Bashkir customs and traditions. Family traditions and life of the Bashkirs

veterinary medicine

Veterinary Faculty of Correspondence Courses

CODE – 20534

Discipline: “HISTORY OF THE FATHERLAND”

Subject: “Reforms B.N. Yeltsin"

First year students of SPGAVM

Korotaeva Lyubov Anatolyevna

Content:

1. Brief biographical information about Yeltsin B.N.

2. Political and economic reforms

Yeltsin's government.

3. Russian foreign policy in 1990 – 1999.

4. Results of the activities of B.N. Yeltsin.

Yeltsin Boris Nikolaevich- state, party and public figure, first President of Russia.

Born on February 1, 1931 in the village of Butka, Talitsky district, Sverdlovsk region - where almost all of his ancestors lived. His childhood coincided with a very difficult period in the life of the country - general dispossession. Everyone was forced into collective farms. When industrialization began, my father left for the construction of the Berezniki potash plant, and the whole family moved there. Existence in a barracks in Berezniki lasted 10 years. At school, Yeltsin stood out among his peers for his activity. From the first grade he was elected headman. Yeltsin was a successful student, but was distinguished by impudent and capricious behavior, conflicted with teachers, for which he was expelled from school after the seventh grade. He was soon reinstated, however, and graduated from school with excellent grades in most subjects. After school, Yeltsin entered the construction department of the Ural Polytechnic Institute named after Kirov.

In 1955, after defending his thesis on the topic “Television Tower,” he graduated.

He worked as a builder, mastering 12 working specialties in a year. He was a site manager, chief engineer, and head of department. In 1961 he joined the CPSU.

In 1961, Yeltsin joined the CPSU. In 1968, he was transferred from economic to professional party work - he headed the construction department of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee.

In 1975 he became secretary, and the next year first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU.

In April 1985 Yeltsin was appointed head. department of the CPSU Central Committee. Two months later he became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee.

In December 1985, Gorbachev invited Yeltsin to head the Moscow party organization instead of Viktor Grishin.

We can say that it was from this appointment that Yeltsin entered big politics. Fate beat him many more times. Sometimes his popularity rose to unprecedented heights, and sometimes they said about him that Yeltsin was a “political corpse.” After the events of 1987 (they will be written about below), many believed that Yeltsin would never be able to return to big politics, but he began to make big politics, not only on a national scale, but also on a global scale.

In 1986 he became a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

In 1987, Yeltsin broke up with M.S. Gorbachev on the fundamental issues of the ongoing political and economic reform, which was especially evident at the October Plenum of 1987. Removed from his post, Yeltsin was appointed to the post of minister - deputy. Chairman of the State Committee for Construction, and led the democratic opposition.

In 1990, at the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, E. demonstratively left the party. The confrontation between the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gorbachev, who sought to maintain a balance between democrats and conservatives, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia E., the leader of supporters of the decisive continuation of reforms, intensified so much that it paralyzed constructive activity in the country.

On June 12, 1991, Yeltsin was elected President of Russia in the general elections. The coup of August 19 - 21, 1991 (GKChP), which tried to restore the collapsing administrative-command system, led to the ban of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR.

In December 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus proclaimed the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

In 1996, Yeltsin was re-elected for a second term.

Boris Nikolayevich appeared in Moscow when the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of the Brezhnev starters had become hopelessly old. A certain descending arc of Soviet power “Brezhnev - Andropov - Chernenko” ended with the arrival of the perestroika leader M. Gorbachev. Mikhail Sergeevich still had the material and personnel resources to renew Soviet socialism. B. Yeltsin no longer had such reserves. It was absolutely clear that the future of Russia was in pitch darkness with a stoppage of industry, famine, and regional separatism. This did not frighten the power-hungry Boris Nikolaevich. He started a game of promises - just to survive the hard years, and then we'll see. Tatarstan was promised sovereignty, youth - a bright future, and the military - weapons.

17-10-2016

A quarter of a century has passed since the collapse of the USSR and the beginning of the construction of a new socio-economic system in Russia. The period is sufficient to make some assessments and conclusions. The transition period ended at least five years ago. Now the main features of the created system have clearly emerged. Let's try to evaluate the results obtained.

After the coup d'etat in August 1991 and the seizure of power by Yeltsin and his followers, all the sins of the Soviet regime were attributed to the bad Marxist idea and the Communist Party. The Russians did not understand the main objective reasons for the Bolshevik direction of development, which consisted in the state of Russian society and the level of the majority of the population. The overwhelming majority, including scientists, writers, and public figures, were of the prevailing opinion that if we only remove the obstacle - the CPSU and the administrative-command system, then of course we will quickly move on to “developed capitalism” without any special problems, create competitive goods, provide themselves and others with high-quality industrial and agricultural products. The previous historical experience of Russia was not taken into account, there was no discussion about possible ways of transition to private property and the market, there was no serious analysis of various alternatives, assessment of their advantages and disadvantages. It was assumed that the Russian population and society were ready for a relatively rapid transition to modern capitalism.

One of the lessons of the Soviet period is that Along with the goal (what to do), no less important is how to achieve it, which path to choose. Otherwise, you can come to bad results or even the opposite. Why, from the very beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, were some public figures against the path of Yeltsin and his associates? What were you afraid of? After all, they supported the proclaimed goal - building a democratic society with a market economy based on private property. The discrepancy was in the ways and means of achieving the goals. Just as the divergence between Western social democracy and social democracy within Russia with the Bolsheviks was, it would seem, in a secondary matter - in the methods of realizing what they wanted. A similar thing happened in the 90s; one of the main reasons for the failure of reforms in Russia over many recent centuries was repeated (reproduced).

Coming to power Yeltsin chose the path of unjustified forcing natural development economy and society. The idea is the same as that of the Bolsheviks - first, with the help of instructions from above, we will change the economy, and then society will change by itself . Reflecting the wishes of the majority Russian population, he chose an easier and seemingly faster path of radical reforms. The approach and methods of carrying out economic reforms were presented by Yeltsin already in October 1991 at the V Congress of People's Deputies and were determined mainly by political goals and reasons:

1. Fear of the remaining possibility of a return to the old structure (although the forces that truly wanted a return were weak then), and therefore the desire to quickly change the economic basis.
2. The desire for final political victory, the defeat of all competitors, and the satisfaction of one’s exorbitant passion for power.
3. The need to fulfill the order of the security forces and military leaders who brought Yeltsin to power and on whom his regime actually relied. It was necessary to quickly and at any cost restore the former military power of Russia, using the latest Western technologies. This is related to the inconsistency of the Yeltsin regime - the need, on the one hand, for democratic reforms and the transition to private property, and, on the other hand, for maintaining the status of a superpower and military superiority.

These circumstances caused the abandonment of phased reforms and the transition to " shock therapy", "Gaidar" races, "Chubais" privatization, the creation of artificial owners and millionaires in as soon as possible, building an oligarchic state and a corrupt economy. It was under Yeltsin that various hidden mechanisms were created for the state to participate in obtaining financial resources to implement the political goals of those in power, a kind of bribery and attracting numerous bureaucrats at various levels to their side, by transferring into their hands the ability to regulate the redistribution of state property. At the same time, so-called offshore companies for pumping illegal cash flows and private enterprises appeared, using extremely profitable government loans and various benefits for “their” people.

Yeltsin's propaganda constantly propagated the idea that either the Yeltsin path or a return to the old, socialist path was possible. In fact, then there was the possibility of choosing different alternatives for the transition period from state ownership to private ownership. For example, it was not at all necessary to destroy (weaken) the administrative-command system, and since it already existed (acquired with such blood), use its advantages and, on its basis, gradually transfer certain parts of the economy to private ownership (something similar in China) and, essentially, but in a perverted form, what is happening now, life does not allow it to be otherwise. It was possible to use mechanisms for creating a deserving and worthy owner, combining various forms and methods, selecting and stimulating the most effective ones. That is, it was possible to follow one of many possible options regarding evolutionary stage-by-stage changes in both society and the economy. The path of reform that Gorbachev envisioned and which, as in 1917, was thwarted, but by the new Bolshevik radicals.

