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5. VII 1921 English Foreign Minister Lord Curzon, in negotiations with US Ambassador Harvey, proposed including Far Eastern and Pacific issues on the agenda of the proposed conference. 10. VII 1921 Secretary of State USA Hughes made a public statement proposing to convene a conference in Washington. An official invitation was sent to the powers on behalf of the US government.
The situation in the Far East on the eve of the Washington Conference was very tense. While the USA and Great Britain were bound by the 1914-18 war in Europe, Japan received complete freedom of action in the Far East and unilaterally upset the pre-war balance of power on the Asian continent and in the basin Pacific Ocean("Twenty-one demands"). After the end of the First World War, England and especially the United States wanted to limit Japanese penetration into China and regain the positions they had lost in the Far East. American diplomacy showed particular interest in this regard.
The convening of the conference was explained not only by the desire of the United States and England to stop Japanese aggression in the Far East, but also by the fact that after the elimination of the naval power of Germany, the maritime rivalry of the great powers was associated mainly with the Pacific Ocean as the main potential springboard naval war. Special role Anglo-American naval rivalry was playing out, threatening to lead to the same results as the previous Anglo-German naval rivalry. US and British diplomacy sought to stabilize on a new basis international relationships in China and the Far East, as well as to prevent a new naval arms race that threatened military conflicts.
American diplomacy played a leading role. Although isolationism dominated US foreign policy and Harding heralded “traditional non-interference in the affairs of the Old World” in his inauguration speech on 4.12.4921, isolationism almost never affected the White House’s Pacific and Far Eastern policy. Wilson's agreement to keep Shandong in Japanese hands caused great discontent in America and was one of the reasons for the Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson's opponents accused him of sacrificing America's Far Eastern interests in the name of European politics. American economic activity - the creation of an international banking consortium in China at the end of 1920 - was also directed against Japan.
Japan was interested in maintaining the existing situation and preventing collective discussion of Far Eastern issues. When the United States announced its intention to convene a conference in Washington, Japanese diplomats said that "Japan is being brought to trial by the Anglo-American tribunal." After unsuccessful attempts to cancel the conference, the Japanese tried to ensure that “issues that had already been resolved were not discussed,” in particular referring to the treaties imposed on China in 1915 (“Twenty-one Demands”), and proposed convening a preliminary conference of the three powers (USA, England and Japan), etc. All these attempts encountered active opposition from White House diplomacy. The Washington Conference was typical example“new”, “legal” (although it was convened outside the framework of the League of Nations), outwardly very democratic diplomacy.
The leaders of the conference in every possible way advertised its openness, the rejection of secret diplomacy, etc. The speeches and speeches of the delegates were published in newspapers and magazines, and even a verbatim report of the conference was published. But this publicity was only for show. None of the decisive questions big politics was not allowed at the official meetings of the conference. Everything was done behind the scenes of the conference during negotiations that took place at meetings of the Big Three, which included Hughes, Balfour and Cato. Even the French delegation was not aware of all the affairs. The French delegation learned about the agreement of the four powers, which the USA, England, Japan and France were supposed to sign, only two days before its signing. Even less was taken into account by the Italian delegation, which, despite its protests, was removed from participation in the treaty of the four powers.
Chapter 2
Main decisions of the conference
The main documents of the Great Patriotic War were: 1) the agreement of the four powers on the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; 2) the agreement of nine powers on the principle of “open doors” in China; 3) agreement of the five powers on the limitation of naval armaments.
The issue of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not discussed at the conference itself: it was predetermined by the Big Three agreement. Since the establishment of the League of Nations, the question of the incompatibility of the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the Charter of the League of Nations has been discussed. In England, pacifist figures, supporters of the League of Nations, and Laborists insisted on the liquidation of this union. Opponents of the renewal of the alliance with Japan pointed out, in particular, that this military alliance aroused Chinese hostility towards England. But their main argument was that in the presence of acute Japanese-American contradictions, an alliance with Japan would threaten England with a military clash with the United States and the collapse of the British Empire, since Canada, for example, would under no circumstances participate in a war against the United States.
Canada, indeed, strongly opposed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Australia and New Zealand generally supported the idea of ​​a renewed alliance with Japan, fearing that otherwise they would be under immediate threat from Japanese aggression. However, even in these dominions there was strong opposition to the renewal of the union, in particular from Labor.

Both before the World War II and at the conference itself, American diplomacy put strong pressure on England, demanding the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The outcome of a possible war between the United States and Japan was largely determined by which side England would be on. In particular, without the use of British bases, the American fleet would not have been able to operate effectively against Japan. Attempts by the British to find some kind of compromise in order to renew the alliance and reassure America were unsuccessful. In April 1921, the editor of the New York Times, Ochs, arrived on an unofficial mission in London and negotiated with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lee, on the issue of limiting naval armaments and the fate of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The British proposed maintaining the Anglo-Japanese alliance, establishing equality between the British and American fleets, and guaranteeing US security in the Atlantic Ocean so that the United States would be able to concentrate its fleet in the Pacific Ocean. In this case, England would retain in its hands the “keys of the Pacific balance.” But White House diplomacy resolutely rejected any proposals that included a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. To put pressure on England, she used not only Canada, but also the Irish question. In particular, in June 1921, Hughes, in a conversation with the British ambassador Geddes, threatened to support Ireland against England if England resumed its alliance with Japan.
At first, at the proposal of England, negotiations were held to conclude a trilateral agreement that would replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The English project provided for the possibility for two of the contracting parties to enter into military agreements with each other, provided that these agreements were of a defensive nature. However, the American delegates also objected to this attempt to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance in one form or another. France was involved in the draft agreement.

On December 13, 1921, the first treaty was signed at the Washington Conference. The so-called treaty of the four powers - the USA, England, France and Japan. The contracting parties agreed to respect the rights of each of the named states to island possessions and island territories in the Pacific Ocean. Any disputes that arise, if it is impossible to resolve them diplomatically, the parties undertake to resolve at general conferences. If the island possessions of any of the four powers were threatened by another power, then all states that signed the treaty were obliged to enter into “a mutual, complete exchange of opinions in order to reach an agreement.” The contract was concluded for 10 years. Article 4 of it marked a victory for American diplomacy; it stated that after ratification of the treaty, the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty, renewed in 1911, loses force. True, British diplomats emphasized that the treaty was not annulled, but only replaced by an agreement of the four powers - the bilateral pact gave way to the pact of the four powers.
A special declaration was attached to the treaty of the four powers of December 13, 1921. It stated that the treaty would apply “to the Pacific Islands in a state of mandate.” At the same time, it was emphasized that the signing of the treaty does not mean the United States’ consent to the mandates and “does not exclude the need to conclude agreements between the United States and the mandatory powers on the islands that are in a state of mandate,”
On February 6, 1922, an additional agreement was signed, clarifying one of the points of the treatise of the four. It stated that “the concept of “island possessions and island territories” used in the said treatise includes, as far as Japan is concerned, only Karafuto (i.e., the southern part of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa, Pescadores and the islands for which Japan received a mandate.” .

All these additional agreements showed how persistent the diplomatic struggle between the United States and Japan was over positions in the Pacific Ocean.
The most important issue discussed at the VK was the question of China. American diplomacy sharply opposed Japanese attempts to retain all positions captured in China. Considering that the unification of China and the acceleration of its capitalist development would expand the domestic market in China and open up new opportunities for American trade and investment, White House diplomacy was not averse to flirting with the national liberation movement Chinese people. The main diplomatic task of the United States in the East was to force Japan to retreat on the Chinese question, to force it to abandon the “21 demands,” and to affirm the principle of “open doors” and equal opportunities in China. British diplomacy tried to achieve a compromise solution. First of all, she was afraid of the national liberation movement in China and its impact on India. She viewed Japan as the “gendarme of the Far East.” Since Japanese expansion covered mainly the region of Manchuria and Northern China, and not the Yangtze Valley and South China(where two-thirds of British capital investments are concentrated), England hoped to reach an agreement with Japan on the basis of the established traditional division of spheres of influence. Along with this, British diplomacy wanted to keep China from getting closer to Russia and the United States. In addition, Japanese expansion still caused great damage to British interests in China. Finally, the pressure of American diplomacy played a role. As a result, England in the East, despite all the zigzags and hesitations, generally spoke out on the Chinese question together with the United States against Japan. Balfour spoke at the conference about rejecting spheres of influence politics and supporting an open door and equal opportunity policy.

