home-Outerwear-Draw a globe. How to draw the earth against the background of the starry sky? Detailed job description

Draw a globe. How to draw the earth against the background of the starry sky? Detailed job description

A squad (group) is in ambush.

Ambush- a method of obtaining intelligence information, in which a squad (a specially designated group of military personnel), located secretly, suddenly attacks the enemy in order to capture prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment. The objects of an ambush attack can be single soldiers and vehicles, enemy reconnaissance units and marching security units, rear units, headquarters and other facilities. Depending on the situation, an ambush can be organized in advance or in a short time by the decision of the senior commander, as well as by the decision of the commander of the reconnaissance agency operating behind enemy lines.

An ambush is set up in the enemy's likely directions of movement in places where surprise of an attack on him is ensured. The success of the ambush depends from the secrecy of its location, accurate fire, endurance, decisive and skillful actions of the scouts.

When an ambush is set up by a squad (group), capture and support subgroups are appointed from its composition (Fig. 7).

The capture subgroup is designed to capture prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment of the enemy. Three or four reconnaissance officers skilled in hand-to-hand combat, throwing hand grenades, and short-range fire at suddenly appearing targets can be assigned to the capture subgroup.

A support subgroup is created to stop the enemy, prohibit his approach (withdrawal) and cover the unit's retreat with fire after completing a combat mission. If the squad operates on a combat vehicle, it is appointed to include the crew of the combat vehicle, a machine gunner and a grenade launcher.

The squad (group) commander personally monitors the enemy, gives the command to open fire and controls the fire and actions of the personnel. If terrain conditions do not allow timely detection of the movement of a suitable enemy, the squad (group) commander appoints an observer, assigning him a place for observation. The observer is obliged to establish and report the composition of the suitable opponent and the order of his nomination.

When deciding on an ambush, the commander The squad (group) determines: the order of setting up and conducting an ambush; distribution of personnel and firepower into subgroups indicating the order of their actions; the procedure for ensuring secrecy during preparation, during and after completing the assigned task.

When setting combat missions, the squad (group) commander indicates: to the observer (if he is assigned) - the location and sector of observation, the procedure for action when the enemy appears. Capture subgroup - combat personnel and senior subgroup, starting position; tasks to capture prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment; the order of actions after completing the task; ready time. Support subgroup - combat personnel and senior subgroup; combat positions; firing positions for each weapon; main and additional sectors of fire; tasks to destroy the enemy, support the actions of the capture subgroup and ensure its withdrawal; volume of engineering equipment position; the order of actions after completing the task; ready time. All personnel are informed of the gathering place after the ambush.

By organizing interaction, the squad (group) commander clarifies and agrees on the procedure for action: when moving to the ambush site and occupying it; fire defeat of the enemy; capturing prisoners, samples of weapons, equipment and documents, examining the dead and wounded; leaving the ambush site.

The first to advance to the ambush site (position) are the support subgroup and the observer, under the cover of which the capture subgroup takes its place. Pits, funnels, ditches, and embankments are used to place fire weapons. Measures are being taken to improve conditions for firing and observation; if necessary, the route of movement and approaches to the ambush site are mined. If there is time, the commander clarifies the tasks of the subgroups directly at the positions. He personally distributes the capture subgroup on the ground, and at the same time determines the order of actions of the personnel and the order of their withdrawal, the procedure for covering the actions of the capture subgroup, and the place of landing it on the combat vehicle.

The squad (group), having taken a position, does not reveal itself in anything. When the enemy appears, the observer uses a prearranged signal to report his approach to the commander. The decision to attack or allow the enemy to pass is made by the commander.

Small groups and single enemy soldiers are captured by surprise ambushes.

Larger enemy forces and single vehicles are brought within close range and destroyed by fire. The survivors are captured, thoroughly searched, weapons and documents found on them and during the inspection of the dead and vehicles are confiscated.

Conventional signs(emblems) on enemy military equipment are remembered or sketched (photographed). Prisoners, documents captured from the enemy, new types of weapons and equipment are sent to the senior commander who sent the ambush, indicating where, when and under what circumstances they were captured. On captured documents h It is prohibited to make any inscriptions or notes.

No matter what conditions the ambush is organized, the commander is obliged to ensure the hidden exit of personnel to the ambush site and their thorough camouflage on the ground; force the enemy to stop movement at a predetermined place; ensure surprise of fire and attack on the enemy; prevent the enemy from leaving the ambush site and the approach of his reinforcements; ensure a quick, hidden and organized withdrawal of your unit from the ambush site.

Having taken up positions, scouts must strictly observe camouflage discipline. Single soldiers approach the ambush site and are captured silently. The enemy patrol vehicle is allowed through the ambush, after which it must be destroyed by the firepower allocated for this. When the main enemy approaches, fire opens at the command of the commander or when the enemy reaches a pre-selected landmark. Fire at the lead vehicle opens simultaneously from the combat vehicle's weapons and grenade launchers. At the same time, the trailing enemy vehicle is also hit. Under the cover of fire from the support subgroup, the capture subgroup makes a rush, captures the prisoner and retreats to the combat vehicle or calls it to itself. After capturing the prisoners, at the signal of the squad (group) commander, the withdrawal is made in the following sequence: capture subgroup, observer, support subgroup . Personnel are boarded on vehicles in the area of ​​their firing positions or at a predetermined assembly point.



The squad (group) commander retreats, as a rule, with the capture subgroup, however, if the enemy has organized pursuit, he may remain with the support subgroup or to organize cover for the capture subgroup's withdrawal. If the task is successfully completed and there is time, traces of the ambush are masked by the support group. Damaged enemy equipment is towed and camouflaged, and corpses are removed.