When assessing the time that has passed since 1991, we must, firstly, treat it as a transition period (approximately 15-20 years), and secondly, we must try to determine the general vector of what has been achieved. Where is it directed - towards the positive, for the better? It is necessary to correctly identify the general trend. Specific indicators are not so important, although they already say a lot, but what is more important is to qualitatively evaluate the new device, its basis, whether the created socio-economic conditions contribute to further natural effective development.

When Yeltsin launched ill-conceived, unprepared, rapid, radical reforms there were two main dangers:

Relatively huge human misfortunes;

Discrediting the Western European model of socio-economic structure.

In connection with the above, when assessing the results of the reforms carried out, it is necessary to answer several important questions.

First question- were there mass upheavals, casualties, famine, disease, incredible suffering of the population, civil wars?

It must be admitted that before the Ukrainian crisis (military actions in Donbass) and the renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, the greatest fears were not confirmed. Despite the fact that, of course, the acceleration further intensified the possible negative consequences of the transition to private property (stratification of the material level of the population; increase in crime, drunkenness, drug addiction, mortality; homelessness, deterioration in medical and social security, etc.), extreme mass troubles were avoided. Of course, we must remember the horrors and victims of the Chechen war. One should also take into account the suffering and loss of more than twenty million(!) ethnic Russians who remained outside Russia in the countries of the former USSR.

And yet, no matter how bad it sounds, they got off lightly, because they were afraid of the worst, it could have been worse. Most likely, this is the merit not of Yeltsin and his associates, but of their opponents; they submitted to arrogant force, as in the days Tsarist Russia. Although, perhaps, the Yeltsinites compromised on something and did not go to extremes. Perhaps, on the contrary, the reason is the passivity of the population and the absence of civil society, while the “demons” themselves were capable of doing anything for personal gain and power. One way or another, in this matter we can award victory to Yeltsin’s path, we award it to his followers small, but still a plus. Although with a reservation, as the events of the Ukrainian crisis have shown, it is too early to put an end to this - maybe twenty-five years is not an insignificant period for Russia.

Second question- have the foundations been laid for an independent, sustainable, efficient economy, necessarily open and connected with the world, capable of ensuring normal modern concepts existence of the population? Have the conditions and mechanisms been created for a small but steady improvement and increase in the production of our own competitive products, the creation of our own new goods and services, and the growth of labor productivity?

Based on the opinion of the majority of objective independent experts, the answer to this question is negative. Although there are known studies according to which in 2000-2010, labor productivity in Russia grew annually by 6-7% (for example, the international consulting company McKinsey & Company and McKinsey Global Institute - MGI). But at the same time, firstly, they forget that by 2000 it had fallen to a low value, so the point of comparison was not chosen entirely correctly. Secondly, according to the authors of the same study, the growth in labor productivity was associated with an increase in the working population (including due to migrant workers) and a more complete utilization of production capacities. In general, labor productivity in Russia remains almost four to five times lower than in developed countries, and in some industries even much more.

It should be remembered that the incorrect implementation of reforms led to a decline in production and the economy comparable to the consequences of World War II, and in 1998 the entire financial system collapsed. It is unknown what would have happened to the regime and the country if a miracle had not happened - an incredible rise in oil and gas prices, which continues to a greater or lesser extent.

Currently, in Russia, the public sector remains prevalent and reaches 50% of the economic structure, while small and medium-sized businesses still occupy a small share. The conditions and mechanisms for the effective functioning of a multi-structure economy have not been created. The most surprising thing is that in many cases the government is a better property manager than the private sector. In most cases, it is not profitable for a farmer to produce agricultural products. Until today, in Russia it was not profitable to invest in upgrading production and improving products with the goal, for example, of an annual increase in profits by 5-15%. Capital growth was mainly associated with mining and processing natural resources, price conditions, banking operations and fraud, all sorts of methods and tricks of illegal enrichment, the use of a state-corrupt system of relations. In fact, until now we have mainly lived at the expense of what was created under Soviet rule, and part of what was available was squandered, stolen, and large cash abroad. The efficiency of the existing economy has remained very low. High prices for natural resources save and corrupt.

An example of the effective coexistence of public and private property is China. The main criteria for the existence of an enterprise there are efficiency, labor productivity, and competitiveness of products. The market is an objective judge. Eastern European countries, which began reforms almost simultaneously with Russia, have fared much better. Although, of course, great difficulties and problems have to be overcome there, but there are already noticeable deep, significant changes that have taken place in the economic and social structure, a healthy basis has been laid, correct, own, and not blindly copied, mechanisms have been developed that contribute to natural advancement forward and development. Russia is still at a crossroads. It looks like they jumped high and hung in the air. There is no strength to fly further upward and it is scary to fall back.

A paradoxical situation is again emerging in Russia - Not only the state, but also the private sector of the economy turned out to be poorly efficient. What was feared happened - the Western European system was discredited. The majority of Russians have a negative attitude towards private property. The transition period under the current regime has not fulfilled its main task of creating conditions for the further development of an effective economy. In general, when assessing Yeltsin’s economic reforms, one should give a minus. The Putin guards that replaced them did not change anything significantly; they only slightly improved, put things in order, and stabilized the existing system.

Third question- Is there progress towards creating a civil society?

Simultaneously with the implementation of radical economic reforms, and perhaps first of all, Yeltsin energetically set about building a strong, centralized state. He recreated a management model similar to the former Soviet one, only he further veiled its essence and decorated it with external, decorative, democratic attributes that did not have a significant impact. The shooting of the parliament and then the creation of a “pocket” one, a constitution that gives the president unprecedented, almost unlimited powers, regulated by the presidential office and the parties and media dependent on it, manipulated elections and much more. Expanded democratic possibilities (“parade of sovereignties”, etc.) were initially temporarily introduced mainly to facilitate the struggle for power.

New-old rules of the game have begun. Society and citizens were allowed everything that was allowed by the top, but at any moment the degree of freedom and its scope are determined only by the ruling apparatus. At any moment when the authorities want (when there is a real danger to the regime), they can take away and change whatever they want. The means by which the government controls have become more hidden and sophisticated. The powers that be hold the main economic levers of control in their hands. The essence of undemocratic Soviet state remained, but on the basis of a mixed public-private economy.

The trouble is not even that there remains a lot of state regulation and 50% of property in its hands, but in the presence of a system in which almost the entire economy is subject to the state and everything is determined by its apparatus. In itself, large state regulation is not always bad, and for Russia, with its penchant for extremes, it may even be a necessary condition, especially during the transition period. But the state must regulate through laws and transparent rules that apply to everyone, and in the current system, the old Russian arbitrariness of power plays a decisive role. The system does not allow society to really control and limit its activities. Everything good and bad, just like before, “comes” from above.

The problem is the specific implementation of the combination of the old Soviet system and elements of capitalism that has been created. In this sense, the autocracy (unlimited supreme power), the state based on violence, and the monopoly on power that existed in Russia for centuries have been preserved. The traditional Russian way of life and the order associated with it turned out to be above all. This order has survived and is victorious, regardless of the presence of a monarchy, councils or the current regime, since it has deep historical roots. It is no coincidence that the State Emergency Committee and the Soviet security forces preferred Yeltsin to Gorbachev, because Gorbachev encroached on “His Majesty” the Russian order, he really began to change its essence. Previously, there was ugly socialism, a parody of it, when an archaic totalitarian regime was hidden under the external socialist form. Now, on its basis, an ugly authoritarian structure has been created with limited private property and the market. Nothing else could have happened when they did it in a hurry with the same available human resources.

The younger and more educated leadership headed by Putin, which replaced Yeltsin’s in 2000, strengthened the created regime of pseudo-democracy and further strengthened the influence of the state on all social processes. The role of society in decision-making remained miniscule, and the population remained just as passive. Private property has weak security; in fact, for the majority of the population, all large property is illegal, the owners are not free and are largely dependent on officials at one level or another. The social insurance system (very important for Russia), although it has some new elements, is largely dependent on “oil money”; the undemocratic nature of the regime leaves little guarantees and weak protection for the population.

There are no free elections. The regime does not promote the creation of independent parties and public organizations and self-government mechanisms. There is no separation of powers. The judicial and legal systems continue to be dependent and in their infancy. The media finally began to serve the interests of the authorities, influential officials and clans. Society is unable to protect its interests from encroachment by either the state or another force (party, organization, individual). Tomorrow they will announce, for example, general nationalization and everything will return; there will be no significant resistance from society.