6. II 1922 a treaty was signed by nine powers: the USA, the British Empire, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and China.
The signatory powers in Art. I pledged to: respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China; provide China with full and unfettered opportunity to develop and maintain a viable and durable government; to use its influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; refrain from taking advantage of the current situation in China in order to obtain special rights and advantages that could harm the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, or from supporting activities hostile to the security of these states.
Art. III obligated the contracting powers, in accordance with the open door principle, not to seek monopolies or advantages or special privileges in any particular area of ​​China that would be detrimental to the citizens of other countries. Art. IV stated that the contracting parties refuse to create spheres of influence in certain parts of Chinese territory. The treaty made no mention of how to implement the open door policy or how to prevent violations of the open door policy. The powers pledged to respect (but not defend) China's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Art. VII provided only for the possibility of an exchange of views between the contracting powers in the event of a violation of the treaty.
A number of concessions to China were made in Eastern Europe. A special resolution provided for the possibility of abolishing extraterritoriality rights in the future. Japan, according to an agreement concluded with China on January 4, 1922, undertook to cleanse Shandong and was forced to actually retreat from the “21 demands.” However, despite China’s insistence, she did not agree to formally abandon them. Japan decisively rejected China's demand to withdraw troops from southern Manchuria. England in East China announced its renunciation of the leased territory of Weihaiwei, but when it came to the cession of Kowloon, Balfour stated that here, based on economic and strategic reasons, England would not make any concessions. A number of decisions of the Supreme Council on economic and military issues were nothing more than a violation of the sovereignty of China and interference in its internal affairs.
During the Great War, for the first time, England’s refusal to accept the traditional “two-power standard,” according to which England maintained a navy equal in strength to the two strongest fleets of other powers, was enshrined in a treaty act. By the end of the First World War, Anglo-American maritime rivalry had become intense. Continuing the naval arms race meant heading into an inevitable collision with America. In this encounter, America would not only have superior economic and financial resources, but would also be in a more advantageous political and strategic position, particularly through its ties to the British dominions, especially Canada. England was forced to renounce unconditional dominance of the seas and agree that the US fleet would be equal in strength to the British fleet. The US government made a statement in September 1921 that it would build a fleet not inferior to the fleet of the strongest naval power, i.e. the British. By the time of the Washington Conference, England had the most powerful navy in the world. However, the US at a fast pace built navy, which threatened within several years not only to catch up, but also to overtake England. Japan implemented the “8+8” program, i.e., the construction of 8 battleships and 8 battlecruisers.
The Americans made the following proposal at the World War II: England should disable a number of old or unfinished battleships and leave 22 in service. America should leave 18, Japan - 10. The tonnage of the battleships was proposed at 500 thousand for England. and America and 300 thousand for Japan, i.e. in a ratio of 5:5:3. Japan strongly objected to the 5:3 ratio and demanded a 10:7 ratio. However, Japan's demand was rejected and the Japanese delegation had to accept the ratio proposed by England and America. According to the agreement of the five powers (USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy), concluded on V. 6. II 1922, the following proportion was established for the replacement of battleships between these powers: 5: 5: 3: 13/4: 13 /4. The replacement tonnage of battleships was set at 525 thousand for England and the USA, 315 thousand for Japan and 175 thousand for France and Italy. For aircraft carriers, the total tonnage was established: the USA and England - 135 thousand each, Japan - 81 thousand, France and Italy - 60 thousand each. For battleships, maximum displacement standards of 35 thousand m were adopted with artillery no more than 16-inch, for aircraft carriers 27 thousand m with artillery no more than 8 inches, for cruisers 10 thousand m with artillery no more than 8 inches. For ten years from the date of signing the treaty, England, the USA and Japan were not to lay down new battleships.
The balance of naval forces established in Washington meant that in the event of a war in the Pacific Ocean between Japan and one of the great powers, Japan would have a clear predominance, since neither England nor the United States could concentrate more than two-thirds of their fleet in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, i.e. That is, neither England nor the United States, acting separately, would have been able to successfully attack Japan in its waters. Although Japan waged a chauvinist campaign directed against the “Washington shame,” however, essentially the balance of forces established by the Washington Treaty was sufficient favorable for Japan.
Japan's major success was Art. 19 of the Five Powers Treaty. Under this article, the United States, the British Empire and Japan agreed not to build bases and fortifications on a number of island possessions in the Pacific Ocean. The United States pledged not to strengthen its island possessions in the Pacific Ocean, with the exception of the Hawaiian Islands and the islands adjacent to the coast of Alaska and the Panama Canal zone (while the Aleutian Islands could not be fortified). England pledged not to strengthen Hong Kong and the island possessions east of 110° E. (England had the right to strengthen Singapore), with the exception of island possessions adjacent to the coast of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japan pledged not to strengthen the Kuril Islands, Bonin, Amami Shima, Formosa, Pescadores, or Mandate Islands. Japan considered Art. 19 as compensation for the rejection of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and for the adoption of norm 5: 3. This article was a major strategic gain for Japan, because even without these islands it had sufficiently powerful and closely located naval bases for operations in the western part of the Pacific ocean. Meanwhile, the United States and England were deprived of the opportunity to have convenient bases for effective operations in the waters adjacent to Japan. A situation was created that made it very difficult, if necessary, for England and the United States to actively act against Japan. Obligations arising from Art. 19, were, as it were, a strategic addition to the treaty of the four powers and the treaty of the nine powers, which did not provide for the possibility of collective action against the violator of the Washington treaties. Therefore, the Washington Naval Treaty caused great discontent in American maritime circles. In England it was also openly recognized that Art. 19 of the treaty leaves Hong Kong and the Philippines in the event of war at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and that in a war against the British Empire or the United States, “Japan is guaranteed an important advantage of first successes.”
The Washington Naval Treaty did not place any restrictions on the total tonnage of the cruising fleet. Likewise, no regulations were passed regarding the submarine fleet, although the British delegation insisted on a complete ban on submarines. The issue of limiting land and air weapons was also discussed at the VK. Representative of France Briand made a speech in which he insisted that the question of limiting land armaments should be made dependent on the degree of moral disarmament of Germany, as well as on the obligations of England and America to actively participate in ensuring the security of France against possible German aggression. England and the USA did not agree with this, and... the question of land disarmament was dropped.
Russia was not invited to the World Conference. In connection with this, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a protest to the relevant governments on July 19, 1921 and stated that it did not recognize any decisions made by the conference. The Soviet government declared its rights to the CER and reserved for itself “complete freedom of action to force respect for these rights and to defend the demands arising from them at that moment and by those means that it deems convenient and appropriate.” No decisions were made on this issue, and China's demand to clear the road was rejected. At the conference itself, without the participation of the Soviet Republic, a number of issues were discussed that directly related to Soviet Russia. No decisions were made on the issue of CVLC (q.v.). Japan announced its intention to evacuate its troops from the Soviet Far East. These troops were indeed evacuated at the end of 1922, but under pressure from the Red Army, and not under the influence of Washington decisions.

The Great Patriotic War was an addition to the Treaty of Versailles, and its resolutions became the basis of a certain new balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, one of the cornerstones of the Versailles system. J.V. Stalin at the XVIII Party Congress, speaking about this post-war regime - the Versailles-Washington world system, indicated: “The main foundations of this regime were in the Far East - the treaty of nine powers, and in Europe - the Versailles and whole line other agreements."