... An example of a successful ambush is the actions of a group under the command of Lieutenant Dardykin on July 5, 1944. Having received the task, Dardykin secretly led scouts to the ambush area on the night of July 5, selected and took positions, and organized observation. At 4.30, the attack group (5 people) silently captured two riders, who showed that their unit was retreating to a new line, and that two armored personnel carriers and several vehicles with infantry remained in Wenzelsdorf. Having camouflaged the captured carts and mined the road, the scouts continued their mission.

At 5.20, an enemy group left Wenzelsdorf in an armored personnel carrier and two cars. The armored personnel carrier hit a mine, the last vehicle was destroyed by anti-tank grenades, and the scouts opened fire on the middle vehicle with machine guns. As a result of a competent choice of position, bold and decisive actions, the numerically superior enemy was defeated, and eight more prisoners were captured. The scouts returned to their location without losses.

Typically, ambushes are classified by the manner in which the unit conducting the ambush is positioned relative to the path of the ambush objective. What is the path of the ambush target? Usually this is a road or path, that is, a rather narrow place where maneuver is limited. The ambush group is located near this road.

At present, the following methods of placing CG are most widespread.

Linear. When organizing an ambush of this type, the unit is positioned on one side of the road at a distance of approximately the length of the column. A linear ambush is quite simple to organize and manage, but it also has some disadvantages.

For example, the enemy’s ability to use the opposite side of the road as a position for organizing counteraction, which turns the operation into a protracted positional battle that can tie down the ZG with fire until reinforcements or air support arrive. The location of the units and their tasks will be discussed below. Currently, this type of ambush is most widespread.

V-shaped. When organizing this type of ambush, the unit is divided into two parts (not necessarily equal), which are located on both

sides of the road. An enemy caught in such an ambush finds himself under crossfire from two opposite directions and is unable to organize effective resistance, since he has nowhere to hide. However, despite the obvious advantages of this type of ambush, they are carried out very rarely. Much less often than some special operations theorists say. Firstly, organizing a V-shaped ambush on flat terrain risks the fact that two parts of the ambush group will be forced to shoot in each other’s direction. Therefore, such an ambush is carried out when both parts of the group are at commanding heights, and the enemy is below. In this case, friendly fire will not work. Secondly, a V-shaped ambush requires much more personnel, which is not always possible in the conditions of a small sabotage unit. Thirdly, when organizing a V-shaped ambush, it is difficult to control the CG and coordinate joint actions, including withdrawal from positions.

When organizing a V-shaped ambush, fire is often first opened on one side, and after the enemy has regrouped and “showed his back” to the second group, from the opposite side. As an original solution for the total destruction of manpower, the second group can use silent weapons in single or sniper shooting mode. Thus, the enemy, carried away by the battle in one direction, is unlikely to notice a mortal enemy behind him and will suffer significant losses.

L-shaped. This type of ambush is organized at a bend in the road with limited room for maneuver. In this case, the main part of the unit is located linearly, on the outside of the turn. The second part is located directly in the direction of the column’s movement and meets the enemy head-on with fire. This type of ambush also has the advantage of using crossfire.

Targeted ambush represents the concentration of fire in a small area. Usually organized by a small unit against a small and compactly moving enemy group. Or against part of the column.

For such an ambush, it is important to have a one-time barrage of fire in order to hit the required target in one minute. Taking on a protracted battle risks the fact that the ambush group will be outflanked and destroyed, since it is vulnerable from the sides and rear. A targeted ambush is often used against enemy patrols and combat security groups.

Area ambush is an area in which several ambushes are carried out. Essentially, these are several pinpoint ambushes located along the road, which can launch an attack either simultaneously or sequentially. The point of organizing such an ambush is that when conducting a column, the enemy uses anti-ambush tactics. One of its elements is to increase the distance between individual vehicles traveling in a convoy to one hundred, and sometimes more, meters. As a result, a column of several units of equipment can stretch over a large segment, and a conventional linear ambush will cover only part of it.

Individual points of an area ambush can be intended to destroy enemy patrols and reinforcements coming to his aid. Conducting an area ambush requires rugged terrain and reliable communications. Controlling the actions of the ambush group in this case is very difficult for the commander.

Ambushes are not always organized long and carefully. Sometimes there is simply no time for this. Sometimes such “impromptu” actions are called a hasty ambush. An ambush can be organized not only by a group specially sent for this purpose.

For example, this can be done by a reconnaissance or sabotage group moving through enemy territory and noticing a convenient target for an ambush. In such a situation there is no time for thorough preparation. However, the operation cannot be performed without any preparation at all. To avoid the unpleasant consequences of such impromptu actions, personnel must have an understanding of the principles of organizing an ambush, how to carry it out, and know in advance about the distribution of roles. Then the commander will be able to arrange the deployment of fighters in the shortest possible time.

Sometimes in such a situation there is no possibility for voice communication, since the slightest noise can alert the enemy. For such a case (and not only for this), it is necessary that the fighters communicate using gestures.

It is very important that the commander quickly and reliably assess the balance of forces. If the enemy is strong enough, the commander may generally decide to avoid combat. In addition, do not forget that a battle behind enemy lines will attract the attention of his large forces. If there is still time before the enemy approaches, mining can be done. It is imperative to outline escape routes. The soldiers' positions should be close to each other. The attack itself lasts 30-40 seconds. During this time, it is necessary to inflict the greatest damage on the enemy and disable the most dangerous weapons and vehicles.

The fire is carried out by each fighter in his sector. The ceasefire and withdrawal of the group occurs at the command of the commander or after the expiration of a specified time. Obviously, planned ambushes are preferable and more effective than hasty ones. But in some cases, hasty ambushes can produce tangible results. For example, if they are organized by a unit that is in search and superior in strength to the target of the ambush.