There are still no signs of the creation of a civil society. Therefore, the assessment for the implementation of political reform is minus.

Despite the fact that the reform period was relatively successful, without disasters or extreme complications, overall the results are weak and bad. Considering the significant lag of Russian society from that of the countries of Eastern Europe, one could hardly expect the same progress, but the current hopeless and depressing situation is a consequence of the chosen wrong path of reform. Although Putin’s leadership is trying to approach many issues in a more balanced way, based on real possibilities, the foundation was laid in a vicious and unhealthy way; again, the new house of European civilized Russia “with a human face” is being built not on a solid foundation, but on sand. Maybe the new leadership is only skillfully prolonging the life of a direction that will then have to be corrected. While most countries are simply developing for the better, building on a good foundation, in Russia they again (periodically) talk about the next “modernization”, the need for “breakthroughs”,“major changes in all spheres of life”, “new ideas and reforms”.

It is right to ask: after perestroika began in Russia, did something happen that could only have happened, or was there a possibility of a different development and, accordingly, different results? As we know, history does not know the subjunctive mood, but there is reason to believe that the alternative path of gradual changes in society and the economy, which could have been chosen in 1991, was more effective and would have led to greater achievements over the past twenty-five years. The proverb says, “after a fight one does not wave one’s fists,” however, it is a pity that once again in many centuries Russia “steps on the same rake.” Other folk proverb teaches: “if you drive more quietly, you will continue” - meaning, It’s better to do everything not quickly, but well and thoroughly.

Thus, Russia has not become different. She didn't go to Europe. The focus on the superpower and its isolation remained, the autocracy and the Soviet system remained, there was no civil society, a full-fledged market and private property. This is the result of Yeltsin’s reform and adventure.

"Shock therapy". B.N. Yeltsin, like M.S. Gorbachev, hesitated with unpopular reforms. By the end of 1991 food supplies have dried up, and there is a real threat of famine. In October 1991, the President of the Russian Federation proposed a program of radical economic reforms based on the so-called "shock therapy" The main ideologist of these reforms was the famous economist and politician Yegor Timurovich Gaidar. He suggested that Yeltsin introduce Western-style free prices for goods and services in the country, abandon state control over domestic and foreign trade, and test the mechanism of market competition between enterprises and industries in Russia. At the same time, it was proposed to carry out privatization and corporatization of state property on an all-Russian scale. Gaidar’s theory was based on the Polish model of “shock therapy.” It was assumed that under the conditions of this economic reform, the least protected segments of the population: pensioners, doctors, teachers, other state employees, as well as the disabled, children, and students would receive support from the state. The program of a gradual transition from socialism to capitalism by Shatalin and Yavlinsky, which suggested dispensing with shock therapy in 500 days, was rejected by Yeltsin.

By decision of Yeltsin, from January 1, 1992, retail prices were released. Almost instantly they increased 10-15 times, and by the end of the year - up to 150 times. Unfortunately, no real positive changes were achieved in the economy. The population of Russia felt a sharp decline in their standard of living in their financial condition. Inflation was gaining momentum. By January 1993, paper money not backed by commodity mass was printed 4 times more than in mid-1992. The decline in production in 1992, when price liberalization was announced, was 35 percent. By this time, the mutual debts of the enterprises amounted to almost 2 trillion rubles and, in fact, deprived most of them of working capital. It was clear that Gaidar's program had failed.

Voucher privatization. The most important direction of reforms under the leadership of B.N. Yeltsin was privatization. At the first stage of privatization, which took place in Russia from 1991 to 1994, all citizens were given privatization checks - vouchers. In accordance with the law of July 3, 1991 “On personalized privatization checks and deposits,” vouchers gave the right to purchase shares of industrial and other enterprises. The issuance of privatization checks was carried out in accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 14, 1992 “On the implementation of the system of privatization checks in the Russian Federation.” Each citizen received one voucher with a nominal value of 10,000 rubles. At that time, with this money you could buy one mirror from a Volga car. But the authors of privatization convinced the population that the cost of a voucher was equal to the cost of two Volga cars. Of course, due to total poverty, the population, not having the necessary information, simply sold privatization checks cheaply to those who were aware of the possibility of acquiring large chunks of former public property.

By July 1, 1994, over 20 thousand former state enterprises were corporatized. About 60% of enterprises passed into private hands.* However, the voucher privatization of state property did not lead to the formation of a middle class, but to the creation of a group of oligarchs. Vouchers, collected during the period of privatization in the hands of one capitalist in the amount of several thousand or tens of thousands, made it possible in the early 1990s to purchase reputable factories and plants generating billions in profits, such as Norilsk Nickel. The annual income of this enterprise exceeds a billion US dollars. Norilsk Nickel is owned by capitalist Vladimir Potanin.

Thanks to Chubais's privatization, the vast majority of factories and factories are now back in the hands of capitalists, as if the October Revolution never happened. This was another robbery of the Russians, who, with the help of A.B. Chubais, the author of privatization for vouchers, lost a huge share of the former national property. Thanks to the Constitution of 1993, subsoil and natural resources are also not public property. The privatization process solved the main tasks set by its authors: the private sector of the economy and the securities market were formed, and made economic reforms irreversible. Thus, the rapid redistribution of property pursued not only economic, but also political goals. Therefore, following the voucher stage of privatization of state property, in July 1994, the stage of so-called loans-for-shares auctions for the sale of enterprises began. With the help of loans-for-shares auctions, which gave the appearance of legality and fairness to privatization, industrial oil production facilities, oil refineries, steel and aluminum plants, and other “tidbits” of former public property were acquired for next to nothing.

The implemented privatization model was one of the main reasons for the destruction of our economy. In the process of its implementation, two fundamental mistakes were made. First- simultaneously with the privatization of the main assets of enterprises, their new owners were given the opportunity to privatize and appropriate rental income. That is, simultaneously with the acquisition of an oil well or mine, the owner received as a gift from the state the subsoil, the natural resources located under the well or on the territory of the mine. (This policy is reminiscent of the Charter of the Nobles, according to which they received the right to develop mineral resources on their lands). Second- a new class of executive directors, top managers and managers of the country's largest city-forming enterprises was essentially removed from public control and legal responsibility for the efficient use of the assets of their enterprises. This was largely facilitated by the fact that the state removed itself from managing the property it owned.

The rejection of the regulatory role of the state and miscalculations in privatization policy led to an acute crisis in the domestic industry and the economy as a whole.

The main reason for this situation was the idea that the transfer of state property into private hands is the cornerstone on which a civilized market is built. At that time, it was argued that the most important thing was to create a “sense of ownership” that was so necessary for a market economy. A.B. Chubais, one of the initiators of the privatization of state-owned enterprises, argued: only a private owner can ensure a significant increase in production efficiency, create genuine incentives to increase the competitiveness of production, constant updating range of products, expanding the scale scientific and technological progress. The Chinese experience was not taken into account.

During mass privatization, income from state enterprises, and at the same time from natural resources, main pipelines, and the monopoly position of producers of important types of products that are in high demand on the market, began to be received by new owners, and not by the state. It is not surprising that as a result of increased cash flows from former state-owned enterprises, including oil producers, people with billions of dollars have appeared in Russia, influencing the government - oligarchs. They received and receive today, bypassing the state treasury, the lion's share of rental income. Let us emphasize that the oligarchs receive not only profits from the operation of enterprises purchased at an inexpensive price, but also income from the natural resources themselves that are contained in our bowels: oil, gold, diamonds, etc. But the mineral resources previously belonged to the entire people, and not to a group of oligarchs.

The former national property is exported abroad in huge quantities by the new owners. And at present, a significant part of the rental income passes by the state treasury and is appropriated by oil workers, gas workers, fishermen, metalworkers, foresters, and new owners of the country’s subsoil and natural resources.

Such a rapid enrichment of the “new Russians”, social stratification, and growing poverty of the overwhelming majority of the population could not but cause a socio-psychological shock among Russian citizens.

