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from Finnish "Mannerheim-linja"

Defense structures (Mannerheim Line) served to protect Finland from the threat of the USSR. They were located between the Gulf of Finland and Ladoga. The complex was created in the 20s-30s of the twentieth century. The length of which was 132 km. The most significant battles in this area took place in 1940 (Winter War). The defense capability of this structure was exaggerated by both sides. The name from the surname Mannerheim did not appear immediately. Initially, the defensive line was named after Enkel. And already at the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, the complex was renamed.

Features of the terrain in the area of the Mannerheim Line

The forests on the territory of the line became a natural defense, which had a large number of stones and boulders. The marshy area also helped with this, not big rivers and lakes. Such natural conditions made it possible to carry out defense with small forces. Mannerheim noted a significant drawback when visiting the then Enckel Line. Pillboxes were required, and their construction without a concrete pad was impossible. The soil did not have a rocky base, which would have led to the subsidence of the structure. It was decided to modernize the existing ones and build other pillboxes.
The "Mannerheim" line as a defense against the Soviet Union briefly

How the Mannerheim defensive line was created

When did the revolution take place in Tsarist Russia, the Finns declared their country's independence in 1917. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union recognized the independence of the new state, the Finns did not believe that the USSR was telling the truth. Relations between the two states became more tense.
In principle, communism was a kind of threat to democracy. The situation was dangerous for Finland, since the capital of the communist revolution (Petrograd) was especially close to the Finns. The former general of Tsarist Russia, Mannerheim, resolutely opposed the Bolsheviks. During the Russian Civil War, in 1919, the Finns even supported the onslaught of the White Guards on Petrograd, but this plan was abandoned (the Finns did not believe that the Whites would defend the independence of Finland). Construction of the line on the Karelian Isthmus had already begun when the Bolsheviks defeated the Russian civil war in 1922. The defense was built in two stages: 1920-1924 and 1932-1939.

Planning
In 1918, during civil war V Russian Empire, the Finnish government and high command began to develop defense plans to protect against a possible attack on Finland from Soviet Russia. The main of these routes was the Karelian Isthmus. The most vulnerable part of this isthmus was in the west, near the Gulf of Finland, the eastern part was better protected by natural waterways.

The first plans for the defensive line were drawn up by A. Rappe at the beginning of May 1918. This line was placed near the border and was intended to protect two railway lines that crossed the border.
Finland had just become independent and did not have guard troops and the border area was unsafe. Border security on the isthmus was the responsibility of the 2nd Division in June 1918. They were also given responsibility for the construction of fortifications. Later it was decided to use natural natural features for defensive purposes.

In October, the Finnish government allocated 300 thousand marks for the work that was to be carried out by German and Finnish sappers, as well as Russian prisoners of war. However, the money allocated was not enough and the lack building materials, and qualified work force, prevented the construction of their own fortifications. With Germany's defeat in World War I, Baron von Brandenstein's plan was broken.

1919-1924
In October 1919, the commander on the Mannerheim Line was Major General Oskar Enckel. During the first period of construction, Fabricius proposed moving the line of defense further to the southeast. General base discussed the matter, but Enckel's earlier plans were followed. In addition, lack of funds led to disagreements between the officers, and Enckel resigned. In 1924, construction work was interrupted for quite a long period.
The first hundred small bunkers were built in 1920-1924. For reasons of economy, the first stage of rigid reinforcement was made of unreinforced concrete. All this provided only partial protection.
The compressive density of concrete was too low and could only provide protection against artillery.

1932-1937
The second stage of construction began on April 1, 1934. Two new types of bunkers were developed. These pillboxes were mainly intended to house troops. The size of the bunker was 15-20 meters long and 5-6 meters wide.
Between 1932 and 1938 the budget for defenses was such that the Finns could only build two or three bunkers a year. In 1936 and 1937 they built two large reference points. The new bunkers differed from the previous ones in design. The peculiarity was that the deployment of troops was between the cannon chambers, which saved the cost of expensive reinforced concrete structures. The roof was protected by two to three meters of soil and one to three meters of rock debris.

1938-1939
Defensive fortifications on the isthmus of the Karelian Peninsula received significantly more funds and resources in May 1938. The situation in Europe has noticeably worsened. The Finns built new fortresses and modernized old ones. Construction began on seven new bunkers, Su 1-7. Su 3 and Su 4 were for army deployment, the rest were for machine guns. They also modernized structures built in the 1920s.

