Capture of Plevna by Russian troops. Siege of Plevna: great victory of the Russian army

140 years ago, on September 11-12, 1877, the third assault on Plevna took place. During the stubborn and bloody battle, the Russian-Romanian troops achieved some successes. The breakthrough of Skobelev’s detachment on September 11 in the southern direction could have decided the outcome of the battle in favor of the Russian army. But the Russian high command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev’s detachment with reserves. As a result, the Turks counterattacked the next day and drove our troops back. The third assault on the Turkish fortress ended in the defeat of the allies.

Preparing the assault

Simultaneously with organizing the attack on Lovcha, the Russian high command was preparing a new assault on Plevna. They planned to throw the Russian-Romanian Western detachment against the Turkish stronghold: 52.1 thousand Russians and 316 guns, 32 thousand Romanians and 108 guns. Total - 84.1 thousand people 424 guns. The army of the Turkish commander Osman Pasha numbered 32 thousand people and 70 guns. The Allies had great superiority in manpower and artillery. However, the task was very difficult. The Turks turned Plevna into a strong fortified area, consisting of a system of redoubts and trenches. The approaches to the fortifications were shot through. The most powerful fortifications were in the northeast and south.

The unsuccessful experience of the first two assaults on Plevna showed that it was impossible to take the fortress without first destroying the enemy defenses. Therefore, it was decided to subject enemy positions to heavy bombardment and only then launch an assault. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy fortifications, suppressing Turkish artillery, and demoralizing the garrison. The general idea of using artillery was stated as follows: “Deploy strong artillery, including 20 siege weapons, and carry out preliminary infantry attacks, prolonged shelling of enemy fortifications, at the same time gradually approaching the enemy infantry position, supporting it by advancing to close range masses of field artillery and, having completely defeated the enemy fortifications and artillery with the mass of our artillery shells, then attack with infantry.” However, it was impossible to solve this problem, since there were no large-caliber guns or ammunition for them to destroy the Turkish fortifications. But the Russian command did not take this circumstance into account. Thus, serious mistakes were made already at the planning stage.

At 6 o'clock on August 26 (September 7), 1877, artillery preparation began. It lasted four days, until August 29 (September 10). On the right flank, 36 Romanian and 46 Russian guns took part in it. In the center are 48 Russian guns. No preparations were made on the left flank. The fire was directed at the most important fortifications of Plevna, but it was not effective enough. The artillery was unable to destroy the redoubts and trenches and disrupt the enemy’s defense system. At night they approached Turkish fortifications and the next day continued shelling enemy positions. Again, no tangible results were achieved. During the shelling, the Turks left the fortifications for shelter or to the rear, and returned at night and corrected all the damage.

On August 27 (September 8), Romanian troops captured the enemy’s forward trench at the Grivitsky redoubt. Of great importance was the advance of Russian troops on the left flank, where two ridges of the Green Mountains were occupied on the southern approaches to Plevna. A cavalry detachment under the command of General Loshkarev advanced towards the fortified camp from the west. Attempts by Turkish troops to counterattack to push the enemy back to their original position did not achieve their goal.

On August 28 (September 9) artillery preparation continued. The prolonged shelling of the fortress led to a large consumption of ammunition. “Although our batteries have moved forward,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “and are generally operating successfully, a positive result is not yet noticeable, and meanwhile the chief of artillery, Prince Masalsky, is already complaining about the excessive consumption of charges and the difficulty of replenishing them in a timely manner. The flying and moving parks barely have time to deliver.” General Zotov gave instructions not to rush too much into the assault on the enemy’s fortified area, but to “patiently let the artillery do its job of destroying barriers, moral exhaustion and material disorganization of the defender.” It was decided to continue to bring the batteries closer to enemy positions, where the terrain allows for continued artillery preparation for some more time. However, four days of intensive artillery preparation did not produce serious results. Nevertheless, at the military council on August 29 (September 10), it was decided to begin the assault the next day.

Thus, on August 26 (September 7) - August 29 (September 10), Russian and Romanian guns fired at Turkish fortifications. Despite the duration of the artillery preparation and the large number of shells fired, it was not possible to inflict significant losses on the Turkish garrison; the damage to the Plevna fortifications was also insignificant; the Turks easily restored the damaged buildings in between shelling of their positions.

By this time, the allied forces were covering Plevna from the north, east and south. The right wing consisted of Romanian troops, with the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions on the heights north and north-east of Grivica, and the 2nd Division in reserve. In the center, between Grivitsa and Radishevo, was the 9th Corps, and between Radishevo and Tuchenitsky Stream - the 4th Corps. The left wing was made up of the detachment of Prince Imereti, which occupied the area between the Tuchenitsky stream and the village of Krishin. The general reserve of the Western Detachment was located behind the 4th Corps south of Radishevo.

Romanian troops with part of the forces of the 9th Army Corps (1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division) were supposed to attack from the northeast, with the aim of capturing the Grivitsky redoubts. The troops of the 4th Corps were given the task of attacking Plevna from the southeast, directing their main efforts to capture the Omar Bey Tabiy redoubt. The detachment of General M.D. Skobelev, allocated from the troops of Prince Imereti, was supposed to attack the enemy from the south. The assault was scheduled to begin at 3 p.m. The artillery was given the following tasks: “At dawn, from all batteries, open the most intense fire on enemy fortifications and continue it until 9 o’clock in the morning. At 9 o'clock, simultaneously and suddenly stop all firing at the enemy. At 11 o'clock in the afternoon, re-open increased artillery fire and continue it until one o'clock in the afternoon. From an hour to 2.5 o'clock, stop again on all batteries, and at 2.5 o'clock again begin an intensified cannonade, stopping it only on those batteries whose action can be impeded by the advancing troops."

The disadvantage of the operation plan was that the disposition was sent out only a few hours before the assault began, and the troops did not have enough time to carefully organize the attack. The direction of the main attack was also chosen incorrectly (as during previous assaults). The Allies planned to storm Plevna from the three most fortified sides. The opportunity to carry out a roundabout maneuver and attack the Turkish garrison from the western direction, where the Turks had almost no fortifications, was not used. The day of the third assault was also chosen poorly due to weather conditions. It rained all night and half a day on August 30 (September 11), 1877, then it gave way to drizzling rain. The soil was soaked, which prevented the movement of artillery and troops, and visibility was poor. The assault had to be postponed. But it was the royal name day, and no one dared to make such a proposal. In his memoirs, the former chairman of the Committee of Ministers P. A. Valuev wrote that “if not for the 30s, we would not have stormed Plevna.”

Storm

At 6 o'clock on August 30 (September 11), 1877, artillery preparation began. Thick fog covered the battlefield and hampered the artillerymen. As a result, the good plan for the use of artillery on this day could not be fully implemented. The artillery was unable to fully support the advancing infantry.