The State Duma of the first convocation, a significant part of which represented the “left wing,” opposed “shock therapy” and advocated softening the course of market reforms. Under pressure from the State Duma, B.N. Yeltsin was forced to replace E.T. Gaidar. And about. V.S. Chernomyrdin, who previously headed Gazprom, one of the richest departments in modern Russia, was appointed Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Crisis in Russia. In the summer of 1994, the government of V.S. Chernomyrdin proclaimed a course towards the formation of a “highly efficient, socially oriented market economy.” However, the crisis in Russia was so deep that it was not possible to create a highly efficient economy. In the words of V.S. Chernomyrdin, “they wanted the best, but it turned out as always.”

Industrial enterprises not related to energy production were in a deplorable state. They did not have the working capital to replace outdated equipment. Old economic ties that previously existed with enterprises of the former Soviet republics were severed, and new partnerships were difficult to establish. Many industrial, transport, and construction enterprises did not pay wages to workers and employees for months; Payments of pensions and benefits were delayed. The standard of living of Russians, already quite modest, has dropped even further. The mortality rate increased by 20%, and the birth rate, on the contrary, decreased by 14%.* There were about 2 million unemployed people in the country, unnecessary people for the economy. The population with incomes below the subsistence level, that is, practically poor people, exceeded 40 million people. These and other figures and facts indicated that the consequences of economic reforms had an extremely negative impact on social status population of Russia. Shock therapy caused significant damage to the public sector - education, science, medicine, culture.

The communists and their allies took advantage of this situation of the working masses in the elections to the State Duma of the second convocation in December 1995. During the protest wave, deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation received the most votes from the party lists. If V.S. Chernomyrdin’s party “Our Home is Russia” gained only about 10% of the votes, then the Communist Party of the Russian Federation twice as much - 22%. In addition, in the elections in single-mandate constituencies, the Communists additionally received 58 more parliamentary seats. The election results allowed the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to elect its representative Gennady Nikolaevich Seleznev as Chairman of the State Duma. Former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Semenovich Stroev was elected Chairman of the Federation Council. Simultaneously with the duties of the speaker of the upper house, E.S. Stroev performed the functions of the head of the administration of the Oryol region.

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Lecture notes Old Russian state and law

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To strengthen the state and strengthen autocratic power, Ivan III carried out the following state and legal reforms. 1. The boyars began to swear great oath

Law codes of 1497 and 1550
The sources of all-Russian law in the 15th-17th centuries were: = grand ducal (royal) legislation, including Code of Laws of Ivan III and Ivan IV; = resolution

Innovations of the Code of Laws of 1550
1. It was prohibited to issue tarhan letters, which exempted people from paying taxes. 2. The principle of law was introduced: “the law has no retroactive effect.” 3. Set

Oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible
Oprichnina is a special type of rule of Ivan the Terrible. During its operation, all institutions or government bodies that were not pleasing to the tsar were dissolved, and their officials were subjected to repression.

During the Time of Troubles
At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries, the Muscovite kingdom was struck by a systemic state and legal crisis. The dramatic events that began with the death of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich and ended only with the election of new

Cathedral Code
The Council Code is a set of laws of the Russian state, approved in 1649 by the Zemsky Sobor. The preparation of legal reform was carried out by a specially created commission - “Order of Prince N.I. Odoev

Reforms of Peter 1
The 17th century in the history of Russia is considered to be the last century of the Muscovite kingdom. It marked the beginning of state legal reforms, the flourishing of the order system of public administration, the

Features of absolutism in Russia
1. If in Europe the absolute monarchy developed under conditions of capitalist relations and the abolition of outdated feudal legal institutions, then absolutism in Russia coincided with the heyday

State legal reforms of Peter 1
With the coming to power of Peter I, a strong, imperious personality, the process of establishing an absolute monarchy and carrying out state and legal reforms in Russia accelerated. Peter I is called the great Russian leader

Legal reforms of Peter 1
During the reign of Peter I, more than 3,000 legal acts were adopted concerning changes in criminal, civil and family law. Peter I devoted especially much attention and effort to lawmaking

During the period of “enlightened” absolutism in Russia
Palace coups. After the death of Peter I, Russia was plunged into a period of palace coups. Between 1725 and 1762

Changes in the government of Paul 1
1. According to the new law on succession to the throne (1797), the power of the emperor passed only to the eldest son, and in his absence - to the king's brother. This law left no chance for women to occupy the royal

Changes in the legal status of nobles
In 1799, by a special decree of the emperor, the noble privileges granted by the Charter of Catherine II were limited. According to the decree: = the nobles were again obliged to serve;

State-legal transformations of Alexander 1
The Russian nobility greeted the accession to the throne of Alexander I (1801-1825) with delight. By the time of the accession of Alexander I, the nobility remained the ruling class. The nobles owned

Changes in government
Alexander I, realizing that it is possible to rule a country successfully when there are reliable levers of control, began to improve the central authorities. He intended to increase the role and

Changes in the army
Under Alexander I, Arakcheevism was introduced (1815-1825) named after the Minister of War A.A. Arakcheev. After the war with Napoleon, Alexander I’s trust in Arakcheev increased so much that

Legal status of Russian outskirts
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian Empire had a huge territory. Tsars, emperors and empresses, conquering more and more new territories and peoples, imposed their rule there, unified the norms of

Change of government
Methods of government in the era of Nicholas I were distinguished by centralization, bureaucratization and militarization of the administrative apparatus. All important government issues Nicholas I sought to resolve with

State policy towards peasants
Feudal-dependent peasants still made up the majority of the Russian population. They were divided into state, landowner, possession and appanage, belonging to the imperial family.

Strengthening the social base of autocracy
The reason for such “indecisiveness” of the monarch is that the absolute monarchy defended the interests of the rich minority, the interests of the nobles, landowners, whom Emperor Nicholas I called “o

In the first half of the 19th century
Availability in Russian Empire different legal systems (Finland, Poland, Bessarabia had their own autonomous legislation), as well as great amount laws, decrees, letters of commendation, regulations

Civil law
Working on the X volume of the Code of Laws, which contained the norms of civil law, M.M. Speransky included in it some norms of bourgeois law, which at one time were included in the draft Civil Code, opening

Family and marriage law
The entire sphere of family relations and their legal regulation were under the jurisdiction of the church, although it should be noted that there was a gradual increase in the number of secular laws on marriage and family. Marriage during

State system on the eve of reforms
In 1856 After the death of Nicholas I, Emperor Alexander II ascended the Russian throne. The reign of Emperor Alexander II (until 1881) became a period of radical reforms and transformations of Russia

Reasons for the abolition of serfdom
1. The development of production forces in Russia has reached the level at which production relations constrained further economic progress. In the 30s-40s. years of the 19th century in Russia, as is known

Preparations for the abolition of serfdom
By the highest order of the monarch Alexander II, careful preparations for the abolition of serfdom began to be prepared by members of the “secret committee” created in January 1857, “for discussion

Disadvantages of peasant reform
1. Preservation of large landownership. 2. The small size of peasant plots, the harvest from the area was barely enough to feed a family, not to mention the production of marketable food

Carrying out legal reform in the second half of the 19th century
The most consistent of the reforms of the 60s of the XIX century was judicial reform. The transition to a new judicial system was carried out according to the royal decree entitled “Establishment of judicial institutions

Court structure
1. General courts. 2. Magistrates' courts. 3. Special courts. 4. The Senate as the highest court. The general court consisted of three main instances: the district court,

Criminal law
Criminal law in the post-reform period was based on the “Code of Criminal and Correctional Punishments” as amended in 1866 and 1885. These "Code..." contained almost 2000

Civil law
In the post-reform period, civil law received further development. After the abolition of serfdom, significant changes occurred in the legal policy of the state in the economic sphere.

