Peoples living in Europe. National composition of foreign Europe

By 1964, ten-year reign Nikita Khrushchev led to an amazing result - there were practically no forces left in the country on which the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee could rely.

The creative intelligentsia, which initially welcomed Khrushchev, recoiled from him, having heard enough “valuable instructions” and direct insults. Russian Orthodox Church, accustomed to post-war period to the relative freedom granted to her by the state, came under pressure not seen since the 1920s.

Diplomats were tired of resolving the consequences of Khrushchev’s abrupt steps on the international stage, and the military was outraged by the ill-conceived mass cuts in the army.

The reform of the management system of industry and agriculture led to chaos and a deep economic crisis, aggravated by Khrushchev’s campaign: widespread planting of corn, persecution of collective farmers’ personal plots, etc.

Just a year after Gagarin’s triumphant flight and the proclamation of the task of building communism in 20 years, Khrushchev plunged the country into Caribbean crisis, and inside, with the help of army units, he suppressed the protest of those dissatisfied with the decline in the living standards of workers in Novocherkassk.

Food prices continued to rise, store shelves became empty, and bread shortages began in some regions. The threat of a new famine looms over the country.

Khrushchev remained popular only in jokes: “On Red Square during the May Day demonstration, a pioneer with flowers comes up to Khrushchev’s Mausoleum and asks:

— Nikita Sergeevich, is it true that you launched not only a satellite, but also agriculture?

-Who told you this? - Khrushchev frowned.

“Tell your dad that I can plant more than just corn!”

Intrigue versus intriguer

Nikita Sergeevich was experienced craftsman court intrigues. He skillfully got rid of his comrades in the post-Stalin triumvirate, Malenkov and Beria, and in 1957 managed to resist an attempt to remove him from the “anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them.” What saved Khrushchev was intervention in the conflict Minister of Defense Georgy Zhukov, whose word turned out to be decisive.

Less than six months had passed before Khrushchev dismissed his savior, fearing the growing influence of the military.

In 1963, Khrushchev's ally, Second Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Frol Kozlov, left his post due to health reasons, and his duties were divided between Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev and transferred from Kyiv to work Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikolai Podgorny.

From about this moment, Leonid Brezhnev began to conduct secret negotiations with members of the CPSU Central Committee, finding out their moods. Usually such conversations took place in Zavidovo, where Brezhnev loved to hunt.

Active participants in the conspiracy, in addition to Brezhnev, were KGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastny, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander Shelepin, already mentioned Podgorny. The further it went, the more the circle of participants in the conspiracy expanded. He was joined by a member of the Politburo and the future chief ideologist of the country Mikhail Suslov, Minister of Defense Rodion Malinovsky, 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexey Kosygin and others.

Among the conspirators there were several different factions that viewed Brezhnev's leadership as temporary, accepted as a compromise. This, of course, suited Brezhnev, who turned out to be much more far-sighted than his comrades.

“You are planning something against me...”

In the summer of 1964, the conspirators decided to speed up the implementation of their plans. At the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev removes Brezhnev from the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, replacing him Anastas Mikoyan. At the same time, Khrushchev rather dismissively informs Brezhnev, who was returned to his previous position - curator of the CPSU Central Committee on issues of the military-industrial complex, that he lacks the skills to hold the position from which he was removed.

In August - September 1964, at meetings of the top Soviet leadership, Khrushchev, dissatisfied with the situation in the country, hinted at an upcoming large-scale rotation in the highest echelons of power.

It turns out to be impossible to conceal a conspiracy of this magnitude - at the end of September 1964, through the son of Sergei Khrushchev, evidence of the existence of a group preparing a coup was transmitted.

Oddly enough, Khrushchev does not take active counter actions. The most that the Soviet leader does is threaten the members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee: “You, friends, are planning something against me. Look, if something happens, I’ll scatter them around like puppies.” In response, members of the Presidium vying with each other begin to assure Khrushchev of their loyalty, which completely satisfies him.

At the beginning of October, Khrushchev went on vacation to Pitsunda, where he was preparing for the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on agriculture scheduled for November.

As one of the participants in the conspiracy recalled, Member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee Dmitry Polyansky, on October 11, Khrushchev called him and said that he knew about the intrigues against him, promised to return to the capital in three or four days and show everyone “Kuzka’s mother.”

Brezhnev at that moment was on a working trip abroad, Podgorny was in Moldova. However, after Polyansky’s call, both urgently returned to Moscow.

Leader in isolation

It is difficult to say whether Khrushchev actually planned anything or his threats were empty. Perhaps, knowing about the conspiracy in principle, he did not fully realize its scale.

Be that as it may, the conspirators decided to act without delay.

On October 12, a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee met in the Kremlin. A decision was made: due to “uncertainties of a fundamental nature that have arisen, to hold the next meeting on October 13 with the participation of Comrade Khrushchev. Instruct tt. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov and Podgorny contact him by phone.” The meeting participants also decided to summon members of the Central Committee and Central Committee of the CPSU to Moscow for a plenum, the time of which would be determined in the presence of Khrushchev.

By this point, both the KGB and the armed forces were effectively controlled by the conspirators. At the state dacha in Pitsunda, Khrushchev was isolated, his negotiations were controlled by the KGB, and ships of the Black Sea Fleet could be seen at sea, arriving “to protect the First Secretary due to the deteriorating situation in Turkey.

By order USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, the troops of most districts were put on combat readiness. Only the Kiev Military District, commanded by Peter Koshevoy, the military man closest to Khrushchev, who was even considered as a candidate for the post of Minister of Defense of the USSR.

To avoid excesses, the conspirators deprived Khrushchev of the opportunity to contact Koshev, and also took measures to exclude the possibility of the First Secretary’s plane turning to Kyiv instead of Moscow.

"The last word"

Together with Khrushchev in Pitsunda he was Anastas Mikoyan. On the evening of October 12, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was invited to come to Moscow to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to resolve urgent issues, explaining that everyone had already arrived and was only waiting for him.

Khrushchev was too experienced a politician not to understand the essence of what was happening. Moreover, Mikoyan told Nikita Sergeevich what awaited him in Moscow, practically in clear text.

However, Khrushchev never took any measures - with a minimum number of guards, he flew to Moscow.

The reasons for Khrushchev's passivity are still being debated. Some believe that he hoped, as in 1957, to tip the scales in his favor at the last moment, having achieved a majority not at the Presidium, but at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Others believe that the 70-year-old Khrushchev, entangled in his own political mistakes, saw his removal as the best way out of the situation, relieving him of any responsibility.

On October 13 at 15:30 a new meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee began in the Kremlin. Arriving in Moscow, Khrushchev took the chairman's seat for the last time in his career. Brezhnev was the first to take the floor, explaining to Khrushchev what kind of questions arose in the Presidium of the Central Committee. To make Khrushchev understand that he was isolated, Brezhnev emphasized that the questions were raised by the secretaries of the regional committees.

Khrushchev did not give up without a fight. While admitting mistakes, he nevertheless expressed his willingness to correct them by continuing his work.

However, after the speech of the First Secretary, numerous speeches by critics began, lasting until the evening and continuing on the morning of October 14. The further the “enumeration of sins” went, the more obvious it became that there could be only one “sentence” - resignation. Only Mikoyan was ready to “give another chance” to Khrushchev, but his position did not find support.

When everything became obvious to everyone, Khrushchev was once again given the floor, this time truly the last. “I’m not asking for mercy - the issue is resolved. “I told Mikoyan: I won’t fight...” said Khrushchev. “I’m glad: finally the party has grown and can control any person.” You get together and say hello, but I can’t object.”

Two lines in the newspaper

It remained to decide who would become the successor. Brezhnev proposed nominating Nikolai Podgorny for the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but he refused in favor of Leonid Ilyich himself, as, in fact, was planned in advance.

The decision, made by a narrow circle of leaders, was to be approved by an extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which began on the same day, at six in the evening, at Catherine Hall Kremlin.

The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee unanimously adopted the resolution “On Comrade Khrushchev,” according to which he was relieved of his posts “due to his advanced age and deteriorating health.”

Khrushchev combined the positions of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The combination of these posts was recognized as inappropriate, and they approved Leonid Brezhnev as the party successor, and Alexei Kosygin as the “state” successor.

There was no defeat of Khrushchev in the press. Two days later, a brief report was published in the newspapers about the extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, where it was decided to replace Khrushchev with Brezhnev. Instead of anathema, oblivion was prepared for Nikita Sergeevich - in the next 20 years, the official media of the USSR former leader Almost nothing was written about the Soviet Union.

"Voskhod" flies to another era

The “palace coup” of 1964 became the most bloodless in the history of the Fatherland. The 18-year era of Leonid Brezhnev's rule began, which would later be called the best period in the country's history in the 20th century.

The reign of Nikita Khrushchev was marked by high-profile space victories. His resignation also turned out to be indirectly connected with space. On October 12, 1964, the manned spacecraft Voskhod-1 launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome with the first crew of three in history - Vladimir Komarov, Konstantina Feoktistova And Boris Egorov. The cosmonauts flew away under Nikita Khrushchev, and reported on the successful completion of the flight program to Leonid Brezhnev...

Immediately after the XXII Congress, Khrushchev undertook his first large-scale trip to Central Asia. Note that he did this unexpectedly even for his colleagues on the Presidium, since Khrushchev had a lot of current affairs in Moscow: after the congress, he had to deal with the redistribution of personal responsibilities in the new composition of the Presidium and Secretariat, meet with foreign delegations, etc. And in At this moment, Khrushchev suddenly literally breaks out of his seat and goes to Central Asia. Why?

Apparently, he did this not by chance, but under the impression of the events that unfolded at the congress around his initiative to rebury Stalin (by the way, this event took place on October 31, and not during the day, but in the dead of night, that is, its initiators acted “like a tati in the night"). Stung by the fact that Central Asian leaders refused to publicly support his initiative, Khrushchev decided to personally verify the mood of the Central Asian elites and, if necessary, “set their brains straight.”

The Central Asian republics themselves also did not expect the arrival of a high-ranking leader. After all, at that time there was a hot struggle going on - cotton harvesting - and almost the entire leadership was dealing with this very issue (they went to collective farms, solved pressing issues of ensuring harvesting with all the necessary means, etc.). However, Khrushchev, apparently, the earth was burning under his feet - he so wanted to protect his wounded pride.

Khrushchev arrived in Tashkent on November 10. He was met at the airport not only by the leaders of Uzbekistan, led by Rashidov, but also by the heads of all Central Asian republics, as well as several union ministers and representatives of the Tashkent public. After resting at the government dacha in Durmen, the distinguished guest went by train to Samarkand the next morning. After exploring the sights of this ancient city, its historical monuments, Khrushchev met with party and Soviet workers of the region, accepted a report from collective farmers and state farm workers on the implementation of the annual cotton procurement plan. After that, he headed to Rashidov’s homeland - the Jizzakh region. At the end of the day, he held a meeting of employees of the Glavgolodnostepstroy management and heads of a number of virgin farms, where the first results of the development of new lands were discussed.

