Finnish losses in the winter war. Triumphant Defeat
In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, long years was virtually forgotten. This was facilitated by its not very successful results and the peculiar “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more afraid than fire to offend any of its “friends,” and Finland after the Great Patriotic War was considered an ally of the USSR.
Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to famous words A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unfamous war”; today this war is very “famous”. One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention many articles in various magazines and collections. But this “celebrity” is very peculiar. The authors who have made denouncing the Soviet “evil empire” their profession cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of ours and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied...
By the end of the 1930s, near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union there was a state that was clearly unfriendly to us. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. identification mark Finnish air force and tank forces had a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who pushed Finland into Hitler’s camp through his actions prefer not to remember this. As well as why peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish ones had. air force. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in an alliance with England and France.
Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy explored the question of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but Helsinki responded with a categorical refusal.
Those who denounce the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that manages its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to the exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis for imposing a naval blockade of Liberty Island, much less launching a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries; the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and was fully consistent with international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start the 3rd world war, if the missiles are not removed. There is such a thing as a “sphere of vital interests”. For our country in 1939, a similar area included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Not even at all sympathetic Soviet power former leader Party of Cadets P. N. Milyukov, in a letter to I. P. Demidov, expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”
On November 26, a famous incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded. Today it is considered good manners to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish claims that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Maynila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. November 30th started fighting.
I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive line on December 4-10. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the sides switched to positional warfare.
What were the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the number of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to conduct full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.
Soviet intelligence was also not up to the task, unable to identify complete and reliable information about Finnish fortifications.
Finally, the Soviet leadership had unreasonable hopes for “class solidarity of the Finnish working people.” There was a widespread belief that the population of countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately “rise up and go over to the side of the Red Army,” that workers and peasants would come out to greet Soviet soldiers with flowers.
As a result, the required number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. Thus, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important section of the front, in December 1939 the Finnish side had 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 crew battalions. On the Soviet side they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle-machine-gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 infantry battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet troops - 169 thousand people. In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel.
Defeat or victory?
So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, a war is considered won if the winner ends up in better position than it was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?
As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and was ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this respect the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unruly bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was created there. Despite persecution by the Finnish authorities, by the time of its ban in December of the same year it had 40 thousand members. Such massive numbers indicate that not only communist supporters joined the Society, but also simply sensible people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with their great neighbor.
According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
It should be noted that if at the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km and in exchange for twice the territory, as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.
It should also be taken into account that at the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the cost of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which they agreed to cede to us, we were talking about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would already run into many billions.
But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers under the Treaty of Nystadt, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.".
Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland was also supposed to transfer 350 sea and river Vehicle, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages, a significant number of cars.
Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, in Russian literature Another figure for Finnish losses is often found - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded.
Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times greater than Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Let's take for example Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, the Russians often lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the Port Arthur fortress, Japanese losses far exceeded Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation arose during the Soviet-Finnish War, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.
As a result, Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army had reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and about urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.
Speaking in Parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. For Russia this is a great victory» . However, one should not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.
1. Units of the Red Army cross the bridge into Finnish territory. 1939
2. Soviet soldier on guard minefield in the area of the former Finnish border outpost. 1939
3. Artillery crew at their gun in a firing position. 1939
4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain I.V. Kapustin, who landed with troops on the island of Seiskaari to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939
5. Soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
6. Border guard outfit on patrol. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the Finnish outpost of Beloostrov. 1939
8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border post of Japinen. 1939
9. Soldiers deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
10. Soldiers of the 7th Army fire at the enemy with rifles. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
11. A reconnaissance group of skiers receives instructions from the commander before going on reconnaissance. 1939
12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborg district. 1939
13. Fighter skiers on a hike. 1940
14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the area of combat operations with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940
15. Fighters cooking food in the forest over a fire during a break between battles. 1939
16. Cooking lunch in the field at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940
17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940
18. Signalmen restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
19. Signal soldiers are restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns in Terijoki. 1939
20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terijoki station. 1939
21. Soldiers and commanders talk with residents of Terijoki. 1939
22. Signalmen on the front line negotiations near the Kemyarya station. 1940
23. Rest of the Red Army soldiers after the battle in the Kemyar area. 1940
24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army listens to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terijoki. 1939
25. View of Suojarva station, taken by Red Army soldiers. 1939
Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–40 (another name is Winter War) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
The formal cause of hostilities was the so-called Mainila incident - artillery shelling from Finnish territory of Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which, according to the Soviet side, occurred on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.