Rebuilding the Armed Forces and Police
Height revolutionary movement, development of capitalist relations, defeat of Russia in Crimean War 1853-1856 necessitated the restructuring of the armed forces and police. Initiated

Local government and education reforms
An important step in improving the local government system was the implementation of zemstvo reform. On January 1, 1864, the monarch approved the “Regulations on provincial and district zemstvo institutions”

Counter-reforms of Alexander 3
After the assassination of Emperor Alexander II the Liberator by Narodnaya Volya terrorists on March 1, 1881, the emperor sat on the royal throne Alexander III(1881-1894). Alexander Alexandrovich is a goth at first

Main directions of counter-reforms
Counter-reforms were carried out almost simultaneously in several directions. Judicial, zemstvo, and city counter-reforms were carried out, and other measures were taken to tighten the regime: the

Prerequisites for the bourgeois-democratic revolution
1. The level of development of the productive forces came into conflict with the nature of production relations. Landownership of land, peasant land shortage, preservation of feudal lords

Stolypin agrarian reform
Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin (1862-1911), from the nobility, former governor of the Saratov province, was appointed prime minister in July 1906. Stolypin’s methods in suppressing

And during the First World War
In general, the Russian legal system was determined by the previous legislation of the late 19th century. with subsequent changes and additions. System of sources of law at the beginning of the 20th century. updated with new items

Bourgeois-democratic revolution
The first Russian revolution, although it forced tsarism to make some concessions, still did not solve the main problems: the nobility remained the ruling class; Samode

The Provisional Government and its legal acts
First World War exacerbated the existing contradictions between the government and society. Revolutionary actions of workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, dissatisfied with the policies of tsarism, are gaining mass

Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies
The Soviets first emerged during the revolution of 1905 -1907 in the city of Ivanovo. In the February bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Soviets played important role. Formally not being bodies

First legal acts
A new period in the development of the domestic state and law is associated with October Revolution, which created a fundamentally new state - the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

Creation and strengthening of law enforcement and repressive bodies
With the victory of the October armed uprising and the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks faced the task of defending the gains of the revolution. V.I. Lenin attached great importance to this problem. Every revolution is only

Created the Court of Cassation in Moscow, which was a court of second instance for district courts
Thus, the three court decrees issued in the first months Soviet power to some extent replaced the old judicial system with a new one. All that remained was to do the main thing - publish

The first Soviet Constitution of 1918
The decrees of the Second Congress of Soviets were the first legal acts of a constitutional nature: they resolved questions about power, about land, about peace. But among these, undoubtedly important for the agitation of the population for the Soviet

Communism" and the Civil War
The policy of "war communism". The internal policy of the Soviet government from the summer of 1918 to March 1921 was called the policy of “war communism.” The policy of the "military com"

Legislation of the policy of “war communism”
1. Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 11, 1918 “On the organization of committees of the rural poor. One of the main tasks of the poor committees is to help food detachments in fulfilling planned food appropriation tasks in the countryside.

Ensuring a new economic policy
The policy of “war communism” led the country’s economy to complete collapse. The situation, aggravated by 7 years of almost continuous war, by the beginning of 1921 was, as they say, worse than ever

Legal support for the new economic policy
The transition to the NEP was legally formalized by the decrees of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, and decisions of the highest authority - the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1921). The introduction of the NEP began with rural

Formation of the USSR and changes in legislation
The tasks of restoration and further growth of the national economy of the RSFSR and other republics where Soviet power was victorious required combining efforts, creating a military and economic

Constitution of the USSR 1924
1. Enshrined the formation of the USSR at the legislative level. 2. Proclaimed the form of government of the USSR to be a federation of republics with the right to freely secede from the union. 3. Zakre

Justice and law enforcement reform
The end of the civil war, the introduction of the New Economic Policy, and the creation of the Soviet Union set new tasks for the justice authorities and all law enforcement agencies. They had to adapt

In the USSR in the 1930s
In the late 20s and early 30s of the last century, significant changes occurred in the Soviet Union. A course was set for the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture, which should

Mass repressions in the USSR
The main support of the regime were the repressive bodies. In 1930, the Republican People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs were abolished, and the police were transferred to the OGPU. The GULAG was formed as part of the OGPU. By the end of the 1930s in

Changes in criminal, military and procedural law
During the period since the adoption of the first Constitution of the USSR from 1924 to 1936, significant economic, political and social changes have occurred in the Soviet Union. These changes were found from

Changes in criminal law in the 30s
The main goal of criminal law in the 1930s was the fight against the most dangerous state crimes committed by class opponents of Soviet power, against crimes encroaching on

Types of punishment
1. Expulsion from the country (for a certain period or indefinitely). 2. Imprisonment (with or without strict isolation from society - sending to special settlements). 3. Forced

Changes in military law
On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, in the late 1930s - early 1940s, changes took place in the military law of the Soviet Union and Russia aimed at increasing the defense capability of states

Features of the functioning of the state and legal system during the Great Patriotic War
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the entire state and legal system of the Soviet Union was subjected to the most severe test of strength. The main task of the Soviet political and legal system

In the post-war period. Reforms of N.S. Khrushchev
State and legal development of the USSR. In connection with the end of the Great Patriotic War, a restructuring of organs was carried out state power and management in accordance with t

Reforms of N.S. Khrushchev
1. The sectoral principle of industrial management in 1957 was replaced by the territorial principle of management. For this purpose, councils of monarchs were formed on the periphery

State and legal changes in the “Brezhnev era”
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who came to power as a result of a party “palace coup,” was a typical representative of the nomenklatura communist elite of the 50s and 60s

Agrarian reform
Agrarian reform was proclaimed at the March (1965) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It included measures to solve social problems in the village, the use of economic incentives in agriculture, increasing

Industrial reforms
In November 1965, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which a report by A.N. Kosygin was heard, justifying economic reform in industry. The head of government proposed introducing a market

Changes in the legal system
During the Brezhnev period of rule, legislation was systematized, culminating in the publication of the Code of Laws of the USSR. The basis of the Code of Laws was the Constitution of the USSR of 1977. In the new Constitution

Features of the USSR Constitution of 1977
1. The text of the Constitution for the first time approved the final construction of a developed socialist society and the creation of a nation-wide state. According to the Constitution, the new national goal was

Management and rights. Collapse of the Soviet Union
After the death of L.I. Brezhnev, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee decided on the issue of his successor. Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov won. Election of Yu.V.Andropov Secretary General CPSU Central Committee calling

Reasons for perestroika
1. Ineffectiveness of the command-administrative management system in the new conditions. 2. Fall in the growth rate of labor productivity. The USSR lagged significantly behind the developed capitalist countries

Statehood. Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993
In the development of the state and law of Russia at the very beginning of the 90s of the twentieth century. Before the adoption of the new Constitution, several main trends can be identified. The first trend was due to

Powers of the President of the Russian Federation
1. Appoints the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (with the consent of the State Duma). 2. Decides to dismiss the government. 3. Appoints deputies of the federal government

Public administration reforms by V.V. Putin
The third stage, which began from the moment V.V. Putin took office as President of the Russian Federation, is characterized by the emerging opportunities to solve large-scale, national problems. It matched

Conclusion
The experience of world civilization shows that the state and society are forced to carry out transformations, modernization, and reforms in order to meet new requirements. Historical experience

Reforms of the Yeltsin era- a set of large-scale socio-economic transformations aimed at a radical restructuring of spheres of life and institutions of the Russian state. Central location focused on economic sector reforms, the main goal of which was the transition from a planned economy to a market economy.

Gaidar's liberal reforms and their consequences

In November 1991, B. N. Yeltsin formed a new government headed by himself. In fact, the government was led by First Deputy Prime Minister G. E. Burbulis. A key position in it was also occupied by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance E.T. Gaidar. The most important positions in the government went to representatives of the group of young qualified economists that formed around Gaidar in the 1980s: P. Aven (Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations), A. Nechaev (head of the economic block of Gaidar’s Ministry), A. Shokhin, A. Chubais (head of the State Property Committee ).

Yeltsin himself called the government's main goals the transition to market economy and the achievement of macroeconomic civilization. It was assumed that Russia would move to a market economy as soon as possible, undergoing so-called “shock therapy.” The government program contained measures such as price holidays, the introduction of free trade and privatization. An alternative was proposed by G. A. Yavlinsky, the author of the “500 days” program. He believed that it was first necessary to stabilize economic situation in the country, and only then carry out market reforms.

Since January 1992, planned economic management was abolished, the main restrictions on wage growth were lifted, and entrepreneurs received freedom to carry out foreign economic activity. The decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the liberalization of prices and the reorganization of trade gave enterprises the right to independently set prices for their products, the right to independently sell and purchase products and raw materials. The main innovation was the elimination of centralized pricing: 80% of wholesale and 90% of retail prices became free. A market infrastructure was created: stock and commodity exchanges, a banking system, and a foreign exchange market appeared. Gaidar's reforms were based on a liberal monetarist model of transition to a market economy, focused on weakening state intervention in the economy, primarily reforming the monetary sector of the economy, achieving financial stabilization in the country, eliminating the budget deficit, and strengthening the ruble. The reformers set aside three years to stabilize the economy.

