home-Shoes-Famous surnames. Beautiful surnames for girls

Famous surnames. Beautiful surnames for girls

203 years ago at dawn on June 24, 1812, an army crossed pontoon bridges across the Neman River in the Kovno (Kaunas) region French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the territory of the Russian Empire.

“...at first Napoleon only wanted to intimidate his enemy with the grandeur of military preparations and force him to publicly, in front of all of Europe, humble himself; This, at least, was how the Russian Chancellor Rumyantsev and many other people understood the French preparations for war; Emperor Alexander obviously admitted the same thing, because before last minute did not lose hope of an opportunity to come to an agreement. But when he refused to take the first step towards this, the Emperor of the French had no choice but, in his own words, to “drink the uncorked wine.”
Here begins one of the most instructive and dramatic pages modern history: a universally recognized mind and military genius, contrary to the instructions of his experience and the experience of all his closest assistants, cannot, despite his repeatedly expressed firm intention, stop, but fatally goes forward and forward, goes into the very depths of the enemy country, conscious of everyone around him death! Constantly remembering and remembering the example of Charles XII and expressing the decision not to repeat his mistakes, he makes exactly the same mistake! Seeing that his wonderful army is dying, melting like ice on the sultry, tiring marches, feeling absorbed by the enormity of the space covered (but not conquered), deceived by the enemy’s tactics, surpassed by his firmness, he still moves forward, literally covering the path with corpses!
In Vitebsk, Napoleon declares the campaign of the 12th year over: “Here I will stop,” he says, “I will look around, gather an army, give it a rest and organize Poland. Two big rivers outline our position; Let's build blockhouses, cross the lines of our fires, form a square with artillery, build barracks and provision stores; in the 13th year we will be in Moscow, in the 14th year - in St. Petersburg. The war with Russia is a three-year war!”
There is every reason to think that if this plan to stop in Lithuania had been carried out, the complacent autocrat of Russia would have been brought to agreement and peace by one measure or another. But Napoleon loses patience, leaves Vitebsk and moves forward. True, he decides to go only to Smolensk, “the key of two roads - to St. Petersburg and Moscow, which must be captured in order to be able to march on both capitals at once in the spring.” In Smolensk he is going to rest, finally arrange everything, and in the spring of 1813, if Russia does not sign peace, finish her off! But, contrary to this, the French army leaves Smolensk and moves forward! In Moscow, the agony of a huge enterprise was about to begin, the participants of which were tired, and the leader had lost his head - there is no other way to express Napoleon’s behavior towards Alexander, behavior that was not only humiliating, but as if calculated to betray the difficulty and hopelessness of his situation: and by , and directly he writes letters with pleasantries, with assurances of friendship, devotion and brotherly love; sends generals with new peace proposals without receiving an answer to the old ones: “I need peace,” he says to Lauriston, who is sent on such a delicate mission to the Russian camp, “peace at all costs - save only honor!”
Permission to rob and anger at the inability to stop it; intention to march on St. Petersburg, i.e. to the north just before the beginning of winter; an order to purchase in a completely devastated, scorched region a huge amount of provisions and fodder, as well as 20,000 horses - all these are facts bordering on ridicule.
After reverse movement, with his calculated slowness to preserve the goods looted by the soldiers, which gave the Russians the opportunity to warn the French troops and block their path; the division of the army into separate independent detachments, one after another beaten, almost exterminated; an order for the front troops to systematically burn out all the surrounding areas of the route - to the direct detriment of the rest of the army; finally, a sacrilegious attitude towards the religion of the country, indulgence in the desecration of temples, murders, starvation of any people who came to hand under the name of “prisoners” - all these are actions that caused terrible manifestations of revenge on the part of the embittered population, actions about which “the legend is fresh” , but which are “hard to believe.”
Here and there, as at Krasnoe and Berezina, sparks of the great commander’s brilliant self-awareness still shine, but these individual manifestations of fortitude and military talent, these last rays of the setting sun are no longer able to prevent the greatest pogrom represented by history...”
(From the book by Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin “Napoleon I in Russia” (with an explanatory description of the paintings), 1899)