When planning the type of ambush, the commander focuses primarily on the accompanying terrain and proceeds from the advantages that it provides. It is quite obvious that an attack on a well-armed enemy column in open terrain will not have much success. But losses in the ZG are guaranteed. In mountainous terrain, the effect of an attack on the same column can lead to a completely different result. This will be discussed in more detail below.

The ambush unit is divided into groups that are assigned specific functions. The standard arrangement is to divide the entire detachment into attack, support and observer groups.

The task of the attack group is to destroy the enemy in the sector of fire. The most accurate and cold-blooded fighters are assigned to this group. The unit commander is usually with this group. The attack group is the most armed group. It is in it that grenade launchers, snipers and most of machine gunners.

The task of the support group is to cover the attack group (main group) from enemy attacks on the flanks or rear. Moreover, it should be taken into account that such a threat can come not only from the personnel of the ambushed column, but also from reinforcements called by the enemy or, for example, an enemy reconnaissance group that happens to be nearby. It is tempting for the support group to help their comrades by joining the fight.

However, such actions can lead not only to the decoding of positions, but also to the engagement of the group in battle. In such conditions, it is easy to be distracted from the main tasks and allow the enemy to maneuver around.

The task of observers is to promptly and accurately identify and report the appearance and any actions of the enemy that are significant.

In this case, observation should be all-round in order to prevent the possibility of the enemy unexpectedly appearing in the ambush area from any direction. When the CG interacts with aviation and artillery, observers adjust fire and give target designations. The most patient and self-possessed fighters who have the skills of camouflage and fire adjustment are appointed as observers.

The activities of observers do not stop until the group leaves, regardless of the results of the attack. It is important for observers and support groups to correctly select positions that allow early detection of the enemy’s appearance and establish his approach to the ambush site. Naturally, without reliable means of communication, observers will not be able to perform the functions assigned to them.

Depending on the task at hand, other groups may be allocated. For example, a capture group - to capture prisoners, documents, weapons. The strongest, most dexterous and decisive fighters proficient in close combat techniques are assigned to such a group. At the time of capture, they may have a minimum of weapons and body armor. When attacking single enemy soldiers or officers, two soldiers are usually assigned to each captured prisoner. A sapper group may be allocated for mining. After completing the task, she can be included in the attack team.

Waiting in ambush can last from several hours to several days. During this entire time, its participants must take measures to disguise their presence. Camouflage concerns restricting movements, eliminating unmasking sounds, lighting fires, etc. It is possible that compliance with camouflage measures may require excluding food that has a specific and pungent odor from the diet of personnel operating in an ambush.

In addition, the enemy can detect activity on the radio. Therefore, radio communications must be limited, and the necessary radio sessions, if possible, should be carried out at a considerable distance from the ambush location. When staying in an ambush for a long time, it is necessary to organize shift rest for personnel. This task rests entirely with the commander and must be carried out without losing vigilance.

At positions, the commander arranges personnel according to a previously developed plan and assigns firing sectors.

The distance of the attacking line from the road is determined by several factors. Among them are the terrain, the ratio of the forces of the defensive group and the target of attack, and the weapons used by the ambush group. When attacking a small group of enemy on foot, it is permissible to position the ZG in close proximity from the place where the enemy is expected to pass. If, of course, local conditions (bushes, trees, etc.) allow the group to be well camouflaged and ensure surprise of the attack.

If the target of the ambush is a fairly formidable enemy that is unlikely to be destroyed with the first salvo, the distance increases. Typically, the closest line of the first ambush line is located no closer than 35 meters - the throwing range of a hand grenade. However, this distance can also be dangerously close. If the enemy is not crushed by one blow, he can go on the offensive. It is unlikely that it will be possible to leave positions located in such proximity easily and without losses, even with favorable terrain. A GR located on a circular or even inaccessible slope may have a more advantageous position. In this case, it will be extremely difficult to dislodge the fighters from there, and they will be able to drop hand grenades on the heads of the defenders.

The ambush group can be positioned in echelon. At the same time, the subgroups into which the ZG is divided are focused on actions for the intended purpose, taking into account the possibility of quickly getting out from under the enemy’s return fire or counterattack.

Here is an example of the echelon that the Mujahideen used in Afghanistan when attacking convoys Soviet troops. In the first echelon there were rebels armed with small arms, who, using natural cover and camouflage, brought the object of attack to close range (50-100 m) and then fired at it and, if possible, captured it.

The second echelon consisted of RPG crews, whose task was to destroy armored or other large targets. They were located behind the first line at a distance of 50-150 m from the object. The third echelon consisted of groups providing fire support and cover for the groups of the first two echelons. Their positions were located at a distance of 500-1000 m from the first two echelons.

They were armed with recoilless rifles, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns. In some cases, diversion groups were created, whose task was to divert part of the forces and assets from the area of ​​​​action of the capture groups and ensure that the latter could complete their task and leave without losses. Such a group usually suddenly opened fire on the column and tried to pin down the guard units in battle. At the same time, the column, which passed forward without security, fell into the zone of action of the capture groups.

As the column approached the ambush site, specially designated snipers opened fire on the drivers and senior officers of the vehicles.

It is taken into account that the enemy usually expects an attack from an ambush and not only takes measures for his safety, but also predicts an attack in one or another convenient place, from his point of view. However, you should not choose an ambush site solely on the grounds that the enemy does not expect an attack there.

In any case, the position must meet the following requirements:

    The location for the ambush must be such that the enemy who comes under fire is forced to maneuver only in the destruction zone.

    The position must provide a clear area of ​​fire.

    SG positions must be reliably protected and camouflaged.

    Even with an optimistic forecast of the outcome of the battle, it is necessary to have safe ways to retreat from positions.

Regardless of the type of ambush and positioning, there is General terms, the implementation of which will make the ambush effective and avoid unjustified losses.

