Brothers Grimm fairy tales The Three Feathers. Three magic feathers

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF I. KANT AND VL. SOLOVYOVA1

V. N. Belov

A comparative analysis of the principles of the ethical constructions of Kant and Solovyov is carried out. The author notes that with all the reverence for Kantian ethics, the Russian philosopher builds ethics on his own principles. Unlike Kant, Soloviev affirms the heteronomy of morality and its religiosity, which has nothing to do with Christianity.

Keywords: ethics, morality, religion, I. Kant, Vl. Soloviev, critical philosophy, philosophy of unity.

Turning to a comparative analysis of the ethical constructions of two outstanding philosophers, we, of course, are obliged to discuss some preliminary and most general points. First of all, it should be understood that we cannot claim to have a thorough and comprehensive study of such large-scale and deep philosophical teachings as the ethical teachings of Kant and Solovyov. Therefore, we will deliberately limit ourselves to considering only the most controversial and spicy stories in comparing the origins, foundations and fundamental structural elements of these ethical teachings in the argumentation of German and Russian philosophers. Moreover, the topic of comparative analysis of the ethics of Kant and Solovyov has attracted and continues to attract the attention of philosophers, mainly domestic ones, has its own rich history and can itself become the subject of a separate study2.

doi: 10.5922/0207-6918-2013-3-2 © Belov V. N., 2013.

1 The study was carried out within the framework of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation grant “The ethical teaching of Kant and its development in the works of G. Cohen and Vl. Solovyov”, project No. 13-03-00042a.

2 The following studies, in particular, are devoted to the comparison of the ethical constructions of Kant and Solovyov: Lazarev V.V. The Categorical Imperative of I. Kant and the Ethics of Vl. Solovyova // Kant and philosophy in Russia. M., 1994; Kalinnikov L. A. Kant in Russian philosophical culture. Kaliningrad, 2005; Nizhnikov S. A. Vl. Solovyov and I. Kant: critical dialogue of philosophical cultures // Solovyov studies. Vol. 10. Ivanovo, 2005. P. 10 - 31; Tsan-kai-si F. V. Vl. Soloviev and I. Kant: the problem of the moral ideal // Ibid. pp. 31-40; Dmitrevskaya I. V. The principle of consistency in the moral philosophy of I. Kant and Vl. Solovyov // Solovyov studies. Vol. 14. Ivanovo, 2007. pp. 226 - 260.

Another general point that requires mandatory preliminary fixation is the historical independence of Kant’s ethics from the ethics of his Russian colleague and, on the contrary, the undoubted influence Solovyov himself emphasized on his teaching of the ethical ideas of the great German thinker. Therefore, the comparative analysis undertaken initially includes problems of the adequacy of Solovyov’s understanding and interpretation of Kant’s ethics, the nature of the development and criticism of this ethical teaching.

Almost all studies of this kind begin, if we follow Solovyov’s own logic, with an assessment of the merits of Kant’s achievements in his substantiation of ethics. Let's not break this tradition. In the article “Kant” in the Brockhaus and Efron dictionary, our philosopher emphasizes that Kant “affirmed the unconditional primacy of practical reason, or moral will, as a precondition for proper reality; he gave impeccable and final formulas of the moral principle and created pure or formal ethics as a science as reliable as pure mathematics...” And although Solovyov highlights the particularly significant role of the German thinker in ethical constructions, his perception of Kant’s philosophy in this part is also of the most systematic critical nature3. Soloviev considers Kant’s most common weak point to be “the ad hoc invention of artificial terms” when “he sometimes uses the same very important term in different and even opposite meanings.” However, things are even worse for Solovyov himself. As A.F. Losev correctly notes, “researcher of philosophy Vl. Solovyov should be very critical of his terminology,” and above all of his use of religious terms. This circumstance makes it very difficult to systematically present the ethical teachings of the two philosophers under consideration.

Another point that complicates the consistent presentation and unambiguous assessments of the philosophy of Kant and Solovyov is the development of their views. And if in Kant we can still talk about the evolution of views within his system, shifting the emphasis in previously proposed theoretical schemes depending on the subject of consideration, then in Solovyov we encounter not just evolution, but revolution - these are the changes that occur in his views. This is especially true for Solovyov’s ethical position. If in The Justification of the Good we encounter an ethical concept that is completely embedded in the philosophy of all-unity and defends the point of view of evolutionism and progressivism, then in last job Russian philosopher - “Three conversations about war, progress and the end world history, with the inclusion of a short story about the Antichrist” - the main theme of the confrontation between good and evil in the world is permeated with eschatological and apocalyptic motives, exposing historical optimism as untenable. Through the mouth of one of the heroes of this story, Solovyov declares: “. if the final result of your progress and your culture is still the death of each and everyone, then it is clear that any progressive cultural activity is useless, that it is aimless and meaningless.”

3 It is no coincidence that it was as an appendix to his main ethical work, “The Justification of the Good,” that the Russian philosopher placed the passage “The Formal Principle of Morality (Kant) - Presentation and Evaluation with Critical Comments on Empirical Ethics.”

Thus, the general mood in the ethical works of the Russian philosopher changes radically towards the end of his life: from cautiously optimistic it turns into absolutely pessimistic. Here we should only point out that both of these attitudes cannot be called inherent in the Christian assessment of the historical existence of man. As the Orthodox philosopher and theologian Georgy Fedotov notes, the absolutization of evil in social space in Vl. Solovyov leads to a situation of suspicion of good.

Asserting the final nature of the German philosopher’s efforts in the construction of moral philosophy, Soloviev, following many of Kant’s critics, finds shortcomings in his system of ethics, which he naturally tries to take into account when creating his theory. First of all, the Russian philosopher notes the formal nature of Kant’s ethics, which he considers conditioned by the formal nature of the mind of the German thinker. With all the well-deserved reverence for Kant’s ethics, Solovyov finds that, due to its absolute formalism, it does not have a worthy exit into the objective world. The formal principle of morality developed by the German philosopher, based on autonomy, or self-legislation of the will, Solovyov accepts only from its critical side, as debunking the arguments of empirical ethics. As for the positive role of this principle, the Russian philosopher states its objective inconsistency. Soloviev states that Kant’s “decomposition of morality into autonomous and heteronomous elements and the formula of the moral law represent one of the greatest successes of the human mind.” However, he immediately neutralizes the positive result of this success with another statement - that the formalism of Kantian idealism deprives the inner world of a person of true reality. In his teaching, according to the Russian philosopher, the connection of mental phenomena “does not at all come from the fact that they are experienced by the being that suffers and acts in them, but this connection, or the unity of mental life, depends entirely on known laws or general relationships, forming a certain order, or established mechanism, of mental phenomena."

Solovyov also recognizes Kant’s attempt to overcome subjectivism in the moral field as unsuccessful. In fact, Kant’s postulates of practical reason, according to Solovyov, do not overcome subjectivism, but introduce ambiguity and uncertainty into the basis of Kantian ethics. Kant’s reasoning, on the one hand, closes in a vicious circle, when “God and the immortal soul are derived from morality, and morality itself is conditioned by God and the immortal soul,” and on the other hand, they are deprived of reliability, since the reliability of these ideas, namely the ideas of God and immortality souls, which are necessary “for the foundation of pure morality,” according to Kant, cannot be proven.

Therefore, Soloviev concludes, although morality is indeed self-legitimate, and “this great success of consciousness associated with his (Kant. - V.B.) name will not be lost for humanity,” it is self-legitimate because “its essence is not an abstract formula hanging in the air, but has within itself all the conditions of its reality.” This is the first thing. And, secondly, the postulates of practical reason, i.e., “what is necessarily presupposed by moral life - the existence of God and the immortal soul - is not a requirement for something else that leads to morality, but is its own, internal basis” .

Having thus revealed errors in the fundamental principles of the construction of moral philosophy by the German thinker, Soloviev proposes to propose a different approach to identifying these principles, based on his concept of unity. The Russian philosopher, asking the fundamental question of human existence, namely the question of the meaning of life, affirms it in the realization of good. Therefore, he puts the idea of ​​Good with a capital G at the basis of his moral philosophy, characterizing Good itself as self-legitimate, autonomous, i.e., not conditioned by anything, and as all-unity, i.e., conditioning everything.

For Vl. Solovyov, within the framework of his concept of unity, the so-called dualism of theoretical and practical reason, which is noted in Kant by the majority of his researchers4, as well as by a number of followers, in particular neo-Kantians, is unacceptable. Overcoming the dualism of the Kantian system of philosophy, but at the same time defending the primacy of practical reason, the Russian philosopher places ethics as the universal justification of good at the basis of his philosophical system. Already on moral philosophy, he builds theoretical philosophy - as a requirement for our mind to clearly and completely clarify “what true good consists of, in contrast to everything that seems or is considered good, without actually being it.”

As the primary data of human morality, Vl. Soloviev offers feelings of shame, pity and reverence, thereby completely ignoring Kant's warnings about the unacceptability of the natural foundations of our morality. This difference in the primary preferences of the thinkers under consideration is based on the difference in assessments of the original nature of man: Kant is inclined to consider this nature to be evil, Solovyov - good. The German philosopher’s denial of material practical principles for constructing his moral philosophy is due to the fact that all of them as such, in his opinion, “are of exactly the same kind and fall under the general principle of self-love, or one’s own happiness (bliss).” As for the three feelings that Solovyov identifies as the primary givens of human morality, the objection that could have come from Kant himself seems quite understandable: “in order to be ashamed, one must already have moral ideas, already possess the concepts of decency and decentness.” ; evidence of shame “must already be preceded by knowledge of decent and correct behavior, that is, morality must already be present.”

Of the three primary data of morality, Solovyov singles out the feeling of shame, which gradually develops, in his opinion, into conscience. This feeling also gives rise to the basic moral principle, namely the principle of asceticism, which is associated with the second principle - the principle of altruism, rooted in a feeling of pity.

Thus, it is obvious that with all due respect to the Kantian principles of ethics, Solovyov proposes his own principles, absolutely pro-

4 In particular, L. A. Kalinnikov characterizes Kantian dualism as monotriadism (almost according to Christian trinitarian dogma), suggesting “a strict distinction between the trifunctionality of consciousness with recognition of the qualitative specificity of epistemological, practical and axiological functions” (Kalinnikov L. A. On the need to reassess neo-Kantianism in the light of the modern interpretation of the system of I. Kant // German and Russian Neo-Kantianism: between the theory of knowledge and criticism of culture / edited by I. N. Griftsova, N. A. Dmitrieva (M., 2010. P. 65).

opposite. Therefore, in general, talking about the Russian philosopher’s taking into account those achievements of Kant’s moral philosophy, which he himself wrote about and which he emphasized as such, makes sense solely in relation to their opposition.

Speaking about the difference in the initial principles of the two ethical systems we are comparing, as factors determining this difference, in addition to the attitude of German and Russian thinkers to the assessment of the general nature of man, we should also point out their attitude to religion. As Kalinnikov rightly notes, “morality and religion find themselves at the very core of the discussion between the two philosophers”; he also finds the expression of the main problems of this discussion in the alternative “does man deify himself or does God become human? Man becomes God or God becomes man?” . The first component of the alternative is supported by Kant, the second, accordingly, by Soloviev.

However, to consider Kant’s philosophical system atheistic due to the fact that it derives religion from morality, and Solovyov’s system, which conditions morality by the presence of religion, as religious, is not entirely fair. It is necessary to clarify the nature of Kant's atheism and Solovyov's religiosity. As for Kant, many of his researchers find, especially in ethical constructions, implicitly contained ideas of Protestantism.

In particular, Cohen declares an undoubted connection between Kant and Luther. “The significance of Protestantism in the history of culture,” he notes, “lies in the separation of religion from science, science from religion. And the philosophical expression of this fundamental idea of ​​the Reformation, in which Kant is associated with Luther, is the addition of logic to ethics, understood as the logic of mathematical natural science. This is not at all a neglect of ethics, on the contrary, only in this way does ethics acquire its privileged position as the primacy of practical reason" (Cohen H. Religion und Sittlichkeit. Eine Betrachtung zur Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie // Poma A. Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen. P. 151 ).

As for Solovyov, we find great confusion in his definition of his own religious position, both in his works and in life5. The famous Russian Orthodox theologian, Protopresbyter Mikhail Pomazansky highlights several points on which Solovyov clearly deviates from Christian doctrine: “Christianity,” notes Fr. Michael, is presented by him as the highest stage in the consistent development of religions. According to Solovyov, all religions are true, but one-sided; Christianity synthesizes the positive aspects of previous religions,” hence Christ is only “the highest link in the series of theophanies (theophany), crowning the previously former theophanies.”

If we talk about Solovyov’s main work on ethics, “Justification of the Good,” then his initial principles cannot be attributed to Christian ones and have less in common with them than Kant’s ethical system, which places the basis of ethics not on religion, but on logic. For example, Kant’s statement about the corruption of natural human nature and the need for rational, i.e. vigorous, efforts of a person who constantly controls his spiritual impulses, and does not seek justification for himself through external conditions, the compelling need to act as duty dictates, and not according to principles common sense or practical prudence - this

5 There is a version about Solovyov’s transition to Catholicism of the Greek rite (see: Solovyov S.M. Vladimir Solovyov: life and creative evolution. M., 1997. P. 230). A.F. Losev doubts the veracity of this version (see:).

the original thought of Kant's ethics contains more Christianity than Solovyov's thought about the natural religiosity of man. The latter is obvious paganism, the relationship with which Christianity has always had an antagonistic character.

For example, one of the most famous Russian theologians, St. Theophan the Recluse, building a system of Christian morality, emphasizes the need to overcome the natural state of man, which fell away from God as a result of the Fall, through faith, repentance and the sacrament of baptism: “So now is the beginning and nature of moral life a person is a donation of freedom to God in a feeling of dependence on Him, made by a vow in baptism (or repentance), due to a change of will from repentant contrition about one’s corruption.”

Consequently, communion with the Christian Truth on the part of a person occurs in the sacrament of baptism. Baptism, in turn, must be preceded by internal changes in human nature, which St. Theophan captures two states - repentance and faith.

And even about the natural freedom of man, according to the Russian saint, cannot be spoken of in a positive sense. With the Fall, man also lost the perfection of his freedom, since freedom is not emptiness, and if it is not filled with Divine power, then it is in the power of the devil. Therefore, the main point of support for the moral life of man is St. Theophan finds in a feeling of dependence on God, in sacrificing his freedom to God.

Also, according to St. Feofan needs constant internal control over his motives. Commenting on the words of the Lord “The Kingdom of God is within you,” he focuses on the fact that “being inside is, in its true form, a condition for a person’s true dominion over himself, therefore, true freedom and rationality, and therefore true spiritual life.” .

For Solovyov, not only the optimistic general assessments of natural human nature are not Christian, but also those characteristics that he attributes to a sense of shame and asceticism. As one of the most famous domestic researchers of the ascetic tradition in Orthodoxy, S.M., notes in this regard. Zorin, for all the importance that the feeling of shame had in Orthodox patristics, “yet this feeling was never relied upon as the basis of Christian asceticism, was not considered as its starting point and characteristic, specific, main driving motive” - since this principle “could not express the specific features of Christian asceticism as a life activity that stems completely and entirely from the mood of self-devoted love for God and is carried out in order to achieve direct communion with God.” In asceticism, what Solovyov singles out as its main characteristic - the attitude towards the physical side of a person - in fact does not have “the meaning of independent, primary and independent - on the contrary, it has a secondary, subordinate and dependent place.”

Thus, trying to overcome Kantian formalism and subjectivism in ethics, the Russian philosopher, as they say, throws out the baby with the bathwater, i.e., in the fundamental principles of his moral philosophy, he betrays to complete oblivion the main achievement of Kant’s ethical teaching - the autonomy of morality. As for the second important aspect, which determines ethical constructions, namely the relationship between morality and religion, then naturalism and evolutionism, characteristic of natural religiosity

Solovyov, the inherent moral principles of his ethical system, are clearly demonstrated by the pagan, and not the Christian, origins of the moral philosophy of this Russian philosopher.

