for an explanation of the expression “having the right to it” we must turn to the source of the article indicated below it. This is the Manifesto of Nicholas I of December 12. 1825 on the accession to the throne and the Manifesto of Alexander I of January 19. 1823 on the approval of the abdication led. book Konstantin Pavlovich. The latter says: “Having called on God for help, having thought maturely about a subject so close to Our heart and so important for the state, and finding that the existing regulations on the order of succession to the throne from those who have the right to it do not take away the freedom to renounce this right in such circumstances , when there will be no difficulties in the further inheritance of the throne...” Those entitled here meant persons who did not yet occupy the throne, precisely the category of persons to whom the leader belonged. book Konstantin Pavlovich, i.e. persons before whom succession to the throne may open. One can raise the question whether here we mean persons who can inherit the throne in general, or only the immediate heirs. Judging by the fact that the imp. Nicholas I, who introduced this article, did not recognize the abdication of the leader. book Konstantin even when he 27 Nov. 1825 opened in the State Council his act of abdication and the unpublished manifesto of January 16. 1823 imp. Alexander I, who affirmed this abdication, made after the opening of the succession to the throne, one might think that he meant by the words “having the right to it” not only the person directly inheriting the throne, but also one to whom the succession to the throne had already opened. In addition, the legislator himself, when he wants to indicate persons who may subsequently inherit the throne, without limiting them to immediate heirs, uses the expression “may have the right to inherit the throne,” such as, for example. , in Art. 185. Our practice implied the right to renounce the rights to the throne for all persons, not only the immediate heirs, but also for all persons who may have the right to inherit the throne.

But renunciation of rights to the throne was not morally free: it should not, according to the law, be carried out if this would cause difficulties in further inheritance; the law appealed to the renouncer's sense of duty. The abdication took place under the control of the Reigning Emperor, who, as the Head of the House, is called upon to take care of the interests of the Reigning House, and as Emperor, to ensure that the question of succession to the throne is always clear and “the throne could not remain idle for a moment” (from Alexander’s Manifesto I). Therefore, the approval of the Emperor, the promulgation of the act of abdication is necessary for the clarity of the issue of succession to the throne, but it did not constitute the main point, because the feat cannot be accepted by force. The Emperor's control could have a moral effect on the abdicator through appeals to his conscience, duty, if his abdication harms the House or the state, plunging it into confusion; but if the person renouncing insisted on his own, no one could force him to accept the throne at the opening of the succession to the throne. The control of the Emperor and the publication of the abdication were introduced precisely to eliminate possible uncertainty and that mystery, which in 1825 almost plunged the country into turmoil and anarchy.

The approval of the sovereign and his conversion of the abdication into law does not create the fact of abdication, but only makes the abdication irrevocable (according to Article 38); renunciation is created by the will of the renunciant, and if the renunciant dies without the publication of his clearly already completed renunciation, then it must be considered valid.

In Russia, there are known examples of renunciation and their conversion into law. Thus, the personal Highest Decree of August 24. 1911 approved the renunciation of the rights to the throne of the princess of imperial blood Tatiana Konstantinovna, and the Personal Highest Decree of February 9. 1914 approved the abdication of the princess of imperial blood Irina Alexandrovna. They say that there was a renunciation. book Vladimir Alexandrovich before his marriage. If it was committed and was not taken back by him before his death, then it is valid even without promulgation in the law, for the constitutive force of renunciation is the will of the renunciant, and promulgation and conversion into law is only a statement of the will of the renunciant, which is legally valid in itself, once in any act it is expressed and not taken back until death; interested persons who know about such an act always have the right to make it public. As for renunciation for other persons, here it is necessary to distinguish between offspring that exist or were conceived at the time of renunciation, and offspring that do not exist and were not conceived at the time of renunciation. Since the right to inherit the throne follows from the law and is a public right, that is, first of all, an obligation, then no one, including the Reigning Emperor, can take away existing rights, and such an expression of his will is legally invalid; Thus, Nicholas II abdicated for his son. book Tsarevich Alexei will not be recognized as legally valid by any lawyer.

Another thing is renunciation for offspring that do not exist and were not conceived at the time of renunciation. Many state scientists believe that for this offspring the rights of inheritance do not exist, because the person who renounced could no longer be for them, by virtue of his renunciation and after it, the conductor of these rights; the law earlier, before conception, could not protect their non-existent rights.

The practice of positive European law is full of such cases of renunciation for non-existent offspring. When princesses who marry foreign princes renounce their rights to the throne both for themselves and for their offspring, the validity of these renunciations is not disputed by anyone. So, on June 24, 1899, the Duke and Prince of Connaught, the first for himself, and the second for himself and for his male offspring, renounced their rights of inheritance in Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. King Otto of Bavaria, upon ascending the Greek throne, renounced the Bavarian throne under certain conditions for himself and for his heirs.