On V. k. main role American diplomacy played. She was the main initiator, organizer and potential guarantor of the newly created balance of power in the Far East. Thus, the United States also acted as an indirect guarantor of the entire Versailles system, although it did not sign the Treaty of Versailles and did not join the League of Nations. The leading role of the United States in the World War II was a manifestation of the sharply increased share of the United States in the world economy and world politics after the First World War. In Eastern Europe, a common front of American and British diplomacy against Japan was established, as a result of which Japan was forced to retreat and gave up a number of positions it had seized in China. However, it retained sufficient positions in its hands to again go on the offensive against China at an opportune moment. The Great Patriotic War not only did not weaken, but, on the contrary, consolidated Japan's monopoly dominance in southern Manchuria and created important strategic guarantees for Japan in the event of war. The Washington treaties did not provide for any sanctions against aggressors. Washington's decisions bore the stamp of the British policy of compromise and the American policy of isolationism. The equilibrium created by Washington's decisions turned out to be extremely unstable and short-lived.
The Washington Conference ended the redivision of the world. In this sense, it complemented Versailles. But in 1919 in Paris, British and French diplomats managed to bypass American diplomats. In Washington, on the contrary, US diplomacy has achieved significant success on Far Eastern issues. England compromised in order to fight Japan and France; Japan was forced to yield to the Americans on the Chinese issue and declare that it would withdraw its troops from Siberia.

The Washington Conference meant that in world politics there was a certain shift of forces towards the United States.

In 1919-1922, the Versailles-Washington system of international treaties was formed, designed to formally consolidate the results of the First World War.
To sum up what has been said, it can be argued that the Conference has achieved a lot.

Firstly, the naval armaments of the three main naval powers are really limited; secondly, a positive balance has been achieved in the Pacific Ocean and an excellent procedure has been established for the arbitration of possible future disputes or collisions; thirdly, if the Chinese question in all its complex totality has not yet been resolved, then a lot has also been achieved: China’s sovereignty has been re-recognized, a new guarantee has been created to protect Chinese national interests, and many of the minor issues regarding China have been resolved.
Chapter 3
Conference results
The Washington Conference was the turning point that determined the development of not only Europe, but the entire world, for the next three decades. It completed the formation of the post-war world order and finally established the inevitability new war, drawing into the European Versailles order also Pacific and Asian contradictions.
The Washington system, which extended to the Asia-Pacific region, was somewhat more balanced than the Versailles system, but it was also not universal. Its instability was determined by the uncertainty of the political development of China, the militaristic foreign policy of Japan and the isolationism of the United States, etc.

The world is gradually ceasing to be Eurocentric, the international system is beginning to transform into a global one.
The Versailles-Washington system was characterized by asynchrony in transformation processes in two main subsystems (European and Far Eastern), which in turn led to subsequent destabilization of the system, that is, systemic changes in one of the subsystems over time caused a new surge of transformations in the other.
The system of treaties created in Versailles and Washington fixed the balance of power between the great powers that emerged as a result of the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles marked the beginning new era without wars and violence. However, the subsequent course of events demonstrated the instability, fragility and fragility of this system. The post-war settlement suffered from several serious flaws.
First, the Versailles order was not comprehensive. Russia and the United States, which were not included in the League of Nations, dropped out of it. Without these major powers, it was impossible to imagine stability in Europe in the mid-twentieth century.
etc.................

In July 1921, President USA Warren Harding took the initiative to hold an international conference in Washington on the limitation of naval arms, Pacific and Far Eastern issues. The convening of the Washington Conference was due to the following main reasons. On Paris Peace Conference some important problems of the post-war settlement were either resolved Not completely. or not affected at all. It was like times about those problems that the American president named. In this sense The Washington Conference was its sort of continuation of the Paris Conference. It was intended to complete the formation process new system international relationships.

Special attention to the Far Eastern issues was explained by the fact that after the World War a new balance of power had emerged in the Asia-Pacific region and the contradictions between the great powers had intensified. The United States, relying on its economic power, sought to secure a dominant position in the Far East and, above all, in China, using a policy of “open doors” and “equal opportunities.” This political course. Great Britain supported, albeit with reservations. The main obstacle to the practical implementation of this course was Japan, which adhered to the traditional imperialist principles of struggle behind"spheres of influence". By imposing the 21 Demands on China and achieving a diplomatic victory over the US at the Paris Conference. Japan has made a major step in the implementation of its main foreign policy task - transforming Chinese territory, and then the entire Asia-Pacific region, into the sphere of exclusively Japanese economic interests and political control. Hence the sharp increase in tension in relations between the United States and the Land of the Rising Sun.

It should be noted that the international situation in Far The East was characterized by extreme complexity and inconsistency. it cannot be reduced only to the American-Japanese conflict Anyway case when solving long-range problems problems are necessary three important circumstances had to be taken into account.

First, in the power triangle USA-Japan-UK the latter occupied a special place. Declaring your solidarity with the American "open door" policy, she at the same time was connected with Japan by the allied agreement concluded in 1902 and renewed in 1911 d. This meant that in in case of armed conflict with Japan United The United States will be opposed by the Anglo-Japanese block - I see, What Japanese the government sought to preserve alliance with England, and American - to destroy it. Concerning Great Britain, then, finding herself in an ambiguous position, she became this union to be burdened. Case is that treaty with Japan at the time of its signing was directed against Germany and Russia, therefore after the defeat in the first war and the weakening Far Eastern positions of the second he Yu Maupe") and capable of "protecting the interests of the United States from any threats", In 1919. V. Wilson outlined the second three-year program, which provided for the construction of 69 large military ships, which in the future guaranteed the United States the possession of the “Trident of Neptune.” The strategic position of the United States on the seas improved significantly after the commissioning of the Panama Canal in July 1920, which provided the ability to quickly transfer the American military flotilla from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and back.

“Mistress of the Seas” Great Britain was unable to compete with America in this area due to blatant inequality in economic and financial Moshi. Therefore, already in 1920. The British government actually abandoned its famous “two-power standard” and put forward a less pretentious demand - the principle of equality of the British fleet with the fleet of the strongest of other naval powers (“oper po\uer<*1ап(1ап»). По мнению английских пра­вительственных и военных кругов, эта уступка компенсирова­лась сохранением за Великобританией контроля над основными морскими путями (Гибралтар. Суэцкий канал. Северное море). широкой сетью военно-морских баз. а также дружественными отношениями с Соединенными Штатами. К тому же она вовсе не означала, что Англия прекращала наращивание своего воен­но-морского потенциала.

However, the American challenge was accepted by another power - Japan. In 1920, it began the implementation of the “8-8” program, gigantic at that time, which involved the construction 8 battleships, 8 cruisers and a large number of support vessels.

At the same time, the unprecedented scope of the race naval weapons required huge expenses, which could lead to financial overvoltage and cause a negative reaction from the public. One should also take into account the widespread prevalence of pacifist sentiments. That's why in governments allied powers and plans began to be developed to limit naval strength establishing certain proportions of fleets, taking into account military-political goals of a given country. More open than others leaders, the American President spoke on this matter W. Gar- ding: "Most wise US policy should become aspiration achieve superiority in sea as a result arms reduction."

It is no coincidence that the idea of ​​convening a conference came from from the United States. With the coming to power of the Republican administration of W. Harding, significant changes occurred in the foreign policy of the United States. Wilsonian liberal globalism has been replaced by neo-isolationism. that is, a policy aimed at ensuring American regional and global interests while maintaining “complete freedom of hands.” Within the framework of this policy, the primary role was played not by the European, but by the Latin American and Far Eastern directions, which in turn implied strengthening the naval power of the United States Hence, the nomination of 3 specific goals that American diplomacy had to implement at the Washington Conference: 1) to prevent a violation of the status quo in the Pacific basin, and, if possible, change it in its favor: 2) through the reduction of naval weapons, to achieve, if not dominant, then an equal position with England on the seas; 3) achieve international recognition of the “open door doctrine” and thereby establish the dominant position of the United States in China.

Administration USA did not hide that the implementation these goals will allow her to take revenge for the “defeat” of Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. In other words. The United States raised the question of a partial revision of the Versailles treaty system in order to achieve this. to achieve satisfaction of a number their claims that were rejected in 1919 in Paris.

The preparation for the conference was accompanied by a noisy propaganda campaign, including progress which glorified the peacefulness of the American administration, the international forum itself was called a “meeting of friends,” and the idea of ​​​​reducing naval weapons was called “America’s great self-sacrifice.” All newspapers quoted W. Harding as saying: “We hope to establish a better order that will restore peace to the world.” The pacifist slogans of 1921 were remarkably similar to those uttered on the eve of Paris conferences. And just as then, they had little correspondence with the real foreign policy tasks and goals of the great powers.