Finland and Soviet intelligence

Soviet intelligence officers worked in Finland at several levels. Soviet intelligence published a top-secret and very detailed photo a book of Finnish terrain and fortifications in 1938. The book includes a seven-page report and 22 pages of maps and photographs. Each issue was numbered. Soviet intelligence was active and increased in 1938, and was expanded even further in 1939. Before Winter War, Soviet intelligence published a book for Red Army officers. The guide includes over 200 pages of maps and photographs.
The Soviet Union received detailed map defense on the isthmus. The German military attaché in Helsinki transferred it to Moscow in September 1939.
Winter War

In the Winter War, the line stopped the Soviet advance for two months. Fort Saarenpää was attacked by the Soviet battleships Marat (later Petropavlovsk) and October Revolution (in December 1939 and January 1940).

During the war, both Finnish and Soviet propaganda greatly exaggerated the scale of the line's fortifications. The first to strengthen the morale of the population, and the second to explain the slow advance of their troops against the Finnish defense. Subsequently, the myth of the “strongly fortified” Mannerheim line entered the official Soviet military history and some Western sources. The vast majority of Mannerheim's line consisted of simple trenches and other field fortifications. The bunkers along the line were mostly small and their number was not large.

After the Winter War, Soviet sappers destroyed the remaining installations. As the war continued, the line was not restored.

In 1939-1940 of the last century, the Finns were able to prove to the whole world that the idea of defending their own borders using fortified areas (URs) had not completely outlived its usefulness. The Finns were able to build many protective structures for artillery and machine guns, various kinds of underground warehouses and shelters, a number of anti-personnel and anti-tank barriers were erected, making bunkers the main trump card. It was the bunkers that formed the basis of a strong defense, and although there were not many of them, they were located in the right numbers and in the right places.

The Mannerheim Line, named after the Finnish marshal, was a chain of fortifications 135 km long and up to 90 km deep on the Karelian Isthmus from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. The shore of the bay was covered with large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, the Finns erected a number of reinforced concrete forts, installing 8 units of 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns in them.

Wherein the basis of the fortifications was the terrain itself. The entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus was covered with forests, crossed by dozens of small and medium-sized rivers, and many lakes. Numerous boulders and rocky ridges were found everywhere in the forests. The Belgian General Badu noted: “ I have never seen anywhere in the world natural conditions more favorable for the construction of fortified lines than on the Karelian Isthmus».

The basis of the line were concrete structures tactically connected to each other - bunkers, shelters and command posts. Main position The Mannerheim line consisted of 22 strong points, occupying 3–4 km along the front and up to 1–2 km in depth. Each strong point consisted of several reinforced concrete bunkers and additional field fortifications (bunkers, dugouts, machine gun nests, rifle trenches). The strongholds were equipped minefields, anti-tank barriers and numerous rows of barbed wire.

They are divided according to construction into the first generation (1920-1937) and the second generation (1938-1939). First generation pillboxes They were quite small, designed to install 1-2 machine guns, and did not have shelters for the garrison or any internal equipment. The thickness of their reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, and the thickness of the floors was 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, most of these bunkers were modernized: the walls were thickened, and armor plates were placed on the embrasures.

Second generation pillboxes received the name “millionaires” from the Finnish population, since their cost exceeded 1 million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such bunkers were erected. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, and was able to extract funds from the government for their construction.

“Millionaires” were large modern reinforced concrete structures that had 4-6 embrasures, mainly of flanking action, of which 1-2 could be guns. Some of the most advanced and heavily fortified bunkers were Sj4 “Poppius” (had embrasures for firing in the western casemate) and Sj5 “Millionaire” (had embrasures for firing in both casemates).

Flanking fire bunkers were called “Le Bourget” casemates, named after the French engineer who introduced them back in the First World War. Such bunkers were perfectly camouflaged with snow and stones, which made them very difficult to detect on the ground; in addition, it was almost impossible to penetrate these casemates from the front.

According to the data contained in the book “Secrets and Lessons of the Winter War”, the Mannerheim line consisted of about 280 reinforced concrete machine-gun and artillery bunkers. Not too many - about 2 bunkers per 1 km of front, if you stretch them all in one line, but they were located at a depth of 90 km. Thus, one bunker accounted for almost 43 km 2. Of course, in addition to the bunkers, there were many other engineering fortifications, but it was the bunkers that were the basis, the core of each strong point.