Over the next two days, Khrushchev visited the Kazakh part of a new large cotton-growing region (the Pakhta-Aral collective farm), then returned to Tashkent, where he visited one of the oldest (established in 1925) and most famous collective farms, the Political Department (20 km from the city, in Verkhnechirchik region). Then, in the Yangiyul district, I met with the famous female machine operator, 24-year-old Tursuna Akhunova. On November 14, Khrushchev visited the All-Union Research Institute of Cotton Growing, located in the vicinity of Tashkent. Finally, on November 15–16, at the Tashkent Opera and Ballet Theater named after A. Navoi, Khrushchev held a zonal meeting on issues Agriculture. There was only one question on the agenda: “On measures to increase the production of cotton, meat, milk and other agricultural products in the republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan and southern regions Kazakhstan". At this meeting, Khrushchev awarded the Order of Lenin to representatives of the Tashkent and Samarkand regions and the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic for their success in the development of cotton growing achieved back in 1959.

This trip clearly indicated the unflagging attention that the Center continued to pay to the Central Asian republics. And the most influential politician in this region was Sharaf Rashidov. And with his visit to Uzbekistan, Khrushchev, in particular, was going to dispel his doubts as to whether he was right when, instead of Mukhitdinov, he placed his bet on Rashidov.

Let us note that the “Tashkent people” from the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Ya. Nasriddinova, M. Abdurazakov and others) tried to dissuade Khrushchev from tightening the punishment for Mukhitdinov (they were going to remove him from the Central Committee of the CPSU) and for this purpose handed him a letter signed two secretaries of the district committee and two chairmen of collective farms, in which they stood up for Mukhitdinov. This petition had an effect on Khrushchev: he instructed his assistant to call Frol Kozlov in Moscow and not to proceed with the draft decision to remove Mukhitdinov from the Central Committee.

Apparently, Rashidov’s behavior completely satisfied Khrushchev and he left Uzbekistan with the feeling that he could rely on this man. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in the spring of 1962, it was Rashidov who was involved as the main participant in the secret operation “Anadyr”, which was launched by Khrushchev, who decided to put a good pig under the very side of the United States - to place Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

The fact is that the Soviet leadership was convinced that the United States would definitely attack Liberty Island, and to lose this stronghold revolutionary movement The USSR did not want to be in Latin America. And since it was not possible to defend the island with conventional weapons, the only possible solution was chosen - to place missiles there. True, they had to be sent there secretly. And in this operation, it was Rashidov who was assigned one of the main roles - he had to lull the vigilance of the Americans. How?

According to the developers of the operation, the missiles (as well as military personnel) were to be delivered secretly to Cuba on several ships, which allegedly transported agricultural equipment for irrigating the land, as well as tourists. Since such equipment was produced and used in Uzbekistan, Rashidov had to take on the mission of a smoke screen. In the second half of March 1962, he arrived in Moscow and on the 22nd he spent 1 hour and 15 minutes in Khrushchev’s Kremlin office. For most people, this meeting took place as a working meeting on land reclamation issues; in fact, the interlocutors, in addition to this issue, discussed another issue - plans for the upcoming operation to divert the eyes of the Americans.

On March 23, Rashidov was again in the Kremlin with Khrushchev, only this time several more people joined their conversation: Chairman of the State Economic Council of the USSR A. Zasyadko, Academician-Secretary of the Department of Hydraulic Engineering and Land Reclamation of the All-Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences A. Askochensky and a number of other persons. This meeting lasted twice as long as yesterday's - almost two and a half hours. It was only about land reclamation in Uzbekistan, however, this rendezvous was also part of the “missile” plan, since information about it was published in the press, which was the same smokescreen for the American intelligence services, who literally studied the entire Soviet press with a magnifying glass .

A month later (April 24), Khrushchev hosted a group of high-ranking military personnel: Minister of Defense R. Malinovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces S. Biryuzov, Commander of the Air Defense Forces V. Sudets, Commander-in-Chief of Long-Range Aviation F. Agaltsov. Apparently, at this meeting the details of the same “missile” operation were settled.

Another month later (May 23), Khrushchev hosted land reclamation specialists - agricultural specialists in irrigating land and growing cotton. However, in addition to them, a representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a member of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations and Chief Editor newspaper "Rural Life" P. Alekseev. The next day, detailed material about this meeting will appear in this newspaper, where it will be reported that it was devoted to the issues of providing material assistance to fraternal Cuba.

At that time, Rashidov was already in Moscow. First, as a candidate member of the Presidium, he participates in a meeting where the country's leadership approved the final decision on the transfer of missiles to Cuba. On May 25, Rashidov again comes to Khrushchev to take part in the last meeting, where the details of the “missile” operation are finally settled. At that meeting, in addition to our hero, were present: F. Kozlov (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee), A. Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR), S. Biryuzov (Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces), Yu. Andropov (Secretary of the Central Committee for International Affairs), A. Alekseev (USSR Ambassador to Cuba), O. Troyanovsky (Assistant to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR). The meeting ends with Khrushchev appointing Rashidov as the head of the delegation that goes to Cuba. The delegation also included: S. Biryuzov (under the pseudonym engineer Petrov), A. Alekseev and a number of other persons.

Rashidov was entrusted with the mission, under the guise of negotiations with Fidel Castro on providing assistance to Cuba in the supply of agricultural machinery, as well as land reclamation equipment, to convey the Soviet government’s proposal for the supply and deployment of missiles in Cuba for defense against American aggression. The entire technical side of the deployment of these missiles was to be discussed with Castro by Biryuzov, and Alekseev’s role as a liaison fell to him.

The delegation stayed in Cuba for two weeks and returned home on June 10. The next day, all its members arrived to Khrushchev and reported to him that the Cuban leadership agreed with the Soviet government’s proposal for the supply of missiles. They were supposed to begin in July, and a huge group had to be transferred: only its nuclear component was an entire missile division of three R-12 regiments (24 launchers). The entire group consisted of about 51 thousand people, but in the end they managed to transfer only 42 thousand (the rest were not allowed in by the Americans, who nevertheless found out about the operation after discovering missile positions being built in Cuba from the air).

Meanwhile, Rashidov continued to participate in Operation Anadyr in the following days. So, on July 13, he met with Fidel Castro in the Kremlin. In addition to them, two ministers were also present at that meeting from the Soviet side: R. Malinovsky (defense) and A. Gromyko (foreign affairs).

As already mentioned, missile technology was transferred to Cuba under the guise of supplying agricultural machinery, as well as under the guise of military exercises, and the military personnel were treated as ordinary tourists.

The Americans nevertheless found out about the “missile” operation (this happened on October 14), which provoked the “Carribean crisis”. On the night of October 27-28, the world stood five minutes away from nuclear war: then US President John Kennedy was ready to give the order to attack Cuba, and Khrushchev in this case was ready to strike back at the United States. Fortunately, the terrible outcome was avoided. However, in that situation, Khrushchev behaved very insultingly towards Cuba. However, it could not have been otherwise, since the Soviet leadership considered Freedom Island as their new union republic, and sometimes they did not stand on ceremony with them either. What happened?

When Khrushchev learned from Kennedy that the Americans were going to bomb missile launch sites in Cuba, he began to bargain with the US President. As a result, the leaders of the two superpowers came to a compromise: Khrushchev agreed to remove all missiles from Cuba, and Kennedy in response promised not to bomb the island. However, the Soviet leader made his decision without any coordination with Cuba. As a result, when the next day this information was transmitted to the whole world in clear text (via Moscow Radio), there was no limit to the indignation of the Cubans. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that when, on the same day, Cuban leader Fidel Castro demanded that the United States completely stop subversive activities against Cuba, the Americans cynically declared that this problem would be discussed and resolved... with the leadership of the USSR. This response had one goal: to humiliate Castro and force him to break with the Soviets. And Castro was already ready to do this, but Khrushchev came to his senses in time and sent the master of such matters, Anastas Mikoyan, to Cuba to settle the conflict. And he completed the mission and settled the conflict. As F. Castro will say a little later: “Khrushchev made a mistake towards us that caused pain to Cuba, but this nevertheless cannot overshadow or annul the feelings of our gratitude that he deserved.”

Rashidov's participation in Operation Anadyr was not the only example of his active presence in the affairs of the top Soviet leadership in the international direction. He continued to be one of the important players in the Kremlin in another direction - the Soviet-Indian one.

As we remember, active cooperation between the USSR and India began in the first half of the 50s. And Uzbekistan was assigned a leading role in this matter as the largest and most authoritative republic in the Central Asian region. As a result, during the period from 1956 to 1961, during the second five-year plan of India, out of 16 projects in the field of heavy industry, 8 were built with the help of the Soviet Union, and Uzbekistan participated in almost every one of these projects. In total, in the second half of the 50s, the USSR provided India with economic assistance in the amount of $681 million, which amounted to 27% of all assistance provided by the USSR to Asian countries.

Meanwhile, at the end of that decade, Soviet-Indian cooperation was expected serious challenge. The fact is that China increasingly began to distance itself from the USSR, considering Khrushchev’s policy in exposing Stalin to be revisionist. And after China and India entered into armed confrontation in 1959, and the USSR took the latter’s side, Chinese leaders made another notch in their memory. And when the Soviet leadership took the same position during the next Sino-Indian conflict - in October 1962 - Beijing called Moscow a traitor to the communist movement. It was then that the USSR began supplying its weapons to India, namely MiG-21 aircraft. In addition, the Soviet leadership began building factories in India to produce this interceptor fighter. Since Uzbekistan continued to play the most active role in Soviet-Indian relations, Rashidov’s position only strengthened.

Meanwhile, it would be incorrect to say that Rashidov then devoted all his time to state problems. No, he found time for other things. For example, at night he continued to write books, and on the very days when Operation Anadyr was unfolding, on his table lay the almost completed manuscript of the novel “The Mighty Wave,” which was dedicated to the construction of the Farhad hydroelectric power station. Let us note that in this case Rashidov knew what he was writing about: in 1944, among the “ten-thousanders”, he came to this hydroelectric power station to participate in its construction.

As in Rashidov’s two previous books (“Winners” and “Stronger than the Storm”), this one also centered on the fates of two young people in love with each other: the boy’s name was Pulat, the girl’s name was Bakhor. Present in the book and popular for Soviet literature and the arts of those years, a production conflict: at the center of it were the 1st secretary of the district party committee Dzhurabov (innovator) and the district council official Sultanov (conservative). As Rashidov himself would later recall:

“Speaking about the main characters of my novels, critics noted the “Korchagin beginning” in their behavior (for the ignorant people, I’ll explain that we're talking about about the hero of N. Ostrovsky’s novel “How the Steel Was Tempered” Pavel Korchagin - one of the most beloved heroes of Soviet youth. - F.R.). In particular, they saw this beginning in the actions of Pulat (“Mighty Wave”). I don't think this statement is worth refuting. The “Korchagin beginning” is palpable in the character of more than one generation of Soviet people. Its origins lie in our revolution, in the glorious traditions of the struggle of the working class. It is brought up by the Communist Party, which has always paid and continues to pay enormous attention to youth. Nowadays, this beginning is manifested in the exploits of astronauts, and in the heroic work of the BAM builders, and in glorious deeds cotton growers, virgin land explorers. It expresses in a concentrated, I would say “materialized” form, loyalty to the great cause of communism, high morality, and unparalleled courage of the conscious builders of a new society. It is typical of the personality of a Soviet person, our contemporary...”

In addition, Rashidov devoted a lot of free time to the sports problems of the republic. Thus, he closely followed the successes of the Tashkent football team“Pakhtakor” was at the origins of the creation of which, as we remember, he was still the president of Uzbekistan (in 1956).