Some European legislation, such as Hanoverian, they allowed renunciation for offspring available at the time of renunciation, but in this case the law requires the appointment of a special guardian in case of renunciation, who must represent the interests of the minor. So, when on June 24, 1899, the Duke and Prince Arthur of Connaught, the first for himself, and the second for himself and for his future offspring, renounced their rights to the throne in Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the minor Prince Arthur was represented by a special guardian specially appointed for representing his interests upon abdication. But usually, in all positive legislation, renunciation is allowed only for oneself and for one’s offspring that does not yet exist and is not conceived at the time of renunciation.

By virtue of this indisputable principle, after imp. Nicholas II's throne was to pass to his son Vel. book Alexei Nikolaevich, who was 13 years old at the time of his abdication. Abdication for him would have been invalid even if it had taken place not through revolutionary violence, but through free expression of will, without any pressure. Vel. book Alexey Nikolaevich could renounce only upon reaching adulthood at 16 years old. Until he comes of age, government by virtue of Art. 45 of the Basic Laws was supposed to pass to the closest to the inheritance of the throne from adult relatives of both sexes of the young Emperor, i.e. to the great. book Mikhail Alexandrovich. The latter also became a victim of revolutionary extortion, and was led as a minor. book Alexey Nikolaevich was captured along with his parents so-called. Provisional government.

Under such circumstances, he could not exercise his rights to the throne, as befits him through the Manifesto. Vel. book Mikhail Alexandrovich published the so-called on March 3, 1917. The “Manifesto” contains the following content: “A heavy burden has been placed on Me by the will of My Brother, who handed over to me the Imperial All-Russian Throne in a time of unprecedented war and popular unrest. Inspired by the common thought with all the people that the good of Our Motherland is above all, I made a firm decision to accept the Supreme power only if such is the will of Our great people, who must, by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish a form of government and new basic laws of the Russian State. Therefore, calling on God’s blessing, I ask all citizens of the Russian State to submit to the Provisional Government, which arose at the initiative of the State Duma and was invested with full power, until such time as convening is possible the shortest possible time, on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, the Constituent Assembly, with its decision on the form of government, will express the will of the people. Signed: Mikhail.”

Vel. book Mikhail Alexandrovich refused to become emperor, but not due to the fact that he did not have the right to ascend the throne if he was alive. book Alexei Nikolaevich, despite such will of the imp. Nicholas II; He did not state that he considered himself obligated to insist on the rights of the drivers. book Alexei to the throne, and consider himself only the ruler of the state. He, on the contrary, declared that he was ready to accept the throne, but not by virtue of the Basic Laws, which he refused, but by virtue of the right of revolution, expressed through the Constituent Assembly. Even if such a meeting took place and, having established new image board, would have elected him sovereign, then led. book Mikhail Alexandrovich would no longer ascend to the throne of his ancestors by God’s Grace, but to the will of the people, created by the will of the people; at the same time, this would be the abolition of the Orthodox-legitimate principle of the Fundamental Laws, built on monarchical sovereignty. Recognition of the right of the Constituent Assembly to establish a form of government is a renunciation of monarchical sovereignty and the establishment of a political form of government based on popular sovereignty, i.e., on the “multi-rebellious will of mankind.” By doing this, he would have abolished all the traditions of previous history and would have continued it on a radically opposite principle in the European democratic-egalitarian style. As an adult heir to the throne, he led. book Mikhail Alexandrovich could enter into government on a legitimate basis only as the ruler of the state under the minor Emperor and demand an oath to the minor Emperor. He did not do this, fundamentally rejecting the binding nature of the Basic Laws, and recognized revolutionary law. If some say that on his part there was no unconditional renunciation of the throne, but only a conditional renunciation, then the only truth is that he did not refuse to receive power from the Constituent Assembly on the basis of popular sovereignty establishing new uniform rule - but thereby he not only renounced the throne, but did not even recognize it as existing. As the heir, he himself called on all citizens to recognize the new revolutionary law, but he did not have the competence to invite obedience to an arbitrary body that arose on the unauthorized illegal initiative of the State Duma, and to allow the Constituent Assembly to establish a new form of government; all statements in this “Manifesto” are legally void. If such an act came even from the Reigning Emperor, then even then it would be necessary to admit that the Emperor himself refuses to take up the feat he has assigned to himself and the throne of the Fundamental Laws is vacant.