Invisible pillboxes

It would seem that it could be simpler - they discovered a bunker, rolled out a gun for direct fire and planted a shell in its embrasure. However, this can only be found in movies or paintings. The attacking Red Army soldiers could not see the real Finnish bunkers in principle; they were hiding behind the earthen hills. It was not possible to reach them with artillery or tank fire.

The main difficulty in fighting Finnish bunkers was that they were all very skillfully tied to the terrain and located so that long distance they were simply not visible, hiding in the folds of the terrain or the forest, and artillery and tanks could not approach them closely due to numerous artificial and, most importantly, natural obstacles.

In addition, many pillboxes were intended only for flanking fire and were not visible from the front at all. To fire at a bunker, a tank or gun had to be turned around, exposing its side to fire from the front.

The excellent location of firing points on the ground led to numerous mistakes by artillery observers, who simply did not see the explosions of their shells or incorrectly determined the range to the target. As a result, the Soviet infantry found itself face to face with the bunker, the bunkers surrounding it and the trenches of the Finnish infantry. And the Finnish infantrymen shot excellently.

As a result, there is a huge consumption of ammunition for each bunker, large losses in tanks and people, troops are marking time, despite overwhelming superiority in all types of weapons.

Common features of Finnish bunkers

This information is taken from a report dated April 1, 1940, by Army Commander 2nd Rank N.N. Voronov, chief of artillery of the Red Army. Later he would become the famous chief marshal of artillery, who already in 1943, together with Rokossovsky, would accept the surrender of the 6th German army in the ruins of Stalingrad.

1. Almost most of the bunkers were on the surface, and only a number of them partially crashed into folds of terrain or hillsides. Talk about underground structures in in this case not necessary (especially for multi-storey buildings), in best case scenario Some bunkers can be classified as semi-underground. The explanation for this is that in the conditions of the Karelian Isthmus it is very difficult to find places where structures could be lowered underground. There is either rocky soil, or groundwater very close to the surface, or even a swamp.

2. Most of The bunkers were intended to conduct flanking fire(firing along the front) into the flank of the attacking troops and was not designed to repel frontal attacks. It can be noted that each bunker covered the approaches to the neighboring bunker. From the front, such bunkers were protected by folds of the terrain (they were built on the reverse slopes of heights, or had artificial hills or forests in front of them). Most bunkers were inaccessible to guns and attacking tanks. Flanking fire allowed bunker garrisons to cut off attacking infantry from their tanks.

3. According to the projects, bunkers were supposed to withstand direct hits from shells with a caliber of up to 203 mm, but in practice some of them were made of concrete Low quality(300-450 kg/sq.cm. with the minimum resistance for fortification structures - more than 750 kg/sq.cm.).

4. The bunkers were heated by stoves(although some bunkers were equipped with central heating). Lighting is partly electric, partly using kerosene lamps Bat" Water supply from wells dug in the barracks. Latrine places there were no bunkers. Communication between bunkers is partly telephone, partly only visual.

This report will not really please People's Commissar Voroshilov, but it reflected true position affairs on the Mannerheim line. This line of defense could not be compared with the French Maginot line, which had multi-story, powerful defensive structures, and solid artillery, including large-caliber guns. The same report also contains information that the Finnish army had a very small number of artillery pieces, mostly outdated systems.

In his memoirs, Voronov listed examples of Finnish artillery. There were 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns (the Finns managed to stuff these guns into a number of bunkers during the battles), 3-inch Russian guns of the 1902 model, 12 and 15-cm howitzers of the Schneider system from the First World War. Most of the shells for Finnish heavy artillery were produced before 1917, which is why up to 1/3 of the shells simply did not explode.

For the most part, the Finns simply had nothing to install in bunkers, so most of them were machine guns. Only 8 bunkers had artillery. Moreover, a number of them did not even have special devices for mounting machine guns (casemate systems); the Finns used ordinary easel and light machine guns in them.

A machine gunner, sitting on a bicycle saddle, could fire at the enemy for several hours without a break..

Many bunkers did not have permanent garrisons trained to conduct combat in such a structure; they were occupied by ordinary rifle units that brought with them weapons, ammunition and food, i.e. some bunkers simply did not have reserves for long-term autonomous operation.