The attack group begins shelling simultaneously, combining fire with the detonation of planted mines. The exception is groups whose task is to make a surprise attack at the allotted time and who for the time being hide their presence. The distribution of sectors of fire should ensure massive, intense fire, leaving no safe zones for the enemy. The firing sectors must overlap each other.

To create a continuous and continuous barrage of fire at the beginning of the shelling, the riflemen in positions must have ammunition prepared for loading. For example, automatic magazines should be located nearby, and not in a pouch. Machine gun barrels must be prepared for replacement when overheated.

It is advisable that places where enemy infantry may be hiding be previously targeted or mined.

The vehicles at the head and tail of the column are immediately destroyed. This is done using either planted mines (land mines) or grenade launchers. You shouldn't rely only on mines. They may not work or may not give the desired effect. For example, a tank walking in front, having stopped, can retain the ability to actively fire. Therefore, RPG crews must be prepared to back up.

Vehicles carrying personnel must be destroyed before the enemy dismounts.

First of all, enemy machine gunners, grenade throwers and snipers are destroyed. Machine gunners, grenade launchers and snipers are also involved in their destruction. They do this either independently or at the command of the commander giving target designation. This indication is usually made by tracer ammunition.

If possible, it is necessary to prevent enemy attempts to call for help via communications. For this (and not only), there must be a sniper near the commander, who works as directed.

If the enemy detects an ambush, the ZG commander gives the command to immediately open fire. Since the effect of a surprise attack is eliminated, the likelihood of achieving the intended outcome is compromised.

Accordingly, the original (optimal) plan will not work. To minimize the negative consequences of premature detection, it is necessary that the commander, when planning, anticipate such scenarios. The problem may be not only the fact that the enemy has some time to prepare for counteraction. The important thing is that the ambush target may not have time to enter entirely (or to the planned extent) into the affected area.

If the head of the column comes under fire from an ambush group, the rest of the column can carry out a flanking maneuver and attack the flank. Planted mines may be useless or cause minimal damage. There is a high probability that the SG will be forced to retreat after the first fire barrage, which should still cause confusion for the enemy. However, this withdrawal must also be planned in advance, and its order communicated to the personnel.

It may also happen that the commander does not immediately determine the fact that the enemy has discovered an ambush. This must also be provided for. It is possible that the ambush target will detect the observers. In this case, they must know what to do: open fire on their own, report to the commander and act on command, or carry out some maneuver; in any case, the commander must be immediately notified of this.

If an ambush is deciphered prematurely, greater responsibility falls on the commander. Not only the success of the operation (albeit not as impressive as originally planned) but also the losses that the ambush group may suffer depend on his correct decision.

It should be borne in mind that while moving along the route, the convoy may conduct periodic harassing shelling of possible ambush locations, although this does not mean that the CG has been detected. Therefore, it is necessary to provide not only good camouflage, but also reliable protection for personnel hidden in ambush. In addition, one of the ZG fighters may mistake such indirect harassing fire for deciphering an ambush and open return fire prematurely.

To prevent this, prior appropriate instruction is required.

An indicative example is from the Afghan experience of the Soviet troops, given in the book “Features of reconnaissance and combat activities of special reconnaissance units and units in Afghanistan.” On the night of March 24, 1985, near the village of Noyazi, the 423rd reconnaissance group carried out an ambush on one of the caravan routes. At 00.30, an unarmed group of rebels of five people passed along the route without observing camouflage measures, which was unhindered by the group commander.

40 minutes later, a second group of 10 rebels passed along the same route, shelling the nearby mountain slopes. The group commander correctly assessed that this shooting was being carried out in order to expose probable ambush sites, and, without revealing himself, he let this group through, taking additional measures to camouflage and protect personnel from accidental defeat. And only at 3 o’clock in the morning the main caravan consisting of 20 animals and 30 guards appeared.

The caravan was destroyed by dagger fire from 50 meters away. Target designation during the battle was carried out by the group commander and his deputy with tracer ammunition, and the choice of weapon for destroying the target was determined by the length of the queue, it was worked out and understood by the personnel during the preparation period. As a result of the ambush, 25 rebels were killed.

Sometimes it happens that early detection of an ambush does not affect the final outcome of the battle. It just makes it harder to achieve your goal. In any case, the final result largely depends on the group’s readiness for various unfavorable (but often predictable) scenarios for the development of the situation.

If during the attack the capture group managed to take prisoners, documents or weapons, it usually leaves first with the loot. The rest of the unit covers its retreat.

If the enemy is destroyed as a result of an attack, an assault group enters the affected area to comb out. During the combing, trophies are collected, if necessary, wounded enemies are destroyed, living and lightly wounded enemy soldiers and officers are captured, the dead are searched, and vehicles are inspected. Of particular value are the documents discovered during the inspection of the dead and the vehicles. New samples of communications equipment, weapons and military equipment are being taken away. Conventional signs (emblems) and numbers on the enemy’s military equipment and uniform are photographed, sketched or remembered.

During this process, the assault team acts very carefully. Some soldiers provide her cover. During combing before retreating, the ambush site may be mined with booby traps. Surviving material assets that ZG cannot take with him must be destroyed on the spot. When organizing an ambush, armored vehicles can be used. It is usually located away from the ambush site in secluded place and waits for commands from the ZG commander.

An example of successful military operations by a reconnaissance group in an ambush to destroy a rebel caravan can be seen in the actions of the 431st Reconnaissance Group in Afghanistan. A group of 18 people, reinforced with two automatic mounted grenade launchers, was withdrawn at 20.00 on October 8, 1985 to conduct ambush operations to intercept a caravan of rebels with weapons and ammunition in an area 12 km southeast of Baraka. The group was given six hours to prepare.

The officer responsible for preparing the group knew the situation in the area of ​​upcoming operations well, since he himself had to operate in this area.

In addition, the day before an air reconnaissance of the area was carried out. Together with the commander of the reconnaissance group, a procedure for the group’s actions was developed various options, the location of the ambush and the battle formation of the group were determined. The caravan's intended route ran along a dry river bed, which facilitated the group's secret exit to the ambush site and location on the ground.

The battle formation of the reconnaissance group in the ambush consisted of a destruction subgroup (12 people), a support subgroup (4 people) and two observation posts of three people each. The destruction subgroup was located in pairs along a front of 80 m, consisting of three light machine guns in the center and crews of automatic grenade launchers on the flanks. Observation posts were placed towards the flanks at a distance of 400-500 m.

The support subgroup was located at a distance of up to 300 m from the destruction subgroup towards the nearby village. Combat vehicles (BMP-2, BTR-70), which were supposed to support the 431st reconnaissance group, were at the point of permanent deployment, ready for immediate deployment. The rebel caravan, as expected, moved along the dry river bed.

The marching order of the caravan included:

    head patrol (combat guard) of up to 10 people, moving at a distance of 400-500 m from the main group of the caravan;

    the main group, which consisted of 30 pack animals, and a direct guard of up to 30 rebels;

    rear patrol (rear security) of 8 people, which moved at a distance of up to 500 m from the main group of the caravan.

Observers detected the movement of the caravan and reported to the group commander by radio about the approach of the rebels. The group commander gave the personnel the command “Get ready”, but warned them to open fire only on his command.

The group commander waited until the combat guard passed by him, which subsequently came under fire from the support subgroup. Having brought the main group of the caravan to a distance of 80-100 m, he gave a signal to the personnel to open fire on the caravan. At the same time, having contacted the unit’s headquarters via radio, he reported the situation and called in an armored group. The battle lasted 30 minutes, after which the rebels stopped resisting and the remnants of the caravan guard were forced to retreat from the battlefield, abandoning their weapons and ammunition.

DShK machine guns captured from the Mujahideen. One crew of such a machine gun in an advantageous position in the gorge could hold off from a company to a battalion of attackers

Afghanistan. 1982

30 minutes after the discovery of the rebel caravan and after a report to the unit commander, an armored group approached the battlefield, under the cover of which the reconnaissance group inspected the battlefield.

As a result of the skillful management of the group commander, clear interaction between subgroups, skillful camouflage of personnel and the sudden opening of fire on the caravan, the 431st reconnaissance group successfully completed its combat mission. As a result of the battle, the following were destroyed: rebels - 23 people, pack animals - 25; captured: rockets - 187 pcs., RPGs - 2 pcs., small arms- 4 pcs., rounds for RPGs - 202 pcs., rounds for recoilless rifles - 65 pcs., mines for 82 mm. mortar - 31 pieces, ammunition for DShK - 2000 pieces, ammunition for small arms - 71,000 pieces.

One rebel was captured.

The reconnaissance group returned to its permanent location using military equipment without losses. A positive aspect of the actions of the 431st reconnaissance group is that during a second inspection of the battle site (during daylight hours), additional weapons and ammunition were discovered abandoned by the rebels. Therefore, based on experience, if there is time and opportunity, with the onset of daylight it is advisable to re-inspect the places where caravans were destroyed and the surrounding area.

This situation is not only an example of positive interaction between the ZG and the armored group, but also an example of competent planning and knowledge of the location of the operation, use of the terrain, camouflage, placement of personnel and their interaction.

If attacks on convoys and caravans become systematic, the enemy begins to vary his actions in order to mislead and prevent ambushes. The enemy analyzes the units' performance in ambushes and plans countermeasures accordingly. Therefore, the more pattern and monotony there is in the tactics of ambush groups, the greater the chance that their actions will be predicted.

A typical example is the 1985 432nd Reconnaissance Group ambush in Afghanistan. The group prepared in advance for the route of the expected movement of the caravan. In the first hour of the night, a group of 5 animals and 10 guards followed, periodically giving signals about the safety of the route. The group commander decided that it was a reconnaissance patrol and let him through.

An hour later, a second group of 4 animals and 8 guards appeared. It was destroyed by small arms fire, but upon inspection of the caravan it turned out that only a small amount of ammunition was captured.

During the interrogation of the wounded prisoner, it turned out that the bulk of the weapons and ammunition were in the first part of the caravan. Using the example of the Afghan Mujahideen, one can trace how the tactics of guiding caravans continuously improved and changed. They also used other techniques.

Often the caravan route was changed at the last moment. Naturally, such actions were possible only in cases where there were other paths suitable for passage in the area. The time of movement could also change.

The movement was carried out not only at night, but also during the day in difficult weather conditions.

Large caravans were often divided into small groups (3-5 pack animals, 1-2 cars, 20-30 guards) and moved independently. Each group had its own route and final destination. The impossibility of monitoring all directions at different times was taken into account. Thus, the risk of loss was reduced quantitatively.

Taking into account the missteps of the first years of the war, the dushmans subsequently appreciated the importance of communications and the effectiveness of their use in ensuring traffic safety, marching security, reconnaissance and warning on routes. The rebels made extensive use of civilians to carry out reconnaissance and warning tasks. By the mid-80s, the Mujahideen had a large number of modern radio equipment and skillfully used them. The rebels' radio interception efforts also increased significantly. This, in turn, complicated the secrecy of communications used by sabotage groups.

In addition to the head patrol, running directly along the route of the main column at a distance of 1 to 10 kilometers, patrols moving parallel to the road began to be used. Usually the movement was along the ridges of adjacent heights in order to detect possible ambushes. Naturally, the Afghans effectively used their knowledge of the area and Special attention allocated to places attractive for organizing an ambush.

Constant radio communication was maintained between all these groups and the caravan.

To identify mined areas, the Mujahideen first drove cattle along the planned route of the caravan.