Vel. book Mikhail Alexandrovich, refusing to enter into government at least as a ruler, expressis verbis, refusing not only the throne, which exists as government agency, but having rejected even the action of the Basic Laws, which could have called him to inherit the Throne, he committed only an act in which he expressed his personal opinions and renunciation, which were not binding on anyone, eliminating himself from inheritance according to the Basic Laws, legally non-existent in his eyes, despite the oath of allegiance he had previously taken as Grand Duke on the day of his majority to the decrees of the Fundamental Laws on the succession to the throne and the order of the Family Institution. All his statements in the “Manifesto”, including the recognition of the so-called. The Provisional Government is legally insignificant, except for the explicit abdication of the throne for itself.

Once upon a time, KVN was the Club of the Cheerful and Resourceful. It was played mainly by undergraduates and graduate students. In essence, it was an amateur performance - “cabbage shows” with elements of competition “who can make the funniest joke?” As the years passed, KVN evolved from an amateur performance into a show. Increasingly, dances were choreographed by professional choreographers who worked with teams professional musicians, over time, professional authors appeared in KVN, who were involved in writing scripts. Today, the role of many teams in preparing a script has been reduced to the ability to find sponsors and extract money from them, and then hire writers who will do it “right.” We will talk about hired authors.

In principle, ordinary TV viewers do not care who writes the jokes - the teams themselves or hired writers. TV viewers turn on KVN to laugh, and it is better to watch professional humor than raw jokes from student amateur performances. On the other hand, such an approach leads to the degradation of KVN - fewer and fewer new authors and original teams appear; the same teams, written by the same authors, are becoming more and more similar friend on a friend.

Let's turn to the “history of the issue”: the authors were not needed either by Odessa (there are authors the whole city), nor NSU (4 powerful student clubs of Akademgorodok with annual skits and developed rivalry), nor Dnepropetrovsk. And it was not accepted to use “other people’s brains” in that romantic period; it was somehow embarrassing... The authors began to be needed by the next generation of teams, which, firstly, could no longer defend their point of view on KVN on equal terms, and secondly, in for the most part, they had neither the resources of the “old people” nor the technology to prepare for the game. And thirdly, the situation with the authors was “legitimized” by AMiK itself: there was a time when AVM, cutting out a number for another young team, would calmly point to the audience at the words “we have nothing else.” And there were already several people sitting there, ready, loyal, trusted and ready to help their master.

Since there were few such people, and their work was not advertised, in the budget of some teams there appeared not just a line “to pay the author’s group”; it was assumed that everyone would be paid, as long as they did not work for the opponent. In turn, growing demand naturally provoked supply, and everyone who could “get hooked” in Moscow rushed to the authors. The most far-sighted even tried to create a kind of trade union in the late 90s: the writers' agency "Guild of Authors" by Sh. Muslimov and M. Shchedrinsky. As a result, the Guild switched to serving the stage and working on TV series, but the very idea that authors need to “flock together” found its successors.

Probably, this idea was most clearly implemented in the foreseeable past by D. Tabarchuk, perhaps the best in the position of “KVN team director.” The group of authors working on " County town", had a separate budget, met at a recreation center and worked continuously for a week or two long before the upcoming game. Those who remember UE will agree that in a couple of years the guys from the KVN team turned into recognizable, almost pop characters and the whole country watched the series with “pioneer”, “fat” and “experienced” with enthusiasm. When the task was completed, the authors were dismissed, and the actors went around the country (and then beyond its borders) to “earn money.”

Currently, single authors in KVN are a rare phenomenon; most authors unite in author groups. Such an organization allows you to work more efficiently: in addition to higher productivity and increased man-hours, it is important to have one or more people in the group who are better at selling or even “selling” material to teams.

Over the past few years, several main groups of authors have emerged that have their own prices and working methods. Some groups have already moved away from KVN, others continue to work. Let's look at some of them:

Martirosyan&Co. Expensive, but high quality. Perhaps the strongest group that managed to work with several teams Major League KVN, including the champions of 2003 and 2004 - “Burnt by the Sun” and the Pyatigorsk National Team. This group went beyond the scope of KVN, and, by and large, it is responsible for its success “ Comedy Club"and the other Comedy Production projects that followed. Now the group has moved away from KVN and is working on a larger scale, increasingly acting as producers rather than authors. The production, sale and resale of humor from other authors has been put on stream. Humor has become a very profitable business, and Comedy Production has become one of the most profitable companies in the domestic show business.