Napoleon's army. What was Napoleon’s “Grand Army” (that was now its official name)? In the period from 1802 to 1805. Napoleon destroyed the previous 13 front-line armies and created a single army with approximately 350 thousand people (by 1812 total representatives put under arms by Napoleon different countries was about 1 million people with all auxiliary and secondary units). Each of the links of this single military mechanism had clearly defined tasks and functions. Unlike the feudal armies of Austria and Russia, Napoleon did not have corporal punishment, and his soldiers were well trained and armed. Approximately a quarter of them were veterans, drafted into the army during the period of the Republic, who went through the Italian and Egyptian campaigns with Napoleon and were infinitely devoted to their emperor. Was excellent too officer corps Great Army. By 1805, approximately half the officer corps came from the ranks. This ratio was not unusual, since promotion in Napoleon’s army required not connections and noble ancestors, but courage, diligence and intelligence. In 1805 there was no shortage of good, experienced officers in the Grand Army. Distinctive feature The composition of the highest military leaders was youth. The average age of Napoleonic marshals was 44. Among them, for example, 62-year-old J.M.F. was considered a veteran. Serurier, on the contrary, was considered a “boy” by 34-year-old J. Lann; the age of the generals ranged from 29 to 58 years, and average age there are about 40 colonels. For comparison: in the Austrian army, the average age of a commanding Areopagus was much higher than seventy.

Napoleonic Guard. The elite unit of the Great Army was undoubtedly the Guard. This connection developed gradually over a number of years. In 1805, the number of guards was determined by researchers to be 12 thousand people. By the time of the confrontation with the third coalition, the core of the imperial guard were the “grumblers” - the embodiment of the spirit of the Great Army - horse grenadiers, rangers, lancers, dragoons, united by the name “old guard”. Serving in the Guard, Napoleon's favorite brainchild, was a great honor and entailed significant benefits, but enlistment in the Guards required at least five years of service and participation in two campaigns. At the same time, access to the guard was open to everyone; suffice it to say that the number of the imperial guard continuously grew and in 1812 amounted to at least 50 thousand people. All units of the Grand Army were superbly trained and tactically prepared.

French cavalry under Napoleon I
(from left to right): cuirassier, dragoon,
horse huntsman, gendarme, Mameluke, hussar.

Napoleon's plan. New strategy war, in as soon as possible thought out by Bonaparte, was possible with the coordinated, painstaking and quick work of the general staff. According to the plan of the French emperor, the Grand Army of about 200 thousand soldiers was supposed to move along the shortest route to the Danube, along the way to be replenished with 25 thousand Bavarians, bypass and defeat the army of Field Marshal K. Mack, and then fall on the Russians. This offensive was supported by three more armies. A. Massena was supposed to pin down the troops of Archduke Charles in Italy, General L. Givion Saint-Cyr was supposed to forestall a possible British landing in the Naples area, and General J. Brun, remaining with a corps of thirty thousand in the Boulogne camp, insured Napoleon’s rear from a possible enemy landing in the English Channel region.

Pedants in Austrian General Staff calculated that the movement of the Great Army to the theater of military operations would take 64 days, but at the same time they forgot (!), when calculating the movement schedule of the Russian army, to take into account the difference of 12 days between the European Gregorian calendar and the Julian calendar adopted in Russia. As a result, Napoleon covered the entire route in 35 days, and the Russian army was in a hurry, exhausted, but was clearly late.

Read also other topics Part V “The struggle for leadership in Europe at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries.” section “West, Russia, East at the end XVIII-early XIX century":

Today we will talk about such a topic as the size of Napoleon’s army. I will not give any special calculations. I'll just look at everything known facts from point of view common sense. All quotes will be from Wiki. The numbers are approximate, because historians themselves are still arguing about them. The main thing is their order.
So: Napoleon concentrated his main forces in 3 groups, which, according to the plan, were supposed to encircle and destroy piece by piece the armies of Barclay and Bagration. The left (218 thousand people) was headed by Napoleon himself, the central (82 thousand people) - his stepson, Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, the right (78 thousand people) - younger brother in the Bonaparte family, King of Westphalia Jerome Bonaparte. In addition to the main forces, Jacques Macdonald's corps of 32.5 thousand people was positioned against Wittgenstein on the left flank. , and in the south - the right flank - the allied corps of Karl Schwarzenberg, numbering 34 thousand people. .

In total, the main military operations against our army were carried out by 3 groups total number 378 thousand people.

Our strengths:

The blow of Napoleon's army was taken upon the troops stationed on western border: 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and 2nd Army of Bagration, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volyn (northwest of present-day Ukraine) was located the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns), which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, the Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian General Shteingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located further from the border.