In 1960, the country's football authorities finally decided to include the majority of republican teams in major league and Pakhtakor took a modest 14th place in that tournament. The following year the result was better - 10th place. However, in 1962, Pakhtakor began to play truly powerfully, surprising most experts - few people expected such agility from him. He ended up in the preliminary subgroup “B”, where together with him were such giants of Soviet football as the Moscow clubs Spartak, Dynamo and Torpedo, as well as Dynamo Tbilisi. The Tashkent team lost to Spartak and Tbilisi, but tied with Torpedo and Dynamo, and won the subgroups against most of the other clubs. Thus, Pakhtakor scored 23 points (5th place) and entered the group, where places from 1st to 12th were up for grabs.

The successes of Pakhtakor at that time were associated with the name of coach Alexander Keller, who introduced his own know-how into the team’s game: he was one of the first to use a positional player in defense (Oleg Motorin) as backup, and also put two central forwards at the forefront of the attack ( Gennady Krasnitsky and Sergey Stadnik). The idea of ​​this know-how was to ensure reliability in defense and open operational space for the tandem of central forwards, who were supported by a tactically very competent and technical player (Idgai Tazetdinov). In addition, from many Soviet clubs that played “Varangians” (invited players from other clubs), Pakhtakor relied on its home-grown students.

Games in subgroup “B” took place from April to September, and in the leader group from September 25 to November 18. Like the rest of Uzbekistan (and that season, the average attendance at matches involving Pakhtakor in the republic was 52 thousand spectators), Rashidov not only followed with interest the performance of his native team on television broadcasts, but, whenever possible, personally attended matches with their participation. However, not only he alone did this, but also many other influential statesmen countries. After all, football in the USSR was more than a sport: for the majority of the population it was a kind of religion, and for politicians it was also a favorite toy that helped them prove their superiority over their competitors on the fields of political struggle. Therefore, behind all the country's football giants there were both real owners from sports societies and behind-the-scenes - high-ranking party and government officials. This has been the case since the 30s, and three decades later the situation in this regard has not changed at all.

For example, CSKA was “overseen” by the Minister of Defense (Malinovsky), the capital’s Dynamo by the Minister of Internal Affairs (Kruglov), the Kiev Dynamo by the President of Ukraine (Shcherbitsky), the Baku Neftchi by the 1st Secretary of the Republic (Akhundov), the Tbilisi “ Dynamo" - 1st Secretary of the Republic (Mzhavanadze), etc. As for Khrushchev, he did not like football, but the then president of the country, Leonid Brezhnev, was a passionate fan, who supported two football clubs at once - the capital's CSKA and Dnepr from Dnepropetrovsk (Brezhnev was born in those parts).

Since Rashidov had many ill-wishers not only in his homeland, but also in Moscow (a number of figures close to Khrushchev feared the growing influence of the owner of Uzbekistan, who, having become a candidate for membership in the Presidium in the fall of 1961, clearly showed a desire to enter the highest party Areopagus as a full member in the near future, especially after their active participation in Operation Anadyr and in Soviet-Indian relations), they tried in every possible way to interfere with Rashidov in his far-reaching plans. However, it was difficult to do this, since in 1962, things were going swimmingly for the owner of Uzbekistan in almost all areas: both in politics and in the economy. And even the fact that that year the republic was in danger of failing to deliver cotton to the state (due to bad weather conditions, 800 thousand tons of cotton would be harvested less than in 1961), this could not help Rashidov’s ill-wishers shake his position in the eyes of Khrushchev - after all, according to other economic indicators, everything was as good as ever. In 1962, Uzbekistan will increase steel production by 12 thousand tons more than in the previous year, coal - by almost 500 thousand tons, oil - by almost 50 thousand tons, gas - by 1020 million cubic meters, etc.

Meanwhile, difficulties in agriculture forced Rashidov to change the curator of this area in the Bureau of the Central Committee - G. Gabrielyants. Instead of him, A. Khaidarov was introduced into the Bureau in August 1962 (as for Gabrielyants, he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the UzSSR). At the same time, new “eyes and ears” of Moscow appeared near Rashidov - 48-year-old 2nd Secretary Vladimir Karlov, who replaced Fyodor Titov in this post (Karlov had previously worked as 1st Secretary of the Kalinin Regional Committee).

Meanwhile, Khrushchev’s plans included the continuation of economic reforms in the country, including in the republics of Central Asia. Since he placed a special emphasis on Uzbekistan (together with Kazakhstan, it was one of the most populous regions of the south of the country) and personally on Rashidov, Khrushchev went to Tashkent in early October 1962 to get acquainted with the activities of workers in industry, agriculture and scientists of the republic.

Khrushchev returned to Moscow enriched with new ideas, which prompted him in December to create the Central Asian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee with its head office in Tashkent, which was entrusted with operational management of the reforms that were soon to begin in Central Asia. At the head of the bureau, Khrushchev appointed an experienced party leader from the main party forge of the country, Moscow, Vladimir Lomonosov (in party work since 1954, in 1958–1962 he was the 2nd secretary and 1st secretary of the Kalinin district party committee in Moscow).

In the same December, new personnel changes took place in the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (now called the Presidium). The Secretary of the Central Committee for Agriculture A. Khaidarov and the Chairman of the KGB of the UzSSR G. Naimushin were removed from it. True, the latter was only demoted to the rank of candidate, which was a consequence of the policy pursued by Khrushchev: thus, he lowered the status of the KGB so that it would not dare to interfere in party affairs. The candidates for the Presidium also included K. Murtazaev and N. Nazhestkin.

At the same time, the Committee of Party Control received significant powers, which was reorganized into the Committee of Party and State Control and was given even greater powers. From now on, the Committee received the right to control party bodies, the government, the armed forces, and even the KGB. In Uzbekistan, 50-year-old Mirzamakhmud Musakhanov, who was a protege of the Tashkent people, was appointed chairman of the KPGK.

However, only six months passed before new adjustments had to be made to the composition of the Presidium. In the spring of 1963, Khrushchev became seriously concerned about the problems of ideology (demanded its strengthening) and Rashidov had to change ideologist in July. Together with Zukhra Rakhimbabaeva, who oversaw this direction for several years, and was now removed from the Presidium and sent to head the Ministry of Culture, Rafik Nishanov, who belonged to the Tashkent clan, became the main ideologist (and member of the Presidium, respectively).

In December 1962, a new chairman of the Supreme Court of the UzSSR was brought into leadership - he became Mamejan Maksumov. This, too, was not an accidental phenomenon, but a natural one: Moscow continued to demand from the republics not only not to weaken the fight against crime, but also to conduct it more harshly.

In 1963, Rashidov's relationship with Khrushchev became complicated. Which is understandable, since the reform activities of the Kremlin owner have acquired the character of outright voluntarism. For example, the “assault” development of virgin and fallow lands, which Khrushchev started in the mid-50s, ultimately caused soil erosion in large areas, which led to a sharp decrease in pasture areas and a reduction in livestock numbers. The sweeping and uncritical exposure of Stalin in 1956 and subsequent years led to serious problems in the ideological field both within the country and in the international arena. And Khrushchev’s decision to liquidate peasant subsidiary plots led to an acute shortage of food, which became the reason for unrest in Novocherkassk (June 1962), which Khrushchev ordered to suppress by force of arms (ultimately 24 people died, including children, and seven workers from among demonstrators were sentenced to death).

Back in 1957, Khrushchev took a radical step: he replaced the sectoral management system with a territorial one. By and large, this reform did not lead to anything good, but only reduced the technical level of production. However, five years later, Khrushchev went even further - he began to create two Councils of Workers' Deputies - industrial and rural, which violated one of the basic principles of the Councils, the unity of their system. At the same time, the CPSU also underwent reforms - “urban” and “rural” regional committees were created. Uzbekistan also did not escape these reforms. Thus, out of 115 districts, only 61 districts were left there. As a result, many settlements turned out to be 300 kilometers away from the regional center. And it became much more difficult for a simple collective farmer to resolve his problems, since getting to the center became more problematic. Naturally, complaints poured in, including to Tashkent, to Rashidov himself. On any given day, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan received several thousand of these complaints. All this cast a shadow on the republican leadership and strained its relations with the ordinary population.

Let us note that the republican leadership could not solve most of the problems that arose promptly, that is, on the spot, but were forced to ask permission from Moscow. Thus, in 1962 alone, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan sent 1,081 petitions to the capital of the USSR asking for permission to take appropriate measures to solve local problems. Moscow responded as follows: 910 requests were satisfied positively, 113 negatively, and 38 were removed from discussion as unprincipled.

Khrushchev tried to force the leadership of Uzbekistan to actively cultivate corn in the republic. He instructed Rashidov to sow 600 thousand hectares of land with it. He responded by saying that it was impossible to sow it in such quantities in the republic - it would be necessary to cut back on irrigated land. Khrushchev continued to insist, but Rashidov resisted. As a result, Khrushchev came to the conclusion that Rashidov was not the person who could be relied upon in the reforms that he intended to continue to carry out in the country. However, this was not only the case with Rashidov. By the end of his reign, Khrushchev's relations with almost the majority of republican leaders had deteriorated.

Khrushchev's relationship with Rashidov began to deteriorate about a year before his resignation. The owner of the Kremlin did not like that the Uzbek leader almost defiantly began to show him what he had proper point perspective on many events inner life countries. However, Khrushchev did not dare to remove him from his post, since affairs in the republic were clearly in disarray. The confident stride of his republic gave Rashidov additional strength in his difficult relationship with Khrushchev. In other cases, the owner of Uzbekistan almost openly challenged the owner of the Kremlin, as was the case, for example, in the case of famous writer Valentin Ovechkin, who shortly before fell into disgrace with Khrushchev. Let us note that this was not the first disgraced writer whom Rashidov warmed up. The first was Konstantin Simonov, who was expelled from Moscow back in 1959. He found refuge in Tashkent with Rashidov. In the same years, the magazine "Star of the East" began publishing best novel Simonov "The Living and the Dead". This was perhaps the very first publication of the novel in the Soviet Union.

The story with Ovechkin could not escape the attention of Moscow. Moreover, Rashidov himself did not try to hide it, and even moreover, he committed completely demonstrative acts. So, in June 1964, when Ovechkin turned 60 years old, Rashidov nominated him for the Order of Lenin. Let us note that the hero of the day himself did not believe that this idea would be successful and even tried to dissuade Rashidov from it. But he didn’t listen to him. The situation became very tense and Moscow spent some time deciding what to do. As a result, a compromise solution was chosen: Ovechkin was still awarded, but instead of the Order of Lenin, he was given an award of a lower rank - the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, while obliging Rashidov not to publish information about the award in the republican press.

Rashidov was forced to agree with the last order, but here, too, he found a way to challenge Moscow: he held a ceremonial meeting in honor of the hero of the day. Let us note that the latter seriously believed that at most two dozen of the bravest and most devoted people would come to see him, but the hall turned out to be filled to capacity. All this was evidence that both Rashidov himself and most of the Uzbek elite not only did not respect Khrushchev, but were no longer too afraid of his unbridled temper.

From a certain time on, Khrushchev’s unpredictable character began to inspire his comrades with almost the same horror as the “Chinese revolution.” Most of the representatives of the highest Soviet elite were increasingly convinced that Khrushchev had fulfilled his mission - he had laid the foundation for the formation of the “red bourgeoisie” class, after which he must give way to a more adequate politician. This is how a conspiracy against Khrushchev arose.