The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. As a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on taking measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the original Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.
Despite the fact that a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Finland and the USSR in 1932, relations between the two countries were quite tense. In Finland they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), might give its territory to another unfriendly country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city of the USSR, Leningrad, was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.
During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland moves into the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.
In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve the exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of several islands and parts of the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories being given to it (not least because of its reluctance to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see. And ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to armament of the demilitarized Åland Islands.
The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). Last try There was a proposal from the USSR on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.
Negotiations dragged on and reached a dead end. The parties began to prepare for war.
On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to begin preparations for hostilities. Newspaper article "Is it true" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intends to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.
There was less than a month left before the Maynila incident, which served as a formal reason for the war.
Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not happen at all, but there were only unsubstantiated statements by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. There are no documents confirming this or that version. Finland proposed joint investigation incident, but the Soviet side harshly rejected the proposal.
Immediately after the start of the war official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "The People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and headed by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, the "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, it did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.
The Soviet Union planned to launch military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army was able to make maximum use of its advantage in manpower and its overwhelming advantage in technology. According to the timeframe, the operation should have taken place within a period of two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on the stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold off the enemy for up to six months and would then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated Finland's strength, while Finland relied too much on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.
As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland there was a general mobilization. The USSR decided to confine itself to parts of the Leningrad Military District, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.
As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies attacked Finland. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in Karelia, and the 14th Army in the Arctic.
The most favorable situation for the USSR developed at the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defense to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to advance successfully, but was also stopped, with part of its forces being surrounded and forced to withdraw. The heaviest and bloodiest battles took place in the sector of the 7th Army, which was advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army had to storm the Mannerheim Line.
As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely meager information about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. Underestimating the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, the Red Army units with losses were able to overcome only the support zone of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were also unsuccessful. By the end of December it became obvious that attempts at an offensive in this style were pointless. There was relative calm at the front.
Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant reinforcement of troops, saturation of them with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods of combating defensive structures were developed, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches and to raise morale (see. ).
The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military District Military Council Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.
Finland at this moment also carried out measures to increase the combat effectiveness of its own troops. Both new equipment and weapons captured in battles and those supplied from abroad entered service, and units received the necessary reinforcements.
Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.
At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.
The greatest fame in the historiography of the Soviet- Finnish war During that period, the 163rd and 44th Infantry Divisions of the 9th Army near Suomussalmi received encirclement. Since mid-December, the 44th Division had been advancing to help the encircled 163rd Division. In the period from January 3 to January 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite difficult situation, continued to fight, having superior technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting and a rapidly changing situation, the division command incorrectly assessed the current situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind the heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division were still able to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the line.
It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns tried to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were unsuccessful and were repulsed.
On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of Finnish defense and brought tank formations into the breach. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.
On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.
In parallel with the fighting, there were battles on the diplomatic front. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line and leaving Soviet troops In terms of operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the fight. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was concluded.
As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus went to the USSR and big cities Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas. Lake Ladoga became an internal lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.
At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between Western countries and the USSR has reached a critical point.
Recommended reading:
1. Irincheev Bair. Stalin's Forgotten Front. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown wars of the 20th century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b.: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter War. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939–1940. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. “Winter War”: working on mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army to summarize the experience of the Finnish campaign / Responsible. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer garden, 2003.
Tatiana Vorontsova
And other Finnish cities had flags at half-staff. People walked the streets with tears in their eyes, some even said that the most pleasant sound to hear right now would be an air raid siren. On March 13, 1940, Finland was plunged into mourning. She mourned her 25 thousand dead and 55 thousand wounded; she grieved over material losses, which even the moral victory, won at the cost of the steadfastness and courage of her soldiers on the battlefields, could not make up for. Now Finland was at the mercy of Russia, and she again listened to the opinions of the great powers. For example, the passionate words of Winston Churchill were heard:
“Finland alone - in mortal danger, but maintaining its greatness - demonstrates what free people are capable of. The service rendered by Finland to all mankind is invaluable... We cannot say what the fate of Finland will be, but there is nothing more regrettable for the entire civilized world than the fact that this beautiful northern people must ultimately perish or, as a result of terrible injustice, fall into slavery worse than death itself.”
Finnish Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner said: “Peace has been restored, but what kind of peace is this? From now on, our country will continue to live, feeling its inferiority.”