Irregular Cossack troops According to the lists, there were 117 thousand light cavalry, but in reality 20-25 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.

On our side, there were about 153 thousand people at the forefront of the main attack.

Let's not be distracted by minor skirmishes and move straight to Borodino. :

On August 26 (September 7) near the village of Borodino (125 km west of Moscow) a largest battle Patriotic War 1812 between the Russian and French armies. The numbers of armies were comparable - 130-135 thousand for Napoleon versus 110-130 thousand for Kutuzov .
And here there are immediate mismatches. Everything is fine on our side. There were 153 left, 110-130 left, plus or minus back and forth, a trip from the border, small battles with the French, sick people, stragglers, accidents and all that. Everything is within the limits of logic.
But with the French it’s not like that. At first there were 378, but only 135 arrived in Moscow. No, it’s clear that the French also had losses, and not small ones. And they had nowhere to get replacements from. And garrisons had to be left in the cities. But somehow this doesn’t fit into the 243 thousand people, there’s a difference.
Moreover, it was the decisive battle in this war. Napoleon himself craved it as much as he could. The French should have attacked by default. And now any schoolchild knows that this requires, first of all, numerical superiority. But it was practically not there. Despite the fact that an extra 50 thousand would solve all the problems of the French without question.
Go ahead. We all know that during the battle Napoleon never brought his last reserve into battle - the old guard. But this could decide the course of the battle and the entire war. What was he afraid of? After all, even according to the most pessimistic calculations, he still had at least 100 thousand people in his reserves. Or maybe, in fact, the old guard was his last reserve?
Napoleon failed to win at Borodino.
After a bloody 12-hour battle, the French, at the cost of 30-34 thousand killed and wounded, pushed back the left flank and center of the Russian positions, but were unable to develop the offensive. The Russian army also suffered heavy losses(40 - 45 thousand killed and wounded). There were almost no prisoners on either side. On September 8, Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army.
And here the numbers don’t add up. Logically, the losses of the attacking side should be at least equal to the losses of the defending side. And taking into account the fact that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, his losses should be greater than ours.
Go ahead. Ours left Moscow and retreated to the south. Napoleon stayed in Moscow for more than a month. Why didn’t any reinforcements come to him during this time? Again, where are these 243 thousand people who could decide the course of the war?
The French army was literally melting before our eyes. It got to the point that they simply couldn’t even overthrow Miloradovich near Tarutino. They no longer had the strength to do so. This is evidenced by the very fact of retreat from Moscow. In the end, it was possible to make a breakthrough to the North. Moreover, back in September, when the weather was relatively good and the French still had strength. And there, in the north, there are many rich cities that were practically not covered by troops. After all, there is St. Petersburg, the capital of the Empire. A rich city with large supplies of food. But apparently there was no strength at all.
You know what happened next.

According to the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5,111 officers, 26,950 lower ranks had passed through East Prussia from the Great Army, “all in a very pitiful condition.” To these 30 thousand must be added approximately 6 thousand soldiers (returned to the French army) from the corps of General Rainier and Marshal MacDonald, operating in the northern and southern directions. Many of those who returned to Königsberg, according to Count Segur, died of illness upon reaching safe territory.
If you take out the 243 thousand difference that I mentioned above, then everything fits together. 135 thousand at Borodino, minus losses of 40-45 thousand, minus deserters, minus those killed in battles during the retreat from Moscow, minus those who simply froze and died of hunger, prisoners, minus secret weapon in the form of Russian partisans, this is how these 36 thousand people turn out. In general, Napoleon's total forces at first most likely amounted to no more than 200 thousand people. Moreover, in all directions, when joining Russia. This is evidenced by Napoleon’s persistent desire to win the war during one general battle and, preferably, on the border. He didn’t have the strength for a protracted company, he didn’t. And his entire campaign is essentially an adventure.

There is nothing complicated in these calculations. Everything is within the limits of common sense.

In fact, the same thing is written on Wiki:

There is evidence (in particular, General Berthesen (French) Russian) that the actual strength of the 1st line of the Grand Army was only about half of its payroll, that is, no more than 235 thousand people, and that the commanders when submitting reports hid the true composition of their units. It is noteworthy that the Russian intelligence data of that time also gave this number

So I essentially didn’t write anything new.



Related publications: