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Magilina Inessa Vladimirovna. The Moscow state and the project of the anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. : dissertation... candidate of historical sciences: 07.00.02 / Magilina Inessa Vladimirovna; [Place of protection: Volgogr. state University] - Volgograd, 2009. - 380 pp.: ill. RSL OD, 61 09-7/726
Introduction
Chapter I. Eastern policy of the Moscow state and the project of the anti-Turkish coalition
1.1. Anti-Turkish coalition as an instrument of the Moscow state’s eastern policy 31
1.2. The activities of the Moscow state in the process of organizing the anti-Turkish coalition
second half of the 80s. 16th century 54
1.3. Early Modern Anti-Turkish Triumvirate Project 82
Chapter II. In search of a military-political alliance
2.1. Efforts of the Muscovite state to conclude an agreement with the Holy Roman Empire 123
2.2. Military-political agreement between the Moscow state and Persia. 144
2.3. The project of the anti-Turkish alliance of Shah Abbas and plans for its implementation 176
2.4. Historical significance of the diplomatic mission of A.F. Zhirovo-Zasekina to Persia 202
Chapter III. The question of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the beginning of the 17th century
3.1. Boris Godunov’s Eastern Policy and Persian-Imperial Negotiations 224
3.2. Anti-Turkish program of False Dmitry I 251
3.3. Diplomatic mission of the Carmelites in Persia 264
3.4. Imperial-Persian embassies in the Moscow state during the Time of Troubles 285
3.5. Changes in the European foreign policy situation and the position of the Moscow state and Persia 313
Conclusion 350
Bibliography, 354
Applications 378
Introduction to the work
The relevance of research. After the fall of Constantinople, one of the main problems international relations was a reflection of Ottoman aggression on European territories. To successfully act against the Ottomans, interested European powers needed to create an anti-Turkish league or coalition. 1 The main goal of the coalition was to develop projects to collectively counter the Ottomans. Initially, it was planned to conclude an alliance between Spain, Venice, the Roman Curia and the Holy Roman Empire. However, the establishment of trade and political contacts with Persia allowed European governments to realize at the end of the 15th century that the Ottoman Empire could be blocked from both the west and the east and would not be able to wage a war on two fronts: against Christian Europeans and Shiite Persians. Due to contradictions between European states, the implementation of the idea of creating a broad anti-Turkish coalition 2 became possible only in the 80s. XVI century The creation of the coalition was the first attempt to form international political alliances consisting of several powers.
The Moscow state acted as an active participant in the anti-Turkish coalition and the main mediator between Persia and Western Europe in the process of concluding a military-political alliance. Participation in the coalition provided the Moscow state with a chance to integrate into the European community, the opportunity to become its full member, strengthen and, possibly, expand its southern borders.
The concepts of “league” and “coalition” are identical, but have a qualitative difference. “League” is an association (union) of organizations or states, “coalition” involves concluding an alliance between states to achieve a certain goal. In this case, the coalition was created to fight Ottoman Empire. In the documentation of the 16th century. The term “league” is more often used, although in practical terms the anti-Turkish alliance is precisely a “coalition”.
2 The negotiation process to create an anti-Turkish coalition can be divided into 3 stages: 1453-1524, the second quarter - the beginning of the 80s. XVI century and since the late 80s. XVI century until 1618 (beginning of the Thirty Years' War in Europe). At the first stage, the European powers tried unsuccessfully to attract first Uzun Hasan to the union, and then, after the creation of a unified Persian state, Shah Ismail I. At the second stage, the main states participating in and sympathizing with the anti-Turkish “coalition” were identified, which, however, was not formalized by international agreements. Distinctive feature In the third period, it became possible to participate in the anti-Turkish coalition, in addition to sovereign states, the Danube principalities and the Balkan peoples who were under the Turkish yoke.
4
The international position of the Moscow state, its role in
international politics of the late XVI - early XVII centuries. were conditioned
several factors. Firstly, the level of political, economic and
social independence of the state. Secondly, the desire to
recognition of its independence by other European and Asian
powers. The third factor is the geostrategic location (geographical
location between Western Europe and Asia and political-strategic
meaning) of the Moscow state - influenced political and economic
relations between European and Eastern powers. Fourth
factor - awareness of oneself as part of the “post-Byzantine world”, independence from
Horde yoke - had the greatest influence and determined mainly
eastern policy of the Moscow state before the start of the Thirty Years
Thus, the study of the process of participation and the role of the Moscow state in the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition seems very relevant both from the point of view of studying the history of Russia at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries, and the history of international relations of this period.
The degree of knowledge of the topic. The process of accumulating historical information about the participation of the Moscow state in the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. occurred both in domestic and foreign historiography.
The question of the Moscow state joining the anti-Turkish league was raised in general works on Russian history starting from late XVIII V. According to M.M. Shcherbatov, the Moscow government sympathized with the creation of an anti-Turkish league, but did not intend to take an active part in it. The historian believed that the coalition could help the Moscow state conclude peace with Poland on favorable terms. 4 M.M. Karamzin, unlike M.M. Shcherbatov, believed that the participation of the Moscow state in the league was possible, but for this he had to secure formal
3 Term see: Khoroshkevich A.L. Russia in the system of international relations of the mid-16th century. M., 2003. P. 559.
4 [Shcherbatov M.M.J Russian history from ancient times, composed by Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov: in 7
t. St. Petersburg, 1791.T.6-7.C.629.
5 agreements with closest allies in this fight. One of
Such allies were the Holy Roman Empire. In a relationship with
the Shah of Persia, the Moscow government adhered to a wait-and-see approach
tactics. Labor M.M. Karamzin contains valuable information on the subject under consideration.
topic in the form of extracts from archival documents^ lost to the present
time. For example, information about the embassy to Persia, Prince. I.P.
Romodanovsky 1606 SM. Soloviev noted the importance of relationships
The Moscow state with European countries, in particular with the Habsburgs,
and emphasized that such a policy was more beneficial to the Austrian
emperors than the Moscow court. He paid special attention to the eastern
aspect of Russian foreign policy after the capture of Kazan and Astrakhan. Historian
was the first to introduce the concept of the “Eastern Question” into science and point out the fact
tripartite negotiations in Moscow in 1593-1594, aimed at creating
anti-Turkish alliance of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and
Persia, but did not achieve the goal. 6 Noted historians have considered the problem
entry of the Moscow state into the anti-Turkish coalition from the point of view
the role and foreign policy position of Russia, which it occupied after
reign of Peter I. Such an evaluative stereotype interprets politics
states of previous eras from the perspective of its political interests are more
late time.
The first special work dedicated to Russian-Persian
relationships, became the study of SM. Bronevsky (1803-1810), made in
the beginning of the 19th century, on the instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince. A.A. Czartoryski. IN
For a number of reasons, the SM manuscript. Bronevsky was published only
in 1996. The manuscript is based on documents from the archives of the College of Foreign Affairs.
According to the researcher, the Moscow state received in 1589
offer from Sixtus V and Emperor Rudolf II to become a member
anti-Turkish alliance. B. Godunov, on behalf of Tsar Fedor, agreed to enter
league, subject to the conclusion of an agreement with all Christian sovereigns.
5 Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 3 books, containing 12 volumes. St. Petersburg, 1843. Book.
III. T. 9. P. 131,413.
6 Soloviev SM. History of Russia from ancient times. 1584-1613. M., 1989. Book. IV. T. 8. pp. 461-463.
CM. Bronevsky argued that it was this proposal that prompted the Moscow government to intensify its Eastern policy. It intended to strengthen its own positions in Transcaucasia. This was also facilitated by the proposals of the Persian Shah Mohammed Soltan Khudabende to conclude an alliance against the Turks. CM. Bronevsky adhered to the opinion of M.M. Shcherbatov that the Moscow authorities did not intend to conclude an alliance against the Ottomans, but tried through their actions through the mediation of Clement VIII and Rudolf II to force Poland to make peace on terms favorable to it.
With the release of the work SM. Solovyov, the interest of historians in the “Eastern Question” and its significance for Russian political doctrine was renewed. This was facilitated by Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878, which required a historical justification for Russia’s role in the liberation of the Balkan peoples. Works on the “Eastern Question” by historians V.V. were published. Makusheva, F.I. Uspensky and SL. Zhigareva.
Slavicist V.V. Makushev used in his research work unpublished materials from Italian archives. The historian analyzed two anti-Turkish projects of the last quarter of the 16th century. from the Ambrosian Library, testifying to the preparation of an uprising of the Balkan Slavs with the assistance of the Moscow state. 8 V.V. Makushev provided evidence of the potential capabilities of the Moscow state, which lay in the Cossacks “who constantly fought with the Turks during this period of time.” 9
Uspensky F.I. formulated the concept of the “Eastern Question” as a foreign policy phenomenon. Taking as a basis the views of SM. Solovyova, F.I. Uspensky believed that in the Moscow state from the end of the 15th century. The “Eastern Question” was understood as “a question of Russian politics.” 10 The historian convincingly showed that the very awareness of this fact did not yet give the Moscow state political and socio-economic opportunities to implement its Eastern policy. Only from the second half of the 16th century.
7 Bronevsky SM. Historical extracts on relations between Russia and Persia, Gruzna and in general with the mountaineers
peoples living in the Caucasus from the time of Ivan Vasilyevich to the present day. St. Petersburg, 1996. pp. 11-16.40.
8 Makushev V.V. Eastern question in XVI-XVII centuries. (Based on unpublished Italian monuments) // Slavic
collection. T. 3. St. Petersburg, 1876. pp. 24-26.
9 Ibid. P. 32.
10 Uspensky F.L. How the “Eastern Question” arose and developed in Russia. St. Petersburg, 1887. P. 32.
7
The “Eastern Question” was skillfully used in foreign policy
Moscow State.""
Legal historian S.A. Zhigarev, in a multi-volume work devoted to Russian policy in the “Eastern Question,” paid main attention to the historical and legal justification of the role and place of Russia in this process. Following N.M. Karamzin S.A. Zhigarev emphasized the wait-and-see nature of the Moscow government’s position in the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The historian believed that the Moscow authorities sought to encourage the Empire and Persia to take active military action against the Ottoman Empire, but they themselves did not intend to participate in the war. Like SM. Solovyov S.A. Zhigarev believed that the main direction of Moscow foreign policy in the last quarter of the 16th century. there was a struggle for Livonia and access to the Baltic Sea. 13
Summarizing the position of V.V. Makusheva, F.I. Uspensky and S.L. Zhigarev, we can say that the “Eastern Question,” identified by historians with the struggle against Turkey, had an autonomous meaning in the foreign policy doctrine of the Moscow State and played a secondary role in relation to the Baltic problem. This scheme easily fits into the basic principles of Western concepts, but does not provide answers to questions related to the foreign policy activities of the Moscow authorities to create an anti-Turkish coalition.
Based on materials from Georgian and Persian ambassadorial books of 1587-1613, archivist S.A. Belokurov noted the emergence of the Caucasian issue in the eastern policy of the Moscow state and its influence on Russian-Persian relations. The historian believed that the main goal of Russian-imperial relations was diplomatic efforts to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance between the emperor, the tsar and the shah. S.A. Belokurov suggested that victories over Kazan and Astrakhan greatly increased the prestige of the Moscow state in
11 Ibid. P. 94.
12 Zhigarev S.L. Russian policy in the Eastern Question (its history in the 16th-19th centuries, critical assessment and
future tasks). Historical and legal essays: in 2 volumes. M., 1896. P. 39.
13 Ibid. P. 77.
8 eyes of Persia. As a result, the Persian army was sent to Moscow in 1553
embassy to establish permanent diplomatic contacts. 14
the most valuable monuments of diplomatic and trade relations of Muscovite Rus'
with Persia. 15 He was the first to draw attention to the forms of contracts between
European and Eastern rulers. Emphasizing their fundamental
difference, he noted that the “peace treaties” corresponded
"shert" charters of Muslim rulers. 16 This remark gives a clue to
understanding the ways of concluding agreements between Muslim and
Christian sovereigns.
The richest documentary material on the relations of Moscow
states with Western European countries gathered at the beginning of the 20th century. E.F.
Shmurlo. In a note to the publication of documents from Italian and Spanish
archives of E.F. Shmurlo emphasized that in the development of close diplomatic
connections were interested in both the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, and
Moscow government. The main goal of their cooperation was anti-Turkish
union, but each side also pursued its own national interests. 17
Orientalist V.V. Bartold believed that European, incl. and Moscow,
sovereigns needed in the 16th-17th centuries. in Persia primarily as a political
an ally in the fight against the Ottoman Empire and only then as a trading partner.
While developing relations with Persia, Russia tried to achieve other goals. So,
The scientist considered the campaign of governor Buturlin in 1604 an attempt by the Moscow authorities
to gain a foothold in the Northern Transcaucasus, and not with help; the Shah's troops fighting in
Dagestan. 18
Belokurov S.A. Historical overview of the connections of the Caucasus with the political formations of the East European Plain and with the Moscow state until the beginning of the 17th century. M., 1889. P. 111-112.
5 Monuments of diplomatic and trade relations between Muscovite Rus' and Persia / Ed. Veselovsky N.I. In West St. Petersburg, 1890-1898.
16 Veselovsky N.I. Errors and errors in the publication of documents on relations between Russian sovereigns and Asian owners. St. Petersburg, 1910 P. 26.
p Monuments of cultural and diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy. [Inventories of Italian archives, documents, reports of the scientific correspondent of the Academy of Sciences Evgenia F. Shmurlo]. T. I. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1907. P. 21. 18 Bartold V.V. Place of the Caspian regions in history Muslim world. Baku, 1925; His own. History of the study of the East in Europe and Russia. Lectures given at the University and at the Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages. L., 1925. P.213.
9
In the 30s. XX century studying issues related to
relations between Russia and Persia continued undeservedly
currently forgotten E.S. Zevakin and M.A. Polievktov.
Zevakin E.S. specially studied diplomatic relations between the Moscow state and Persia in the second half of the 16th-17th centuries. 19 According to the scientist, one of the main aspects of Persia’s foreign policy relations with European states in the last quarter of the 16th century. there were relations with the Holy Roman Empire. The Persian question in Russian-imperial relations ultimately boiled down to the question of a Russian-imperial-Persian alliance directed against the Ottoman Empire. Unlike V.V. Bartold, he believed that European states could need Persia as an ally in the anti-Turkish coalition only in the 16th century. From the beginning of the second quarter of the 17th century. Economic interests came to the fore.
Unlike his predecessors, M.A. Polievktov managed to identify 2 directions of Russian foreign policy at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries: the Baltic and the Black Sea-Caucasian (i.e. eastern). The historian believed that the main task of Moscow's eastern policy at the end of the 16th century. There were efforts aimed at paralyzing the actions of the Ottomans in the North Caucasus. From the first quarter of the 17th century. protecting one's own interests in this region has become paramount. The researcher provides valuable information of a historical and biographical nature in the annotations to the register of travelers in the Caucasus and Persia in the 13th-18th centuries. 21
In the post-war period N.A. Smirnov expressed the idea that the confrontation between the Moscow state and the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of the struggle with the Tatar-Mongols. The fight against the Ottomans brought the Muscovite state closer to Persia and the Holy Roman Empire, which sought help from Moscow. According to the scientist, resolving contradictions
19 Zevakin E.S. History of diplomatic and trade relations between Russia and Persia in the 16th-17th centuries. 1934. Archive
orientalists of the Leningrad branch of IVAS. Rank 1. Op. 6. Units hr. 3. L. 1-67. Unfortunately, this valuable
The researcher's work is still unpublished.
20 Zevakin E.S. The Persian question in Russian-European relations in the 17th century. // Historical notes. 1940. No. 8.
pp. 128-162.
21 Polievktov M.A. Economic and political intelligence of the Moscow state of the 17th century in the Caucasus.
Tiflis, 1932. P. 16; His own. European travelers in the Caucasus in the XHI-XVIII centuries. Tiflis, 1935.
10 between the Moscow state and Turkey would inevitably lead to
war. The historian believed that the initiator of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition was
Boris Godunov, and believed that the embassy of N. Varkocha from Emperor Rudolf II
looked for help in Moscow not only against Turkey, but also against Poland. 22
According to Ya.S. Lurie, the main direction of foreign policy
Moscow state of the last quarter of the 16th century. was Baltic. But
there was also a Black Sea-Caspian direction. Both courses are external
policies that emerged in the middle of the century merged with each other: the struggle for
The Baltic was to be fought against Turkey. The researcher reported that
Ivan IV promised to join the anti-Turkish league only on the condition that
it will include all Christian states, including Poland. He believed that
in this way the Moscow state could provide itself with protection from
aggressive plans of Stefan Batory. I'M WITH. Lurie also expressed a controversial
the opinion that Boris Godunov's negotiations on an alliance against the Ottoman
empires were only a diplomatic maneuver, and the king did not fight the Sultan
was going to. . /
Researcher of Russian-English relations N.T. Nakashidze concluded that from the second half of the 16th century. The “Eastern Question” became a pan-European problem, in which Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, France, England and the Moscow State took part. At this time, the active foreign policy of the Moscow government contributed to the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. B. Godunov understood that in order to solve both the Baltic and the “Turkish-Crimean” problems it was necessary to conclude an alliance with the European powers. But, as N.T. believed. Nakashidze, the emperor and the popes did not want the Moscow state to strengthen in the international arena. Therefore, Moscow was assigned a secondary role in the coalition. It was assumed that it would neutralize the Crimean Khanate in the long war and ensure a coalition
22 Smirnov N.A. Russia and Türkiye in the 16th-17th centuries. In 2 vols. M., 1946. T. 1. P. 140-153.
23 Lurie Y.S. New data about the embassy of Sugorsky and Artsybashev in 1576 // Historical notes. 1948. T.
27. P. 297; its ok. Issues of domestic and foreign policy in the messages of Ivan the Terrible // Messages of Ivan
Grozny. Preparation of the text by D.S. Likhachev and Ya.S. Lurie. Translation and comments I'M WITH. Lurie. M.-L., 1951. P. 492-
551; his ex. Russian-English relations and international politics of the second half of the 16th century. //
International relations of Russia until the 17th century. M., 1961. S. 419-443.
money and will help improve relations between the Holy Roman Empire and Persia and Georgia. 24
The issue of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was also given attention by a major
Soviet scientist I.B. Grekov. He believed that the Moscow state had become
be interested in projects for creating an anti-Turkish coalition even under Vasily III.
The historian saw the reason for this not only in the desire of the Grand Duke to increase his
status among European sovereigns, but also in the permanent Turkish-Crimean
aggression in the countries of Eastern Europe since the 20-30s. XVI century At the same time, according to
I.B. Grekov, the dependence of the Tatar states on Turkey was constantly increasing
Volga region and Crimea. The Ottoman Empire sought to weaken as much as possible
The Moscow state with the help of raids by the Crimean and Kazan Tatars. This
helped Turkish politicians manipulate the balance of power between
Moscow and Warsaw. 25,
The intentions of the Moscow authorities to enter into a war with the Ottoman Empire concerned T.G. Tivadze in his dissertation on the place of Persia in the foreign policy of the Muscovite state at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. The historian adhered to the position of Ya.S. Lurie that the negotiations of the Moscow state on the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance with Western European partners were only a diplomatic maneuver. At the same time, T.G. Tivadze believed that the Moscow government had a great interest in an alliance with Persia. The Shah was the first to propose to the Tsar to restore relations that had been interrupted in the middle of the 16th century, but the initiator of the military-political alliance with Persia was the Moscow State. The union could help Moscow oust the Ottomans from the Caspian regions and strengthen its position in the North Caucasus."
A.P. Novoseltsev believed that the Moscow state had in the second half of the 16th century. close diplomatic ties with Persia, due to common interests in the fight against Turkey. In his opinion, Persia managed to conclude an agreement with the Moscow state, which resulted in
24 Nakashidze N.T. Russian-English relations. Tbilisi, 1955. P. 34.
25: Grekov I.B. Essays on the history of international relations in Eastern Europe in the XIV-XVI centuries. M., 1963. P. 233.
26 Tivadze T.G. The Iranian question in the foreign policy of the Moscow state at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries:
military expedition Buturlin to the Caucasus. In addition to these two powers, the anti-Turkish coalition included the Georgian kingdoms, Kazakh khanates, Khorezm and the power of the Great Mogul. The conclusion of A.P. seems convincing. Novoseltsev that since the beginning of the 20s. XVII century to first place in Russian-
Persian relations raised questions of a trade and economic nature.