Bibliography

1. Zorin S. M. Asceticism according to Orthodox Christian teaching. T. 1: Fundamental. Book 1: Critical review the most important literature question. St. Petersburg, 1907.

2. Kalinnikov L. A. Kant in Russian philosophical culture. Kaliningrad, 2005.

3. Kant I. Critique of practical reason // Kant I. Soch. : in 4 t. on it. and Russian language T. 3. M., 1997.

4. Losev A. F. The creative path of Vladimir Solovyov // Solovyov V. S. Works: in 2 volumes. T. 1. M., 1990.

5. Mikhail Pomazansky, prot. Notes on the religious and philosophical system of V. S. Solovyov // Vl. Soloviev: pro et contra. St. Petersburg, 2002.

6. Theophan the Recluse, saint. The path to salvation. A short essay on asceticism. M., 1996.

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9. Solovyov V.S. The first beginning of theoretical philosophy // Ibid.

10. Soloviev V. S. Appendix. The formal principle of morality (Kant) - presentation and assessment with critical remarks about empirical ethics // Ibid.

11. Solovyov V.S. Three conversations about war, progress and the end of world history // Ibid.

12. Fedotov G. P. About the Antichrist’s good // Vl. Soloviev: pro et contra. St. Petersburg, 2002.

13. Philosophical Dictionary of Vladimir Solovyov. Rostov n/d, 1997.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Belov - Doctor of Philosophy. sciences, prof. Department of Philosophy of Culture and Cultural Studies, Faculty of Philosophy, Saratov State University. N. G. Chernyshevsky, [email protected]

THE FOUNDATIONS OF I. KANT"S AND V. SOLOVYOV"S MORAL PHILOSOPHIES

The grounds of construction of ethical systems of Kant and Solovjev are comparatively tested in this article. Noting the obvious strenghts of Kant's ethics, Solovjev finds, that because of its absolute formalism it doesn't have the complete implementation in the objective world. Solovjev also sees as unsuccessful Kant's attempt at overcoming subjectivism in the moral sphere. In Solovjev's opinion, Kant's postulates of practical reason don't overcome subjectivism, but bring to the foundation of Kant's ethical the double meaning and uncertainty.

The author notes, that for all his respect to Kant's ethic, Russian philosopher constructs ethic on his own principles. In the foundation of his moral philosophy Solovjev puts down the idea of ​​Good, characterizing it as lawful, autonomous and all-united ( vseedinoje). Solovjev proposes to regard the feelings of shame, pity and reverence as the primary data of human morality, disregarding the warnings of Kant about the unacceptability of natural foundations for our morals. Such distinction in the primary data of human morality of the concerned authors re-

poses on distinction in appraisal of human primary nature: Kant considers it as evil, Solovjev -as good.

Thus, in contrast to I. Kant V. Solovjev affirms the heteronomy of morals and its religiousness, which, however, has little in common with Christianity.

Key words: ethics, morals, religion, I. Kant, Vl. Solovyov, critical philosophy, philosophy of all-unity.

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5. Mikhail Pomazanskij, prot. Zamechanija o religiozno-filosofskoj sisteme V. S. Solov"eva // Vl. Solov"ev: pro et contra. SPb., 2002.

6. Svjatitel" Feofan Zatvornik. Put" ko spaseniju. Kratkij ocherk asketiki. M., 1996.

7. Svjatitel" Feofan Zatvornik Vyshenskij. Nachertanie hristianskogo nravouchenija. M., 2002.

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9. Solov"ev V. S. Pervoe nachalo teoreticheskoj filosofii // Solov"ev V. S. Soch. v 2-h t. T. 1. M., 1990.

10. Solov"ev V.S. Prilozhenie. Formal"nyj princip nravstvennosti (Kanta) - izlozhenie i ocenka s kriticheskimi zamechanijami ob jempiricheskoj jetike // Solov"ev V.S. Soch. v 2-h t. T. 1. M., 1990.

11. Solov"ev V.S. Tri razgovora o vojne, progresse i konce vsemirnoj istorii // Solovev V. S. Soch. v 2-h t. T. 2. M., 1990.

12. Fedotov G. P. Ob antichristovom dobre // Vl. Solovev: pro et contra. SPb., 2002.

13. Filosofskij slovar "Vladimira Solov"eva. Rostov n/D., 1997.

About the author

Prof. Vladimir Belov, Department of Philosophy of Culture and Cultural Studies, Faculty of Philosophy, N. G. Chernyshevsky State University of Saratov, [email protected]

Moral philosophy as a system: the ethics of “Conciliar Good” B.C. Solovyova

A.A. Huseynov

Moral philosophy of B.C. Solovyov (1853-1900) was the pinnacle of the development of Russian ethics. She determined its heyday in the first quarter of the 20th century. and during the period of creation of ethical systems of the Russian diaspora. According to N.Ya. Grot, it became “the first experience of a systematic and completely independent consideration of the basic principles of moral philosophy. This is the first ethical system of a Russian thinker.” E.L. shared the same opinion. Radlov, assessing Solovyov’s moral teaching as “the only complete system of ethics in the Russian language.” Unlike his immediate predecessor L.M. Lopatin, Soloviev shifts the emphasis from the ethical worldview to moral activity, the essence of which for him is the “collective embodiment of good,” “the universal organization of morality.” All this turned out to be fraught with a weakening of the ideological autonomy of ethics. Soloviev recognizes the independence and autonomy of the ethical principle, but within certain limits. First of all, he opposes the “one-sided dependence of ethics on religion and metaphysics.” However, this independence of the ethical is purely phenomenological in nature: it means a natural and self-evident source of morality - natural in a religious sense and self-evident in a metaphysical sense.

1 Questions of philosophy and psychology. 1897. No. 36 (1). P. 155.

2 Radlov E.L. Essay on the history of Russian philosophy // Vvedensky A.I., Losev A.F., Radlov E.L., Shpet G.G. Essays on the history of Russian philosophy. Sverdlovsk, 1991. P. 188. To be fair, it should be noted that some critics accused Solovyov’s ethics of being journalistic and preachy, of “the predominance of subjective fantasy over sober thought” (Chicherin B.N. On the principles of ethics // Questions of Philosophy and Psychology. 1897 No. 39 (4), p. 630). However, in our opinion, Radlov was right when he noticed that Solovyov looked at his work (“The Justification of Good”) not only as a theoretical treatise, but also as a moralizing work, and that in this respect Solovyov’s ethics “adjoins as the last link to a whole series of messages and teachings with which the whole Ancient Rus' and which, in a modified form and with updated content, continue to exist to this day." See: Radlov E.L. Op. cit. P. 188.

The main work of B.C. Solovyov on ethics - “Justification of the Good: Moral Philosophy” (1897) - was intended, according to the author’s plan, to become the first part of the system of “positive” philosophy. The idea of ​​positive philosophy arose from Solovyov in connection with the criticism of “abstract principles,” which he tried to base on “some positive concept of what is truly whole or all-unity.” Hence his “positive” philosophy of “all-unity,” which he subdivided into three parts: ethical, epistemological and aesthetic, respectively expressing moral activity, theoretical knowledge and artistic creativity. Solovyov managed to complete only the first part of his system: the “justification of good” was to be followed by “justification of truth” and “justification of beauty"; however, these parts remained developed at the level of individual articles on “theoretical philosophy” and “positive aesthetics” (philosophy of art).

It is no coincidence that Solovyov’s philosophical system begins with ethics and is even, to a certain extent, satisfied with a complete and systematic ethics. In the subject of ethics, Soloviev sees an unconditional and self-evident beginning, “undoubtedly accessible to our knowledge,” believing that only in the field of moral philosophy “knowledge coincides with its subject,” leaving no room for critical doubts. It is in this connection that Solovyov proclaims the independence of moral philosophy from theoretical philosophy (from epistemology and metaphysics). The self-sufficiency of “justification of the good” can be judged at least by the fact that at the end of his work Solovyov speaks not about the transition to “justification of truth”, but about the need for “justification of the Good as Truth in theoretical philosophy.”

The subject of moral philosophy, according to Solovyov, is the concept of goodness in its direct relationship with the moral meaning of life. This relationship is due to the fact that, according to his purpose, a person is “an unconditional internal form for Good as an unconditional content” and that, therefore, the meaning of his life can be found only through good, just as good can be justified only by the meaning of life. The unconditionality of good is expressed in the fact that in itself it is “not conditioned by anything, that it conditions everything and is realized through everything.” The first moment, according to Solovyov, determines the purity of good, the second - its completeness, and the third - strength and effectiveness. If in Kant's ethics the first sign of goodness - purity - found its expression, then Solovyov sees his task as substantiating the second essential point - the completeness or unity of goodness, and also to show the organic interconnection of all moments of the unconditionality of goodness. Based on this, Soloviev considers the concept of good in the unity of three stages of its manifestation, which is reflected in the structure and content of the work, consisting of three parts: 1) good in human nature; 2) good as an unconditional, divine principle (“good from God”); 3) good in human history. This sequence of consideration of the stages of good stems, according to Solovyov, from a self-evident religious feeling, “composed of three moral categories: 1) imperfection in us, 2) perfection in God and 3) improvement as our life task.”

It is characteristic that Solovyov begins his research not with the unconditional divine “prototype” of good or the historical forms of its implementation, but with the self-evident “primary data of morality” inherent in human nature: feelings of shame, pity and reverence, which exhaust all spheres of possible moral relations of a person: to what is below him, what is equal to him and what is above him. These relationships are understood by Solovyov as human dominance over material sensuality (the ascetic principle in morality), as solidarity with living beings (the principle of altruism) and as internal subordination to the superhuman principle (the religious principle in morality). All other moral attitudes (virtues) are considered as modifications of the three primary foundations. For example, generosity and selflessness as modifications of ascetic virtue; generosity as a special manifestation of altruism, etc.

The first part of “The Justification of Good” ends with a critique of “abstract eudaimonism” and its varieties (hedonism, utilitarianism), which are unable to express the fullness of good. Good, as the unconditional desirability and reality of good, is separated here from good itself, and in its individuality is understood as well-being, which is an uncertain and unfulfilled requirement of life.

The second part of Solovyov’s essay begins with the definition of “the unity of moral foundations.” Substantiating the fundamental internal connection of shame, pity and reverence, Soloviev sees in it a reaction of the “hidden integrity of the human being” against “individual division in half,” “selfish isolation” and the violation of “religious chastity” that separates man from God. In the integral nature of man, goodness coincides with goodness, so the ethics of pure duty cannot contradict the ethics of eudaimonism.

The key point of the second part can be considered the chapter “The Unconditional Beginning of Morality”, in which Solovyov tries to define the completeness, perfection of good (the unity of good and good), appearing in three forms: 1) unconditionally existing, eternally valid perfection - in God; 2) potential perfection - in human consciousness and will, which contain the absolute fullness of being as an ideal and norm; 3) the actual formation and implementation of perfection in the world-historical process." This allows Solovyov to formulate the categorical imperative of the "ethics of unity": "In perfect internal agreement with the highest will, recognizing for all others the unconditional meaning or value, since they also have an image and likeness of God, take as full a part as possible in the work of your own and the general improvement for the sake of the final revelation of the Kingdom of God in the world.”

Starting directly from the “categorical imperative of improvement,” Solovyov moves on to the third moment of the unconditionality of good - the actual implementation of perfection. The process of improvement is considered not only as a divine-human, but also as a divine-material process. The historical realization of good is preceded by the “existential” reality of the moral order. The positive unity of the worldwide process of improvement receives a threefold expression in Solovyov’s ethics: 1) the lower kingdoms are included in the moral order as necessary conditions for its implementation; 2) each lower shows a gravitation towards the higher; 3) each higher materially and spiritually absorbs the lower. In this part of the study, Solovyov’s moral philosophy acquires pronounced Sophian features, which make it possible to see the unity of ontology and ethics in the “reality of the moral order.”

A perfect moral order presupposes, according to Solovyov, the moral freedom of each person, which can only be realized within the framework of the historical development of society, or “collective man.” This marks the transition to the third part of “The Justification of Good”: consideration of good through the history of mankind. The starting point of this part is the substantiation of the unity of the individual and society, which determines the “personal-social” nature of man and the “personal-social” nature of life, which in historical development corresponds to three main stages: tribal, national-state and universal. Soloviev further traces historical development“personal-social” consciousness in its main directions, undertaking a comparative analysis of Buddhism, Platonism and Christianity and concluding about the positive, holistic religious and moral universalism of Christianity in comparison with the negative universalism of Buddhism and the one-sided universalism of Platonism.

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Becker Matthias. The beginnings of moral philosophy in “The Justification of Good” by Vladimir Solovyov: dissertation... candidate of philosophical sciences: 09.00.05.- St. Petersburg, 2002.- 125 pp.: ill. RSL OD, 61 03-9/413-2

Introduction

CHAPTER 1. B.C. Soloviev and the question of free will 17

1. Will in Solovyov and Kant

2. Introduction by Solovyov of the possibility of absolute arbitrariness

3. Solovyov’s turn as Kant’s “Copernican revolution”

CHAPTER 2. Shame and asceticism as the basis of human unity in the moral philosophy of V. S. Solovyov 40

1. The structure of the feeling of shame. The feeling of shame as a distinction between feeling (sensuality) and action (reality)

2. Shame as moral consciousness

3. The feeling of shame as a fact of reality

4. True and imaginary moral asceticism

5. Asceticism as the unity of sensuality and reason

CHAPTER 3. Pity and altruism as the realization of a person’s moral completeness in the teachings of B.C. Solovyov 63

1. Pity as a combination of feeling and reason

2. Pity and human will

CHAPTER 4. The opposition of good and goodness (Solovyov’s criticism of abstract eudaimonism)... 78

1. Definition of a person as a person who “desires something”

2. Criticism of prudential eudaimonism

3. The difference between moral and eudaimonic asceticism

4. Criticism of utilitarianism

CHAPTER 5. The relationship of good to good as the main principle in the moral philosophy of V. S. Solovyov 99

Conclusion 115

References 1

Solovyov's introduction to the possibility of absolute arbitrariness

Soloviev raised the question of free will already in the introduction to “The Justification of the Good.” In this introduction he touched upon problems which, according to his understanding, preceded moral philosophy, so he did not include them in his ethical theory. It should be noted that Solovyov, in the final version of the work “Justification of the Good,” offers different versions of introductions, for before the introduction there are still the prefaces of the first and second editions, of which especially the second, entitled “The Moral Meaning of Life in its Preliminary Concept,” can be attributed to the nature of the introduction . This introduction bears the title “Moral Philosophy as an Independent Science.” This is the kind of introduction in which Soloviev examines problems whose solutions have already been outlined in different systems ethics, but in Solovyov’s understanding, the above problems do not belong to moral philosophy proper. However, moral philosophy presupposes these problems, which characterize different degrees of approximation to real, moral philosophy. The last problem, which represents the transition to moral philosophy, i.e. to the first chapter of “Justification of the Good”, is the question of free will, concerning the basic position of Kant’s ethics, whom Solovyov considered the most important predecessor of his moral philosophy.