The disturbing shelling of suspicious places, especially various bushes and thickets, has already been mentioned.

Disinformation was actively used. In addition to the fact that false information about the passage of the caravan in certain place and at a certain time they diverted Soviet troops from areas where there was actually movement, the sent sabotage groups themselves could (and did) fall into prepared ambushes or minefields.

If an ambush is detected, the convoy can change its route and bypass the dangerous place or stop while waiting for the group to leave the ambush site. To avoid collisions with enemy patrols and not to be detected before the main caravan approaches, the ambush group can be located away from its route in a secluded place. At the posts there are only carefully disguised observers who signal the commander about maneuvers in the ambush zone.

After enemy patrols pass the site of the intended ambush and the caravan approaches, the group, at the command of observers, secretly advances to the site of the operation. However, such opportunities are not always available. Primarily due to the terrain, which can make secretive movements difficult. In addition, it is necessary to maintain complete silence when moving, since at night in the mountains sounds can be heard very far away. And enemy patrols can use periodic waiting tactics, especially in places suitable for an ambush.

The enemy may also use other measures, such as aviation.

More details about anti-ambush measures taken during convoys are discussed in the next chapter.

Type of lesson: LECTURE – CONVERSATION

Study questions:

1. RD during an ambush.

2. Actions of HP RD when ambushed.

Position categories of listeners: employees of special forces units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Lesson objectives:

deepen the knowledge and practical skills of employees in the field of tactical training.

TSO and visual aids: overhead projector, laser pointer, slides No.______, posters No._______

Used Books:

“Single reconnaissance training” U-M P.

“Training of a military intelligence officer” by P. Ya. Popovskikh and others.

"BUSV part 2"

Introductory part - 10 min .

1.Check the availability of students and their readiness for the lesson.

2. Announce the topic, goals, objectives, educational issues and lesson plan.

3. Conduct a short survey on the previous material, get listeners to Active participation in the main part of the lesson.

The main part is 70 minutes.

To capture prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and military equipment, along with searches and raids, ambushes are used, which consist in the advance and secret placement of a unit (group) on the enemy’s routes for a surprise attack on him.

Types of ambush:

1. By type of battle order:

Linear;

L-shaped;

- Three-way (fire bag).

2. By organization:

- prepared in advance;

- “on the fly.”

3. By nature of actions:

Silent;

- after a fire attack.

Ambush as a method of reconnaissance is used in all types of combat operations, on any terrain, in various meteorological conditions and at any time of the day, in front of the front, on the enemy’s flanks and in his rear. It can be organized by units conducting reconnaissance (combat reconnaissance patrols, reconnaissance groups, deep reconnaissance groups) and a unit (group) specially designated for this purpose, usually consisting of up to a reinforced platoon.

To set up ambushes in order to destroy the enemy, units consisting of up to a reinforced company (motorized rifle, tank), or special forces group can be assigned.

The success of a unit's actions in an ambush depends on the secrecy of its location, readiness to conduct accurate fire, determination, endurance and skillful actions of personnel.

The targets of an ambush attack can be single militants, groups of militants on foot or on motorcycles, cars, armored personnel carriers, small reconnaissance groups and marching security units. Ambushes are set up in places that provide a secretive (camouflaged) location of a unit (group), near roads, trails, at bridges, crossings and passages in barriers, at water sources and at other points where the appearance of single soldiers, vehicles or small groups of the enemy is most likely .

The most possible ambush sites:

- forest edges, clearings;

- bridges, crossing points (fords);

- outskirts settlements;

- street intersections, clearings;

- road bends, steep ascents and descents;

- hollows, mouths of ravines;

- dense thickets of bushes;

- approaches to water sources.

The method of attacking from an ambush depends on its purpose, situational conditions, the strength of the enemy and the composition of the unit conducting the ambush. You can attack from an ambush silently, as well as after inflicting a sudden fire defeat on the enemy, followed by the capture of prisoners, documents, weapons and military equipment.

Units conducting reconnaissance and ambush attacks should strive to carry out silently (without opening fire, using grenades, mines, etc.), so that their actions do not attract the attention of the enemy.

When setting up ambushes against a superior enemy or armored targets, the second method is usually used - an attack after inflicting a sudden fire defeat.

When conducting combat operations in conditions of direct contact with the enemy, ambushes are organized by order of battalion and regiment commanders and are arranged at joints, flanks, in front of the security line, as well as in the depths of the enemy’s battle formations. When units operate in reconnaissance, ambushes are arranged by the decision of their commanders.

A unit (group) sent into an ambush for a certain period of time returns back after completing the task or after the time for which it was sent has expired.

A unit (group) for operations in an ambush can be divided into sections (groups, soldiers) of attack, support and observers.

Attack Squad ( everything said below about attack and support sections also applies to soldiers or groups allocated for the same task) suddenly and swiftly attacks the enemy and captures prisoners, documents, weapons and military equipment. To attack the enemy, soldiers and sergeants are appointed, physically strong, dexterous and decisive, who are proficient in the techniques of attacking an armed enemy. The composition and weapons of the attack squad depend on the target of the attack and the method of capturing the prisoner. When attacking single enemy soldiers or officers, two scouts are usually assigned to each captured prisoner.

The support squad is usually assigned in cases where an attack on the enemy is carried out after he has been defeated by fire, as well as to cover the actions of the attack squad, if necessary. For this purpose, soldiers and sergeants are selected who know how to accurately throw grenades and confidently fire in close combat. To inflict fire damage on the enemy, both standard weapons and weapons of reconnaissance vehicles are used.

Depending on the situation and terrain conditions, the support department may be located in one or two places.

Observers are appointed in order to timely warn the commander that the enemy is approaching the ambush site. They observe the enemy's likely routes of movement or an identified enemy against whom an ambush is being organized.