On the right flank, at 15:00, Romanian troops launched an attack on two Grivitsky redoubts, which were located about 400 meters from each other. Suffering heavy losses from rifle and artillery fire, the Romanians attacked the fortifications three times, but were unsuccessful. The unfired Romanian soldiers, having encountered stubborn enemy resistance, were at a loss. Then the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General M.V. Rodionov was brought forward to help them. With the arrival of the Russians, the Romanians perked up and went into battle again. Russian-Romanian troops launched a fourth attack and, at the cost of heavy losses, captured Grivitsky redoubt No. 1. The Turks tried to recapture the redoubt, but were driven back. The Allies were unable to advance further. The Turks took measures to strengthen defense in this direction. “The Grivitsky redoubt remained behind us,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “but the Turks managed to build new fortifications against it, while ours, having settled in the redoubt, did nothing all day to firmly establish themselves in it, and did not even bring artillery into it."

In the central sector, due to an error, the attack began not at 15:00, as was the plan of the operation, but around noon. Russian troops came under heavy fire from the Omar redoubt. The Russian command consistently threw regiment after regiment into battle, but without success. Russian troops suffered heavy losses - about 4.5 thousand people. As a result, the Russian regiments went on the attack at different times, entered the battle in parts, and acted frontally. Such attacks were easily repelled by the enemy. The infantry offensive itself was poorly prepared by artillery. The strongest Turkish fortification in this direction, the Omar redoubt, was not destroyed.

Battle on the Romanian part of the redoubt at the village. Grivitsa. G. Dembitsky

The Russian troops achieved the greatest success on the left wing, where Skobelev’s detachment operated. Here the enemy occupied positions that the chief of staff of the Western detachment and its de facto leader, General P. D. Zotov, considered the “strategic-tactical key” of Plevna. They stretched from southwest to northeast, from a group of redoubts near the village of Krishin to the Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga redoubts. Ahead of this position, Turkish troops occupied the third ridge of the Green Mountains. Skobelev considered the main task to be the capture of the Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga redoubts (they were later called Skobelevsky). At dawn, artillery preparation began, and at 10 o'clock our troops went on the offensive and knocked down the enemy from the third ridge of the Green Mountains. The Turks retreated.

General Skobelev began the main task - the assault on the two main Turkish fortifications in this direction. True, the nature of the terrain was not conducive to the success of the Russian troops. In order to reach the redoubts, the advancing troops had to descend along the gentle northern slope of the third ridge into a ravine in which the Zelenogorsk stream flowed on steep banks inaccessible to artillery. There was only one bridge across the stream. Having crossed the stream, it was necessary to climb a steep slope to a height where strong enemy fortifications No. 1 (Kavanlyk) and No. 2 (Isa-Aga) were located, which were connected by a deep trench. In front of the redoubts, on the slope, rifle trenches were located.

At about 3 p.m., Skobelev’s troops launched an assault on enemy fortifications. The Vladimir and Suzdal regiments advancing in the first echelon suffered heavy losses from enemy fire and lay down near the Zelenogorsk stream. Skobelev launched the second echelon - the Revel Regiment - into the attack. Our troops attacked again, but this attack was stopped by heavy fire from the Turkish army. Skobelev launched his last, third echelon - the Libavsky regiment and two rifle battalions - into the attack. And he himself led the attack. Our troops reached the enemy, hand-to-hand combat began. At 16:30, Russian troops took the Kavanlyk redoubt; after a stubborn battle, at 18:00 the Isa-Aga redoubt was occupied. Turkish troops, having received reinforcements from the reserve, made several attempts to knock out the enemy, but to no avail. Shootings continued throughout the night.

In fact, Skobelev’s detachment opened the road to Plevna itself. There were no longer any Turkish fortifications in front of the detachment's troops and the city. A situation was created in which the further development of the offensive gave the entire city into the hands of the Russians. Panic began in the ranks of the Turkish army; the enemy soldiers were tired of the fierce battle. However, Skobelev’s detachment also needed serious reinforcements. The soldiers had been fighting since the morning, they were tired, many had not slept for 2-4 days. The detachment lost a lot of people, the troops had to be brought together into combined teams with random commanders at their head. There were mountains of corpses everywhere. There was a groan from the wounded, whom there was no one to remove. Ammunition was running low. All reserves have been used. The soldiers could not even dig in, since there was no entrenching tool, but “despite fatigue, hunger, fatigue from battle, the soldiers felt the need to dig in and did not spare the rest of their strength for this. They dug, or rather, picked the ground with bayonets, cutlasses, scraped with mannequins, raked with their hands, just to somehow protect themselves from fire on three sides” (Kuropatkin. Actions of General Skobelev’s detachments in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1-878, part .I.). Even corpses of their own and Turkish soldiers were used to construct barriers.

Further developments depended on who would more accurately assess the situation and direct reserves to this area. Skobelev demanded that reinforcements be sent in a timely manner, but this was categorically refused. Neither the commander-in-chief nor Nepokochitsky agreed to expose the Bolgarenskoe highway; they did not believe that the Turks would dare to expose other directions in order to push back Skobelev’s detachment. The Russian high command had the opportunity to regroup forces to the south and take the city itself. But the Russian command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev’s detachment with reserves, believing that the assault had failed and there was no point in supporting the success of the Russian general. Although by introducing fresh reserves on the Russian left flank, it was still possible to correct the errors of the attack plan and the failure of the troops of the right flank and center, achieving, albeit at an unnecessarily high cost, a decisive victory. Thus, the Russian command did not understand the benefits of the current situation created in connection with the breakthrough of the flank of the Turkish defense and Skobelev’s access to Plevna itself, and did not take advantage of the real opportunity to win a decisive victory. The breakthrough of fresh Russian troops into Plevna itself decided the outcome of the battle for the entire fortified area. Thus, the Russian command itself abandoned a sure chance of victory.

On August 31 (September 12), 1877, there were no active hostilities on the right flank and in the center. The Turks launched one attack on Grivitsky redoubt No. 1, but it was repelled. The Turkish commander-in-chief Osman Pasha, unlike the Russian command, correctly assessed the situation and, given the great danger from Skobelev’s detachment, which occupied two of the most important fortifications of the Turkish army near Plevna itself, decided to throw large forces against it. Osman Pasha almost completely strengthened his right flank, transferring 15 fresh battalions to this direction, taken from various defense sectors and from the general reserve of the Plevna garrison. The fulfillment of the Turkish commander's plan was facilitated by the inaction of the main forces of the Russian-Romanian army in other directions. At the same time, Skobelev’s detachment was not even supported by strong reinforcements so that he would retain these fortifications in the hands of the Russian army, which would help in the future offensive. Krylov, who temporarily commanded the 4th Corps, sent only the Shuisky regiment, exhausted by the battle on September 11 and weak (1,300 people), to the redoubts. In addition, the regiment was late; it had to be used only to cover the retreat of Skobelev’s detachment. Together with Shuisky, Krylov also sent the Yaroslavl regiment, but Zotov took him into his general reserve.

On the morning of August 31 (September 12), the Turks launched a decisive counterattack on the Skobelev redoubts. Our troops repulsed four Turkish attacks. Then the Turkish commander ordered the fifth attack to pull together all reserves, extremely reducing the composition of the garrisons in the trenches and redoubts in all other positions. To inspire the counterattacking units, they were ordered to carry a green banner in front of them, and the mullahs in the camps to chant prayers. Behind the attacking troops, Osman Pasha placed a battery and two cavalry regiments, ordering them to shoot at anyone who decided to retreat.

Meanwhile, after repelling the fourth Turkish attack, the position of the troops of the Russian left wing became hopeless. Skobelev in his report described the state of the redoubts as follows: “The redoubts presented a terrible picture by this time (3.5 hours in the afternoon). A mass of corpses of Russians and Turks lay in piles. The interior of the redoubt was especially filled with them. In the deep trench that connected the redoubts, dozens of people were killed by enemy longitudinal shots at once, and piles of corpses filling the trench alternated with still living defenders. At redoubt No. 2, part of the parapet facing the city of Plevna was made up of corpses. At Redoubt No. 1, three guns of the 5th Battery of the 3rd Artillery Brigade were partly mangled and stripped of their servants and horses. I ordered the remaining two guns of the 2nd Artillery Brigade, which also lost their servants, to be taken away earlier. The gun stationed in the redoubt was also knocked out. I took the rings out of the gun in case they fell into the hands of the Turks.” The position of the Russians in the rear of the redoubts was also difficult. Kuropatkin wrote about it this way: “The section of the position between the third ridge and the redoubts also presented a painful picture: thousands of wounded and corpses lay in this area. Hundreds of bodies... lying mixed with Turkish corpses, decomposed and contaminated the air."

The final fifth attack at 16:00 was led by the Turkish commander Osman Pasha himself. During the defense of the Kavanlyk redoubt, its commandant, Major F. Gortalov, died heroically. However, despite the heroism and perseverance of the Russian soldiers, the Turkish army was able to recapture the redoubts. The Russian troops retreated in an orderly manner, carrying away the wounded.

General M.D. Skobelev on horseback. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburgsky

Results

Thus, the third assault on Plevna, despite the high military valor, dedication and perseverance of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. Allied forces suffered serious losses. 13 thousand Russians and 3 thousand Romanians died. The losses were especially serious on the left wing: the troops lost 6.5 thousand people killed and wounded, which amounted to 44% of officers and 41% of soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the troops of Skobelev and Imeretinsky. The Turks estimated their losses at 3 thousand people. Apparently they underestimated it.

The failure of the third assault was caused by a number of reasons, based on the mistakes of the Russian high command. Many mistakes were “inherited” from the first and second assaults on Plevna, that is, they did not bother to work on the mistakes. Among the reasons for the failure of the assault: poor reconnaissance of the location of the Turkish army and its defense system; underestimation of enemy forces and means; a patterned attack in the same directions on the most fortified areas of the Turkish fortified area; lack of maneuver of troops to attack Plevna from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications; refusal to transfer the main efforts to a more promising direction, where Skobelev’s detachment successfully broke through; lack of interaction between groupings of troops advancing in different directions (when some troops advanced, others stood) and clear control of all allied forces. In addition, they were unable to organize full-fledged artillery preparation with the use of large-caliber guns - the Turkish fortifications were almost not damaged during the shelling, the Turks were quickly restored. They chose the wrong day for the attack.

As historian N.I. Belyaev noted: “The Third Plevna clearly showed that during the 2.5 months of the war, the Russian high command learned nothing, did not take into account any of its previous mistakes, and managed to add new ones to the old ones. Ultimately, it is necessary to admit that the third assault on Plevna was not based on real calculation, but was built only based on the valor of the Russian soldier, on the unexpected appearance of favorable circumstances, on chance" (N.I. Belyaev. Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878).

The lack of a unified command played a negative role. Formally, the Western detachment was headed by the Romanian Prince Karl, but in fact the head of the troops was the chief of staff of the detachment, General Zotov. The Romanian troops were under the command of their general Cernata. Near Plevna were Russian Emperor Alexander II, Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, and Commander-in-Chief of the Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Everything did not allow for clear control of the allied forces.

The unsuccessful outcome of the third assault on Plevna forced the Russian high command to change the way they fought the enemy. On September 1 (13), Tsar Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether it should retreat beyond the Osma River. The chief of staff of the Western detachment, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, and the chief of army artillery, Lieutenant General Prince N. F. Masalsky, spoke in favor of retreat. The continuation of the fight for the fortress was advocated by the assistant chief of staff of the Danube Army, Major General K.V. Levitsky and Minister of War D.A. Milyutin.

The situation was not as dangerous as some generals saw it. The allied Russian-Romanian troops in the Balkans numbered 277 thousand people. The Ottoman Empire had an army of 350 thousand, but could only field about 200 thousand people against the allies. The main group of the Russian army, consisting of more than 100 thousand people with 470 guns, was located at Kalafat, Lovchi and Plevna. The enemy opposed these troops with 70 thousand soldiers and 110 guns stationed in the area of Vidin, Orhaniye and Plevna. Therefore, Milyutin insisted on continuing operations in the Plevna area. At the same time, he proposed a new way to fight the enemy. In his opinion, it was necessary to abandon direct assaults on Plevna and break enemy resistance through a blockade. Milyutin correctly noted that the active army, even without large-caliber artillery of mounted fire, would not be able to reliably suppress and destroy enemy fortifications, therefore, victory in a frontal assault is unlikely. In the event of a complete siege, quick success can be achieved, since the Turkish army does not have the reserves to conduct a long-term fight. Indeed, the enemy was already in a bad position. On September 2 (14), 1877, Osman Pasha reported to the high command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements, and losses had greatly weakened the garrison. The Turkish commander noted that the army was put “in the need to retreat, but it is very difficult to carry out the retreat.”

As a result, Alexander II supported Milyutin's point of view. There have been changes in the leadership of the Western detachment. Engineer-General E.I. Totleben, summoned from St. Petersburg, was appointed assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian Prince Charles. He was a hero of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. General Zotov returned to command of the 4th Corps. The entire cavalry was subordinated to the brave and decisive I.V. Gurko. These changes improved troop control. In addition, the newly arrived Guards Corps joined the Western detachment: 1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, Guards Rifle Brigade. A proper siege of Plevna began, which ultimately led to victory.

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Fall of Plevna

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
Capture of the Grivitsky redoubt near Plevna

The capture of Plevna by Russian troops was a key event in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which predetermined the successful completion of the campaign on the Balkan Peninsula. The fighting near Plevna lasted five months and is considered one of the most tragic pages in Russian military history.

After crossing the Danube at Zimnitsa, the Russian Danube Army (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Elder)) advanced its Western detachment (9th Corps, Lieutenant General) to the Turkish fortress of Nikopol to capture it and secure the right flank of the main forces. After capturing the fortress on July 4 (16), Russian troops did not take active action for two days to capture Plevna, located 40 km from it, the garrison of which consisted of 3 Turkish infantry battalions and 4 guns. But on July 1 (13) the Turkish corps began moving out of Vidin to strengthen the garrison. It consisted of 19 battalions, 5 squadrons and 9 batteries - 17 thousand bayonets, 500 sabers and 58 guns. Having passed a forced march of 200 km in 6 days, at dawn on July 7 (19), Osman Pasha reached Plevna and took up defensive positions on the outskirts of the city. On July 6 (18), the Russian command sent a detachment of up to 9 thousand people with 46 guns (lieutenant general) to the fortress. On the evening of the next day, parts of the detachment reached the distant approaches to Plevna and were stopped by Turkish artillery fire. On the morning of July 8 (20), Russian troops launched an offensive, which initially developed successfully, but was soon stopped by enemy reserves. Schilder-Schuldner stopped the fruitless attacks, and the Russian troops, having suffered heavy losses (up to 2.8 thousand people), returned to their original position. On July 18 (30), the second assault on Plevna took place, which also failed and cost the Russian troops about 7 thousand people. This failure forced the command to suspend offensive operations in the Constantinople direction.

The Turks quickly restored the destroyed defensive structures, erected new ones and turned the closest approaches to Plevna into a heavily fortified area with more than 32 thousand troops defending it with 70 guns. This group posed a threat to the Russian crossing of the Danube, located 660 km from Plevna. Therefore, the Russian command decided to make a third attempt to capture Plevna. The Western detachment was increased more than 3 times (84 thousand people, 424 guns, including Romanian troops - 32 thousand people, 108 guns). Emperor Alexander II, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the Minister of War were with the detachment, which made unified command and control of the troops difficult. The planning and preparation of the allied forces for the offensive were carried out in a formulaic manner, the attacks were planned to be carried out in the same directions, and the interaction between the troops attacking in each of them was not organized. Before the start of the offensive on August 22 (September 3), Lovcha was captured, and on the right flank and in the center of the battle formation of the Western detachment, a 4-day artillery preparation was carried out, in which 130 guns took part, but the fire was ineffective - it was not possible to destroy the Turkish redoubts and trenches and disrupt the enemy's defense system.

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
Artillery battle near Plevna. Battery of siege weapons on the Grand Duke's Mountain

In the middle of the day on August 30 (September 11), a general offensive began. Romanian troops and the Russian infantry brigade of the 5th Infantry Division struck from the northeast, the Russian 4th Corps - from the southeast, and a detachment (up to 2 infantry brigades) - from the south. The regiments went on the attack at different times, entered the battle in parts, acted frontally and were easily repelled by the enemy. On the right flank, Russian-Romanian troops, at the cost of heavy losses, captured Grivitsky redoubt No. 1, but did not advance further. The Russian 4th Corps was not successful and suffered heavy losses.

Henryk Dembitsky.
Battle on the Romanian part of the redoubt at the village. Grivitsa

Only Skobelev’s detachment in the 2nd half of the day managed to capture the redoubts of Kouvanlyk and Isa-Aga and open the way to Plevna. But the Russian high command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev’s detachment with reserves, which the next day, having repelled 4 strong counterattacks of the Turks, was forced to retreat under pressure from superior enemy forces to its original position. The third attack on Plevna, despite the high military valor, dedication and perseverance of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure.

Diorama "Battle of Plevna" from the Military Museum in Bucharest, Romania

The failure of all attempts to capture Plevna was due to a number of reasons: poor intelligence of the Turkish troops and their defense system; underestimation of enemy forces and means; a patterned attack in the same directions on the most fortified areas of Turkish positions; the lack of maneuver of troops to attack Plevna from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications, as well as to transfer the main efforts to a more promising direction; lack of interaction between groupings of troops advancing in different directions and clear control of all allied forces.

The unsuccessful outcome of the offensive forced the Russian high command to change the way they fought the enemy. On September 1 (13), Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether it should retreat beyond the Osma River. The chief of staff of the Western detachment, Lieutenant General, and the chief of artillery of the army, Lieutenant General Prince, spoke in favor of retreat. The continuation of the fight for the fortress was advocated by the assistant chief of staff of the Danube Army, Major General, and the Minister of War, Infantry General D.A. Milyutin. Their point of view was supported by Alexander II. The council participants decided not to retreat from Plevna, strengthen their positions and wait for reinforcements from Russia, after which it was planned to begin a blockade or a proper siege of the fortress and force it to capitulate. An engineer-general was appointed as assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian Prince Charles to lead the siege work. Arriving at the theater of military operations, Totleben came to the conclusion that the Plevna garrison was provided with food for only two months, and therefore could not withstand a prolonged blockade. The newly arrived Guards Corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, Guards Rifle Brigade) joined the Western Detachment.

In order to implement the plan developed by the Russian command, it was considered necessary to cut off communications between Osman Pasha’s army and the base in Orhaniye. The Turks firmly held three fortified points on the Sofia Highway, along which the Plevna garrison was supplied - Gorny and Dolny Dubnyaki and Telish. The Russian command decided to use Guard troops entrusted to the lieutenant general to capture them. On October 12 (24) and October 16 (28), after bloody battles, the guards occupied Gorny Dubnyak and Telish. On October 20 (November 1), Russian troops entered Dolny Dubnyak, abandoned by the Turks without a fight. On the same day, the advanced units of the 3rd Grenadier Division that arrived in Bulgaria approached the settlement north-west of Plevna - Mountain Metropolis, interrupting communications with Vidin. As a result, the fortress garrison was completely isolated.

On October 31 (November 12), the Turkish commander was asked to surrender, but he refused. By the end of November, the besieged garrison of Plevna found itself in a critical situation. Of the 50 thousand people who found themselves in Plevna after the annexation of the Dolny Dubnyak garrison, less than 44 thousand remained. Taking into account the deplorable state of the garrison troops, Osman Pasha convened a military council on November 19 (December 1). Its participants made a unanimous decision to fight their way out of Plevna. The Turkish commander expected to cross to the left bank of the Vid River, strike at Russian troops in a northwest direction towards Magaletta, and then move, depending on the situation, to Vidin or Sofia.