About the nature of such preliminary problems of moral philosophy, it is necessary to add that they have a bifurcated character, because, on the one hand, they affect the real problems of different ethical theories, despite the fact that they do not turn out to be important for the main task of moral philosophy posed by Solovyov, and, on the other hand, they are excluded from “real” moral philosophy and, thus, they are considered as imaginary problems of moral philosophy. This ambiguity is exacerbated in the case of the last problem of introduction, when the question of free will is raised. The question of free will is considered a question associated in the history of ethics with the name of Kant, for the emergence and solution of this question leads to the very center of Kant’s ethics. Soloviev dealt with this question, necessary after Kant’s ethics, only in the introduction. The duality of Solovyov's attitude to the question of free will is also expressed in his general attitude towards Kant, which is stated in the second preface and in the introduction. Soloviev outlined his general attitude towards Kant and further main directions of philosophy in the second preface as follows:

"The founder of it (moral philosophy, author) as a science, Kant, focused on the first essential sign of absolute good - its purity, which requires from a person a formally unconditional, or self-legal, will, free from all empirical impurities: pure good requires that it be chosen only for himself; any other motivation is unworthy of him. Without repeating what was well expounded by Kant on the question of the formal purity of good will, I turned in particular to the second essential sign of goodness - its unity, without separating it from the other two (as Kant did relative to the first), but by directly developing the rationally conceivable content of the universal good from those actual moral data in which it is embedded. Thus, the result was not dialectical moments of an abstract idea (as in Hegel) and not empirical complications of natural facts (as in Herbert Spencer ), but the completeness of moral norms for all basic practical relations of individual and collective life. Only with such completeness is goodness justified in our consciousness, only under the condition of this completeness can it realize for us both its purity and its invincible power."9

However, touching on the issue of free will, Solovyov drew a clear line between Kant’s ethics and his understanding of free will. The distinction is expressed in the fact that he considered the question of free will not important, perhaps even imaginary, but also poorly posed by Kant:

“There is a very widespread view that the fate of moral consciousness depends on one or another solution to the question of free will. The question is reduced to an alternative: either our actions are free, or they are necessary - and then they assert that the second of these two solutions, namely determinism, or the doctrine the fact that all our actions and states occur with necessity makes human morality impossible, and thus takes away all meaning from moral philosophy. If, they say, a person is only a wheel in the world machine, then what kind of moral actions can we talk about? But The whole strength of such an argument lies in the incorrect confusion of mechanical determinism with determinism in general - an error from which Kant himself is not free."

But this necessity, always equal to itself in its general concept, is modified, however, in various areas of its manifestation, and according to the three main types of necessity (relative to phenomena and actions), we also distinguish three types of determinism: 1) mechanical, which, if it was the only one who would really exclude morality as such; 2) psychological, allowing for some moral elements, but poorly compatible with others, and 3) rational-ideological, giving room to all moral requirements in all their strength and in full."11

So, according to Solovyov, the question of free will is resolved not by recognizing or not recognizing free will, but by affirming different degrees of this freedom, corresponding to the main forms of determinism. In his work “The Justification of the Good,” Soloviev once again contrasted himself with Kant’s understanding of free will and criticized the poverty of a purely formal principle:

“For our will to be pure, or (formally) self-legal, it must be determined exclusively by respect for moral duty - this is clear, as is the fact that A is equal to A. But why is this A required at all? On what is the requirement of a “pure” will based? "If I want to get pure hydrogen from water, then, of course, I must remove oxygen from it. But if I want to drink or wash, then I don’t need pure hydrogen at all, but only require its certain compound with oxygen H20, called water "In Kant, without a doubt, one should recognize the Lavoisier of moral philosophy. His decomposition of morality into autonomous and heteronomous elements and the formula of the moral law represent one of the greatest successes of the human mind. But the matter cannot be limited here to scientific interest alone. Kant speaks of practical reason as unconditional principle of actual human behavior, and here his statements are similar to what if a chemist began to demand or considered it possible that people use pure hydrogen instead of water."12

The problem with Solovyov’s criticism of Kant is precisely that he distinguishes between things that in Kant are mutually determined. Thus, the duality of Solovyov’s criticism of Kant is expressed. It can be understood as creative aspiration to overcome the shortcomings of Kant's ethics while preserving its achievements in the history of practical philosophy. However, the general direction of Solovyov’s criticism of Kant turns out to be not entirely new in philosophical thinking after Kant,13 but one must pay attention to the special emphases of his criticism.

Shame as Moral Self-Consciousness

However, it should be noted that only such a structure, created by a feeling of shame, does the concept of morality arise, because this structure in its pure form relies on the basic definitions and concepts of moral activity and their relationships. This sets the general philosophical root of the feeling of shame, which is expressed precisely in the fundamental basis of the moral structure, including the emergence of a special state of reality, to which moral activity (or moral subjectivity) simultaneously belongs and does not belong.

In this regard, the question arises about the duration of the feeling of shame, which is not only associated with the moment of manifestation of the feeling of shame, but also with a certain situation, including a special attitude towards sexual intercourse. One might even say that Soloviev created the feeling of shame so that it fully corresponded to his purely philosophical intention. The philosophical significance of the feeling of shame is affirmed by the definition of the special situation of a given reality, laying the foundation of moral subjectivity. However, this foundation of moral subjectivity, with a sense of shame, was associated with the given time, with a given space and with certain conditions, and therefore is limited in a given reality and turns out to be not absolute. So, the feeling of shame relies on some kind of relative moral basis, bringing one’s self-restraint also to the definition of a particular given reality. From this it is necessary to derive moral feeling into the moral principle of asceticism in order to overcome the limitations of time and space of a given reality by creating an independent, original moral reality.

But, on the other hand, the limitations of the feeling of shame remain within its own structure. Related to this is that the connection with the given reality of time and space is not abolished, so that from this point of view, the relativity of the general philosophical structure created by the feeling of shame arises. Consequently, because of this relativity, duality arises in the understanding of Solovyov’s moral philosophy, in which, on the one hand, something is proven in consistency, and, on the other hand, because of the relativity in relation to a given reality, something is only assumed. But such a relativity of reality, included in the structure of moral philosophy, takes into account, in fact, the problem of practical philosophy, which intends to influence reality given only by certain conditions of time and space. Therefore, it is possible that each moral structure is not only affirmed in accordance with the logic of thinking, but is also justified or not justified by the relativity of a given reality. Just as the given reality is not satisfied with the conclusions of thought, so perhaps it already has enough of the given moral structure and does not require any generalizations of thought at all. In both cases, this reality rejects the conclusions of practical philosophy, firstly, because of the non-identity of thinking and being, and secondly, because of the already created identity of thinking and being. As a consequence, what is required is a structure of moral philosophy that proves something, but also expects that it only suggests it.

Also in Solovyov one can notice an ambivalent attitude towards Kant’s ethics, for he did not completely reject it. The problem is that Solovyov’s objections in the direction of Kantian ethics and its categorical imperative, in fact, relate not only to the extent to which goodness is actually realized on the basis of the application of the categorical imperative, but also to the extent to which it is generally considered necessary that practical philosophy rises to the most universal level so that it can be realized in reality. In other words, the question is to what extent, in view of the concreteness of moral reality, the realization of good is hindered by the fact that Kant defined a universal rational basis. Undoubtedly, Soloviev was to a certain extent convinced of the consistency of Kant’s conclusions and even of their applicability, therefore he only half denied them and retained the nature of his proposals in his moral philosophy, relatively justified from the point of view of the history of philosophy and not rejected in moral philosophy, as well as applicable in this reality.

In order to explain the connection between the feeling of shame and the moral principle of asceticism, we must first emphasize the difference between the feeling of shame and the feeling of pity, as regards moral subjectivity. Moreover, such a difference also relates to how Solovyov understood the essence of both moral feelings, and this is not limited to the fact that shame is a moral feeling related to what is beneath me, and pity (or compassion) is a feeling related to to what is next to me. As for the unity of moral feeling and moral principle, it can be stated in such a way that Soloviev, when pointing to the feeling of pity, affirmed the inseparable connection of this feeling with active altruism in order to present feeling and action only in unity, but he did not explain such a unity of the feeling of shame and asceticism. What is important here is that the feeling of shame is separated from the flow of events of a given reality and is conditioned as a moral feeling. In fact, for the sake of the foundation of moral philosophy, the feeling of shame must be kept separate within the boundaries of feeling in order to posit in its pure form the basic moral concepts - man, a fact of reality, existence. From this point of view, the feeling of shame defines what underlines the most general moral definitions. But, from another point of view, the feeling of shame produces opposites, defined only by the feeling of shame of sexual intercourse and cannot be tolerated by the ashamed person. We are talking, first of all, about the opposition between human and animal. It is this opposition between human and animal that becomes the beginning of the moral principle of asceticism. By this Solovyov refers to the general contradiction within a person, which inspires a person to act, and not only because of the contradiction, but also because of the generalization of this contradiction, which, precisely as the internal contradiction of the acting person, receives different expressions, for example, as the contradiction of spiritual and material nature. Soloviev explained the significance of this general internal opposition for asceticism in this way:

“The basic moral feeling of shame actually contains a person’s negative attitude towards the animal nature that takes possession of him. The human spirit, even at very low levels of development, opposes the most vivid and powerful manifestation of this nature with the consciousness of its dignity: I am ashamed to obey carnal desire, I am ashamed to be like "The animal, the lower side of my being should not predominate in me - such a predominance is something shameful, sinful. This self-affirmation of moral dignity - semi-conscious and unstable in a simple feeling of shame - is elevated by the action of reason to the principle of asceticism."

As a result, one important point should be affirmed: Soloviev noted that what manifests itself as an animal is represented in different ways, for example, as material nature, or even matter in general, or as a lower nature, and also as flesh or carnal desires. On the other hand, the opposites are not only between existence as man or human, but also between spirit or spirituality, reason or higher nature. In fact, all these concepts on both sides of the opposition naturally do not coincide and have different meanings, but they coincide in a certain respect, because they all turn out to be the same in relation to the other side of the opposition. Thus, despite the fact that these different concepts on both sides of the opposite have different shades, they are identified because they are expressed, first of all, in opposition to another and are not determined by themselves, but only within the framework of the opposition. Solovyov's concept of asceticism can be assessed in such a way that he set the opposite as absolute, and the opposites in relation to each other as relative.

Pity as a combination of feeling and reason

To better understand the functions of the three basic moral feelings, you should pay attention to the chapter “Imaginary principles of morality (Criticism of abstract eudaimonism in its various modifications).” We can say that this chapter is considered one of the most important parts of “The Justification of the Good”, because it expresses some general relationship of this work of Solovyov to the general trends in the history of ethics and to important statements of the past. First of all, Solovyov continues the traditions of Kantian ethics with his opposition of duty and inclination (disposition), but he turned the problem into a different plane. Solovyov’s contrast between inclination and duty lies not in the area of ​​ethics, but in experience or in common sense, that a person, like an animal, desires what is pleasant or strives for pleasure, excluding any external demands. Thus, if a person lives as a special person, then he desires something. This general approach, according to Solovyov, is characterized by the principle of eudaimonism. But as a principle, eudaimonism is already a principle of ethics or practical philosophy. Soloviev described the advantage of this principle for ethics as follows:

“This eudaimonic principle (...) has the apparent advantage that it does not raise the question why) You can ask why I should strive for moral goodness when this desire contradicts my natural inclinations and only causes me suffering, but you cannot ask why I must desire my well-being, for I already desire it by necessity of nature - this desire is inseparably connected with my existence and is its direct expression: I exist as a desirer and desire, of course, only what satisfies me or what pleases me . Everyone believes his well-being either in what directly causes him pleasure, or in what leads to this, i.e. serves as a means for delivering pleasant states. Thus, well-being is defined most closely through the concept of pleasure (... ).."

To understand the direction of Solovyov’s thinking, one must first more accurately highlight the plane of his opposition between duty and inclination, for he rejected this eudaimonistic principle in ethics in the further course of his work “The Justification of the Good.” The structure of Solovyov’s thought is formed in such a way that he proceeded from the I, which desires something, in order to then prove the incompatibility of the desiring I and the moral I. As a result, moral duty and empirical inclination do not coincide in any way. In order to determine in more detail the difference between Solovyov and Kant, it is necessary to discuss Solovyov’s premise, to the extent that this I, desiring something, goes without saying. Soloviev examined the basis of this desiring I: objects or states do not always correspond to the degree of real pleasantness of the sensations they deliver. Thus, with a strong erotic attraction to a certain person of the other sex, the fact of owning this particular person is desired as the greatest bliss, before which the desirability of owning any other person disappears, meanwhile, the real pleasure delivered by this infinitely desirable fact probably has nothing to do with infinity and is approximately equal to the pleasantness of any other satisfaction of these instincts. - In general, the desirability of certain objects, or the value as goods, is determined not by subsequent subjective states of pleasure, but by the objective relationships of these objects with our bodily or mental nature, and the sources and properties of these relationships are for the most part not recognized by us with sufficient clarity, but are only revealed its action in the form of blind attraction. But if pleasure is not the essence of the good, or of what is desired as such, then it is in any case its constant sign."63

Here we can admit that Soloviev himself admitted that this abstract desiring I is more or less some kind of construct of thinking. The problem is that the desiring person divides the objects of his desire according to different values. Pleasure or pleasantness is felt not only as this pleasure or this pleasantness in the present moment and in a given place, but also as a complex of relationships between different pleasures. In other words, no pleasure turns out to be completely separate, but one can understand any pleasure in different degrees, as having become and becoming pleasure at the same time. Thus, the sensation and value of pleasure changes constantly from the point of view of the actor and the perceiver. Solovyov’s example from the field of eroticism and love clarifies this to the most extreme possible: on the one hand, extreme love for a certain person distinguishes the object of desire from the mass of desired objects, and, on the other hand, real erotic attraction, perhaps, does not differ in special quality from others attractions. In fact, it is only possible to state that any desired and actual pleasure depends on the relationship between the object and the desiring I, which is subject to various external and internal conditions.

What conclusions can be drawn from this problem of varied definitions of desired pleasures? The difficulty of this problem does not allow us to determine a general classification of pleasures from different points of view. Because it is impossible to deny the fact that a person constantly desires something, it is required not to avoid this problem. To resolve the problem, it can be divided into two general directions: subjective and objective. The subjective direction emphasizes the point that a person himself determines the holistic structure of pleasures. In life there are different shades of pleasures and amenities, but in order to understand them as exactly my pleasures and my pleasures, this I, as someone who desires something, must recognize

Ibid., p. 209; or: Collection cit., ibid., p. 148 them as truly or fairly the pleasures and pleasures I desire. It's not the same thing. The essence of the matter is that a person has already been given certain requirements of life, although these requirements are requirements of different kinds, for example, moral, natural or other kinds, and all these various requirements are more or less mixed with pleasures and amenities. In other words, in a person there is external and internal, i.e. the external requirement and the internal feeling resulting from the fulfillment of the requirement are difficult to distinguish from each other. Since a person will have to define himself as this desiring Self in life, he must recognize what belongs to him as his own internal, and what turns out to be alien and external to him.

This problem of individual determination became a problem in practical philosophy in the 19th century, and remains one of its main problems to this day. The question is how one can distinguish the internal from the external if, in fact, it is impossible to separate the integrity of the internal state of pleasure and pleasantness from the variety of external demands. At the same time, we must also take into account the fact that sometimes pleasure manifests itself only in connection with some kind of necessity, and vice versa. In order not to lose the plane of the desiring I when considering the problem, the question can also be expressed this way: what should I desire so that the desire remains precisely my desire, or in other words: what pleasure is truly considered my own pleasure? Renunciation of the world (for example, in Schopenhauer) and the “will to power” in the philosophy of Nietzsche provide examples of the solution to this problem.

Regarding Nietzsche's philosophy, "will to power" does not mean the possession of oneself, but the possession of desires and pleasures, in order to possess oneself as a process of sharing the values ​​of desires and pleasures. In other words, the “will to power” requires that, with the complexity of the displacement of necessity and pleasure, the basic desiring I is restored and preserved, which, precisely as a desiring person, is not posited by the influence of an external object, but possesses itself, determining the imaginary nature of the object of desire, rejecting or turning away from it.

However, contrary to this, Soloviev affirmed the objective direction of this desiring I, saying simply that, despite the fact that desires and pleasures are subject to various relationships between the desiring person and the object of desire, a constant sign is formed, expressed by the I as desiring. By this Soloviev believed that from an external point of view there are only certain alternating actions of desire. Thus, every act of desire includes, on the one hand, the object of desire and pleasure and, on the other hand, the Self, desiring something. Moreover, all these actions of desire also have their own limited space and are separated in time from another action of desire, since they alternate. For such an action, it goes without saying that there is a self that desires something, and an object of desire and pleasure. This is his constant sign. Consequently, what is important is only that some I desires something, and not that the I and the object are moments or parts of a certain connection or even a certain relationship.