Judging by the recollections of eyewitnesses of those events, the conspiracy began to mature around February 1964. Moreover, the conspirators did not even rule out the option of physically eliminating Khrushchev. For example, Brezhnev, in a conversation with the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Semichastny (in June), sounded the waters on the subject of either poisoning the First Secretary or setting up a plane crash for him. However, the KGB chief dissuaded Brezhnev from this option. Let us remember that Khrushchev himself came to power as a result of almost the same murder (his Politburo comrade Lavrentiy Beria was arrested and shot), and a few years later the same Khrushchev, with the help of intrigues, removed the rest of his comrades from power (but left alive) according to the Stalinist Politburo: Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Bulganin. At the same time, another was discredited and dismissed famous figure- Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov. In short, passions no worse than Shakespeare’s have always reigned in the highest political circles of the USSR; another thing is that the majority of the population was protected from information about them: the details of all these behind-the-scenes squabbles never appeared in the media.

By May 1964, dozens of people were already involved in the conspiracy to remove Khrushchev, including some leaders of the republics. In particular, among the conspirators were the 1st Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia and Georgia Zarobyan and Mzhavanadze. However, they were neither candidates nor members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, while Sharaf Rashidov was. Therefore, it is quite likely to assume that Rashidov could certainly have been privy to this conspiracy, especially since he, as we remember, Lately he almost openly conflicted with Khrushchev (take, for example, the same story with the writer Ovechkin). It can be assumed that Rashidov was initiated into the conspiracy by Brezhnev, who had long-standing ties with him - dating back to the second half of the 50s, when Leonid Ilyich served as 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. Now Brezhnev was the secretary of the Central Committee, to whom the work with the leaders of the republics and regional committees was actually confined, which, naturally, made it easier for him to communicate with the republican leaders.

While the conspiracy against Khrushchev was brewing in Moscow, a number of personnel changes took place in Uzbekistan. Thus, in December 1963, Moscow replaced the chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the UzSSR: instead of G. Naimushin, S. Kiselev arrived in Tashkent. Let us note that while Naimushin (like previous KGB chairmen) was a candidate member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Kiselev was not given such an honor, which clearly indicated that Khrushchev continued to keep state security at some distance from party bodies.

In mid-March 1964, personnel changes took place in the composition of another law enforcement agency - the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There, Rashidov changed the Minister of Internal Affairs, replacing career policeman T. Jalilov with career security officer Khaidar Yakhyaev. Let us note that the latter was ten years younger than Rashidov and was his fellow countryman - a Samarkand resident.

In 1945, when Rashidov worked as secretary of the Samarkand regional committee for personnel, he briefly held the position of head general department Samarkand district executive committee. From there he was transferred to work in state security agencies. A little later, Yakhyaev graduated in absentia from the philological faculty of Samarkand State University (as we remember, Rashidov also studied at the same university, but a little earlier). In 1961, Yakhyaev headed the KGB for the Surkhandarya region, and three years later Rashidov appointed him Minister of Internal Affairs.

Meanwhile, the conspiracy against Khrushchev could not be kept secret. Vasily Golyukov, an employee of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (protection of high-ranking figures), found out about him and tried to let Khrushchev know about it. But he didn’t believe him. And he continued his vacation in Crimea, instead of returning to Moscow and trying to neutralize the conspirators. As a result, behind his back, they appointed a Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and summoned Khrushchev to Moscow.

As for Rashidov, he was in Uzbekistan in the days before the Plenum. On September 29, he hosted a reception in Tashkent in honor of the participants of the World Youth Forum, and on October 6, he received a delegation of leading officials of the Communist Party of Norway. And only in the tenth month he flew to Moscow. On October 13, he was already present at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, where its entire composition expressed a vote of no confidence in Khrushchev. They say that a member of the Presidium, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Gennady Voronov behaved especially harshly at that meeting, who, in response to Khrushchev’s remark “After all, we are all friends here,” replied: “You have no friends here!” Voronov was right, and in a broad sense: in politics there are never friends - there are only comrades-in-arms.

At that meeting, everyone present spoke, including Rashidov. Unfortunately, in the transcript of that meeting his speech is given only briefly. Therefore, I will cite only some points from this speech: “There is inconsistency in your character: in speeches - one thing, and in actions - another”; “I'm tired of your reorganizations”; “You humiliate your comrades”; “Everyone associates your name.” At the end of the speech, Rashidov agreed with the opinion of the majority - Khrushchev should be dismissed. The next day, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, which approved this decision. Khrushchev simultaneously lost the posts of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (Leonid Brezhnev became) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Alexei Kosygin was appointed to this post), from that moment turning into a pensioner of union importance.

It is worth noting that the news about the change in the leadership of the country was received by the majority of the population with surprising calm. Which is not surprising, since by that time Khrushchev’s authority among the people was already at its lowest point and was essentially supported artificially - thanks to the media. Therefore, his departure from the political arena did not evoke even a hint of any sympathy among most people.

Alexey Ivanovich Adzhubey (January 9, 1924, Samarkand - March 19, 1993, Moscow) - Soviet journalist, publicist, editor-in-chief of the newspapers Komsomolskaya Pravda (1957-1959) and Izvestia (1959-1964). Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee. Son-in-law of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Below is an excerpt from his book Those Ten Years (1989).

Dmitry Baltermants. Nikita Khrushchev for the last time on the podium of the Mausoleum. May 1, 1964

"At Pitsunda, Khrushchev's vacation was conditional character. He immediately visited a poultry farm, received Japanese and then Pakistani parliamentarians, sent greetings to the participants of the XVIII Olympic Games in Japan, and talked on the phone with cosmonauts V. Komarov, K. Feoktistov, and B. Egorov. Then he met with the French Minister of State for Nuclear Research. Considering that all this took a little more than a week, you cannot say that Nikita Sergeevich often visited the sun, the sea, or that a bad feeling crept into his soul. I am often asked: did Khrushchev really not know that preparations were underway for his removal? I answer: I knew. I knew that one leading comrade, traveling around the regions, directly stated: Khrushchev must be removed. Flying to Pitsunda, he said to Podgorny, who was seeing him off: “Call Ignatov, what is he talking about there? What kind of intrigue is this? When I get back, I’ll have to figure it all out.” With that he left. His nature was not such as to take seriously the strange voyages and conversations of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR N.G. Ignatov, and even more so to think that Ignatov is not leading them on his own initiative.

And then on October 13 came a phone call that Khrushchev himself later called “downright hysterical.” They demanded his immediate return to Moscow due to acute disagreements in the leadership. As far as I know, Suslov called. Did Khrushchev guess what the true reason for the call was? Nikita Sergeevich’s son was vacationing with his father. Even before leaving for Pitsunda, he told his father about a conversation with Ignatov’s guard, Galyukov, who high degree responsibility revealed the entire mechanism of the conspiracy against Khrushchev, named the names of its active participants. This man took a great risk, but honesty and respect for Khrushchev exceeded the feeling of fear. Mikoyan met with Galyukov in Moscow. Sergei, on behalf of Anastas Ivanovich, recorded this conversation, but it remains unknown whether Mikoyan drew Khrushchev’s attention to all these strange events, and whether he himself gave them fatal significance?

Sergei, naturally, was nervous. Suddenly he found himself at the center of political intrigues that were destined to change the course of time. Neither his father nor Mikoyan included him in their conversations on Pitsunda. When Khrushchev received a call from Moscow, it became clear to him that the conspiracy was coming to an end. He looked, as his son said, tired and indifferent. He said: “I won’t fight.” And Mikoyan? He flew to Moscow with Khrushchev. Perhaps he, too, was not going to fight, he realized that it was hopeless? Anastas Ivanovich defended Nikita Sergeevich at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee as best he could and to the end. Both of them, Khrushchev and Mikoyan, were already old people, and who knows if the supply of gunpowder in their flasks had not dried up. Mikoyan did not last long as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; in 1965 he himself resigned. For some time they tolerated him as a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, left his office in the Kremlin, invited him to the podium of the Mausoleum on holidays, and then stopped caring about the “decorum”. On the 60th anniversary October revolution he was not even invited to the ceremonial meeting. A year later, in 1978, A.I. Mikoyan died.

At the airport in Moscow, Khrushchev and Mikoyan were met only by KGB Chairman V.E. Semichastny. They immediately went to a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. On October 14, the Plenum of the Central Committee took place, at which Khrushchev did not speak. He sat silently, head down. For him, this short hour was, of course, terrible, indescribable torture. But at home he stayed calm. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan lived on the Lenin Hills, in one of the government mansions next door to Nikita Sergeevich. They were returning together from those meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee at which they discussed the removal of Khrushchev. I came to Nikita Sergeevich’s house at that time. He went to his room in silence. Before the Plenum of the Central Committee, he said: “They agreed.” Khrushchev could say with a clear conscience that he was “leaving affairs in the state in greater order than they were when he took them over.”

This idea belongs not to me, but to Mark Frankland, one of those Western Sovietologists who are trying to understand what the “decade of Khrushchev” was for the Soviet Union (I quote from the “Political Biography of Khrushchev” written by R. Medvedev). Opinions on this matter from “foreign shores” are varied and interesting. At the beginning of 1988, I met with the American professor Taubman. He connects and compares the activities of Khrushchev, Kennedy, John XXIII, believing that each of them wanted to change the world for the better, began to act in this direction in accordance with their convictions, but they did not manage to do much. This statement is only part of the answer to the question of why my American interlocutor combined these three names in a conversation. Probably, the truth lies deeper, and perhaps we still have not realized not only its local, but also its universal essence. “Please note,” Taubman said, “in the West, people of the Kennedy era are interested in the Khrushchev era.” Joining the professor’s thoughts, I also consider myself not only a “man of Khrushchev,” or more precisely, of the 20th Congress, but also an adherent, if this expression is possible, of the policy that President Kennedy developed and dreamed of implementing. I even heard the following statement: “If Kennedy had not been killed, it would not have been possible to remove Khrushchev...” But this is in the realm of speculation.<...>

When it comes to a politician, emotional assessments are often subjective. However, I will still give a few dozen more lines about Khrushchev, written at a time when he was already retired. Their author is Italian journalist Giuseppe Boffa, a former correspondent for the Unita newspaper in Moscow. (Now he is a senator, director of the Institute of International Studies.) “Layers of borrowings from the past experience of the development of the Soviet Union led to the fact that Khrushchev’s manner of thinking was characterized by obvious eclecticism in the sense that various moments of this historical experience formed in his judgments in bizarre combinations , without being subjected to the selection of mature comprehension, which is characteristic of a genuine culture of thought. One feature amazed many who knew this man closely: in his culture, insights of sharp and powerful thought and heavy gaps of ignorance, elementary, simplified ideas and the ability for the most subtle psychological and political analysis were combined and alternated...”

Returning the respect of society to millions of innocents, debunking the cult of Stalin, rejecting terror and repression as a method of managing the affairs of the state, not only Khrushchev, but also a wide circle of people did not rise to the understanding of a more complex truth: with gigantic efforts, the people of our country built a society from which, despite all its Despite the indisputable achievements, Lenin’s covenant disappeared: for socialism, people are above all! Doesn’t what I said contradict what I started my notes with, and what to do with the optimism that colored the activities of many post-war generations of Soviet people? Or is there no contradiction here, but the “optimism of ignorance” has simply exhausted itself?
The last words addressed to Khrushchev at the October Plenum of the Central Committee in 1964 were spoken by Brezhnev. Not without pathos, he ended the short meeting, as if summing up Suslov’s speech. So, they say, Khrushchev debunked the cult of Stalin after his death, and we are debunking the cult of Khrushchev during his lifetime. Well, Brezhnev was right. The cult of Khrushchev is over. I think Khrushchev would never have agreed to the role that the theorists of the stagnation period were preparing for Brezhnev himself.