The task of setting up an ambush for the unit (group) commander is usually set on the ground or on the map. When setting a task, information about the enemy, the place, time and purpose of the ambush and the order of actions after completing the task are indicated.

Having understood the received task, the unit (group) commander determines the order and hidden route of advance to the ambush site.

The unit advances to the ambush site in a formation that ensures secrecy of movement and combat readiness in case of a sudden meeting with the enemy. In order not to reveal your location with traces of vehicles and other signs, it is better to approach the ambush site from the side opposite to the enemy’s appearance.

As the group reaches the ambush site, the unit (group) commander organizes observation and (if the situation allows), placing the unit in a sheltered place in readiness to fire in case sudden appearance enemy, personally studies the situation and terrain in the ambush area and determines: the most likely direction of the enemy’s appearance, the method of attack, the composition and location of the attack squads, support and observers, what tasks to assign them, where and what to prepare or set up barriers on the enemy’s likely routes of movement , as well as the order of actions of the unit after completing the task or when the enemy discovers the ambush site. Squad (crew) commanders are also involved in studying the area.

As a result of studying the situation and terrain, the unit (group) commander makes a decision to set up an ambush and assigns a task to his subordinates (gives a combat order).

When setting a mission (in a combat order), the unit (group) commander indicates:

· landmarks (if necessary);

· information about the enemy;

· task of the unit (group);

· locations of squads (soldiers, tanks, armored personnel carriers, fire weapons) and their tasks;

· the procedure for opening fire and actions when capturing prisoners (documents, weapons) and after completing the task;

· signals (opening fire, attack, retreat) and a deputy.

In addition, the procedure for the evacuation of the wounded and killed, as well as the delivery of prisoners, captured documents, samples of weapons and military equipment, the procedure for the unit’s actions when an ambush is detected by the enemy, and, if necessary, who, where and what kind of barriers are prepared (installed) are indicated.

Having given the combat order and making sure that his subordinates have correctly understood the assigned task, the unit commander gives the command to occupy the ambush site with squads in accordance with the received task.

Attack squads are located in a convenient location for attacking the enemy (usually in the center of an ambush) and in close proximity to him (at a distance from throwing a grenade).

The support squad is on one or both flanks (behind) of the attack squad, occupying a position from which it is possible to fire at the target of the attack.

The unit commander personally places observers. They are located in places that make it possible to detect the enemy's appearance in advance and establish his approach to the ambush site. In this case, observation should be all-round in order to prevent the possibility of the enemy unexpectedly appearing in the ambush area from any direction.

Given time and terrain conditions, obstacles (including mines) and various kinds of obstacles can be installed or prepared for installation on the enemy’s likely routes of movement, for example, stringing wire across the road, damaging bridges, creating rubble on forest roads, etc. This work usually performed by specially appointed soldiers and sergeants under the direct supervision of the unit (group) commander.

In order to camouflage the ambush site, all traces left by tracked and wheeled vehicles, as well as other signs by which the enemy can detect a unit in ambush, must be carefully camouflaged or eliminated. Obstacles created on the enemy's likely routes of movement should look natural so as not to arouse suspicion. The personnel of the unit located in ambush must observe the strictest discipline and camouflage.

The commander of the unit (group) is usually located with the attack squad. However, he must personally observe the approaches to the ambush and see the signals of the observers.

When a unit acts in reconnaissance, very often the situation may develop in such a way that, with general favorable conditions To set up an ambush, the commander of a reconnaissance group (reconnaissance patrol, combat reconnaissance patrol) will have extremely limited time to organize it. In this case, the unit commander, quickly assessing the situation, makes a decision to organize an ambush.

Having made a decision, he immediately leads the unit to the selected ambush site, indicates the location of the attack and support units, organizes observation and assigns a task to the squads and fire weapons during the attack, as well as after the completion of the attack.

Monitoring the actions of the enemy (object of attack) will very often be assigned to a patrol vehicle, the task of which is assigned by radio.

The actions of a unit in an ambush are determined by the method of attack and depend on the strength, composition and actions of the target of the attack.

Having positioned itself in ambush, the unit should not reveal itself in any way. Observers silently warn the unit commander about the enemy's approach using a set signal.

If the attack is carried out on single soldiers and officers or small groups of the enemy, then they should be allowed to approach the center of the ambush location, and then suddenly, without opening fire, at the command (signal) of the unit (group) commander, attack them and capture them. The unit (group) allows a larger group and individual enemy vehicles to come within close range, and then suddenly opens fire on them and launches an attack.

In other cases, an attack on individual enemy vehicles (a car, an armored personnel carrier, a tank) is carried out after they have been knocked out (detonated) by fire, a grenade or a mine.

When attacking a reconnaissance patrol, a marching guard unit, or another enemy unit, they are brought within close range and, at a signal from the unit (group) commander, are hit by sudden fire. In this case, tanks (guns) fire primarily at tanks and armored personnel carriers, and if they are not there, at cars and manpower. Machine guns and other fire weapons concentrate fire on enemy personnel. After defeating the enemy, under the cover of fire from support squads, the attack squad, at the signal of the unit (group) commander, quickly attacks the enemy. The surviving enemy soldiers and officers are captured, the dead are searched, and the vehicles are inspected. Documents found during the inspection of the dead and the vehicles are confiscated. New types of weapons and military equipment are being taken away. Conventional signs (emblems) on enemy military equipment are photographed, sketched or remembered.

The unit commander most often personally directs the actions of the attackers and, together with them, participates in the capture of prisoners, and then, if the situation allows, organizes the concealment of traces of the ambush.

After completing the task, the unit (group) acts in accordance with the instructions received: continues to perform the previously assigned task or joins (returns) to its troops.

If the ambush was carried out silently, the unit continues to operate covertly in the future.