In work on the history of Russian-Iranian embassies of the late XVI - early XVII centuries. P.P. Bushev noted that the joint struggle with Turkey and the Crimean Khanate was the core of Russian-Persian relations of the period under review. However, in general, relations between the two states were reduced not to a military-political alliance, but to trade and commercial activities. The historian concluded that different approach Moscow State and Iran to solve their priority political problems. He believed that the political line of Moscow diplomacy towards Persia during the period noted was more consistent, direct and testified to the tsar’s firm intention to conclude an anti-Turkish military-defensive alliance. Persia's position, on the contrary, was characterized by duality and insincerity. According to P.P. Bushev, the Shah had no intention of concluding a military alliance with the Moscow state. The picture presented by the researcher turned out to be clearly incomplete, since in his work he relied primarily on materials from inventory 1 of fund 77 “Relations between Russia and Persia” of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, published by N.I. Veselovsky. Unfortunately, the most important documents of inventories 2 and 3 of the same fund, containing letters and agreements of the Russian tsars and Persian shahs, as well as materials from fund 32 “Relations of Russia with the Roman Empire”, which make it possible to make significant additions to the characteristics of the Russian-Persian relationships. 28
The only special work devoted to the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the 70s. XVI century, the publications of large
Novoseltsev A.P. Russian-Iranian political relations in the second half of the 16th century. // International relations of Russia until the 17th century. M., 1961. S. 444-461; its eeee. Russian-Iranian relations in the first half of the 17th century. // International relations of Russia in the XVII-XVIII centuries. Economics, politics, culture. M., 1966. P. 103-121. 28 Bushev P.P. History of embassies and diplomatic relations between the Russian and Iranian states in 1586-1612. M., 1976. S. 435-442.
13
specialist of Russian-Polish relations B.N. Flory. Historian
convincingly proved that already during the reign of Ivan IV one of the main
foreign policy issues of the Moscow state was the search for allies for
fight against the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, the most suitable
Poland, not the Holy Roman Empire, was the candidate for such a union.
The possibility of improving relations with Poland allowed the Moscow authorities
begin negotiations on an alliance against the Turks and Tatars. The scientist linked
the “Baltic” problem with the solution of the “eastern” issue in cooperation with
Poland, suggesting a close connection between these areas of foreign
policies of the Moscow state in the second half of the 16th century. . B.N. Florya believed that the Moscow state resumed in the 80s. XVI century negotiations with Persia and Poland on the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. One of the goals of the union was to be the elimination of Turkey's protectorate over the Crimean Khanate. To fight the Turks, Poland needed to create a large standing army, which meant changing the taxation system. This would lead to the strengthening of central power and a reduction in the rights and freedoms of the gentry. Therefore, the Polish gentry chose to maintain peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire. This is a valuable observation by B.N. Flory explains why Poland has always remained opposed to the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. The scientist believed that Persia was also unable to join the anti-Turkish coalition. But he came to the controversial conclusion that the main reason for B. Godunov’s failure to create an alliance against Turkey was that he tried to direct this agreement against Poland, an ally of the Holy Roman Empire. thirty
In his doctoral dissertation about N. Varkoč's embassies to Russia and the attempt to form an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th century. I. Prochazka noted that the main goal of the imperial embassies to Moscow was the conclusion of a military-strategic agreement between the Moscow State and the Holy Roman Empire against Turkey. But, following the traditional point of view
29 Florya B.N. The project of the anti-Gguretz coalition in Russian foreign policy of the 70s. XVI century // Social
economic and political history South-Eastern Europe to mid. XIX century Chisinau, 1980. pp. 118-132.
30 Florya B.N. Russian-Austrian relations at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries. (Embassy of Afanasy Vlasyev in
Empire) // International relations of the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and Slavic
German relations. M., 1968. P. 54-80; His own. Russian-Polish relations and the Baltic issue at the end of the 16th century
- early 17th century M., 1973; His own. Russia and the Czech uprising against the Habsburgs. M., 1986.
14 Soviet historiography of the 1980s, the dissertation author tried to link the problem
anti-Turkish coalition with Russian-Polish and Russian-Swedish relations.
Varkocha to Moscow and concluded that they were aimed at creating
anti-Turkish alliance between Moscow and Prague. However, the conclusions made by I.
Prohazka that the anti-Turkish coalition was necessary for Moscow
state in order to break the ring of powers hostile to it is debatable. Except
Moreover, I. Prochazka’s statement that it was Russia that tried to involve
Persia into the anti-Turkish coalition and that the Shah by all available means
tried to avoid this, not true at all. Probably to such conclusions
the researcher came because he had a very limited circle
sources, ignoring the most important of them, in particular the reports of N. Varkoch
about the progress of negotiations. 31
The foreign policy of Abbas I was discussed in works on Persian-European
diplomatic relations of the XVI-XVII centuries. Azerbaijani researchers
EM. Shakhmaliev, O.A. Efendiev, Kh.A. Kambay-zade and Ya.M. Makhmudov. 32 of them
Views on this problem can be summarized in the form of several provisions. In
foreign policy of Shah Abbas I in the second half of the 16th - early 17th centuries.
return of Khorosan to the Safavid state; return of Iranian
territories captured by Turkey; elimination of Portuguese rule in
Hormuz and the establishment of complete control over the Persian Gulf. Search
the Shah carried out allies against Turkey in Europe without the participation of Moscow
states. It was not even considered as a potential ally.
The Western European policy of Abbas I pursued economic goals, in no way
not related to the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. The above
the provisions seem to be very controversial, providing incomplete, in places
31 Prokhazka I. The embassy of Nikolai Varkoch to Russia and the problem of the formation of an anti-Turkish movement at the end of the 16th century
coalitions in Eastern Europe: dis.... cand. ist. Sciences: 07.00.02/ Prochazka Jiri.- M., 1981. - 144 l.
32 Shakhmaliev E.M. On the issue of diplomatic relations of the first Safavids with Western countries // Proceedings
Azerbaijan State University, history and philosophy series. 1950. No. 4. P. 51-67; Efendiev
O.A. Azerbaijani Safavid state in the 16th century. Baku, 1981; Kambay-Zadeh H.A. Safavid State
in the eastern policy of Western European powers at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries // Countries of the Middle and
Middle East in the system of international relations. Baku, 1990. pp. 21-29; Makhmudov Ya.M. Relationships
Ak-Koyunlu and Safavid states with Western countries. Baku, 1991.
15 distorted view of Persian foreign policy due to
limitations and specificity of the sources used
Azerbaijani scientists. .
The author of a fundamental work on the history of Persia, John Malcolm, was the first foreign scientist to characterize Russian-Iranian relations at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. as trade and economic. His research is descriptive in nature and is valuable primarily because it is based on Persian sources. The English historian was the first to highlight the role of the Shirley brothers in the reorganization of the Persian army and in the organization of the Persian embassy to Europe in 1600-1601. 34
In foreign historiography, the Jesuit historian Fr. Pavel Pearling was the first to touch upon the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the second half of the 16th century. He made significant contributions to the study of this issue. The researcher’s undoubted merit is the publication of secret documents from the Vatican archives, accessible only to Catholic priests. According to P. Pearling, it was in the Roman Curia that the idea was born to involve the Moscow state in the anti-Turkish league. The papal legate A. Possevino^ met in the 1580s. in Moscow with Ivan IV. Returning home, he drew up an ideological and political justification for the idea of Balkan pan-Slavism with the Moscow state as its leader. P. Pearling believed that the Roman Curia needed the Moscow state as an intermediary to attract Persia into the ranks of the league. He noted that B. Godunov, while assuring the Turks and Crimean Tatars of friendship, was simultaneously creating an anti-Turkish league. The only and obligatory condition of the Moscow authorities since the time of Ivan IV was the signing of an anti-Turkish treaty in Moscow. P. Pearling reproached B. Godunov for the fact that instead of providing military assistance to the Holy Roman Empire, he paid off the emperor with material assistance. The researcher assessed the position of the Moscow state in relation to
33 The authors used mainly Persian medieval chronicles, which are characterized by tendentiousness
material, and English sources. Extensive documentation of the Ambassadorial Prikaz concerning Russian-
Azerbaijani researchers did not consider Persian relations at all, references were mainly
done for work Busheva P.P. History of embassies and diplomatic relations between Russian and Iranian
states in 1586-1612, which is of a very tendentious nature.
34 Malcolm J. Histoire de la Perse. V. II. Paris, 1821.
anti-Turkish coalition as a whole as positive and considered the period 1593-1603. most favorable for its creation.
The negotiation process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was examined by researcher of Russian-Austrian relations X. і Ubersberger. He was the first to draw attention to the differences in the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the Moscow State, which determined the unequal attitude of their rulers to the implementation of foreign policy tasks. The scientist believed that in relations with the emperor, the main goal of B. Godunov was not the conclusion of an anti-Turkish alliance, but to obtain guarantees in the event of the throne passing into his hands. The emperor had to undertake obligations to protect the Godunov dynasty from the claims of Poland. Thus, the Moscow state, under the pretext of concluding an anti-Turkish alliance, was going to drag the Empire into a war with Poland. X. Ubersberger wrongfully identified the Holy Roman Empire with Austria-Hungary in the second half of the 19th century, so when a historian talks about the policy of “Austria”, it is necessary to understand this as the policy of a specific emperor, in particular Rudolf P. 36
French orientalist of Iranian origin Khanbaba Bayani published valuable documents of diplomatic correspondence between Abbas I and Safi I with European sovereigns from London and Paris archives. He believed that the main goal of the relationship between the Moscow state and Persia was the conclusion of a military-defensive alliance against Turkey. European states were even more interested in this union. 37
Around the same time, a small work on the history of Iranian diplomacy was published by Reza Sardari, who lived in Paris. The work listed Russian embassies to Persia in 1590-1618. and one Persian to Moscow in 1616. Sardari only briefly touched upon the goals and objectives of the embassies. He believed that during this period there were peaceful and
Pierling P. Papes et tsars (1547-1597): D "aprns des documents nouveaux. Paris, 1890; Pierling P. Un missionnaire diplomate au seizieme siccle // Revue du monde catholique. Paris, 1894. T. XXIV. P. 526-543; Pierling P. Lettre du Dmitri dit le faux a Clement VIII. Paris, 1898; Pierling P. La Russie et le Saint-Siege. Etudes diplomatiques. T. I, T. II, T. III. Paris, 1896-1901.
36 Uebersbergers H. Osterreich und RuCland seit dem Ende des 15 Jahrhunderts. Bd. 1: 1488-1605. Wien u Leipzig, 1906.
37 BayaniK. Les relation de Gigap avec PEurope occidentale a I "epoque Safavide (Portugal, Espagne, Angleterre, Holland
et France); (avec documents inedita). Paris, 1937. /
17 /
good neighborly relations. According to R. Sardari, the Shah himself
offered B. Godunov the trading cities of Derbent and Baku as a “gesture
good will". But he took this as a sign of Persia’s weakness and later in every possible way
tried to emphasize the supremacy of his own power. Unfortunately,
the researcher did not indicate the sources of his information. However, analysis of the text
work suggests that their circle was very limited and they had
Russian emigrant origin. Information from R. Sardari about goals and objectives
and the results of the embassies is far from complete, and the conclusions are highly controversial.
He identified the goals and objectives of Russian foreign policy at the end of the 16th century - beginning
XVII centuries and the 18th century, confused the Muscovite state with the Russian Empire,
called B. Godunov and M. Romanov emperors. 38
Based on Iranian sources, the French orientalist L. Bellan compiled a detailed description of the reign of Shah Abbas I. The study contains brief information about the arrival of Russian ambassadors to the court of Abbas I, as well as about the Shah’s plans to create an anti-Turkish coalition. Particularly valuable is the information about the negotiations in 1602 between Abassa I and the imperial ambassador G. Tekander regarding the conclusion of an offensive alliance against Turkey, which is missing from the ambassador’s report on his journey. L. Bellan believed that the Shirley brothers played an important role in attracting Persia to the anti-Turkish coalition. The embassy of A. Shirley and Hussein Ali Beg to Europe (1599-1600) had 2 tasks: to conclude an offensive alliance against the Ottomans and to agree on the supply of Persian raw silk to European markets. 39
Czech researcher J. Matousek studied the goals and objectives of European politics in the period of preparation for the war against the Ottomans in the early 1590s. A significant place in his work is devoted to Russian-imperial relations, which were carried out during this period through the embassies of N. Varkoch in 1593 and 1594-1595. Considering the Russian-Imperial-Persian negotiations in Moscow in 1593, the historian concluded that all three parties agreed
Sardari R.. Un chapitre de G histoire diplomatique de l"lran. (Les Traites entre PIran et la Russie depuis le XVI siecle jusqu"a 1917). Paris, 1941. 39 Bellan L.L. Chah Abbas.: Sa vie, son histoire. Paris, 1932.
18 conclude an agreement on a joint fight against the Ottomans. The historian believed
that the Roman Curia was going to join the alliance, but on condition
signing of the treaty in Rome. 40
The English scientists L. Lockhart and P. Sykes, who studied the history of Persia, relying on Persian chronicles, came to the erroneous conclusion that between the Moscow state and Persia until the middle of the 17th century. there were no political contacts. In contrast to ties with England, ties with which have been established since the early 60s. XVI century and, according to Lockhart and Sykes, uninterruptedly evolving into a military alliance, with the help of which Abbas achieved the liberation of Hormuz from the Spaniards in 1620. 41
Austrian researchers W. Leitsch, B. von Palombini, K. Voselka emphasized that the initiative to create an anti-Turkish coalition always came from Western Europe, and the Moscow state was assigned a secondary role in the proposed union. They believed that the relationship between the Moscow State and the Holy Roman > empire at the end of the 16th century. were distinguished by intensity and ostentatious pomp, but negotiations on the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance were fruitless. 42. V. Leitsch, following Ubersberger, argued that the socio-political and economic specifics of the development of the Holy Roman Empire and the Moscow State influenced different approaches to solving foreign policy problems. Similarly, the historian believed that the Muscovite state, under the pretext of concluding an anti-Turkish alliance, was going to drag the Empire into a war with Poland. V. Leich considered the main interests of the Moscow state in the fight against the Ottomans to be the return of southern Russian lands. Poland also laid claim to these same lands. Therefore, the interests of the Moscow state and Poland collided not only in the Baltic, but also in the Black Sea direction. 4 B. von Palombini argued that at the end of the 16th century. The Moscow state, having regulated
40 MatousekJ. Tureska valka v evropske politice v letach 1592-1594, Obrazs z dejin diplomacie protireformacni. Prague,
1935. P. 218-223.
41 Lockhart L. The fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan occupation of Persia. Cambridge, 1958; Sykes P. A.The
History of Persia. V.I. London, 1951.
42 Leitsch W. Moskau und die Politik des Kaiserhofes im XVII Jahrhundert (1604-1654). Graz-Koln, 1960. S. 36;
Palombini Barbara von. Bilndniswerben abendlandischer Machte um Persien 1453-1600. Wiesbaden, 1968. S. 107;
VocelkaK. Die politische Propaganda Kaiser Rudolf II (1576-1612). Wien, 1981.
43 Leitsch W. Op. cit. S. 34.
19 relations with Poland, was ready to join the anti-Turkish league as
"temporarily interested state". 44 K. Voselka managed to prove that
early 1590s the idea of creating an anti-Turkish league acquired new content.
European governments began to be guided by political and
economic benefits, and not medieval slogans like “crusader
campaign against the infidels." The Moscow authorities acted in a similar way.
The Roman Curia, for example, proposed creating an anti-Turkish league in the form of an alliance
Christian states to maintain European peace. According to
Voselki, Imperial-Persian diplomatic relations were established
only in 1600 with the arrival in Prague of the great embassy of Hussein Ali Beg and
Anthony Shirley. As a result of negotiations, the Shah opened a second front in 1603 with
by the Ottomans, which allowed the emperor to insist on continuing the war. However
no serious military-political imperial-Persian agreement
there was no agreement. 45 Imperial-Persian connections K. Voselka believed
"exotic". 46
Jan Paul Niederkorn, exploring the history of the "Long Turkish War",
which was led by the Empire from 1593 to 1606, tried to summarize the role and participation in
each of the European countries. Based on imperial and Italian
documents, the historian claims that the plan to create a broad anti-Turkish league
developed by the Roman Curia by the early 1590s. Ya.P. Niederkorn called
European coalition, because Spain was supposed to participate in it,
Holy Roman Empire, France and Venice, although participation was expected
Moscow State and Persia. The league remained open to small
Italian states. Poland's participation in it was not envisaged. Scientist
adhered to the opinion of V. Leich and K. Voselka that the Moscow authorities
were not against participating in the anti-Turkish league, but were persecuted, like others,
their political goals. At the same time, Godunov avoided open conflict with
Turkey and took a wait-and-see attitude. Ya.P. Niederkorn believed that
the condition for the participation of the Moscow state in the league was joining the coalition
PalombiniB. Op. cit. S. 103.
VocelkaTO. Op. cit.
VocelkaK. Rudolf II und seine Zeit. Wien-Koln-Graz, 1985 S. 194.
20 Spain, the Roman Curia, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice.
The Austrian historian’s remark about different approaches seems important
pope and emperor to resolve the issue of joint military action
league participants. Clement VIII believed that the Muscovite state would accept
direct participation in hostilities on the territory of the South-Eastern
Europe: in Moldova and Bulgaria. Rudolf II expected from Moscow above all
monetary assistance and actions against the Crimean Tatars. YAP. Niederkorn believed,
that Clement VIII was mistaken about the degree of influence of Moscow
state on the Balkan peoples, because it did not have political relations with them
connections. The role of instigators of the fight against Ottoman rule is more
The Roman Curia and the Holy Roman Empire were approaching. 47 Researcher
ignored the plans of the Roman Curia itself, which clearly outlined
the role of the Moscow state in the involvement of the Balkan Slavs in
anti-Turkish movement. In addition, the plans of the Moscow state
regarding the anti-Turkish struggle are outlined not on archival materials, but from
Analysis of domestic (pre-revolutionary / and Soviet), as well as
foreign historiography allowed us to come to the conclusion that the history of participation
Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end
XVI - early XVII centuries. has not been specifically studied and has not been sufficiently studied. IN
post-Soviet period is a problem under consideration neither in Russia nor abroad
has not been specifically studied. Scientists have touched on certain aspects of this topic in
the process of general research into Russian history, the study of Russian history
diplomacy, Russian-imperial and Russian-Iranian relations, history of creation
coalitions of an earlier period. In the scientific literature only in general terms
reflects issues of bilateral and trilateral relations between
Muscovy, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, associated
with the creation of the anti-Turkish league. Background, reasons and features
the emergence of the idea of creating a coalition, intensifying the eastern direction
47 Niederkorn J.P. Die europaischen Machte und der “Lange Tiirkerkrieg” Kaiser Rudolf II (1593-1606). Wien, 1993. S. 67-70; 453-460.
21 foreign policy of the Moscow state, changes in priorities
Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations have not been studied. Conditions for
implementation of the anti-Turkish coalition project has not been identified. Specifics and
The dynamics of the development of the process of creating an anti-Turkish alliance have not been determined.
The causes and consequences shown by historians, as well as the assessments of events, are controversial.
Data from researchers on the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end
XVI - early XVII centuries. are fragmentary and contain factual inaccuracies. They
require verification and significant supplementation with information from archival and
Purpose and objectives of the study. The purpose of the dissertation research is to find out the reasons and features of the process of participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition as an independent direction of Eastern policy.
To achieve this goal, the following tasks have been identified:
Identify the prerequisites, determine the features of the emergence of the idea of creation
anti-Turkish coalition of European states;
determine the reasons for the intensification of the eastern direction of the foreign policy of the Moscow State in the XVI century - AD. XVII centuries;
highlight the conditions for the implementation of the project of an anti-Turkish coalition consisting of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia;
Reveal the reasons, clarify the goals and features of the integration process
Moscow state into the European community through participation in
anti-Turkish coalition; /
trace the specifics and dynamics of the development of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition;
to clarify the reasons for changes in foreign policy priorities in Russian-Austrian and Russian-Persian relations.
Chronological framework of the study cover the period from 1587 to 1618. - the time of greatest diplomatic activity of the European powers, Moscow State and Persia in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The lower chronological limit is determined by the beginning of practical actions
22
The Moscow state aimed at creating a coalition.
The upper chronological boundary of the study was determined by the start date
The Thirty Years' War, which changed foreign policy priorities
majority of coalition members.
Geographical scope of the study limited to the territories of states and peoples that were part of the anti-Turkish coalition or were in the sphere of their political influence.
Methodological basis dissertation are the principles of historicism and
objectivity, allowing the study of objects and phenomena in diversity and
specific historical conditions of their origin and development. During
General historical and special methods of scientific research were used for the dissertation work. Historical-genetic method helped to trace the dynamics of the creation and development of the anti-Turkish coalition. Historical-comparative method allowed us to identify common and specific features states participating in the anti-Turkish coalition, patterns and random phenomena in the development of relations between them. Historical-typological method made it possible to develop a classification of types of interstate agreements and treaties between Christian states and Persia in the time period under consideration, and a periodization of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Combination historical-comparative And historical-typological methods made it possible to identify common and specific features characteristic of different periods of the coalition creation process. Historical-systemic method allowed us to consider the relationship between the powers of the anti-Turkish coalition as a unified system of their international relations at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries, to take into account the national interests of these states, and to trace their influence on the development of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Method of structural analysis of historical sources helped to determine the place of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of each of the powers considered, and to identify the specifics of the “understanding of this idea by the governments of the powers.”
23
Sourceresearch base make up
started XVII centuries on the history of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition, participation in this
process of the Moscow State and other countries. Written sources
can be divided into 4 groups depending on the origin, purpose of creation
and the nature of the information contained in them: office work
documentation of Russian origin, office documentation
foreign origin, chronicles, memoirs, diaries and travel notes.