Criticism of prudential eudaimonism

So, the integrity of a person as the essence of morality means some kind of specific, meaningful subjectivity of a person, different from the assumption of the abstract unity of the moral subject. A person is considered whole because unity is created, maintained and strengthened in him in order to act morally. In this sense, moral action is connected, first of all, with the foundation of some internal, meaningful and formal unity, which is separated from the superiority of the results of moral, or generally any human action. As for the results of action, they can only be attributed to goods, but not to good. Goodness is precisely determined by some internal independent moral unity of a person, different from the current practical reality, at that time relating to it. The relation is defined in this way because moral autonomy refers to some given practical autonomy. This difference relies mainly on the integrity of man as the essence of morality. So, we can highlight the integrity of a person in relation to two sides. On the one hand, it differs from the abstract opposition of a morally acting person to a given practical reality, so that this morally acting person, as a unity, defines himself before the moral action taking place in practical reality. On the other hand, the integrity of a person is limited by a sufficient distance from practical reality to meaningfully and formally separate moral action from practical reality, eliminating the fact that moral action is completely included in practical reality.

Still, it should be added that the integrity of a person does not simply mean some kind of practical subjectivity, defining oneself as an object of one’s own and independent from the given world. Generally speaking, Solovyov always presupposes such a practical reality, which is constituted by the given practical actions of a person aimed at the object of desire or pleasure. So, man is given along with his objects, i.e. only different subjectivities are given, corresponding to the objects of desire and the methods of achieving them. Hence the question is raised about the integrity of man. Therefore, the problem is that the integrity of man is not created by generalizing the unity of man, given together with his objects, but by defining moral formality as the only possibility of distinguishing man from objectivity. This formality is of such a meager nature that at first only the structure of space is given such as below, next to and above (feelings - shame, pity and reverence). Thus, the most important thing is that the integrity of a person arises from the unity of general form and content, allowing a person to act both from a formal point of view and from the point of view of objectivity in practical reality.

If we compare the attitude to objectivity in Solovyov’s moral philosophy with the same in Kant’s ethics, then we should pay attention to the fact that for Kant the main difference between inclination and duty is the separation of objects of action (given in inclinations towards something) from moral duty, which is determined only in reason, between them there are judgments, so that Kant’s reason relates only to the objects of human action through judgments. The mind receives the content of morality from judgments, which themselves are products of the determining nature of reason. Inclinations are calculated from the realm of judgments, because they have independence by their direct relationship to objects (or the sensibility of these objects). Therefore, the mind does not pay attention to objects of desire at all in its self-determination, only through judgments. Thus, Kant remains, in fact, a world untouched by reason, lying separately and independently of these objects, to which man relates with his immediate and special desires, pleasures, enjoyments, and inclinations. This world is removed from the realm of morality insofar as it is not subject to the self-determination of reason in relation to judgments regarding objects of desires and inclinations. So, it turns out that man is divided into two sides: on the one hand, he, using the formulas of the categorical imperative, is a perfect moral subject, who can only correctly apply these universal formulas in order to gradually implement the universal demands of reason and complete the world of morality, and On the other hand, he, simply wanting something, either suppresses his desires for the sake of establishing the moral world, or he cannot prevent his desires and inclinations. As a result, there is a world of objects that do not fall under the moral demands of independent reason, but are established due to the necessity of individual desires and inclinations. To say that these objects will gradually fall under moral requirements turns out to be incorrect, because they are only given as individual objects by immediate desires and inclinations, but not as judgments of a relatively general nature. In other words, there is no connection between the individual objects of desire and the judgment of these desires to obtain communication between them. Therefore, behind moral goals, the realm of objects of practical activity arises, the more reliably the mind asserts its absolute subjective power. There is this option already indicated above, to suppress these objects of desire, or simply not pay attention to them for the sake of moral goals, but, despite ignoring the objects of desire, these objects of immediate desire still exist as such, and are not subject to moral necessity. In fact, in Kant's ethics there is no place for a collision or communication between morality and inclinations, because the clear difference between morality and inclinations is presupposed in self-determined reason, but their actual contradiction for practical action is not strengthened. This is already served by the comparison of the unknowable thing in itself and the justification for the cognizing subject of the assigned forms of representation (i.e., space and time) in the Critique of Pure Reason. Thus, it is already assumed there that the fact that each immediate object of desire simply exists separately in space and time is eliminated, regardless of the extent to which the conditions for representing the givenness of the object (i.e., space and time) exist outside of man or within a person are assumed. The direct connection of a person with individual objects of desire means that the object is given as an indissoluble whole and it is impossible to remove from it any special ways of representing it to a person. Thus, already in transcendental aesthetics, Kant created the foundation for the fact that a distance arises between the object of desire (or inclination) and the incomprehensible thing in itself, which exists completely independently of man (that is, precisely independently of man’s desire). This thing in itself corresponds to the self-determined mind, on which the object of desire no longer has any influence, because this actual object for desire is already completely excluded from the point of view of reason.

Solovyov’s moral philosophy does not justify the object of desire at all, and therefore it cannot be said that in this respect it stands in direct opposition to Kant’s ethics, but it tries to substantiate morality in actual opposition to the object of desire, as far as this is possible in moral philosophy as a theory, in contrast to practical reality. One of the central roles in justifying the practical collision of objectivity and rationality is played by the clear difference between good and good. It should be added that Soloviev created his moral philosophy in contrast to Hegel’s answer to the understanding of objectivity and rationality in Kant’s philosophy. Hegel precisely built the whole world from the basic unity of objectivity and rationality in dialectical development so that object and reason gradually and in turn coincide and then do not coincide, but without the possibility that the opposition of objectivity and rationality is generalized and some kind of practical meaning is obtained. Reason, in the end, absorbs all objectivity and thereby loses the basis of rational practical action of a person. Therefore, in fact, the difference between good and good in Solovyov substantiates and generalizes the opposition of objectivity and rationality for practical reality in order to resolve this issue for the practical reality of an acting person. Thus, rationality is affirmed only in connection with the action of man, who, as an agent, can only be separate. Moreover, only he himself can establish his rationality. However, unlike Kant, rationality is determined in a collision with objectivity in relation to practical reality. Only in relation to practical reality does the contradiction between objectivity and rationality matter, because only there everything is resolved for the predominance of reason. So, the difference between good and good, brought to the antinomy of good and good, expresses the opposition between objectivity and rationality, because good comes from the I, desiring some object, and the clearest and most reliable subjective principle of human action is grounded in good. Goodness and goodness are expressions of rationality and objectivity in practical reality, so that they really communicate with each other there. Thus, the identity of good and good (as bliss) in religion is, in fact, attributed to practical reality, so Solovyov did not base this identity with metaphysical references.

