First Anglo-Afghan War. Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century

For some reason in Russia there is a very widespread opinion that Britain as if I lost three wars with Afghanistan. However, the facts say that about one defeat The British can only talk about the first war. That war (in general - won Britain) so sank into the souls of the British themselves because they in one battle, being ambushed, lost 16 thousand Human. One detail makes this story especially scary and amazing - out of 16 thousand only one person survived. Apparently, it was from this tragedy of January 1842 years and the roots of legends about notorious invincibility of the Afghans.

FIRST ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR

As written in Great Soviet Encyclopedia(first edition):

"the independent state existence of Afghanistan begins in 1747 with the proclamation Ahmed Khan, elected tribal leader fools, ruler of Kabul and Kandahar. He has laid the foundation now [ written in 1926] ruling dynasty– Durani. At the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, Afghanistan fell apart into a number of possessions at war with each other: the strife gave rise to the intervention of the governments of Russia and England, who assessed the importance of the Afghan regions as approaches to India."

The reason for the start of the first Anglo-Afghan war was a business trip in 1837 by lieutenant Vitkevich as a Russian resident at seized power in Kabul Dost Muhammad. He had been at war with his relative for ten years Shuja Shah, based in India and supported by Britain. London assessed the mission Vitkevich as the intention of St. Petersburg to gain a foothold in Afghanistan with the prospect of penetrating India.

Hostilities began in January 1839, when the Anglo-Indian army consisting of 12 thousand fighters, 38 thousand servants and 30 thousand camels entered Afghanistan through Bolansky pass. At the beginning Dost Mohammed was able to field 12 thousand cavalry, 2.5 thousand infantry and 45 guns. On April 25, Anglo-Indian troops took Kandahar and went to Kabul. The Afghans put up their first serious resistance only at Ghazni(140 km southwest of Kabul). The fortress was defended by a selected garrison of three thousand under the command of Haider Khan, however, she was taken. 7 August 1839 British and Indians took Kabul without a fight. The emir reigned on the throne there Shuja Shah. Former Emir Dost Mohammed went to the mountains with 350 soldiers.

It seems that the war was won quite easily by the British, Indians and Shuja Shah. However, the Afghan feudal lords reacted coolly, to say the least, to Shuje. In two s small years they inspired unrest, and on November 2, 1841 they carried out a massacre in Kabul. Among the British killed was Ambassador Burns. British didn't answer immediate measures, and the Afghans, regarding this as weakness, arranged to massacre the British in other parts of Afghanistan.Only on December 30, 1841, the British agreed with the leaders of the Afghan tribes - they promised to let the Anglo-Indian troops back to India for a ransom (at the beginning of these week-long negotiations, the Afghans cut off the head of the British envoy and joyfully carried it through the streets of Kabul).

At the beginning of January 1842, the British and Indians set out from Kabul in the direction of Jalalabad, and when they entered the mountains, the Afghans attacked and killed them. Of the 16 thousand British and Indians (of which there were 4 thousand fighters), only one person survived - the doctor Brydon, which on January 14 reached Jalalabad, where the Anglo-Indian brigade was stationed. The brigade commander sent word to Calcutta, and two punitive expeditions were organized - one division each from Quetta to Kandahar and through Jalalabad to Kabul. Eight months later, on September 16, 1842, both divisions took Kabul. From there punitive detachments were sent to the surrounding area.

Having suppressed the atrocities of the Afghans, Britain refrained from occupying Afghanistan. She preferred the method of bribery and intrigue, and re-took the throne Dost Mohammed made no attempts at rapprochement with Russia and concluded a peace treaty with Britain.

SECOND ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR

TSB:

“The Crimean War again raised the question of the “threat to India.” In Russia, in circles close to the government, agitation began in favor of an Indian campaign. England, just in case, took measures by concluding an alliance treaty with Dost Mohammed".

The status quo remained for almost 40 years, until the next Russian-Turkish war began. Britain was dissatisfied with the successes of Russian troops in this war - Russian troops were approaching Constantinople. In response to this dissatisfaction in London, St. Petersburg decided to hold a demonstration in Turkestan in order to influence the London cabinet with the appearance of a threat to India.

The Russian troops located in Turkestan were ordered to march in three columns to Chardzhuy, Balkh, Chitral. A mission led by General Stoletov was sent to Kabul. Emir of Afghanistan Shir Ali Khan On July 17, 1878 he accepted the mission with the greatest honors and, as he put it, "gave the key to India into the hands of Russia". General Stoletov promised the emir generous military and material support and advised not to allow the British embassy, ​​equipped by the British government, into the country after the news of Stoletov’s mission.

The emir followed Russian advice, and the second Anglo-Afghan war began. The British entered Afghanistan in November 1878 in three columns - Peshawar General Brown (16 thousand with 48 guns), Kuramskaya general Roberts(6 thousand with 18 guns) and Kandahar General Stewart (13 thousand with 32 guns). The first two columns were aimed at Kabul, the third - Kandahar and Herat. In November-December, the first two columns occupied the areas of Jalalabad and Khost, the third took Kandahar on December 27.

Emir Shir Ali fled to northern Afghanistan Mazar-i-Sharif where he died. His successor (son) Yakub Khan gave up resistance and on May 15, 1879 signed a peace under which the Afghan government lost the right to conduct any foreign policy except through the mediation of the British government, and all strategic passages between Afghanistan and India were transferred to the latter.

However, in September 1879 Yakub Khan was overthrown by his brother Eyubom. And in January 1880, another contender for the Afghan throne arose - Abdurrahman Khan, nephew Shir Ali, who lived in Samarkand since 1870. He overthrew Eyuba, proclaimed himself emir and was recognized by the British - in exchange for adherence to the treaty of May 1879.

Abdurrahmansoon turned his gaze to the north, entering into hostilities against Russian troops. However, in March 1885 it was defeated by General Komarov in the Kushka area. The Russians had 1,800 soldiers and 4 guns, the Afghans had 4,700 and 8 guns. Having lost more than a thousand killed and all their guns, the Afghans fled home. The Russians lost 9 soldiers killed and 45 wounded.

THIRD ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR

After the second war, the Afghans again did not disturb the British and Indians for almost 40 years, until February 21, 1919, the third son of the then Emir of Afghanistan Amanullah didn't soak his dad. Suppressing his uncle's attempt Nasrullah Khan take power and ascend the throne, Amanullah immediately declared jihad- "holy war" Britain, mobilized and sent 12 thousand regular fighters and 100 thousand nomadic partisans to India.

The fighting began on May 3, 1919 - Afghans attacked the border post in Khyber aisle The British responded with an aerial bombardment of Kabul. Then on 11 May the 1st Indian Infantry Division, supported by the 1st cavalry brigade attacked Afghan troops in Khyber passage and put them to flight. On the same day, British aircraft bombed Jalalabad. As a result, the Afghans in this direction were completely demoralized and depressed. However, in the Khost region, large detachments of Afghan partisans under the command of Nadir Shah invaded India on May 23. They occupied the Tal railway station, surrounded two infantry battalions, cavalry squadron and battery. But on June 1, in a battle with the infantry brigade of the general Dauer the Afghans suffered a terrible defeat and went to Afghanistan.

Amanullah asked for peace.On July 8, 1919, a peace treaty was signed, giving Afghanistan the right to foreign relations, but leaving all other clauses of the previous 1879 treaty in force.

* * *

Perhaps those interested in the history of the Afghan wars will find the following excerpt from a historical sketch of Afghanistan useful: Great Soviet Encyclopedia:

“The history of Afghanistan from the beginning of the 19th century (i.e., earlier than Afghanistan formed within its modern borders) until the very last years [ this was written in 1926] was determined by the role that fell to him in the struggle of English and Russian imperialism in Central Asia. British imperialism, trying to stop the Russian advance towards India, at the cost of wars, a complex diplomatic game, bribery, etc., turned Afghanistan into a buffer state, the role of which Afghanistan served until 1919. In order to create this buffer, England during the 19th century. achieved, through diplomatic and military pressure on tsarist Russia, annexation to the indigenous Afghan regions– Kandahar and Kabul– a number of regions north of the Hindu Kush, neither in ethnic composition nor in economics, are in any way connected with genuine Afghanistan. On the other hand, as a result of two bloody wars (1841 and 1880), England recaptured from Afghanistan and annexed to its Indian possessions an extremely strategically important strip of land along the southern border of Afghanistan with a 2 million, almost purely Afghan population. This achieved a triple goal: expanding the buffer belt between India and Russian Turkestan, strengthening the natural defense of India’s borders and facilitating the leadership of the buffer state, since this state was an artificial conglomerate of nationally and economically unrelated areas.

For decades, tsarist policy was powerless to break the established dependence of Afghanistan on England. Afghanistan, while maintaining external independence, actually became a colony of England: this situation was secured by the 1907 convention between Russia and England, according to which the tsarist government recognized Afghanistan “outside its sphere of influence.” Afghanistan served England as a reliable “buffer” until 1919, when the coup that took place in Kabul overthrew the English protege, and Afghanistan, by declaring war on England, achieved recognition of its independence, securing it with an alliance with the USSR [ so in the text]. Since then, the history of Afghanistan has taken new paths ."

It is necessary to clarify how the “colonial” status of Afghanistan was expressed. This is the transfer of foreign policy relations to Britain and the receipt of an annual subsidy in the amount of 60 thousand pounds sterling. Until 1919, this subsidy accounted for approximately half of Afghanistan's budget revenues. Naturally, after 1919, when Britain recognized the independence of Afghanistan, it stopped subsidizing it. According to TSB, Afghanistan has experienced a severe financial crisis due to the cessation of subsidies. However, according to the same TSB, the 1924 budget was reduced without a deficit. At the same time, taxes in Afghanistan were reduced, and internal customs duties were completely abolished. Guess how the budget deficit was eliminated? The clue is the last part of the penultimate sentence from the above passage from TSB.