When an ambush is detected by the enemy, when a surprise attack is ruled out, at the command of the unit (group) commander, the enemy is defeated by fire and, depending on its strength, the unit attacks, or, taking advantage of his confusion, retreats to the location of his troops, or continues to carry out the previously assigned task.

When a unit is detected and pursued by the enemy, the attacking unit with captured prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and military equipment is the first to withdraw. The rest of the squad, under the command of the unit commander, covers their retreat, destroying the pursuing enemy with fire and grenades. Having broken away from the enemy's pursuit, the unit continues to carry out its assigned mission.

Captured prisoners (documents) are interrogated (studied), and the intelligence information received is reported to the commander who sent the unit to reconnaissance. Depending on the instructions received, prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and military equipment are delivered to headquarters or remain in the unit until the assigned task is completed.

When setting up ambushes at night The unit should be positioned at shortened intervals and as close as possible to the probable path of the enemy’s movement on one side of the road (linear battle formation) in order to eliminate the danger of hitting the unit’s personnel with its own fire. Night vision devices can be used to observe the enemy, but without irradiating the area with infrared light sources.

in winterThe same techniques and methods of action of units in an ambush are used as in the summer. When a unit is positioned in an ambush, special attention should be paid to camouflaging tracks in the snow and ensuring trouble-free operation of weapons and military equipment in conditions of low temperatures and deep snow cover. The personnel are provided with warm uniforms, anti-frostbite products, white camouflage coats, and, if necessary, skis.

Ambushes in the mountainsThey are usually located near mountain roads, trails, and passes. It is more profitable to set up ambushes along roads and trails passing through narrow valleys, gorges, through forest areas and canyons. At the same time, you should not always choose roads and paths for moving a unit to the ambush site, since the enemy will also set up ambushes near them. To covertly advance to the ambush site, it is better to use difficult terrain. The unit (group) assigned to set up an ambush will often have to act on foot. Therefore, personnel must know the techniques and methods of movement in the mountains and be provided with special equipment to overcome various mountain obstacles.

When organizing an ambush in narrow valleys and gorges, the attack unit is usually located near the road, trail, and the support units are located on elevated places on one or both sides of the valley or gorge, so that it is possible to create a fire bag (three-way fire coverage).


Attack on government convoys from prepared ambushes in guerrilla wars has always been the most tactically convenient and least punishable type of combat operations. The advantage of the attackers consists of the illegality of the attack, the use of secretive and advantageous positions for shooting at tactically dominant heights, the arrangement and organization of an ambush in a place that is tactically unfavorable for the column, where it is difficult to maneuver equipment and counter attacking actions. According to the current situation, the task of an attack on a convoy is both the destruction of manpower and the robbery of valuable cargo.

In Chechnya, where large-scale operations are no longer taking place, militants have chosen the tactics of ambushes and road mining. However, they never refused such actions.

The militants try to organize an ambush in places where the column is forced to slow down: - in mountain gorges, in front of tunnels and bridges, on descents and ascents, in mountain villages (on one side there is an abyss, on the other there is a steep slope) in places where mountain fogs accumulate, on winding sections of the road, on narrow and uneven roads, before and after road turns, on sections of the road where visibility is limited and where traffic is lost from sight. Very comfortable spot for an ambush - on the slope before the turn in the road (or on the slope remaining after the turn), when the cars are moving directly towards or away from the shooters. In this case, vehicles are targets that do not have a lateral displacement for enemy shooters, and therefore the targets are almost motionless and the most susceptible to damage.

In any case, in order to fire, the attackers must ensure that the column is in a place that is sufficiently exposed to fire and does not have the only shelters near it. An ambush can also be set up so that on the side opposite from the firing positions there are cliffs, steep slopes, water barriers, and wetlands, so that the soldiers from the column have nowhere to hide. If there is no such thing on the terrain, there may be enemy mines, machine gunners and snipers on the other side of the road. The enemy really doesn’t like it when a column can “spread” to the sides - this reduces losses in the column. In addition, an aggressive transition of the column's manpower into a bottom-up offensive is highly undesirable for the enemy. Therefore, roadsides are often mined and ambush firing positions are established behind natural impassable obstacles - cliffs, water barriers, etc., so that the attackers do not reach enemy positions. Possible routes of advance “from the column to the top” can also be mined. Enemy firing positions are almost are never on the crests of heights- (where the enemy is clearly visible against the sky), and on slopes facing the road, in shaded or bushy places, in piles of stones (or under these piles) Attention! In front of such enemy positions, on your side there will be “bare”, not overgrown (or sparsely overgrown) places - areas of terrain. These are either natural or artificially cleared by the enemy firing sectors.

1. Hidden location of Ph.D. for the purpose of a surprise attack. 2. Method of conducting military reconnaissance. 3. In the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia - a type of search, a squad used to detain wanted persons if there is information about their appearance in the identification. place. In 3. observers, capture and support groups are appointed. 4. In the operational investigation - one of the developed search operations. practice of methods of suppressing crime. The advance and covert placement of an operative (group of operatives) on the known or most likely route of movement (place of appearance) of the person who committed the crime, the wanted person or other person being studied for the purpose of capturing him. Some experts consider 3. an independent ORM (I.A. Medvedev and others). I.N. Yakimov called 3. a method of detaining a criminal. See Behavioral act of the subject directly carried out. ORD. Yakimov I.N. Forensics: A Guide to Criminal Technology and Tactics. - M., 1925; Ozhegov SI. Dictionary of the Russian language. - M, 1990; ; Medvedev I.A. Ambush as an urgent operational investigative measure in the practice of internal affairs bodies //Judicial reform and the effectiveness of the activities of the court, prosecutor's office and investigation. - St. Petersburg, 1999; Criminal investigation practice /Under scientific. ed. A.I. Alekseeva. M, 1999; .

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