By the end of November, the Plevna taxation detachment consisted of 130 thousand combatant lower ranks, 502 field and 58 siege guns. The troops were divided into six sections: 1st - Romanian General A. Cernat (consisted of Romanian troops), 2nd - Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener, 3rd - Lieutenant General P.D. Zotov, 4th - Lieutenant General M.D. Skobelev, 5th - Lieutenant General and 6th - Lieutenant General. A tour of the Plevna fortifications convinced Totleben that an attempt by the Turks to break through would most likely follow in the 6th sector.

On the night of November 27-28 (December 9-10), taking advantage of the darkness and bad weather, the Turkish army left its positions near Plevna and secretly approached the crossings of the Vid. By 5 o'clock in the morning, three brigades of Tahir Pasha's division moved to the left bank of the river. The troops were followed by convoys. Osman Pasha was also forced to take with him about 200 families from among the Turkish residents of Plevna and most of the wounded. Despite all the precautions taken, the crossing of the Turkish army turned out to be a complete surprise for the Russian command. At 7:30 the enemy quickly attacked the center of the position
6th section, occupied by 7 companies of the 9th Siberian Grenadier Regiment of the 3rd Grenadier Division. 16 Turkish battalions drove the Russian grenadiers out of the trenches, capturing 8 guns. By 8:30 the first line of Russian fortifications between the Dolny Metropol and the Dug Grave was broken through. The retreating Siberians tried to fortify themselves in the buildings scattered between the first and second lines of defense, but to no avail. At this moment, the 10th Little Russian Grenadier Regiment approached from the direction of the Mountain Metropolis and counterattacked the enemy. However, the heroic counterattack of the Little Russians failed - the regiment retreated with heavy losses. At about 9 o'clock the Turks managed to break through the second line of Russian fortifications.

Plan of the battle of Plevna on November 28 (December 10), 1877

The critical moment of the last Plevna battle had arrived. The entire area north of the Dug Grave was littered with the bodies of killed and wounded grenadiers of the Siberian and Little Russian regiments. Corps commander Ganetsky arrived on the battlefield to personally lead the troops. At the beginning of 11 o'clock, the long-awaited 2nd brigade of the 3rd Grenadier Division (11th Phanagorian and 12th Astrakhan regiments) appeared from the direction of the Mountain Metropolis. As a result of the ensuing counterattack, the Russian grenadiers recaptured the second line of fortifications occupied by the enemy. The 3rd brigade was supported by the approaching 7th Grenadier Samogitsky and 8th Grenadier Moscow regiments of the 2nd division.

Chapel-monument in honor of the grenadier,
killed in the battle of Plevna on November 28 (December 10), 1877

Pressed from the front and flanks, Turkish troops began to retreat to the first line of fortifications. Osman Pasha intended to wait for the arrival of the second division from the right bank of the Vid, but it was delayed due to the crossing of numerous convoys. By 12 noon the enemy was driven out of the first line of fortifications. As a result of the counterattack, Russian troops not only recaptured 8 guns captured by the Turks, but also captured 10 enemy ones.

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
The last battle near Plevna on November 28, 1877 (1889)

Lieutenant General Ganetsky, seriously fearing a new attack by the Turks, did not plan to pursue them. He ordered to occupy the forward fortifications, bring artillery here and wait for the enemy to attack. However, the intention of the commander of the Grenadier Corps - to stop the advancing troops - did not come true. The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division, which occupied the fortified position of the Dolne-Dubnyaksky detachment, seeing the retreat of the Turks, moved forward and began to envelop them from the left flank. Following her, the rest of the troops of the 6th section went on the offensive. Under the pressure of the Russians, the Turks at first slowly and in relative order retreated to Vid, but soon the retreating ones encountered their convoys. Panic began among the civilians following the convoys. At that moment Osman Pasha was wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Pertev Bey, commander of one of the two regiments covering the convoys, tried to stop the Russians, but to no avail. His regiment was overthrown, and the retreat of the Turkish army turned into a disorderly flight. Soldiers and officers, residents of Plevna, artillery pieces, carts, and pack animals crowded together at the bridges in a dense mass. The grenadiers approached the enemy at 800 steps, firing aimed rifle fire at him.

In the remaining areas of investment, the blocking troops also went on the offensive and, having captured the fortifications of the northern, eastern and southern fronts, occupied Plevna and reached the heights to the west of it. The 1st and 3rd brigades of the Turkish division of Adil Pasha, which covered the retreat of the main forces of Osman Pasha's army, laid down their arms. Surrounded on all sides by superior forces, Osman Pasha decided to surrender.

Osman Pasha presents a saber to Lieutenant General I.S. Ganetsky

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
The captured Osman Pasha, who commanded the Turkish troops in Plevna, is presented to His Imperial Majesty the Sovereign Emperor Alexander II
on the day of the capture of Plevna by Russian troops on November 29, 1877

10 generals, 2,128 officers, 41,200 soldiers surrendered; 77 guns were delivered. The fall of Plevna made it possible for the Russian command to free up more than 100 thousand people for an offensive across the Balkans.

Capture of Plevna from November 28 to 29, 1877
Lubok publishing house I.D. Sytin

In the fighting near Plevna, methods of encircling and blockading an enemy group were developed. The Russian army used new infantry techniques, whose rifle chains combined fire and movement, and used self-entrenchment when approaching the enemy. The importance of field fortifications, the interaction of infantry with artillery, the high efficiency of heavy artillery in fire preparation for an attack on fortified positions was revealed, and the possibility of controlling artillery fire when firing from closed positions was determined. The Bulgarian militia fought bravely as part of the Russian troops near Plevna.

In memory of the battles near Plevna, a mausoleum of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers, the Skobelevsky Park Museum, the historical museum “Liberation of Plevna in 1877” were built in the city, near Grivitsa - a mausoleum of Romanian soldiers and about 100 monuments in the vicinity of the fortress.

Skobelev Park in Plevna

In Moscow, at the Ilyinsky Gate, there is a monument-chapel to the Russian grenadiers who fell near Plevna. The chapel was built on the initiative of the Russian Archaeological Society and military personnel of the Grenadier Corps stationed in Moscow, who raised about 50 thousand rubles for its construction. The authors of the monument were the famous architect and sculptor V.I. Sherwood and engineer-colonel A.I. Lyashkin.