Also interesting is the TSB chapter called “Country Defense” (meaning Afghanistan):

"The strategic role of Afghanistan is determined by the fact that it stands on the routes leading to India– most precious colony of England, and is the only springboard for its capture; in short, it is the gateway to India. This implies the strategic role of Afghanistan– to be India's foremost theatre. Afghanistan is a highly raised triangle with vertices at Faizabad, Herat and Kandahar; in the middle of the triangle runs the first-class stronghold of the Hindu Kush, branched in the west by three bells. Defense Center Afghanistan As in ancient times, so now is Kabul, the junction of the most important routes of the country and its political center. The strongest face of the said triangle and at the same time historically the most important is the northern one, facing Turkestan; it has four defensive lines: Amu Darya, a number of steppe cities with a citadel in the form of a fortress Dey-Dadi, a group of fortified points in the foothills of the Hindu Kush and the Hindu Kush itself. These borders defend Kabul, the center of life of the entire country, and at the same time cover the routes to India. The operational direction coming from the north through Kabul and further to the Indus River is called Kabul.

Other two operational areas– Kandahar And Pamir, defined: first– districts (or points) Kushka– Herat– Kandahar– Quetta– lower Indus and second - districts (or points) of Fergana– Pamir ( Badakhshan) - Pmountains of the eastern Hindu Kush– Gilgit (Chitral) – Punjab, bypassing the Indus defensive line,– are of less importance, especially Pamir."

As you can see - in SOVIET encyclopedia(and not in military, but in general civil terms) the defense of Afghanistan was considered not from British India, not from Persia, not from China, but only from the USSR.

First Anglo-Afghan War- war between Great Britain and Afghanistan 1838-1842.

Causes

The progressive movement of Russia into the Caucasus and Turkestan during the first three quarters of the 19th century forced England to pay attention to Afghanistan, which at that time was still separated from its Indian possessions by the vast territory of Sikh and Sindhi possessions. As Russian possessions approached the borders of Afghanistan, the military importance of Turkey and Persia gradually fell in the eyes of the British and in return the importance of Afghanistan became important, which became the only barrier separating Russian possessions from the borders of India. Hence, thoughts about the subjugation of Afghanistan, or at least about a strong alliance with it, became an obligatory element of all British considerations concerning the defense of their Indian possessions. But the initial reason that forced England to enter into relations with Afghanistan already in 1808 was not Russia’s expansion to the south, but Napoleon’s plans to seize British India. In 1807, the Franco-Iranian Alliance was signed, allowing France to send its troops through Iran to capture India, so the East India Company had to take retaliatory action. Since Afghanistan was the “northern gateway” to India, it was decided to send an embassy there.

By the 1830s, the advantage was on the side of Dost Muhammad, who, while remaining ruler of Kabul and Ghazni, distributed the provinces to his brothers and sons. Only Herat still remained in the power of Kamran, the nephew of Shah Shuja, the latter lived in India, receiving a small subsidy from the British. The internecine war weakened Afghanistan so much that neighbors began to encroach on some parts of its territory. The Sikhs began to threaten Peshawar from the east, and the Persians laid claim to Herat from the west. Dost Mohammed's position became difficult, but worsened further when Shah Shuja, encouraged by the British, entered into an alliance with the Sikhs in 1833 and invaded Sindh, intending to then march on Kandahar and Kabul.

Finding his strength to fight him insufficient, Dost Muhammad sent an embassy to Russia in 1834 asking for help. The Emir's envoy Hussein Ali Khan reached Orenburg only in 1836, where, through the military governor V.A. Perovsky, he entered into negotiations with the Russian government. The result of these relations was the dispatch to Afghanistan in 1837 of Perovsky’s lieutenant I.V. Vitkevich. The arrival of Vitkevich in Kabul in December of the same year, which discovered negotiations had begun between Russia and Afghanistan, as well as the movement of Persian troops to Herat, carried out under the influence of Russian diplomacy in Tehran, turned out to be a sufficient reason for England to declare war on Dost Mohammed.

On October 1, 1838, the Governor General of India, George Eden, announced a manifesto containing a declaration of war and the motivation for the decision taken by the British.

Preparations for the English offensive

Back in August 1838, the military units intended for the campaign were warned about this, and on September 13, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, General Fane, the composition of the expeditionary force was determined. Karnul was appointed as the concentration point. The detachment consisted of five infantry brigades (15 regiments), one artillery (5 batteries), and one cavalry (3 cavalry regiments). The infantry brigades were consolidated into two divisions, under the command of generals Cotton and Duncan. In addition to this detachment, called the Bengal Army and assembled under the personal command of the commander-in-chief, another detachment was formed in Bombay, consisting of three brigades, infantry (3 regiments), artillery and cavalry under the command of General Keane (commander of the Bombay Army). The troops recruited by Shah Shuja had about 6 thousand people. They were supposed to, together with the Bengal Army, cross the Indus on the road to Shikarpur and from there go to Kandahar and Kabul. Finally, the Sikh regiments of Ranjit Singh and a small detachment of Indo-British troops, only about 10 thousand people under the command of Shah Shuja’s son, Teimur Mirza and under the leadership of the English captain Wada, were supposed to head from Peshawar to Kabul. Meanwhile, while the troops were concentrating, circumstances in Afghanistan changed greatly: the Persians, who were besieging Herat at that time, were unable to take it, and in early September 1838 they were forced to leave. Vitkevich was no longer in Kabul, Dost Mohammed remained helpless. With the Persian retreat from Herat, of course, any pretext for going to Afghanistan disappeared, but the then Viceroy of India, Lord Oakland, insisted on implementing the decision. However, the composition of the expeditionary force was nevertheless reduced to 21 thousand people, including Bengali troops - 9.5 thousand people, concentrated at Firospur in early December (one division of General Cotton, consisting of 3 infantry brigades). The combined forces of Bengal and Bombay troops received the name "Indus Army", the command of which was entrusted to General Keane. The number of convoys accompanying the troops was excessively large and made their movement very difficult; Thus, the Bengal contingent was followed by a convoy of 30 thousand pack camels with 38 thousand convoy servants. The Bengal troops were to march from Firospur to the southwest, through Bagawalpur and then through Sind to the banks of the Indus; crossing the river at Sukkur. From here the troops were to proceed northwest through Shikarpur and Bagh, to the beginning of the Bolan Pass, then through the pass to Quetta, and from here through the Kojak Pass to Kandahar.

The forces that Afghanistan had at that time were very insignificant. Dost Mohammed maintained 2.5 thousand infantry men armed with large-caliber matchlock rifles, 12-13 thousand horsemen and about 45 guns. The best branch of the army was the cavalry. In addition to this “regular” army, there was a militia, which, under favorable conditions, could provide several tens of thousands of untrained, undisciplined and poorly armed soldiers.

March to Kabul

By April 1839, the Indian army concentrated at Quetta and then continued to move to Kandahar and Ghazni, without encountering resistance from the Afghans anywhere. The troops experienced hardships from a lack of food, as well as vehicles, due to the heavy mortality of transport animals. About 20 thousand heads died on the way to Kandahar alone. Indo-British troops entered Kandahar without a fight on April 25. Their further route lay in Ghazni. This city was defended by a garrison under the command of Haider Khan, the son of Dost Muhammad. In view of the Afghans' reluctance to surrender, the British blew up the fortress wall with a mine and launched an assault. The garrison fought to the last opportunity. About 1000 of his men died in battle, 1600 were taken prisoner, including Haider Khan himself. The British victory cost only 17 killed and 165 wounded, including 18 officers. Despite, however, the significant superiority of the enemy forces, Dost Muhammad did not lose heart. Relying on the strength of the resistance of the Ghazni fortress, he decided to throw his best troops under the command of his son Akbar Khan first to Peshawar, where in April the Sikh troops of Ranjit Singh began to gather, defeat the latter and then attack the Indus Army with all their might. However, the rapid fall of Ghazni ruined the emir's plans. Dost Mohammed changed his intention and decided with a detachment of troops, a force of about 6,000 people, to set out from Kabul to meet the Indus Army, and give it battle on the banks of the Kabul Darya. He reached with his troops to the village. Arganda, where such alarming signs of fermentation and treason were discovered in the detachment that there was no hope for the success of the battle. Then Dost Mohammed allowed (August 2) his troops to submit to Shah Shuja, and he himself, with a small handful of followers (350 people), retreated to Bamiyan. The emir's flight became known in the British camp the very next day; a pursuit was sent after him, but he managed to bypass the passes of the Hindu Kush and reach Afghan Turkestan. On August 7, Shah Shuja solemnly entered Kabul, and three weeks later the Sikh detachment of Teimur Mirza arrived here, which, in view of the death of Ranjit Singh in June 1839, only entered the Khyber Pass at the end of July, and after a short skirmish at Ali-Mejid , headed to Kabul without encountering any resistance along the way.

The beginning of the uprisings

Thus, Shah Shuja was placed on the throne and, according to the spirit of the declaration on October 1, 1838, the troops were to return to India. But in view of the dubious state of affairs, it was decided to return home only half of the Army of the Indus, and the remaining troops were to remain in Afghanistan under the command of General Cotton. In September, the entire Bombay Division left Kabul, heading through the Bolan Gap. In October, part of the Bengal detachment left, heading through Peshawar. 7 thousand Anglo-Indian troops remained in Afghanistan. 13 thousand people of Shah Shuja (supported by the East India Company) and 5 thousand Sikh contingent. The bulk of these troops remained in Kabul, a significant number of them were in Jalalabad, and small detachments were located in Kandahar, Ghazni and Bamiyan. At first everything went well. The influx of money into the country revived it and strengthened commercial and industrial activity, but then the rise in price of basic necessities, the intrusive invasion of foreigners into the internal affairs of the country, their systematic insult to the religious and family feelings of the people and other reasons brought general discontent into the country. Growing gradually, it soon began to manifest itself in separate uprisings in different parts of Afghanistan. The Ghilzais, who greatly disturbed the Indus Army on its way from Kandahar to Ghazni, did not recognize the authority of Shah Shuja and continued to interrupt communications between Kabul and Ghazni. They were pacified, but not for long, in September 1839 by the expedition of Major Outram. In the spring of the following year, the Ghilzais revolted on a larger scale, and the troops of General Noth sent against them with great difficulty brought them to submission. In the fall of 1839, the Khybers became indignant. In the spring of 1840, the Hazaras rebelled (near Bamiyan).