1. Office documentation of Russian origin. Some of the sources from this group were published in monuments to diplomatic relations between Russia and foreign powers, edited by N.N. Bantysh-Kamensky and N.I. Veselovsky, in the Don Affairs and in the Rank Books of the period 1475-1605. and the Time of Troubles. 48 Unlike N.I. Veselovsky, N.N. Bantysh-Kamensky published documents in facsimile versions. The collections included materials on the relations of the Moscow State with the Holy Roman Empire and Persia in 1488-1621: boyar lists and rank lists, ambassadorial books, article lists (ambassador reports), instructions to ambassadors, unsubscribes and petitions.
Unpublished sources are presented by documents from the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA): F. 32 Relations of Russia with the Roman Empire, 49 F. 77 Relations of Russia with Persia, 50 F. PO Relations of Russia with Georgia, F. 115 Kabardian, Circassian and other affairs , "cases from the archives of the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences
48 Monuments of diplomatic relations of Ancient Russia with foreign powers. Relations with Rome
Empire / Ed. N.N. Bantysh-Kamensky. T. I, from 1488 to 1594. T. II, from 1594 to 1621. St. Petersburg, 1851 - 1852;
Monuments of diplomatic and trade relations between Muscovite Rus' and Persia / Ed. N.I. Veselovsky. T.
1.SP6., 1890;T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1892; T. 3. St. Petersburg, 1898; Don affairs: In 5 volumes. T. 1.M., 1898; Discharge records for Troubles
time collected by a Full Member S.A. Belokurov. M., 1907; Rank book 1475-1598 / Prepared. IN AND.
Buganov. M., 1966; Rank book 1559-1605 / Prepared. L.F. Kuzmina. M., 1974; Rank book 1475-1605 T.
I-III / Prep. N.G. Savich. M., 1977-1982.
49 RGADA. F. 32. Op. I. 1488-17.19. Register 1 - books and files. Book 5. 1584-1594. L. 266-312; Register 2 - letters and
contracts. 1593. Unit. hr. 1; Op. 2. Certificates. 1573-1699. Unit hr. 23-25, 29; Op. 3. 1490-1713. Treatises. 152 units hr.
50
RGADA. F. 77. Op. 1. Books and affairs 1588-1719. Book 2. 1588-1589. L. 1-26; Book 4. 1592-1594. L. 1-93; Book 5.
1595-1617; Book 6. 1618-1624. L. 1-114435 storage units; F. 77. Op. 2. Charters 1603-1717. 93 storage units; Op. 3. Treatises 1588-
1719. 15 storage units. Op. 3. Units hr. 5.
51 RGADA. F.PO.Op. 1.D. 1586-1695. L. 1-39; Op. 2. D. 1587-1614. L. 1-63.
52 RGADA. F. 115. Op. 1. D. 1578-1720. L. 1-16.
24
(IRI SPb.): F. 178 Astrakhan Acts or “Astrakhan Order
ward". 53 They include embassy books, article lists, orders, unsubscribes,
petitions, draft speeches of ambassadors at reception audiences, shorthand
records of negotiations, collections of letters exchanged between each other
sovereigns, treaties (agreements) between states, diplomatic letters.
During the study, in the composition of funds 32 and 77 RGADA, it was possible to find
many important documents that were not included in N.N.’s publications. Bantysh-
Kamensky and N.I. Veselovsky: most of the documents of the register 2 inventory 1,
files of inventory 2 F. 32, embassy books No. 2, 4 and 6, partially book No. 5 of inventory 1,
files of inventories 2 and 3 F. 77. Many of the documents F. 32 are compiled in German
language, some in Latin. Among them there are many materials that
missing from Austrian archives.
The sources of the first group contain extensive data on diplomatic correspondence between the Prague, Moscow and Persian courts, draft agreements on a military offensive alliance against the Ottoman Empire, which were supposed to be concluded between the participants in the anti-Turkish coalition. These sources were deposited in the affairs of the Ambassadorial Prikaz for the period 1588 to 1719. The paperwork materials revealed valuable information about the negotiation process on the creation of an anti-Turkish offensive alliance between the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, routes and conditions of stay in various countries ah allied embassies. The documents give an idea of the composition, work and needs of diplomatic missions, the powers of ambassadors, the nature and forms of relations between the allied states, highlight the political connections of the coalition member states, make it possible to clarify the role of the Moscow state in the anti-Turkish alliance, and trace changes in the foreign policy of the allied states that occurred at the beginning XVII century
2. Record keeping documents of foreign origin. The sources of this group are represented by documents of foreign diplomatic departments, extracted by Russian and foreign historians
53 IRI SPb. F. 178. Op. 1.Storage unit No. 115; Unit storage unit no. 138; storage unit no. 191; Ed. No. 201; Unit hr. No. 225.
25 from foreign archives and libraries. Most of them were published on
original language in collections of documents published under the editorship of Russian and
French scientists A.I. Turgeneva, 54 D. Bercher, 55 E. Charriera, 56 T. de Gonto
Biron de Salignac, 57 E.L. Shmurlo. 58
The same group of sources includes diplomatic documents of the Carmelite Order under the code name “Chronicle of the Carmelites,” published in 1939 in London. 59 “The Chronicle” contains instructions and reports of the Carmelites who carried out diplomatic tasks of the Roman Curia in Persia, correspondence of the papal office with the Persian shahs, proposals of Shah Abbas I to create an anti-Turkish coalition, plans of the Roman Curia and some other European states to create an anti-Turkish alliance. The Chronicle documents the negotiation process for the creation of an anti-Turkish league between the Roman Curia, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia.
The correspondence of the Roman pontiffs with the Moscow sovereigns 61 and monuments of diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy represent diplomatic documents 62 devoted to the issue of creating an anti-Turkish coalition during the reign of Vasily III and Ivan IV. Unpublished materials consist of a collection of documents F. 30 RGADA, extracted by Russian scientists from the archives of the Vatican, Rome and Venice, archives and libraries
France and England.
It is noteworthy that documentation of a diplomatic nature on the topic in question in the Austrian and Persian archives is very
Historica Russiae Monumenta, ex antiques exterarum gentium archivis et bibliothecis deprompta, ab A.J. Turgenevio. V. I. SPb., 1841; V. II. SPb., 1842; Supplementum ad Historica Russiae Monumenta. SPb., 1848.
55 Berchet G La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia. Torino, 1865.
56 Negociations de la France dans le Levant ou correspondans, memo ires et acts diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de
France a Constantinople et des ambassadeurs, envoyes ou residents a Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jerusalem en
Turquie, Perse, Georgie, Crimee, Syrie, Egypte etc. / Par E. Charriere. Paris, 1853.
57 Ambassade en Turquie Jean de Goniaut Biron baron de Salignac 1605 a 1610. Correspondance diplomatique et
documents inedit (publies et annotes) / Par le Comte Theodor de Gontant Biron. Paris, M DCCC LXXXIX (1887).
58 Monuments of cultural and diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy. [Inventories of Italian archives,
documents, reports of a scientific correspondent of the Academy of Sciences Evgenia F. Shmurlo]. T. I. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1907.
59 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia. Papal Mission of the XVII-th and XVIII-th Centuries. London, 1939.
61 Correspondence of popes with Russian sovereigns in the 16th century. St. Petersburg, 1834.
62
Monuments of cultural and diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy. T. 1. Issue. 1. L., 1925; Russia and Italy.
Collection of historical materials concerning relations between Russia and Italy. T. 2. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1913.
63 RGADA. F. 30. Op. 1. Unit hr. 163.
26 scarce and difficult to access. 64 This is probably due to the fact that in
The Holy Roman Empire at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. was missing
diplomatic department, such documents were not systematized and
settled in the imperial archives randomly. In addition, the emperor had
several residences scattered throughout the Empire. In Persia from
When the Kazhgar dynasty came to power, all documents were destroyed,
associated with Safavid rule. Court historiographer of the next Shah
usually compiled a chronicle without relying on archival materials, that is, from memory
and by the impression made on him personally. Therefore Iranian
researchers of international diplomatic relations noted
period used mainly foreign sources, including
Russian origin.
Office documentation of foreign origin
represented by letters of foreign sovereigns/, reports, reports and
reports of foreign ambassadors, dispatches from papal nuncios and other
diplomatic correspondence of foreign powers regarding the conclusion
anti-Turkish coalition. The sources of the second group contain valuable data about
development of projects for creating an anti-Turkish coalition, secret instructions
to European diplomats in Persia, secret reports from European
diplomats to their rulers. Documents provide insight into connections
The Moscow state with foreign countries, internal political
events of the Moscow state, plans for the campaign of False Dmitry I against
Turkey, embassies of the Holy Roman Empire in Moscow, international
position of the Ottoman Empire. Sources allow you to find out the reaction
Ottoman Empire on the actions of European states directed against
her, Turkey’s attitude towards the states of the anti-Turkish coalition (including
Muscovy and Persia), highlight the proposals of the Roman Curia about
the role of the Moscow state in the proposed union.
Lobanov N. New documents on the history of Russian-German relations at the beginning of the 17th century. 1604-1654 Vienna State Archives // New and Contemporary History. 2002. No. I. P. 202-208; Stanley L.P. Muslim dynasties chronological and genealogical tables with historical introductions. St. Petersburg, 1899. P. 27.
3. Chronicles. Presented with materials from published
monuments of Russian chronicles - Nikon Chronicle and New Chronicler. The Nikon Chronicle repeatedly contains descriptions of Shamkhal and Gilyan “guests” at the court of the Moscow sovereign. 65 The New Chronicle reflects historical events from the end of the reign of Ivan IV to the 1730s, including data on the arrivals and receptions of Persian ambassadors. 66 Information from chronicle monuments allows us to get a general idea of the events in the Moscow state and Russian diplomacy of the era in question, complements the information from the ambassadorial books F. 77 RGADA.
4. Memoirs, diaries, travel notes. Represented by memories
diary entries and reports of foreign ambassadors and travelers:
imperial ambassadors Niklas von Varkotsch, 67 Michael Schiele, 68 Oruj bey Bayat -
Secretary of the Persian Embassy Hussein Ali Bey Bayat and A. Shirley in
Europe, 69 Stefan Kakash von Zalonkemeny and Georg Tektander von der
Yabelya, 70 Spanish ambassadors to Persia A. de Gouvea 71 and Garcia da Silva da
Figueroa, 72 Polish ambassadors and at the court of False Dmitry I. 73 Sources of this group
supplement data from other documents on work, instructions and authority
ambassadors with instructions to create an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th century -
beginning of the 17th century In addition, the travel notes of the Spanish ambassadors give
an idea of the Spanish king's response to Abbas I's proposals for an alliance
against the Ottoman Empire, on resolving the conflict situation in
Chronicle collection, called the Patriarchal or Nikon Chronicle // Complete collection Russian Chronicles (PSRL) / [Reproduction of text ed. 1910]. T.6. M., 1965. 06 New chronicler // PSRL. /[ Reproduction of text ed. 1910]. T. 14. M., 1965.
67 Description of the trip to Moscow by the ambassador of the Roman Emperor Nikolay Varkoch from July 22, 1593 M., 1874.
68 Report on the trip to Moscow of the courtier of the Roman Emperor Mikhail Chalet in 1598 // CHOIDR. 1875.
Book 2. -S. 132-157.
69 The full version of Oruj Bey’s work has been translated from Spanish. language in English. and published G. Le Strepjem. See: Don
Juan of Persia a shi"ah catholic 1599 -1601. London, 1926. The full version of Oruj Beg's notes was recently published
Bayata in Russian. See: Russia and Europe through the eyes Oruj-bey Bayat- Don Juan of Persia / Trans. With
English, introduction, comment. and decree O. Efendieva, A. Farzalieva. St. Petersburg, 2007.
70 Kakash and Tektander. Travel to Persia through Muscovy in 1602-1603. / lane with him. A. Stankevich
M., 1896.
71 Gouveantis Automus. Relation des grandes guerres et victoires obtenues par le roy de Perse Chah -Abbas contre les
empereurs de Turque Mahomet et Achmet son fils Rouen, 1646.
72 Don Garcias de Figueroa de Silva. L "ambassade en Perse contenant la politique de ce grand empire les moeurs du Roy
Schach Abbas etc. Paris, 1667.
73 Diary of Moscow incidents and the master's embassy to Moscow N. Olesnitsky and his secretary A. Gonsevsky
/Trans. Polish, preface N.G. Ustryalova // The legend of contemporaries about Dmitry the Pretender. St. Petersburg, 1859, 4.2.
-WITH. 199-262.
28 Hormuz, the evolution of the Shah's attitude towards European sovereigns and the Spanish
the king in particular.
This group of documents includes a unique and little accessible source to a wide range of researchers about the anti-Turkish mission of papal envoys to Persia in 1604 - 1612. - O. Paul-Simon and Fr. Zhanna-Tadde, compiled and published by Fr. Berthold-Ignacio de Sainte-Anne. 74 Of great value is the information it contains about the negotiations of papal ambassadors with False Dmitry I regarding the anti-Turkish alliance and their stay in the Moscow state during the Time of Troubles.
Thus, the main part of the source base for the dissertation research was made up of office documentation of the Ambassadorial Order of the Moscow State and foreign diplomatic departments. Some sources are included in scientific circulation first. Many of the documents used in the work were compiled in foreign languages and translated into Russian for the first time in the course of this research; a wide range of sources makes it possible to critically comprehend the historiographic data on the participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the late 16th - early 17th centuries, and to involve it in the study history, new materials, restore the picture of the negotiation process, identify the reasons, goals, conditions, dynamics and features of the participation of the Moscow state and other countries in the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance in the specified period.
Scientific novelty of the research. For the first time, a special scientific study has been carried out on the participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition.
The evolution of the idea > of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of European states is traced. In the last quarter of the 16th century. The idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was transformed in connection with the ongoing socio-political and economic changes in the international situation.
74 Bertold-Ignace de Sainte-Anne. Reverend Pere. Histoire de L"Etablissement de la Misson de Perse par les Peres Carmes-Dechausses (de l"annee 1604 a 1612); Bruxelle, 1886.
The reasons are revealed, the goals and features of the process are clarified
integration of the Moscow state into the European community through
participation in the anti-Turkish coalition. Contrary to the traditional opinion of Russians
and foreign researchers, the Moscow state intended
participate in military and political actions against the Ottoman Empire. His military-political and military-strategic plans related to the creation of a coalition were multidimensional and long-term in nature.
Conditions have been determined for the implementation of the anti-Turkish coalition project in
composition of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia.
The Holy Roman Empire and Persia shared borders with the Ottoman Empire
empire and were in a state of permanent war with it.
The geostrategic position of the Moscow State allowed it
act both as an intermediary and coordinator, and as a direct
participant in the fight against the Ottoman Empire.
Financial, human and diplomatic resources identified
The Moscow state is necessary to participate in the anti-Turkish coalition, and
also possible forms of his participation in the anti-Turkish campaign. Moskovskoe
the state could involve detachments of Don troops in the military anti-Turkish campaign
and partly Zaporozhye Cossacks, Kabardian and Circassian vassals
squads, placed in the fortresses of Transcaucasia, located at the intersection
roads, streltsy garrisons, exert force and diplomatic pressure on
Crimean Tatars, assist Persia in the rapid implementation through Europe
raw silk, supply firearms to Persia in exchange for
territorial concessions on its part.
The reasons for the change in foreign policy priorities in Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations at the beginning of the 17th century are clarified. It was found that the participation of the Moscow state in the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was an independent direction of its eastern policy of the late 16th - early 17th centuries. The stages of this process are highlighted. It has been determined that the process at different stages of development has different dynamics and different significance for the coalition participants. Achievements in prison
The anti-Turkish agreement was virtually nullified as a result of the Troubles in the Moscow State and the signing of a peace treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The creation of an anti-Turkish coalition became impossible. With the beginning of the Thirty Years' War in Europe, the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition ceased to be relevant until the last quarter of the 17th century.
Structure and content of the dissertation work determined by its general concept, purpose, objectives and logic of research. The dissertation consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature, and an appendix.
The dissertation has a certain structural composition, which is due to the fact that the work examines two problems in their interrelation: the issue of creating a pan-European anti-Turkish military-strategic alliance with the participation of the Moscow state and Persia and the evolution of Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations. Both research problems are considered in interrelation, development and chronological sequence. This specificity is reflected in the content of the chapters, their number and chronological sequence of the structure of the work.
Anti-Turkish coalition as an instrument of the Moscow state's eastern policy
The Ottoman threat or the “Eastern Question” was perceived by the European community as a struggle between Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire.2 The Roman pontiffs after 1453 repeatedly attempted to organize a new crusade. At the end of the 15th - beginning of the 16th century. The medieval concept of the crusade as “the liberation of the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels” underwent major changes. For the papacy, of course, issues of faith were of priority importance, because only the Roman Pontiff had the religious and political authority to call Christendom to a "holy war" against the infidels. But now the religious and philosophical idea has acquired specific political and geographical content. The new crusade is a struggle against the Ottomans, against the alien cultural and religious world of Islam, which threatened to destroy the Christian world. The fight against the “largest military power of the Middle Ages”4 was possible only under the condition of “nemic commune” - the unification of the military-technical potentials of all interested countries. Hence the need arose to create an anti-Turkish coalition.5 Various options for an anti-Turkish league or coalition were considered in the Roman Curia. Final version had to satisfy all interested parties. It was quite difficult to do this, given the contradictions between European states.6 Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were supposed to be present in the anti-Turkish coalition. The Roman Curia was assigned the role of ideological leader. The listed states had land or sea borders with the Ottoman Empire and were in a state of permanent war with the Ottomans. The Holy Roman Empire was most interested in creating an anti-Turkish coalition; the Empire was a confederation of German, Slavic and Italian principalities and lands.7 The main reason for the consolidation of various political entities around the Holy Roman Empire, with the ruling Habsburg dynasty, in the second half of the 15th century. there was opposition to Ottoman aggression.8 Since 1526, when the kingdoms of the Czech Republic and Hungary became part of the Empire, in the eyes of Europe it began to be considered “the shield of the Christian world against the Turkish threat.”9 During the first half of the 16th century. The Empire was gradually losing territory to the Ottomans in the Balkans and Hungary and was in dire need of allies who could share with it the burden of the anti-Turkish struggle. Therefore, the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the country’s foreign policy was a priority. Theoretically, other European states, in particular France, England, and Poland, could join the anti-Turkish coalition. But these countries, in the matter of creating an anti-Turkish coalition, pursued their own, narrowly national interests.10 Therefore, despite the fact that the Roman Curia carried out active propaganda work among European monarchs, due to contradictions between Spain, France and England, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice, the Empire and Poland, such plans remained only hypothetical projects. In order to change the situation, it was necessary to make serious adjustments to the composition of the league participants. The Roman Curia began to consider options for political union with states outside the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church, including non-Christians. The issue of such an alliance for the Roman Curia was complex from a theological perspective. From an orthodox point of view, the expansion of the league to include non-Christian states was considered unacceptable and “against faith.”11 In the 16th century. on the issue of the anti-Turkish struggle, the Roman pontiffs turned out to be more pragmatic politicians than orthodox high priests. They managed to theologically substantiate the need to create a league specifically against the Ottomans “in alliance with the 12 interested states, including non-Christians.”