Soldiers were returning home on skis from the battlefields, many of them, shocked by the conditions of peace, sobbing. They could barely stand on their feet from fatigue, but still considered themselves invincible. Many were tormented by the question of how they would feel when they had time to rest and think about everything.
When members of the peace negotiations delegation returned to Helsinki on March 14, they found a city indifferent to everything. The world under such conditions seemed unreal... terrible.
In Russia, they say, one of the generals remarked: “We have won enough land to bury our dead...”
The Russians had plenty of time to develop their plans, choose the time and place to attack, and they greatly outnumbered their neighbor. But, as Khrushchev wrote, “...even in such the most favorable conditions, only with great difficulty and at the cost of huge losses were we able to win. Victory at such a cost was actually a moral defeat.”
From total number 1.5 million people sent to Finland, USSR losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment, including equipment, ammunition, horses, cars and trucks.
Finland's losses, although disproportionately smaller, were crushing for the 4 million people. If something similar had happened in 1940 in the United States, with its population of more than 130 million, American losses in just 105 days would have amounted to 2.6 million people killed and wounded.
During the discussion of the terms of the peace treaty, Molotov noted: “Since blood was shed against the wishes of the Soviet government and not through the fault of Russia, territorial concessions", proposed by Finland, should be significantly larger than those proposed by Russia at the negotiations in Moscow in October and November 1939."
Under the terms of the peace treaty, the following were transferred to Russia: the second largest city in Finland, Viipuri (now Vyborg - Ed.); the largest port on the Arctic Ocean, Petsamo; strategically important area of the Hanko Peninsula; the largest Lake Ladoga and the entire Karelian Isthmus are home to 12 percent of Finland's population.
Finland gave up its territory with a total area of 22 thousand square kilometers in favor of the Soviet Union. In addition to Viipuri, it lost such important ports as Uuras, Koivisto, the northern part of Lake Ladoga and the important Saimaa Canal. Two weeks were given to evacuate the population and remove property; most property had to be abandoned or destroyed. A huge loss for the country's economy was the loss of the forest industry of Karelia with its excellent sawmills, wood processing and plywood enterprises. Finland also lost some of its chemical, textile and steel industries. 10 percent of enterprises in these industries were located in the Vuoksa River valley. Almost 100 power plants went to the victorious Soviet Union.
In his radio address to the people of Finland, President Kallio recalled everyone's remaining obligations to the families of those killed, war veterans and other victims, as well as to regional population, which have now become part of Russia. People living on departing rivers USSR territories, were given the right to decide for themselves whether to leave their homes or stay and become citizens of the Soviet Union.
Not a single Finn chose the latter, although the signed peace treaty turned 450 thousand people are poor and homeless. The Finnish government requisitioned all available vehicles for the evacuation of refugees and created conditions for their temporary residence in other parts of Finland. Many of these people required government support, since more than half of them lived off Agriculture; 40 thousand farms had to be found, and the collective responsibility for this fell on the shoulders of the entire people of Finland. On June 28, 1940, the Emergency Relocation Act was passed to ensure the rights of refugees.
The question of why the USSR signed a peace treaty without serious intentions to occupy Finland was discussed for many years after the war. Khrushchev said that Stalin showed political wisdom here, because he understood that “Finland was not at all needed for the world proletarian revolution.”
But the colossal efforts of the Finns to defend their country undoubtedly did not help last role in Stalin's decision to abandon his plans. To subdue this stubborn and hostile people, who would undoubtedly start a guerrilla war that could last for who knows how long, was not an easy task.
More broadly, Stalin simply did not dare to allow the conflict in Finland to escalate into a world war, because his intentions did not include a war against the allies on the side of Germany. In conditions when the Finnish border still remained unviolated, and the allies were preparing to assist it with equipment and weapons, the war could well drag on until the spring, and then victory, most likely, would have been won by the Soviet Union at an immeasurably higher price.
The Winter War of 1939-1940 greatly influenced the rapidly changing plans of the great powers. For British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, his government's indecision during the "winter madness" ended with his resignation seven weeks later when the Nazis invaded Norway and Denmark. A week after the invasion of Norway and Denmark, the French government led by Daladier fell, who was replaced by Pierre Laval, who cleverly used the conflict in Finland to come to power.