Captivity of Dost Muhammad

Meanwhile, Dost Mohammed, after his short stay in Khulm, tried to seek refuge with the Bukhara emir Nasrullah, but made a mistake in his calculations and returned back to Khulm. Around this time (mid-1840), the British, in order to influence the Uzbek rulers of Afghan Turkestan, moved a small detachment north of Bamiyan, to Baygak. Dost Mohammed took advantage of this circumstance and persuaded the Khulma Khan to attack Baygak. On August 30, an attack was made on the British post and the detachment occupying it had to retreat to Bamiyan. Dost Mohammed with an Uzbek detachment pursued the British, but on September 18 he was defeated by the native units of General Denny. Having lost hope for the assistance of the Uzbeks, Dost Mohammed went to Kugistan (a province north of Kabul) and created unrest there. A detachment under the command of General Sel was sent against the rebels from Kabul. A battle took place in the Pervan Valley (north of Charikar) on November 2, in which the British were defeated. The next day, Sel's detachment retreated to Charikar. This was the state of affairs when an incomprehensible event, which has not yet been clarified by history, took place. On the third day after the Battle of Pervan, Dost Muhammad appeared in Kabul and placed himself at the disposal of the British. Nasrullah's failure, the weakness of the Uzbeks, fear for one's own head, which was probably not poorly appreciated by the British, these are, apparently, circumstances that can serve as a clue to Dost Mohammed's act. The surrendered emir was sent to live in India.

Insurrection

With the removal of Dost Mohammed and after the failure of Perovsky’s Khiva campaign, the British’s stay in Afghanistan lost its meaning, which is why Shah Shuja reminded them of this. However, the British, apparently, did not intend to leave, settling in the country as if at home, planting gardens here, building houses, sending their families out of India. This behavior of foreigners further incited the Afghan population against them. The anger gradually increased. Rebellions and unrest began to arise between the Duraniyas, Ghilzais and other tribes of Afghanistan. The pacification of these outbreaks absorbed all the attention of the British, but the further, the less successful it became. The state of affairs threatened a general uprising, which was not slow to appear. The reason for it was the reduction and even termination of cash subsidies given to the leaders of the Ghilzais, Kugistans, Qizilbashs and other Afghan tribes. Shah Shuja, in response to a number of complaints addressed to him on this matter, referred to the self-will of the British, hinting at the desirability of freeing himself from foreigners. This hint was enough for a conspiracy to be hatched at the end of September 1841 to regain what was lost and overthrow the rule of foreigners. The British, warned about the conspiracy, did nothing. A series of uprisings began.

At the end of September, the eastern Ghilzais blocked in their mountains all the passes leading from Kabul to the Jalalabad region, interrupting British communication with India. The pacification of the Ghilzais was entrusted to General Sel, who had already been assigned with his brigade to return to India through Peshawar. He was supposed to restore order in the Ghilzai lands, heading to Jalalabad. On October 11, he entered the Khurd-Kabul Gorge and, fighting continuous battles with the rebels along the way, by October 30 he barely reached Gandamak, having suffered significant losses.

At the same time, an uprising broke out in Kugistan and in the space between Kabul and Kandahar. Finally, on November 2, a massacre occurred in Kabul itself and one of the first victims was the Englishman Burns, who served as an unofficial adviser to Shah Shuja. Two houses in which the British mission was located were looted, their guards were slaughtered, the treasury (170 thousand rupees) was plundered, and all the servants were killed. And all this was done in the presence of 6 thousand British troops, locked in a fortified camp half an hour away from the indignant city. There was no order from General Elphinstone, who commanded the troops near Kabul at that time, and not a single British officer came to the rescue of his own.

The impunity of the massacre on November 2, 1841 was in the eyes of the Afghans evidence of the weakness of the British, the news of the success of the uprising spread throughout the country and crowds of ghazis (companions for the faith) poured into the city from everywhere. Shah Shuja locked himself in the Kabul citadel of Bala Gissar and waited for the outcome of events. The uprising was led by the Mohammedans, relatives of Dost Mohammed, who elected Mohammed Zeman Khan, the nephew of Dost Mohammed and the former ruler of the Jalalabad region, as emir. The British troops were deprived of most of their provisions and artillery supplies. In Kudar, the indignant soldiers of the Kugistan regiment themselves massacred their English officers. In Charikar, a Gurkha regiment was besieged by Afghans in their barracks, forced to leave them due to lack of water, and was exterminated on the way to Kabul. In Chain-dabad, between Kabul and Ghazni, a detachment of Captain Woodbourne was slaughtered. Captain Firriz's detachment was besieged in the Khyber Mountains by several thousand Afghans and barely made it to Peshawar.

Retreat and destruction of Elphinstone's detachment

Weak and indecisive Elphinstone saw salvation only in retreat. Instead of taking vigorous action, he entered into negotiations with the Afghans. Meanwhile, the troops were starving and gradually became completely demoralized. The negotiations dragged on endlessly. The English representative Macnachten, invited to a meeting with Akbar Khan, was treacherously killed on December 23rd. His severed head, stuck on a pike, was carried through the streets of the city, and his mutilated body was exposed for desecration in the Kabul bazaar for three days. With the death of Macnachten, the leaders of the uprising considered the treaty he had worked out invalid and offered Elphinstone new, more humiliating conditions. On the first day of 1842, the agreement with the Afghans was sealed by 18 serdars. In pursuance of this agreement, the British handed over to the Afghans: all sums of money, in the amount of 1,400,000 rupees, all artillery, with the exception of 9 cannons, many different firearms and bladed weapons, all shells, ammunition, all the sick and seriously wounded with two doctors and, finally, the hostages included 6 officers. The convoy of Afghan troops promised by the agreement was not assigned. Not receiving the promised convoy, Elphinstone decided to set off at his own peril and risk, and on January 6, British troops, including 4.5 thousand combat personnel, with non-combatants, women, children and camp servants, set out from Kabul, heading towards Khurd-Kabul gorge. As soon as the tail of the column left the camp, the Afghan attacks began, the guns were soon taken from the British and the entire detachment was turned into a panic-stricken crowd. Not far from Jalalabad, where General Sel was with his detachment, the Afghans completed the extermination of Elphinstone’s detachment. Those who escaped here died further from cold, hunger and deprivation. Of the 16 thousand people who set out from Kabul, the only person who survived was Dr. Bryden, who on January 14, wounded and completely exhausted from hunger, reached Jalalabad.

End of the war

The fate of other British troops in Afghanistan was as follows. Sel successfully held out in Jalalabad, repelling and even dispersing crowds of Afghans, and General Nott also held out in Kandahar. Both refused to surrender the positions they occupied to the Afghans, despite the instructions of Elphinstone, who carried out the agreement on January 1. Captain Kregi held out successfully in Kelat-i-Ghilzai. In Ghazni, Colonel Pamer resisted for a long time, but believing the Afghans that they would let him through to Peshawar, he surrendered the citadel (March 6). An immediate attack followed on the garrison, and it was completely destroyed, with the exception of Pamer and several officers who were taken prisoner. Communications between India and Kabul were interrupted as early as October 1841. When news of the Kabul uprising was received in Calcutta, General Wild's brigade was sent through Peshawar to support the Kabul army, but it (January 1842) could not get through the Khyber Pass and was driven back with great damage. To save the detachments of Sel and Nott remaining in Afghanistan, the following measures were taken: Pollock, who replaced Wild, was reinforced with 4 infantry regiments, cavalry and artillery, and General England’s brigade was moved from Sindh to Kandahar. The latter was met at the Kojak Pass by Afghans at the end of March and retreated to Quetta. Pollock was already in Peshawar in February, but remained here for two months. Subsequently, however, the actions of the British were more decisive and successful. Having set out on April 3, Pollock walked a few days to Jalalabad, where he united with Sel. On May 10, after a small matter at the Kojak Pass, General England also arrived in Kandahar.

After this, British troops had to either withdraw from Afghanistan, or advance deeper into the country to restore their prestige and free hostages and prisoners. The new viceroy was inclined towards the first; public opinion in England loudly demanded the second. Finally, Nott was ordered to begin a retreat from Afghanistan, but in a roundabout way, through Ghazni-Kabul-Peshawar, while Pollock was asked to support Nott by moving to Kabul. Nott set out from Kandahar on 7, Pollock from Jalalabad on 20 August. Meanwhile, in Kabul, since Elphinstone's departure, internecine strife continued, which significantly weakened the Afghans' ability to resist. Pollock and Nott moved towards Kabul almost unhindered, easily dispersing the discordant crowds of Afghans. On September 15, Pollock arrived in Kabul, and the next day Nott. From here they sent punitive expeditions to various parts of the country, and Kabul was given over to the troops for plunder. After almost a month's stay near Kabul, on October 12, British troops set out for Peshawar. This retreat was like an escape. Nott's detachment, walking behind, was subjected to continuous attacks by Afghans. In the last days of December the troops reached the borders of India. At the same time, Dost Mohammed received permission to return to Afghanistan, where, in view of the death of Shah Shuja, he soon took the throne of the emirs. Thus ended the first Anglo-Afghan war. It cost more than 18 thousand people, 25 million pounds sterling and greatly diminished the political importance and military prestige of the British in Central Asia.

see also

Sources

• Military Encyclopedia / Ed. V. F. Novitsky and others - St. Petersburg. : company of I.V. Sytin, 1911-1915.