UPISHNAYA. When working with a team, she practices a pedagogical approach: they do not exert pressure with authority. As a rule, this provides an opportunity for self-development of the team. Many original guys came out from under the wing of “Pelmeni”. Sometimes the style of humor " Ural Pelmeni”, put into the mouths of other teams, did not find a response from the audience and the jury, but in terms of the formation and development of the team, this group is the most preferable. Payment by days of work with the team. From 250 to 400 euros per day. IN Lately“Ural Dumplings” has its own television project “Show News”, and they themselves actively use the services of outside authors.

One way to save on author's group demonstrated by the administration of the KVN team “ Burnt out by the sun": they decided that any young KVN teams would be great as authors. And there was a time when people from the US literally “combed” different leagues, right down to the central ones, offering teams to sell a suitable joke or number. One by one, another scenario appeared for the Tired Ones. When the savings reached the point where reprises were simply “taken,” this shop had to be closed and the administration changed.

LUNovsko-Belorusskaya. More precisely, Belarusian. Almost complete withdrawal of the team from the material. Team members can write something, try, bring reams of material, but they are brushed aside like mosquitoes. The exceptions are teams that have played enough and can defend their material. The pay is very high: from $500 per day and above. As a rule, this method does not fail, except in cases where the authors are too driven (for example, the final of 2004, RUDN University). Currently, this group has also moved to KVN and concentrated on working on projects for the STS TV channel.

Gulikovskaya. On early stage the work scheme consisted of complete subordination of the team to oneself and, as it turned out later, this led to a dubious future for the team. If the team was independent, like “Burnt by the Sun”, already at least somehow established, the cooperation was positive. Everything is written, from surreal to pop. In the first games, as a rule, there is only pop, and closer to the end it is surreal. This bore fruit.
Later, the work pattern changed in proportion to Gulikov's increased position and influence. In order for teams to be guaranteed entry into the Premier League or First League, they turn to Gulikov with a request to “work” before Sochi, for example. He recruits a group, then selects a certain number of teams with whom he “works,” and for an amount of about $500 a day, he travels from one team to another, spending several hours on each and offering the teams the same or very similar numbers. If a team does not buy the number, it is offered to the next team. Next, the team is required to show the rehearsed material. And so on for 57 days.

The material that remains unattached is offered under the guise of “bolts” either to teams that arrived in the capital a little later, or to someone else already in Sochi (and this “someone else” will definitely be found, believe me). As a result, all teams will be assigned to those leagues that Gulikov has already decided on.

Is it possible to create a group of authors not in Moscow, far from the gathering place of the “bash” teams? It turns out that it is possible. Siberian group of authors, which has developed around “Children of Lieutenant Schmidt” is traditionally strong, prolific, ready to work not only for KVN people and does not bother too much about how and who will use their texts. As a result, we have a couple of low-profile scandals involving the use of the same material by several “Siberian” teams at once. But Siberians are trying to sort out their relationship themselves; they traditionally do not like Moscow and AMiK, so information from the Urals usually does not become available to the general public.

BSUshnaya. More precisely - Kupridovskaya. Looking at the fruitful “harvest” of his colleagues in the endless field of humor, Cuprido decided to follow their example. He did this more delicately (unlike Gulikov), helping beginners. During the first games of the season, he usually looked at up-and-coming teams. If the team did not get eliminated in the first games, then, arriving at the next game, they were left without material: Chief Editor cut the team's performance short, arguing that “this is not Slobozhanka or the Volga region. Here the level is at least the First League! To save the speech, the editor gave a phone number " good author» from the best team of the International KVN Union BSU team. Sometimes (without advertising and in the strictest confidence) he himself joined in working with the team.

In recent years, teams that reached a third or even a quarter of the Euroleague themselves asked the editors for the coveted numbers in order to strengthen themselves and “break everyone.” The style of work of BGUshek is similar to the style of UPIshek. And the prices are much lower.

Of course, in addition to the listed groups of authors, there are others, but there are not so many of them. Plus, authors from different author groups are often attracted to another group if there is a need for it. Relations between the groups are mostly friendly, but some element of competition certainly remains. Such a semblance of a trade union helps, if necessary, to strengthen groups of authors, build relationships with customers, keeping prices at a certain level and warning each other about unscrupulous partners or colleagues in the shop.

Let's take a closer look negative sides work of teams with hired authors.

1. The very spirit of KVN is being killed. KVN games are turning into a budget competition: who can buy larger number quality authors. Nowadays it is no longer considered shameful to justify a loss by citing an insufficient budget to pay for the services of third-party authors.

2. The writing team has less chance of winning, because hired authors have more experience or even lobby for material at the editorial level (and are often included in it). If it is still possible to fight a more experienced opponent at the expense of originality, then it is very difficult or even impossible to fight against lobbying editors. In addition, in modern KVN there are many examples when the “authors” of a team can sit on the jury.