The installation of armored caps on bunkers built after 1936, used to protect observers, turned out to be erroneous - they only unmasked the structure. Periscopes, which were more suitable for monitoring the terrain and did not reveal bunkers, were beyond the means of the rather poor Finnish army.

In the end, not at all good location, nor the stamina of the defenders did not bring the Finns victory. The Mannerheim Line was broken, and the enormous numerical and technical superiority of the Red Army took its toll. All bunkers that got in the way of the Soviet infantry were destroyed either by heavy howitzer artillery or by sappers.

/Based on materials popmech.ru, army.armor.kiev.ua And en.wikipedia.org /

Propaganda film about the fighting of the Red Army and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet during the war between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

On November 26, 1939, the USSR government sent a note of protest to the Finnish government regarding the artillery shelling, which, according to the Soviet side, was carried out from Finnish territory. Responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities by the Soviet side was placed entirely on Finland. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland (with the second largest city of Vyborg). 430 thousand Finnish residents were forcibly resettled by Finland from the front-line areas inland. The outbreak of hostilities led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR, as an aggressor, was expelled from the League of Nations.

PRODUCTION: Leningrad newsreel studio

The film has entered the "Public Domain" category.

FILM CREATORS:

Editing directors: , N. Komarevtsev, V. Solovtsov
Operators: N. Blazhkov, F. Ovsyanikov, P. Paley, G. Simonov, Y. Slavin, Efim Uchitel, S. Fomin, G. Shulyatin, F. Pechul (uncredited), S. Shkolnikov (uncredited)
Chiefs film crews : A. Kuznetsov, M. Naginsky
Consultant: Hero Soviet Union brigade commander A.F. Khrenov
Text: B. Agapov
Lyrics: A. Gotovich
Music songs and musical arrangement : Dmitry Astradantsev
Sound engineers: I. Volk, D. Ovsyanikov

REFERENCE

1. In 1936, partial modernization of the pillboxes built in 1924 began ( Oscar Enckel line). The first one was built in 1937 dot - “millionaire”(it cost 1 million Finnish marks). The initiator of the work was the baron Mannerheim, returned to big politics. 7 “millionaires” were built on the Enkel line.
New pillboxes met the requirements modern warfare, were built from high-quality concrete, had flanking fire embrasures and powerful protection from steel plates installed at an angle. When a shell hit such a pillbox, it hit the shield and flew off, exploding to the side. Unlike other pillboxes of the Karelian Isthmus, the “millionaires” had not only powerful protection, but also modern system life support. The remaining pillboxes on the Karelian Isthmus were machine-gun and unable to withstand tanks. The Finns failed to build a continuous concrete defense line on the Karelian Isthmus. 22 resistance centers were created covering the main roads. Soviet propaganda talked about 343 impregnable concrete fortresses on the Mannerheim Line. But research by local historians showed that on the Karelian Isthmus there were about 180.

2. Stalin demands that the Finnish government move the border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad and lease the Hanko Peninsula to accommodate a Soviet naval base. It is not possible to reach an agreement with Finland. On November 30, 1939, units of the Leningrad Military District crossed the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus. The Red Army soldiers were led to believe that they were going to help the Finnish workers pay off the White Guards.

3. From December 17 to December 25, 1939 at an altitude of 65.5 meters the bloodiest battle took place initial stage Soviet-Finnish war. The 20th Heavy Tank Brigade tried to take a pillbox on the Mannerheim Line. In many sectors of the front, Red Army units were unable to even approach the line of permanent structures. Of the 200 Finnish pillboxes, only 55 were in the combat contact zone. On the eastern sector of the front, in the Taipole region, Soviet troops quickly destroyed all concrete structures, but were unable to break through the defenses. It rested exclusively on wood-earth fortifications and trenches. December 25 Stalin ordered the assault to stop and prepare for the decisive battle.

4. The Finns defeated 5 divisions (and completely destroyed 3) and a tank brigade of the Red Army north of Ladoga. On February 11, 1940, the Red Army launched an attack on Karelian Isthmus. The troops attacked along the entire front. Special assault groups consisting of tanks, infantry and sappers broke through the Mannerheim line. Soviet sappers made a breakthrough, lined the embrasures with explosives, and blew them up along with themselves. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line in the main direction, Soviet troops developed an offensive towards Vyborg.

Information from open sources was used.