In culture

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Literature

• Khalfin N.A. Failure of British aggression in Afghanistan
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Notes

Excerpt characterizing the First Anglo-Afghan War

Sonya's letter to Nicholas, which was the fulfillment of his prayer, was written from Trinity. This is what caused it. The thought of Nicholas marrying a rich bride occupied the old countess more and more. She knew that Sonya was the main obstacle to this. And Sonya’s life recently, especially after Nikolai’s letter describing his meeting in Bogucharovo with Princess Marya, became harder and harder in the countess’s house. The Countess did not miss a single opportunity to make an offensive or cruel hint to Sonya.
But a few days before leaving Moscow, touched and excited by everything that was happening, the Countess, calling Sonya to her, instead of reproaches and demands, turned to her with tears and prayed that she, by sacrificing herself, would repay for everything. what was done for her was to break her ties with Nikolai.
“I won’t be at peace until you give me this promise.”
Sonya burst into tears hysterically, answered through her sobs that she would do everything, that she was ready for anything, but she did not make a direct promise and in her soul could not decide on what was demanded of her. She had to sacrifice herself for the happiness of the family that fed and raised her. Sacrificing herself for the happiness of others was Sonya's habit. Her position in the house was such that only on the path of sacrifice could she show her virtues, and she was accustomed and loved to sacrifice herself. But first, in all acts of self-sacrifice, she joyfully realized that by sacrificing herself, she thereby raised her worth in the eyes of herself and others and became more worthy of Nicolas, whom she loved most in life; but now her sacrifice had to consist in giving up what for her constituted the entire reward of the sacrifice, the entire meaning of life. And for the first time in her life, she felt bitterness towards those people who had benefited her in order to torture her more painfully; I felt envy of Natasha, who had never experienced anything like this, never needed sacrifices and forced others to sacrifice herself and yet was loved by everyone. And for the first time, Sonya felt how, out of her quiet, pure love for Nicolas, a passionate feeling suddenly began to grow, which stood above rules, virtue, and religion; and under the influence of this feeling, Sonya involuntarily, learned by her dependent life of secrecy, answered the Countess in general, vague words, avoided conversations with her and decided to wait for a meeting with Nikolai so that in this meeting she would not free her, but, on the contrary, forever bind herself to him .
The troubles and horror of the last days of the Rostovs’ stay in Moscow drowned out the dark thoughts that were weighing on her. She was glad to find salvation from them in practical activities. But when she learned about the presence of Prince Andrei in their house, despite all the sincere pity that she felt for him and Natasha, a joyful and superstitious feeling that God did not want her to be separated from Nicolas overtook her. She knew that Natasha loved one Prince Andrei and did not stop loving him. She knew that now, brought together in such terrible conditions, they would love each other again and that then Nicholas, due to the kinship that would be between them, would not be able to marry Princess Marya. Despite all the horror of everything that happened in the last days and during the first days of the journey, this feeling, this awareness of the intervention of providence in her personal affairs pleased Sonya.
The Rostovs spent their first day on their trip at the Trinity Lavra.
In the Lavra hotel, the Rostovs were allocated three large rooms, one of which was occupied by Prince Andrei. The wounded man was much better that day. Natasha sat with him. In the next room the Count and Countess sat, respectfully talking with the rector, who had visited their old acquaintances and investors. Sonya was sitting right there, and she was tormented by curiosity about what Prince Andrei and Natasha were talking about. She listened to the sounds of their voices from behind the door. The door of Prince Andrei's room opened. Natasha came out from there with an excited face and, not noticing the monk who stood up to meet her and grabbed the wide sleeve of his right hand, walked up to Sonya and took her hand.
- Natasha, what are you doing? Come here,” said the Countess.
Natasha came under the blessing, and the abbot advised to turn to God and his saint for help.
Immediately after the abbot left, Nashata took her friend’s hand and walked with her into the empty room.
- Sonya, right? will he be alive? - she said. – Sonya, how happy I am and how unhappy I am! Sonya, my dear, everything is as before. If only he were alive. He can’t... because, because... that... - And Natasha burst into tears.
- So! I knew it! Thank God,” said Sonya. - He will be alive!
Sonya was no less excited than her friend - both by her fear and grief, and by her personal thoughts that were not expressed to anyone. She, sobbing, kissed and consoled Natasha. “If only he were alive!” - she thought. After crying, talking and wiping away their tears, both friends approached Prince Andrei’s door. Natasha carefully opened the doors and looked into the room. Sonya stood next to her at the half-open door.
Prince Andrei lay high on three pillows. His pale face was calm, his eyes were closed, and you could see how he was breathing evenly.
- Oh, Natasha! – Sonya suddenly almost screamed, grabbing her cousin’s hand and retreating from the door.
- What? What? – Natasha asked.
“This is this, that, that...” said Sonya with a pale face and trembling lips.
Natasha quietly closed the door and went with Sonya to the window, not yet understanding what they were saying to her.
“Do you remember,” Sonya said with a frightened and solemn face, “do you remember when I looked for you in the mirror... In Otradnoye, at Christmas time... Do you remember what I saw?..
- Yes Yes! - Natasha said, opening her eyes wide, vaguely remembering that Sonya then said something about Prince Andrei, whom she saw lying down.
- Do you remember? – Sonya continued. “I saw it then and told everyone, both you and Dunyasha.” “I saw that he was lying on the bed,” she said, making a gesture with her hand with a raised finger at every detail, “and that he had closed his eyes, and that he was covered with a pink blanket, and that he had folded his hands,” Sonya said, making sure that as she described the details she saw now, that these same details she saw then. She didn’t see anything then, but said that she saw what came into her head; but what she came up with then seemed to her as valid as any other memory. What she said then, that he looked back at her and smiled and was covered with something red, she not only remembered, but was firmly convinced that even then she said and saw that he was covered with a pink, exactly pink, blanket, and that his eyes were closed.
“Yes, yes, exactly in pink,” said Natasha, who now also seemed to remember what was said in pink, and in this she saw the main unusualness and mystery of the prediction.
– But what does this mean? – Natasha said thoughtfully.
- Oh, I don’t know how extraordinary all this is! - Sonya said, clutching her head.
A few minutes later, Prince Andrei called, and Natasha came in to see him; and Sonya, experiencing an emotion and tenderness she had rarely experienced, remained at the window, pondering the extraordinary nature of what had happened.
On this day there was an opportunity to send letters to the army, and the Countess wrote a letter to her son.
“Sonya,” said the Countess, raising her head from the letter as her niece walked past her. – Sonya, won’t you write to Nikolenka? - said the countess in a quiet, trembling voice, and in the look of her tired eyes, looking through glasses, Sonya read everything that the countess understood in these words. This look expressed pleading, fear of refusal, shame for having to ask, and readiness for irreconcilable hatred in case of refusal.
Sonya went up to the countess and, kneeling down, kissed her hand.
“I’ll write, maman,” she said.
Sonya was softened, excited and touched by everything that happened that day, especially by the mysterious performance of fortune-telling that she just saw. Now that she knew that on the occasion of the renewal of Natasha’s relationship with Prince Andrei, Nikolai could not marry Princess Marya, she joyfully felt the return of that mood of self-sacrifice in which she loved and was accustomed to living. And with tears in her eyes and with the joy of realizing a generous deed, she, interrupted several times by tears that clouded her velvety black eyes, wrote that touching letter, the receipt of which so amazed Nikolai.

At the guardhouse where Pierre was taken, the officer and soldiers who took him treated him with hostility, but at the same time with respect. One could still feel in their attitude towards him doubt about who he was (whether he was a very important person), and hostility due to their still fresh personal struggle with him.
But when, on the morning of another day, the shift came, Pierre felt that for the new guard - for the officers and soldiers - it no longer had the meaning that it had for those who took him. And indeed, in this big, fat man in a peasant’s caftan, the guards of the next day no longer saw that living man who so desperately fought with the marauder and with the escort soldiers and said a solemn phrase about saving the child, but saw only the seventeenth of those being held for some reason, by by order of the highest authorities, the captured Russians. If there was anything special about Pierre, it was only his timid, intently thoughtful appearance and the French language, in which, surprisingly for the French, he spoke well. Despite the fact that on the same day Pierre was connected with other suspected suspects, since the separate room he occupied was needed by an officer.
All the Russians kept with Pierre were people of the lowest rank. And all of them, recognizing Pierre as a master, shunned him, especially since he spoke French. Pierre heard with sadness the ridicule of himself.
The next evening, Pierre learned that all of these prisoners (and probably himself included) were to be tried for arson. On the third day, Pierre was taken with others to a house where a French general with a white mustache, two colonels and other Frenchmen with scarves on their hands were sitting. Pierre, along with others, was asked questions about who he was with the precision and certainty with which defendants are usually treated, supposedly exceeding human weaknesses. where he was? for what purpose? and so on.
These questions, leaving aside the essence of the life matter and excluding the possibility of revealing this essence, like all questions asked in courts, had the goal only of setting up the groove along which the judges wanted the defendant’s answers to flow and lead him to the desired goal, that is to the accusation. As soon as he began to say something that did not satisfy the purpose of the accusation, they took a groove, and the water could flow wherever it wanted. In addition, Pierre experienced the same thing that a defendant experiences in all courts: bewilderment as to why all these questions were asked of him. He felt that this trick of inserting a groove was used only out of condescension or, as it were, out of politeness. He knew that he was in the power of these people, that only power had brought him here, that only power gave them the right to demand answers to questions, that the only purpose of this meeting was to accuse him. And therefore, since there was power and there was a desire to accuse, there was no need for the trick of questions and trial. It was obvious that all answers had to lead to guilt. When asked what he was doing when they took him, Pierre answered with some tragedy that he was carrying a child to his parents, qu"il avait sauve des flammes [whom he saved from the flames]. - Why did he fight with the marauder? Pierre answered, that he was defending a woman, that protecting an insulted woman is the duty of every person, that... He was stopped: this did not go to the point. Why was he in the courtyard of a house on fire, where witnesses saw him? He answered that he was going to see what was happening in Moscow. They stopped him again: they didn’t ask him where he was going, and why was he near the fire? Who was he? They repeated the first question to him, to which he said that he did not want to answer. Again he answered that he could not say that .
- Write it down, this is not good. “It’s very bad,” the general with a white mustache and a red, ruddy face told him sternly.
On the fourth day, fires started on Zubovsky Val.
Pierre and thirteen others were taken to Krymsky Brod, to the carriage house of a merchant's house. Walking through the streets, Pierre was choking from the smoke, which seemed to be standing over the entire city. Fires were visible from different directions. Pierre did not yet understand the significance of the burning of Moscow and looked at these fires with horror.
Pierre stayed in the carriage house of a house near the Crimean Brod for four more days, and during these days he learned from the conversation of the French soldiers that everyone kept here expected the marshal's decision every day. Which marshal, Pierre could not find out from the soldiers. For the soldier, obviously, the marshal seemed to be the highest and somewhat mysterious link in power.
These first days, until September 8th, the day on which the prisoners were taken for secondary interrogation, were the most difficult for Pierre.