As for Germany, if the Soviet Union had not appeared in such an unsightly form in the war with Finland, Hitler would hardly have underestimated Russia's military potential in the way he did. Compared to the enormous efforts expended by the USSR in Finland, the result obtained was far from so impressive.
Despite the fact that half of the regular Russian divisions stationed in the European part and in Siberia were thrown against a small neighboring country, the Red Army suffered a major failure, and the reasons for this are obvious.
As Marshal Mannerheim wrote, “a typical mistake of the Red High Command was that when conducting military operations, due attention was not paid to the main factors in the war against Finland: the peculiarities of the theater of operations and the power of the enemy.” The latter was weak in terms of logistics, but the Russians did not fully realize that the organizational structure of their army was too cumbersome to fight in the wild northern terrain in the dead of winter. Mannerheim notes that they could well have conducted preliminary exercises in conditions similar to those they were about to encounter in Finland, but the Russians did not do this, blindly believing in their superiority in modern technology. To imitate the actions of the Germans on the plains of Poland in the wooded areas of Finland was to doom oneself to failure.
Another mistake was the use of commissars in the active army. “The fact that every order first had to be approved by the political commissars necessarily led to delays and confusion, not to mention weak initiative and fear of responsibility,” Mannerheim wrote. - The blame for the fact that the encircled units refused to surrender, despite the cold and hunger, lies entirely with the commissars. Soldiers were prevented from surrendering by threats of reprisals against their families and assurances that they would be shot or tortured if they fell into enemy hands. In many cases, officers and soldiers preferred suicide to surrender.”
Although Russian officers were courageous people, senior commanders were characterized by inertia, which precluded the possibility of acting flexibly. “What was striking was their lack creative imagination where the changing situation required quick decision-making...” wrote Mannerheim. And although the Russian soldier demonstrated courage, perseverance and unpretentiousness, he also lacked initiative. "Unlike his Finnish opponent, he was a fighter of the masses, unable to act independently in the absence of contact with his officers or comrades." Mannerheim attributed this to the Russian man’s ability to endure suffering and hardship, developed during centuries of difficult struggle with nature, to the sometimes unnecessary manifestation of courage and fatalism inaccessible to the understanding of Europeans.
Undoubtedly, the experience accumulated during the Finnish campaign was fully used by Marshal Timoshenko in his reorganization of the Red Army. According to him, “The Russians learned a lot from this difficult war, in which the Finns fought heroically.”
Expressing the official point of view, Marshal S.S. Biryuzov wrote:
“The assault on the Mannerheim line was considered a standard of operational and tactical art. The troops learned to overcome the enemy’s long-term defenses through the constant accumulation of forces and patiently “gnawing” holes in the enemy’s defensive structures, created according to all the rules engineering science. But in a rapidly changing environment, insufficient attention was paid to the interaction of various types of troops. We had to re-learn under enemy fire, paying a high price for the experience and knowledge without which we could not have defeated Hitler’s army.”
Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov summed up the results: “We learned a harsh lesson. And he was supposed to be useful to us. The Finnish campaign showed that the organization of the leadership of the armed forces in the center left much to be desired. In the event of a war (big or small), it was necessary to know in advance who would be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and through what apparatus the work would be carried out; should it have been a specially created body, or should it have been General base as in peacetime. And these were by no means minor issues.”
As for the far-reaching consequences of the Winter War, which influenced the actions of the Red Army against Hitler, then Chief Marshal artillery N.N. Voronov wrote:
“At the end of March, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party took place, at which great attention was devoted to considering the lessons of the war. He noted serious shortcomings in the actions of our troops, as well as in their theoretical and practical training. We still haven't learned to use our full potential new technology. The work of the rear services was criticized. The troops turned out to be ill-prepared for combat operations in forests, in conditions of frosty weather and impassable roads. The party demanded a thorough learning from experience accumulated in the battles of Khasan, Khalkhin Gol and the Karelian Isthmus, improving weapons and training troops. There is an urgent need for an urgent revision of regulations and instructions in order to bring them into line with modern requirements of warfare... Special attention was given to artillery. In frosty weather in Finland, the semi-automatic mechanisms of the guns failed. When the temperature dropped sharply, there were interruptions in the firing of 150-mm howitzers. A lot of research work was required.”
Khrushchev said: “All of us - and first of all Stalin - felt in our victory the defeat inflicted on us by the Finns. It was a dangerous defeat, because it strengthened the confidence of our enemies that the Soviet Union was a colossus with feet of clay... We had to learn lessons for the near future from what happened.”