Solovyov V.S. Works in 2 volumes. T. 2 M., “Thought”, 1988.-- (Philosophical heritage. T. 105). KANT (Immanuel Kant, original Cant) is the founder of philosophical criticism, which represents the main turning point in the history of human thought, so that the entire development of philosophy, if not in content, then in the relation of thought to this content, should be divided into two periods: before- critical (or pre-Kantian) and post-critical (or post-Kantian). According to his own comparison (with Copernicus), Kant did not open new worlds for the mind, but put the mind itself on such a new point of view from which everything that was before appeared to him in a different and more true form. The importance of Kant is exaggerated only when in his teaching one wants to see not a rearrangement and deepening of the essential problems of philosophy, but their best and almost final solution. Such a final role actually belongs to Kant only in the field of ethics (precisely in its “pure” or formal part); in other departments of philosophy, he retains the merit of a great motivator, but not a solver of the most important issues. Kant's biography is of no external interest. He spent his entire life, devoted exclusively to mental work, in the same Konigsberg, where he was born (April 22, 1724) and died (February 12, 1804). His father was a poor master of a saddle shop. The family was distinguished by honesty and religiosity in a pietistic spirit (especially the mother). The same spirit prevailed in the school (collegium Fredericianum) where Kant received his secondary education (1733-1740). The director of this college, Pastor F. A. Schultz, was at the same time a professor of theology at the University of Konigsberg, where Kant entered the theological faculty. Pietistic education undoubtedly left a mark on Kant in the general character and tone of his understanding of life, but did not satisfy the mental demands that arose early in his disproportionately developed head. In addition to theological lectures, he enthusiastically studied secular sciences, philosophy and physics and mathematics. The end of the course coincided with the death of his father (1746), forcing him to look for a means of livelihood. He spent nine years as a home teacher in three families, partly in Konigsberg itself, partly on nearby estates. Kant's mental development went from exact knowledge to philosophy. He became an independent philosopher late, only at the age of 45, but much earlier declared himself as a leading scientist. In 1755, he published (anonymously) his physical and astronomical theory of the universe (“Allgemeine Naturgeschichte u Theorie des Himmels” 1), which in essence, he only repeated Laplace several decades later. This theory, which is called Kant-Laplace, but in fairness should be called Kantian, remains generally accepted in science. Other, smaller works of natural science content published by Kant around the same time (1754-1756) are still important: about fire, about the rotation of the Earth around its axis, about the decrepitude of the Earth, about earthquakes 2. In 1755, Kant became a privatdozent of philosophy at the University of Königsb[erg] and only 15 years later, in the 47th year of his life, he received the position of an ordinary professor of logic and metaphysics, having defended his dissertation “De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis" 3 (1770). [Before this, during the occupation of Koenigsberg by Russian troops, a vacant chair of philosophy opened up, which Kant wanted to fill, but the Russian governor approved, based on seniority, another candidate) 4 . Of Kant’s philosophical works, the named work is the first where he is an original thinker, with a new and important look at the subjective nature of space and time. Shortly before, as can be seen from one letter, he conceived another small essay: “On the Limits of Human Knowledge,” which he intended to publish in the same year, but it appeared only 11 years later, after it had grown into the “Critique of Pure Reason.” (1781). In the next 12 years, all of Kant’s other main works in the field of philosophy were published: “Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysyk die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können” (1783), where Kant sets out the essence of his critique of knowledge in a different order; "Grundlegung zur Metaphisyk der Sitten" (1785); "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft" (1786); "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft" (1788); "Kritik der Urtheilskraft" (1790); "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft" 5 (1793). Among the minor works, in addition to the aforementioned Latin dissertation, the following are of significant philosophical interest: “The Idea of ​​Universal History” (1784), “Eternal Peace” (1795), “The Advances of Metaphysics since the Time of Leibniz and Wolf” (1791), “On Philosophy in General” (1794) , "The Dispute of the Faculties" (1798). Of less interest are “The Dreams of a Spiritual Seer” (1766), a work of the pre-Critical era, written under the influence of David Hume; its subject is the vision and theory of Swedenborg, to which Kant is extremely skeptical, although one of the main thoughts of the Swedish mystic - about the ideality of space and time - was reflected in Kant's Latin dissertation, and then in the "Critique of Pure Reason" (this is more than a probable assumption is not at all shaken by the angry abuse of Kuno Fischer in his polemic with Dr. Tafel 6). In addition to his writings, Kant also acted a lot as a teacher. Despite the weakness of his voice, his lectures, with their content and originality, attracted a significant number of listeners. In addition to logic and metaphysics, he taught courses in mathematics, physics, natural law, ethics, physical geography, anthropology, and rational theology. He was forced to stop lecturing on this last subject due to external pressure. During the reign of Frederick II, when Kant's student von Zedlitz was the minister of public education and spiritual affairs, our philosopher enjoyed special favor from the government, but with the accession of Frederick William II this attitude changed, especially when the reactionary cleric Wölner was appointed as Zedlitz's successor. The essay on “Religion within the Limits of Reason alone” caused extreme displeasure among his superiors, and Kant received (in 1794) a royal decree that began like this: “First of all, we send you gracious greetings, our worthy and highly learned dear loyal subject! Our highest person has long since “I saw with great displeasure that you are abusing your philosophy to distort and humiliate some of the main and fundamental teachings of Holy Scripture and Christianity.” It was further said that if Kant persists, he must “inevitably expect unpleasant orders.” Kant responded, justifying his point of view, and declared in conclusion that, as a loyal subject, he promised in his lectures and writings not to touch upon religion at all, both natural and revealed. Soon after this, he abandoned other private lectures, limiting himself to the compulsory course of logic and metaphysics, and in 1797, feeling the approach of decrepitness, he completely stopped teaching. He thought of devoting the rest of his life to the extensive work he had begun, which was supposed to contain an encyclopedia of all sciences, but weakening mental abilities did not allow him to continue this work, which remained in fragments. Before he reached the age of 80 two months, Kant died of senile infirmity. Kant's personality and life present a completely integral image, characterized by the constant predominance of reason over affects and moral duty over passions and lower interests. Having understood his scientific and philosophical calling as the highest duty, Kant unconditionally subordinated everything else to it. By virtue of it, he conquered even nature, turning his weak and sickly body into a strong support for the most intense mental energy. Very prone to cordial communication, Kant found that family life interfered with mental work - and remained forever alone. With a special passion for geography and travel, he did not leave Konigsberg so as not to interrupt the performance of his duties. Sick by nature, he uses willpower and in the right way In his life he achieved the point that he lived to a ripe old age without ever being sick. Kant gave the necessary satisfaction to the needs of the heart in friendship with people who did not interfere, but supported him in his mental work. His main friend was the merchant Green, who combined such mental development with great practical abilities that the entire “Critique of Pure Reason” passed through his preliminary approval. Friendship also justified the only carnal weakness that Kant allowed himself: he loved the pleasures of the table in a small company of friends. But this became possible for him only in the second half of his life, when he achieved residency and when his writings began to generate income, and until 1770 he received only 62 thalers a year. Subsequently, his economic situation improved so much that he was able to make savings with which he bought a house. However, he was completely free from stinginess and greed. When Minister von Zedlitz offered him a chair in Halle with a double salary, he rejected this lucrative invitation. Having learned that the son of one of his friends was establishing a book trade, in order to support him, he provided him with the publication of his works for next to nothing, refusing the incomparably more favorable conditions of other booksellers. Kant's aesthetic development was significantly lower than his mental and moral development. He understood abstractly the meaning of beauty, but this area did not arouse any keen interest in him. Of the arts, he most of all found taste in culinary arts, which was his favorite subject of conversations with women; in poetry he respected only didactics; I couldn’t stand music as an obsessive art; I was completely indifferent to plastic arts. This poverty of the aesthetic element is quite understandable in our philosopher. His calling was to create everywhere the deepest division between perfect shape and the real content of being, and their inseparable unity is the essence of beauty and art. Kant's doctrine of knowledge. How can we cognize things or objects that are outside of us and independent of us? This question, which does not exist for naive, immediate consciousness, but constitutes the main task of any philosophy, is posed and solved by Kant with special profundity and originality. Our mind can cognize objects because everything cognizable in them is created by the same mind according to its inherent rules or laws; in other words, knowledge is possible because we do not know things in themselves, but their appearance in our consciousness, conditioned not by anything external, but by the forms and categories of our own mental activity. Since ancient times it has been recognized in philosophy that the sensory qualities of objects - colors, sounds, smells - are determined as such by the senses; but from these sensual, or secondary, qualities differed primary qualities or definitions, such as, for example, extension, substantiality, causality, which were considered to belong to things in themselves, regardless of the knower. Kant was the first to systematically and scientifically show that these “primary” determinations are also determined by the knowing mind, but not in its empirical states (like sensory properties), but by its a priori or transcendental acts that create objects as such. Kant approaches this idea through a formal analysis of what knowledge is. Cognition in general consists of judgments, that is, of such a combination of two representations in which one serves as a predicate (predicate) of the other (A is B). But if all knowledge consists of judgments, then it cannot be said, on the contrary, that all judgment is knowledge. The meaning of real cognition belongs only to such judgments in which the connection between the subject and the predicate: 1) appears to be universal and necessary and 2) posits something new, not contained in the concept of the subject, as its attribute. Judgments that satisfy only one of these two requirements, but not the other, do not constitute knowledge (in the scientific sense of the word). Analytical judgments satisfy one first condition, for example, a body is something extended - this judgment is reliable a priori, it is a universal and necessary truth, but only because the predicate of extension is already contained in the very concept of body, therefore, nothing new is communicated by this judgment. On the contrary, the second requirement is satisfied by synthetic judgments a posteriori, for example, the length of this street is 377 fathoms. or today's air temperature = 2° R. Such judgments convey something new, for the number of fathoms and degrees can be deduced analytically from the representation of a given street and daytime temperature; But on the other hand, these judgments express only isolated empirical facts, devoid of universal and necessary meaning and therefore do not constitute true knowledge. For the formation of this latter, therefore, only the third kind of judgment remains, namely those which, in order to be universal and necessary, must be a priori, similar to analytical judgments (for the facts given a posteriori, no matter how many of them are collected, are responsible only for themselves and from them it is in no way possible to extract a universal and necessary law); but with this apriority they must - in contrast to analytical judgments - convey new content, that is, be synthetic. Such synthetic judgments a priori really exist in science, both in purely mathematical science and in natural science or physics (in the broad sense of the ancients). When we say that the sum of 789 and 567 is 1356, then we are expressing a universal and necessary truth; We are sure in advance that always and when applied to all objects, the sum of these numbers remains necessarily the same; therefore, this is an a priori judgment, but it is not analytical, for the number 1356 is not at all a sign logically contained in the concept of the numbers 789 and 567 taken together; in order to obtain the third number from these two, it was necessary to perform a special mental act addition, gave new number, therefore it is synthetic judgment a priori. Similarly, in geometry, the position is that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, although a priori, that is, independent of any experience, reliably, but not deduced analytically, because the concept of shortness of distance is not contained as a sign in the concept of straightness; therefore this is also synthetic judgment a priori. Finally, in natural science, if all the so-called laws of nature are something more than a simple statement of isolated cases, more often or less frequently repeated, then they owe their meaning to the underlying position of causality, which establishes a universal and necessary connection between phenomena; but the basic principle chese phenomena have their own cause" is, firstly, a priori, independent of experience (for experience cannot embrace everyone phenomena), and secondly, it posits something that cannot be analytically deduced from a given order of phenomena (for from the fact that some phenomena occur in a certain time sequence, it does not at all follow that one is the cause of the other); therefore, this principle is synthetic judgment a priori, and through it the same character belongs to all pure natural science, whose task is to establish the causal connection of phenomena. A precise definition of what and what cognition consists of leads to the solution of the question: how is knowledge possible? or - what is the same - how are synthetic judgments a priori possible? In order for the synthetic connection of two representations to have an a priori, and therefore universal and necessary character, it is required that this connection be a definite and correct act of the cognizing subject himself, that is, that he has the ability and known methods to connect or connect the empirical material of individual sensations, which themselves in themselves do not yet provide any knowledge. They can become the subject of knowledge only through the activity of the knowing mind itself. And indeed, our mind, firstly, brings all given sensations into some visual or visual (anschaulich) order in the forms of time and space, or creates a world of sensory phenomena, and secondly, these sensual he connects phenomena mentally according to the known basic methods of understanding (categories of reason) that create the world experience, liable to scientific knowledge. Time and space can be neither external realities nor concepts abstracted from the properties or relationships of things given in experience. The first naive view of time and space as original realities outside of us, according to Kant’s fair remark (in his Latin dissertation), belongs to the realm of fable (pertinetad mundum fabulosum), while the second, apparently more scientific, view is refuted in detail by our philosopher. The real strength of his entire argument comes from the undoubted truth that every experience, even the most elementary, is conceivable only by distinguishing moments and places, i.e. assumes time and space, which, being thus indispensable conditions of any experience, cannot be the products of any experience; the very attempt at an empirical explanation of these forms of sensibility is possible only with a twofold, rather gross misunderstanding: with the identification of them themselves with the abstract concept of them and then with the confusion of time and space itself with particular temporal and spatial relations, as if someone were to question the origin of the zoological kind "horse" confused, on the one hand, with the question of the origin of the abstract concept of “horse”, and on the other hand, with the pedigree of certain specimens of the horse breed. The psychophysical genealogy of time and space presupposes, in addition to time and space itself, a certain animal-human organization, that is, some extremely complex temporal-spatial phenomenon. If, therefore, time and space can be neither external objects nor concepts abstracted from external experience, then - Kant concludes - each of them can only be pure view(intuitus purus, reine Anschauung), that is, an a priori, subjective and ideal form or, as it were, a scheme (veluti schema), necessarily inherent in our mind and determining for it the correct coordination of sensory data; in other words, these are the essence of the two main conditions for the visual synthesis of sensuality performed by our mind. All states of our subject, without exception, appear as moments of the same time (which is possible only due to the a priori nature of this form), while some of them are defined as parts of the same space (which also presupposes the subjective, a priori nature of the spatial view). From this difference follows the opposition between internal phenomena, connected in time, but not in space, and external phenomena, connected not only in time, but also in space - the opposition is only relative and, from Kant’s point of view, not entirely explainable (see below). criticism of the doctrine). Whatever, however, may be the unknown (from this point of view) final basis, by virtue of which some of our sensory states are objectified and presented as external things, while others, on the contrary, entirely retain their subjective character, then initial method, in which the former are posited as external objects, that is, the very idea of ​​outside-being, or spatial view, is in any case, just like time, its own, independent of anything external, pure and transcendental act of the knowing subject itself. Thanks to this a priori-synthetic nature of time and space, mathematics is possible as real knowledge, that is, formed from synthetic judgments a priori. Numbers are a priori, but at the same time visual acts of addition (Zusammensetzung) in time; geometric quantities are the same a priori and visual acts of addition in space. To be countable and measurable, that is, to be in time and space, is a universal and necessary (because a priori posited) condition of everything. sensual, as a result of which Kant called his teaching about time and space transcendental aesthetics(from αἴσϑησις - feeling, sensation). But in addition to the visual mathematical connection of sensory facts, we also comprehend their rational, or logical connection. Thus, we believe that one fact is the cause of another; in a complex series of changes we distinguish transitory elements from abiding ones; we assert that under such and such conditions this fact possible, but for such and such is necessary, etc. If such a connection were a connection between things in themselves, then we could not know it the way we know it; for, firstly, it is impossible to understand how something that is outside of us and does not depend on us can enter into us and become our concept; secondly, even if it were possible for such a real influence of an external object on the subject to produce cognition, then this influence in each case would be only an isolated fact, and the cognition arising from here would have the same factual (empirical) character. Suppose we could perceive two real objects in their objective, mind-independent connection - this would give us the right to assert that they are connected with each other in all those cases when we perceived them; but cases, even if they are many, do not contain that sign of universality and necessity that distinguishes laws from facts and which is actually found in our natural scientific knowledge. Finally, thirdly, the very idea of ​​external objects connected with each other in one way or another and in different ways acting on each other and on us - this very idea complex, out-of-being already presupposes the forms of space and time, which, as proven in transcendental aesthetics, are ideal subjective views, and therefore, everything that is in them does not exist outside the cognizing subject, but only as its representation. For all these reasons, those principles or fundamental laws by which sensory phenomena are connected and the world of scientific experience is created are the own a priori actions of our understanding according to its inherent concepts. The main ways in which our mind connects or puts together the objects of its knowledge are expressed in forms of judgment that represent one or another combination between a subject and a predicate. There are four types of this combination, of which three cases are possible in each. I. When a predicate expresses volume subject, then this latter can be under its predicate either as a single instance, or as part of a genus, or as a whole genus: thus, judgments by quantity are singular, special And universal, where from 3 quantity categories: 1) Unity, 2) Plurality and 3) Universality. II. When (from the side of content) a predicate is thought of as a feature contained in the subject, then this feature can either be affirmed, or denied, or, finally, excluded in such a way that the subject is left with all other features except this one; hence there are three forms of quality judgment: affirmative(A is B), negative(A is not B) and endless(A is not B), which corresponds to three categories qualities: 4) Reality, 5) Negation and 6) Limitation. III. In addition to the quantity and quality of judgments, their form is also determined by the relationship between the subject and the predicate in the sense that the latter is either assimilated to the former unconditionally, as its belonging, or the subject is indicated as a condition of the predicate (if there is A, that is, B), or, finally, they are combined in such a way that the predicate appears to be divided into several types, through one of which the subject is associated with it (for example, this organism is or plant, or animal). Thus, we have unconditional or indicative (categorical) judgments, then conditional (hypothetical) and, finally, disjunctive; their corresponding categories relationship will be: 7) Substance(and affiliation), 8) Cause(and action), 9) Interaction, or communication. IV. With any combination of a subject with a predicate, whatever it may be in quantity, quality and relation, the question still remains: is this combination presented as only possible, or as actually existing, or, finally, as necessary? In other words: does the copula of a given proposition mean that A May be B, or what A There is B, or finally, what A there must be In (in the general sense of Müssen). From this point of view, judgments are problematic(doubtful), assertoric(assuring) and apodictic(mandatory), which corresponds to three categories modalities: 10) Opportunity, 11) Reality or existence and 12) Necessity. These basic concepts (categories or predicates), from which some other general concepts are easily derived, such as, for example, size, strength etc., further serve to determine the fundamental truths that determine experimental knowledge or natural science; Kant calls these latter principles of pure understanding (see below). But that by means of all these formal principles one can create from sense data a single nature or one world experience, universal and necessary both in parts and as a whole, it is necessary, first of all, that all individual and particular functions of the understanding (together with all visual acts in the sensory sphere) relate to a single amateur consciousness as a general synthetic connection of all sensory and rational elements of cognition. Since everything comes down to a regular connection or addition of ideas, it is clear that in addition to the rules of connection, the connecting action itself is also required. First, the views to be joined must be highlighted or captured in their particularity (“appreciated”); but since the connection several representations are impossible in the very act of “approximation” of each of them, and yet all of them must be present when they are combined, then, secondly, the ability playback(Reproductio) of already “captured” representations with a new act of their connection, and, thirdly, as a guarantee that the reproduced representations are the same as those that were previously captured, an act of recognition(Recognitio), which is possible only if the subject grasping, reproducing and recognizing representations remains the same or equal to himself. Consciousness (“apperception”) of an object as such, i.e., a known, definite and natural synthesis of ideas, is possible only with the unity of self-consciousness, i.e., when the subject invariably retains its internal unconditional identity: I = I (Kant calls this “synthetic unity of transcendental apperception" and other similar names). The unity of self-consciousness sufficiently explains the possibility of synthetic cognitive acts in general. The unified consciousness, acting as a productive imagination (as opposed to the aforementioned reproductive), creates from sensory perceptions, through visual forms, integral images of objects; it, in its discursive or rational action, creates a connection between phenomena according to categories. But objects of actual experience have both a sensual and mental character, they are both visual images and carriers of rational definitions. In what way do these two inseparable and yet opposite sides of our world converge with each other, in what way are categories applied to sensory phenomena, or are these latter subsumed under categories to produce real objects of experience? Two opposite terms, like sensuality and reason, require something third to unite them. Third, between the sensory image and the pure concept, Kant finds in the so-called diagrams, which he deduces from the nature of time. Time, as we have seen, is pure view and basic general form everyone sensory phenomena, but at the same time it contains four kinds of mental definitions that provide corresponding schemes for all categories, thus forming connecting links or, as it were, some kind of bridge between the sensory and mental world. In time as a form of sensory phenomena, we distinguish, firstly, duration or magnitude, i.e. number moments or equal units, which gives quantity diagram; secondly, content or temporary being itself, that which fills time - this gives quality scheme(namely, filled time - a scheme of reality, empty time-- scheme of negation); thirdly, phenomena are in different time periods ok relative to each other than given relationship schemes, namely, either one phenomenon remains while the others pass away (hence the scheme of substance and accidents), or one follows the other (the scheme of cause and effect), or they all exist at the same time (the scheme of interaction or community); 4th, a phenomenon in time exists either sometime (scheme of possibility), or at a certain moment (scheme of reality), or at any time (scheme of necessity). By representing sensory phenomena according to these schemes, pure imagination in each case indicates to the understanding the applicability of one or another of its categories. If, then, the real objects of our experience - all that we call the world of phenomena or nature - consist of products of pure imagination, connected by the understanding by virtue of the correspondence between the imaginative schemes of phenomena and its own categories, then it is clear that the fundamental truths (axioms) of experimental science, or natural science, can only be the principles of pure reason, that is, they must have an a priori character. Although the understanding essentially operates only through concepts, thanks to schematism, its concepts also embrace real objects, that is, visual-sensory phenomena. Thus, nature is determined by reason from four sides: from the side of the visual form of phenomena, their sensory content, their essential connection with each other and their connection with our knowledge. As located in time and space, sensory phenomena are views and in this sense are determined by the first principle of the understanding, which Kant calls the “axiom of views” and which reads: all views are extensive quantities, that is, they always consist of homogeneous parts, in turn composed of the same parts, and so on ad infinitum - in other words: sensory phenomena as quantities are divisible to infinity, and, therefore, no atoms exist; this principle obviously corresponds to the category of quantity. Phenomena receive their content from sensations; although the internal property of sensations as special states of the sentient subject is something immediately given and is not subject to determination a priori, there is, however, some indispensable condition or general method of all sensation, determined by the understanding in its second principle, which says: in all phenomena feeling and the reality corresponding to it in the subject (realitas phaenomenon) has an intensive magnitude, i.e. degree. Sensation is not composed of homogeneous parts or units, like perception, but it can gradually decrease or increase in its strength. This principle, which Kant calls “preliminary perception” 7, corresponds to the category of quality. The connection of phenomena in terms of their relationship to each other is determined by the general principle that states: all phenomena in their existence are subject a priori to rules that determine their relationships with each other in time. Kant calls these rules that determine the relationships between phenomena “analogies of experience” 8 . Corresponding to the categories of relationship, they are the following: 1) with every change of phenomena, the substance remains and its quantity in nature does not increase or decrease(this principle corresponds to categorical substance); 2) fundamentals generation: everything that happens presupposes