X
On September 8, a very important officer entered the barn to see the prisoners, judging by the respect with which the guards treated him. This officer, probably a staff officer, with a list in his hands, made a roll call of all the Russians, calling Pierre: celui qui n "avoue pas son nom [the one who does not say his name]. And, indifferently and lazily looking at all the prisoners, he ordered the guard it is proper for the officer to dress and tidy them up before leading them to the marshal. An hour later a company of soldiers arrived, and Pierre and thirteen others were led to the Maiden's Field. The day was clear, sunny after the rain, and the air was unusually clean. Smoke did not settle down as in that day when Pierre was taken out of the guardhouse of Zubovsky Val; smoke rose in columns in the clear air. The fires of the fires were nowhere to be seen, but columns of smoke rose from all sides, and all of Moscow, everything that Pierre could see, was one conflagration. On all sides one could see vacant lots with stoves and chimneys and occasionally the charred walls of stone houses. Pierre looked closely at the fires and did not recognize the familiar quarters of the city. In some places, surviving churches could be seen. The Kremlin, undestroyed, loomed white from afar with its towers and Ivan the Great. Nearby, the dome of the Novodevichy Convent glittered merrily, and the bell of the Gospel was especially loudly heard from there. This announcement reminded Pierre that it was Sunday and the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin Mary. But it seemed that there was no one to celebrate this holiday: everywhere there was devastation from the fire, and from the Russian people there were only occasionally ragged, frightened people who hid at the sight of the French.

Afghanistan at that time did not have a common border with the British possessions in India. They were separated by two independent principalities - Sindh and the Sikh state. While British troops were to invade Afghanistan through Sindh, the Sikhs undertook to advance from Peshawar to Kabul. The former Sadozai Shah Shuja was supposed to accompany the British army as the “legitimate Afghan sovereign.” A 6,000-strong detachment of sepoys under the command of English officers was recruited in India and provided with money.

In the autumn of 1838 the war began. A 22,000-strong army, consisting of British and sepoy units, moved to Kandahar. A high-ranking official, Macnaghten, served as the English ambassador to Shah Shuja, and Alexander Burns was appointed his assistant. Kandahar offered no resistance. The Barakzai rulers fled, and the rest of the highest dignitaries of this principality, bribed by the British, went over to Shuja's side. Shuja himself was crowned king in Kandahar after he signed an unequal treaty with the British. Then British troops stormed Ghazni and opened their way to Kabul. On the eve of the decisive battle, the Afghan khans, bribed by MacNaughten, went over to the side of the British. On August 7, 1839, the British entered the capital without a fight. Dost Muhammad retreated beyond the Hindu Kush, from where, with the help of the Uzbeks of the Kunduz Khanate, he continued his guerrilla war against the British. He still hoped for Russian help.

After the occupation of Kabul, real difficulties began for the British. By this time, people's discontent was growing in Afghanistan, and the resistance to foreign conquerors and their protege, Shuja, was intensifying. The Ghilzais, who from the very beginning did not recognize the authority of Shuja, raised one uprising for

others, disrupting communications between Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. Unrest and uprisings occurred in many other parts of Afghanistan.

Dost Mohammed also did not lay down his arms and headed to Kohistan, where he led the people's militia and created a serious threat to the power of Shuja and the British over the capital. At the end of September - October 1840, several fierce battles took place in the gorges of Kohistan, and on November 2 a decisive battle broke out at Parwan. Dost Mohammed led a successful attack on the English cavalry that had crossed the river. The cavalry, which turned to panicked flight, carried away the infantry with it. The British suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded.

Surrender emir And struggle people

The next day the order was given for the British to retreat. They feared an uprising in the rear and encirclement. The command assessed the current situation as very critical, and the Kabul garrison was preparing to defend the city. However, at this moment, under circumstances that were not entirely clear (in any case, completely unexpected for the British), Dost Mohammed surrendered. On the night of November 3, immediately after the victory, leaving his troops secretly, he rode off, accompanied by one servant. Arriving in Kabul, he went to Macnaghten and told him of his surrender. Wanting to quickly remove the popular emir in the country from Afghanistan, the British hastily sent him to India with his entire family, except for his son, the talented military leader Ak-bar Khan, who was thrown into prison by the emir of Bukhara.

At the first moment after the emir’s surrender, the wave of uprisings that had engulfed Afghanistan in many places subsided and, as it seemed to the British, a period of calm had begun. However, it soon became clear how deeply they were mistaken. The people rose up to fight, and their speech had a decisive influence on the outcome of events.

In the spring and summer of 1841, the flame of a people's war flared up in the country. The regions of Jalalabad, Zurmata, Kalati and others were engulfed in unrest. Soon after Dost Mohammed was sent to India, the Gilzai tribes resumed armed struggle. Active protests against the British took place

and in many other places in Afghanistan, discontent against the British began to quickly intensify among the Afghan aristocracy, khans, and tribal leaders. Many of those who sided with Shuji were resentful of not receiving the promised rewards. Cash handouts to the khans and leaders were canceled due to the British government's demand to reduce the costs of the occupation of Afghanistan.

The British alienated all segments of the population of Afghanistan. At the same time, neither the growing discontent of the people nor the growing wave of uprisings shook the confidence of such English leaders as MacNaghten in the strength of their position in the occupied country. In August 1841 MacNaghten reported that the country was completely calm.

Insurrection V Kabul 2 November 1841 G .

Signs of fatal events for the British in Afghanistan began to appear with particular force in September 1841. The Kabul uprising was immediately preceded by a major armed uprising of the Ghilzais, whose leaders, apparently, were closely connected with the leaders of the conspiracy in the capital. At the end of September, the Ghilzais occupied the mountain passes on the way from Kabul to Jalalabad and interrupted the communication of the Kabul garrison with India.

On the night of November 2, 1841, the rebels surrounded the house of the British resident in Kabul, A. Burns, and the homes of other British officers. The houses were burned, and they themselves and the guards were killed.

The uprising that began in Kabul was massive: the urban poor, artisans, traders and peasants of settled villages took part in it. Soon they were joined by detachments of Afghan tribes who approached the capital.

Having learned about the uprising in the capital, Shuja sent a guards regiment from Bala Hisar, his headquarters, to suppress it. The commander of the English garrison also expelled troops from the Sher Pur camp. But they did not even dare to approach the capital. The city fell into the hands of the rebels.

News of the success of the rebels shook the whole country. Communication between the English garrisons and India was severed. Troops from surrounding areas continued to flock to Kabul, hurrying

to help the rebels. The English camp and garrison in the Bala Hissar fortress were besieged.

In November, Akbar Khan arrived in Kabul from Bukhara, who soon rose to first place among the leaders of the liberation struggle of the Afghan people, leaving a memory of himself as a fearless and incorruptible leader who knew how not only to heroically fight enemies on the battlefield, but to destroy their plans and intrigues.

Soon MacNaghten had to negotiate with the rebels. On December 12, 1841, he signed an agreement with them, which contained a commitment to withdraw British troops from Afghanistan, return prisoners and return Dost Muhammad to his homeland.

But the signing of the agreement was only a maneuver on McNaghten’s part. He hoped to capture Akbar Khan or kill him during negotiations, for which he ordered two battalions with artillery to be pulled to the meeting place. However, Akbar Khan guessed his plans and killed him during the skirmish, so that the troops did not even have time to intervene.

These events caused panic among the British, and on January 1, 1842, a new agreement was concluded between the British leadership and the Afghan leaders, the terms of which provided for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan, as well as the retention of hostages until the return of Emir Dost Mohammed.

Retreat English from Kabul

In January 1842, the retreat of the English garrison began. About 5 thousand soldiers and officers and 12 thousand camp servants left Kabul. Seeing that the British, having violated the agreement, took the guns with them, the Afghan leaders announced their abandonment of their previous promise to guard the garrison along the retreat route.

During the retreat, the English troops were destroyed by mountain tribes. Of the entire Kabul garrison, not counting those captured, only one person escaped and reached Jalalabad.

The beginning of 1842 was marked by attacks by Afghan troops on the English garrisons that still remained in some

cities and towns of the country. The rebels cleared the entire country of foreigners, except for the besieged garrisons in Jalalabad and Kanjar. The siege of the Ghazni fortress ended successfully, which the rebels liberated on March 7, 1842, destroying the English garrison.

Destruction Kabul And conclusion English troops from Afghanistan

After the departure of foreign troops from Kabul, Shujah compromised with the heads of several warring feudal factions, among whom were the leaders of the uprising, Muhammad Zeman and Amanullah Loghari. Under pressure from the masses, he was forced to declare a holy war on the British and even undertake a campaign against Jalalabad. Along the way, he was killed by Loghari with the help of influential Durrani leaders, who installed Fath Jang, the second son of Shuja, on the throne.

Akbar failed to cope with the separatism of the feudal lords. Fath Jang also took the path of betrayal. He managed to escape to the British, and using his name, the British troops launched a punitive expedition, as a result of which they were able to recapture Kabul. Kabul was destroyed, but the leaders of British colonial policy now understood that they would no longer be able to keep Afghanistan under their rule. The ongoing people's war soon forced the British to completely clear the country. The return of British troops from Kabul to India was more like a stampede than a voluntary departure.

At the end of 1843, the British authorities allowed Dost Mohammed to return to his homeland, recognizing that their aggressive plans for Afghanistan had suffered a complete collapse. Soon Dost Mohammed again became emir. Thus ended the war of 1838-1842.