Efforts of the Muscovite state to conclude a treaty with the Holy Roman Empire
The Ottoman threat or the “Eastern Question” was perceived by the European community as a struggle between Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire.2 The Roman pontiffs after 1453 repeatedly attempted to organize a new crusade. At the end of the 15th - beginning of the 16th century. The medieval concept of the crusade as “the liberation of the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels” underwent major changes. For the papacy, of course, issues of faith were of priority importance, because only the Roman Pontiff had the religious and political authority to call Christendom to a "holy war" against the infidels. But now the religious and philosophical idea has acquired specific political and geographical content. The new crusade is a struggle against the Ottomans, against the alien cultural and religious world of Islam, which threatened to destroy the Christian world. The fight against the “largest military power of the Middle Ages”4 was possible only under the condition of “nemic commune” - the unification of the military-technical potentials of all interested countries. Hence the need arose to create an anti-Turkish coalition.5 Various options for an anti-Turkish league or coalition were considered in the Roman Curia. The final version had to satisfy all interested parties. It was quite difficult to do this, given the contradictions between European states.6 Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were supposed to be present in the anti-Turkish coalition. The Roman Curia was assigned the role of ideological leader. The listed states had land or sea borders with the Ottoman Empire and were in a state of permanent war with the Ottomans. The Holy Roman Empire was most interested in creating an anti-Turkish coalition; the Empire was a confederation of German, Slavic and Italian principalities and lands.7 The main reason for the consolidation of various political entities around the Holy Roman Empire, with the ruling Habsburg dynasty, in the second half of the 15th century. there was opposition to Ottoman aggression.8 Since 1526, when the kingdoms of the Czech Republic and Hungary became part of the Empire, in the eyes of Europe it began to be considered “the shield of the Christian world against the Turkish threat.”9 During the first half of the 16th century. The Empire was gradually losing territory to the Ottomans in the Balkans and Hungary and was in dire need of allies who could share with it the burden of the anti-Turkish struggle. Therefore, the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the country’s foreign policy was a priority. Theoretically, other European states, in particular France, England, and Poland, could join the anti-Turkish coalition. But these countries, in the matter of creating an anti-Turkish coalition, pursued their own, narrowly national interests.10 Therefore, despite the fact that the Roman Curia carried out active propaganda work among European monarchs, due to contradictions between Spain, France and England, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice, the Empire and Poland, such plans remained only hypothetical projects. In order to change the situation, it was necessary to make serious adjustments to the composition of the league participants. The Roman Curia began to consider options for political union with states outside the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church, including non-Christians. The issue of such an alliance for the Roman Curia was complex from a theological perspective. From an orthodox point of view, the expansion of the league to include non-Christian states was considered unacceptable and “against faith.”11 In the 16th century. on the issue of the anti-Turkish struggle, the Roman pontiffs turned out to be more pragmatic politicians than orthodox high priests. They managed to theologically substantiate the need to create a league specifically against the Ottomans “in alliance with the 12 interested states, including non-Christians.” After sending “Turkish aid” to the emperor, Moscow rightly hoped for a positive solution to the issue of an alliance agreement. The Moscow government demonstrated maximum goodwill and seriousness of intentions. The emperor and his government could not ignore the gesture of voluntary material assistance, because... were interested in continuing this type of service. Moscow envoys M.I. received preliminary consent to send ambassadors of European sovereigns interested in creating an anti-Turkish coalition to Moscow. Velyaminov and A. Vlasyev in September 1595. Upon returning to Moscow, the ambassadors reported in detail about the balance of power in Europe. Circumstances were favorable for at least a detailed discussion of the articles of the future treaty. Together with Velyaminov and Vlasyev, the messenger Jan Prochinsky arrived in Moscow on December 1, 1595, with the emperor’s gratitude for the “royal treasury.”1 L. Pauli arrived with a letter from the emperor, notifying about the sending to Moscow of a great embassy led by Avram Burgrave of Dunavsky (Abraham von Don or Donau), governor of the state of Lower Lausitz and chairman of the Bohemian Court of Appeal.3 This was the most respectable embassy in the entire history of Russian-imperial relations. Burgrave Abraham von Donau was not only a noble and influential nobleman, but also a rich man, so he was able to equip an embassy caravan of 120 nobles, not counting the service personnel. 4
The embassy arrived in Moscow on April 28, and on May 22, 1597, during the first audience with the Moscow sovereign, Lou a Pauli submitted letters from his immediate master, Archduke Maximilian, to Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich and B. Godunov.5 Why is this detail important? for the embassy of Abraham von Donau? The fact is that Austrian historians are trying to substantiate the thesis that the Moscow side did not understand well what exactly the emperor wanted from it and that the embassy of A. Donau was again, once again, discussing the rights and possibilities of Archduke Maximilian to the Polish throne. Maximilian was very interested in the issue of the Polish crown, and the Moscow government allegedly tried to regain the Kyiv lands in this way. Emperor Rudolf II himself no longer shared these claims of his younger brother, because they prevented him from establishing relations with the Polish king Sigismund III.6
Russian historian B.N. agrees with this point of view. Florya, who also believes that the main goal of bilateral relations between the Empire and the Moscow state should have been a joint struggle, believed that the messenger L. Pauli submitted this letter to Godunov. February 1, 1597, that is, when he conveyed the news of the arrival of the imperial embassy. See: Lists of diplomatic persons. P. 16. This fact raises some doubts, because Bilateral relations between the Moscow court and Archduke Maximilian developed quite intensively and the issues discussed between them could not have had such a long delay. Perhaps L. Pauli brought Maximilian’s letter in the summer of 1596, received an answer to it, and in October 1596 he was again sent to Moscow as the emperor’s messenger.
Poland. However, it is worth emphasizing that negotiations on the affairs of the emperor and on the affairs of the archduke, although they often took place during the same embassy, were always carried out separately. Moreover, the imperial ambassador could represent the interests of Maximilian and even the interests of the Spanish king, as N. Varcoch did, but the archduke's ambassador always spoke only on his behalf and never discussed the emperor's problems.
Boris Godunov's Eastern Policy and Persian-Imperial Negotiations
August 28, 1603 to Moscow together with A.F. The embassy of Shah Abbas, headed by Lachin Bey, arrived at Zhirovo-Zasekin. Despite the fact that information about Lachin Bey’s embassy is completely absent from materials on Russian-Persian relations, it is very important for understanding the relationship between possible allies in the anti-Turkish coalition during this period of time. Scarce information about the mission of Lachin Bey was preserved only in materials on Russian-imperial relations, reflecting the stay of G. Logau’s embassy in Moscow. This fact is symbolic, because If we consider Russian-Persian relations during this period of time in isolation from the idea of an anti-Turkish alliance, then this episode seems strange, to say the least. If we assume a relationship with the issues discussed with the emperor’s embassy, then this fact seems understandable. For the first time M.M. drew attention to the embassy of Lachin Bey. Shcherbatov, who wrote that he discovered brief information about the arrival of the embassy in Moscow in the Discharge Book for 7111-7112.2 At the same time, the historian emphasized that in the archives of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs he was unable to find either a description of the reception of the Persian ambassador or the reasons for his arrival in Moscow. Despite the almost complete lack of information about the content of the negotiations between Tsar Boris and Lachin Bek, M.M. Shcherbatov was amazed by the gifts that the ambassador delivered to Moscow on behalf of Shah Abbas. Abbas’s most valuable gift to Tsar Boris was “a chair forged in silver and richly decorated, which still exists today and shows that he (Lachin Beg) was one of the great ambassadors, and that the reason for his embassy had quite important reasons.”3 This is the conclusion from The Shah's gift was made by M.M. Shcherbatov. But the Moscow side also gave him special meaning, which is clearly seen from the speech of the bailiff I. Sudakov to the Austrian ambassador G. Logau: “and the Shah sent to His Royal Majesty about friendship and love, and with him (Lachin bey) he sent many amateur funerals to the Royal Majesty. And for the honor of the Tsar’s Majesty, he sent to our Great Sovereign, His Tsar’s Majesty, a place of Tsar’s gold from the lalas and from the yacht and with other expensive stones of the former Great Sovereigns of Persitsa.”4
The description of the reception of the embassy has been preserved in the Discharge Book. “On the 4th day of the summer of September 7112, the Kizilbash Ambassador Lachin Bek visited the Sovereign and Grand Duke Boris Fedorovich of All Russia for the first time. And the sovereign was in royal dress in the Golden Chamber; the bells were in a white dress after the prince. Ivan Mikhailovich Katyrev-Rostovsky, and Prince. Ivan Ondreevich Bolshoi Khovansky, and Semyon Dmitriev’s son, and Fedor Ulyanov, the son of the Tulupov-Velyaminovs. The prince's ambassador had bailiffs. Fyodor Ondrevich Zvenigorodsky, and Ondrei Matveev, son of Voeikov, and clerk Dorofey Bokhin.”5 The ambassador’s reception testified to his personal status: “Abbas Shakhov, ambassador Lachinbek... a great neighbor, Shiryaz governor,”6 and the status of the embassy itself, i.e. To. The embassy was received seven days after entering Moscow.
However, the Discharge Books do not have information about the purpose of the embassies and the content of the negotiations. Bailiff I. Sudakov thus explained to G. Logau the purpose of Lachin Bey’s embassy. “And the Shah sent him to the Tsar’s Majesty about friendship and love, ... And he ordered that he, the Shah Abbas Majesty, in the entire will of our Great Sovereign, and that the Tsar’s Majesty will command him, and he will take into account that stand together at the command of the Tsar’s Majesty.”8 Moreover, in the original version, the goal was stated somewhat differently, but in our opinion, it was this formulation that reflected the actual objectives of Lachin Bey’s mission. “So that Great Sovereign ours, His Royal Majesty, kept the Shah in friendship and love and was with him in union and to the end against all enemies.”9
As a manuscript
Magilina Inessa Vladimirovna
MOSCOW STATE AND PROJECT
ANTI-TURKISH COALITION
AT THE END OF THE XVI – BEGINNING OF THE XVII centuries.
dissertations for an academic degree
Candidate of Historical Sciences
Volgograd 2009
The work was carried out at the State educational institution
Higher professional education
"Volgograd State University"
Scientific supervisor: Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor
Tyumentsev Igor Olegovich.
Official opponents: Doctor of Historical Sciences, presenter
Researcher at the Institute
Russian history of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Khoroshkevich Anna Leonidovna.
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor
Kusainova Elena Viktorovna.
Leading organization: Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Southern Federal
University".
The defense of the dissertation will take place on October 9, 2009 at 10 a.m. at a meeting of the dissertation council D 212.029.02 at Volgograd State University (400062, Volgograd, Universitetsky Avenue, 100)
The dissertation can be found in the library of Volgograd State University
Scientific Secretary
Dissertation Council
Doctor of Historical Sciences O.Yu. Redkina
^ Relevance of the research topic. After the fall of Constantinople, the European powers were under threat of Ottoman conquest for a century and a half and needed to create an anti-Turkish league or coalition. The main goal of the coalition was to develop a project for joint actions of European states to attack the Ottoman Empire. At first, it was planned to conclude an alliance exclusively of European states that had direct borders with the Ottoman Empire. However, the establishment of trade and political contacts with Persia allowed European governments to realize at the end of the 15th century that the Ottoman Empire could be blocked from both the west and the east and would not be able to wage a war on two fronts: against Christian Europeans and Shiite Persians. Due to contradictions between European states, the implementation of the idea of creating a broad anti-Turkish coalition became possible only in the 80s. XVI century The anti-Turkish coalition project was the first attempt to create an international political alliance that included several states.
The Moscow state acted as an active participant in the anti-Turkish agreement and the main mediator between Persia and Western Europe in the process of concluding a military-political alliance. Participation in the coalition provided the Moscow state with a chance to integrate into the European community, the opportunity to become its full member, strengthen and, possibly, expand its southern borders.
The international position of the Moscow state, its role in international politics of the late 16th – early 17th centuries. were due to several factors. Firstly, the level of political, economic and social independence of the state. Secondly, the desire for recognition of its independence by other European and Asian powers. The third factor - the geostrategic position (geographical location between Western Europe and Asia and the political and strategic significance) of the Moscow state - influenced the political and economic relations between the European and Eastern powers. The fourth factor - awareness of oneself as part of the “post-Byzantine world”1, independence from the Horde yoke - had the greatest influence and determined the eastern policy of the Moscow state before the start of the Thirty Years' War.
Thus, the study of the process of participation and the role of the Moscow state in the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition seems very relevant both from the point of view of studying the history of Russia at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries, and from the point of view of studying the history of international relations of this period.
^ Degree of knowledge of the topic. The question of the Moscow state joining the anti-Turkish league was touched upon in general works on the history of Russia starting from the end of the 18th century. According to M.M. Shcherbatov, the Moscow government sympathized with the creation of an anti-Turkish league, but did not intend to take an active part in it. MM. Karamzin, unlike M.M. Shcherbatova believed that the participation of the Moscow state in the league was possible, but for this he had to secure formal agreements with his closest allies in this struggle. The closest ally was the Holy Roman Empire. CM. Soloviev noted the importance of the relations of the Moscow state with European countries, in particular with the Holy Roman Empire, and emphasized that such a policy was more beneficial to the Austrian emperors than to the Moscow court. He paid special attention to the eastern aspect of Russian foreign policy after the capture of Kazan and Astrakhan. The historian was the first to introduce into science the concept of the “Eastern Question” and pointed out the fact of tripartite negotiations in Moscow in 1593–1594, aimed at creating an anti-Turkish alliance of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, but which did not achieve the goal. The noted historians considered the problem of the Moscow state joining the anti-Turkish coalition from the point of view of the role and foreign policy position of Russia, which it occupied after the reign of Peter I. Such an evaluative stereotype interprets the policy of the state of previous eras from the position of its political interests of a later time.
The first special work devoted to Russian-Persian relations was the essay by S.M. Bronevsky (1803 – 1805), published only in 1996 and remaining unknown to contemporaries. According to the scientist, the Moscow authorities received an offer to join the anti-Turkish agreement in 1589 from the Pope and Emperor Rudolf II. The Moscow leadership agreed to join the league subject to the conclusion of an agreement with all Christian sovereigns. CM. Bronevsky argued that it was this proposal that prompted the Moscow authorities to intensify their Eastern policy. They intended to strengthen their own positions in Transcaucasia. This was also facilitated by the proposals of the Persian Shah Mohammed Soltan Khudabende to conclude an alliance against the Turks. CM. Bronevsky agreed with M.M. Shcherbatov that the Moscow authorities did not intend to conclude an alliance against the Turks, but tried, through their actions through the mediation of Clement VIII and Rudolf II, to force Poland to make peace on terms favorable to them2.
Russian-Turkish War 1877 – 1878 awakened in Russian society a great interest in the “Eastern Question” and the role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples. Works on the “Eastern Question” by historians V.V. have been published. Makusheva, F.I. Uspensky and S.L. Zhigareva3. According to the authors, the concept of the “Eastern Question,” associated primarily with the struggle against Turkey, had an autonomous meaning in the foreign policy doctrine of the Moscow State and played a secondary role in relation to the Baltic problem. The “Eastern Question” was not associated with the eastern policy of the Moscow state, as if it did not exist. This scheme easily fits into the basic principles of Western concepts, but does not provide answers to many questions related to the foreign policy activities of the Moscow authorities to create an anti-Turkish coalition.
Based on materials from Georgian and Persian ambassadorial books of 1587–1613, historian-archivist S.A. Belokurov noted the emergence of the Caucasian issue in the eastern policy of the Moscow state and its influence on Russian-Persian relations. He believed that the main goal of Russian-Austrian relations was diplomatic efforts to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance between the emperor, the tsar and the shah4.
Orientalist scientist N.I. Veselovsky was the first to draw attention to the forms of agreements between European and Eastern rulers. Emphasizing their fundamental difference, he noted that the “peace treaties” corresponded to the “shert” charters of Muslim rulers5. This valuable remark gives the key to understanding the methods of concluding treaties between Muslim and Christian sovereigns. In the notes for the publication of documents on the history of Russian-European diplomacy from the Italian and Spanish archives, E.F. Shmurlo emphasized that both the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs and the Moscow government were interested in developing close diplomatic relations. The main goal of their cooperation was an anti-Turkish alliance, but each side also pursued its own national interests6.
Outstanding orientalist V.V. Bartold believed that European, incl. and Moscow sovereigns needed in the 16th – 17th centuries. in Persia, first of all as a political ally in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, and only then as a trading partner. In relations with Persia, Russia also pursued its own national goals. Thus, the scientist considered the campaign of governor Buturlin in 1604 to be an attempt by the Moscow authorities to gain a foothold in the Northern Transcaucasus, and not to help the Shah’s troops fighting in Dagestan7.
One of the first Soviet historians M.A. Polievktov identified two directions of Russian foreign policy at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries: the Baltic and the Black Sea-Caucasian (i.e., eastern). He believed that the main task of Moscow's eastern policy at the end of the 16th century. there were efforts to paralyze Turkey’s influence in the North Caucasus, and at the beginning of the 17th century. – defending one’s own interests and establishing oneself in the Caucasus8. Another Soviet historian E.S. Zevakin, unlike V.V. Bartold believed that European states could need Persia as an ally in the anti-Turkish coalition only in the 16th century, and from the second quarter of the 17th century. Purely economic interests came to the fore. In the last quarter of the 16th century. One of the main aspects of Persia's foreign policy relations with European states, according to the researcher, was relations with the Holy Roman Empire. The Persian question in Russian-Austrian relations ultimately came down to the question of a Russian-imperial-Persian alliance directed against the Ottoman Empire9.
In the post-war period N.A. Smirnov expressed the idea that the Moscow state’s opposition to the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of the fight against the Tatar-Mongols. The fight against the Ottomans brought the Muscovite state closer to Persia and the Holy Roman Empire, which sought help from Moscow. The historian believed that the initiator of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition was Boris Godunov10. According to Ya.S. Lurie, the main direction of the foreign policy of the Moscow state in the last quarter of the 16th century. the Baltic appeared, but as a secondary one, the Black Sea-Caspian also existed. Both foreign policy courses that emerged in the middle of the century merged with each other: the struggle for the Baltic was to be waged against Turkey11.
Prominent Soviet historian A.P. Novoseltsev believed that the Moscow state in the second half of the 16th century. had close diplomatic ties with Persia, due to common interests in the fight against Turkey. In his opinion, Persia managed to conclude an agreement with the Moscow state, which resulted in Buturlin’s military expedition to the Caucasus12.
Tivadze T.G. in her PhD thesis she argued that the Moscow state did not intend to fight with the Ottoman Empire, and negotiations on this issue were only a diplomatic maneuver in order to attract the attention of Western European partners. It initiated a military-political alliance, while the Shah only invited the Tsar to restore relations that were interrupted in the middle of the 16th century.13
In a special work on the history of Russian-Iranian relations at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries. P.P. Bushev noted that the joint struggle with Turkey and the Crimean Khanate was the core of Russian-Persian relations of the period under review. However, in general, relations between the two states were reduced not to a military-political alliance, but to trade and commercial activities. The scientist concluded that the Moscow state and Iran have different approaches to solving their priority political problems14.
Specialist in Russian-Polish relations B.N. Florya convincingly proved that already during the reign of Ivan IV, one of the main issues of the foreign policy of the Moscow state was the search for allies to fight the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, the most suitable candidate for such a union was Poland, and not the Holy Roman Empire. The scientist linked the “Baltic” problem with the solution of the “eastern” issue in cooperation with Poland, suggesting a close connection between these areas of the foreign policy of the Moscow state in the second half of the 16th century. The Peruvian researcher is responsible for the only special work to date devoted to attempts to create an anti-Turkish alliance in the 70s of the 16th century.15
In foreign historiography, he was the first to touch upon the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the second half of the 16th century. Jesuit historian Fr. Pavel Pearling, who believed that it was in the Roman Curia that the idea was born to attract the Muscovite state to the anti-Turkish league. A. Possevino negotiated in the 1580s. in Moscow with Ivan IV and, returning home, drew up an ideological and political justification for this league. P. Pearling believed that the Roman Curia needed the Moscow state as an intermediary to attract Persia into the ranks of the league. He assessed the position of the Moscow state in relation to the anti-Turkish coalition as a whole as positive and considered the period 1593 - 1603. most favorable for its creation16.
The negotiation process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was examined by the researcher of Russian-Austrian relations H. Ubersberger. He was the first to draw attention to the differences in the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the Moscow State, which determined the different attitudes of their rulers to the implementation of foreign policy tasks. H. Ubersberger believed that in relations with the emperor, the main goal of B. Godunov was not to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance, but to obtain guarantees in the event of the throne passing into his hands. The emperor had to undertake obligations to protect the Godunov dynasty from the claims of Poland. Thus, the Moscow state, under the pretext of concluding an anti-Turkish alliance, was going to drag the Empire into a war with Poland17.
Based on Iranian sources, the French orientalist L. Bellan believed that the Shirley brothers played an important role in involving Persia in the anti-Turkish coalition. The embassy of A. Shirley and Hussein Ali Beg to Europe (1599–1600) had two tasks: to conclude an offensive alliance against the Ottomans and to agree on the supply of Persian raw silk to European markets18.
Khanbaba Bayani considered the main goal of the relationship between the Moscow state and Persia to be the conclusion of a military-defensive alliance against Turkey. European states were no less interested in such a union19.
Czech researcher J. Matousek studied the goals and objectives of European politics in the period of preparation for the war against the Ottomans in the early 1590s. A significant place in his work is devoted to Russian-imperial relations, which were carried out during this period through the embassies of N. Varkoch. Considering the Russian-Imperial-Persian negotiations in Moscow in 1593, the scientist came to the conclusion that all three parties agreed to conclude an agreement on a joint fight against the Ottomans20.
Austrian researchers W. Leitsch, B. von Palombini, K. Voselka emphasized that the initiative to create an anti-Turkish coalition always came from Western Europe, and the Moscow state was assigned a secondary role in the proposed alliance. In addition, B. von Palombini argued that at the end of the 16th century. The Moscow state, having regulated relations with Poland, was ready to join the anti-Turkish league as a “temporarily interested state”21.
Ya.P. Niederkorn believed that the plan for creating a broad anti-Turkish league was developed by the Roman Curia by the early 1590s. He called the coalition European, because Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were to participate in it, although the participation of Muscovy and Persia was expected. The scientist was of the opinion of V. Leich and K. Voselka that the Moscow authorities were not against participation in the anti-Turkish league, but, like others, pursued their own political goals. He believed that the condition for the participation of the Moscow state in the league was the entry into it of Spain, the Roman Curia, the Holy Roman Empire, Venice and the signing of an anti-Turkish treaty in Moscow22.