In the era of “developed socialism”, a man who was called the “gray eminence” gained increasing importance. Now they hardly remember him. Just as you can’t blame everything on Khrushchev, you can’t blame everything on Brezhnev. Suslov liked to keep a low profile. Was this shadow moving its “master”? I had occasion to meet this man more than once, but I cannot claim that I knew him well. What has been said is rather a touch to the portrait of a high-ranking party functionary. Tall, thin, with sunken, often unshaven cheeks, he walked or stood slightly bent over, since Stalin, Khrushchev, and other party leaders were short. A certain carelessness in his clothes, especially on weekdays, a gray complexion, a rare smile and a lack of complacency in his gaze made him look like a seminarian, as the classics of Russian literature painted them - the only thing missing was bread crumbs and ashes on the lapels of his jacket. Even at a time of absolute fashion for a jacket and tunic, Suslov wore a civilian suit. Mikhail Andreevich was considered a party intellectual and did not want to associate his appearance with military traits. (The only exception was during the war.) He skillfully used euphemisms and even smashed enemies and apostates with erased cliched phrases, saving himself from unrest, because due to poor health he valued life above all else.

The village boy Suslov early, in the very first post-revolutionary years, discovered two passions - for learning and participation in control bodies. He graduated from the prestigious Plekhanov Institute of National Economy at that time. Became a lecturer. In 1931, he left teaching at the Institute of the Red Professorship and Moscow State University and began working at the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate. This is where the main features of his nature came in handy, harshness towards people, disguised as contempt for apostates.<...>

Already under Stalin, Suslov was gaining reliable positions in the Central Committee. Zhdanov's death in the summer of 1948 freed up his place in the ranks of theoreticians and propagandists of Stalin's teachings. He remained like this almost all his life, changing his color like a chameleon, in accordance with situations and the only principle: to be at the top, in those party echelons, where he managed to rise at the cost of great effort, as a result of a complex string of pre-calculated moves. After Stalin's death, Suslov temporarily went into the shadows, not showing his ambitions, content only with being on stage. Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, busy with their own destinies, seem to lose sight of him, leaving him alone. But Suslov knows that even proud loneliness is essentially fatal to his career. He relies on Khrushchev and actively shows himself as an independent and principled supporter of renewal. Love and devotion to Stalin, if not forgotten, are this moment postponed, camouflaged. Suslov's voice - criticism of Stalin's tyranny - is heard at the 20th Party Congress. He is firmly focused on supporting collegiality, critical analysis of the past, etc. Few people realize that all these political demarches are, in fact, strangling one’s most cherished attachments, and was Suslov the only one who had to do this?!

Khrushchev, who needed a scholar-interpreter, however, fell in love not with Suslov, but with the more educated and charming professor Shepilov, but he treacherously and unexpectedly joined the “seven” of pro-Stalinists who tried to overthrow Khrushchev in June 1957. Suslov also wins here - Shepilov’s departure makes his position in the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee more reliable. Suslov intuitively feels that under Khrushchev it is necessary to be careful, to carry out decisions that are pleasing to the apparatus without unnecessary noise and publicity, and not to pretend in any way to equal rights when discussing ideological problems. When Khrushchev began preparing for the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and the question of a new Party Program came up on the agenda, Suslov did not present himself as Khrushchev’s main adviser, giving the First Secretary of the Party the opportunity to first of all express his own views.<...>

Suslov was annoyed (if not more) by Khrushchev’s new thoughts, but he was forced to put up with the “lack of education” of the first person, yielding to him and, to the best of his ability, correcting what Khrushchev said in the spirit of “eternal truths.” Khrushchev was irritated, seeing how his ideas were drowning in the streams of old stereotypes, and sharply criticized Suslov for Talmudism and blasphemy. Suslov put up with it, withdrew into himself and accumulated hostility towards Khrushchev. He preferred to stay away from Khrushchev and deal with routine ideological issues, which most often did not reach Khrushchev. And yet Khrushchev needed Suslov. In particular, when it came to the international communist and labor movement, about the disagreements that arose with the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Party of Albania and in a number of other cases. Suslov’s “inflexibility” personified the CPSU’s loyalty to Lenin’s teachings, and in addition, by the will of circumstances, Suslov was the only specialist on Marxism-Leninism in the Presidium of the Central Committee; Yu. V. Andropov, L. F. Ilyichev and B. N. Ponomarev became secretaries of the Central Committee only after XXII Congress of the CPSU and have not yet taken shape to actively oppose Suslov. By nominating these people to the secretariat of the Central Committee, Khrushchev, over time, intended, of course, to break the monopoly position of the party ideologist.

I don’t know how accurate Khrushchev’s choice turned out to be. In this “troika,” only Yu. V. Andropov undoubtedly enjoyed the active support of Nikita Sergeevich. Khrushchev's disappointment was caused, for example, by the hasty “self-nomination” of Ilyichev and Ponomarev to the ranks of academicians. Khrushchev was raging, considered this a use of his official position (the secretaries of the Central Committee pose academicians with the problem of “loyalty”) and, of course, guessed that this happened under the “cover” of his name. Obedient pundits could not have assumed that no discussion of this nomination took place with Khrushchev. Khrushchev even raised the question of depriving Ilyichev and Ponomarev of their academic immunity, but then reconciled himself, did not want to put either of them in an awkward position. Moreover, both faithfully served Khrushchev himself. On the sidelines of the Central Committee, the election of new academicians also caused a wave of critical statements, here A. N. Shelepin, a man of strict official and human rules, was especially excited. The pursuit of academic titles was stopped by the order that employees of the apparatus do not have the right to nominate themselves for defending doctoral or candidate dissertations, nor do they have the right to occupy public positions on various boards, societies, editorial boards, etc. without appropriate approval.

Among the “liberties” that Brezhnev granted to the staff of the apparatus was the lifting of this ban. The “boom” of defending doctoral and candidate dissertations penetrated literally all departments of not only the Central Committee, but also local party committees - from republican to district. At the end of the 60s, of many of my former acquaintances, only a few did not have doctoral degrees. Of course, people who deserved this academic title also became Doctors of Science, but the overwhelming majority, as they say, were in a hurry to “grab” the scientific “pie.” The head of the propaganda department, V. I. Stepakov, became a Doctor of Science, and was soon removed for including a quote from Bernstein in the theses for the 100th anniversary of Lenin’s birth, attributing it to Lenin. His doctoral dissertation was devoted to the problems of propaganda of Marxism-Leninism in the conditions of developed socialism (?!). A tragicomic story unfolded with the election of the head of the Central Committee's science department, Trapeznikov, Brezhnev's longtime friend, to the Academy of Sciences. Under strong pressure, on the third or fourth attempt, Trapeznikov managed to become a corresponding member. The next step to becoming a full academician was even more difficult. The oldest members of the academy did not even want to hear about admitting him to their scientific fraternity. Specially for the meeting of the Academy, at which this issue was decided, a book by Trapeznikov was published, dedicated to the problems of organizing agricultural production. (The argument of his opponents, where are the written works, disappeared.) And yet, the President of the Academy of Sciences A.P. Aleksandrov could not guarantee one hundred percent success to his patron on the Central Committee. The old, honored scientist, who, unfortunately, did not have any will to protect the dignity of the academy, gathered his most influential colleagues and turned to them with a request-promise, which sounded something like this: “If we elect Trapeznikov as an academician, he undertakes to retire from the post of head of the science department, which in itself is more important than his passive presence in our ranks.”

Trapeznikov was not elected as an academician and did not leave the Central Committee. Was it only ambition that drove these people? Not at all. The reliability of the rear was ensured. With any shift in the title of Doctor of Science, and even more so as a member of the Academy, they assumed a more prestigious position. In Moscow they joked that in such a simple way the Central Committee apparatus became a real carrier scientific and technological progress. The percentage of doctors of science in other departments exceeded the corresponding figure in research institutes.

It must be said that Suslov himself was alien to such attempts. In the image of the ascetic, which he skillfully created himself and which was created around his name, this circumstance played famous role. The ostentatious asceticism of Mikhail Andreevich, the modesty of his family life, etc. have a very conditional justification. “Discreet” behavior, isolation, dislike of being in public, in public places, for example in theaters, at exhibitions, was regarded as over-busy, harsh, etc. Once Suslov visited Paris, attended the congress of the French Communist Party, on a free day he was invited to visit Louvre. He refused - he was not interested. At all the meetings where I saw Suslov, he always wrote something, practically not paying attention to the speakers. As the meeting progressed, assistants continually approached him, bowed their heads, handed him folders of papers, and took away those that had been looked at. From month to month, from year to year, the image of a great worker was created. It would be wrong to say that this is a contrived mise-en-scène. Suslov undoubtedly believed in the necessity of what came from his pen, just as graphomaniacs believe in it.

All this was mixed with a personal desire to show off in public opinion, including among his colleagues, as a man of one passion - serving the ideals of communism. With all this, Suslov skillfully used all the privileges of a person of his position, and not only himself, but also his family, which was no different from all others in this rank. All the talk about how Suslov ate only oatmeal from morning until evening is more than naive. During the Brezhnev years, especially in the mid-70s, when Suslov won the complete favor of the owner, felt his dependence on him, Suslov opened up a little. Became more imposing. Like Brezhnev, he fell madly in love with hockey and did not miss the main hockey performances with his grandson.

It is not these accessory details that are important, however. What is the nature, the core of natures like Suslov? What makes their long careers successful? Usually such people say and believe that they serve not this or that patron (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev), but the party. Immediately after the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev wanted to transfer Suslov from the Central Committee to the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He consulted on this matter with Mikoyan, Kosygin, and Brezhnev. They had a conversation on Sunday at the dacha and were not embarrassed by my presence. Brezhnev was instructed to express this proposal to Suslov over the phone. Brezhnev returned and reported that Suslov had become hysterical, begging him not to touch him, otherwise he would choose to resign. Khrushchev did not insist. Personnel changes at this level are by no means simple and it is absurd to believe that one word from the first person is enough to change a person’s position. Formally, the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was no less than that of the Secretary of the Central Committee, but Suslov understood that in this case the possibility of removing him from big politics would be easier. Khrushchev's irritation with Suslov grew. I have already talked about Nikita Sergeevich’s anger regarding Suslov’s proposals on cinema and the decision that Suslov was preparing in this regard. Khrushchev believed that Suslov simply “can’t pull it off”, is not energetic enough, and quick-witted. That “cinematic” episode resulted in yet another personnel leapfrog. Khrushchev demanded that the chairman of Goskino (at that time he was A.V. Romanov) simultaneously become deputy head of the propaganda department of the Central Committee. According to Khrushchev, this would ensure a greater share of party responsibility.

Ideological turmoil, the uncontrollability of events in literary, artistic circles, theater and music unnerved Khrushchev, and anger rained down on Suslov’s head. “We have to deal with piglets and milk yields, the work of industry, and your helplessness forces us to get involved in ideological matters,” he irritably reprimanded Suslov. The horror was that Suslov seemed to want the same thing that Khrushchev wanted from him - “tightening the screws.” Mikhail Andreevich would have been happy to create new versions of Zhdanov’s Central Committee resolutions on literature, music, and painting, but he could not develop a version acceptable to Khrushchev. I think that Khrushchev himself would not have been able to formulate exactly what he wanted in relations with the creative intelligentsia. This nervousness and confusion led Khrushchev to a quarrel with the intelligentsia, and Suslov - into the ranks of his worst enemies.

Even in his old age, Khrushchev was naive and did not take into account the hardware games. It never occurred to him that Suslov only “joined” Khrushchev because he knew the choice of the “seven” pro-Stalinists. They preferred to take Shepilov as their ideologist. There were traits in Suslov’s character that made him vindictive towards people. Having decided something, he did not consider any arguments. He considered any manifestation of dissent to be a front. Looking with cold eyes at the interlocutor who was explaining something to him or objecting, Suslov, with a quick movement of his tongue, licked his constantly dry lips and said the indisputable. Thus, after watching E. Klimov’s film “Agony,” Suslov said only a few words: “There is no need to delve into the dirty linen of the royal family,” and that’s all. In the same manner, he did not accept a dozen more films, and they ended up in the “graveyard” of Goskino.

Suslov knew that Solzhenitsyn’s novel “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” was presented to Khrushchev’s court by his assistant Vladimir Semenovich Lebedev, that Lebedev coordinated with Khrushchev a number of other “objectionable” publications - E. Kazakevich’s book “The Blue Notebook”, Tvardovsky’s poem “Terkin on That light" and a number of others. After Khrushchev’s dismissal, Lebedev was expelled from the Central Committee apparatus, sent to the smallest editorial position at Politizdat, and a series of nagging brought the sick man to a sad end. I don’t know what stopped Suslov, who demanded the expulsion of my entire family from Moscow. In the propaganda department of the Central Committee, where I was summoned for many weeks and threatened with terrible punishment if I refused, the “order of Suslov” was clearly felt. But I still refused. For half a century, this man worked in the upper and uppermost echelons of party power. The end of his life was difficult.

Just before his death, which was fleeting and unexpected for many, apparently there was a major quarrel with Brezhnev. So, in any case, very knowledgeable people in Moscow said. Some circle of people needed to remove Suslov from the political arena even before the possible death of the seriously ill Secretary General. This group of people assumed that Suslov could well be the successor to a high post, because behind him came the glory of the oldest and the most experienced leader, a theorist, he impressed many party functionaries. Suslov did not expect a major conversation at the Presidium of the Central Committee and went to the hospital for medical examination. Without surviving the stressful situation, he died.

Both during Khrushchev’s release and after, many assurances were given about the need to improve the management of the country’s affairs and restore collegiality. These assurances were received with hope. However, it became increasingly clear how different words and deeds were. In fact, those forces took revenge that wanted peace, prosperity, a “reliable” leader - a defender of the interests of a bureaucratic group of people who were increasingly moving away from the people.

The removal of Khrushchev from high party and government posts, although it was a bolt from the blue for many, did not cause much regret. This event found an unusually strong response abroad. In the country, almost all social groups of society expressed one or another complaint against Khrushchev. He cut off pensions for the military, and also carried out cuts in the army too often. Loan holders blamed him for stopping circulation, forgetting that there had been no subscription for loans since 1957. We remembered the monetary reform, or rather, the change in the exchange rate of the ruble, corn, the separation of regional party committees, the liquidation of ministries, economic councils. I have already spoken about the dissatisfaction of some of the creative intelligentsia. Although everyone recognized his merit in liberating millions of innocents from oppression, repression, slander, and fear. For a politician, this alone is enough to leave good memory. However, it can be stable and deep only with an objective assessment of the role and place of the individual in the historical process.

Almost a quarter of a century has passed, and what occupies me is not even the fact of the changes that took place then, but the surprisingly simple “technology” of their implementation. In fact, neither the party nor the country heard any arguments, no serious justifications - neither pro nor contra. No discussions, heated speeches, no information: in April they shouted “hurray”, in October “down with it”. We never found out what Nikita Sergeevich wanted to say at an hour when not only his personal fate was being decided. How did it happen that the people who supported Khrushchev in 1957, organized again in 1964, overthrew him? At first, Khrushchev was seen as “one of our own”: a party worker who had gone through all the steps of the party ladder, a man who eliminated the fear of waves Stalin's repressions, mowing down the device with unpredictable cruelty.

Khrushchev's openness, his sharp criticism of shortcomings, and his desire to rely on new forces found support. However, the innovative style was accepted and understood only as long as it followed, albeit updated, but established stereotypes. The more difficult the tasks became, the more frequent breakdowns, the heavier the burden, the more irritation accumulated in the souls of Nikita Sergeevich’s former followers. Both Khrushchev himself and his entourage became different, not the same as in the early 50s. Over the years, the upper apparatus of the party administration was divided into groups and groups. Ambitions and psychological incompatibility gave rise to hostility towards each other. Those who stirred up the mess did not dare to enter into an open dispute with Khrushchev, hold a democratic Plenum of the Central Committee, make critical remarks, demand the removal of the “First” in the face of the party and the people; they were afraid. And then the most reliable option turned out to be the already familiar scenario that was followed in 1957. With the difference that at that time the party knew well how and what was happening at the top, what the battle was going on for.

The plenum that freed Khrushchev passed without a single speaker. A member of the Central Committee, Lesechko, responded and accused Khrushchev of something. In fact, they didn’t listen to him. Everything was decided the day before the Plenum. And the Plenum silently listened to a short speech by Suslov, who noted that in last years it became difficult to work with Khrushchev, that the “cult of Khrushchev” interfered with collegial leadership, and, without going into details, deprived Khrushchev of all his posts.

At that time, I was often told that “all of Moscow” knew about the impending removal of Khrushchev in the summer, and it is strange that I did not hear about it. Probably, many still did not know or hear. Khrushchev believed in the inviolability of his authority, and, most likely, in the inability of those who were near him to “raise their hands” against the first person in the party. Ignatov’s calculation of receiving a promotion for his “service” and re-entering the upper leadership core turned out to be incorrect. At the Plenum of the Central Committee, his position did not change for the better - he remained as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Some time later, Ignatov led a delegation of deputies of the Supreme Council to Brazil. There he became seriously ill. They said that some strange microbe or virus had entered his body; It was not possible to save Ignatov.<...>

Our society has accumulated difficult experiences. The storm that shakes him today is a storm of purification, a lesson for those who think that they can avoid responsibility. Sooner or later, as we see, no one will pass it. Neither Stalin, nor Khrushchev, nor Brezhnev."

On June 8, 1957, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the question of the trip of members of the Presidium to the celebration of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad was raised. The day before, during one of the receptions, Mikoyan whispered to Furtseva, who was a candidate member of the Presidium in those years: “They,” at the same time, nodding towards Malenkov and Kaganovich, “hiding behind the question of a trip to Leningrad, they want something else.” They apparently came to an agreement and therefore demand an immediate meeting of the Presidium.”

How to celebrate the 250th anniversary of Leningrad?

The meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on June 18 was convened without the consent of Khrushchev on the initiative of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shipilov, Saburov, Pervukhin, Voroshilov and Bulganin, who joined them on some positions, with a proposal to discuss the celebration of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad. Subsequently, in order to completely discredit the initiators of this meeting, the propaganda apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee will label them “Stalin’s guard”, “anti-party group”, which were full of textbooks on the history of the CPSU. All this was done to give the behind-the-scenes Kremlin intrigues a high ideological resonance. Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee gathered on the appointed day and hour. Suddenly, the usual flow of meetings was disrupted. At the suggestion of Malenkov, Khrushchev was removed from the meeting of the Presidium, since it was further proposed to discuss his activities. Bulganin was offered the chairman's place. The first phrase of the newly appointed chairman of the meeting could not help but plunge Nikita Sergeevich into amazement: “Comrades, what can we talk about - you know all the facts. Unbearable. We are heading towards disaster. Everything began to be decided individually. We're back to the old days."

On you, country, a hero

By 1957, Nikita Khrushchev, a year after his historic speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU criticizing Stalin's repressions, had finally emerged as a refined communist leader, capable of speaking at dinner, telling jokes, teaching, while receiving numerous applause. Apart from five years of primary school, he had no completed education. He did not bother himself with a deep analysis of figures and facts, but only “gave up ideas.” The pinnacle of this “profound thinking” was the slogan “Let’s catch up and overtake America.” The naked eye could see with what difficulty Khrushchev adhered to the text of the reports written to him. But when he looked up from what he had written, the flow of words could no longer be stopped by anything. And, as sharp tongues used to say, one could wrap an elephant in a newspaper with his immense performance. He was no better than his closest colleagues in the “Stalinist guard”. Like them, the decisive thing in his career was the art of constantly maintaining Stalin’s trust and favor, and in this he succeeded in his years. Perhaps personal resentment prevented Dmitry Shipilov from being sufficiently objective, but later he recalled Khrushchev this way: “Future historians and psychologists will look with amazement for the answer to the question: where did an illiterate person, deeply provincial in manners and thinking, end up with so much subtle resourcefulness? , double-dealing, Jesuitism, perfidy, hypocrisy, immorality in achieving their goals? The Stalinist style of leading the country was anathema, but it was difficult to call what replaced it a style.

“And suddenly Bulganin found himself in this dung heap”

It was no coincidence that Bulganin ended up chairing the meeting of the Presidium. Ironically, it was the second time that Bulganin’s cabinet united the conspirators. The first time was in 1953, when Khrushchev was preparing a confrontation with Beria. A few years later, in 1957, almost the same high-ranking Soviet workers gathered in Bulganin’s office, but with a different task - to remove Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the Party Central Committee. Shortly before the events occurred, at the beginning of June 1957, Khrushchev and Bulganin were in Finland. A brilliant hypocrite, Bulganin played the role of a devoted comrade well, carefully hiding his true intentions. The experience of conspiracy gained back in tsarist times and under Soviet rule was not out of place in the struggle for Kremlin posts. The disgruntled farmer Nikita later in his speech allowed himself the following imagery to address his recent comrade: “And suddenly Bulganin found himself in this dung heap.” Marshal Zhukov, although he immediately took Khrushchev’s side, nevertheless criticized his activities. He sent a note to presiding Bulganin: “Nikolai Alexandrovich, I propose to end the discussion of the issue here. Severely reprimand Khrushchev for violating the collective leadership and leave everything as before for now, and then we’ll see.” But on this day the moves were already planned in advance and such a turn was not planned there. Despite the fact that Khrushchev expressed repentance, by a majority vote (7:4) at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, on June 18, 1957, he was removed from the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and a collective proposal was being prepared for the plenum on this decision.

Rescue of a drowning man...

Then Khrushchev stated that he did not agree with this decision, and together with Mikoyan demanded that the entire Presidium be assembled with the invitation of the secretaries of the Central Committee. On the morning of June 19, the second meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee began. By calling on his supporters, Khrushchev managed to change the balance of power in his favor (13 versus 6). But the positional struggle of the groups continued. In order to interfere with the interaction of Khrushchev’s opponents, on the instructions of KGB Chairman Serov, the secret telephone numbers of subscribers of the Kremlin automatic telephone exchange were simultaneously secretly changed and the wiretapping of their offices was intensified. The fact that in the summer of 1957 Serov, Chairman of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers, was on Khrushchev’s side was not accidental. Connected him with Khrushchev collaboration in Kyiv. It was Khrushchev who pulled Serov to Moscow. (Undoubtedly, this did not happen simply as mutual respect. I think there was a deal. Serov destroyed documents compromising Khrushchev, and in return received the post of chairman of the KGB - ed. EMB) Khrushchev's removal would inevitably entail his resignation from his post chairman. It has already been proposed to appoint either Bulganin or Patolichev to this position, but always one of the party leaders. Serov had the opportunity to repeat the fate of the executed secret service leaders: after all, he was known as the organizer of the execution of Stalin’s order on the deportation of peoples.