something from which it necessarily follows, or: all changes occur according to the law of cause and effect(corresponds to] categorical causality); 3) fundamentals reciprocity: all substances, as far as they exist simultaneously, consist in continuous communication or interaction with each other. The general dependence of phenomena on the conditions of knowledge is determined in the following three principles, which Kant calls “postulates of empirical thinking in general” 9 and which correspond to the categories of modality: 1) what is in accordance with the formal conditions of experience (from the point of view and from the side of concepts), then Maybe; 2) what is associated with the material conditions of experience (sensation), then really; 3) that whose connection with the real is determined by the general conditions of experience, then exists necessary. The doctrine of consciousness, of categories, of schematism and of fundamental principles constitutes “transcendental analytics,” the results of which (in combination with the results of “transcendental aesthetics”) boil down to the following. Real knowledge, that is, through synthetic judgments a priori, is possible, since its object - the world of phenomena, experience or nature - is not something external to the knower and independent of him, but, on the contrary, represents in all its cognizable determinations only a product of the mind itself in its visual and rational functions, conditioned by the transcendental unity of self-consciousness and coordinated with each other through the schemes of pure imagination. The world is known by the mind only insofar as it is created by it; strictly speaking, the mind knows only its own acts; as the internal reflection of an amateur subject, knowledge does not represent anything mysterious. How geometric lines and the figures are understood by us a priori in all their properties, because they are constructed by us ourselves, so that the mind rationally finds in them only what it intuitively puts into them - similarly, the whole world of our experience, being a priori synthetic by constructing the mind, naturally, and is known in the same way. The fact of cognition seems mysterious or, frankly speaking, unthinkable only under the false assumption that the cognizing subject must move into some external sphere of reality or that things must somehow penetrate into the sphere of the subject; but in fact, cognizable reality is only a product of the spontaneous activity of our mind in its own sphere, and therefore there is no need for the impossible transition from the subject to external things and from them to the subject: since the supposed things are outside of us, we know absolutely nothing about them and we cannot know, but everything that we know is with us, is a phenomenon of our consciousness, a product of our mind. In a word, an act of a subject can be actual knowledge, since what is known is an act of the same subject. Kant calls this view of his transcendental or critical idealism, distinguishing it from dogmatic idealism, of which Berkeley was a typical representative. The difference is that critical idealism recognizes the objects of our world as works of the subject not from the side of their possible existence in themselves, but only from the side of their actual cognition, while dogmatic idealism asserts that the things of the external world do not exist except in our knowledge . Although Kant sometimes becomes entangled in his own critical networks, he nevertheless decisively distinguishes the knowable being (essentia) or the nature of the objective world from its existence (existentia). The first is completely posited by our mind and is resolved without a trace into phenomenal subjective existence; the second is a product of the mind only insofar as it is determined by the first, but in itself does not depend on it and is therefore unknowable. In creating nature, our mind is self-active, that is, all forms and methods of its synthetic action, both visual and rational, are taken by it a priori from itself; but the material of this mental activity, namely sensations, or sensory perceptions, is not produced by the mind a priori, but is received by it as data independent of it. Of course, sensations are also states of the subject, but not in its activity, but only as passive or receptive. Therefore, we must admit that this initial sensory material of all experience and cognition, as given and not created in us, is conditioned in some incomprehensible way by that sphere of being independent of us, and therefore unknowable, which Kant designated as a thing in itself ( Ding an sich). But it is sensations (introduced into the visual forms of space and time) that provide real objects for the connecting constructions of the mind, and thus in the world of our knowledge, in the world of phenomena, there is always preserved some sensory residue that is irreducible to a priori elements, undoubtedly, although in an unknown way, originating from areas of existence independent of us. The object, as cognizable, is entirely posited by the cognizing mind; it is only our idea, and there is nothing here that does not belong to the subject; but in the object as existing, There is such an independent element, or, more precisely, some index it is precisely the fact of sensory perception - not in the sense of the content of sensations, which is as subjective as everything else, but in the sense of their origin, since the subject is receptive in them, and not active. This character of sensory perception shows that it is determined by something independent of us; but this something remains completely unknown to us and can never become an object of knowledge. Kant firmly and invariably adheres to the point of view that the cognizable object as such is completely our representation, in all its parts the product of the sensory-rational functions of the knowing subject, and, however, the very process of this work in its first material beginning, namely in sensations or sensual perceptions, is caused in some unknown way by some unknown “thing in itself”. So, for example, this table or this house is only my idea; I cannot find anything here that is not a phenomenon of my own consciousness; it is absurd to assert that this table corresponds to some table an sich, or this house to a house an sich; but, on the other hand, these phenomena of my consciousness (insofar as I distinguish them from simple hallucinations or fantasies) would not have occurred, that is, they would not have been created by my mind, if it had not been determined by something independent of it, having its own indicator in those sensations from which our mind constructs these ideas of a table or a house. Thus, it is not the existence of these objects as such, in their specific qualities, but only the very fact of their existence in my consciousness that has some basis independent of this consciousness. This point of view raises new questions not resolved by our philosopher; but the thesis itself has a fairly definite meaning, always the same for Kant. Otherwise, that is, if the very fact of the existence of a given phenomenon were generally recognized as entirely dependent on my mind alone, then Kant’s beloved example of the essential difference and even incommensurability between a thaler, only imagined, and a thaler lying in my pocket, would lose its meaning. Contrary to the erroneous opinion of some interpreters (among other things, Schopenhauer and Kuno Fischer 10), no internal contradiction can be found on this point between the 1st and 2nd editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. Having set out in the 1st edition the view of critical idealism that the world is cognizable by us only in its manifest forms, which are the constructions of the mental activity of our subject and do not exist at all apart from our representation, Kant saw that this view is confused by many with that fantastic idealism, according to to which the world is created by the subject without any given material and there is only a dream or an empty ghost. In view of this, Kant, in the 2nd edition, as well as in the Prolegomena, emphasized the difference between the two idealisms and presented his own in such a way that further confusion was impossible. The actual content of scientific knowledge is given by sensory objects created by the mind from sensations in the form of spatio-temporal perception. Without such visual objects, the concepts of the understanding are only empty forms. For, for example, causality to be the principle of real knowledge, specific objects are required, in a certain space and time, which are connected by a causal relationship. But how should one look at objects? supersensible, systematic knowledge of which has been proposed since ancient times by various philosophical teachings (whose claims in modern Kantian Germany were inherited by the system of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics)? Opportunity true sciences - mathematics and pure natural science - were proven by Kant in transcendental aesthetics and in transcendental analytics; impossibility imaginary metaphysical science as objective knowledge is proven by him in transcendental dialectics, which completes the essential part of the “Critique of Pure Reason.” Our mind has a need to convey the character of unconditionality to its given content. Thoughts about the unconditional or absolute, to which he comes on all his paths, cannot be concepts of the mind, which always relate to the conditional objects of sensory experience; Kant calls them, in contrast to rational concepts and rules, ideas or absolute principles of reason, thus relating them to a special ability (reason in the narrow sense). Philosophy can rightfully deal with ideas as long as it accepts them in their real meaning, namely sees in them expressions of what there must be according to requirements mind. But since the idea of ​​the unconditional arises in us in connection with conditional data and absolute principles are always thought of in connection with one or another series of relative concepts and objects, the mind falls into an involuntary temptation to confuse its rational function with the rational one and place the absolute idea in the same conditional a series of given objects - not as the goal of aspiration, but as a truly given completion of the series. Such an illegal, although natural, transfer of absolute ideas onto the plane of relative phenomena that constitute the subject of rational knowledge gives rise to an imaginary and deceptive metaphysical science that considers the principles of reason as knowable entities. The problem of this science cannot be solved at all, not because it exceeds the limited powers of the human mind, as superficial skepticism likes to assert, but because here the cognitive forces are directed towards something that cannot be the subject of knowledge at all. The unconditional must be supersensible, since everything sensible is necessarily conditional; but real knowledge (as opposed to purely formal thinking) relates to given objects, and objects are given to us only through sensory perceptions, under the conditions of space and time; therefore, they are always sensual, and the unconditional, as supersensible, can never be the subject of real (experiential) knowledge. Ideas of reason are things that are thought, not knowable; intelligible (νοῦμενα), and not manifest; required, not data. Therefore, when our mind takes its ideas for knowable objects or entities, it goes beyond the limits of its right; Kant calls this illegal use of reason transcendental, distinguishing it (The direct opposite of the transcendental is immanent, that is, within the limits of experience, and the empirical material of experience differs from its a priori conditions, which are transcendental (but not transcendental).) from transcendental. Transcendental meaning belongs to all a priori conditions of experience (i.e., those functions of view and reason that do not follow from experience, but determine it and therefore necessarily precede any experience), as well as ideas in their true sense, as the principles and postulates of reason; the science that studies these a priori foundations of everything that exists is transcendental philosophy, or (true) metaphysics - this is how Kant designated his own philosophy - the direct opposite of which is that transcendental (transcendental) philosophy, or false metaphysics, the destruction of which was one of his main tasks. Reason, in its false application, starts from a conditional cognizable existence, in order then, through deceptive syllogisms, to move on to the imaginary, and in fact impossible, and therefore non-existent knowledge unconditional things. Real being - conditional and cognizable - is given to us from three different sides or in three forms: as internal or mental phenomena (being within us), as external or physical phenomena (being outside of us) and as the possibility of phenomena, indefinite being, or subject in general. From these conditional data the mind correctly concludes to the unconditional ideas: from internal phenomena - to the idea of ​​an unconditional subject, or soul, from external phenomena - to the idea of ​​an unconditional object, or world, from the possibility of all being - to the idea of ​​the unconditional as such, or God. These ideas have the (logical) appearance of cognizable objects, and when the mind, carried away by this appearance, takes them for real objects and associates cognitive judgments with them, then three imaginary sciences arise: about the soul - rational psychology, about the world (as a real totality of external being) - rational cosmology and about God - rational theology. The imaginary rational knowledge of the essence of the soul expresses four main theses about it: 1) the soul is substance; 2) it is a substance simple and - as a consequence of these two definitions - immaterial or disembodied and indestructible, i.e. immortal; 3) she is a creature self-conscious, or personality, and, finally, 4) she is a being, directly self-authentic, These definitions are derived through inferences, which Kant denounces as paralogisms, i.e., erroneous syllogisms. The main mistake is that the same term is used here in different senses, so that the connection between the premises and conclusions of these syllogisms is only apparent; yes, under subject in one case we mean our actual l, i.e., the manifested unity and self-activity (Spontan - eität) of thinking, connecting all the phenomena of internal, and through that, external experience, and in the other case we mean the subject of internal existence in itself, about which we can't know anything. Regardless of Kant’s formal refutation of paralogisms, not without exaggeration, the following points are of significant interest in the criticism of rational psychology. From simplicity or inner unity and constancy, our I it cannot be concluded that it is an immaterial substance. There is no doubt that Pasha I as an internal mental phenomenon, having neither extension or components in space, nor weight or mass, it is not a body or substance. But after all, corporeal or material being itself, insofar as it is determined by the indicated properties, is only phenomenon in the field of our external senses, and, consequently, the affirmation of the immateriality of the soul in this sense comes down to the proposition that an internal or mental phenomenon is not an external or physical phenomenon, or that a phenomenon determined by one form of time is not a phenomenon determined by the forms of time and space. This is a truth that goes without saying, but it in no way relates to the unknown essence of mental and physical existence, and there is no reasonable obstacle to admit that this essence is the same for both spheres of existence; therefore, it is impossible to assert the immateriality of the soul in the sense that it necessarily has special substance that is not reducible to the substance of material phenomena. In the same way, from the simplicity of the thinker I the immortality of the soul, i.e., the impossibility of the disappearance of this self, does not in any way follow. Without a doubt, the thinking subject, not being an extended or extensive quantity, cannot be destroyed by decomposition into parts, but, as a tense force or an intensive quantity, it is capable of gradual decrease, and there is nothing impossible in the assumption that the degree of intensity of this force can fall to 0 and that, therefore, thinking I may disappear. Just as unfounded, according to Kant, is the assertion of rational psychology. self-confidence internal mental experience as opposed to external experience. As phenomena in our consciousness, the objects of both experiences are equally reliable. The undoubted difference between them is that physical phenomena exist as parts of space, while mental phenomena do not; but since space itself is the form of our own sensibility, this difference does not in the least affect the reliability of both. If in this respect the internal phenomenon as such had an advantage, then every hallucination would be more reliable than the physical body. In fact, their reliability as states of consciousness is the same, but in the sense objective phenomena, the physical body has the advantage that otherwise, namely universal, thus enters into the connection of experience formed by the mind. In general, the world of our experience, internal, as well as the so-called external, has self-reliability for the mind, since it is built by it, and the mind itself is reliable for itself only in this activity. The cosmological idea, i.e. the idea of ​​the world as a complete whole, when this completeness is taken for a given fact or object of knowledge, entangles the mind in internal contradictions, expressed in the following four antinomies: 1. Position: world has a beginning(border) in time and space; opposition: the world in time and space endless, 2. Position: everything in the world consists of simple(indivisible); antithesis: nothing is simple, but everything difficult. 3. Position]: in the world there are free causes; antithesis: there is no freedom, but everything is nature(i.e. necessity). 4. Position]: in the series of world causes there is a certain necessary being; antithesis: in this series there is nothing necessary, but everything accidentally. In all four cases the position and the contrary can be proved by equally clear and irrefutable evidence. Kant calls the first two antinomies mathematical, since they are concerned with the composition and division of the homogeneous. Theses and antitheses here cannot be equally true, since we are talking about the same homogeneous object (the world as given in space), about which two directly contradictory judgments cannot be asserted; therefore, these theses and antitheses are equally false. This is generally possible when the concept underlying both positions that cancel each other contradicts itself; so, for example, two positions: "quadrangular circle Not round" and "quadrangular circle round"- both are false due to the internal contradiction in the very concept of a quadrangular circle. Such a contradictory concept underlies the first two antinomies. When I talk about objects in space and time, I am not talking about things in themselves, about which I know nothing, but about things in appearance, that is, about experience as a special kind of cognition of objects, the only one accessible to man. What I think in space and time, I cannot say that it exists in space and time by itself and without these thoughts of mine; for then I will contradict myself, since space and time, with all the phenomena in them, are not something existing in themselves and outside my ideas, but are themselves only presentation methods, and, obviously, it would be absurd to say that our mode of representation exists outside of our representation. Objects of the senses, therefore, exist only in experience; to attribute to them their own independent existence apart from and before experience means to imagine that experience is valid even without experience or before it. If I ask about the magnitude of the world in space and time, then it is assumed that this magnitude, determined in one way or another, should belong to the world itself, apart from any experience. But this contradicts the concept of the sensory world or the world of phenomena, the existence and connection of which takes place only in representation, namely in experience, since this is not a thing in itself, but only a way of representation. It follows from this that since the concept of a sensory world existing for itself contradicts itself, then any solution to the question of the size of this world will always be false, no matter how they try to resolve it: affirmatively, that is, in the sense of infinity, or negatively - in the sense of the limitedness of the world. The same applies to the second antinomy concerning the division of phenomena, for these latter are only representations and parts exist only in their representation, therefore, in the division itself, that is, in the possible experience in which they are given, and division cannot move beyond this experience. Accept that a known phenomenon, e.g. body, contains in itself, before any experience, all the parts to which possible experience can reach - this means that a simple phenomenon that can exist only in experience is given at the same time its own existence, prior to experience, or to assert that ideas exist before they are presented, which contradicts itself, and therefore is absurd and all sorts of things the solution to this misunderstood problem, whether one asserts that bodies themselves consist of infinitely many parts or of a finite number of simple parts. In this first, mathematical class of antinomies (1st and 2nd), the falsity of the assumption was that self-contradictory(namely a phenomenon as a thing in itself) seemed to be united in one concept. As for the second, dynamic class of antinomies (3rd and 4th), then the falsity of the assumption consists, on the contrary, in the fact that in fact, what is connected appears to be contradictory, consequently, whereas in the first case both opposite statements are false, here, on the contrary, statements that are opposed to each other only by misunderstanding can both be true. The fact is that a mathematical connection necessarily presupposes the homogeneity of what is connected (in the concept of magnitude), while a dynamic connection does not require this at all. When we're talking about about the magnitude of the extended, then all parts must be homogeneous with each other and with the whole; on the contrary, in the connection between cause and action, although homogeneity may occur, this is not necessary, for this is not required by the concept of causality, where through one something else is posited, completely different from it. The contradiction between nature and freedom is inevitable only when phenomena are confused with things in themselves; then the natural law of sensory phenomena is accepted as the law of being itself, the subject of freedom is placed among other natural objects, and, consequently, double causation turns out to be impossible, since it would be necessary to simultaneously affirm and deny the same thing about the same object in the same meaning. If we relate natural necessity only to phenomena, and freedom -- only to things in themselves, then both of these types of causality can be recognized without any contradiction, no matter how difficult or impossible it may be to understand free causality. In ourselves, precisely in our minds, we find the combination of these two causalities. When we act according to the idea of ​​good, according to conscience or according to moral duty, then the true reason for our actions is precisely this objective idea, which is not at all subordinate to time and is not included in the mechanical connection of phenomena, for obligation has an unconditional character and, from the point of view of time, What must perhaps there is a future that precedes the present, that is, absurdity. But in reality there is no such absurdity, because due is not at all connected with time or is a free cause, precisely because it belongs to what exists in itself, regardless of the connection of phenomena. When my action is determined by the pure idea of ​​good, then, without a doubt, this idea is the cause of my action; but it is impossible to say that good is a phenomenon that precedes in time a good action, for this idea has an objective meaning, identical to itself at all moments of time. Therefore this is the reason Not phenomenal, not included as a link in the chain of natural necessity. But on the other hand, every single action of mine, good as well as evil, necessarily has, in the order of time, a subjective psychological motive that determines it, that is, a certain mental phenomenon that precedes this action and necessarily determines it not by its internal quality, but as an event or occurrence that takes place in the world of phenomena at a given, specific moment in time. Our practical reason (or will), in its being, self-determined by the idea of ​​good, is (in Kant’s terminology) intelligible character and as a phenomenon determined by psychological motivation and included in the general natural connection of phenomena, our will represents the character empirical. Thus, the antinomy of freedom and necessity is resolved in such a way that all actions are free from the point of view of the intelligible character and all actions are necessary from the point of view of the empirical character. As for the 4th antinomy, one should only distinguish the cause in the phenomenon from the cause of the phenomena, as far as it can be conceived as a thing in itself, and then both positions (i.e., both the affirmation and the denial of the unconditional cause of the world) can be equally admitted; for their contradiction is based solely on a misunderstanding, according to which what has meaning only in the order of phenomena extends to things in themselves, and in general these two concepts are confused into one. Criticism of rational theology consists in its essential part of the refutation of three imaginary proofs of the existence of God, which originate from very ancient times, but received formal completeness in the new school philosophy. 1) Ontological proof from the concept of an all-perfect Being deduces the necessity of its existence on the basis that if this Being lacked real existence, then it would not have all the perfections. The obvious error of such an argument is that real existence is taken here as a feature included in the content of the concept along with other features and deduced analytically, whereas in fact existence is a fact, incoming to the concept and knowable only from experience. 2) Cosmological proof: our world represents only limited and random being, that is, not containing its own reason, and therefore it requires another reason, unconditionally necessary and unlimited - a Being possessing all realities, or the fullness of being. In this imaginary argument, the category of causality, which constitutes the mental condition of our experience, is illegally transferred beyond the boundaries of all experience, and, in addition, an arbitrary leap is made from the concept of world cause to the most all-real Being. 