Quotes

[...]the Russians even during the war floated the myth of the “Mannerheim Line”. It was argued that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus was based on an unusually strong and built last word technology, a defensive rampart that can be compared to the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever broken through. The Russian breakthrough was “a feat unparalleled in the history of all wars”... All this is nonsense; in reality the situation looks completely different... There was a defensive line, of course, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine gun nests and two dozen new pillboxes built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the “Mannerheim Line”. Its strength was the result of the stamina and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures.
Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Memoirs. Publishing house "VAGRIUS". 1999.,

[...]Weak sides Finnish long-term structures are as follows: inferior quality of concrete in first-term buildings, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, lack of rigid reinforcement in first-term buildings.
The strong qualities of bunkers were large quantities fire embrasures that shot through the near and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, in the rich filling of gaps.[...]
Major General of the Engineering Troops A. Khrenov (Battles in Finland, Military Publishing House of the NKO USSR, 1941),

Stalin is smart capable person, to justify the failures during the war with Finland, he invented the reason that we “suddenly” discovered a well-equipped Mannerheim line. A special film was released showing these structures to justify that it was difficult to fight against such a line and quickly win a victory.
Anastas Mikoyan,

[...]True, a detailed description of Mannerheim’s entire line has not been carried out anywhere. Some of our intelligence officers, as was clear from the materials sent to the LVO, considered even this line to be nothing more than propaganda. As it turned out later in practice, this was a gross miscalculation... Before starting action, I once again requested reconnaissance in Moscow (regarding the Finnish fortifications - Author), but again received information that was later not confirmed, since it underestimated the real power of the Mannerheim line. Unfortunately, this created many difficulties. The Red Army literally had to lean into it to understand what it was.
Meretskov K. A. (In the service of the people. Pages of memoirs. M., 1969),

[...]And now I will allow myself, as a witness and participant in many events, to restore historical truth about intelligence and its imaginary sins in the Soviet-Finnish war... I remember well that all of us, employees of the operational department (on the eve and during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940, V. Novobranets worked in the operational department of the LVO Headquarters - Author) , used the so-called “black album”, which contained all the comprehensive data on Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus (“Mannerheim Line”). The album contained photographs and characteristics of each bunker: wall thickness, ramp, armament, etc. Later, already working at the Intelligence Agency, I again saw this “black album”. He was also at the headquarters of the active troops on the Karelian Isthmus. How dare government leaders claim that such data did not exist? The government itself is to blame for the unsuccessful initial actions of the troops, and first of all the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and Stalin personally, and not intelligence[...]
V.A. Rookie. On the eve of the war. Magazine "Znamya", 1990, No. 6.,

[...]The Mannerheim Line is the last defensive line in the history of mankind that played at least some role. Second World War showed that it is not pillboxes or bunkers that decide the matter, but tanks, bomber aircraft, attack aircraft and mechanization.
The Mannerheim Line is a phantom. For the Finns, it is a monument to their heroic resistance to the Red Army, which led to Finland remaining independent. For Soviet commanders, this is an excuse to Stalin for such huge losses. This is the line of our memory of the imperceptible but bloody Soviet-Finnish war.[...]
From the book “Without Moscow” by L. Lurie (2014),

The film was created as a report and explanation of long-term military operations (3.5 months at 70 kilometers of battlefield depth). In fact, as an idea of overcoming high-tech defense in the harsh conditions of a 40-degree winter.
The film clearly explains the main reasons for this war: the ability to create a powerful military group within an artillery shot of Leningrad, the participation of Western militaristic powers in the creation of the Mannerheim Line.
The film persistently creates the impression of an extremely difficult military operation: maps of defense in depth are shown, the number and details of enemy fortifications are reported, fierce resistance is described, and ingenious strategic and tactical decisions are told.
Kino-teatr.ru,

[...]no one is going to dispute the subsequent Finnish period of history and Mannerheim’s actions, no one is going to whitewash this period of history. In general, everything that happened is another proof of how dramatically the lives of many people have changed, October Revolution, whose centenary we will celebrate in a year. But at the same time, we must not forget the worthy service of General Mannerheim, which he performed in the interests of Russia.
Sergei Ivanov (from a speech at the opening ceremony in St. Petersburg memorial plaque Finnish Field Marshal Karl Mannerheim),