The government's stabilization policy also included a number of measures to prevent hyperinflation and social protection of the population. Government spending was sharply reduced, efforts were made to make the ruble convertible, in particular, a free exchange rate for the Russian currency was established based on supply and demand. The market gradually filled with goods, money acquired a price, and queues in stores began to disappear.

In the process of implementing reforms, Gaidar's government faced many difficulties. The situation was aggravated by political instability in the country: from the very beginning, the work of the government was criticized by the Supreme Council, which rejected all the bills proposed by the ministers. Directors of enterprises, two-thirds of which, according to expert estimates, were unsuitable for a market economy and doomed to bankruptcy, also stood in opposition to the government. President Yeltsin periodically spoke out in defense of the latter, and this helped save the situation - the head of state at that time enjoyed great authority. In the summer of 1992, Yeltsin made concessions to some industrialists: representatives of the military-industrial complex and fuel and energy complex were included in the government, and the immediate transition of insolvent enterprises to bankruptcy had to be abandoned.

Much of what was planned by Gaidar’s team immediately went wrong. So, initially prices were supposed to be released only by the summer of 1992, but as a result this was done back in January. It was not possible to carry out the planned monetary reform, which involved the introduction of a new currency - the Russian ruble (this was due to pressure from the leaders of other republics of the former USSR). Real “shock therapy,” according to many economists, never happened in Russia, since radical liberal reforms were not fully thought out, and in practice were accompanied by compromises and were not fully implemented. It was not possible to complete internal and external price liberalization, and the privatization program developed by the government was not effective enough. Contrary to forecasts that prices would rise fivefold, they rose more than a hundredfold. A colossal blow was dealt to the monetary savings of citizens, which provoked enormous discontent among the population. In the spring of 1992, the government had to raise wages, but after this there was a rise in prices again - the chance to achieve a market equilibrium that would curb inflation was failed.

At the end of 1992, the Congress of People's Deputies achieved Gaidar's resignation from the post of prime minister, and he was replaced by V. S. Chernomyrdin. The new cabinet included representatives of several political forces - both democrats and communists. In September 1993, Gaidar returned to the government as Minister of Economy and Deputy Prime Minister, which allowed the transformation to continue. During the autumn of 1993, the agricultural sector was liberalized, and state financing of the national economy through the credit and budget system ceased. As a result, inflation rates decreased and the budget deficit decreased. Already in December 1993, Gaidar and B. Fedorov left the government, but Chernomyrdin, nevertheless, did not completely abandon the policy of monetary stabilization. For some time, the inflation rate continued to decline, but in the fall of 1994, due to pressure on the government from the industrial and agricultural lobbies, inflation accelerated. On October 11, the ruble exchange rate fell by 27%; this day went down in history as “Black Tuesday.” After this, market economist A. B. Chubais was appointed first deputy prime minister.

Despite the numerous negative aspects of the reforms of the Gaidar-Yeltsin government, they also brought a number of positive results. A market has developed in Russia, the country's economy avoided complete bankruptcy and regained the trust of foreign partners, the population was saved from the real threat of famine.

Privatization

On December 25, 1990, the Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activities was adopted in Russia, in accordance with which individual entrepreneurial activity. In practice, this meant buying out state-owned enterprises at low prices. This opportunity was available, first of all, to their directors. Even before the start of market reforms, they gained full ownership of hundreds of thousands of state-owned enterprises. In the second half of 1992, with the beginning of “people’s” privatization in Russia, the government found itself in a difficult situation: it was urgently necessary to take control of the spontaneous privatization carried out by the nomenklatura. In August of the same year, the president signed a decree “On the introduction of a system of privatization checks in the Russian Federation.” The value of all Russian enterprises at the beginning of the 1990s was summed up and divided by the number of residents of the country. All Russians, including children, were given the right to receive one privatization check (voucher) with a nominal value of 10 thousand rubles. The authorities assumed that people would invest the vouchers in shares of privatized enterprises and receive dividends. In reality, this did not happen because the country's economy did not achieve the expected growth.

The first stage of privatization ended with the rapid redistribution of state property and the establishment of the real foundations of a market economy. A social stratum of shareholders has appeared in Russia (about 40 million people). Thousands of large insurance, investment, pension companies, and commercial banks emerged. In parallel with the privatization of large enterprises, “small privatization” took place: service enterprises and shops were sold at auction. By the beginning of 1996, almost 85% of them had been privatized. The non-state sector has gained a dominant position in the Russian economy.

Agrarian reform

At the end of 1990, the Congress of People's Deputies adopted the laws “On Peasant (Farming) Economy” and “On Land Reform”. Agrarian reform began in the country, the main task of which was the reform of collective and state farms and the development of private farms. Peasants received the right to leave collective and state farms with their share of the land. On December 27, 1991, the president signed a decree “On urgent measures to implement land reform in the RSFSR,” designed to accelerate the development of farming in the countryside. Regional land distribution funds were created, and collective and state farms were subject to reorganization within two months. By mid-1993, the number of farms in Russia reached 270 thousand, although in subsequent years its growth stopped.

The main reason for the slow pace of agrarian reform was the unsettled nature of land relations. Until the October events of 1993, the Supreme Council consistently prevented the restoration of private ownership of land, and only on October 27, 1993, by the presidential decree “On the regulation of land relations and the development of agrarian reform in Russia,” private ownership of land was allowed. Now it could be sold and used as collateral. There were only three restrictions: it was impossible to change the agricultural purpose of the land, foreigners could not own the land, and it was impossible to have more land than was determined in a particular region. In the spring of 1994, the government submitted its draft Land Code to the State Duma for consideration. At first it did not receive the support of deputies, but after the introduction of a clause stating that land could be privately owned, but without the right to sell, the lower house of parliament, and then the Federation Council, accepted it. The final version of the code was vetoed by President Yeltsin - in the resulting version Land Code contradicted the Constitution, which allowed private ownership of land.

By the mid-1990s, the situation in agriculture began to change for the better. The agricultural sector began to adapt to market conditions, the gross harvest and the share in the structure of flax, sugar beet and sunflower sown areas increased. Productivity increased and crops expanded. The positive dynamics of agricultural development were interrupted by the deep economic crisis that Russia faced in 1998.

Military reform

Russia inherited one of the largest military-industrial complexes in the world from the collapse of the USSR. Russia inherited about 85% of the Soviet armed forces. Military reform in the country was announced in 1992, immediately after the creation Russian army. Its main direction was the demilitarization of the economy, which did not fully correspond to the realities of that time: the military-industrial complex needed a complete restructuring. Spending on the country's defense fell sharply, but the size of the armed forces continued to remain at the same level. As a result, the combat effectiveness of the army decreased; all types of armed forces, with the exception of the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces), found themselves in a critical condition. one system Air defense ceased to exist, since the most powerful groups of radio technical and anti-aircraft missile forces, as well as fighter aircraft, were located in the CIS countries, in the border zones of the former USSR.

The need for military reform was confirmed by the failures of Russian troops in the first Chechen war (1994-1996). It became obvious that in the ranks of the armed forces, in addition to the decline in combat effectiveness, social tension was growing, expressed in draft evasion, hazing, and cases of desertion. On May 16, 1996, on the eve of the presidential elections, B. N. Yeltsin issued a decree “On the transition to filling positions of privates and sergeants in the armed forces and other troops of the Russian Federation on a professional basis.” The primary task of the upcoming military reform was not to increase the professionalism of the armed forces, but to reduce them and set a course for staffing the army and navy with contract volunteers.

In the summer of 1997, the country's authorities finally decided on a strategy for military reform. The main direction was to reduce the number of armed forces. On July 16, 1997, the President signed a decree “On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure.” In 1997-1998, the armed forces were reduced by 500 thousand people. During 1997, the concept of national security of Russia was approved, reform of the army and navy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Border Service, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations began.

Despite the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, the Russian authorities have taken the first steps to create a new national defense system.