The last fight

On June 22, the unscheduled Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee opened its work. Despite the apparent victory, the situation for Khrushchev continued to remain ambiguous. At any moment, under the influence of emotions, everything could change. Particularly indicative in this regard was the first speech made for reference by Suslov. The information was prepared by him very carefully and carefully and was accompanied by lengthy discussions about the importance of the moment. Having generally characterized Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shipilov negatively, Suslov allowed himself some critical remarks about Khrushchev himself: “Of course, Comrade Khrushchev has shortcomings, for example, a certain harshness and ardor. Some of his speeches were without proper coordination with the Presidium.” Suslov’s caution, and perhaps, to some extent, cunning, became especially noticeable when he emphasized that the Presidium had not made a final decision, and concluded his speech with a glory addressed to the party “and its combat headquarters - the Central Committee.” As they say - neither ours nor yours. Suslov himself could count on a high place under any circumstances. But such uncertainty did not last long. Immediately after Suslov there was a well-orchestrated speech by Zhukov, who directed the discussion in the direction desired by Khrushchev. With pathos, he dealt a fatal blow to the conspirators: “We, comrades, and our people carried them in our hearts like a banner, believed in them, in their purity and objectivity, but in fact you see how “pure” people they are. If only the people knew that innocent blood was dripping from their fingers, they would greet them not with applause, but with stones.” And in order to completely irritate the members of the Central Committee sitting in the hall, Zhukov inserted: “According to them, it is allegedly not excluded that after the members of the Central Committee who burst into the Presidium, tanks may burst into the Kremlin, and the Kremlin may be surrounded by troops.” And the plenum began to seethe... Could Zhukov have imagined then that just four months later, with the same fury in this hall, he himself would be discussed and dismissed from office?

Escaped and joined

The position of the future General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. Brezhnev on the Presidium of the Central Committee has not been described anywhere before. In the midst of the discussion, Brezhnev left the hall and approached the head of security who was on duty at the door: “I have a bad heart. If they ask, say that I went to the doctor.” And he went to the dacha himself. He knew well that during the meetings a group of doctors from the 4th Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health was on duty, including his personal doctor. Leonid Ilyich either maneuvered, or simply chickened out and avoided participating in the vote so as not to expose himself. Of all Khrushchev’s opponents, only Dmitry Trofimovich Shipilov had a special place. As Nikita believed, he was “one of the guys” in the Kremlin court intrigues. He was dubbed a “joiner” because he did not belong to the group of Molotov, Malenkov, or Kaganovich either by his actions or his connections, but at the same time he criticized Khrushchev’s methods of work. During the discussion at the Presidium, Shipilov figuratively stated that “Khrushchev “put on Stalin’s felt boots” and began to trample in them, master them and feel more and more confident in them. He is an expert on all issues, he is a speaker at plenums and meetings on all issues. Whether it is industry, agriculture, international affairs, ideology - he alone decides everything. Moreover, it is illiterate and incorrect.” The accusations against Shipilov at the Plenum were of an anecdotal nature. During D. Polyansky’s speech, someone from the audience called Shipilov a “dude.” "Yes this is correct! - Polyansky supported. - He behaves like a dude and a dude. He comes to every meeting in a new, heavily pressed suit. But I think that anyone, like Shipilov, can come to this plenum in an old, even wrinkled suit.” Shipilov grinned. Khrushchev noticed this and furiously roared into the hall: “Look, Shipilov sits and smiles all the time.” At this moment, the concepts of the words “Shipilov” and “traitor” were identical for Khrushchev. The meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, which began, according to the well-known Russian proverb “for health,” with a discussion of the celebration of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad, ended with the fact that as a result of the discussion, the Plenum of the Central Committee declared the conspirators an “anti-party group” and expelled them from the top leadership of the party, and after some time - and from the ranks of the communists. Only Voroshilov and Bulganin, who took part in the conspiracy, by a happy coincidence and taking into account their deep repentance, escaped with a slight fright and retained their posts, and even then not for long.

Vladimir MURUZIN

Source: FeldPost

http://mospravda.ru/politics/article/amerika_i_zagovor_protiv_Hrysheva

Immediately after the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev put forward the slogan “Let’s catch up and overtake America!”, his party comrades made an attempt to overthrow him...

So everything was connected by dates, by events that happened 55 years ago. “After” does not mean “as a result” at all. But there is also a certain internal connection: what was later officially called “economic voluntarism” - arbitrary decisions in economic practice that run counter to objective conditions and scientifically based recommendations. Simply put - the lack of a real view of life in the country, of the capabilities of the system.

Lenin was a realist. Although he said: “When we win on a global scale, ... we will make public latrines out of gold...” But when it came to specifics, about the economy, about America, here he was sober in his assessments and, first of all, relied for... sabotage activities.

“The slogan “Catch up and overtake America!” should also not be taken literally: all optimism must be reasonable and have its limits,” Lenin warned. “Catching up and overtaking America means, first of all, the need to rot, decompose, destroy as quickly as possible and by all possible measures.” "its economic and political balance, to undermine it and thus fragment its strength and will to resist. Only after this can we hope to practically 'catch up and surpass' the United States and its civilization. A revolutionary must first of all be a realist."

From which it follows that Ilyich believed more in sabotage and ideological subversion than in the Soviet economy, that it was capable of defeating the American system in equal competition. Therefore, this statement by the leader of the revolution was never made public; only the most meticulous knew about it.

Stalin knew. And that’s why he spoke about competition with the West in general. The first Soviet lathe, released in 1932, was called "DiP" - "Catch up and overtake." That was the slogan. However, without a hysterical campaign and without mentioning America.

Of course, in any case, the two most powerful powers, political antipodes, were doomed to rivalry. But Khrushchev elevated it to the level of national-state stupidity, brought it to a farce and at the same time to a tragedy. This slogan generated and consolidated the spirit of competition and aggression along with an inferiority complex. A devastating combination. Russians still live in this state.

The most popular joke of those times: on the side of the highway there is a poster with the call “Let’s catch up and overtake America!”, and a hundred meters away from it there is a traffic police warning poster: “If you’re not sure, don’t overtake!” Self-irony helped then, but not very much. Khrushchev announced: “In the next 10 to 12 years, we will surpass the United States both in the absolute volume of industry and in per capita production. And in agriculture, this task will be solved much earlier.” And he decided to overtake America in the production of meat, milk and butter per capita by 1960-1961.

What started in the country is now difficult to imagine. Newspapers and radio went on a rampage of propaganda and "mobilizing the working people to carry out the party's plans." Right down to the signs: "Hold on, Iowa Cow!"

In December 1959, the first secretary of the Ryazan regional party committee, Alexei Larionov, became a Hero of Socialist Labor. Because the Ryazan region made a commitment to exceed the annual meat plan by three times, and exceeded it by 3.8 times! How did Larionov make such a breakthrough? Firstly, throughout the country it was practically prohibited to keep livestock on private farms, especially in urban settlements. The cattle were submitted to the state plan. Secondly, on collective and state farms they put part of the dairy herd and young animals under the knife. They handed over calves to meat processing plants! That is, they ruined the future of livestock farming. But the slaughter of young animals was no longer enough to fulfill the 1960 plan. Larionov's envoys went to neighboring regions and began buying cattle from the population and selling them as having been raised on farms in the Ryazan region. And finally, simple postscripts were used.

By the end of 1960, the deception was revealed. Larionov's case was considered by the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR. He was stripped of the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and removed from his post.

After which Alexey Larionov shot himself.

Well, he wasn’t alone; the same thing was happening all over the country, albeit on a smaller scale. The dirty deed was done - the already shaky foundations of agriculture were undermined. There was no milk and meat in stores. And then bread. Since 1963, the USSR began purchasing grain from the USA and Canada.

In 1963, I, together with other boys and girls from our virgin (!), grain-growing (!) North Kazakhstan region, went to Artek. Through Moscow. What made the greatest impression on us in the capital of our Motherland? Not the Kremlin. Not the Tsar Cannon. And not even the metro.

We were completely amazed that in Moscow bread was sold WITHOUT LINES! Our childhood and teenage years at that time were spent queuing for milk and bread. Parents are at work, and we are in line.

Then bread appeared and has always been there. Milk - intermittently. But meat was never seen in stores until the end of Soviet power in 1991, which in turn gave rise to a series of various jokes. For example: an absent-minded shopper asks in a fish store: “Don’t you have any meat?” The seller replies: “We don’t have fish! And there’s no meat in the store opposite!”

That campaign - “Let's catch up and overtake America!” - it might not have started. Because a month after its announcement, on June 18, 1957, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, 7 out of 11 members of the Presidium voted for the removal of Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. And therefore it can be argued that there was no “anti-party group” (under this name these events entered the history of the country and the party). The majority of members of the Presidium cannot be a “group”.

The secretary of the Central Committee, Dmitry Shepilov, spoke out most harshly. After the “defeat of the anti-party group”, for a long time he was still called by the people the man with the longest surname - “I joined Knimshepilov.” The wording was as follows: “Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov who joined them.”

In 1991, 86-year-old Dmitry Shepilov (he died in 1995) recalled: “I spoke really sharply. I started like this: the Soviet people and our party paid with great blood for the cult of personality. And then time passed, and we again found ourselves faced with a fact new, emerging cult. Khrushchev... he decides everything. And illiterately, incorrectly... Everyone said that the situation was intolerable, Khrushchev must be relieved of his post as First Secretary..."

However, they didn't succeed. Because there's a conspiracy in in every sense there was no such word - no clear plan of action, no leader.

“What is important is the complete lack of preparation for this whole matter,” Shepilov recalled. “It would be unforgivable for them if they were up to something.”

Shepilov meant members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, people higher than him in the party hierarchy, whom the whole country recently called nothing less than “leaders” - Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov... If there was a conspiracy, then Shepilov was not part of it dedicated:

“Nobody said who would replace Khrushchev... Apparently, everything was so unprepared that there was no such question. It’s just... it was some kind of explosion. Was there an anti-party group - I can’t say no . I just do not know".

Lazar Kaganovich also confirms in his memoirs that there was no conspiracy: “If we had organized ourselves, we could have taken power... The majority of the Politburo was behind us, but... Khrushchev managed to deceive us all. He is a swindler of the highest order. And we are parliamentarians got busy..."

What kind of parliamentarism?!! We agreed to convene the Plenum of the Central Committee. Formally, they were obliged to do this. According to the protocol of the First Secretary, only the Plenum of the Central Committee can remove it. But this is a formality. The members of the Presidium came to any Plenum with a ready-made decision, and the Plenum obediently stamped it. However, they did not prepare for the Plenum, did not organize it, and thought that the decision of the Presidium would be enough.