For almost 10 years, from December 1979 to February 1989, military operations took place on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan, called the Afghan War, but in fact it was one of the periods of civil war that has been shaking this state for more than a decade. On the one hand, pro-government forces (the Afghan army) fought, supported by a limited contingent of Soviet troops, and they were opposed by quite numerous formations of armed Afghan Muslims (Mujahideen), who received significant material support from NATO forces and most countries of the Muslim world. It turned out that on the territory of Afghanistan the interests of two opposing political systems once again collided: one sought to support the pro-communist regime in this country, while others preferred that Afghan society follow the Islamist path of development. Simply put, there was a struggle to establish absolute control over the territory of this Asian state.

Over the course of all 10 years, the permanent Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan numbered about 100 thousand soldiers and officers, and in total more than half a million Soviet military personnel passed through the Afghan war. And this war cost the Soviet Union about 75 billion dollars. In turn, the West provided the Mujahideen with financial assistance worth $8.5 billion.

Causes of the Afghan War

Central Asia, where the Republic of Afghanistan is located, has always been one of the key regions where the interests of many of the world's strongest powers have intersected for several centuries. So in the 80s of the last century the interests of the USSR and the USA collided there.

When Afghanistan gained independence back in 1919 and was freed from British colonization, the first country to recognize this independence was the young Soviet country. In all subsequent years, the USSR provided its southern neighbor with tangible material assistance and support, and Afghanistan, in turn, remained devoted to the most important political issues.

And when, as a result of the April Revolution of 1978, supporters of the ideas of socialism came to power in this Asian country and proclaimed Afghanistan a democratic republic, the opposition (radical Islamists) declared a holy war on the newly created government. Under the pretext of providing international assistance to the fraternal Afghan people and to protect their southern borders, the leadership of the USSR decided to introduce its military contingent into the territory of the neighboring country, especially since the Afghan government had repeatedly turned to the USSR with requests for military assistance. In fact, everything was a little different: the leadership of the Soviet Union could not allow this country to leave its sphere of influence, since the coming to power of the Afghan opposition could lead to a strengthening of the US position in this region, located very close to Soviet territory. That is, it was at this time that Afghanistan became the place where the interests of two “superpowers” ​​collided, and their interference in the country’s internal politics became the cause of the 10-year Afghan war.

Progress of the war

On December 12, 1979, members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without the consent of the Supreme Council, finally made a decision to provide international assistance to the fraternal people of Afghanistan. And already on December 25, units of the 40th Army began to cross the Amu Darya River to the territory of a neighboring state.

During the Afghan war, four periods can be roughly distinguished:

• Period I – from December 1979 to February 1980. A limited contingent was introduced into Afghanistan and placed in garrisons. Their task was to control the situation in large cities, guard and defend the locations of military units. During this period, no military operations took place, but as a result of shelling and attacks by the Mujahideen, Soviet units suffered losses. So in 1980, 1,500 people died.
• Period II - from March 1980 to April 1985. Conducting active combat operations and major military operations together with the forces of the Afghan army throughout the state. It was during this period that the Soviet military contingent suffered significant losses: about 2,000 people died in 1982, and more than 2,300 in 1985. At this time, the Afghan opposition moved its main armed forces to mountainous areas, where it was difficult to use modern motorized equipment. The rebels switched to maneuverable actions in small detachments, which did not make it possible to use aviation and artillery to destroy them. To defeat the enemy, it was necessary to eliminate the base areas of concentration of the Mujahideen. In 1980, a major operation was carried out in Panjshir; in December 1981, a rebel base was destroyed in the province of Jowzjan; in June 1982, Panjshir was captured as a result of military operations with a massive landing. In April 1983, opposition forces were defeated in the Nijrab gorge.
• III period - from May 1985 to December 1986. Active military operations of the Soviet contingent are decreasing, military operations are more often carried out by the Afghan army, which received significant support from aviation and artillery. The delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad to arm the Mujahideen was stopped. 6 tank, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were returned to the USSR.
• IV period – from January 1987 to February 1989.

The leadership of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the support of the UN, began preparations for a peaceful resolution of the situation in the country. Some Soviet units, together with the Afghan army, are conducting operations to destroy militant bases in the provinces of Logar, Nangarhar, Kabul and Kandahar. This period ended on February 15, 1988 with the withdrawal of all Soviet military units from Afghanistan.

Results of the Afghan War

Over the 10 years of this war in Afghanistan, almost 15 thousand Soviet soldiers died, more than 6 thousand remained disabled, and about 200 people are still considered missing.

Three years after the departure of the Soviet military contingent, radical Islamists came to power in the country, and in 1992 Afghanistan was proclaimed an Islamic state. But peace and tranquility never came in the country.

First Anglo-Afghan War (1838 - 1842)

Afghanistan is figuratively called the “graveyard of armies.” On the one hand, because rough terrain simply cannot be completely controlled. On the other hand, there is no single center of power with whom to negotiate. With a huge number of autonomous tribes, communities, religious figures speaking different dialects and having completely different interests. In a poor country, any help and injections will turn out to be a drop in the ocean, it is not possible to benefit everyone quickly and immediately, and half-starved people who have nothing to lose will covet with envy the newcomers who turn into a source of prey. Moreover, the aliens - in their ideology and mentality - are so different from the indigenous population that the principle of “friend or foe” works flawlessly. The inability to win in direct combat is compensated by treachery. It is easy for the rebels to disappear into the local population, which is “incomprehensible” and homogeneous in the eyes of the aliens. Fortunately, even the relief becomes their natural ally.

From the point of view of global international relations, Afghanistan was a place where the interests of the Anglo-Saxon world and Russian civilization came into contact. In the world of the 21st century, common goals come to the fore - the fight against international terrorism and drug trafficking. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Afghanistan was seen as an opportunity to strengthen oneself and weaken an opponent, as a field for a military-diplomatic game. Thus, for England in the 19th century, Afghanistan and Iran personified the most vulnerable place for Albion’s colonial possessions in India.

Background of the issue

Afghanistan throughout its short history - the first Afghan state itself arose in 1747 - has traditionally maintained political, trade and religious-cultural ties, primarily with neighboring Muslim countries of the South Asian subcontinent, Central Asia, Iran and the Ottoman Empire. However, from the end of the 18th century. This small, backward state, lost in the depths of Asia, found itself drawn into the orbit of big politics carried out in the region by competing European powers, including Russia.

Due to its geostrategic location (at the junction of the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and the Iranian Plateau), Afghanistan throughout almost the entire 19th century and until this country restored its political independence in 1919 became the object of the Anglo-Russian colonial confrontation (“the Cold War of the 19th century”). , in fact, the “front line” of confrontation. Of course, this rivalry and the transformation of Afghanistan into a state politically dependent on England during it had a lasting and profound impact on many aspects of the life of its people.

A distinctive feature of the population of Afghanistan (from ancient times to the present day) is ethnic diversity, tribal fragmentation and the presence of various languages ​​and dialects. On an area of ​​652.9 thousand square meters. km. (100 thousand more than the territory of France) is home to more than 30 nationalities and a huge number of tribes. This ethnic diversity is caused by several reasons:

Geographical features of the country: Mountain ranges divide Afghanistan into various regions, often difficult to access, which traditionally contribute to ethnic, cultural and linguistic divisions.

Frequent campaigns of conquest of foreign armies in Afghanistan. The newcomers settled on the conquered lands, and a bizarre mixture of cultures and languages ​​took place.

Afghanistan's transit position at the intersection of important trade routes. In addition to merchant colonies, numerous preachers of different origins and entire communities of believers of different religions settled here.

During the reign of the last shahs of the Durrani dynasty (i.e., at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries), the first open attempts by the British to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan date back. To prevent an alliance between Shah Zaman and the ruler of Mysore (a state in southern India) Tipu Sultan, the English East India Company, using its influence in Iran, ensured that the Iranian authorities assisted Shah Zadeh Mahmud in his struggle for the Afghan throne. Thus, English colonial leaders contributed to the overthrow of Shah Zaman.

At the end of 1808, a diplomatic mission was sent to Afghanistan, headed by M. Elphinstone, who on June 17, 1809 managed to conclude an agreement with Shah Shuja. This agreement imposed obligations on Shah Shuja not to allow French troops to pass through Afghanistan in the event of Napoleon I's campaign against India and not to join the Franco-Russian-Iranian alliance. The treaty remained on paper because Shah Shuja was overthrown soon after its signing.

Dost Muhammad Khan, an energetic ruler, came to power in Kabul in 1826 and soon managed to subjugate Ghazni and significantly expand his possessions. Subsequently, he consistently and persistently strove for supremacy over his brothers who ruled in other regions, regions and cities of Afghanistan. The objective result of the policy of Dost Muhammad Khan was a significant (though not final) overcoming of feudal fragmentation, which marked a new stage in the history of the Afghan state.

One of the most important measures carried out by Dost Muhammad Khan was the creation of a regular army. Kabul gunsmiths produced long-barreled muskets that had even greater range than the guns with which the British colonial army in India was then armed. Relying on the new army, Dost Muhammad Khan extended his power to a number of regions of Afghanistan. At the end of 1833 he subjugated Jalalabad.

The strengthening of the independent Principality of Kabul and the successes of Dost Muhammad Khan in unifying the state impeded plans for British expansion into Afghanistan and further into Central Asia. The intransigent position of the East India Company towards Dost Muhammad Khan was explained by the desire to eliminate this obstacle. The East India Company tried to use its protege, the former Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, who lived in India on English support, to undermine Dost Muhammad Khan's policy of unifying Afghanistan. In 1833, the British took a number of steps in preparation for Shuja's campaign in Afghanistan. They managed to agree with Ranjit Singh, the Sultan of Punjab, the ruler of the Sikh state, to assist Shuja. In addition, the East India Company attempted to antagonize the Afghan leaders against Dost Muhammad Khan.

In March 1834, Shuja with a 22,000-strong army, recruited and armed with the help of the East India Company, marched through the Bolan Pass to Kandahar. The Kandahar rulers turned to Dost Muhammad Khan for help. At the end of June 1834, a decisive battle took place near the settlement of Kalai Azim, near Kandahar. Shuja was defeated and fled from the battlefield. Taking advantage of the situation created as a result of Shuja's campaign, the Sikhs in 1834 finally included Peshawar and the Peshawar region into their possessions.