[...]To those who are shouting there now, I want to remind you from us: you don’t need to be holier than the Pope and don’t try to be a greater patriot and communist than Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, who personally defended Mannerheim, ensured his election and preservation followed him by the post of President of Finland and knew how to treat a defeated but worthy opponent with respect[...]
And here the plaque in honor of Mannerheim is another attempt of the Russian Military Historical Society, another of our attempts to overcome the tragic split in our society on the eve of the centenary of the Russian Revolution. That is why we are erecting monuments throughout the country to the heroes of the First World War, who later found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades.
V. Medinsky, Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation (from a speech at the installation ceremony of a memorial plaque in St. Petersburg),

The Mannerheim Line is a chain of military fortifications between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland, consisting of interconnected fortified concrete structures - bunkers, which were part of strongholds. Around them, mines and rows of barbed wire became impregnable barriers. In total, there were about 280 firing points on the Mannerheim Line, extending 135 km wide and 90 km deep. The fortifications appeared in the 20s of the 20th century on the initiative of the Finnish command to protect against Russian attacks. The creation of the fortification was supervised by Oscar Enkel. Gradually, the structures were strengthened, and the quality of materials improved, thereby modernizing the line of defense.

During the Russian-Finnish war in 1939, attacks Soviet troops fortified area ended in defeat. Combined with the difficult terrain and difficult terrain of the Karelian Isthmus, powerful defensive structures became impregnable. The line was named after the commander of the Finnish troops, Karl Mannerheim. It was possible to break through the defenses only two months later, and this became the turning point of the Winter War. Immediately after this, the defensive line was undermined by sappers. All that remained in place were engineering structures and many military installations, remains of shells and mines in huge concentrations, which turned this area into an open-air museum.

How to get there

On foot:
1. By train to Leipyasuo station, and from there along the forest path to the grader. Then turn left and go to height 65.5.
About 10 km from Leipyasuo station.
2. By train to Kirillovskoye station, then along the road to the tank training ground. At the training ground, follow the “Tank Director” to an altitude of 65.5.
From Kirillovsky to the training ground along an asphalt road - 10 km (you can catch a ride), along the "Tank Director" to an altitude of 65.5 - 4 km.
Total - 14 km.
3. By train to Gavrilovo station, further along the road to the grader, then turn left and up to height 65.5.
Approximately 12 km.

By car:

Along "Scandinavia" to Gavrilovo, then take a grader and drive to an altitude of 65.5.
From the junction with the Ring Road to height 65.5 - approximately 100 km.

Mannerheim Line (Russia) - description, history, location. Exact address, phone number, website. Tourist reviews, photos and videos.

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The Mannerheim Line is a whole complex of defensive structures created between 1920 and 1930. on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus. It was in these places that fierce battles took place during the terrible Soviet-Finnish or “Winter” War. In Finland, the “Mannerheim Line” was only called main line defense It was named in honor of the lieutenant general of the Russian army, the commander-in-chief of the marshal of the Finnish army, and later the president of Finland - Carl Gustav Mannerheim.

The strengthening of the strategically important region of the Karelian Isthmus began in 1918, that is, immediately after Finland gained independence, and continued until Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940. The initial line of defense was called the “Enkel Line” and crossed the entire Karelian Isthmus from Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland.

Despite the fact that by 1924 a powerful fortified area had appeared here, in 1927 it became clear that it was necessary to improve the defensive structures, which was done throughout 1931-1932. The new objects had enormous firepower, but were also expensive, for which they received the nickname “millionaires.”

Of course, the Mannerheim line played a certain role during the Soviet-Finnish War, but its significance was greatly exaggerated on both sides - on the Suomi side to strengthen morale, and on the USSR side to justify failures and heavy losses. The direct builder of the line and participant in the conflict, Carl Gustav Mannerheim, spoke about this. However, the fortifications that have survived today are of great historical interest.

To visit the defensive line, it is better to book an excursion, during which, in addition to a story and overview of the structures, you can see the weapons and equipment of both sides at war, as well as learn interesting details about the “Winter” War. Or even try a field lunch or tea by the fire.

Mannerheim Line

Coordinates

The most convenient section of the Mannerheim Line to visit is the fortified area of Summakylä, near the village of Kamenka. The distance from St. Petersburg to it is a little more than a hundred kilometers along the E18 highway, then take the exit to Kirillovskoye, then follow the A125 highway, and at the intersection with A125 turn left. Defense structures are located very close to the highway.