Reforms and society

The demolition of the old socio-economic system and the emergence of a market economy in Russia radically changed the social conditions of life of the population. The state has lost the ability to bear the costs of free education and medicine. Access to transport services and medical care for the population has decreased, and recreational and leisure facilities have closed. Prices for services provided by catering establishments, hairdressing salons and other service enterprises have increased. By 1994, real incomes in the country had approximately halved. Of the 148 million Russians, about 32 million, that is, more than 24%, found themselves below the poverty line. This contributed to a fall in the standard of living and, accordingly, a reduction in its average duration. In 1992-1995, the absolute population decline was 2.7 million people. As Russian citizens adapted to new socio-economic conditions, in the second half of the decade, demographic indicators improved and the decline in living standards slowed.

Not wanting to remain unemployed, many people not employed in production began to look for alternative ways earn a living. Russians began to master private street trading, permitted by the Gaidar government, and make short trips abroad to purchase goods with subsequent sale in Russian markets (such people were called “shuttle traders”). Gradually displacing domestic producers, they penetrated into the Russian market large quantities foreign, previously scarce, goods: food, household appliances, clothing and shoes. True, this concerned mainly large cities.

The negative consequences of the reforms were an increase in the number of homeless people and refugees, as well as the increasing influence of criminal structures. Economic crime has reached catastrophic proportions, and contract killings have become more frequent.

August 1991 marked the beginning of a new stage of Russian modernization, no longer socialist, but radical liberal, not evolutionary, but revolutionary. It was already noted above that although most researchers call the socio-economic and political transformations in Russia the 90s. last century with radical reforms, in fact they were revolutionary in nature, especially in 1992 - 1994. During this period, both main signs of the revolution were evident - a change in power and forms of ownership. There were also elements of a third, not always mandatory, but always the most terrible component of the revolution - civil war: the shooting of parliament, bloody ethnic conflicts, the Chechen war and various kinds of large-scale criminal showdowns. The fact that a full-scale civil war was avoided is undoubtedly the merit of the leaders of that time and their ability to make compromises.

Unlike the previous period, when the leaders of the USSR, understanding the need to renew society, did not have a clear concept of transformation and reacted with a noticeable lag in time to fluctuations in mass sentiment to the left or right, the renewed Russian political elite clearly defined the Western model of society as a guideline, mainly in American version. One of the central provisions of the liberal-radical ideology of the 80s. XX century there was an idea of ​​​​the benefits of free market relations, unencumbered by government intervention. This ideology of a market economy became widespread in the 1980s. in the USA during the presidency of R. Reagan and in the UK during the reign of Prime Minister M. Thatcher. It was these ideas that were adopted by our liberal radicals, who ignored the fact that these countries had strong statehood, they did not worry sharp turn V social development and that they have a mature legal culture population.

If the former Soviet ideology professed a kind of political determinism, which consisted in faith in the ability of the state and the CPSU to remake human nature and eliminate all the vices of society, then the new liberal-radical faith was based on economic determinism, proving that as soon as the state was eliminated from the natural-historical process, they would immediately start working beneficial market mechanisms and economic freedoms that can benefit everyone. Meanwhile, the capitalist mode of production, functioning in conditions of mature capitalism, cannot do without a strong state that ensures private property rights, strict rules and laws of a civilized, socially oriented market. The production relations of capitalism receive their necessary legal expression in property relations, the regulation of which is one of the main functions of the state. If the state is destroyed or seriously weakened, as happened in Russia, then there is no need to seriously talk about any normal capitalism.

The social danger of this model of unlimited freedom of market relations was very clearly manifested in the conditions of the current global financial crisis, which broke out in the fall of 2008. Prominent economists in the United States, where this financial crisis began, which became global due to the global nature of the modern economy, admitted that they were mistaken in believing that the market has a “self-preservation instinct.” The nature of market relations unregulated in the interests of society leads to the fact that their agents, obsessed with the desire to obtain excess profits, are not inclined to take into account the interests of society. This is why the “invisible hand” of an unregulated market inevitably leads to crises. It is no coincidence that the leaders of the 20 most powerful economies in the world, who gathered in Washington on November 15, 2008, trying to overcome the consequences of the global financial crisis and prevent its recurrence, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to change the global financial architecture, organize international control over its functioning, and create for this purpose there are special institutions both at the national and international level.

But our liberal radicals in the early 1990s. were passionate about the idea of ​​free market relations, the maximum elimination of the state from their regulation, which, in their opinion, should lead to the prosperity of the Russian economy. At the same time, they ignored not only the world experience in the development of mature market economies, especially European countries, but also the historically established special role of the Russian state in public life, its economic sphere, the need for strong statehood in conditions of radical transformations, the paternalistic mentality of the bulk of the population.

A specific program of radical economic reforms was approved by the Russian authorities in the fall of 1991, and its adoption and implementation began to be associated with the name of E.T. Gaidar, who took the place of Deputy Prime Minister for Economics in the new Russian government. The program he proposed was based on the liberal ideas of a market economy, in particular, the concept of shock therapy, used in the process of modernization in both third world countries and Eastern Europe. The main thing in it was a one-time transition to a market economy and radical measures to combat inflation and budget deficits aimed at stabilizing economic development.

Gaidar's version of shock therapy included three main reforms. The first major measure - the one-time introduction of free prices from January 1992 - was supposed to determine the market value of goods, eliminate commodity shortages, “launch” the mechanism of competition between all industries and enterprises, and force people and organizations to “earn money.” The second measure - the liberalization of domestic and foreign trade - was supposed to speed up trade turnover and create an infrastructure for the sale of the maximum possible volumes of domestic and imported products. The third measure - widespread and rapid privatization of housing and state-owned enterprises - was supposed to turn the masses of the population into owners and create powerful labor, savings and other economic incentives for them to operate. At their core, these reforms were implemented during one Gaidar year, and in the next period, until Yeltsin resigned in 1999, they developed with some, sometimes important, adjustments that did not change the essence of the matter. E. Gaidar proposed relying on the market as an instrument of structural changes in the economy: free prices were supposed to “select” those goods and commodity producers that met the needs of society, and reject those that did not correspond to this. reform Russian statehood liberalization

But already the first radical reform - the release of prices from the beginning of January 1992 - led to unexpected dramatic results. Instead of the predicted threefold increase in prices, they increased by 10-12 times, so that the planned increase in salaries and pensions by 70%, which turned out to be paltry compared to the real increase in prices, led to the fact that the majority of the population found themselves below the poverty line. The sharp gap between rising prices and household incomes continued subsequently, becoming a strong trend modern stage modernization in Russia.

The introduction of economic freedom in industry, most of which had a monopolistic character, produced results that were largely unforeseen and contrary to the intentions of the reformers. Since the beginning of price liberalization, they all began to rapidly inflate prices for their products to the maximum, which gave rise to a kind of vicious circle. Each new price increase by enterprises resulted in a corresponding, or even greater increase in tariffs for the transportation of goods, prices for energy, raw materials, etc. General price inflation without taking into account market conditions and possible economic consequences gave rise to a widespread sales crisis. The problem of mutual non-payments by enterprises arose: by June 1, 1992, their amount reached about 2 trillion. rubles, and without receiving money for their products, many enterprises faced the threat of collapse. In many industries, the production of essential goods has become unprofitable. In the most difficult situation, in fact, “unnecessary” to the market, were the knowledge-intensive industries, in particular those serving the military-industrial complex. Instead of the expected structural restructuring of industry, the process of deindustrialization began at a rapid pace in Russia.

Voucher privatization also did not confirm the forecasts of radical reformers. Formally, the scheme developed by the State Property Committee of Russia headed by A. Chubais and approved by the legislature corresponded to the principles of “people's privatization”: all adult Russians received one privatization voucher, and the majority of them were to become the middle class - owners of enterprises and shareholders. In reality, popular capitalism was not created. The overwhelming majority of Russians, not knowing how to manage the vouchers themselves, transferred them to check investment funds (CHIFs), which were obliged to invest them profitably in privatized enterprises. However, most of the 2 thousand CHIFs, which accumulated the bulk of the vouchers, disappeared within one or two years, greatly enriching their leadership. Most of the ordinary shareholders at the enterprises also quite quickly said goodbye to state vouchers: the shares, as a result of manipulation, machinations and pressure, migrated into the hands of the management of the enterprises and their entourage. The majority of Russians (about 60%) were left without vouchers or shares, and the majority of those who retained shares, as sociological surveys showed, were employees or shareholders of unprofitable enterprises and did not receive dividends.