After Winter War the institution of political commissars was officially abolished and three years later general and other ranks with all their privileges were reintroduced in the Red Army.
For the Finns, the Winter War of 1939-1940, despite its ending in disaster, became a heroic and glorious page in history. Over the next 15 months, they had to exist in a “half-world” situation, until finally undisguised hatred of the Soviet Union prevailed over common sense. Matched by Russia's almost pathological suspicion of Finland. During this period, an impenetrable shroud of secrecy surrounded all government activities outside Finland; censorship deprived the population of the opportunity to receive information about what was happening outside the country's borders. People were convinced that Hitler was completing the defeat of Great Britain, and the Soviet Union was still a threat to their country.
The Finnish gratitude to Germany for its past assistance in their struggle for independence and for the much-needed supplies it offered played a significant role in Finland siding with Germany in the hope of regaining lost territories. After several warnings, in December 1941 Britain declared Finland war, but the armed forces of the two countries did not have to meet on the battlefield. Formally, Finland was not an ally of Germany; The armies of Finland and Germany each fought under their own command, and there was virtually no cooperation between the armed forces of these countries.
Many Finnish soldiers lost their initial enthusiasm during the so-called "subsequent war", when the previous borders were restored. In September 1944, the war with Russia ended. The Finns rid their land of the presence of the Germans, but lost Karelia forever, as well as some other areas.
Russia's reparations for these wars were huge, but the Finns paid them. They stoically convinced themselves: “The East took our men, the Germans took our women, the Swedes took our children. But we still have our military debt.”
Finland's confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Winter War must remain among the most exciting events in history.
Armed conflict between Soviet state and Finland, contemporaries increasingly evaluate it as one of components Second World War. Let's try to isolate real reasons Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.
The origins of this war are in the system itself international relations, which had developed by 1939. At that time, war, the destruction and violence it brought, were considered an extreme, but completely acceptable method of achieving geopolitical goals and protecting the interests of the state. Large countries built up armaments, small states looked for allies and entered into agreements with them for assistance in case of war.
Soviet-Finnish relations from the very beginning could not be called friendly. Finnish nationalists wanted to return Soviet Karelia to the control of their country. And the activities of the Comintern, directly financed by the CPSU (b), were aimed at the speedy establishment of the power of the proletariat throughout globe. It is most convenient to start the next campaign to overthrow bourgeois governments from neighboring states. This fact should already make the rulers of Finland worry.
Another exacerbation began in 1938. The Soviet Union predicted the imminent outbreak of war with Germany. And to prepare for this event, it was necessary to strengthen the western borders of the state. The city of Leningrad, which is the cradle October revolution, was in those years a large industrial centre. A loss former capital during the first days of hostilities would have been a serious blow for the USSR. Therefore, the Finnish leadership received a proposal to lease their Hanko Peninsula to create military bases there.
Permanent deployment armed forces The USSR on the territory of a neighboring state was fraught with a violent change of power to “workers and peasants”. The Finns remembered well the events of the twenties, when Bolshevik activists tried to create Soviet republic and annex Finland to the USSR. The activities of the Communist Party were banned in this country. Therefore, the Finnish government could not agree to such a proposal.
In addition, in the Finnish territories designated for transfer there was the famous Mannerheim defensive line, which was considered insurmountable. If it is voluntarily handed over to a potential enemy, then nothing will be able to restrain the Soviet troops from advancing forward. A similar trick had already been performed in Czechoslovakia by the Germans in 1939, so the Finnish leadership was clearly aware of the consequences of such a step.
On the other hand, Stalin had no compelling reason to believe that Finland's neutrality would remain unshakable during the upcoming big war. The political elites of capitalist countries generally saw the USSR as a threat to the stability of European states.
In short, the parties in 1939 could not and, perhaps, did not want to come to an agreement. Soviet Union they required guarantees and a buffer zone in front of their territory. Finland needed to maintain its neutrality in order to be able to quickly change foreign policy and lean towards the favorite in the approaching big war.
Another reason for a military solution to the current situation seems to be a test of strength in a real war. Finnish fortifications were stormed in the harsh winter of 1939-1940, which was a difficult test for both military personnel and equipment.
Part of the community of historians cite the desire for the “Sovietization” of Finland as one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war. However, such assumptions are not confirmed by facts. In March 1940, the Finnish defensive fortifications fell, and the imminent defeat in the conflict became obvious. Without waiting for help from the Western allies, the government sent a delegation to Moscow to conclude a peace agreement.