An analysis of historiography shows that the problems of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries. and the role of the Moscow state in this process has not been sufficiently studied. Scientists touched upon certain aspects of this topic in the process of general research into Russian history, studying the history of Russian diplomacy, Russian-Austrian and Russian-Iranian relations, and the history of the creation of a coalition of an earlier period. The scientific literature reflects only in general terms the issues of bilateral and trilateral relations between the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia related to the creation of the anti-Turkish League. The prerequisites, reasons and features of the emergence of the idea of creating a coalition, intensifying the eastern direction of the Moscow state’s foreign policy, changing the priorities of Russian-Austrian and Russian-Persian relations have not been studied. The conditions for the implementation of the anti-Turkish coalition project have not been identified. The specifics and dynamics of the development of the process of creating an anti-Turkish alliance have not been determined. The causes and consequences identified by historians, as well as assessments of events, are controversial. Data from researchers on the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries. are fragmentary and contain factual inaccuracies. They require verification and significant addition with information from archival and published historical sources.
^ Purpose and objectives of the study. The purpose of the dissertation research is to find out the reasons and features of the process of participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition as an independent direction of Eastern policy.
To achieve this goal, the following tasks have been identified: – to identify the prerequisites, to determine the features of the emergence of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition of European states;
– determine the reasons for the intensification of the eastern direction of the Moscow State’s foreign policy;
– to clarify the circumstances of the implementation of the anti-Turkish coalition project consisting of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia;
– reveal the reasons, clarify the goals and features of the process of integration of the Moscow state into the European community through participation in the anti-Turkish coalition;
– to trace the specifics and dynamics of the development of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition;
– to clarify the reasons for the change in foreign policy priorities in Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations, which did not allow the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition;
– highlight the stages of evolution of the anti-Turkish project in the foreign policy of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia over the thirty-year period under review.
^ The chronological scope of the study covers the period from 1587 to 1618. - the time of greatest diplomatic activity of the European powers, Moscow State and Persia in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The lower chronological limit is determined by the beginning of practical actions of the Moscow state aimed at creating a coalition. The upper chronological limit of the study was determined by the date of the start of the Thirty Years' War, which radically changed the foreign policy priorities of the majority of coalition participants.
^ The geographical scope of the study is limited to the territories of states and peoples that were part of the anti-Turkish coalition or were in the sphere of their political influence.
^ The methodological basis of the dissertation is the principles of historicism and objectivity, which make it possible to study objects and phenomena in the diversity and specific historical conditions of their origin and development. During the dissertation work, general historical and special methods of scientific research were used. The historical-genetic method helped to trace the dynamics of the creation and development of the anti-Turkish coalition. The historical-comparative method made it possible to identify common and specific features of the member states of the anti-Turkish coalition, patterns and random phenomena in the development of relations between them. The historical-typological method made it possible to develop a classification of types of interstate agreements and treaties between Christian states and Persia in the time period under consideration, and a periodization of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The combination of historical-comparative and historical-typological methods made it possible to identify common and specific features characteristic of different periods of the coalition creation process. The historical-systemic method made it possible to consider the relationship between the powers of the anti-Turkish coalition as a unified system of their international relations at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries, to take into account the national interests of these states, and to trace their influence on the development of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The method of structural analysis of historical sources helped to determine the place of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of each of the powers considered, and to identify the specifics of the understanding of this idea by the governments of the powers.
^ The source base of the study consists of published and archival written historical sources late XVI – early XVII centuries. on the history of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition, the participation of the Moscow State and other countries in this process. Written sources can be divided into four groups depending on their origin, purposes of creation and the nature of the information they contain.
1. Office documentation of Russian origin. The greatest value for the study are unpublished documents from the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA): F. 32 Relations of Russia with the Roman Empire, F. 77 Relations of Russia with Persia, F. 110 Relations of Russia with Georgia, F. 115 Kabardian, Circassian and others files, as well as documents from the archives of the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ASPbII RAS): F. 178 Astrakhan Order Chamber. Some of the sources of this group were published in monuments of diplomatic relations between Russia and foreign powers, Don affairs and discharge books. The collections of documents included materials on the relations of the Moscow state with the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, and the composition of Russian embassies. The sources of this group contain extensive data deposited in the affairs of the Ambassadorial Prikaz of the period 1588–1719, on diplomatic correspondence between the imperial, Moscow and Persian courts, drafts and texts of agreements on a military offensive alliance against the Ottoman Empire, which were supposed to be concluded between participants in the anti-Turkish coalition . The paperwork materials revealed valuable information about the negotiation process on the creation of an anti-Turkish offensive alliance between the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, the routes and conditions of stay of the allied embassies in various countries. The documents give an idea of the work and needs of diplomatic missions, the powers of ambassadors, the nature and forms of relationships between the allied sovereigns, highlight the political connections of the states participating in the coalition, make it possible to clarify the role of the Moscow state in the anti-Turkish alliance, and trace changes in the foreign policy of the allied states at the beginning of the 17th century.
2. Office documentation of foreign origin. The sources of this group are represented by documents of foreign diplomatic departments, extracted by Russian and foreign historians from foreign archives and libraries. Some of them were published in collections of documents edited by A.I. Turgeneva23, D. Bercher24, E. Charriera25, T. de Gonto Birona de Salignac26, E.L. Shmurlo27. Of great value are the documents “Chronicles of the Carmelites”, containing reports of the Carmelites who carried out diplomatic assignments of the Roman Curia in Persia and the Muscovite state, correspondence of the papal office with the shahs, proposals of Abbas I to create an anti-Turkish coalition28. This same group of sources includes materials from the correspondence of the Roman pontiffs with the Moscow sovereigns29 and False Dmitry I30. Unpublished materials consist of a collection of documents F. 30 RGADA, extracted by Russian scientists from the archives of the Vatican, Rome and Venice, archives and libraries of France and England.
The sources of the second group contain valuable information about the development of projects for creating an anti-Turkish coalition, correspondence between the Persian shahs and European sovereigns, secret instructions of European diplomats in Persia, and reports from European diplomats to their rulers. The documents give an idea of the connections of the Moscow state with foreign countries, internal political events of the Moscow state, plans for the campaign of False Dmitry I against Turkey, imperial and Persian embassies in Moscow, and the international position of the Ottoman Empire. The sources make it possible to clarify the reaction of the Ottoman Empire to the actions of European states directed against it, the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the states of the anti-Turkish coalition (including the Muscovite state and Persia), and highlight the proposals of the Roman Curia on the role of the Moscow state in the proposed alliance.
3. Chronicles. Presented with materials from Russian chronicle monuments – the Nikon Chronicle and the New Chronicler31. The Nikon Chronicle repeatedly contains descriptions of the arrival of Shamkhal and Gilyan “guests” to the court of the Moscow sovereign. The New Chronicle reflects events from the end of the reign of Ivan IV to the 1730s, including data on the receptions of Persian ambassadors. Information from chronicle monuments allows us to get a general idea of the events in the Moscow state of the era under consideration and complements information from embassy books.
4. Memoirs, diaries, travel notes. Represented by memoirs, diary entries, reports of foreign ambassadors and travelers: imperial ambassadors Niklas von Varkotsch32, Michael Schiele33, Oruj bey Bayat - secretary of the Persian embassy Hussein Ali bey and A. Shirley to Europe34, imperial ambassadors Stefan Kakash and Georg Tektander35, Polish and papal ambassadors at the court of False Dmitry I36, the Spanish ambassadors to Persia Antonio da Gouvea37 and Garcia da Figueroa38. The sources of this group complement the data of other documents on the instructions and powers of ambassadors, on plans for creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the late 16th - early 17th centuries. The travel notes of the Spanish ambassadors also give an idea of the reaction of Philip III to the proposals of Abbas I regarding the conclusion of an anti-Turkish alliance, the evolution of the Shah’s attitude towards the Spanish king and other European sovereigns.
The study is based on the records of the Ambassadorial Order of the Moscow State and foreign diplomatic departments, which make it possible to reconstruct in basic terms the negotiation process to create a coalition and clarify the positions of the parties participating in them. The data obtained make it possible to verify the testimony of other groups, to supplement and clarify the overall picture of the negotiation process, to identify the reasons, goals, conditions, dynamics and features of the participation of the Moscow state and other countries in the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance during the specified period.
^ Scientific novelty of the research. For the first time, a special scientific study has been carried out on the participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition.
– The evolution of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of European states is traced. At different stages of the historical development of the interested powers, the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was transformed in connection with the socio-political and economic changes taking place in them.
– The reasons are revealed, the goals and features of the process of integration of the Moscow state into the European community through participation in the anti-Turkish coalition are clarified. Contrary to the traditional opinion of Russian and foreign researchers, the Moscow state intended to participate in military and political actions against the Ottoman Empire. His military-political and military-strategic plans related to the creation of a coalition were multidimensional and long-term in nature.
– Conditions have been determined for the implementation of the project of an anti-Turkish coalition consisting of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia. The Holy Roman Empire and Persia shared borders with the Ottoman Empire and were in a state of permanent war with it. The geostrategic position of the Moscow state allowed it to act both as a mediator and coordinator, and as a direct participant in the fight against Turkey.
– The financial, human and diplomatic resources of the Moscow state necessary for participation in the anti-Turkish coalition, as well as possible forms of its participation in the anti-Turkish campaign, have been identified. The Moscow state could involve detachments of Don and, in part, Zaporizhian Cossacks, vassal Kabardian squads in the anti-Turkish campaign, place small streltsy garrisons in Transcaucasian fortresses located at the intersection of roads, exert diplomatic pressure on the Crimean Tatars, assist Persia in the rapid sale of silk through Europe. raw materials, supply firearms to Persia in exchange for territorial concessions on its part.
– The reasons for the change in foreign policy priorities in Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations at the beginning of the 17th century are clarified. It was found that the participation of the Moscow state in the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was an instrument of its eastern policy, with the help of which it in the late 16th - early 17th centuries. integrated into the European community. The stages of this process are highlighted. It was determined that the process at different stages of development had different dynamics and different significance for the coalition participants. Achievements in concluding an anti-Turkish agreement were virtually reduced to zero as a result of the Troubles in the Moscow State and the signing of a peace treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and Turkey. The creation of an anti-Turkish coalition became impossible with the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in Europe.
^ Practical significance of the study. The provisions and conclusions of the dissertation work can be used in the preparation of new scientific research and general works on the history of foreign policy of Russia, Persia, European states participating in the anti-Turkish coalition, the history of Russia in the 16th – 17th centuries; in the development of general and special courses on the history of Russian-Austrian and Russian-Iranian international relations, the history of the development of European diplomacy.
^ Approbation of work. The main provisions and conclusions of the dissertation are presented at the international scientific conference “Modernization and traditions - the Lower Volga region as a crossroads of cultures” (Volgograd, 2006), the regional scientific conference “Local history readings” (Volgograd, 2002), at the annual scientific conferences of graduate students and teachers of Volgograd State University (Volgograd , 2002 – 2006). On the topic of the dissertation, 8 articles were published with a total volume of 3.5 pp.
^ Structure of the dissertation. The dissertation consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature, and an appendix.
The Introduction substantiates the relevance of the topic and provides an analysis scientific literature and sources, the purpose and objectives are defined, the chronological and geographical framework, the methodological basis of the study are noted scientific novelty, the composition of the dissertation is justified.
^ The first chapter, “The Eastern Policy of the Moscow State and the Project of the Anti-Turkish Coalition,” consisting of three paragraphs, examines the emergence of the idea of an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy plans of European states and the transformation of this idea into a specific instrument of the Eastern policy of the Moscow State, and identifies the reasons for the participation of the Moscow State and the Holy Roman empire and Persia in the anti-Turkish coalition, the role of the Moscow state in relations between Persia and the Holy Roman Empire is revealed.
The “Eastern Question” was perceived by Europeans as the struggle of Christian Europe against Ottoman aggression. Counteraction to the Ottoman Empire was possible only by creating an anti-Turkish coalition, in which Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were to be present. The Roman Curia was assigned the role of ideological leader. Theoretically, France, England, and Poland could join the anti-Turkish coalition. But these countries pursued their own, narrowly national interests in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. In order to change the situation, the Roman Curia began to consider options for a political union with states outside the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church. The first on the list of candidates was Shiite Persia, diplomatic contacts with which were established in the last third of the 15th century. As a result of the alliance with Persia, the Ottomans could be squeezed between two fronts - from the west and the east. In this case, they would not be able to wage war against both Christians and Persians. But always, when it came to bringing Persia into the ranks of the anti-Turkish coalition, the Moscow state came to the fore.
The “Eastern Question” for the Moscow State, in addition to the political component, also had a historical and philosophical justification related to the role of Moscow as a spiritual successor Byzantine Empire and defenders of the Slavic peoples of the Balkans. With the help of hypothetical participation in the not yet created anti-Turkish coalition, Moscow demonstrated its potential capabilities. The political situation in Europe was such that if in the first half of the 16th century. the participation of the Moscow state in the pan-European anti-Turkish league was theoretically possible, then with the annexation of the Volga khanates came new stage in the development of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe. The balance of power in the system of Eastern European states changed in favor of the Moscow state.
The creation of an anti-Turkish coalition at this time was a subject of geopolitics - the first international project New time. It is important that the Moscow state was able to assess the scale of the anti-Turkish project in time and determine its place in it. Since the late 70s. XVI century the question of the participation of the Moscow state in the pan-European war against the Turks begins to move from the sphere of projects to the sphere of practical politics. However, a number of subjective factors prevented the implementation of anti-Turkish plans. The situation in which the Moscow state found itself as a result of defeat in the Livonian War should in no way affect the international authority of the country and its potential capabilities. Ivan IV was able to convince the papal envoy A. Possevino that “we want to unite” with the Roman Pontiff, the Emperor and all other Christian sovereigns in an anti-Turkish alliance. In the early 80s. XVI century It became finally clear to European politicians that attracting Persia to the anti-Turkish league was possible only through the mediation of the Moscow state. European-Persian ties did not bring concrete results. Communication between Europe and Persia through the Moscow state could be carried out two to three times faster and safer. By this time, the Moscow state, in addition to the benefits associated with international transit, also had in the eyes of Europeans the political influence that it could exert on Persia. Gregory XIII in the early 80s. XVI century assigned the Moscow state the role of a mediator between the Persian Shah and the European sovereigns and proposed attacking the Ottomans from two sides: from the west - by the forces of Europeans, and from the northeast - by the forces of the “Russian-Persian alliance”.
Ivan IV understood the main trends of European politics and used them to the maximum to solve his own foreign policy problems. The project will involve
As a manuscript
MOSCOW STATE AND PROJECT
ANTI-TURKISH COALITION
AT THE ENDXVI– BEGINNINGXVIIcenturies
07.00.02 – Domestic history
dissertations for an academic degree
candidate of historical sciences
Volgograd 2009
The work was carried out at the State educational institution
"Volgograd State University"
Scientific supervisor: Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor
Official opponents: Doctor of Historical Sciences, presenter
Researcher at the Institute
Russian history of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor
Leading organization: Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Southern Federal
university."
The defense of the dissertation will take place on October 9, 2009 at 10 o’clock at a meeting of the dissertation council D 212.029.02 at Volgograd State University (Volgograd, University Avenue, 100)
The dissertation can be found in the library of Volgograd State University
Scientific Secretary
dissertation council
Doctor of Historical Sciences
Relevance of the research topic. After the fall of Constantinople, the European powers were under threat of Ottoman conquest for a century and a half and needed to create an anti-Turkish league or coalition. The main goal of the coalition was to develop a project for joint actions of European states to attack the Ottoman Empire. At first, it was planned to conclude an alliance exclusively of European states that had direct borders with the Ottoman Empire. However, the establishment of trade and political contacts with Persia allowed European governments to realize at the end of the 15th century that the Ottoman Empire could be blocked from both the west and the east and would not be able to wage a war on two fronts: against Christian Europeans and Shiite Persians. Due to contradictions between European states, the implementation of the idea of creating a broad anti-Turkish coalition became possible only in the 80s. XVI century The anti-Turkish coalition project was the first attempt to create an international political alliance that included several states.
The Moscow state acted as an active participant in the anti-Turkish agreement and the main mediator between Persia and Western Europe in the process of concluding a military-political alliance. Participation in the coalition provided the Moscow state with a chance to integrate into the European community, the opportunity to become its full member, strengthen and, possibly, expand its southern borders.
The international position of the Moscow state, its role in international politics of the late 16th – early 17th centuries. were due to several factors. Firstly, the level of political, economic and social independence of the state. Secondly, the desire for recognition of its independence by other European and Asian powers. The third factor - the geostrategic position (geographical location between Western Europe and Asia and the political and strategic significance) of the Moscow state - influenced the political and economic relations between the European and Eastern powers. The fourth factor - awareness of oneself as part of the “post-Byzantine world”, independence from the Horde yoke - had the greatest influence and determined the eastern policy of the Moscow state before the start of the Thirty Years' War.
Thus, the study of the process of participation and the role of the Moscow state in the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition seems very relevant both from the point of view of studying the history of Russia at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries, and from the point of view of studying the history of international relations of this period.
The degree of knowledge of the topic. The question of the Moscow state joining the anti-Turkish league was touched upon in general works on the history of Russia starting from the end of the 18th century. According to the opinion, the Moscow government sympathized with the creation of an anti-Turkish league, but did not intend to take active part in it. In contrast, he believed that the participation of the Moscow state in the league was possible, but for this he had to secure formal agreements with his closest allies in this fight. The closest ally was the Holy Roman Empire. noted the importance of relations between the Moscow state and European countries, in particular with the Holy Roman Empire, and emphasized that such a policy was more beneficial to the Austrian emperors than to the Moscow court. He paid special attention to the eastern aspect of Russian foreign policy after the capture of Kazan and Astrakhan. The historian was the first to introduce into science the concept of the “Eastern Question” and pointed out the fact of tripartite negotiations in Moscow in 1593–1594, aimed at creating an anti-Turkish alliance of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, but which did not achieve the goal. The noted historians considered the problem of the Moscow state joining the anti-Turkish coalition from the point of view of the role and foreign policy position of Russia, which it occupied after the reign of Peter I. Such an evaluative stereotype interprets the policy of the state of previous eras from the position of its political interests of a later time.
The first special work devoted to Russian-Persian relations was an essay (1803 - 1805), published only in 1996 and remaining unknown to contemporaries. According to the scientist, the Moscow authorities received an offer to join the anti-Turkish agreement in 1589 from the Pope and Emperor Rudolf II. The Moscow leadership agreed to join the league subject to the conclusion of an agreement with all Christian sovereigns. argued that it was this proposal that prompted the Moscow authorities to intensify their Eastern policy. They intended to strengthen their own positions in Transcaucasia. This was also facilitated by the proposals of the Persian Shah Mohammed Soltan Khudabende to conclude an alliance against the Turks. agreed that the Moscow authorities did not intend to conclude an alliance against the Turks, but tried, through their actions through the mediation of Clement VIII and Rudolf II, to force Poland to make peace on terms favorable to them.
Russian-Turkish War 1877 – 1878 awakened in Russian society a great interest in the “Eastern Question” and the role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples. Works have been published on the “Eastern Question” by historians, and. According to the authors, the concept of the “Eastern Question,” associated primarily with the struggle against Turkey, had an autonomous meaning in the foreign policy doctrine of the Moscow State and played a secondary role in relation to the Baltic problem. The “Eastern Question” was not associated with the eastern policy of the Moscow state, as if it did not exist. This scheme easily fits into the basic principles of Western concepts, but does not provide answers to many questions related to the foreign policy activities of the Moscow authorities to create an anti-Turkish coalition.
Based on materials from Georgian and Persian ambassadorial books of 1587–1613, the historian-archivist noted the emergence of the Caucasian issue in the eastern policy of the Moscow state and its influence on Russian-Persian relations. He believed that the main goal of Russian-Austrian relations was diplomatic efforts to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance between the emperor, the tsar and the shah.
The orientalist scholar was the first to draw attention to the forms of agreements between European and Eastern rulers. Emphasizing their fundamental difference, he noted that the “peace treaties” corresponded to the “shert” charters of Muslim rulers. This valuable remark gives the key to understanding the methods of concluding treaties between Muslim and Christian sovereigns. In the notes for the publication of documents on the history of Russian-European diplomacy from Italian and Spanish archives, he emphasized that both the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs and the Moscow government were interested in the development of close diplomatic relations. The main goal of their cooperation was an anti-Turkish alliance, but each side also pursued its own national interests.
An outstanding orientalist believed that European, including Moscow, sovereigns needed in the 16th – 17th centuries. in Persia, first of all as a political ally in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, and only then as a trading partner. In relations with Persia, Russia also pursued its own national goals. Thus, the scientist considered the campaign of governor Buturlin in 1604 to be an attempt by the Moscow authorities to gain a foothold in the Northern Transcaucasia, and not to help the Shah’s troops fighting in Dagestan.
One of the first Soviet historians identified two directions of Russian foreign policy at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries: the Baltic and the Black Sea-Caucasian (i.e., eastern). He believed that the main task of Moscow's eastern policy at the end of the 16th century. there were efforts to paralyze Turkey’s influence in the North Caucasus, and at the beginning of the 17th century. – defending one’s own interests and establishing oneself in the Caucasus. Another Soviet historian, in contrast, believed that European states could need Persia as an ally in the anti-Turkish coalition only in the 16th century, and from the second quarter of the 17th century. Purely economic interests came to the fore. In the last quarter of the 16th century. One of the main aspects of Persia's foreign policy relations with European states, according to the researcher, was relations with the Holy Roman Empire. The Persian question in Russian-Austrian relations ultimately came down to the question of a Russian-imperial-Persian alliance directed against the Ottoman Empire.