3) Teleological the proof deduces the existence of God from world teleology, or the purposeful structure of nature. The purposiveness of the physical world, noticed by our ability to judge, even if we attribute to it a meaning independent of our mind, has in any case only a relative and formal character, and to explain it it would be enough to assume some creative (formative) force acting on goals, i.e. Dimiurge, and not the all-good, all-wise and all-perfect God. Such a God cannot be proven theoretically and is only ideal, the reliability of which is based not on the cognitive, but on the moral ability of man: this is a postulate pure practical reason. Moral teaching Kant is based on the isolation of all empirical elements from human practice in order to obtain as a result the pure formal essence of morality, that is, a universal, necessary rule of activity, containing within itself its goal and therefore giving our will a character corresponding to pure reason self-legitimacy(autonomy). Kant has a completely negative attitude towards imaginary morality based on the pleasant and useful, on instinct, on external authority and on feeling; such morality foreign(heteronomic), because all these motives, essentially private and random, cannot have unconditional significance for the mind and internally ultimately determine the will of a rational being as such. - In general, all rules of activity, prescribing something, have an imperative form, or essence imperatives; when a prescription is conditioned by some given purpose not contained in the rule itself, then the imperative has the character hypothetical. These goals can be either special (some of many possible) - and then the imperatives determined by them are the essence technical rules of skill; or is it an always real goal, which is the own well-being of each being, and the imperatives determined by this goal are pragmatic instructions of prudence. But neither skill nor prudence constitute morality; to some extent these properties belong to animals; a person who, with technical dexterity, successfully operates in some specialty or prudently arranges his personal well-being, may, despite this, be completely devoid of moral dignity. Such dignity is attributed only to those who unconditionally subordinate not only some private and casual interests, but also the entire well-being of their life to moral duty or the demands of conscience; only such a will, desiring good for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else, is a pure or good will, which has an end in itself. Its rule, or moral law, not being conditioned by any external goal, is not hypothetical, but categorical imperative free from everything material definition, defined purely formally, that is, by the very concept of unconditional and universal obligation; act only according to that rule, following which you can at the same time(without internal contradiction) want it to become a universal law, or in other words: act as if the rule of your activity through your will were to become a universal law of nature(From the point of view of modality, the moral law has the character apodictic(necessary or obligatory), while the pragmatic instructions of prudence assertoric, and the technical rules of skill are only problematic(of course, in the sense of practical instructions).). This rule, taking away the meaning of the goal from any external objects of the will, leaves as the goal only the subjects of moral action themselves, who thereby receive unconditional dignity(Würde) as opposed to relative prices(Preis), belonging to external objects, which may not be the goal, but the means for moral activity. Hence the second formula of the categorical imperative: act in such a way that humanity, both in your person and in the person of anyone else, is always used by you as an end and never only as a means. Thus, we get the idea of ​​the will of every rational being as a general legislative will. This concept of every rational being, which in all the rules of its will must look at itself as giving a universal law, in order from this point of view to evaluate itself and its actions, leads to a new, very fruitful concept: kingdoms of goals, that is, the systematic connection of various intelligent beings by means of general laws determining their interaction as ends in themselves. Hence the third formula of the categorical imperative: act on the idea that all rules, by virtue of their own legislation, must be coordinated into one possible kingdom of goals, which in implementation would also be the kingdom of nature. The full implementation of a moral principle is no longer an obligation determined by the idea of ​​good, that is, good or pure will, but a postulate determined by the idea of ​​the highest good (summum bonum, das höchste Gut). Pure will or virtue must be absolutely independent of pleasure and happiness or well-being; but the persistent contradiction between virtue and happiness does not agree with the idea of ​​the highest good, which in its fullness must include all good, therefore, happiness, that is, a satisfied state of life - not as a condition or cause of virtue, but, on the contrary, as a conditioned its consequence. The highest good is the unity of virtue and well-being. According to the demand of reason, the highest good must be realized. From the analysis of this general postulate we get three particular ones: free will, immortality of the soul and the existence of God. “To realize the highest good means: 1) strive for moral perfection, 2) achieve it and, 3) thereby becoming worthy of bliss, use it as a necessary consequence of perfect virtue.” Without freedom the pursuit of moral perfection is impossible; its achievement is possible only in an infinite existence and, therefore, requires the immortality of the soul; finally, the agreement of moral perfection (internal) with external well-being presupposes that the ideal of reason is at the same time the actual ruler of the world order, or the real God. The first of these ideas - freedom - is considered by Kant not only as one of the postulates of practical reason, but also as a general condition of morality in general. The possibility of freedom is based on difference empirical nature from intelligible, i.e., on the differences in human individuality in order phenomena from her as well things in themselves. Belonging to the world of phenomena, our empirical character is subject to general law phenomena or natural necessity; but, being at the same time a thing in itself, we have a character independent of the law of phenomena or a free intelligible character (see above). Its manifestation in the field of psychological experience, or a judgment of an intelligible nature about the empirical, is conscience. In conscience, moral duty, and therefore freedom, is known to us with complete certainty, although they do not constitute the subject of theoretical knowledge, which relates only to sensory phenomena. As for the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, these ideas constitute the subject reasonable faith: faith - since they are not subject to experience, rational - since they are necessarily affirmed on the demands of reason. In Kant's teaching on law and state, on history and religion, not everything deserves equal attention; We will only indicate thoughts that are more original and significant. Kant considered it a necessary requirement of reason that the beginning of law should not be limited to the boundaries of individual states and peoples, but should extend to the entire totality of humanity in order to achieve eternal peace. In view of this goal, Kant set the following positive conditions: 1) the civil structure in each state must be lawful; 2) international law must be based on a union of free states; 3) mutual relations between peoples and states should be determined by universal hospitality or “cosmopolitan law.” Kant’s main views on law and the state were formed under the strong influence of the ideas of Rousseau, but Kant goes further than him in his views on history, which he defines as the development of humanity in freedom, or the progressive transition from the natural to the moral state. Kant’s attitude towards religion is determined by his moral philosophy: he allows only “moral theology”, denying “theological morality”, i.e., in his point of view, religion should be moral, or based on morality, and not vice versa. Kant (in accordance with biblical teaching) recognizes the real basis of religion as “radical evil” in human nature, i.e., the contradiction between the requirement of rational-moral law and the disordered aspirations of sensory nature, which do not obey a higher principle. Hence the need for deliverance or salvation - and this is the essence of religion. The fact of radical evil or sin is opposed to the ideal of a morally perfect or sinless person. Perfect righteousness, that is, a pure or divinely attuned will, is revealed in a constant and decisive triumph over all temptations of the evil nature; the highest expression of holiness is voluntarily accepted suffering in the name of a moral principle. For a sinful person, suffering is a necessary moment in the process of getting rid of evil, it is an inevitable punishment for sin; but the suffering of a sinless man (the Son of God), not being a consequence of his own sin, can have substitutive force or cover up the sins of humanity. For true religion, practical faith in a moral ideal is necessary, that is, in a completely righteous person or the Son of God, who is the rational basis, purpose and meaning (Logos) of everything that exists. To recognize the embodiment of this ideal as actually accomplished in the person of 1. Christ does not contradict reason, if only such historical faith is subordinated to moral faith, that is, it is attributed exclusively to that in the life of Christ that has a moral meaning. Kant interprets the other main dogmas of Christianity from a moral point of view, thus including them in his “religion within the limits of one reason.” But Kant has a completely negative attitude towards the miracles of the Gospel, as well as miracles in general. Kant's doctrine of expediency and beauty, set forth in the Critique of Judgment is the third main part of critical philosophy. All the faculties of the human spirit can be reduced to three: educational capabilities, desirable And feeling pleasure or displeasure. The first receives its highest definition or normal form from the categories of reason, the second from the ideas of practical reason, the third from teleological and aesthetic reflection. In general, our judgments are either determining or reflective. The first subsume particular data under a general rule - such are all the judgments of the exact sciences; the latter perceive some specific pattern in these objects or evaluate them in relation to some goal. This goal can be subjective, that is, contained only in our imagination; or the goal is posited objectively, as something whose implementation is given by the reality of the object itself. Subjective reflection (since it has a general meaning) produces aesthetic judgments, objective ones - teleological ones. The formal expediency of the represented object psychologically corresponds to the well-known relationship between the imagination and the intelligentsia. When this relationship is agreement or harmony, precisely when an imaginary object in its particularity is consistent with its mental goal, then this causes in us a feeling of pleasure, otherwise - displeasure; Thus, the purposeful state - harmonious and pleasant - of our mental powers directly corresponds to the contemplated purposiveness. It does not follow from this that the essence of aesthetic judgments can be reduced to a subjective feeling of pleasure. Aesthetic pleasure is a special type of pleasure, definitely different from others. We like the beautiful, but we also like what is useful to our body (for example, nutritious items), or what satisfies our passions; on the other hand, for moral feeling there is nothing more pleasant than virtue. But neither one nor the other is aesthetic pleasure; both of them have this in common with each other that their objects give us needed that is, that our will is interested in them (the lower, sensual will in the first case, the higher, moral will in the second). In contrast, aesthetic pleasure is defined as pure or disinterested; his objects are not materially needed, they cause pleasure alone presentation their forms(whereas the presentation of a moral duty can be pleasant only in connection with its actual fulfillment, and the presentation of a nutritious object causes pleasure in a hungry person only in view of the impending satiation). Further, aesthetic enjoyment There is universal is necessary but at the same time it is not determined by abstract concepts, but has directly contemplative character.--Feeling beautiful refers to the shape of objects; but form is a limitation - and there are objects that we aesthetically like by removing all restrictions, that is, by their immensity and, consequently, by the negation of form. The sight of a starry sky or an endless sea evokes a disinterested and weak-willed pleasure, ending in the idea, universal and necessary, therefore, according to all these signs, aesthetic; however, its object is not form, as in beauty, but, on the contrary, the abolition of all form in immensity and infinity. On this basis, Kant distinguishes from the beautiful sublime(das erhabene), which he divides into the mathematically sublime or great and dynamically sublime or mighty. Under certain individual conditions, the aesthetic ability to enjoy the beautiful and sublime transforms into the ability to create objects that evoke these feelings, that is, works of art. Such ability is genius, in which a strong imagination is balanced by a special receptivity of the mind. Kant limits genius to one area of ​​art. Beautiful and sublime works of both nature and art are expedient subjectively, that is, in relation to our aesthetic feeling and idea. But there is an objective purposefulness in nature, precisely in the field of living organic nature. In an organic being there is an internal purposiveness, which consists in the fact that all its parts in their structure, relationship and action are determined by one common goal, which is not outside it, but is the own life of this being as a whole. The mutual dependence of the parts and their internal subordination to the whole as a goal are also characteristic of a work of art; But natural or organic differs from this aesthetic expediency in that, by virtue of it, the organism creates and reproduces itself, without the need for an outside artist. Recognition of objective purposiveness in nature leads, from Kant’s point of view, to a certain antinomy. On the one hand, his theoretical natural philosophy states: “In the natural scientific explanation of things according to critical principles there is no other causality than mechanical”; on the other hand, the “criticism of the faculty of judgment” recognizes that organisms are created from within according to the idea of ​​a goal, which determines their entire actual life. The resolution of the antinomy states: neither the natural scientific knowledge of mechanical causality, nor the reflective understanding of organic purposiveness has as its subject the thing in itself or true being, but only phenomena determined by the activity of our mind, which, as a theoretical understanding, produces and therefore cognizes their causal connection according to mechanical laws, but as a reflection or teleological force of judgment creates, and therefore sees their expediency. This imaginary resolution of the imaginary antinomy, which ends the last of Kant’s three main philosophical works, especially clearly reveals the fundamental flaw of his entire philosophy, which necessarily caused the further movement of speculative thought and makes all attempts to return philosophy to pure Kantianism unsuccessful. Criticism of Kant's philosophy. The positive essence of this philosophy can be expressed in two words: the dependence of the world of phenomena on the mind and the unconditional independence of the moral principle. The mind can only cognize what is created by the mind - and indeed, the entire world we know is formed by the mind, through its inherent forms of sensory intuition and rational categories. This statement denies the apparent independence of external things and phenomena; everything that we actually know from things turns into a representation of the mind. Both this affirmation and this denial are unconditionally true and constitute that new point of view, which Kant, of all philosophers, was the first to adopt with complete firmness and clarity. With this, he elevated philosophical thinking to a higher level (compared to its previous state), from which it can never descend. But for philosophy (as well as for physical science) it is not enough to replace the apparent with the true - it is also necessary to give the true point of view such completeness and certainty that it would be possible to satisfactorily explain the very fact of deceptive appearance. After all, it is not due to ignorance alone, as the ancient Indian sages believed, that we distinguish reality from representation in the cognizable, i.e., we take some representations for res. The theory of Copernicus (with which Kant compares his philosophy) acquired its final significance in science due to the fact that it not only represents the real appearance of the solar system, but also explains quite satisfactorily those apparent movements celestial bodies, which were previously taken for real. But Kant did not bring the philosophical truth he had comprehended to the proper completeness and certainty, he stopped halfway and therefore did not avoid obvious contradictions. The mind is predominantly critical and formal, he was content with abstract correctness general principles, comparing them with reality, but not caring that they penetrate and comprehend it. Having understood with complete clarity that the world is knowable only because it is produced by the mind, or that everything we know is a product of the mind, he built an entire system on this truth general formulas, without paying any attention to the most essential question for living consciousness: what, exactly, is this creative mind and what is its relationship to the given empirical mind of each individual person? When Kant argued that space and time are only forms of intuition of the human mind, he obviously did not mean his own mind, which itself arose and grew in certain spatial and temporal conditions and, therefore, could not be the creator of these conditions. It is clear that the forms of space and time are equally produced by every mind. Plurality itself (many minds), as is undoubtedly true in general and as Kant recognized in particular, is a category of mind; however, it obviously cannot be initially and exclusively a category (i.e., a rule and method of manifestation) one of many minds i.e. already defined by this category. It, like everything that constitutes a common condition for all empirical minds (hence also the forms of space and time), cannot only be the product of some empirical subject or subjects. Kant himself distinguishes the transcendental subject from the empirical, but dwells so little on this most important distinction that it completely disappears among the immeasurable multitude of scholastic and useless distinctions and terms - it disappears so much that many later interpreters and critics unintentionally confuse two subjects, Kant’s idealism is given an empirical-psychological character and thus turns all critical philosophy into sheer absurdity. Only through the proper development of the idea of ​​a transcendental subject can Kant's main idea, that all objects and phenomena we know are ideas or thoughts of the mind, receive its true rational meaning - otherwise it destroys itself. If everything that I can know - all objects and phenomena - are only my ideas, that is, they exist only because I think about them, then I myself exist only in my own idea or because I actually think about myself ; and in this case, Kant’s entire teaching about the transcendental unity of consciousness necessarily turns out to be a simple petitio principii 11. To avoid this, it is necessary to decisively distinguish between the actual consciousness of the (empirical) subject, i.e., his conditional and intermittent thinking, which cannot in any way serve as the basis for either his own or someone else’s being, from the transcendental subject, or the abiding and universal mind, which thinking, with its universal and necessary forms and categories, creates and determines all objects and phenomena (and, consequently, myself as a phenomenon) completely independently of my or anyone else’s psychological states. The entire cognizable world of phenomena is only a representation, moreover, it is a representation of my mind, since my mind coincides with the transcendental mind (that is, formally - always, materially - under certain conditions); but this same world, without ceasing to be a representation (namely, of a transcendental subject), receives the meaning of external independent existence for me (as an empirical subject), since I find and affirm myself as one of the phenomena of this world. If in the ethical sphere I, as practical reason, am a self-legitimate creator of the moral order, and I, as a sensual and evil being, must obey this moral order as a law external to me, then, in the same way, in the sphere of knowledge I, as pure reason (i.e. . that is, since this mind acts in me or manifests itself through me), I create, according to the forms and categories inherent in me, the whole world of phenomena, and I, as an empirical subject, entering into the composition of this world, obey its laws, or the natural course of things, both external and necessary conditions my own being. From this point of view, the abyss assumed by Kant between moral world and physical. Between both, i.e., more precisely, between a person’s position in one and the other, there is not only a correspondence, but also a direct internal connection. Truth is cognized by the empirical mind only formally, just as moral goodness exists for the empirical, heteronomous will only in the form of duty. The world of phenomena looms over the empirical mind as something external and impenetrable, just as the moral order appears to the heteronomous will as an external and burdensome law. Consequently, for real knowledge of the truth, as well as for real moral improvement, we need a homogeneous transformation: the empirical mind must assimilate the creative power of the transcendental mind, and the heteronomous will must become self-legitimate, that is, make good the object of its own disinterested striving. This double transformation must obviously be our own doing, that is, it must come from our will, which sets itself truth and goodness as an unconditional goal; Thus, the initiative belongs to the moral principle in us, and the “primacy of practical reason” receives from this point of view an even deeper meaning than in which Kant asserted it, for whom, however, it will remain great merit the first herald in the philosophy of unconditional, pure or autonomous morality. His derivation and threefold definition of the categorical imperative gave ethics a foundation equal in reliability to the axioms of pure mathematics. On the contrary, his “metaphysical fundamental principles of natural science”, connected more by words than by thoughts, with the “criticism of pure reason,” have a dubious philosophical significance. The most important and difficult question in philosophical science about nature there is a question about matter; it has the same meaning here as in philosophical anthropology belongs to the question of free will. In his “Metaphysische Anfangsgründe” Kant gives a number of definitions of matter: it is “movable in space”, “being that fills space”, “motive force”, and finally, “substance of motion”. Any dogmatic philosopher could subscribe to all these definitions, even if he was a supporter of materialism (in its dynamic variety). How, however, do these definitions relate to Kant’s own principles? What do the words “being filling space” mean for critical philosophy? After all, space is only a visual act of our mind; it does not exist in itself, but only seems by us - how can representation be filled with being? One cannot get away from this with a general statement that Kant’s entire metaphysics of matter must be related to the world as a phenomenon; The concept of phenomenon also has a certain meaning of actuality in Kant. representation, conditioned by the representing mind, and this term cannot be used as a false mark for the passage of any dogmatic goods through critical customs. From a critical point of view, when we talk about the being or existence of something, we mean one of three things: either it is a thing in itself, possessing genuine existence, but completely unknowable, or it is a phenomenon, that is, a representation in our consciousness , or, finally, this is one of the general conditions of any idea or phenomenon, that is, some a priori form or category of our mind. In which of these three senses is existence attributed to matter? It cannot be a “thing in itself,” because then it would be absolutely unknowable, whereas, according to Kant, it is not only knowable, but is also the only object of natural scientific knowledge. But matter is also not a phenomenon or a representation, that is, a sensory object, for it is not represented at all and is not subject to any feelings - you cannot see, hear, touch matter; our sensations relate to bodies, but the concepts of matter and body are not identical, for we are talking about the “matter of bodies”; further, we distinguish mental phenomena from material ones, therefore, matter is what distinguishes one type of phenomena from others, and not one of the phenomena; it is general, united and abiding in all phenomena of the second kind; Kant finally defines it as force, but force is not a phenomenon, but a cause of phenomena - in a word, it is ultimately reduced to signs that are rationally conceivable, and not sensually represented. So, it remains to recognize matter as one of the mental conditions of our knowledge or the world of phenomena; but it cannot be reduced to one of their visual forms: as filling space and abiding in time, it is neither space nor time, therefore, for it only the realm of rational categories remains. And indeed, it is easy to reduce it, as Kant himself partly does, to the categories of reality, substance, causality and necessity. But what does this mean from the point of view of critical philosophy? Just because we think of something as a substance, it does not follow that it is a true substance apart from our thinking; otherwise the soul would be such a substance that Kant resolutely rejects it as a “paralogism” in his criticism of rational psychology. This means that matter is not substance, but only our thought about substance; but then this will essentially be Berkeley’s idealism, which Kant always so zealously disavows. To avoid it from this side, he makes some vague references to matter as the original basis (or cause) of those sensible data(sensations) that are independent of our mind and constitute the material of its constructions. But such a view, if we dwell on it seriously, would, firstly, make matter a thing in itself, and secondly, would create from the category of causality a way of actually knowing this thing in itself (since matter would then be known as a genuine the cause producing our sensations), which contradicts the very essence of critical philosophy, and, finally, thirdly, such a view completely disagrees with the actual psychophysiological genesis of our sensory knowledge. There is no doubt, in fact, that our sensations - visual, auditory, tactile, etc. - are caused not by some things in themselves, but by known, definite phenomena, i.e., creations of the mind. True, from Kant’s point of view, something inexplicable and even downright absurd emerges here: those sensations from which our mind creates phenomena turn out to be conditioned by the action of these very phenomena. Thus, there is no doubt that the phenomenon of the sun with its rays is created by our mind from visual sensations, and these sensations themselves just as undoubtedly come from nothing other than the action of these same solar rays on our visual organs. The only way to get out of this false circle without falling into naive realism is the one to which I hinted above—namely, the consistent development of the idea of ​​the transcendental subject in its difference and relationship with the empirical subject; here matter would find its rightful and decent place. The question of free will (from its metaphysical side) is resolved in Kant just as unsatisfactorily as the question of matter. The distinction between intelligible character, that is, us as a being in ourselves, and empirical character, that is, us as a phenomenon, is useless for real explanation. The assertion that the intelligible character is the free cause of the empirical, or that it freely creates the latter independently of time, has no conceivable content. The concept of creation is reduced to the concept of a temporary occurrence; when I say that something was created even by direct and instantaneous creativity, I mean at least two successive moments in time: the first, when this created thing did not yet exist, and the second, when it appeared; the same should be said about the concept of an act. Free will on this basis is not only something unknowable, but also something unthinkable; In general, the opposition that Kant makes here between thinking and cognition is completely incorrect. Of course, not every thought is knowledge, but every reliable thought is certainly knowledge; if we have sufficient grounds to assert that a known thought is reliable, then we thereby affirm not only a subjective, but also an objective meaning behind it - we affirm that through it the truth is known, and, therefore, we attribute to it the character of knowledge. That there is only thought and not knowledge refers to the possibility alone, and not to the reality of objects. Meanwhile, Kant tries to deduce free will as something real and reliable; but in this case it is knowable (namely, it is knowable as truth), and according to Kant’s principles it cannot be such. Equally unfounded is the distinction between reflective and determining judgments, introduced by Kant in the “critique of judgment” to explain the beautiful and the expedient. There was no mention of him when Kant examined the nature of knowledge; then judgments were divided into synthetic and analytical, a priori and a posteriori. The new division was invented in the most naive way when the need arose to protect preconceived thoughts from obvious contradictions with reality. In nature, we find the connection of phenomena according to goals precisely in organisms; hence the direct analytical conclusion that we perceive not only mechanical causality, but also expediency. If we actually discover the connection of phenomena according to goals, then it means that goals can be the subject of our knowledge: ab esse ad posse 1 2 valet consequentia. But Kant argues differently: since he (in the “Critique of Pure Reason” and in the “Metaphysische Anfangsgr [ünde der Naturwissenschaft]” argued that the object of knowledge can only be mechanical causality, then, therefore, natural purposiveness (in the reliability of which he, however, , has no doubt) cannot be an object of knowledge. What is it? Let it be an object reflections, and for the sake of this, let judgments be divided into determining (for mechanical causation) and reflective (for expediency). So dangerous are preconceived thoughts even to great critical minds. However, the ad hoc invention of artificial terms is generally one of Kant’s weaknesses. Quite often, for the sake of symmetry in some particular and completely unnecessary division of concepts, he invents special word , which then remains without any use, occurring only this once? At the same time, Kant falls into another, even more inconvenient extreme: he uses the same, sometimes very important term in different and even opposite senses. This, by the way, is his use of the terms “reason,” “metaphysics,” and “experience.” “Reason” has three main meanings for him: firstly, it is, in contrast to reason, a special ability to form ideas; secondly, reason (theoretical), including both reason and sensory perception, designates the entire sphere of our cognitive and mental activity, and the isolation of pure or a priori elements from this entire sphere constitutes in this sense “criticism of pure reason”; thirdly, finally, reason (practical) means self-determining will. By metaphysics, Kant means, on the one hand, the beyond (transcendental) and, therefore, illegal and imaginary use of the mind for the knowledge of essences or things in themselves: the soul, the world, God, and, on the other hand, he denotes the a priori and completely legitimate knowledge of phenomena from their general determining conditions or laws - such is the metaphysics of nature, based on the criticism of pure reason; finally, Kant calls metaphysics a system of a priori definitions of morality that are not cognitive, but only practically obligatory (metaphysics of morals). By experience, Kant means, on the one hand, that which is given in knowledge, independent of our mind, and, on the other hand, on the contrary, experience is a product of our mind, a construction that it makes from sensory data, through its a priori forms and categories. All the shortcomings of Kant's content and presentation cannot overshadow his great merits. He raised the general level of philosophical thinking; he put the main question of epistemology on a new basis and, in principle, resolved it satisfactorily; he made it forever impossible in philosophy to naively recognize space and time as independent realities or as ready-made properties of things; he established the unconditional primacy of practical reason or moral will, as a precondition for proper reality; he gave impeccable and final formulas of the moral principle and created pure or formal ethics, as a science as reliable as pure mathematics; finally, with his dialectical analysis of the old dogmatic metaphysics, he freed the human mind from crude and unworthy concepts about the soul, the world and God, and thereby aroused the need for more satisfactory foundations for our beliefs; In particular, with his criticism of pseudo-rational scholasticism in the field of theology, he rendered a service to true religion, which largely redeemed the one-sidedness of his own moral-rationalistic interpretation of religious facts. The place occupied by Kant in the historical and logical development of new philosophy is indicated by me in the article Hegel 13 . Kant's philosophy (especially the Critique of Pure Reason) produced a powerful movement of minds and gave rise to an immense literature. But Kant had relatively few unconditional followers. This is sufficiently explained by the fact that some of the most important questions brought to the fore by the Critique of Pure Reason were left by Kant himself either without any solution or with an ambiguous solution, which required further independent work of thought. Of the strict Kantians, the most remarkable are: Yog. Schultz, whose interpretations of the critique of pure reason are fully approved by Kant, L. G. Jacob and K. H. E. Schmid, who published several philosophical textbooks on Kant, K. L. Reingold (“Letters on Kant’s Philosophy”), with With all his enthusiasm for the new point of view, he had to retreat from the teacher’s system and, trying to correct it, changed his views several times. The great poet Schiller treated Kantianism even more freely, having mastered and talentedly developed only one side of the teaching, namely the ideas about life, beauty and art. Among Kant’s opponents, worthy of mention are: Harve (from the point of view of popular philosophy of the 18th century), Selle and Weishaupt (from the point of view of Locke), Feder and Tiedemann (from the point of view of Locke and partly Leibniz), pure Leibnizians Eberhard and Schwab, the skeptic G. E. Schulze (in his "Aenesidemus").