For some reason, the Soviet leadership turned out to be extremely accommodating. Instead of quickly ending the war with the complete defeat of the enemy and the annexation of its territory to the Soviet Union, as was done, for example, with Belarus, a peace treaty was signed. By the way, this agreement also took into account the interests of the Finnish side, for example, the demilitarization of the Åland Islands. Probably in 1940 the USSR focused on preparing for war with Germany.
The formal reason for the start of the war of 1939-1940 was the artillery shelling of the positions of Soviet troops near the Finnish border. Which, naturally, the Finns were accused of. For this reason, Finland was asked to withdraw troops 25 kilometers in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. When the Finns refused, the outbreak of war became inevitable.
This was followed by a short but bloody war, which ended in 1940 with the victory of the Soviet side.
On the eve of the World War, both Europe and Asia were already in flames with many local conflicts. International tension was caused high probability a new big war, and all the most powerful political players on the world map before it began tried to secure favorable starting positions for themselves, without neglecting any means. The USSR was no exception. In 1939-1940 The Soviet-Finnish war began. The reasons for the inevitable military conflict lay in the same looming threat of a major European war. The USSR, increasingly realizing its inevitability, was forced to look for an opportunity to push back state border as far as possible from one of the most strategically important cities - Leningrad. Taking this into account, the Soviet leadership entered into negotiations with the Finns, offering their neighbors an exchange of territories. At the same time, the Finns were offered a territory almost twice as large as what the USSR planned to receive in return. One of the demands that the Finns did not want to accept under any circumstances was the USSR’s request to locate military bases on Finnish territory. Even the admonitions of Germany (an ally of Helsinki), including Hermann Goering, who hinted to the Finns that they could not count on Berlin’s help, did not force Finland to move away from its positions. Thus, the parties who did not come to a compromise came to the beginning of the conflict.
Progress of hostilities
The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939. Obviously, the Soviet command was counting on a quick and victorious war with minimal losses. However, the Finns themselves were also not going to surrender to the mercy of their big neighbor. The president of the country is the military Mannerheim, who, by the way, received his education in Russian Empire, planned to delay Soviet troops with a massive defense for as long as possible, until the start of assistance from Europe. The complete quantitative advantage of the Soviet country in both human resources and equipment was obvious. The war for the USSR began with heavy fighting. Its first stage in historiography is usually dated from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 - the time that became the bloodiest for the advancing Soviet troops. The line of defense, called the Mannerheim Line, became an insurmountable obstacle for the Red Army soldiers. Fortified pillboxes and bunkers, Molotov cocktails, which later became known as Molotov cocktails, severe frosts that reached 40 degrees - all this is considered to be the main reasons for the failures of the USSR in the Finnish campaign.
The turning point in the war and its end
The second stage of the war begins on February 11, the moment of the general offensive of the Red Army. At this time, a significant amount of manpower and equipment was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. For several days before the attack, the Soviet army carried out artillery preparations, subjecting the entire surrounding area to heavy bombardment.
As a result of the successful preparation of the operation and the further assault, the first line of defense was broken within three days, and by February 17 the Finns had completely switched to the second line. During February 21-28, the second line was also broken. On March 13, the Soviet-Finnish war ended. On this day, the USSR stormed Vyborg. The leaders of Suomi realized that there was no longer a chance to defend themselves after a breakthrough in the defense, and the Soviet-Finnish war itself was doomed to remain a local conflict, without outside support, which is what Mannerheim was counting on. Given this, a request for negotiations was a logical conclusion. 
Results of the war
As a result of protracted bloody battles, the USSR achieved satisfaction of all its claims. In particular, the country became the sole owner of the waters of Lake Ladoga. In total, the Soviet-Finnish war guaranteed the USSR an increase in territory by 40 thousand square meters. km. As for losses, this war cost the Soviet country dearly. According to some estimates, about 150 thousand people left their lives in the snows of Finland. Was this company necessary? Considering the moment that Leningrad was the target German troops almost from the very beginning of the attack, it is worth admitting that yes. However, heavy losses seriously cast doubt on the combat effectiveness of the Soviet army. By the way, the end of hostilities did not mark the end of the conflict. Soviet-Finnish War 1941-1944 became a continuation of the epic, during which the Finns, trying to regain what they had lost, failed again.