In the post-war period, he expressed the idea that the Moscow state’s opposition to the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of the fight against the Tatar-Mongols. The fight against the Ottomans brought the Muscovite state closer to Persia and the Holy Roman Empire, which sought help from Moscow. The historian believed that the initiator of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition was Boris Godunov. In opinion, the main direction of the foreign policy of the Moscow state in the last quarter of the 16th century. the Baltic appeared, but as a secondary one, the Black Sea-Caspian also existed. Both foreign policy courses that emerged in the middle of the century merged with each other: the struggle for the Baltic was to be waged against Turkey11.
A prominent Soviet historian believed that the Moscow state in the second half of the 16th century. had close diplomatic ties with Persia, due to common interests in the fight against Turkey. In his opinion, Persia managed to conclude an agreement with the Moscow state, which resulted in Buturlin’s military expedition to the Caucasus12.
in her PhD thesis she argued that the Moscow state did not intend to fight with the Ottoman Empire, and negotiations on this issue were only a diplomatic maneuver in order to attract the attention of Western European partners. It initiated a military-political alliance, while the Shah only invited the Tsar to restore relations that were interrupted in the middle of the 16th century.13
In a special work on the history of Russian-Iranian relations at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries. noted that the joint struggle with Turkey and the Crimean Khanate was the core of Russian-Persian relations of the period under review. However, in general, relations between the two states were reduced not to a military-political alliance, but to trade and commercial activities. The scientist concluded that the Moscow state and Iran have different approaches to solving their priority political problems14.
A specialist in Russian-Polish relations, he convincingly proved that already during the reign of Ivan IV, one of the main issues of the foreign policy of the Moscow state was the search for allies to fight the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, the most suitable candidate for such a union was Poland, and not the Holy Roman Empire. The scientist linked the “Baltic” problem with the solution of the “eastern” issue in cooperation with Poland, suggesting a close connection between these areas of the foreign policy of the Moscow state in the second half of the 16th century. The Peruvian researcher is responsible for the only special work to date devoted to attempts to create an anti-Turkish alliance in the 70s of the 16th century.15
In foreign historiography, he was the first to touch upon the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the second half of the 16th century. Jesuit historian Fr. Pavel Pearling, who believed that it was in the Roman Curia that the idea was born to attract the Muscovite state to the anti-Turkish league. A. Possevino negotiated in the 1580s. in Moscow with Ivan IV and, returning home, drew up an ideological and political justification for this league. P. Pearling believed that the Roman Curia needed the Moscow state as an intermediary to attract Persia into the ranks of the league. He assessed the position of the Moscow state in relation to the anti-Turkish coalition as a whole as positive and considered the period 1593 - 1603. most favorable for its creation16.
The negotiation process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was examined by the researcher of Russian-Austrian relations H. Ubersberger. He was the first to draw attention to the differences in the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the Moscow State, which determined the different attitudes of their rulers to the implementation of foreign policy tasks. H. Ubersberger believed that in relations with the emperor, the main goal of B. Godunov was not to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance, but to obtain guarantees in the event of the throne passing into his hands. The emperor had to undertake obligations to protect the Godunov dynasty from the claims of Poland. Thus, the Moscow state, under the pretext of concluding an anti-Turkish alliance, was going to drag the Empire into a war with Poland17.
Based on Iranian sources, the French orientalist L. Bellan believed that the Shirley brothers played an important role in involving Persia in the anti-Turkish coalition. The embassy of A. Shirley and Hussein Ali Beg to Europe (1599–1600) had two tasks: to conclude an offensive alliance against the Ottomans and to agree on the supply of Persian raw silk to European markets18.
Khanbaba Bayani considered the main goal of the relationship between the Moscow state and Persia to be the conclusion of a military-defensive alliance against Turkey. European states were no less interested in such a union19.
Czech researcher J. Matousek studied the goals and objectives of European politics in the period of preparation for the war against the Ottomans in the early 1590s. A significant place in his work is devoted to Russian-imperial relations, which were carried out during this period through the embassies of N. Varkoch. Considering the Russian-Imperial-Persian negotiations in Moscow in 1593, the scientist came to the conclusion that all three parties agreed to conclude an agreement on a joint fight against the Ottomans20.
Austrian researchers W. Leitsch, B. von Palombini, K. Voselka emphasized that the initiative to create an anti-Turkish coalition always came from Western Europe, and the Moscow state was assigned a secondary role in the proposed alliance. In addition, B. von Palombini argued that at the end of the 16th century. The Moscow state, having regulated relations with Poland, was ready to join the anti-Turkish league as a “temporarily interested state”21.
believed that the plan for creating a broad anti-Turkish league was developed by the Roman Curia by the early 1590s. He called the coalition European, because Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were supposed to participate in it, although the participation of the Muscovite state and Persia was expected. The scientist was of the opinion of V. Leich and K. Voselka that the Moscow authorities were not against participation in the anti-Turkish league, but, like others, pursued their own political goals. He believed that the condition for the participation of the Moscow state in the league was the entry into it of Spain, the Roman Curia, the Holy Roman Empire, Venice and the signing of an anti-Turkish treaty in Moscow22.
An analysis of historiography shows that the problems of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries. and the role of the Moscow state in this process has not been sufficiently studied. Scientists touched upon certain aspects of this topic in the process of general research into Russian history, studying the history of Russian diplomacy, Russian-Austrian and Russian-Iranian relations, and the history of the creation of a coalition of an earlier period. The scientific literature reflects only in general terms the issues of bilateral and trilateral relations between the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia related to the creation of the anti-Turkish League. The prerequisites, reasons and features of the emergence of the idea of creating a coalition, intensifying the eastern direction of the Moscow state’s foreign policy, changing the priorities of Russian-Austrian and Russian-Persian relations have not been studied. The conditions for the implementation of the anti-Turkish coalition project have not been identified. The specifics and dynamics of the development of the process of creating an anti-Turkish alliance have not been determined. The causes and consequences identified by historians, as well as assessments of events, are controversial. Data from researchers on the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries. are fragmentary and contain factual inaccuracies. They require verification and significant addition with information from archival and published historical sources.
Purpose and objectives of the study. The purpose of the dissertation research is to find out the reasons and features of the process of participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition as an independent direction of Eastern policy.
To achieve this goal, the following tasks have been identified: – to identify the prerequisites, to determine the features of the emergence of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition of European states;
– determine the reasons for the intensification of the eastern direction of the Moscow State’s foreign policy;
– to clarify the circumstances of the implementation of the anti-Turkish coalition project consisting of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia;
– reveal the reasons, clarify the goals and features of the process of integration of the Moscow state into the European community through participation in the anti-Turkish coalition;
– to trace the specifics and dynamics of the development of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition;
– to clarify the reasons for the change in foreign policy priorities in Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations, which did not allow the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition;
– highlight the stages of evolution of the anti-Turkish project in the foreign policy of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia over the thirty-year period under review.
Chronological framework research cover the period from 1587 to 1618. - the time of greatest diplomatic activity of the European powers, Moscow State and Persia in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The lower chronological limit is determined by the beginning of practical actions of the Moscow state aimed at creating a coalition. The upper chronological limit of the study was determined by the date of the start of the Thirty Years' War, which radically changed the foreign policy priorities of the majority of coalition participants.
Geographical scope of the study limited to the territories of states and peoples that were part of the anti-Turkish coalition or were in the sphere of their political influence.
Methodological basis dissertation are the principles of historicism and objectivity, which make it possible to study objects and phenomena in the diversity and specific historical conditions of their origin and development. During the dissertation work, general historical and special methods of scientific research were used. Historical-genetic method helped to trace the dynamics of the creation and development of the anti-Turkish coalition. Historical-comparative method made it possible to identify common and specific features of the member states of the anti-Turkish coalition, patterns and random phenomena in the development of relations between them. Historical-typological method made it possible to develop a classification of types of interstate agreements and treaties between Christian states and Persia in the time period under consideration, and a periodization of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Combination historical-comparative And historical-typological methods made it possible to identify common and specific features characteristic of different periods of the coalition creation process. Historical-systemic method allowed us to consider the relationship between the powers of the anti-Turkish coalition as a unified system of their international relations at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries, to take into account the national interests of these states, and to trace their influence on the development of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Method of structural analysis of historical sources helped to determine the place of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of each of the powers considered, and to identify the specifics of the understanding of this idea by the governments of the powers.
Research source base consists of published and archival written historical sources of the late 16th – early 17th centuries. on the history of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition, the participation of the Moscow State and other countries in this process. Written sources can be divided into four groups depending on their origin, purposes of creation and the nature of the information they contain.
1. Office documentation of Russian origin . The greatest value for the study are unpublished documents from the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA): F. 32 Relations of Russia with the Roman Empire, F. 77 Relations of Russia with Persia, F. 110 Relations of Russia with Georgia, F. 115 Kabardian, Circassian and others files, as well as documents from the archives of the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ASPbII RAS): F. 178 Astrakhan Order Chamber. Some of the sources of this group were published in monuments of diplomatic relations between Russia and foreign powers, Don affairs and discharge books. The collections of documents included materials on the relations of the Moscow state with the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, and the composition of Russian embassies. The sources of this group contain extensive data deposited in the affairs of the Ambassadorial Prikaz of the period 1588–1719, on diplomatic correspondence between the imperial, Moscow and Persian courts, drafts and texts of agreements on a military offensive alliance against the Ottoman Empire, which were supposed to be concluded between participants in the anti-Turkish coalition . The paperwork materials revealed valuable information about the negotiation process on the creation of an anti-Turkish offensive alliance between the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, the routes and conditions of stay of the allied embassies in various countries. The documents give an idea of the work and needs of diplomatic missions, the powers of ambassadors, the nature and forms of relationships between the allied sovereigns, highlight the political connections of the states participating in the coalition, make it possible to clarify the role of the Moscow state in the anti-Turkish alliance, and trace changes in the foreign policy of the allied states at the beginning of the 17th century.
2. Office documentation of foreign origin . The sources of this group are represented by documents of foreign diplomatic departments, extracted by Russian and foreign historians from foreign archives and libraries. Some of them were published in collections of documents edited by 23, D. Bercher24, E. Charrière25, T. de Gonto Biron de Salignac26, 27. The documents “Chronicles of the Carmelites”, containing reports of the Carmelites who carried out diplomatic missions of the Roman Curia in Persia and Moscow, are of great value. state, correspondence of the papal office with the shahs, proposals of Abbas I to create an anti-Turkish coalition28. This same group of sources includes materials from the correspondence of the Roman pontiffs with the Moscow sovereigns29 and False Dmitry I30. Unpublished materials consist of a collection of documents F. 30 RGADA, extracted by Russian scientists from the archives of the Vatican, Rome and Venice, archives and libraries of France and England.
The sources of the second group contain valuable information about the development of projects for creating an anti-Turkish coalition, correspondence between the Persian shahs and European sovereigns, secret instructions of European diplomats in Persia, and reports from European diplomats to their rulers. The documents give an idea of the connections of the Moscow state with foreign countries, internal political events of the Moscow state, plans for the campaign of False Dmitry I against Turkey, imperial and Persian embassies in Moscow, and the international position of the Ottoman Empire. The sources make it possible to clarify the reaction of the Ottoman Empire to the actions of European states directed against it, the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the states of the anti-Turkish coalition (including the Muscovite state and Persia), and highlight the proposals of the Roman Curia on the role of the Moscow state in the proposed alliance.
3. Chronicles. Presented with materials from Russian chronicle monuments – the Nikon Chronicle and the New Chronicler31. The Nikon Chronicle repeatedly contains descriptions of the arrival of Shamkhal and Gilyan “guests” to the court of the Moscow sovereign. The New Chronicle reflects events from the end of the reign of Ivan IV to the 1730s, including data on the receptions of Persian ambassadors. Information from chronicle monuments allows us to get a general idea of the events in the Moscow state of the era under consideration and complements information from embassy books.
4. Memoirs, diaries, travel notes . Represented by memoirs, diary entries, reports of foreign ambassadors and travelers: imperial ambassadors Niklas von Varkotsch32, Michael Schiele33, Oruj bey Bayat - secretary of the Persian embassy Hussein Ali bey and A. Shirley to Europe34, imperial ambassadors Stefan Kakash and Georg Tektander35, Polish and papal ambassadors at the court of False Dmitry I36, the Spanish ambassadors to Persia Antonio da Gouvea37 and Garcia da Figueroa38. The sources of this group complement the data of other documents on the instructions and powers of ambassadors, on plans for creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the late 16th - early 17th centuries. The travel notes of the Spanish ambassadors also give an idea of the reaction of Philip III to the proposals of Abbas I regarding the conclusion of an anti-Turkish alliance, the evolution of the Shah’s attitude towards the Spanish king and other European sovereigns.
The study is based on the records of the Ambassadorial Order of the Moscow State and foreign diplomatic departments, which make it possible to reconstruct in basic terms the negotiation process to create a coalition and clarify the positions of the parties participating in them. The data obtained make it possible to verify the testimony of other groups, to supplement and clarify the overall picture of the negotiation process, to identify the reasons, goals, conditions, dynamics and features of the participation of the Moscow state and other countries in the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance during the specified period.
Scientific novelty research. For the first time, a special scientific study has been carried out on the participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition.
– The evolution of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of European states is traced. At different stages of the historical development of the interested powers, the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was transformed in connection with the socio-political and economic changes taking place in them.
– The reasons are revealed, the goals and features of the process of integration of the Moscow state into the European community through participation in the anti-Turkish coalition are clarified. Contrary to the traditional opinion of Russian and foreign researchers, the Moscow state intended to participate in military and political actions against the Ottoman Empire. His military-political and military-strategic plans related to the creation of a coalition were multidimensional and long-term in nature.
– Conditions have been determined for the implementation of the project of an anti-Turkish coalition consisting of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia. The Holy Roman Empire and Persia shared borders with the Ottoman Empire and were in a state of permanent war with it. The geostrategic position of the Moscow state allowed it to act both as a mediator and coordinator, and as a direct participant in the fight against Turkey.
– The financial, human and diplomatic resources of the Moscow state necessary for participation in the anti-Turkish coalition, as well as possible forms of its participation in the anti-Turkish campaign, have been identified. The Moscow state could involve detachments of Don and, in part, Zaporizhian Cossacks, vassal Kabardian squads in the anti-Turkish campaign, place small streltsy garrisons in Transcaucasian fortresses located at the intersection of roads, exert diplomatic pressure on the Crimean Tatars, assist Persia in the rapid sale of silk through Europe. raw materials, supply firearms to Persia in exchange for territorial concessions on its part.
– The reasons for the change in foreign policy priorities in Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations at the beginning of the 17th century are clarified. It was found that the participation of the Moscow state in the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was an instrument of its eastern policy, with the help of which it in the late 16th - early 17th centuries. integrated into the European community. The stages of this process are highlighted. It was determined that the process at different stages of development had different dynamics and different significance for the coalition participants. Achievements in concluding an anti-Turkish agreement were virtually reduced to zero as a result of the Troubles in the Moscow State and the signing of a peace treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and Turkey. The creation of an anti-Turkish coalition became impossible with the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in Europe.
Practical significance of the study. The provisions and conclusions of the dissertation work can be used in the preparation of new scientific research and generalizing works on the history of the foreign policy of Russia, Persia, European states participating in the anti-Turkish coalition, the history of Russia in the 16th – 17th centuries; in the development of general and special courses on the history of Russian-Austrian and Russian-Iranian international relations, the history of the development of European diplomacy.
Approbation of work. The main provisions and conclusions of the dissertation are presented at the international scientific conference “Modernization and traditions - the Lower Volga region as a crossroads of cultures” (Volgograd, 2006), the regional scientific conference “Local history readings” (Volgograd, 2002), at the annual scientific conferences of graduate students and teachers of Volgograd State University (Volgograd , 2002 – 2006). On the topic of the dissertation, 8 articles were published with a total volume of 3.5 pp.
Structure of the dissertation. The dissertation consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature, and an appendix.
In the Introduction the relevance of the topic is substantiated, an analysis of scientific literature and sources is given, the purpose and objectives, chronological and geographical framework, the methodological basis of the study are determined, the scientific novelty is noted, and the composition of the dissertation is justified.
In the first chapter“Eastern policy of the Moscow state and the project of the anti-Turkish coalition », consisting of three paragraphs, the emergence of the idea of an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy plans of European states and the transformation of this idea into a specific instrument of the eastern policy of the Moscow State is considered, the reasons for the participation of the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia in the anti-Turkish coalition are determined, the role of the Moscow State in relations between Persia is revealed and the Holy Roman Empire.
The “Eastern Question” was perceived by Europeans as the struggle of Christian Europe against Ottoman aggression. Counteraction to the Ottoman Empire was possible only by creating an anti-Turkish coalition, in which Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were to be present. The Roman Curia was assigned the role of ideological leader. Theoretically, France, England, and Poland could join the anti-Turkish coalition. But these countries pursued their own, narrowly national interests in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. In order to change the situation, the Roman Curia began to consider options for a political union with states outside the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church. The first on the list of candidates was Shiite Persia, diplomatic contacts with which were established in the last third of the 15th century. As a result of the alliance with Persia, the Ottomans could be squeezed between two fronts - from the west and the east. In this case, they would not be able to wage war against both Christians and Persians. But always, when it came to bringing Persia into the ranks of the anti-Turkish coalition, the Moscow state came to the fore.
The “Eastern Question” for the Moscow state, in addition to the political component, also had a historical and philosophical justification related to the role of Moscow as the spiritual successor of the Byzantine Empire and protector of the Slavic peoples of the Balkans. With the help of hypothetical participation in the not yet created anti-Turkish coalition, Moscow demonstrated its potential capabilities. The political situation in Europe was such that if in the first half of the 16th century. Since the participation of the Moscow state in the pan-European anti-Turkish league was theoretically possible, then with the annexation of the Volga khanates a new stage began in the development of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe. The balance of power in the system of Eastern European states changed in favor of the Moscow state.
The creation of an anti-Turkish coalition at this time was the subject of geopolitics - the first international project of the New Age. It is important that the Moscow state was able to assess the scale of the anti-Turkish project in time and determine its place in it. Since the late 70s. XVI century the question of the participation of the Moscow state in the pan-European war against the Turks begins to move from the sphere of projects to the sphere of practical politics. However, a number of subjective factors prevented the implementation of anti-Turkish plans. The situation in which the Moscow state found itself as a result of defeat in the Livonian War should in no way affect the international authority of the country and its potential capabilities. Ivan IV was able to convince the papal envoy A. Possevino that “we want to unite” with the Roman Pontiff, the Emperor and all other Christian sovereigns in an anti-Turkish alliance. In the early 80s. XVI century It became finally clear to European politicians that attracting Persia to the anti-Turkish league was possible only through the mediation of the Moscow state. European-Persian ties did not bring concrete results. Communication between Europe and Persia through the Moscow state could be carried out two to three times faster and safer. By this time, the Moscow state, in addition to the benefits associated with international transit, also had in the eyes of Europeans the political influence that it could exert on Persia. Gregory XIII in the early 80s. XVI century assigned the Moscow state the role of a mediator between the Persian Shah and the European sovereigns and proposed attacking the Ottomans from two sides: from the west - by the forces of Europeans, and from the northeast - by the forces of the “Russian-Persian alliance”.
Ivan IV understood the main trends of European politics and used them to the maximum to solve his own foreign policy problems. The project of participation in the anti-Turkish coalition became a diplomatic tool with the help of which the Moscow state tried to integrate into the system of European international relations. At this point, foreign policy goals and internal motives of the Moscow state regarding the “eastern question” intersect. The formation of the eastern direction of the Moscow state's foreign policy occurred naturally, and it was this policy that made it attractive for participation in pan-European projects.
In the mid-80s. XVI century the issue of creating an anti-Turkish coalition is reaching a qualitatively new level. This is due to changes in the international situation and the coming to power of new political leaders both in Moscow and in Persia. In 1587, Tsar Feodor received a request from Shah Khudabende for help in the fight against the Ottomans. For support, the Shah offered to transfer the cities of Baku and Derbent to the Moscow state. In addition, the Shah asked the Moscow sovereign to unite with interested Christian monarchs in an anti-Turkish alliance and report this to Persia. The Moscow government instantly responded to such a tempting offer and immediately took the initiative into its own hands. Sent to Persia in 1589, he convinced Shah Abbas that he could join the anti-Turkish coalition of Western European states only with the help of the Moscow sovereign and B. Godunov personally.
In 1588, Rudolf II received a proposal stating that the tsar assumed obligations to conclude an anti-Turkish military-political alliance with the shah, which the emperor and other European sovereigns could join. The Moscow government passed off the proposals made in 1587 by Shah Khudabende as its own, making appropriate adjustments to them. These proposals will form the foreign policy program of the Moscow state until the outbreak of the Time of Troubles. Intensive negotiations began between the Empire and the Moscow state, which were led personally by Godunov on the Moscow side, and by the experienced and far-sighted diplomat N. Varkoch on the imperial side.