NOTES

Vl. Solovyov taught one of the most important sections in the Brockhaus and Efron Dictionary for several years - the history of philosophy. Among his own articles (and there are about 200 of them) on various branches of humanitarian knowledge, articles on Kant and Hegel, Comte, Plato, Danilevsky, and Leontiev stand out. A number of articles by Vl. Solovyov is devoted to basic philosophical concepts (for example, free will, reality, world process, nature, space, etc.). The first article by Vl. Solovyova appeared in Volume V (1) of the Dictionary, the last one in Volume XXIX (2). Of the two hundred articles, only a little more than 60 were included in Russian Collected Works (see: Soloviev Vl. Collection Op.: In 10 volumes. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg, 1911-1914. T. 10). They are presented more fully in the German edition of the philosopher. First published in volume XIV (2) of the Encyclopedic Dictionary. Included in the first and second Russian collected works. About the attitude of Vl. There were completely opposite points of view between Solovyov and Kant. Thus, opening the 56th issue of “Questions of Philosophy and Psychology”, entirely dedicated to the recently deceased philosopher, is an article by the prominent Russian neo-Kantian A. I. Vvedensky “On mysticism and criticism in the theory of knowledge of V. S. Solovyov” (Speech delivered in public meeting of the St. Petersburg Philosophical Society, held in memory of Vl. S. Solovyov on December 3, 1900) declared Solovyov’s merit “the spread of criticism among us” and “replenishment of the study of Kant” (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology. 1901. No. 56. P. 17). Vvedensky’s point of view was sharply criticized in an article by Vl. Ern “Gnoseology of V. S. Solovyov” (Collection first about Vladimir Solovyov, M., 1911. P. 129--207), in which Vvedensky was reproached for the fact that he “is not so much studying Solovyov’s epistemology as neocantizes about her" (ibid., pp. 129--130). For some overview of opinions about Vl. Solovyov’s attitude towards Kant and a modern historical and philosophical solution to this problem, see: Losev A. F. Vl. Soloviev. pp. 79--84. 1 General natural history and theory of the sky (1755) // Kant I. Collection cit.: In 6 vols. M., 1964. T. 1. 2 The question of whether the earth is aging from a physical point of view (1754). On the causes of earthquakes (1756). New notes to explain the theory of winds (1756) // Ibid. . 3 On the form and principles of the sensory and intelligible // Kant I. Collection op. T. 2. 4 See: Gulyga A.V. Kant. M., 1977. pp. 42-44. 5 Apparently, this refers to a letter to Markus Hertz dated June 7, 1771, in which Kant wrote about his work on this work (Kant I. Treatises and letters. M., 1980. S. 523--526). Previously, the same work appeared in the form of a plan in Kant’s letter to I. G. Lambert dated September 2, 1770 (ibid., pp. 520-523); we mean the following works of Kant: Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that may appear as a science (Collected works. Vol. 4. Part 1); Foundations of the metaphysics of morality (ibid.); Metaphysical principles of natural science (Vol. 6); Critique of Practical Reason (Vol. 4. Part 1); Critique of Judgment (Vol. 6); Religion within the limits of reason alone (Kant I. Treatises and letters). 6 See: Fisher Kuno. History of new philosophy. St. Petersburg, 1901. T. IV. Kant. P. 280. 7 or anticipation of perception (see: Kant I. Collection op. T. 3. pp. 241--248). 8 Ibid. pp. 248-278. 9 Ibid. pp. 280-286. 10 See: Fisher Kuno. Decree. op. P. 627. 11 anticipation of the basis (lat.) - a logical error consisting in the assumption of an unproven premise for proof. 12 inference from the actual to the possible is valid (lat.). 13 See present. volume. pp. 424-426.