In October 1835, Dost Muhammad Khan addressed a letter to the Russian Tsar Nicholas I, which was delivered by Afghan envoys to Orenburg in May 1836. Orenburg governor V. A. Perovsky, attaching great importance to the emir's diplomatic step aimed at establishing friendly relations between Afghanistan and Russia, sent Afghan envoys to St. Petersburg, accompanied by his adjutant I. V. Vitkevich.

In May 1836, Dost Muhammad Khan addressed the Governor-General of India, Lord D. Auckland, with a request for assistance in resolving Afghan-Sikh relations. The Afghan emir agreed to recognize Sikh rule over Kashmir on the condition that Peshawar be returned to him. However, the reunification of Peshawar with Afghanistan was contrary to the interests of the leaders of British colonial policy, and they did not comply with the plans of the emir.

Vitkevich's mission

I. V. Vitkevich, who accompanied the Afghan envoys from Orenburg to St. Petersburg, was then appointed by the Tsarist Foreign Ministry as the representative of Russia in Kabul. His duty, as stated in the instructions, was to facilitate the reconciliation of the “Afghan owners,” i.e. Dost Muhammad Khan and the Kandahar ruler Kokhandil Khan. Vitkevich also had to explain to the Barakzai rulers “that Russia, due to the distance, cannot provide them with real assistance, but, nevertheless, takes a sincere part in them and will always, through Persia, provide friendly intercession for them...”. In addition, he was tasked with identifying opportunities for expanding Russian-Afghan trade.

On the way to Kabul, Vitkevich visited Kandahar. There, the Russian representative took part in negotiations between the Iranians and Kokhandil Khan, as a result of which a decision was made on an alliance directed against the Sadozai ruler of Herat. In the current situation, Muhammad Shah, who ruled Iran, with the approval of tsarist diplomacy, undertook a large campaign against Herat and in October 1837 besieged the city. By the way, I. Blaramberg, who served in the Russian embassy, ​​was in the camp of the Iranian Shah’s troops as a military adviser. The British, in turn, provided material assistance to Kamran, who ruled Herat. In addition, the officer E. Pottinger, whom they sent to Herat, actually led the defense of the city.

In December 1837, I.V. Vitkevich arrived in Kabul, the capital of Dost Muhammad Khan, where the English mission of A. Burns was located at that time. Burns's task was to prepare the conquest of Afghanistan by the East India Company, to prevent the rapprochement of Dost Muhammad Khan and the Barakzai rulers of Kandahar with Iran, and to prevent their joint action against the Herat possession.

However, A. Burns' mission failed, primarily as a result of the aggressive intentions of the leaders of British colonial policy towards Afghanistan. During the negotiations, A. Burns received from Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, an order to categorically reject Dost Muhammad Khan's claims to Peshawar and to let him know that the British would openly support Ranjit Singh's attack on Afghanistan if the emir did not stop friendly relations with Iran and Russia. Burns was also charged with demanding that Dost Muhammad Khan stop relations with Russia and Iran and immediately expel I.V. Vitkevich from Kabul. Moreover, the emir should never again receive Russian and Iranian representatives without the sanction of the British authorities. Since Dost Muhammad Khan did not accept these humiliating demands, expressed in the form of an ultimatum, Burns left Kabul in April 1838.

In this situation, I.V. Vitkevich managed to assist in the reconciliation of Dost Muhammad Khan with the Kandahar ruler Kohandil Khan and persuade them to a defensive alliance with Iran against the threat of an attack from England. The draft agreement was to come into force subject to a guarantee from the tsarist government. Vitkevich also managed to successfully negotiate with Dost Muhammad Khan to expand trade between Russia and Afghanistan. In addition, he promised the emir Russia’s assistance in the fight for the return of Peshawar. This had a very favorable effect on the results of the negotiations.

However, significant changes occurred in the policy of the tsarist government at this time, which prevented the continuation of the previous line of opposition to British expansion in the Middle East. Trying to get closer to England in resolving the Turkish-Egyptian conflict and hoping to gain British support on the issue of the straits, the tsarist government made concessions on the Herat issue. I.V. Vitkevich left Afghanistan. The Shah of Iran and the ruler of Kandahar were informed of the tsar's disagreement with approving the Iran-Afghan treaty. Thus, the diplomatic results of Vitkevich’s mission were nullified.

Despite this, the British continued to use Witkevich's mission as a pretext for starting a war against Afghanistan, claiming that Dost Muhammad Khan's contacts with Iran and Russia posed a threat to the security of British India. In May 1838, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg handed a note to the Russian Foreign Secretary accusing Russia of hostile steps in Iran and Afghanistan. This, in London’s opinion, threatened British possessions in India and complicated the situation in Asia.

Somewhat earlier, a propaganda campaign was launched in England accusing Russia of aggressive intentions against England. Taking into account the situation developing around Afghanistan, the Russian emperor, interested in establishing closer contacts with England, an alliance with which was necessary to pursue an active policy towards the Ottoman Empire (which at that time was waging an armed struggle against the Egyptian Pasha - Muhammad Ali), recalled Simonich from his post in Iran and disavowed the Russian agent in Afghanistan - Vitkevich. The latter was accused of exceeding his powers, which, as it was announced, amounted only to the collection of information of a trade and economic nature.

Thus, the Russian Empire, under British pressure, abandoned its active policy in this part of Asia and made concessions, freezing its relations with Afghanistan for almost 20 years. Vitkevich, who arrived in St. Petersburg at the end of April 1839, although he was received by the recently appointed head of the Asian Department L. G. Senyavin, was removed from service. On May 8, 1839, he was found dead in a room at the Paris Hotel on Bolshaya Morskaya Street. A note found in the room said that he decided to commit suicide and burned his notes and documents before his death. The mystery of his death has not yet been solved. The pistol did not appear in the list of things that belonged to Vitkevich, compiled by the police bailiff after his death.

Leaving outside the scope of this section the question of the reality of the “throw to the south,” that is, the campaign of the Russian army in India, we only note that plans for such a campaign were being worked out at the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District and the General Staff of the Russian Army in St. Petersburg. Afghanistan, the eastern regions of Iran, and subsequently the Gindukush principalities located in the upper reaches of the Indus, Baluchistan and areas of northern India were visited (often incognito - usually under the guise of Bukhara, Khiva, Armenian and Iranian merchants) by agents and officers of the headquarters of the Turkestan and Caucasian military districts. The Russian military, both then and later, considered Afghanistan as a possible probable enemy - an ally of England. Its territory was studied very carefully as a theater of possible military operations against the Afghan and British armies themselves.

Russia also did not refuse to provide political asylum to a number of representatives of the Afghan political elite - primarily members of the ruling dynasty, who were forced to leave their country for various reasons. Without advertising their presence in Russia too much, the Russian administration tried to turn them into agents of its influence, whose return to their homeland with subsequent active participation in the political life of Afghanistan could be used to realize the political and economic ambitions of the Russian Empire in this country.

Treaty of 1838

Conducting foreign policy preparations for the war against Afghanistan, the leaders of British colonial policy made attempts to attract Ranjit Singh, whose relations with Dost Muhammad Khan remained very hostile, to active participation in the war. Ranjit Singh did not make any concessions to Dost Muhammad Khan on the issue of returning Peshawar. On the contrary, during lengthy negotiations, using the tension of the foreign policy situation, he tried to achieve new acquisitions in Afghan lands or political benefits.

In May 1838, William MacNaghten, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Governor-General of India, was sent to Lahore to negotiate with Ranjit Singh. He managed to persuade Ranjit Singh to conclude an alliance treaty with Shuja, guaranteed by the East India Company. This treaty was signed in July 1838. The East India Company and Ranjit Singh committed to restore Shuja to the Shah's throne of Afghanistan. For the promised military-political support, Shuja ceded Sindh, which did not belong to him, to the British and confirmed the refusal in favor of the Sikh state “for eternity” from Peshawar, Multan, Kashmir and other regions conquered by Ranjit Singh, which were previously part of the possessions of the Sadozai shahs of Afghanistan. Shuja also promised to refuse to join his future state of Herat. The foreign policy of Afghanistan and the Sikh state was to be brought under the control of the British. The terms of the agreement stipulated that Shuja, after being restored to the throne, would invite English officers to organize the army.

Not wanting to aggravate relations with England and yielding to its diplomatic pressure, Ranjit Singh agreed to sign the treaty, while at the same time categorically refusing to allow the troops of the East India Company through the territory of Punjab. The East India Company had to change not only the original plans for the movement of its troops, but also their composition, including in the expeditionary force, in addition to units manned by Indian sepoys, also British regular units.

The next step in British policy in preparing for the invasion of Afghanistan was to put pressure on the Shah of Iran to force him to end the siege of Herat. The British government even went so far as to sever diplomatic relations with Iran. Under the threat of war, the Shah of Iran was forced at the end of August - beginning of September 1838 to lift the siege and withdraw troops from the city.

Having achieved the retreat of tsarist diplomacy, concluding a treaty with Ranjit Singh and Shuja, and forcing the Shah of Iran to withdraw his troops from Herat, the British accelerated preparations for the invasion of Afghanistan. On October 1, 1838, trying to justify what was essentially a war of conquest, the Governor-General of India D. Auckland published a manifesto in Simla. The document spoke of the “need” to overthrow the usurper Dost Muhammad Khan and install the legitimate Shuja on the Afghan throne with the support of the armies of the East India Company.

On the eve of the British aggression, the territory of South-Eastern Afghanistan subject to Dost Muhammad Khan extended from Kohistan (north of Kabul) to Mukur in the south-west and from Bamiyan in the north-west to the Khyber Pass in the south-east. The total population of the lands subject to Dost Muhammad Khan was about 1,300 thousand people.

Beginning of the war

At the end of 1838, the troops of the East India Company under the command of Lieutenant General Keane were sent to Afghanistan. At the beginning of April 1839, all the troops intended for the invasion of Afghanistan through Kandahar united in Quetta. This army, called the “Army of the Indus,” included about 20 thousand combat soldiers and officers. However, its total number was significantly greater, since the army had about 38 thousand baggage and camp servants. The actual leader of the expedition was the secretary of the Anglo-Indian government, William Macnaghten, who was under Shuja as “ambassador and minister.”