As a result of three embassies of N. Varkoch to Moscow in 1589, 1593 and 1595. The parties outlined their positions, plans and opportunities available for their implementation. Firstly, the Moscow state was going to participate in military actions against the Turks, but linked these actions with the conclusion of a written alliance treaty. Secondly, the ally of both powers was clearly identified - Safavid Persia. Thirdly, the Moscow government defined its position as a mediator and coordinator of actions between the Holy Roman Empire and Persia. This position in the proposed alliance was assigned to him by the Empire and Persia. Fourthly, Moscow is ready to provide the emperor with both financial and military assistance in the upcoming war with the Ottomans, but for this it is necessary to conclude a military offensive alliance as quickly as possible. Finally, fifthly, the great embassy, which was supposed to arrive in Moscow in the summer of 1594, was to formalize the agreements reached.
However, at the end of 1593, Turkey, without an official declaration of war, began military operations against the Empire. The Reichstag refused to allocate funds for the maintenance of the emperor's mercenary army without an official declaration of war. Moscow responded to the emperor’s request for urgent help by allocating the treasury in the form of “soft junk”, valued by Prague merchants at rubles. Translated into German money, this amount was equal to thalers. For comparison: the Roman Curia from 1593 to 1606. spent 1 escudo (about 2.5 million thalers) to support the emperor, and Spain spent 3 thalers during all the years of the “Long Turkish War”. This act made a deep impression on the emperor, so until the end of his life Rudolf considered the Russians allies of the Empire. The generous gesture of the Moscow government impressed not only the emperor, but had a great international resonance.
The common task of the three states was to fight the Ottoman Empire, but the goals differed significantly. The Holy Roman Empire tried to stop the advance of the Ottomans deeper into their territories and, if possible, expel them from the Balkan Peninsula. Persia sought to return the ancient Iranian territories and in the future destroy Turkey as a state. The Moscow state did not lay claim to Ottoman territories, but slowly and steadily expanded its own: through Transcaucasia to the Black and Caspian Seas. In the proposed triumvirate, the Moscow state was assigned the role of mediator and coordinator of joint actions. This status was given to Moscow by its allies - the Holy Roman Empire and Persia.
However, from the very beginning, there was a hidden contradiction in the proposed alliance, which later played a negative role. The specific structure of the Holy Roman Empire did not give Rudolf II the opportunity to pursue an active offensive policy. The absolute power of the emperor was limited by the financial prerogatives of the imperial princes, who adhered to a defensive foreign policy. The power of the Moscow sovereigns, although limited by the boyar duma and zemstvo councils, developed in the direction of absolutism. From the end of the 15th century. The territory of the Moscow state had a steady tendency to expand. Therefore, the foreign policy of the Moscow state was actively offensive and could in the future lead to a clash with the Ottomans. Political and economic structure Safavid Persia and the Muscovite state had much in common. The power of the Shah was limited only by the separatist actions of the Kizilbash leaders, which Abbas mercilessly suppressed. Since the middle of the 16th century. Persia expanded its territory. The main enemy on this path was the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Persia, like the Moscow state, pursued an offensive foreign policy. The presence of common goals and the desire for political rapprochement prevented the tsar, emperor and shah from understanding the fundamental difference in each other's political and financial capabilities.
This did not mean that such a contradiction completely excluded allied relations between the participants of the supposed triumvirate. With skillful coordination of actions and the presence of pre-developed plans, success was possible. It was also necessary to clearly stipulate what each side expected to gain from the proposed alliance, in addition to the successful implementation of the anti-Turkish action plan. The next condition, which will play a dramatic role in the creation of the union, was not obvious until a certain time. It consisted in the legal form of the agreement, and was most important for the Moscow state. The Empire and Persia intended to conclude the usual “union against a common enemy” in such cases; in this case, the enemy was the Ottoman Empire. The Moscow state insisted on concluding such an agreement, which, if necessary, could be used against any enemy. Consequently, the alliance, initially created in the form of an anti-Turkish triumvirate, would oblige the parties to the agreement, if necessary, to turn their forces against the enemy of one of the parties. However, at the first stage of the negotiation process, these nuances were not fully understood by the parties and, as it seemed, were not an obstacle to concluding an anti-Turkish agreement. Rather, on the contrary, the development of relationships from 1588 to 1595. between the Empire, the Moscow State and Persia instilled a certain optimism in the participants in the negotiation process.
In the second chapter“In search of a military-political alliance,” consisting of four paragraphs, highlights the preparation of anti-Turkish agreements between the Moscow State and the Holy Roman Empire, the Moscow State and Persia, analyzes the structure of the proposed anti-Turkish alliance, reveals the reasons why the anti-Turkish agreement between the Moscow State and European countries and Persia was not signed, the history of the Prince's embassy was reconstructed. -Zasekin and his results are considered.
Period from 1595 to 1600 was most favorable for concluding a tripartite alliance agreement between the Moscow State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia. The reasons why it was not possible to formalize an anti-Turkish agreement between the three sovereigns during this period were both objective and subjective. The stumbling block was the form of the agreement, which the Moscow side insisted on. The agreement, in the opinion of the Moscow government headed by B. Godunov, should have been concluded in the form of a “finishing off”. “Finishing agreements” usually had the nature of a peace agreement, but if there was a threat of attack on one of the parties, they obliged the participants to joint military action. That is, the agreement implied joint actions against common enemies, even if one of the parties was not interested in participating in the conflict. Theoretically, the agreement was directed against the Ottoman Empire, but in practice, any aggressor who attacked one of the parties to the agreement could become an “enemy”. For example, in the event of an attack by Poland on the Muscovite state, the Roman Empire had to provide moral and military support to its ally. The imperial government, well aware of the difficult relations between Poland and the Moscow state, could not decide to conclude such an agreement. Otherwise, he would have to fight a war on two fronts. Therefore, Ambassador Abraham von Donau, sent to Moscow in 1597, was instructed to agree only to the signing of an agreement designed for the years of the life of Rudolf II and Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich. Their heirs then had to confirm and renew the contract. In addition, imperial diplomats were prohibited from discussing the text of the treaty article by article. The treaty with limited legal possibilities presented by the Empire did not suit B. Godunov, who wanted to enlist the support of Rudolf II in the struggle for power after the death of Tsar Feodor. Godunov promised to provide the emperor financial assistance only after concluding an agreement giving him personal guarantees. Thus, both sides could only hope to sign an alliance treaty in the future.
Similarly, the Moscow government promised Persia military and material assistance only after the signing of an alliance treaty. Persia was asked to conclude an agreement that included elements of “finishing off” and “union” (military-defensive and offensive alliance). Negotiations lasted from 1588 to 1597. The Moscow side considered the transfer of the trade ports of Baku and Derbent, once offered in exchange for military assistance by the Shahs and Abbas I, to be an indispensable condition of the agreement. The Moscow government regarded these proposals as a chance to take Persia under its “great hand.” From that moment on, in his negotiations with the Empire and in his letters to Rudolf II, the thesis was repeated that the Shah wanted to be “in everything in the will of the sovereign.” Therefore, the texts of the agreement on behalf of Tsar Fedor and on behalf of Shah Abbas I, drawn up by the Moscow side, differed. According to the agreement, the tsar had to, under the articles of the agreement, “do the truth,” that is, take an oath according to Orthodox custom. In contrast, the Shah had to “commit a mess according to his faith.” The concept of “wort, shert” had a double interpretation: to take an oath, as well as the oath of Muslim rulers to their overlord, so the proposed treaty was initially unequal.
The Moscow government tried to sign the agreement twice. In 1598, the embassy of the prince was instructed to do this. and clerk S. Emelyanov. Analysis of the texts of the agreement made it possible to identify some of their features. Both texts combined the forms of “completion” and “connection”. However, the texts of the “finishing orders” of the tsar and the shah were not identical, although according to international legal tradition they should have duplicated each other. They differed in spelling. The expression “brotherhood” is found in the texts, but it is used not in the sense of an equal relationship, but as a relationship between an older brother, the Moscow sovereign, and a younger brother, the Persian Shah. In the text, compiled on behalf of Abbas I, in addresses to the king, the pronoun “You” is found - the usual form of addressing the overlord. The title of the king in the treaty was more magnificent and longer than that of the Shah. Military assistance and support for the Moscow sovereign was assessed not by two cities, as previously stated, but by three, including Shemakha, a major center of sericulture in Transcaucasia, the capital of the Shamkhal Khanate. Thus, the Shamkhal Khan passed from under the suzerainty of the Shah to the citizenship of the Moscow sovereign. In general, the content of the agreement met the parameters of the anti-Turkish agreement, but the concession of Derbent, Baku and Shamakhi could be considered as recognition of the Shah’s dependence on the Tsar.
The Moscow government was very interested in signing such an agreement. A war with the Ottoman Empire in alliance with Persia and other European states could bring tangible benefits to the Moscow state with minimal human and financial costs. Persia and the Roman Empire had to use all their resources in the fight against Turkey. internal resources. The Moscow side could involve detachments of Don, Terek and Zaporozhye Cossacks, vassal Kabardian squads in the military campaign; place rifle garrisons in Transcaucasia; exert force and diplomatic pressure on the Crimean Tatars; to assist Persia in the rapid sale of raw silk through Europe; supply firearms to Persia in exchange for territorial concessions on its part.
Taking advantage of the difficult situation of Persia, the Moscow government tried to force Abbas I to conclude an agreement on terms favorable to itself. The Shah understood the current situation, responded evasively to the proposals of the Moscow side and preferred to conclude not a bilateral agreement with the Moscow state, but a broad anti-Turkish agreement with the European powers. In 1598, brothers Anthony and Robert Shirley arrived in Persia on a diplomatic mission. The secret organizer of the mission was Clement VIII. A. Shirley informed the Shah about the political balance of power in Europe and the need for immediate anti-Turkish actions to help the emperor. By the end of spring 1599, the Shah organized a great embassy to the European sovereigns, headed by Hussein Ali Bek and A. Shirley, with proposals to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance.
Comparative analysis of the texts of European diplomatic correspondence of the last quarter of the 16th century. and the draft anti-Turkish agreement proposed by Abbas I to the European sovereigns, gives reason to believe that it was drawn up with the participation of A. Shirley, who acted on behalf of the Roman Curia. Abbas I proposed that the governments of Christian states denounce all treaties and agreements with the Ottoman Empire and conclude a written agreement with him on a joint fight against the Ottomans. The main person involved in this agreement was to be the Holy Roman Emperor. The most unusual thing in the Shah's proposals was the form of the future union, which was supposed to be created in the form of a confederation, taking into account the interests of each of the participants. The Confederates were required to participate in hostilities against the Ottoman Empire. Individual withdrawal from the war or the conclusion of a separate peace was regarded as betrayal. For his part, the Shah promised to begin military action against the Ottomans at any moment. In addition, the Shah guaranteed Europeans the free exercise of Christian worship in Persia and maximum benefits for European merchants.
Only the Roman Curia and the Holy Roman Empire were fully interested in the Shah's proposals. Venice and Spain avoided participating in hostilities, but did not reject the idea in principle. It was beneficial for them to have a strong ally in the rear of their worst enemy. Despite agreeing in principle with the Shah’s proposals, the imperial side failed to respond to them in a timely and adequate manner. The Persian embassy arrived in Prague in the fall of 1600 at a time when Rudolf II was seriously ill. Among the victims of the emperor's morbid suspicion were V. Rumpf and those who supervised the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition in the imperial government. The Persian ambassadors had no one to deliver the Shah's messages. They were inactive for almost six months. The intervention of the emperor's brothers and Cardinal Dietrichstein did not lead to the conclusion of a treaty. Time was lost. Persian ambassadors left for Rome and Spain. A messenger M. Schel was sent to Persia with a letter from Rudolf II, which expressed agreement in principle to the proposals of the Shah. However, Godunov did not allow the imperial envoy to enter Persia. The letters were confiscated and reached the Shah only through the embassy of the prince. -Zasekina.
Europe was not ready to accept the proposals of Abbas I. The Shah rejected the defensive tactics of the war with the Ottomans, which made it possible to deal with the allies separately. Rudolf II, who adhered to defensive tactics in relation to the Ottoman Empire, due to subjective and objective reasons, missed the opportunity to liberate the Balkans from the Ottomans. Abbas I offered the European states in exchange for an alliance against the Ottoman Empire much more than what the crusades and colonial conquests brought them. Europe missed, perhaps, the only opportunity in the history of international relations to peacefully and voluntarily involve a major Muslim power in the orbit of its interests.
In 1600, Godunov, who became the Moscow sovereign, made a second attempt to conclude a military-political agreement with Shah Abbas. In the current domestic and foreign political situation, this agreement was of strategic importance for Godunov. The Zasekin embassy stayed at the Shah's court for 1.5 years. There is no documentary evidence that Abbas agreed to sign the agreement in the form in which it was proposed by the Moscow side. Nevertheless, negotiations on joint military operations in the Transcaucasus were definitely carried out and the result of these negotiations was the Shah’s entry into the war with the Ottomans in the fall of 1602. Abbas took this risky step only after he secured guarantees, albeit oral ones, from Tsar Boris. The signing of the text of the agreement was postponed until the arrival of the Persian embassy of Lachin Bey in Moscow, who set off on the journey together with the Zasekin embassy. In the spring of 1604, a Russian garrison was sent to Dagestan, consisting of three regiments under the command of a governor; Cossack and Nogai detachments joined the army. The actions of the Moscow government and a conversation with Lachin Bek, who was returning to Persia, made it possible for the imperial ambassador G. Tektander to report to the emperor that the Russians had entered into an alliance with the Persian Shah. The text of the agreement, even if it was signed by Lachin Bey in Moscow, has not been preserved, like all other embassy documentation for this period. But as a result of successful negotiations between Zasekin and Shah Abbas, Tsar Boris adjusted his foreign policy position and moved from a mediating role to the role of a direct active participant in the anti-Turkish coalition.
In the third chapter“The issue of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the beginning of the 17th century” , consisting of five paragraphs, the changes that occurred at the beginning of the 17th century are analyzed. in the foreign policy of the Moscow state, European powers and Persia; the anti-Turkish plans of False Dmitry I and the activities of the Carmelites sent to Persia through the Moscow State in 1604 to negotiate the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition are considered; the imperial-Persian embassies located in Moscow during the Time of Troubles were reconstructed; the influence of the European foreign policy situation on the transformation of the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition on the eve of the Thirty Years' War is revealed.
Despite the fact that in 1600 it was not possible to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance between the Christian sovereigns and the Shah, European projects in this direction underwent serious adjustments. The Roman Curia announced a change from defensive tactics to an offensive strategy in the anti-Turkish movement. An offensive strategy could only bring success if there was a simultaneous attack on the Ottoman Empire from several directions at once - west, east and northeast. The participation of the Moscow state in the anti-Turkish coalition continued to remain relevant.
The socio-economic crisis of the Moscow state at the beginning of the 17th century. pushed B. Godunov to take active military action that could defuse tensions in society. B. Godunov tried to conclude a military-political agreement with Rudolf II, guaranteeing the safety of him and his heir. Trips to the emperor in 1599, 1602 and 1603 - 1604, the arrival of an imperial embassy in Moscow led by G. von Logau did not lead to the signing of an agreement, but Godunov nevertheless secured some guarantees from the emperor. Despite the fact that the Troubles began in the Moscow state, False Dmitry, who seized the throne, managed to take advantage of the well-functioning mechanism of Russian-imperial relations. The new ruler declared the eastern direction of foreign policy a priority. Statements about a future war with the Ottomans were made by the impostor back in Poland. Having seized power, False Dmitry I declared a crusade against the Turks the motto of his reign. A victorious war with the Ottomans was necessary for False Dmitry I as well as for B. Godunov. In addition, a successful campaign allowed the Don Cossacks and the minor nobility, who supported the impostor, to expand their possessions at the expense of the conquered territories and reduced the possibility of a clash between False Dmitry and the privileged Moscow nobility. False Dmitry was convinced that now Sigismund III would also join the anti-Turkish campaign, since with his coming to power all contradictions between the countries were eliminated. Prague also closely followed developments in the Muscovite state and had high hopes for the new tsar. False Dmitry I outlined his proposals for the creation of an anti-Turkish league in a letter to Paul V. In terms of the degree of development and depth of content, the anti-Turkish program of False Dmitry can only be compared with the proposals of Shah Abbas I. Without a domestic political program, the new ruler had a fairly clear foreign policy concept, which most seriously continued Godunov course. The only thing False Dmitry urgently asked Paul V to do was to convince Rudolf II to continue the war with the Ottoman Empire. False Dmitry I, like Abbas I, thought that he was making an offer to the Roman Curia and other states that was impossible to refuse. In a reply letter, Paul V suggested that False Dmitry begin the campaign on his own, already in the spring of 1606; a written agreement could be drawn up later. Paul V assured False Dmitry that the rest of the potential members of the league would join the campaign. For the summer of 1606, False Dmitry I planned a campaign against the Ottomans, in the Azov region.
In this situation, Shah Abbas I continued to be the most reliable ally of the Moscow state in the fight against the Ottomans. False Dmitry decided to send an embassy to Persia in May 1606, headed by Prince. . His task was to obtain reliable information about the Persian-Turkish war and, possibly, to develop a plan for joint military action. But at the end of May False Dmitry I was killed. The Moscow throne was taken by V. Shuisky, who, under pressure from the Polish and papal ambassadors in Moscow, did not cancel the embassy to Persia. Therefore, in the credentials of Prince. They crossed out the name of the impostor and wrote in the name of the new king.
The Roman Curia often employed monks from various orders as diplomats. In 1604, six Carmelites were sent from Rome to Persia: Paul-Simon, Jean Tadde, Vincent, Redempt, Riodolid and Jean de Lassomption. The Carmelites were tasked with gaining confidence in Abbas I and softening his distrust of Europe, which arose due to the wait-and-see attitude of European sovereigns regarding the Shah’s proposals for an anti-Turkish coalition. The monks joined the Persian ambassador Zainul Abdin Beg in Prague, who was returning home after unsuccessful attempts to conclude an offensive alliance with the emperor against Turkey. The death of False Dmitry I and the Time of Troubles delayed the embassy in Tsaritsyn for a year. The Carmelites were able to get to Persia only in 1607. By that time, the international situation had changed. The Holy Roman Empire concluded the Treaty of Sitvatorok with the Ottoman Empire in 1606, and Persia conquered several strategically important areas from the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was experiencing an internal political crisis. It was easier for Abbas I to develop military success in an alliance with European countries. Therefore, the Carmelites managed to regain the trust of the Shah, revive his hopes for an alliance with the Europeans and inspire new plans to fight the Ottomans. In 1608 Fr. Paul-Simon returned to Rome with the news that Abbas I had accepted the Curia's apology and was about to send a new embassy to Europe, headed by Robert Shirley, with new proposals from the Shah. Abbas I took into account the complex and contradictory international situation in Europe and no longer insisted on European military action against the Ottoman Empire and called for economic sanctions against Turkey. Military assistance for Persia also remained relevant. In this, the Shah relied on the Moscow State, where the Carmelite Fr. Jean Tadde. Abbas I hoped that the king would sanction the campaign of the Don Cossacks against the Turks. However, the Carmelite did not reach Moscow. He was arrested in Astrakhan by the governor and spent more than two years in captivity, after which he returned to Persia in 1612.
The remoteness, vastness of the territory of the Moscow State, and lack of reliable information did not allow foreign countries objectively evaluate the events occurring in it. The Troubles led to a significant decrease in the political and diplomatic activity of the Moscow state apparatus, especially in the central and western regions. However, this phenomenon was not widespread. The Moscow state continued to remain an object of international relations during this period, although it limited its foreign policy aspirations. Playing the role of a transit corridor, it preserved in 1606–1616. function as an intermediary between European states and Persia. Analysis of embassy documentation made it possible to identify more than five Persian and imperial embassies that visited the Muscovite state at the indicated time. In 1608–1609, the Persian embassies of Rahullah bek and Ali Quli bek, sent by the Shah to Rudolf II and Sigismund III back in 1604, returned through Muscovy. In Astrakhan, Rahullah bek died and the embassy was headed by Tahmasp bey. On the way back from Poland, Takhmasp bek was robbed by Tushino Cossacks, then during the movement of the zemstvo militias he was sent to Nizhny Novgorod, where he remained until 1614. The next one was the embassy of Amir Ali beg to V. Shuisky. Amir Ali bey was detained and robbed by Tush residents. The second militia also sent him to Nizhny Novgorod. In the spring of 1613, the ambassador was returned to Moscow to meet with Tsar M. Romanov. He was allowed to leave for Persia only in 1614. The embassy of R. Shirley, sent by the Shah in 1608, also traveled to Europe through the Moscow state engulfed in Troubles. The ambassador left a unique description of his meeting with False Dmitry II in Tushino, which took place in compliance with all diplomatic formalities. There was even talk about the marriage of one of the daughters of Yu. Mnishka to the eldest son of the Shah.
The response of European monarchs to the new Persian proposals again did not live up to the Shah’s hopes. Emperor Rudolf II was removed from power by his younger brother Matthias. The Roman Curia was not able to respond to the proposals of the Shah due to the unstable internal political situation. Spain chose to deal with the pirate problem off the coast of Algeria, which was formally part of the Ottoman Empire. Only England was interested in the Shah's proposals, which contributed to the improvement of its relations with Persia.