“A group opposed this decision: members of the Presidium Mikoyan, Suslov and candidates for members of the Presidium (without the right to vote) Furtseva, Shvernik, myself and Kirichenko,” recalled the then Minister of Defense Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who saved Khrushchev. “We were in the minority.” In order to delay the time to call the absent members of the Presidium (Kirichenko and Saburov), we made a proposal, in view of the importance of the issue, to take a break until tomorrow and urgently call all members of the Presidium... Seeing that the matter was taking a serious turn, Khrushchev proposed convening a Plenum of the Central Committee. The group rejected this proposal, saying that first we will remove Khrushchev, and then it will be possible to convene the Plenum. I saw a way out of this situation only in decisive action. I stated: I categorically insist on the urgent convening of the Plenum of the Central Committee... If today... a decision is made on removal of Khrushchev, I will not submit to this decision and will immediately appeal to the party through the party organizations of the Armed Forces..."

He was asked if he was going to send tanks to Moscow. Zhukov replied: “Tanks cannot approach Moscow without an order from the minister, and there was no such order from me.”

In other words, he made it clear whose side the real power is on...

“This, of course, was an unusual and forced statement. I wanted to carry out a psychological attack on the anti-party group and delay time until the arrival of members of the Central Committee, who were already being transported to Moscow by military aircraft. After this statement of mine, it was decided to postpone the meeting to the third day, and with this The group itself lost the case they had started against Khrushchev."

On June 22, the Plenum met. One of the longest and most turbulent in the history of the CPSU. It lasted from June 22 to June 29. But the resolution was published only on July 4.

One of the main speakers was Zhukov. By the way, among his accusations against Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich was this: they doubt the reality of Khrushchev’s slogan - to catch up and surpass America in the production of meat and milk.

The Plenum overturned the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee to remove Khrushchev. And he declared Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich “and Shepilov, who joined them,” to be an “anti-party group.” Thus ended their political career. And also the careers of Bulganin (then Chairman of the Council of Ministers), Voroshilov, Pervukhin and Saburov.

But only the first four appeared publicly. Because it was impossible to announce publicly that the majority of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee turned out to be “conspirators.”

Why the Plenum of the Central Committee supported Khrushchev is still being debated by historians. There are many reasons, it’s impossible to cover everything short essay. The plenum was not in in full force- Mostly members of the Central Committee loyal to Khrushchev were delivered to Moscow by military aircraft. Dmitry Shepilov said that they were intimidated: they say that if Khrushchev is removed, arrests and repressions will begin... After all, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich have the terrible glory of Stalin’s first comrades-in-arms. And Khrushchev has the well-deserved fame of exposing Stalin’s crimes...

Nobody wanted a return to the repressive past.

By the way, this is precisely what Zhukov’s speech and the subsequent propaganda campaign against the “anti-party group” were based on, which is still reflected in the interpretation of those events by some historians. They say that the ardent Stalinists wanted Stalin’s revenge, but the young and at that time progressive members of the Central Committee opposed... There was nothing even close to that. Malenkov was the same Stalinist and the same, if not more, anti-Stalinist, like Khrushchev. The very first anti-Stalinist public statements came from him (at the suggestion of Beria). But Malenkov lacked determination. Khrushchev took over from him the initiative to expose Stalin. “If Malenkov could speak at the 20th Congress the way Khrushchev did,” the grandmother said in two. Khrushchev could. Thus he went down in history, in the grateful memory of posterity.

In a large sense, it was also a war of the Central Committee against the Council of Ministers, a war of the party apparatus against the executive, economic - for power in the country. After all, under Stalin the main position was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. (By the way, Khrushchev, having become prime minister, himself started a war against the party. And suffered a crushing defeat in 1964.)

It was also a story of betrayal. Probably, in June 1957, Malenkov more than once remembered his friend Lavrentiy Beria, whom he betrayed, allowed to be arrested (June 26, 1953) and shot. Malenkov became Stalin's heir as prime minister at the instigation of Beria. Beria was his first deputy. At the same time, he was the head of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs, which included state security. And the two of them, on Beria’s initiative, began reforms in the country. At that time, people associated the name of Malenkov with the expansion of production of goods for the population, an increase in purchase prices for agricultural products, a reduction in mandatory supplies to the state, and a sharp reduction in taxes on peasants: “As Malenkov came, they ate their fill of pancakes.” Malenkov in narrow political circles called for the peaceful coexistence of the two systems (?!), supported Beria’s idea (?!) of the reunification of Germany (?!)...

But, apparently, he was also afraid of Beria and his growing power. In general, in 1953, Malenkov and Khrushchev united and destroyed Beria. I clearly remember that two or three years after those events, we, barefoot boys, on our dusty streets were jumping up and down (just in time) and shouting: “Beria, Beria! Lost trust! And Comrade Malenkov kicked him!” We heard it from adults, of course. This ditty has the status of a historical document. It shows that at that time the people placed the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers above the position of First Secretary of the Central Committee; Malenkov was considered the main one in the country. But having betrayed Beria, he was left naked and defenseless. A position is not enough - you also need character and will. And Malenkov, around Stalin, was called Malanya - probably not only because of the consonance of his surname and his loose body. Molotov said about him: “A bit weak in terms of will, a bit weak.”

In 1955, Khrushchev removed Malenkov from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, accusing him, among other things, of directly promoting Beria’s plans and even collaborating with him. It all ended for Malenkov with an “anti-party group” and exile to Ekibastuz, to the post of director of the power plant.

And four months later Khrushchev dealt with the one who saved him from collapse - Zhukov. He removed him from the post of Minister of Defense and removed him from the Presidium of the Central Committee.

In general, it’s still a story. Campaign "Let's catch up and overtake America!" unfolded unhindered, continued and came to a known end. 55 years have passed. We are in second place after the United States in terms of the number of dollar billionaires. And they caught up and surpassed America in gasoline prices.

In June 1957, a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee took place, at which veteran party members tried to remove Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev from the post of first secretary. After which the Plenum of the Central Committee was convened, where the balance of forces changed, and Khrushchev declared Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who had joined them, as an anti-party group. It is believed that, not to mention the struggle for power, at the heart of this clash was the confrontation between supporters of de-Stalinization led by Khrushchev and people who opposed Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization and wanted to restore Stalin’s role in history.

Some are of the opinion that there was a struggle between old people and young people in the party, although in fact the same Kaganovich was only a few months older than Khrushchev.

There is also a third version. Its supporters claim that it was about the seizure of power in the country by the party bureaucracy. And Nikita Khrushchev won this fight because he relied on the republican and regional party apparatus. His opponents defended the “Stalinist” line, that the state should have total control over everything, including the party.

The increasing role of the party apparatus in the Soviet Union began precisely with the rise of Stalin as first secretary, since under Lenin this position meant nothing at all. The Bolsheviks believed that the bureaucracy should be controlled. And until 1957, every member of the party apparatus understood that if he made a mistake, he would not go unpunished. Stalin personally acted as a guarantor that the bureaucracy would not gain omnipotence. When he died, they tried to replace him with collective leadership, but Khrushchev took power into his own hands and soon became the sole leader.

Few people know that Stalin’s successor could be Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, a young energetic politician, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who during the war headed the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement and was the leader of Belarus. But Khrushchev, Beria, Molotov and the rest quickly pushed him aside, and in 1954 they sent him to lead Kazakhstan. Then Khrushchev, with the support of Molotov and Kaganovich, managed to get rid of Beria, who was the most talented of them, but also the most dangerous for everyone, including his closest associates.

Before Khrushchev became the head of the USSR, while remaining in the position of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the one who held the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers was considered number one in the country. It was this post that Stalin occupied, and everyone got used to the fact that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was the number one person. Since 1953, Malenkov has been such a person.

Khrushchev quickly began to irritate many, especially since everyone remembered how he behaved under Stalin: he was a smart guy, a merry fellow and a laugher. Now he has become the master, he began to be rude to everyone, give instructions, and take over all possible powers.

In fact, no matter how they tried to introduce collective leadership in the country, the entire Soviet system was geared towards autocracy. Later, when Khrushchev was already replaced, the next leadership came to power, also under the slogan of collectivity. And at first there were really three leaders - Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin. And then it all ended with unity of command.

Having come to power, Khrushchev began to gradually form the party apparatus that he wanted to see. In 1953, Malenkov gave a major report to party activists and criticized the bureaucracy. He said that the bureaucrats in the country have become insolent, the people live very poorly, people complain, and so on. The regional committee secretaries were afraid that, as in 1937, they would be shot for any mistake. But Khrushchev, after Malenkov’s report, added that everything said was correct, but we must not forget that the apparatus is the pillar of power.

One more circumstance should be noted. The creation of the KGB in 1954 led to two important things. Firstly, the function of control over party bodies was taken away from intelligence officers. Now the head of the KGB department in the region could not monitor the secretary of the regional committee, no matter what he did. And secondly, the function of total control over the economy was taken away from state security. What did this lead to? Since 1957, relations in the economy fell into the hands of the party apparatus and immediately began to acquire various informal relations. The concepts of blat, the right people, acquaintances, calling, and so on appeared.

On the other hand, Khrushchev took a step that was surprising for a party leader after the 1957 coup attempt: he split the party. He introduced double - industrial and agricultural - departments of the party. This was actually an attempt to create two from one party, at least to avoid a party monopoly in the localities. And although it was perhaps one of Khrushchev’s most reasonable reforms, it turned his main support – the party apparatus – against him, which ultimately destroyed him.

After all, in 1957, when they tried to remove Khrushchev for the first time, the party was on his side. Bulganin chaired the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, and he proposed transferring Khrushchev to the Minister of Agriculture and removing the post of First Secretary altogether. Zhukov, in response to Bulganin’s statement, proposed reprimanding Khrushchev, but leaving him in office. Apparently, the conspirators did not even have any plan, they were clearly not preparing for decisive action and did not present clear charges. There was no consolidated position. Most members of the Presidium opposed Khrushchev - not only Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, but also Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, Shepilov who joined them and Brezhnev, who, however, unexpectedly fell ill on the second day and was absent from the meeting.

According to Shepilov’s recollections, Mikoyan, if not directly involved in this conspiracy, then showed dissatisfaction, just like Furtseva and Zhukov. Zhukov and Serov were dissatisfied with the campaign against Stalin, but in the end they still supported Khrushchev, based on their personal interests. He was also supported by the first secretaries and leaders of Ukraine and Uzbekistan. He was supported by Suslov, who was his main support. Brezhnev's behavior remained a mystery, because his interests coincided with the interests of Khrushchev. He was probably just afraid that Khrushchev would lose.

After the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the main accused were Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich. Voroshilov and Bulganin continued to hold high positions: Voroshilov remained Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, and Bulganin remained Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Khrushchev assessed them correctly: at the Plenum itself they behaved cowardly, so they were not dangerous. But that wasn't even the main reason. Remove all management and all known leaders at the same time, replace them with no one famous people Khrushchev did not dare. Therefore, he was forced to begin by limiting himself to the resignations of his three first deputies.

But on the other hand, unlike Stalin, he did not repress his political opponents, much less shoot them. They all continued to work, although they were demoted.

Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, recently the second-in-command in the state, was sent to Ust-Kamenogorsk to head the power plant. It is interesting that Malenkov ended his life as a church reader. Kaganovich was sent to the Sverdlovsk region to head the trust. Molotov was appointed ambassador to Mongolia, after the XXII Congress of the CPSU he was expelled from the party, but was reinstated in 1984.

After the removal of Khrushchev, the line to strengthen the party apparatus only became stronger. They canceled the rotation, and people began to head the same areas for twenty years, turning into little princes. Brezhnev strengthened the omnipotence of the party apparatus, and this lack of control led to the establishment of informal connections, which to some extent destroyed Soviet Union.