3. There are fewer and fewer new authors, since they are not given the opportunity to grow, and the teams themselves prefer to use the material of hired “experienced” authors. A vicious circle arises: the services of proven authors lead to the impossibility of growth for new ones, and the lack of new authors creates an increased demand for old ones. In order for new authors to be noticed and “baptized”, the patronage of one of the old proven groups is necessary. And there is practically no chance that a team hooked on the needle of hired authors will ever jump off and start writing themselves. It's especially bad when a team uses third-party writers early in their career.

4. If the team decides that it cannot do without outside authors, this is one way. In the end, no one forced most drug addicts either. But if something is imposed on the team of authors, then a psychologically interesting situation arises, similar to “hostage syndrome.” It is impossible to work with the author and not be friends with him (not love him) therefore, one half of the team (more administrative) does not like “outsiders”. If only because they essentially take money from the rest of the team members. But the other part (mostly the acting part) over time becomes devoted to other people’s authors to the point of self-forgetfulness. It is clear that such a “split personality of the team” does not bring anything good as a result, although it does not begin to affect itself so quickly.

5. Teams that are written to by the same people become more similar to each other, differing only in their clothing. Parade of clones with identical numbers. In some games, the same authors wrote for opposing teams.

6. Almost all groups of authors and authors write not only for KVN, but also for other television projects: sketchcoms, humorous programs, TV series. It is quite possible that the jokes offered to the team are waste, rejected by the producers, from other activities. For example, the same Comedy Club. Anyway, creative forces there is less left on KVN, and sometimes there are mistakes in the form of intersections of jokes between KVN and other programs.

7. And finally, the material side of the issue, the most obvious: the money spent on hired authors could be spent on other purposes.

In addition to the negative ones, there are also positive sides . There are fewer of them, but they exist.

1. As already mentioned, using the labor of hired writers makes a television show more stable.

3. When a team is under time pressure, only hired authors who work directly with the team can help with material. Exhausted by rehearsals, exhausted after endless editing and “calculating” the mood of the Maslyakov family, in the absence of a good archive, the team can hope either for a miracle or for salvation from the mercenaries.

So, before the team decides to turn to hired authors, they should weigh all the pros and cons a hundred times more, and when choosing authors, it is better to look not for “robots”, but for “teachers.” The trends of modern KVN are such that only super-talented and disruptive teams can reach the top without the help of outside authors, and even then under a very fortunate combination of circumstances.

Now let's move on to the main question: does anything need to be changed?

The answer to this question very much depends on whose position you are answering it from.
The current situation is beneficial:
- for hired authors who have a permanent and stable source of income;
- editing, which often participates in the authors’ income or arranges numbers for teams. In addition, the editors have less to work with a bunch of raw material;
- management of television leagues and television channels, getting a more or less decent picture regardless of the level of independence of the playing teams;
- teams, compensating for the lack of authorial abilities with the ability to find rich sponsors.

If we move on to the idealized KVN, in which you need to be cheerful and resourceful, be able to joke yourself, and in which the funniest team must win, then hiring hired authors is evil. To reduce the influence of hired authors you need to:

1. It is mandatory to warm up. Ideally, increase the number of improvisational competitions.

3. Eliminate the practice of league editors “working” with the teams playing in them for a fee.

A large number of teams play in KVN. Every year, many teams take their first steps in KVN or move up the steps to the top of the KVN pyramid. The way should be given to the most talented and bright, and not to the richest. Then KVN will once again regain its position as a bright and original game, a program radically different from endless stream monotonous shows, will become a source of personnel in in the best sense this word.

Of course, it was not possible to talk about everything completely in the article, and it is hardly possible to do this in one, even a very large article. Many surnames and team names are deliberately left “between the lines.” But the format of the site for which this article was written involves communication - complement, express your opinions, assessments, we hope for an interesting and meaningful conversation.

Eye_Mind with the participation of Mallorca especially for

P.S. We, a group of authors under the nickname Mallorca, thank all KVN members who helped and are helping us with information. We say thank you to those people from leagues and teams with whom we consult when preparing the next material, and we want to emphasize once again that maintaining their anonymity is for us important task. Therefore, Mallorca will not respond to remarks from those who want to show off their deduction on the Internet, considering this a provocation. We are doing this project with sincere desire to improve something in our favorite game, and for this, it seems to us, it’s worth, for example, taking a step to the side, stopping and thinking about what’s happening. From our own experience, we will say that we ourselves found it interesting how seemingly familiar things change when you analyze them from the point of view of a “view of the process.” And we are glad that there are already people who want to look at the process and analyze it with us, as evidenced by this article.