The owners of state property became “red directors”, government officials, primarily senior officials, domestic and foreign financial corporations and simply clever financial speculators, criminal shadow structures. They managed not only to expropriate shares and vouchers from ordinary citizens, but also to provide access to the most profitable industries. The trend of the first, “voucher” stage of privatization was consolidated in the second, “market” stage, which began in 1994 and meant the open sale of enterprises at market value. And at this stage, deals between government officials and the most clever financiers played a decisive role.

Very quickly, the main form of sale of state property became loans-for-shares auctions: the state, in dire need of “real” money, transferred a block of shares at a reduced cost, as a rule, to a large commercial bank, but if the state did not repay the debt, which became the rule, the bank became the full owner of the shares , taking over and highly profitable enterprises. It was precisely this consequence that accompanied the first loans-for-shares auction, which took place in 1995: ONEXIM Bank acquired a controlling stake in the Norilsk Nickel Plant, the world flagship in the production of nickel, chromium, cobalt, and platinum, for $170 million (according to official data, in 2001). the net profit of this enterprise amounted to about 1 billion dollars, and the capitalization of the corporation exceeded 10 billion dollars). It is significant that at the auction the application of the Russian Credit Bank, which offered the state an amount twice as large as ONEXIM Bank, was rejected. In December 1995, at a collateral auction for the sale of a government stake (51%) of shares in the national company Sibneft, it was acquired by the Oil Financial Company, controlled by B. Berezovsky and R. Abramovich, together with the Capital Savings Bank for 100, 3 million dollars. In 2000, the net profit of the Sibneft company amounted to $674.8 million. In 2005, Sibneft was bought from R. Abramovich by the state-controlled Gazprom company for $13 billion.

Was it possible to distribute state property and social structuring of the new Russia “fairly,” as justified by radical leaders during the struggle for power? Ideally, theoretically, yes, but the ideal model presupposes a number of strict conditions: a rational bureaucracy with strong moral foundations, a strong, impartial state that balances and serves citizens according to the law; a developed civil society that controls the activities of the state and bureaucracy; citizens have approximately equal starting opportunities and entrepreneurial abilities. Since none of these conditions existed in Russian society, there could be neither democratic privatization nor democratic capitalism.

Some of those who benefited most from Russian privatization were the radical politicians who came to power. Immediately after August 1991, facts began to multiply, indicating that people who actively fought against the old regime under the slogans of the destruction of all and every privilege, having strengthened themselves in power, began to dispose of state property with amazing cynicism, privatizing for themselves, their relatives, in their interests. The bulk of the new business elite (61%, according to the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences) was made up of the former Soviet nomenklatura, which “stakes out” profitable strategic positions in the economy back in the days of Gorbachev. E. Gaidar, comprehending the nature of privatization after his resignation, had to admit that its main component was the “exchange of nomenklatura power for property,” however, the reformer saw in this “the only way for the peaceful reform of society, the peaceful evolution of the state.” Mass privatization, thus carried out in Russia, served as an important mechanism for the formation of capitalism of the nomenklatura-oligarchic type.

The appropriation of state property by the nouveau riche was a fundamental cause of the subsequent deepening of economic inequality. The social strata that “sank” to the social bottom became poorer absolutely and relatively: during the Yeltsin period (1991 - 1999), the real wages of those employed in the economy decreased by 2.5 times, pensions by 3.3 times, and the income gap was 10%. the richest and 10% of the poorest Russians increased from 4.5 to 15.5 times. This is according to official data. But sociological surveys give different figures: this income gap is 25 - 30 times. This figure in Finland is 4 times, in France - 5 times, in the UK - 7. All developed countries monitor this indicator, since if it exceeds 7 - 8 times, it is fraught with instability.

Thus, privatization contributed to the redistribution of national wealth in favor of a small layer of wealthy people who acquired their capital in conditions quick transition to the market. According to the Russian Academy of Sciences, by the end of 1993, the rich stratum in the country was 3-5%, the middle-income group was 13-15%, and the rest were below the poverty line. In the Message of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to the Federal Assembly on March 10, 2006, he noted the low level of citizens’ trust in big business and highlighted the reasons for this: “some representatives of these communities, neglecting the norms of law and morality, moved on to personal enrichment unprecedented in the history of our country at the expense of the majority of citizens.”

Significant failures and huge social “prices” of radical economic reforms of the 90s. was explained not only by the erroneously chosen ideology of a market economy, but also by the fact that our reformers did not know well the peculiarities of the Russian economy, which were formed during the previous decades of Soviet history, and ignored the historically developed mentality of the bulk of the population, in which business, entrepreneurship, and trade were not considered values. In addition, these economic reforms, in particular the privatization of state property, were not accompanied by legal support in the interests of society. The main concern of the reformers was to create as quickly as possible, at any cost, a powerful layer of owners as a guarantee against the restoration of the USSR. All this led to a striking discrepancy between the goals of the reform and its real results, to massive abuse, the criminalization of economic relations and a large-scale increase in the corruption of society.

It was already mentioned above that the attitude towards radical economic reforms and their consequences among researchers is very ambiguous, but the majority gives them negative assessments. At the same time, relying on the principles of objectivity and historicism, it is important to evaluate certain phenomena and processes based on the real capabilities of a given society and real alternatives, and not on what should have been done in accordance with a certain ideal. Based on this, in the radical reforms of the 90s. Both positive and negative aspects can be identified.

The first positive consequence of the radical reforms of 1992 was the creation of a full-blooded market and the resuscitation of Russian economic life. The Russian economy, which was in a state of collapse in 1991, completely out of subordination to centralized planning and subordination, testifying to its condition by empty store shelves and the threat of famine that really emerged for the Russian masses, overcame the commodity shortage within one year. In subsequent years, the filling of the rapidly expanding network of stores with goods led to an abundance of goods; Russian retail trade in terms of the range of goods practically ceased to differ from the West.

The second positive consequence was the overcoming of economic autarky and an increasingly active entry into the global economic space. The introduction of internal convertibility of the ruble made the Russian market attractive to the world economy; foreign goods flowed into Russia, instantly filling the commodity gaps created by the Soviet economy. Russian commodity producers, for their part, sharply increased their activity on the world market. True, they were almost exclusively producers and suppliers of oil, gas, metals, and timber, which alone were competitive in the global economy. But their successes became an important factor in the establishment of market relations in the Russian economy as a whole. Russia has practically restored the previous volumes of oil exports and significantly exceeded the volumes of gas exports. Going back, the income received from this contributed to the development of market mechanisms already in the domestic economy.

Positive changes include the emergence of a layer of businessmen, the formation of a new middle class, including representatives of various professions with a characteristic entrepreneurial mentality. Among the structural social change The sharp expansion of the service sector, which involved at least a third of the employed population, was very noticeable.

Among the negative consequences of radical reforms, the collapse of uncompetitive enterprises, as a consequence, a sharp drop in industrial production, deindustrialization, and Russia's entry into the world economy as its fuel and raw materials sector, is usually given first place. A decline in production also occurred in most sectors of the light and food industries and in agriculture. Authoritative sources indicate that from 1991 to 1999. the decline in GDP was at least 45%, and the decline in industrial production was about 55%. The numbers are dramatic and even tragic. At the same time, considering these indicators and identifying their real meaning, V.V. Sogrin turned to comparing the nature of the Soviet and post-Soviet economies. The Soviet economy had a pronounced anti-consumer character. The lion's share of Soviet GDP was made up of military production and the products of the industries serving it. A significant part was the so-called dead capital (unfinished construction, unused equipment, etc.). It was these items that were primarily reduced in the post-Soviet market economy, focused on the fastest possible return. That is, the decline in the production of marketable products in the 90s, which are in demand among the population, actually purchased by them, and not stored as unnecessary, as was the case in the Soviet period, was clearly less than the given figures.

Important negative aspects of radical economic reforms include the emergence of sharp social contrasts that were absent during the Soviet period, the division of society into a rich and super-rich minority and a poor and poor majority, and the emergence of capitalism of the nomenklatura-oligarchic type.