Monument to the heroes of Plevna in Moscow

Material prepared by the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The beginning of the siege. After the successful crossing of the Danube by Russian troops at Sistovo, the Turkish command on July 2 (14) began the transfer of Osman Pasha’s corps to Plevna from Vidin (northwest Bulgaria), which was tasked with striking the right flank of the Russian troops. On July 4, 1877, the 9th Army Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener captured the Nikopol fortress on the banks of the Danube north of Plevna.

The Russian command allocated a nine-thousand-strong detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner to occupy Plevna, which on the evening of July 7 reached the outskirts of the city and the next morning attacked Turkish positions. The 15,000-strong garrison of Plevna repelled scattered attacks by Russian regiments, inflicting serious losses on them (2.5 thousand people).

After the concentration of Kridener's entire corps (26 thousand soldiers, 140 guns) near the city, a second assault on Plevna was launched on July 18. By this time, Osman Pasha concentrated about 23 thousand people and 58 guns in the city. Kridener had no information about the Turkish forces, exaggerated their numbers and acted indecisively. The attacks were carried out from the east and southeast head-on against the most fortified areas, troops were brought into battle in parts. The assault ended in failure. Russian losses amounted to 7 thousand people, Turks - about 4 thousand people.

Plevna was of great strategic importance; its strong garrison threatened the crossings of the Danube and could attack the advancing Russian army in the flank and rear. Therefore, the Russian command postponed the transfer of the main forces through the Balkan Mountains (the Shipka Pass was captured on July 8) and during July-August concentrated an 83,000-strong army with 424 guns near Plevna, of which 32,000 people and 108 guns were from the allied Romanian army.

Third assault on Plevna. The Allies besieged Plevna from the south and east. On the right flank, opposite the Grivitsky redoubts, the Romanians settled down. From the east the city was besieged by Kridener's corps, from the southeast by General Krylov's 8th corps. In the southern direction there was a left-flank detachment of General M.D. Skobelev. From the north, the Turkish garrison was reliably covered by the heights of Yanyk-Bair, and from the west it was supplied along the Sofia-Plevna road. By the end of summer, the Turks increased the size of the Plevna garrison to 34 thousand people with 72 guns. The nominal commander of the allied army near Plevna was the Romanian king Carol I; in fact, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, was in charge. But near Plevna there was also the headquarters of the Russian Emperor Alexander II and the commander-in-chief of the entire Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Sr.

The third assault on Plevna took place on August 26-31. The Turks predicted the directions of attack of the Russian and Romanian troops and managed to hold their line of defense, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. The decisive day was August 30, when the Romanians, with the support of the Russian 18th Infantry Regiment, managed to capture one of the two Grivitsky redoubts. On the same day, Skobelev’s detachment, delivering an auxiliary attack, found a weak point in the Turkish positions, broke through their defenses in the Green Mountains area, captured the Issa and Kavanlyk redoubts and reached the southern outskirts of the city. The Turks hastily transferred reserves from the north and east against Skobelev.

On August 31, the Russian command did not take offensive actions and did not support Skobelev with reserves. As a result, under the pressure of superior forces, Skobelev’s detachment was forced to return to its original positions. In the third assault on Plevna, Russian and Romanian troops lost 16 thousand people, the Turks - about three thousand.

Siege and capture of Plevna. On September 1, it was decided to proceed to a thorough siege of Plevna, for the leadership of which the best specialist in siege work in Russia, engineer-general E. I. Totleben, was called in. To successfully conduct a siege, the Russians needed to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the Turks received reinforcements. To solve this problem, a strike detachment of General I.V. Gurko was created from the guards units. He managed to capture Gorny Dubnyak on October 12, Telish on October 16, Dolny Dubnyak on October 20 - strongholds on the Sofia road, thereby completely closing the blockade ring of the Pleven garrison, whose number by that time amounted to 50 thousand people.

The lack of food forced the Turkish commander Osman Pasha to attempt an independent liberation of Plevna. On November 28, having withdrawn troops from defensive positions, he attacked Russian troops northwest of Plevna. Units of the 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Divisions and the 5th Infantry Division of the Russian Army repelled the Turkish attack. Having lost 6 thousand soldiers and unable to escape from encirclement, Osman Pasha surrendered with 43 thousand soldiers. The fall of Plevna freed up a hundred thousand Russian-Romanian army for a subsequent offensive across the Balkans.

In the fighting near Plevna, forms and methods of besieging fortresses were further developed. The Russian army developed new methods of infantry combat tactics, a combination of movement and fire from rifle chains, and the use of infantry self-entrenchment in the offensive began. At Plevna, the importance of field fortifications, the interaction of infantry with artillery, the role of heavy artillery in preparing an attack on fortified positions was revealed, and the possibility of controlling artillery fire when firing from closed positions was determined. In memory of the battles for Plevna, a mausoleum was built in the city in memory of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers (1905), a park-museum of M. D. Skobelev (1907), and an artistic panorama complex “Liberation of Plevna in 1877.” In Moscow, at the Ilyinsky Gate, there is a monument to the grenadiers who fell near Plevna.

Based on materials from Internet resources

140th anniversary of the capture of Plevna. A significant date in the history of not only Russia, but also Bulgaria, where it is celebrated as “Day of Appreciation”!

The siege of Plevna is an episode of the Russian-Turkish War, which has more than once formed the basis of vivid stories. Turkish fortress on the Danube Plain, 35 km from the river. The Danube became the final point in a long and difficult relationship.

I suggest playing a question and answer game, those who are well familiar with the topic will awaken their “gray matter”, and someone will gain new knowledge, which is also not bad, agree! So - “7 QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CAPTURE OF PLEVNA.”

1. Who took part in the Russian-Turkish War and where did it all start?

The main opposing parties to this armed conflict were the Russian and Ottoman empires, respectively. Turkish troops supported Abkhaz, Dagestan and Chechen rebels, as well as the Polish Legion. Russia, in turn, was supported by the Balkans.

The reason for the start of the war was internal resistance in some Balkan countries under Turkish yoke. The brutally suppressed April uprising in Bulgaria forced some European countries (especially the Russian Empire) to show sympathy for Christians located in Turkey. Another reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the defeat of Serbia in the Serbo-Montenegrin-Turkish War and the failed Constantinople Conference.

2. How long did the Russian-Turkish war last?

The question is, of course, interesting, because The Russian-Turkish wars cover a huge period of 351 years (1568-1918) with interruptions, of course. But the most acute confrontation in Russian-Turkish relations occurred in the second half of the 19th century. During this period, the Crimean War and the last Russian-Turkish campaign of 1877-1878 took place, during which the siege of Plevna took place.

On April 24, 1877, the Russian Empire declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Russian troops included about 700 thousand people, the enemy army numbered about 281 thousand people. Despite the significant numerical superiority of the Russians, a significant advantage of the Turks was the possession and equipping of the army with modern weapons.