In 1613, the Shah's ambassador Murshid Quli bek returned from the Empire to Persia with Adam d'Adarno and Yusuf Grigoriev, sent by Emperor Matthias to Abbas I. They were detained in Moscow, taken to Tsar Mikhail Romanov, and then taken to different cities: Adam d'Adarno - to Yaroslavl, Yu. Grigoriev - to Ustyug, Murshid Kuli bek - to Kazan. There they were kept in complete isolation as prisoners. The reason for the captivity of the ambassadors was declared to be their route through Polish territories. Murshid Quli beg managed to return to Persia in 1614 along with the embassy of Bulat beg, who arrived in the Moscow state after the Time of Troubles, and the Moscow embassy to the Shah, headed by. It is known that Y. Grigoriev was still in custody in 1622, and d’Adarno died in a monastery prison in 1654. During this period, in addition to the Persian and imperial ambassadors, the Moscow authorities detained the diplomatic couriers of the Persian Shah, Mugip beg and Meh beg. In 1615, R. Shirley returned to Persia and delivered information to Abbas I that the idea of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was no longer relevant for European politicians, and a major religious and political conflict was brewing in Europe.
The international image of the Moscow state suffered seriously as a result of the Time of Troubles. Well-established political connections pushed the prince. in 1612, on behalf of the “zemstvo”, offer the Moscow throne to Archduke Maximilian of Habsburg. The majority of the Moscow boyars preferred to see as the tsar a long-familiar, proven ally, for whom Fyodor Ioannovich and Boris Godunov had wooed their daughters. The question of Maximilian’s “vocation” disappeared in 1613 in connection with the coronation of Michael. In 1612, Rudolf II died, Matthias became the new emperor. As a political figure, Mathias was never seriously considered by the Moscow authorities. The bet was made on Maximilian. Having come to power, Matthias found himself in a difficult internal political situation. To strengthen his position, he needed a victorious war with the Ottomans, with whom he advocated peace while in opposition to Emperor Rudolf II in 1606–1607. Matthias continued to consider the Moscow state a potential ally. During his reign until 1619, the course of imperial policy towards the Moscow state generally remained the same. Despite the great propaganda work that the ambassadors of the Polish king carried out in Prague, Matthias did not support Sigismund III in the “Moscow adventure”. The leading role in maintaining the previous course of the Empire, aimed at allied relations with the Moscow State and Persia, was played by Cardinal M. Klesl, the forerunner of modern politicians. As a mediator between the Polish and Muscovite states, the imperial government made every effort to bring them to a peace agreement and continue the course towards creating an anti-Turkish coalition.
On the contrary, the policy of the new Moscow government was inconsistent and did not have promising goals. Therefore, Moscow diplomats, having inherited well-established ties with the Empire, retained only the external form of the previous relations. Formally, the Moscow state declared the slogan of “union” against the Ottoman Empire. In practice, it detained imperial diplomats on the way to the Persian Shah. The rash actions of the Moscow authorities disrupted negotiations between the emperor and the shah, putting the new tsar in an ambiguous position.
In relation to Persia, Moscow politicians also acted inconsistently and unpromisingly. After the Shah was notified of the accession to the throne of Mikhail Romanov in 1614, the Moscow government began to persistently and persistently beg Abbas I for financial assistance to wage the war with Poland. The issue of financial support determined the entire spectrum of relations between the Moscow State and Persia in 1614–1616. At the same time, the Moscow authorities deliberately misinformed the Shah about the internal and external situation of the country, passing off wishful thinking. Attempts by Abbas I to give relations between the two states a long-term perspective in the form of joint mutually beneficial projects in Transcaucasia ended in failure. The Moscow state practically abandoned the eastern direction in foreign policy. References to the economic crisis and the war with the Poles were poorly hidden the real reason such behavior is fear for one’s own power. The new Moscow government only outwardly tried to imitate the authority and course of the Godunov government. The Shah very soon realized the true state of affairs in the Moscow state. Asking for money to wage war, even after the signing of the Deulin truce with Poland, led to the almost complete loss of the political authority of the Moscow state in the eyes of Shah Abbas.
In custody The results of the study are summed up. Period from 1587 to 1618 in the history of international relations marks the transition from the foreign policy conditions and goals of the late Middle Ages to the modern era. At the turn of historical eras, the idea of the anti-Turkish struggle became the first international project aimed at weakening the hegemonic positions of one state in a certain region, in this case the Ottoman Empire. The most active participants in the anti-Turkish alliance in the period under review were the Holy Roman Empire, the Moscow State and Safavid Persia. They could form the core of a broad anti-Turkish coalition, which various European countries could later join. In the noted states, there were socio-political and economic conditions for the successful creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. To bring the project to life, their governments lacked political endurance and perseverance. However, for almost 30 years, the anti-Turkish project has repeatedly come close to its implementation. Its history can be divided into 4 periods.
First period (1587 – 1592) can be called a stage in the revival of the idea of an anti-Turkish coalition. The initiative to organize an anti-Turkish alliance at that time belonged to the Muslim state - Persia. The idea of such an incredible alliance for the late Middle Ages quickly acquired real content. Its most ardent propagandists were Emperor Rudolf II and Boris Godunov on behalf of Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich. The Roman Curia joined the coalition morally and materially. Spain and Venice remained among the sympathizers. Opponents also appeared - Poland and France. Thus, over the course of 4 years, hypothetical alliances of potential allies and opponents of the anti-Turkish coalition have formed in the international arena. Politicians from states supporting the alliance began to discuss projects of joint action and forms of concluding the proposed alliance. Moscow diplomacy took the most active part in these discussions. The Moscow government, led by Godunov, intuitively felt that the anti-Turkish project would help the Moscow state integrate into the European community and implement long-term plans for its eastern policy. Geographical position and the political connections of the Moscow state allowed Moscow politicians to become intermediary coordinators in relations between Shah Abbas I and European sovereigns. In general, this period can be described as successful.
Second period (1593–1599) was most favorable for documenting the anti-Turkish alliance. International events and the situation contributed to the conclusion of an anti-Turkish coalition, to begin with, in a small format - between the most interested countries. The Moscow state and Persia were ready to do this. But the execution of the agreement was upset by the party most interested in it - the Holy Roman Empire. Emperor Rudolf II had been at war with the Ottomans since 1593 and was in dire need of allies. However, he lacked the political will to convince the imperial estates to agree to sign the treaty. This period can be considered a time of missed opportunities.
Third period (1600–1612)– the longest in time. It can be divided into two stages: 1600–1606 and 1607–1612.
A feature of the first stage was the offensive policy of the Moscow State and Persia towards the Ottoman Empire. The foreign policy actions of the Moscow sovereigns and the Persian Shah were more active than in the previous period. The main partners in the project once again have the opportunity to sign an anti-Turkish agreement. Abbas I ended the war with the Uzbeks and resumed attempts to form an alliance against the Ottomans. No less active were the actions in this direction by Tsar Boris Godunov and False Dmitry I, who replaced him, explained by their unstable position on the throne. Moscow and Persia have moved from negotiations to real action. Abbas I started a war with Turkey in 1602. B. Godunov sent an army under his command to strike the Ottoman bases in Dagestan. But these steps were taken not on the basis of a written agreement, but by oral agreement between the emperor, the king and the shah. The opposition of the imperial classes to the foreign policy activities of Rudolf II led to a “idle movement” in the process of concluding the treaty. In connection with the anti-Turkish plans of False Dmitry I, new prospects opened up in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The report of the murder of the impostor in May 1606 made a grave impression on the Prague government. Perhaps it was this news that finally tipped the scales among the imperial classes in favor of supporters of an immediate end to the war. The Protestant classes refused in the fall of 1606 to allocate funds to continue the war, forcing the emperor to conclude the Peace of Sitvatorok. Encouraging successes at the beginning of the stage were practically reduced to zero.
At the second stage, negotiations on the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition were conducted least actively. This was influenced by the internal political processes taking place in the Holy Roman Empire and the Moscow State, which as a result of the Time of Troubles dropped out of the potential participants anti-Turkish coalition. The Moscow state continued to remain an object of triple relations for Persia and the Holy Roman Empire, but as a subject of these relations it became incapacitated. As a result, only Abbas I remained an active participant in the anti-Turkish movement, having successfully completed the war with Turkey in 1612. Thus, the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the third period proceeded with varying degrees of success. The possibility of concluding an alliance remained.
Fourth period (1613–1618) became a turning point not only in the history of Europe, but also in the internal politics of the Moscow State and the Holy Roman Empire. Externally political problems the three powers remained generally the same, but in the changed international situation they acquired different relevance for each of the parties. Success in solving them depended on the degree of mobility and the ability to correctly assess the situation and adapt to new conditions.
For the new Emperor Matthias, a victorious war against the Ottomans could help defuse social tensions and strengthen his position on the throne. Therefore, he did not abandon the idea of an anti-Turkish coalition and former allies. Abbas I was not going to stop at the victory he had achieved, and the next war with Turkey was a matter of time. He remained the most interested monarch in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Disillusioned with his Western European allies, the Shah pinned his hopes on the help of the Moscow state, where the Time of Troubles ended. The new proposals of Abbas I could be of interest to the Moscow authorities and Emperor Matthias. But the Moscow government failed to timely and correctly assess the changed international situation and tried to solve political problems using old methods, which were already failing in the last years of Boris Godunov’s reign. In an effort to extract short-term benefits from the well-functioning mechanism of international relations, it lost sight of the long-term perspective. During the period under review, the Moscow authorities took a defensive and wait-and-see position in foreign policy, thereby missing the chance to restore the authority of the Moscow state in the international arena. With the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the Moscow state found itself on the outskirts of international relations. European politicians perceived him mainly as an ally in the anti-Turkish coalition and as a mediator in relations with Persia. However, during the 5 years of Mikhail Romanov’s reign, the Moscow government was more concerned about maintaining power than about the prestige of the country, and caused serious damage to the international image of its state, which became possible to fully revive only under Peter I.
The main provisions of the dissertation are reflected in the following publications:
Journal article from the Higher Attestation Commission list
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6. Magilina, I.V. The diplomatic mission of the Carmelite monks in the Moscow state during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century / // Bulletin of VolSU. Episode 4. History. Regional studies. International relationships. –Vol. 12. –Volgograd: VolSU Publishing House, 2007. – P. 164–170.
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37 Gouveanus Autonius. Relation des grandes guerres et victoires obtenues par le roy de Perse Chahe-Abbas contre les empereurs de Turque Mahomet et Achmet son fils... Rouen, 1646.
38 Don Garcias de Figueroa de Silva. L’ ambassade en perse contenant la politique de ce grand empire les moeurs du Roy Schach Abbas etc. Paris, 1667.
With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Turks decided to take control of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus (including Abkhazia). A year later, their fleet appeared in Sevastopol Bay, attacked and devastated the city.
Anti-Turkish coalition. An anti-Turkish coalition was formed in Transcaucasia, which included the Principality of Abkhazia, as can be seen from the letter of the Kartvelian king George VIII to the Duke of Burgundy dated 1459: “... the Christian princes... concluded a truce among themselves and swore with all their might to fight the Turks... each is fielding his troops. I am deploying 40,000 people... The Mingrelian king Bendian is ready with his troops, the Georgian king Gorgora (from Samtskhe) is heading with 20 thousand cavalry. The Duke of Anakotia (Avogazia - Abkhazia) Rabia promised to march with his brothers, vassals and all the troops (30 thousand soldiers). The alliance involves ... and three Tatar princes ... The listed persons swore allegiance to each other, the traitor will be punished ... ". However, the emerging alliance fell apart.
In the early 60s of the 15th century. the Turks annexed Crimea and part of the Caucasian coast, and with the capture of Caffa in 1475, the Genoese colonial system in the Black Sea region ceased to exist.
In 1553, the Turks tried to gain a foothold in Dzhigetia. They repeatedly invaded Imereti. Kutaisi, Gelati and other points came under fire. All this happened against the background of the confrontation between two powerful states - Turkey and Iran. Each pursued a win-win for themselves, but insidious policy of “divide and conquer” and tried to win over to their side as many ruling princes and kings of Transcaucasia as possible. But the half-century war between Turkey and Iran ended with a peace treaty, according to which all disputed territories were divided into spheres of influence. Turkey got all of Western Transcaucasia (including Abkhazia). But it still needed to be conquered.
Turks in Abkhazia. In 1578, a Turkish garrison was stationed in Sevastopolis for a short time. This is evidenced by inscriptions on tombstones found on the territory of the city of Sukhum.
In the first half of the 17th century. The Turks blocked the city from the sea, since they could not take possession of it from the land side. I had to pay tribute. Abkhazian feudal lords even began to receive Turkish names. For example, the name Karabey belonged to the Lykhny prince in the 20s. XVII century
Cossacks. At the same time, the population of Western Transcaucasia (including Abkhazia) was closely connected with the Don and Dnieper Cossacks. It saw them as its allies against the Turkish “basurmans”.
After successful Turkish campaigns, the Cossacks, returning to their homeland, filled the large Pitsunda bowl with gold and silver coins. Their legends preserve information about joint campaigns with “Abkhaz Christians” to the Turkish shores.
Turkish landing. In retaliation, in May 1634, the Turks landed a large force in the area of Cape Kodori, devastated the surrounding area and plundered the Dranda Monastery. They imposed tribute on the Abkhazians, but they did not pay it for long, and then stopped altogether. The Turks used the feuds of local feudal lords for their own selfish purposes. There were times when they did not succeed. So, in 1672 “the Mingrelian prince invited the Abkhazians to help against the Turks.” But such alliances were short-lived.
Sukhum-Kale. In 1724, the Turkish architect Yusuf Agha built a bastion-type fortress. She and the city itself began to be called Sukhum-Kale. The Turks interpreted this name in their own way, as “su” - water, “hum” - sand, “kala” - fortress, city. In the 30s of the XVIII century. Between 70 and 112 soldiers served in Sukhum-Kale.
Abkhazians and Turks. After the Turks robbed and burned the Ilori temple in 1733 and then moved into northwestern Abkhazia, Shervashidze and his subjects were forced to convert to Islam. However, a quarrel soon arose between them and the Ottomans. The Abkhaz attacked the Turkish camp and destroyed it. Some of the Ottomans fled with the pasha, others died. As a result, the Abkhazians not only reconquered all their property, but also reconverted to their faith. This victory was attributed to the miracles of St. George of Ilorsky, who that night ordered the Abkhazians to march and thereby gave them strength in the battle.
In 1757, the Samurzakan ruler Khutuniya Shervashidze fought with the Turks in Imereti. Before he died, he defeated 16 enemies. At the instigation of the Turks, the feudal lords of Dzyapsh-ip rebelled against the ruler of Bzyb Abkhazia, Manuchar Shervashidze. At this time, he and his two brothers, Shirvan and Zurab, were exiled to Turkey. As a result, Dzyapsh-ipa managed to take possession of the territory between the river. Psyrdzkha and Kodor. Soon Zurab Shervashidze, with the help of the Turks, returned to Abkhazia again as governor.
In 1771, the Abkhazians, under the leadership of Zurab and Levan Shervashidze (owner of Samurzakano), besieged and took the Sukhumi fortress. Then they gave it up “for 20 Turkish bags and ten thousand piasters.” Three years later, the Turks left Sukhum-Kale, “as a fortress useless to them.” After this, the Shervashidzes divided Abkhazia among themselves into four parts - Bzyb Abkhazia (Zupu) went to Zurab; Keleshbey became the ruler of the central one - between Anakopia and Kodor (Aku); the territory between Kodor and Aaldzga (Abzhua) was received by another nephew of Zurab - Bekirbey; Samurzakan remained with the ruler Levan.
Abkhazia and Türkiye in the XVI-XVII centuries. Strengthening political and economic contacts with the Ottoman Empire during the 16th-17th centuries. led to the gradual spread of Sunni Islam. So, if at the beginning of the 16th century. Traditional (pre-Christian) and Christian beliefs were still preserved throughout the territory of Abkhazia, then from the middle of it the process of involving it into the Islamic world began.
Abkhazia in the 17th - 18th centuries
Muslim religion. By the 40s of the 17th century. refers to the first testimony of the Turkish geographer and historian Evliya Celebi about the Muslim Abkhazians. He wrote that they have a mosque and if you “call someone a Christian, they will kill him, but if you call him a Muslim, they will be happy. They do not recognize the Koran and have no religion. At the same time, they don’t like Christians, but they will give their souls for Muslims.” At the same time, the Abkhazians had not yet paid the Sultan “haraj”, which was usually imposed on non-Muslims. That part of the Abkhazians who lived in the coastal Abzhua and Samurzakani were supposedly Christians. This choice of religion is also evidenced by the fact that the ruler of South-Eastern Abkhazia, Putu Shervashidze, showed loyalty to Christian teaching, and the ruler of the rest of Abkhazia, Karabey, was a supporter of Islam. The penetration of Islam into Abkhazia in the middle of the 18th century. Contributed to internecine strife, the removal of the Catholicos from Pitsunda and the expulsion of Christian priests from many points. But due to the lack of socio-economic conditions here, the seeds of a new world religion did not germinate on local soil very easily.
Religious syncretism. Until the middle of the 18th century. Abkhaz society developed at the confessional level in three religious directions - many elements of Christianity were preserved, various traditional folk cults were revived, and the influence of Islam expanded.
Jan Reynnegs, doctor, traveler, observed in the second half of the 18th century. a mixture of traditional and Christian beliefs among the Abkhazians. In early May, they gathered in the sacred forest near the large iron cross, where the hermits lived. Everyone brought wooden crosses with them and placed them everywhere, and then exchanged them as a sign of friendship. In many places in Abkhazia, roughly processed iron crosses are found, the lower end of which represents a point for attaching to a wooden shaft.
The revival of traditional religion among the Abkhazians can also be traced in the funeral rite. They continue to bury people in cemeteries near abandoned churches, but with a Christian Western orientation (head to the west). The custom of homestead and roadside burials appears. In coastal areas, the traditional ancient ritual of air burials is being revived and becoming popular. He surprised travelers. At the same time, they sacrificed a horse, as they once did. Then they hung a box with the deceased on a tree, and next to it were his belongings and weapons that he used in the war. Cults associated with the worship of trees (especially walnut and oak), groves, fire and the hearth chain, mountain spirits, the sun and moon, animals (especially the bull, dog, horse), earth, water and their deities, iron and the forge, were also revived. the soul of the dead, the god Antsva, etc. So in these conditions there was little place for Christianity and Islam. And only towards the end of the 18th century. The ruling elite of the Abkhazians more or less turns to Islam.
Farm. The basis of the economy of Abkhazia at this time was agriculture, cattle breeding, hunting, beekeeping and various forms of craft activities.
Various authors (for example, the Georgian geographer-historian of the first half of the 18th century Vakhushti Bagrationi) noted that the land in Abkhazia is fertile and the climate is mild. It contains a lot of fruits, grapes, livestock, animals, birds and fish. The local large goat with soft motley fur, long horns and a knee-length beard was particularly beautiful.
The main agricultural crop in Abkhazia until the 18th century. it was millet. Then they began to consume more corn and, especially, beans, coming from Turkey. The main tools were a wooden plow with an iron tip, onto the tip of which a hardened steel strip was welded, a hoe and an ax. The daily food of the Abkhazians included cheese, milk and game. A prominent role until the end of the 18th century. pig farming played. According to eyewitnesses, the pigs here were “the size of donkeys.” Pork was used to make cheap lard and ham for sale.
Trade. A large amount of wax was exported from Abkhazia. Due to the lack of full-fledged city life at that time, each peasant household satisfied its needs independently. Abkhaz women were excellent at spinning threads, which were exported to Smyrna and Thessaloniki. Men produced iron using the ancient “cheese-making method”, making high-quality chain mail, and forged sharp daggers and sabers. At that time, money did not circulate in Abkhazia - the exchange was in kind. Armenian colonies from the Persian city of Jugha appeared here in order to revive trade. The most famous was the trade in Isguar (Cape Kodori), which consisted of two hundred small wicker huts where traders lived. Similar trades took place in the Sukhumi fortress and near Gudauta, on the Bamborsky Cape, where expensive boxwood was exchanged for salt and iron.
But the most important subject of trade were the people who were most interested in the Turkish merchants, who outdid the Genoese in this regard. They sold mostly prisoners, but also their fellow tribesmen for a large sum. The most valued were young, strong, handsome men (15 rubles) and 13-18 year old girls (20 rubles). According to Chardin, the Turks exported up to 12 thousand slaves annually. In this regard, Putu Shervashidze became especially famous.
In exchange for people, Turkish traders brought goods from various countries to Abkhazia: all kinds of carpets, blankets, canvases, leather, shawls, cloth, silks, saddles, harnesses, iron, copper, cauldrons, smoking pipes, salted fish, sugar, salt and, of course, a variety of weapons - guns, sabers, daggers, knives, pistols, gunpowder, arrows.
This continued until a double-headed eagle loomed on the horizon. Tsarist Russia. Due to rebellion, Abkhazia faced new tragic upheavals associated with the makhajirism, the forced eviction of most of the Abkhaz people outside their homeland.