The ceremonial opening of the Washington Conference took place on November 11, 1921 - on the third anniversary of the signing of the Compiegne Armistice. 14 countries took part in it; 5 great powers - USA. England. France, Italy, Japan; 4 states. those who had significant interests in the Asia-Pacific region - Holland, Belgium, Portugal and China; as well as 5 British dominions. Soviet Russia, according to the official reasoning - “due to the lack of a unified government” - did not receive an invitation, as did the Far Eastern Republic, but without any explanation. In this regard, the governments of the RSFSR and the Far Eastern Republic simultaneously declared that they did not recognize any decisions of the conference, By analogies with Versailles all significant issues discussed at closed meetings of the Big Five, and at open plenary sessions they were officially approved already ready resolutions. The head of the American delegation, Secretary of State Charles, was elected chairman of the conference. Evans Huoz- The agenda of the day included three main polls: about mutual guarantees of inviolability island territories in the Pacific ocean; on the limitation of naval armaments; about the situation on Far East and recognition of territorial integrity and independence of China.

On Washington Conference were accepted following main documents.

- "Treaty of the Four Powers"

This agreement was concluded on December 13, 1921 by representatives of the USA and England. France and Japan. It consisted of only four articles and is known in the history of international relations as

Quadruple Pacific Treaty", or "Far Eastern Entente". The content of the treaty is almost completely revealed in its official title - “On the joint protection of the rights of the contracting parties to island possessions and island territories in the Pacific Ocean.” In other words, the agreement legally consolidated the status quo and temporary balance of the four powers in the Asia-Pacific region.

Special Article 4 mattered agreement, which established that after its ratification automatically loses power Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement of 1911 It was a big one diplomatic victory for the United States States achieved in difficult confrontation with England and Japan. During the behind-the-scenes negotiations, the American delegation chose Great Britain as the “weakest link”, knowing about her ambivalence towards union treaty. At this Americans used various means pressure: from benign promises to provide large loans to reckless threats admit Irish Republic. England after short resistance succumbed to the American onslaught. Head of the British delegation member Cabinet of Ministers A. Balfour clearly explained to the head of the Japanese delegation to the Minister of Navy Baron T. Kato. What Japan even benefited from this decision, for Now instead of o-z-

The South ally received three at once. Kato replied to that sense. What quantity(allies) does not replace quality (contracts!, so both according to the agreement of 1911 and the event of an attack on Japan to her"immediate military assistance" was offered, and under contract 1921 - Only exchange opinions." The Japanese minister failed result activities of British diplomats; *You gave our union a brilliant funeral.” Whatever it was. the signing of the "Pact of Four" marked the first, but Not the last success of the United States at the Washington Conference.

"Treaty of the Five Powers"

The great powers entered into a treaty to limit naval armaments.

The initiative in the development and adoption of this document belonged to the United States. In his speech, US Secretary of State Charles Hughes outlined the American plan. highlighting its three main components. It was proposed, first of all, to reduce the number of battleships that determined the strength of the navy (battleships included the largest military ships with a displacement of more than 10 thousand tons and had guns with a caliber of more than 5 inches). The reduction was to be carried out through the liquidation of ships that were under construction, as well as the withdrawal of ships already in service. The implementation of the American project would lead to the following quantitative changes in the battleship fleets: England retained 20 battleships out of 32, the USA increased the number of battleships from 16 to 18 (with the refusal to build 11 more ships), Japan remained the same number - 10 battleships (with the planned increasing to 1^). Similar proposals applied to other classes of ships. Secondly, it provided for the establishment of “ceilings” of the maximum tonnage and its ratio for the five great maritime powers. In accordance with “this provision, in the future the replacement of obsolete battleships with new ones will be carried out in such a way that their total tonnage does not exceed 500 thousand tons for the USA and England, and 300 thousand tons for Japan, i.e. the ratio of the battle fleets of the three powers was established in the proportion 5: 5: 3. Thirdly, the construction of battleships with a displacement of more than 35 thousand tons was prohibited, which, oddly enough, strictly corresponded to the capacity of the Panama Canal -

In his opening speech, C. Hughes spoke a lot and heartfeltly about the disasters of the world war, about the desire of peoples for peace. about the need to reduce spending on weapons in order to use it to restore the destroyed economy. As the press noted, in the 35 minutes spent on speaking, the Secretary of State USA sunk more ships than all the famous admirals of past centuries. The speech received enthusiastic publicity: the American proposals were called “an unprecedented sacrifice to pacifism”, “the practical embodiment of mankind’s centuries-old dream of peace and disarmament.” Behind all these high-profile phrases, the real goal of American diplomacy faded into the background - to achieve naval parity with Great Britain and strengthen the strategic position of the United States as a great maritime power.

Discussion of the American project took place in a fierce struggle between "friends and allies". The results of this the struggles were like this.

Negotiations on reduction of battle fleets and aircraft carriers. apart from some changes in details, ended for the USA successfully. England as mentioned above reasons went towards American proposals, which predetermined general agreement.

The desire of the United States to extend the principles developed regarding battleships to all other categories of the surface fleet met with decisive resistance from Great Britain. The thing is. that cruisers, destroyers and other fast warships were essential for effective communication with the scattered parts of the British Empire. The intransigence of the position of the British delegation did not allow this issue to be resolved positively.

The same fate befell the English American project reduction of the submarine fleet. France and Italy acted as his main opponents. An interesting dialogue took place between the British and the French. A. Balfour declared the need to eliminate all submarines, calling them the most barbaric type of naval forces and reminding delegates of the ruthless submarine war that Germany waged against the Allied powers. In response,1 the deputy head of the French delegation, A. Sarro (the official leader was Prime Minister A. Briand, who had left for Paris), defined as “senseless” attempts to pit one category of the navy against others. Then he assured those present at the meeting that. France is ready to destroy all its submarines if Great Britain does the same with its battleships. Sarro concluded sarcastically: "It is true, we are told that England never uses its battleships for military purposes. Well... of course. She keeps them "Apparently, for catching sardines. So let her allow France to have submarine boats, well. Let's say, for botanical research of the seabed. " As a result of this discussion, the submarine fleet remained inviolable.

What concerns the problem of “disarmament in drier", then it was only formally touched upon in a number of speeches, but no one seriously her didn't consider it. Just as ostentatious was a discussion the issue of reducing aviation.

The content of the “string of powers agreement” can be reduced to the following main provisions. 1) The ratio of the battle fleets of England, USA, Japan. France and Italy were set in the proportion 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75. The total tonnage of battleships was 525-525-315-175-175 thousand tons, respectively. 2) The maximum tonnage for aircraft carriers of five sea ​​powers was determined in sizes: 135-135-81-61-61 thousand tons. 3) The displacement of one battleship should not exceed 35 thousand tons. 4) Article 19 prohibited the construction of new and strengthening of old naval bases in the central and western parts of the Pacific Ocean (east of the 110th meridian). The USA and England could not have any naval bases at a distance of less than 5 thousand km from Japanese islands. This ruling was a major strategic win for Japan.

"Treaty five powers" became an important element of the post-war system of international relationships, although definitely his extremely difficult to characterize.

Firstly, the significance of this document went beyond regional boundaries, since it limited not the Pacific, but the world fleet of the great powers. The treaty not only stopped the dangerous trend towards an unrestricted naval arms race, He established maximum tonnage standards for the largest sea ​​ships, which implied a very significant (about half) reduction in the battle fleet already built or under construction. And this. certainly should be assessed positively.

Secondly, the agreement of the five powers formalized a global naval balance that, albeit to varying degrees, corresponded to the interests of all its participants. The United States won another diplomatic victory, achieving naval parity with Great Britain, maximizing its position on the seas and maintaining the strategic importance of the Panama Canal. England, having refused the “two-power standard”, which turned into an unbearable burden for it, retained leadership in the surface fleet in the class of high-speed ships, which, combined with a wide network of naval bases, ensured its advantages as the strongest naval power; Japan, insisting on The inclusion in the treaty of a provision limiting the military presence of the United States and England in the Pacific Ocean zone changed the balance of forces in this region in its favor. In addition, the lag behind the Anglo-Saxon powers in the number of battleships and aircraft carriers was to a certain extent compensated by the advantageous geographical location Japanese islands:

if American naval interests spread over two oceans, and British ones over the whole world, then Japan could concentrate its navy in one area strategically important to it. France and Italy, with their more modest maritime capabilities, received effective guarantees of their security, leaving their ground forces and submarine fleet outside the scope of restrictions and reductions. in which they did not concede, but on in some areas they were superior to the leading naval powers of the world.

Third, the Big Five Treaty could not become effective means of disarmament, so how it contained the program not a complete, but a partial reduction of armaments - By all In areas not covered by the text of the agreement, the great powers continued to increase their military power. "That's not crossed out what had been achieved, but noticeably weakened its significance.

"Nine Power Treaty"

All countries that sent their representatives to Washington became parties to this treaty, signed on February 6, 1922. with the exception of the English dominions. The basis of the agreement was the American project, supported by the delegations of England and China. Its content was as follows. In Article 1 of the treaty, the parties pledged to respect the sovereignty. independence, “territorial integrity and inviolability” of the Republic of China. Article 3 affirmed the principle of “open doors” and “equal opportunities” for trade and industrial activities of “all nations throughout Chinese territory.” At the same time, the states that entered into the treaty assumed an obligation “to refrain from obtaining special rights and advantages in China." In accordance with the adopted regulations, Japan was forced to give up some of its privileges; the exclusive right to provide loans to the Chinese government for construction railway in Manchuria. send their advisers to Northeast China, etc. Under pressure from the USA and England, the head of the Japanese delegation T. Kago On February 4, 1922, he signed a special agreement with representatives of the Beijing government, according to which Japan pledged to withdraw its troops from Shantung Province within 6 months and return the Qingdao-Shinan railway and the territory of Jiaozhou to China.

In a certain sense, the “Treaty of Nine Powers” ​​was a landmark event in the development of international relations in the Far East.

Firstly, the doctrine of “open doors” and “equal opportunities”, proclaimed back in 1899, first received international recognition, which was an undoubted success of American foreign policy. At the signing ceremony, Charles Hughes said: “We believe that thanks to this treaty, the “open door” in China has finally become a reality.” “Equal opportunity” in the face of economic inequality provided the United States with significant advantages in the struggle for China. secondly, the agreement, which rejected the policy of “spheres of influence" had a pronounced anti-Japanese orientation and weakened Japan’s Far Eastern positions. On the one hand, this indicated that the United States, having conceded to Japan on the issue of naval bases, took revenge in solving the Chinese problem and improved their positions at the expense of the Japanese. On the other hand, such an outcome of the negotiations could not satisfy Japan and would inevitably lead to a new aggravation of American-Japanese contradictions. Thirdly, the agreement of the nine powers, with all its democratic formulations, was contradictory and inconsistent. It removed only some of the many restrictions on Chinese sovereignty.China's proposals for the complete abolition of extraterritoriality rights of foreign citizens. “21 demands” for the return of all leased territories were not satisfied. England, which announced the transfer Republic of China Wei-Highway. retained the Kowloon Peninsula and Hong Kong. Japan rejects China's demand for Japanese troop withdrawal from Southern Manchuria and refused to discuss the issue of ownership of Port Arthur and Dairen. Fourthly, despite the duality in the approach to Chinese problem, agreement 1922 should be recognized as a major positive step in its solution - in comparison with the imperialist methods of semi-colonial exploitation of China, so characteristic of the previous policies of the great powers.

During discussion of the "Treaty of Nine" powers" on Washington conference, as at the Paris conference, the Russian question arose. While the general anti-Soviet mood remained, certain changes occurred in the policies of the allied powers. what's not in the latter was due to the end in Russia civil war. In this context, two episodes were extremely revealing. The United States came up with the idea of ​​"internationalizing" the Chinese Eastern Railway. There was a protest from the Soviet government;!, which stated that the problem CER- this is the subject of bilateral negotiations between China and the RSFSR. and not a conference taking place without the participation of the Russian Republic. The Allied response was very symptomatic. A special technical subcommittee presented a report. which noted that “the road is indeed the property of the Russian government.” In the resolution of the Washington Conference, which confirmed the powers of the inter-allied committee to manage the CER. The main goal of his activities was declared to be “the return of the Russian railway to its rightful owner.” Such a nod to Soviet Russia was largely due to this. that the Entente powers, and above all the United States, began to perceive it as an element of the global balance of power and as a possible counterbalance to Japan.

This was also evidenced by such facts as Ch-Hughes’s reception of the DDA delegation. a number of statements by official American and British representatives about the need to withdraw Japanese troops from the Far East, etc.

By demonstrating your desire if not respect, then in every way case, take into account “legitimate interests” Soviet Russia. allied powers By essentially recognized its de facto.

How can you evaluate the main results of the work of the Washington forum?

The convening and decisions of the conference were the first major diplomatic victory for the United States since the end of the World War. They managed to significantly strengthen their role in solving a number of major international problems and in some least take revenge for failures in Paris. In this sense, the Washington Conference, being a continuation of Versailles, was also its partial revision.

The conference in Washington legally formalized the new “balance of power” in the Asia-Pacific region. Consensus was reached on a naval balance, mutual guarantees of regional interests and general principles of Far Eastern policy.

At the same time, the Washington system does not was universal. The resolutions of the conference were temporary and compromise in nature, and many issues were never resolved. found theirs in them permissions. Controversy between great powers were smoothed over, but not eliminated.

Completion of the Washington Conference signified marks the beginning of functioning Versailles-Washington systems of international relations.

Versailles-Washington system of international relations: content and nature

The above analysis of the main decisions of the Paris and Washington conferences allows us to draw the following general conclusions on the content and nature of the Versailles-Washington system.

First. This system appeared international legal formalization of the results of the First World War and the new disposition that emerged after its end strength Her the creation completed the process of transition from war to peace and contributed to the temporary stabilization of international relations,

Second. Versailles-Washington system was extremely complex and contradictory. IN they went together like democratic, fair^ so and conservative, imperialist principles of peaceful settlement.

The first were due dramatic changes in the post-war world: the rise of the revolutionary and national liberation movement, the emergence of the “Bolshevik threat”, the widespread spread of pacifist sentiments. as well as the desire of a number of leaders of the victorious powers to give the new world order a liberal, more civilized appearance. Decisions such as the legal recognition of nine newly formed states from Central and Eastern Europe were based on these principles;

establishment of the League of Nations; proclamation of the independence and territorial integrity of China: limitation and reduction of naval armaments, etc. A significant drawback of many of the above-mentioned resolutions was their declarative nature, not supported by real guarantees. However, even in this form they had an important positive significance, becoming an internationally recognized basis for the struggle for the implementation of democratic goals and declarations. Not we should also forget that liberal principles were first introduced in theory and practice of interstate relations.

At the same time, decisive role a conservative tendency played a role in the formation of the post-war international system. ETS is reflected in the solution of such issues as development;

Treaty of 4 powers(USA, UK, France and Japan) December 13, 1921 - on the joint defense of territorial “rights” in the Pacific Ocean. Goal: to unite forces against the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. The treaty also provided (under pressure from the Americans) for the liquidation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902), which was directed at that time against US plans. Some British dominions (primarily Canada) also spoke out against the Anglo-Japanese alliance, fearing the strengthening of Japan at the expense of China and other countries of the Far East.

Treaty of 5 powers- February 6, 1922 (USA, UK, Japan, France and Italy) on the limitation of naval armaments, which changed their ratio in favor of the USA. According to it, Great Britain is forced to give up unconditional dominance at sea. The agreement established a certain proportion of the maximum tonnage of the battle fleet of its participants: USA - 5, UK-5, Japan-3,

France - 1.75, Italy - 1.75. The total tonnage of battleships should not exceed: for the USA and Great Britain 525 thousand tons each, for Japan 315 thousand tons, for Italy and France 175 thousand tons each.

Aircraft carrier tonnage: 135 thousand tons for the USA and Great Britain, 81 thousand tons for Japan and 60 thousand tons each for Italy and France. However, the total tonnage of the powers' navies was not limited, so that the de facto superiority of the British fleet remained. Japan secured strategic advantages for itself by obtaining a commitment from the American and British governments not to build new bases on the Pacific Islands to the east of the 110th meridian of eastern longitude (with the exception of islands off the coast of the USA, Canada, Alaska, the Panama Canal zone, Australia, New Zealand and Hawaii).

Treaty of 9 powers- February 6, 1922. (USA, UK, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and China)

The treaty provided these states with “equal opportunities” in China in the areas of trade and entrepreneurial activity and obliged not to resort to using the internal situation of China to obtain privileges that infringe on the rights and interests of other parties to the treaty. China was seen as a common target for exploitation. The treaty was aimed against Japan's claims to monopoly dominance in China. The agreement was in line with the American “open door” policy; the United States hoped to oust its competitors from China.

Earlier, on February 4, 1922, the Washington Agreement was signed - a Sino-Japanese agreement on the evacuation of Japanese troops from the Chinese province of Shandong, as well as on the return of the Qingdao-Jinan railway and the territory of Jiaozhou to China. In addition, the Japanese government will not demand that China fulfill the fifth group of Japan’s “Twenty-one Demands” (on the appointment of Japanese advisers to Chinese government etc.). However, Japan rejected China's demand for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Southern Manchuria. Simultaneously with the Nine Power Treaty, on February 6, 1922, the Treaty on the Chinese Customs Tariff was signed, which established China’s customs inequality.

The decisions reached at the conference completed the redistribution of colonial possessions and spheres of influence of imperialist states in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East that took place after World War I. American imperialism secured a number of important concessions from Great Britain and Japan. However, the resulting equilibrium was unstable. Already on US conferences declared the inadequacy of Japanese concessions in China; in turn, Japan immediately after it took the path of revising Washington’s decisions.

on the limitation of naval armaments and Pacific and Far Eastern issues - was convened at the initiative of the United States and took place in Washington from November 12, 1921 to January 6, 1922. The conference was attended by 9 powers: the USA, the British Empire (Great Britain, dominions and India), Japan. France, Italy, China, Belgium, Portugal and Holland. The USA was represented there by Secretary of State Hughes, Lodge, Underwood and Root; England - Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty Lee and Geddes. The Dominions and India were represented by independent delegates, only the Union of South Africa authorized Balfour to be its representative. Therefore, Balfour signed the relevant documents twice: both as a representative of England and as a representative of the Union of South Africa; Japan was represented by Kato, Shidehara, Tokugawa and Hanihara; France - Briand, Viviani, Sarro and Jusserand; Italy - Schanzer, Ricci and Albertini. On December 14, 1920, Senator Bora made a proposal to convene a conference on limiting naval armaments. 24. II 1921 this proposal was included as an amendment to the maritime bill adopted by Congress. The problem of naval weapons was closely connected with Pacific and Far Eastern issues, in particular with the fate Anglo-Japanese alliance(cm.). In February 1921, Canadian Prime Minister Meighen put forward a proposal to conclude a four-power treaty (USA, UK, Japan and France) to replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty. Meighen's plan was discussed at the British Imperial Conference in the summer of 1921. On July 5, 1921, the British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon, in negotiations with US Ambassador Harvey, proposed including Far Eastern and Pacific issues on the agenda of the projected conference. 10. VII 1921 US Secretary of State Hughes made a public statement proposing to convene a conference in Washington. An official invitation was sent to the powers on behalf of the US government. The situation in the Far East on the eve of the Washington Conference was very tense. While the USA and Great Britain were tied up in the 1914-18 war in Europe, Japan received complete freedom of action in the Far East and unilaterally upset the pre-war balance of power on the Asian continent and in the Pacific Ocean (see. "Twenty-one demands"). After the end of the First World War, England and especially the United States wanted to limit Japanese penetration into China and regain the positions they had lost in the Far East. American diplomacy showed particular interest in this regard. The convening of the conference was explained not only by the desire of the United States and England to stop Japanese aggression in the Far East, but also by the fact that after the elimination of Germany's naval power, the maritime rivalry of the great powers was associated mainly with the Pacific Ocean as the main potential springboard for a naval war. A special role was played by Anglo-American maritime rivalry, which threatened to lead to the same results as the previous Anglo-German maritime rivalry. The diplomacy of the United States and England sought to stabilize international relations in China and the Far East on a new basis, as well as to prevent a new naval arms race that threatened military conflicts. American diplomacy played a leading role. Although isolationism dominated foreign policy The USA and Harding, in their inauguration speech on 4.12.4921, announced “traditional non-interference in the affairs of the Old World,” but isolationism almost never affected the White House’s Pacific and Far Eastern policies. Wilson's agreement to keep Shandong in Japanese hands caused great discontent in America and was one of the reasons for the Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson's opponents accused him of sacrificing America's Far Eastern interests in the name of European politics. American economic activity - the creation of an international banking consortium in China at the end of 1920 - was also directed against Japan. Japan was interested in maintaining the existing situation and preventing collective discussion of Far Eastern issues. When the United States announced its intention to convene a conference in Washington, Japanese diplomats said that "Japan is being brought to trial by the Anglo-American tribunal." After unsuccessful attempts to cancel the conference, the Japanese tried to ensure that “issues that had already been resolved were not discussed,” in particular referring to the treaties imposed on China in 1915 (“Twenty-one Demands”), and proposed convening a preliminary conference of the three powers (USA, England and Japan), etc. All these attempts encountered active opposition from White House diplomacy. The Washington Conference was a typical example of a “new”, “legal” (although it was convened outside the framework of the League of Nations), outwardly very democratic diplomacy. The leaders of the conference in every possible way advertised its openness, the rejection of secret diplomacy, etc. The speeches and speeches of the delegates were published in newspapers and magazines, and even a verbatim report of the conference was published. But this publicity was only for show. None of the decisive questions of big politics were resolved at the official meetings of the conference. Everything was done behind the scenes of the conference during the negotiations that took place at the meetings of the Big Three, which included Hughes, Balfour and Cato. Even the French delegation was not aware of all the affairs. The French delegation learned about the agreement of the four powers, which the USA, England, Japan and France were supposed to sign, only two days before its signing. Even less respect was given to the Italian delegation, which, despite its protests, was excluded from participating in the four-power treaty. The main documents of the Great Patriotic War were: 1) the agreement of the four powers on the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; 2) the agreement of nine powers on the principle of “open doors” in China; 3) agreement of the five powers on the limitation of naval armaments. The question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not discussed at the conference itself: it was predetermined by the Big Three agreement. Since the establishment of the League of Nations, the question of the incompatibility of the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the Charter of the League of Nations has been discussed. In England, pacifist figures, supporters of the League of Nations, and Laborists insisted on the liquidation of this union. Opponents of the renewal of the alliance with Japan pointed out, in particular, that this military alliance aroused Chinese hostility towards England. But their main argument was that in the presence of acute Japanese-American contradictions, an alliance with Japan would threaten England with a military clash with the United States and the collapse of the British Empire, since Canada, for example, would under no circumstances participate in a war against the United States. Canada, indeed, strongly opposed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Australia and New Zealand generally supported the idea of ​​a renewed alliance with Japan, fearing that otherwise they would be under immediate threat from Japanese aggression. However, even in these dominions there was strong opposition to the renewal of the union, in particular from Labor. Both before the World War II and at the conference itself, American diplomacy put strong pressure on England, demanding the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The outcome of a possible war between the United States and Japan was largely determined by which side England would be on. In particular, without the use of British bases, the American fleet would not have been able to operate effectively against Japan. Attempts by the British to find some kind of compromise in order to renew the alliance and reassure America were unsuccessful. In April 1921, the editor of the New York Times, Ochs, arrived on an unofficial mission in London and negotiated with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lee, on the issue of limiting naval armaments and the fate of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The British proposed maintaining the Anglo-Japanese alliance, establishing equality between the British and American fleets, and guaranteeing US security in the Atlantic Ocean so that the United States would be able to concentrate its fleet in the Pacific Ocean. In this case, England would retain in its hands the “keys of the Pacific balance.” But White House diplomacy resolutely rejected any proposals that included a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. To put pressure on England, she used not only Canada, but also the Irish question. In particular, in June 1921, Hughes, in a conversation with the British ambassador Geddes, threatened to support Ireland against England if England resumed its alliance with Japan. At first, at the proposal of England, negotiations were held to conclude a trilateral agreement that would replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The English project provided for the possibility for two of the contracting parties to enter into military agreements with each other, provided that these agreements were of a defensive nature. However, the American delegates also objected to this attempt to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance in one form or another. France was involved in the draft agreement. An agreement was concluded between the USA, the British Empire, France and Japan on December 13, 1921 (see. Four Power Treaty) regarding their island possessions and island territories in the Pacific Ocean, after the ratification of which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which served as the basis of British policy in the Far East, lost force. The most important issue discussed at the VK was the question of China. American diplomacy sharply opposed Japanese attempts to retain all positions captured in China. Considering that the unification of China and the acceleration of its capitalist development would expand the domestic market in China and open up new opportunities for American trade and investment, White House diplomacy was not averse to even flirting with the national liberation movement of the Chinese people. The main diplomatic task of the United States in the Great Patriotic War was to force Japan to retreat on the Chinese question, to force it to abandon the “21 Demands,” and to affirm the principle of “open doors” and equal opportunities in China, proclaimed back in 1899 by US Secretary of State Gay. British diplomacy tried to achieve a compromise solution. First of all, she was afraid of the national liberation movement in China and its impact on India. She viewed Japan as the “gendarme of the Far East.” Since Japanese expansion covered mainly the region of Manchuria and Northern China, and not the Yangtze Valley and Southern China (where two-thirds of British investment was concentrated), England hoped to negotiate a “modus vivendi” with Japan based on the established traditional division of spheres of influence. Along with this, British diplomacy wanted to keep China from getting closer to Soviet Russia and the United States. In addition, Japanese expansion still caused great damage to British interests in China. Finally, the pressure of American diplomacy played a role: As a result, England in the East, despite all the zigzags and hesitations, generally spoke out on the Chinese issue together with the United States against Japan. Balfour spoke at the conference about rejecting spheres of influence politics and supporting an open door and equal opportunity policy. 6. II 1922 a treaty was signed by nine powers: the USA, the British Empire, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and China. The signatory powers in Art. I pledged to: respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China; to give China full and unfettered opportunity to develop and maintain a viable and durable government; to use its influence for the purpose of actually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; refrain from taking advantage of the current situation in China in order to obtain special rights and advantages that could harm the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, or from supporting activities hostile to the security of these states. Art. III obligated the contracting powers, in accordance with the "open door" principle, not to seek monopolies or advantages or special privileges in any particular area of ​​​​China that would be detrimental to the citizens of other countries. Art. IV stated that the contracting parties refuse to create spheres of influence in certain parts of Chinese territory. The treaty made no mention of how to implement the open door policy or how to prevent violations of the open door policy. The powers pledged to respect (but not defend) China's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Art. VII provided only for the possibility of an exchange of views between the contracting powers in the event of a violation of the treaty. A number of concessions to China were made in Eastern Europe. A special resolution provided for the possibility of abolishing extraterritoriality rights in the future. Japan, under an agreement concluded with China on January 4, 1922, pledged to cleanse Shandong and was forced to actually retreat from the “21 demands.” However, despite China’s insistence, she did not agree to formally abandon them. The Japanese representative Shidehara, speaking at the plenum of the conference on 2.2, on the contrary, stated that there could be no talk of annulment of the 1915 treaties, since they were “signed legally and sealed.” He, speaking on 4.II, once again confirmed the existence of “special rights” of Japan in China: “to say that Japan has special interests in China is simply to state a clear and modern fact "Japan resolutely rejected China's demand for the withdrawal of troops from southern Manchuria. England in the East announced its renunciation of the leased territory of Weihaiwei, but when it came to the cession of Kowloon, Balfour stated that here, based on economic and strategic motives, England will not make any concessions. A number of decisions of the Great Britain on economic and military issues were nothing more than a violation of the sovereignty of China and interference in its internal affairs. In the Great Britain, for the first time, England’s refusal of the traditional "two power standard", according to which England maintained a navy equal in strength to the two strongest fleets of other powers. By the end of the First World War, Anglo-American naval rivalry had become intense. To continue the naval arms race meant going to inevitable clash with America.In this clash, America would not only have superior economic and financial resources, but would also be in a more advantageous political and strategic position, in particular due to its connections with the British dominions, especially Canada. England was forced to renounce unconditional dominance of the seas and agree that the US fleet would be equal in strength to the British fleet. Back on 17.3.1920, the First Lord of the Admiralty Long made a statement that England would be content with a fleet not inferior in strength to the strongest fleet of another power. This position was confirmed by the imperial conference of 1921. On the other hand, the US government in September 1921 made a statement that it would build a fleet not inferior to the fleet of the strongest naval power, i.e. the British. By the time of the Washington Conference, England had the most powerful navy in the world. However, the United States was rapidly building a navy, which within a few years threatened not only to catch up, but also to overtake England. Japan implemented the “8+8” program, i.e., the construction of 8 battleships and 8 battlecruisers. The balance of forces of the battle fleets in 1921 and 1924 (in accordance with the construction programs) was assumed to be as follows: The Americans made the following proposal at the Eastern Seaboard: England should disable a number of old or not yet completed battleships and leave 22 in service. America should leave 18, Japan - 10. The tonnage of the battleships was proposed at 500 thousand for England and America and 300 thousand for Japan, i.e. in the proportion 5:5:3. With regard to cruisers, the American proposal boiled down to England and the USA leaving 450 thousand each. m and Japan - 270 thousand, and in relation to aircraft carriers, the USA and England - 80 thousand each, and Japan - 48 thousand. Japan strongly objected to the proportion of 5: 3 and demanded a proportion of 10: 7. However, Japan’s demand was rejected, and the Japanese delegation had to accept the ratio proposed by England and America. According to the agreement of the five powers (USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy), concluded on V. k. 6. II 1922, the following proportion was established for the replacement of battleships between these powers: 5: 5: 3: 13/4: 13 /4. The replacement tonnage of battleships was set at 525 thousand for England and the USA, 315 thousand for Japan and 175 thousand for France and Italy. For aircraft carriers, the total tonnage was established: the USA and England were 135 thousand each, Japan - 81 thousand, France and Italy - 60 thousand each. For battleships, the maximum displacement standards were 35 thousand. m with artillery no more than 16-inch, for aircraft carriers 27 thousand. m with artillery no more than 8 inches, for cruisers 10 thousand. m with artillery no more than 8-inch. For ten years from the date of signing the treaty, England, the USA and Japan were not to lay down new battleships. The balance of naval forces established in Washington meant that in the event of a war in the Pacific Ocean between Japan and one of the great powers, Japan would have a clear predominance, since neither England nor the United States could concentrate more than two-thirds of their fleet in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, i.e. That is, neither England nor the United States, acting separately, would be able to successfully attack Japan in its waters. Although a chauvinist campaign was waged in Japan against the “Washington shame,” the balance of forces established by the Washington Treaty was essentially quite favorable for Japan. Japan's major success was Art. 19 of the Five Powers Treaty. Under this article, the United States, the British Empire and Japan agreed not to build bases and fortifications on a number of island possessions in the Pacific Ocean. The United States pledged not to strengthen its island possessions in the Pacific Ocean, with the exception of the Hawaiian Islands and the islands adjacent to the coast of Alaska and the Panama Canal zone (while the Aleutian Islands could not be fortified). England pledged not to strengthen Hong Kong and the island possessions east of 110° E. (England had the right to strengthen Singapore), with the exception of island possessions adjacent to the coast of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japan pledged not to strengthen the Kuril Islands, Bonin, Amami Shima, Formosa, Pescadores, or Mandate Islands. Japan considered Art. 19 as compensation for the rejection of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and for the adoption of norm 5: 3. This article was a major strategic gain for Japan, because even without these islands it had sufficiently powerful and closely located naval bases for operations in the western part of the Pacific ocean. Meanwhile, the United States and England were deprived of the opportunity to have convenient bases for effective operations in the waters adjacent to Japan. A situation was created that made it very difficult, if necessary, for England and the United States to actively act against Japan. Obligations arising from Art. 19, were, as it were, a strategic addition to the treaty of the four powers and the treaty of the nine powers, which did not provide for the possibility of collective action against the violator of the Washington treaties. Therefore, the Washington Naval Treaty caused great discontent in American maritime circles. In England it was also openly recognized that Art. 19 of the treaty leaves Hong Kong and the Philippines in the event of war at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and that in a war against the British Empire or the United States, “Japan is guaranteed an important advantage of first successes.” The Washington Naval Treaty did not place any restrictions on the total tonnage of the cruising fleet. Likewise, no regulations were passed regarding the submarine fleet, although the British delegation insisted on a complete ban on submarines. The issue of limiting land and air weapons was also discussed at the VK. Representative of France Briand made a speech in which he insisted that the question of limiting land armaments should be made dependent on the degree of moral disarmament of Germany, as well as on the obligations of England and America to actively participate in ensuring the security of France against possible German aggression. England and the USA did not agree with this, and... the question of land disarmament was dropped. Soviet Russia was not invited to the VK. In connection with this, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a protest to the relevant governments on July 19, 1921 and stated that it did not recognize any decisions made by the conference: “The Russian government,” the NKID note stated, “ solemnly declares that it does not recognize any decision taken by the said conference, since this meeting will take place without its participation... It considers that it has grounds to assert that, in fact, the decisions of this conference will remain null and void due to the absence and non-participation of one of key stakeholders." 2. XI 1921 NKID again protested against the elimination Soviet republic from participating in the conference. This note stated that “under such conditions, the decisions of the Washington Conference will inevitably only become a source of new conflicts, new confusion and new upheavals.” 8. XII 1921 The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs protested against the fact that the issue of the Chinese-Eastern Railway was discussed at the Washington Conference. etc., relating exclusively to China and Russia. The Soviet government declared its rights to the CER and reserved for itself “complete freedom of action to force respect for these rights and to defend the demands arising from them at that moment and by those means that it deems convenient and appropriate.” No decisions were made on this issue, and China's demand to clear the road was rejected. During the work of the VK, a delegation from the then existing Far Eastern Republic arrived in Washington, and published a number of revealing documents concerning the intervention of capitalist powers in the Soviet Far East. This publication had great political significance. At the conference itself, without the participation of the Soviet Republic, a number of issues directly related to Soviet Russia were discussed. On the issue of CVLC(see) no decisions were made. Japan announced its intention to evacuate its troops from the Soviet Far East. These troops were indeed evacuated at the end of 1922, but under pressure from the Red Army, and not under the influence of Washington decisions. The Great Patriotic War was an addition to the Treaty of Versailles, and its decisions became the basis of a certain new balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, one of the cornerstones of the Versailles system. J.V. Stalin at the 18th Party Congress, speaking about this post-war regime - the Versailles-Washington peace system, indicated: “The main foundations of this regime were in the Far East - the treaty of nine powers, and in Europe - the Versailles and a number of other treaties.” American diplomacy played a major role in the Eastern Caucasus. She was the main initiator, organizer and potential guarantor of the newly created balance of power in the Far East. Thus, the United States also acted as an indirect guarantor of the entire Versailles system, although it did not sign the Treaty of Versailles and did not join the League of Nations. The leading role of the United States in the World War II was a manifestation of the sharply increased share of the United States in the world economy and world politics after the First World War. In Eastern Europe, a common front of American and British diplomacy against Japan was established, as a result of which Japan was forced to retreat and gave up a number of positions it had seized in China. However, it retained sufficient positions in its hands to again go on the offensive against China at an opportune moment. The Great Patriotic War not only did not weaken, but, on the contrary, consolidated Japan's monopoly dominance in southern Manchuria and created important strategic guarantees for Japan in the event of war. The Washington treaties did not provide for any sanctions against aggressors. Washington's decisions bore the stamp of the British policy of compromise and the American policy of isolationism. The equilibrium created by Washington's decisions turned out to be extremely unstable and short-lived. Of decisive importance in this regard was the fact that Soviet Union- a great Pacific power - found itself on the sidelines in resolving vital issues affecting it. Literature: Washington Conference on Arms Limitation and Pacific and Far Eastern Issues, 1921-1922. Full translation of acts and documents. M. 1924. 139 p. (Narkomindel). - Conference on the limitation of armament. Washington. Nov. 12, 1921-Feb. 6, 1922. Washington. 1922. 1757 p. Text in English and French language - Buell, R. L. The Washington conference. New York - London, 1922. XIII, 461 p. - Sullivan, M. The great adventure at Washington. The story of the Conference. London. 1922. XI, 290 p. - Willoughby, W. W. China at the Conference. A report. Baltimore. 1922. XVI, 419 p. -Wou Saofong. La Chine et la conf?rence de Washington. Paris. 1927. 234 p.