In mid-April, the advance towards Kandahar began. The conquerors initially met almost no resistance from the Afghans. Moreover, some influential Afghan Sardars, bribed by the British, went over to Shuja’s side as the “Indus Army” approached Kandahar.

Soon after the entry of British troops into Kandahar, a ceremony took place to restore Shuja to the throne. The day before, on May 7, 1839, he signed an eight-point treaty that effectively destroyed the country's independence. Shuja confirmed the territorial concessions (enshrined in the 1838 treaty), agreed to the isolation of Afghanistan from the outside world, and also to the fact that the British occupation forces would remain.

However, from the very beginning of the war, the negative attitude of the Afghan people towards Shah Shuja, who arrived in the country with foreign troops, began to become clear. The Afghan resistance took the form of a religious war for faith against the British.

On July 21, 1839, advanced British troops approached the Ghazni fortress, which was considered impregnable and well prepared for a siege. However, as a result of betrayal, the British learned about the number of troops in Ghazni, about the most vulnerable point of the city’s defense - the unbarricaded “Kabul Gate”. Having taken the city by storm, the English conquerors carried out a bloody massacre of the inhabitants of Ghazni. A week later, leaving a garrison in the captured fortress, they set out for Kabul. An 11,000-strong English detachment was also advancing through the Khyber Pass to Kabul; Soon the British took Jalalabad.

Dost Muhammad Khan with the army he had assembled, which numbered up to 6 thousand people, set out from Kabul to meet the British and Shuja. But the betrayal of some of the military leaders forced Dost Muhammad Khan to leave the army, retreating with his family and a few associates to Bamiyan, and then further north, to Khulm. The army he left behind scattered. On August 7, 1839, the British and Shuja entered the capital without a fight.

Spoiled by easy victories in the colonial wars, British officials and officers believed that their position in this occupied country was secure. Neglecting basic precautions, the British command extremely unsuccessfully deployed troops in the vicinity of Kabul - in a swampy lowland, in an extremely unfavorable area from a military point of view. In addition, soon part of the occupation forces was withdrawn from Afghanistan, and the number of the garrison located near Kabul was significantly reduced. Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare began in Afghanistan, and discontent among various segments of the population grew. The British had to abandon plans for an immediate attack on South Turkestan, where Dost Muhammad Khan was hiding, as the local population was preparing to resist them.

On November 2, 1840, at the Battle of Parwan, the British were defeated, suffering heavy losses in killed and wounded. They retreated, fearing an uprising in the areas in their rear, as well as encirclement. But it was at this moment, under circumstances that remained not entirely clear, in any case, completely unexpectedly for the British, Dost Muhammad Khan left his army, came to Kabul and surrendered. Wanting to quickly remove the popular emir from the country, the British sent him under strong guard to India.

At the first moment after the emir’s surrender, the wave of uprisings that swept Afghanistan subsided; it seemed that a period of calm had set in. However, this silence was deceptive. Soon the whole people rose up to fight, whose performance had a decisive influence on the outcome of events. In the spring and summer of 1841, the flame of the people's war began to flare up more and more widely in the country. The clergy, who considered the establishment of the power of the “infidels” (the British) as a desecration of Muslim orthodoxy, stopped mentioning the name of Shuja in the “khutbah” - during prayers read on the holiday of Friday. Increased tax oppression also caused dissatisfaction.

The winter of 1840/1841 was famine in many parts of Afghanistan. Food resources in the vicinity of the capital were also small. Large purchases of provisions and fodder for the English camp soon caused a sharp increase in food prices in the bazaars of Kabul. The English conquerors thus alienated all segments of the population of Afghanistan. But neither the growing discontent of the people nor the growing wave of uprisings shook the confidence of the British leaders, including MacNaghten, in the strength of their position in the occupied country.

The turning point in the war and the defeat of the British

Signs of big events being prepared in Afghanistan began to appear with particular force in September 1841. The Kabul uprising was immediately preceded by a major armed uprising of the Ghilzais, who interrupted the communication of the Kabul garrison with India. On the night of November 2, 1841, an uprising began in Kabul. The rebels surrounded the houses of the British resident in Kabul, Alexander Burns, and other British officers. After an unsuccessful attempt to calm the rebels by offering them a ransom, A. Burns dressed in a woman's dress and fled, but was identified and killed.

The urban poor, artisans and traders, as well as peasants from surrounding villages took part in the Kabul uprising. Soon they were joined by detachments of Afghan tribes who approached the capital. The British troops stationed in the Sherpur camp (near Kabul) were demoralized and did not take active action against the rebels. The capital was completely in the hands of the rebels. In addition, on November 5, 1841, British food warehouses were captured by the Afghans. The English garrison found itself in a very critical situation. After a stubborn battle, in which the British lost several hundred killed and part of their guns, the rebels captured important positions on the heights of Bemaru.

By this time, among the leaders of the liberation struggle of the Afghan people, Muhammad Akbar Khan, the son of the emir, took first place. McNaghten had to negotiate with the Afghan leaders and on December 11, 1841, sign an agreement with them, which contained an obligation to withdraw British troops from Afghanistan, return prisoners and return Dost Muhammad Khan to his homeland. Perhaps the signing of the agreement was only a maneuver on Macnaghten’s part, a desire to stall for time in order to cause discord among the participants in the uprising through intrigue, and, if an opportunity presented itself, to capture the rebel leaders and destroy them. But he did not take into account the treachery of the Afghan leaders themselves, who sensed the weakness of the British.

The denouement came when Muhammad Akbar Khan tried, during negotiations on December 23, 1841, to capture Macnaghten himself, who, however, resisted and was shot by Akbar Khan.

Macnaghten's death caused panic among the British. On January 1, 1842, a new agreement was concluded between the British leaders and the Afghan Sardars, the terms of which provided for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan. About 4.5 thousand soldiers and officers with nine guns and 12 thousand camp and baggage servants left Kabul. A harsh winter and the actions of Afghan partisans turned the retreat of the demoralized British and Sinai units into a disaster; the entire occupying army was destroyed. At the beginning of 1842, attacks by Afghan troops on the English garrisons remaining in some cities and regions of the country were still continuing.

After the departure of foreign troops from Kabul, Shuja was forced, under pressure from the popular masses, to declare a “holy war” on the British and advance to Jalalabad, where he expected to move to the English camp. However, on the way, he was attacked by one of the Barakzai sardars with a small group of followers. Shuja was shot dead as a traitor.

At the beginning of April 1842, General Pollock’s units moved from Peshawar to the rescue of the besieged Jalalabad garrison. Having met almost no resistance (the leaders of the Afghan tribes in the Khyber region were bribed by the British), Pollock’s troops approached Jalalabad on April 17.

Muhammad Akbar Khan entered into negotiations with Pollock on the conditions for the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan and the return of Dost Muhammad Khan from captivity, but upon receiving news of the death of Shuja and the accession of his son Fath Jang to the throne, he urgently left for Kabul. Here he took up the post of wazir (vizier) under Fath Jang. However, the latter managed to escape to Jalalabad to the British.

Meanwhile, the new Governor-General of India, Ellenborough, sent additional instructions to the troops, essentially ordering the launch of a punitive expedition. In August 1842, the British moved to Kabul and soon occupied it, establishing Fath Janga in Bala Hisar. Having occupied the capital of Afghanistan, the British colonialists burned and plundered the city and its surroundings, killing thousands of civilians. English punitive detachments operated in a number of regions of the country.

However, the British were unable to keep Afghanistan under their rule. The ongoing people's war forced them to leave the territory of this country. Since Fath Jang, who understood that without the support of foreigners he would not remain in power, abdicated the throne, instead of him, before leaving Kabul, the British placed another son of Shuja, Shahpur, on the throne. However, soon, having learned about the impending speech of Muhammad Akbar Khan, the new Shah fled from the capital.

At the beginning of 1843, Dost Muhammad Khan was allowed to return to his homeland. Thus, the British admitted the complete failure of their policy towards Afghanistan.

Thus ended the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-1842. The British themselves remembered this war for the fact that in one battle, having been ambushed, their troops lost 16 thousand soldiers. One detail makes this story especially scary: out of 16 thousand, only one person was saved.

conclusions

1) During the first Anglo-Afghan war, the main goal of Great Britain was the gradual transformation of Afghanistan into a colony, an ordinary province under the control of the East India Company and a governor-general. Events developed according to a standard scenario, repeatedly successfully tested in India, but without taking into account the special Afghan specifics, which led to the military defeat of the expeditionary force.

2) It was on the territory of Afghanistan that the British for the first time (during their advance in South Asia) encountered active opposition from Russia and tsarist diplomacy, which on the whole turned out to be very effective (taking into account the available resources). Moral support from Russia was an important factor in prompting Afghan leaders to reject British demands.

3) England’s position in the region was quite strong, however, this advantage could not be realized. Which ultimately led to the restoration of an independent Afghan state and a temporary weakening of British expansion.

4) The contradictions between Russia and Great Britain were very strong. Considering that for Russia the Afghan issue was of secondary importance, a concession to Russia seems somewhat painful, but logical. However, Russia was never able to achieve its goals and gain approval for its position regarding the straits. Moreover, the catastrophic defeat of Britain in this war, and the indirect blame (by manipulating public opinion) for the failure on provocations on the part of Russian diplomacy, led to revanchist sentiments, which could be one of the factors in Britain's entry into the Crimean War against Russia. So overall the concession was useless. However, if the Shah of Iran had continued the operation in the Herat region, the British could have built war tactics differently, in particular, not withdrawing “extra” units after the capture of Kabul, which could have led to a different development of events.

5) It is noteworthy that both diplomats participating in the confrontation, both the Russian Vitkevich and the British Burns, experienced moments of triumph and failure, but their final fate was tragic.

6) The lessons of the first Anglo-British war were not sufficiently taken into account during future military operations in this region, which again led to tragic consequences.