At Constitution Hall, Washington, DC. The conference was attended by the USA, Great Britain, China, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, as well as the five British dominions, although the main issues were resolved by the three strongest naval powers of the USA - the British Empire - Japan. Soviet Russia did not receive an invitation to Washington, as a result of which it declared its non-recognition of any decisions of the conference.

The Washington Conference was convened at the initiative of the United States, which hoped to achieve a favorable solution to the issue of naval armaments and consolidate a new balance of forces in China and in the Pacific Ocean. The conference was also directed against the national liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries. The Soviet government, which did not receive an invitation to the conference, protested on July 19 and November 2, 1921 against its exclusion from participation in the conference, and on December 8, 1921 sent a protest against the discussion of the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway at the conference. In December 1921, a delegation from the Far Eastern Republic arrived in Washington, but was not allowed to attend the conference. It can be very bad.

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Characteristics of conditions

At the time of the conference, the British government had a debt to the USA - $4.5 billion, France - $3.5 billion, Italy - $1.8 billion.

Main agreements

Four Power Treaty of December 13, 1921, which became known as the “Quadruple Pacific Treaty” or “Far Eastern Entente”. The treaty was intended to unite the forces of the Allies against the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. Under this treaty, the signatories pledged to mutually respect the rights to islands and island possessions in the Pacific Ocean. The treaty also provided (under pressure from American diplomacy) for the liquidation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which was directed at that time against US plans in the Far East and the Pacific. Some British dominions (primarily Canada), who feared the strengthening of Japan at the expense of China and other countries of the Far East, also spoke out against the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Thus, the agreement legally consolidated the status quo and temporary balance of the four powers in the Pacific region.

Five Power Treaty, better known as the Washington Naval Agreement of 1922. Treaty between the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy on the limitation of naval armaments. The agreement established the ratio of the tonnage of battleships and aircraft carriers in the following proportion: 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75 (USA, England, Japan, France, Italy, respectively). The US proposal to ban the construction of battleships with a displacement of over 35 thousand tons was also adopted. The agreement was concluded for a period until December 31, 1936.

Treaty of the Nine Powers dated February 6, 1922, signed by all conference participants. The agreement concerned ensuring guarantees of the territorial integrity of China, respect for its sovereignty, and also proclaimed the principle of “open doors and equal opportunities” in relation to China in the field of trade and business activities and obliged not to resort to using the internal situation in China in order to obtain special rights and privileges , which may harm the rights and interests of other states parties to the treaty. China was viewed by the parties to the treaty as a common target of exploitation. This treaty was aimed against Japan's claims to monopoly dominance in China. Even earlier, on February 5, 1922, Japan was forced to sign the so-called Washington Agreement- Sino-Japanese agreement on the evacuation of Japanese troops from the Chinese province of Shandong, as well as on the return of the Qingdao-Jinan railway and the territory of Jiao-Zhou to China. The head of the Japanese delegation pledged that the Japanese government would not demand that the Chinese government fulfill the fifth group of Japan’s “twenty-one demands” regarding the appointment of Japanese advisers to the Chinese government, etc. However, Japan rejected China’s demand for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Southern Manchuria. Simultaneously with the Nine Power Treaty, on February 6, 1922, the Treaty on the Chinese Customs Tariff was signed, which established the customs inequalities of China.