3. How did the last Russian-Turkish campaign take place?

This armed conflict was fought in two directions: Asian and European.

The Asian direction was to ensure the security of its own borders and the desire of the Russian Empire to shift the Turkish emphasis exclusively to the European theater of operations. The beginning of the countdown is considered to be the Abkhazian rebellion that occurred in May 1877. During operations in Transcaucasia, Russian troops captured many citadels, garrisons and fortresses. In the second half of the summer of 1877, hostilities were temporarily “frozen” for the reason that both sides were awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. Beginning in September, the Russians began to adhere to siege tactics.

The European direction developed with the introduction of Russian troops into Romania. This was done to eliminate the Danube fleet of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the crossings of the Danube.

The next stage in the advance of the Russian troops was the siege of Plevna, which began on July 20, 1877.

4. Siege of Plevna. How it was?

After the successful crossing of the Danube by Russian troops, the Turkish command began transferring to Plevna. In July 1877, the Russian corps captured the Nikopol fortress on the banks of the Danube north of Plevna.

The Russian command allocated another nine-thousandth detachment to occupy Plevna, which on the evening of July 20 reached the outskirts of the city and the next morning attacked Turkish positions. The Russian attacks were repelled.

After the entire Russian corps was concentrated near the city, a second assault on Plevna was launched. Since there was no information about the Turkish forces, the attacks were carried out hesitantly, which led to failure.

At this time, the Russian command postponed the transfer of the main forces through the Balkan Mountains (the Shipka Pass had already been captured) and during July-August concentrated an army near Plevna.

The Allies besieged Plevna from the south and east and the third assault began, it was decided to proceed to a thorough siege. The best siege specialist in Russia, engineer-general Totleben, was called in to provide guidance. The Russians cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the Turks received reinforcements and managed to capture strongholds, thereby completely closing the blockade ring.

On December 10, Osman Pasha, having removed his troops from defensive positions, attacked the Russian troops, but having lost 6 thousand soldiers and unable to escape from the encirclement, he surrendered.

5. Why is the capture of Plevna highlighted?

6. What was the result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878?

How do almost all wars end? Of course, there was a change in boundaries. The Russian Empire expanded to include Bessarabia, which was lost during the Crimean War. And this war also played a big role in international relations. It gave rise to a gradual shift away from confrontation between the Russian Empire and Great Britain for the reason that the countries began to focus more on their own interests (Russia was interested in the Black Sea, and England in Egypt).

7. In what types of art was the capture of Plevna reflected?

You know, this victory is increasingly being called forgotten, and it is culture and art that help keep this experience, dear in every sense, in the memory of generations. Architecture - Pleven Epic (panorama) - a museum in the city of Pleven, opened on December 10, 1977, the day when Pleven celebrated the 100th anniversary of its liberation. Architects Plamena Tsacheva and Ivo Petrov from Plevna.

Sculpture - Monument to the Heroes of Plevna in Moscow, sculptor Vladimir Iosifovich Sherwood.

Nemirovich-Danchenko V.I. “Skobelev. Personal memories and impressions."

Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev - military leader and strategist, general. Participant in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, liberator of Bulgaria. He went down in history with the nickname “White General,” and not only because he participated in battles in a white uniform and on a white horse. The Bulgarian people consider him a national hero. Master of words, journalist Vasily Ivanovich Nemirovich-Danchenko was personally acquainted with Skobelev and brilliantly conveyed the nuances of the era. The book was first published in 1884 and has been reprinted to this day.

Skritsky N.V. “Balkan Gambit. The Unknown War 1877-1878"

From the mouth of the military historian Skritsky, little-known and controversial facts of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, people and events that influenced the development of the situation are presented.

“... I prefer to sacrifice our lives for the benefit of the people and in defense of the truth, and with the greatest joy and happiness I am ready to shed blood rather than shamefully lay down my arms” (quoted by N.V. Skritsky “Balkan Gambit”).

Vasiliev B. L. “They were and were not”

A work of fiction - an epic novel - about the events of the last Russian-Turkish campaign. His works are distinguished by liveliness and sincerity. Book one, “Gentlemen Volunteers,” tells about the noble family of the Oleksins, whose young offspring are sent there among hundreds of volunteers. The second book is called “Gentlemen Officers”, here Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev becomes the key character... Boris Lvovich Vasiliev is a master of the historical novel!

In painting, the theme of the Balkan conflict was revealed in more detail by Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, a direct participant in the hostilities. You can read more about him in our blog post “Around! The Circle of Books” - Artist Vasily Vereshchagin is 175 years old.

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Lifshits - Russian writer and poet wrote the poem “Plevna”.

Plevna

I remember when I was a child, I leafed through the Niva -

A yellowed and dusty heap...

The wind ruffles the horse's mane.

Screams. Shots. Blood and gunpowder.

Drums. Tents. Cards.

The general wears a white spear.

Whiskers flutter

Those that are no longer worn.

The rider's eyes sparkle angrily.

On February 24, 1878, exhausted by the winter campaign, but inspired by victories, Russian troops occupied San Stefano and approached the suburbs of Istanbul - that is, the very walls of Constantinople. The Russian army took a direct road to the Turkish capital. There was no one to defend Istanbul - the best Turkish armies capitulated, one was blocked in the Danube region, and the army of Suleiman Pasha was recently defeated south of the Balkan Mountains. Skobelev was appointed commander of the 4th Army Corps, stationed in the vicinity of Adrianople. The army had a dream of capturing Constantinople, of returning the Byzantine capital to the fold of the Orthodox Church. This dream did not come true. But in that war, the Russian soldier won freedom for Orthodox Bulgaria, and also contributed to the independence of the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians. We celebrate the victorious end of the war, as a result of which the Orthodox peoples received a chance for free development.

Nikolai Dmitrievich Dmitriev-Orenburgsky. General M.D. Skobelev on horseback. 1883

The years 1877-1878 remained in people's memory as one of the most glorious pages of battle and political history. The feat of the heroes of Plevna and Shipka, the liberators of Sofia, is honored both in Russia and in Bulgaria. It was an impeccable war of liberation - and the Balkans had been waiting for it for a long time, they hoped for Russia, they understood that help could only come from St. Petersburg and Moscow.

The Balkans remember heroes. One of the main churches of Sofia is the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, a symbol of liberation from the Ottoman yoke. It was erected in memory of Russian soldiers who died in the battles for the liberation of Bulgaria. From 1878 to this day in Bulgaria, during the liturgy in Orthodox churches, during the great entrance of the liturgy of the faithful, Alexander II and all Russian soldiers who died in the war of liberation are commemorated. Bulgaria has not forgotten those battles!

Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia

Nowadays, the friendship between Russians and Bulgarians is being dangerously tested. There are many false and therefore disappointed expectations in this story. Alas, our peoples suffer from an “inferiority complex,” and patriots have become painfully vulnerable - and therefore always choose the path to disengagement, to grievances and conflicts. Therefore, false legends are used - for example, that during the Great Patriotic War the Bulgarians fought against the Red Army. But the authorities of the then Bulgaria, being allies of Hitler, flatly refused to participate in hostilities against Russia. They understood that the Bulgarians would not shoot at the Russians...

Bulgaria is the only country among the Reich's allies that did not fight with the USSR, despite the hysterical pressure of Hitler's diplomacy.

The anti-fascist underground in Bulgaria arose as soon as Germany attacked the USSR. And since 1944, the First Bulgarian Army fought the Nazis as part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

Today there are many professional truth-tellers and provocateurs, and they like to talk about the “ungratefulness” of the Slavic peoples, who often fought against Russia. They say, we don’t need such little brothers... Instead of quarreling nations by looking for the slightest reason, it would be better to remember General Stoychev more often - the only foreign commander who participated in the Victory Parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945! Such an honor was not given for beautiful eyes. Popular wisdom is not wrong: “They carry water for the offended.” Collecting grievances is the lot of the weak.

Bulgaria is not a vassal of Russia, it did not swear allegiance to Russia. But it is difficult to find in Europe a people closer to Russian in culture.

Bulgarians know and respect Russia. It is always easy for us to find a common language. Just don’t put your hopes on big politics, just as you shouldn’t believe in its propaganda support...

But let's talk about the factors of the 1878 victory. And about controversial issues in the interpretation of that war.

Crossing of the Russian army across the Danube at Zimnitsa on June 15, 1877, Nikolai Dmitriev-Orenburgsky (1883)

1. Did Russia really selflessly fight for the freedom of fraternal peoples?

This was, as we know, not the first Russian-Turkish war. Russia dealt several powerful blows to the Ottoman Empire. Established a foothold on the Black Sea. In Crimea, in the Caucasus.

But the officers dreamed of a liberation campaign in the Balkans, and the leaders of thought - priests, writers - called for help for the Orthodox peoples. This was the main thing.

Of course, we were also talking about the state prestige of Russia, which had to be restored after the unsuccessful Crimean War. Strategists and dreamers thought about the liberation of Constantinople and control over the straits. But, as is known, Russia refrained from such radical actions. London, Paris, Berlin would not allow the Ottoman Empire to be completely destroyed, and St. Petersburg understood this.

2. What was the reason for the war? Why did it start in 1877?

In 1876, the Turks brutally suppressed the April Uprising in Bulgaria. The troops of the Bulgarian rebels were defeated, even the elderly and children were subjected to repression... Russian diplomacy was unable to obtain concessions from Istanbul, and in April 1877, without enlisting the support of any significant allies except Austria-Hungary, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Fighting began in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

3. What does the expression “Everything is calm on Shipka” mean?

“Everything is Calm on Shipka” is one of the most truthful pictures about the war, the creation of Vasily Vereshchagin. And at the same time, these are the famous words of General Fyodor Radetsky addressed to the commander-in-chief. He constantly repeated this report, no matter how difficult it was. It turned out that the death of soldiers was something that was taken for granted and not worth reporting.

The artist was hostile to Radetsky. Vereshchagin visited the Shipka Pass, painted soldiers from life, painted snow trenches. It was then that the idea of a triptych was born - a requiem for a common soldier.

The first picture depicts a sentry, knee-deep in a blizzard, apparently forgotten and lonely by everyone. On the second - he is still standing, although he is covered with snow up to his chest. The soldier did not flinch! The sentry was not changed. The cold and blizzard turned out to be stronger than him, and in the third picture we see only a huge snowdrift in the place of the sentry, the only reminder of which is the corner of his greatcoat, not yet covered with snow.

The simple plot makes a strong impression and makes you think about the ugly side of the war. In the snows of Shipka there remains the grave of an unknown soldier, a Russian sentry. There is both bitter satire and a monument to the courage of the Russian soldier, faithful to his duty, capable of miracles of fortitude.

This picture is well known in both Russia and Bulgaria. The memory of the famous and unknown heroes who fought in 1878 for the freedom of Bulgaria will not die. “Everything is calm on Shipka” - these words for us are both the definition of bragging and a symbol of reliability. From which side should you look? And heroes remain heroes.

Vasily Vereshchagin. Everything is calm on Shipka. 1878, 1879

4. How did you manage to liberate the Bulgarian capital - Sofia?

The Bulgarian city was the main supply base for the Turkish army. And the Turks defended Sofia with fury. The battles for the city began on December 31, 1877 near the village of Gorni-Bogrov. Bulgarian volunteers fought alongside the Russians. Gurko's troops cut off the enemy's path to retreat to Plovdiv. The Turkish commander Nuri Pasha was terrified of being surrounded and hastily retreated to the west, leaving 6 thousand wounded in the city... He gave the order to burn the city. The intervention of Italian diplomats saved the city from destruction.

On January 4, the Russian army entered Sofia. The centuries-old Turkish yoke was put to an end. On this winter day, Sofia blossomed. The Bulgarians enthusiastically greeted the Russians, and General Gurko was crowned with triumphant laurels.

The classic of Bulgarian literature Ivan Vazov wrote:

"Mom mom! Look, look..."
"What's there?" - “Guns, sabers I see...”
“Russians!..” - “Yes, then they are,
Let's go meet them closer.
It was God himself who sent them,
To help us, son."
The boy, having forgotten his toys,
He ran to meet the soldiers.
Like the sun I'm glad:
“Hello, brothers!”

5. How was the Russian army treated in Bulgaria?

The soldiers were greeted hospitably, as liberators, as brothers. The generals were treated like kings. Moreover, the Bulgarians fought shoulder to shoulder with the Russians; it was a true military brotherhood.

Before the start of the war, the Bulgarian militia was quickly formed from among refugees and residents of Bessarabia. The militia was commanded by General N.G. Stoletov. By the beginning of hostilities, he had 5 thousand Bulgarians at his disposal. During the war, more and more patriots joined them. Flying partisan detachments operated behind enemy lines. The Bulgarians provided the Russian army with food and intelligence. The inscriptions on the monuments to Russian soldiers, of which there are hundreds in modern Bulgaria, also testify to the military brotherhood:

Bow to you, Russian army, which delivered us from Turkish slavery.
Bow down, Bulgaria, to the graves with which you are strewn.
Eternal glory to the Russian soldiers who fell for the liberation of Bulgaria.

Russia does not border with Bulgaria. But never has one people come to the rescue of another with such courage. And never before has any people kept gratitude to another people for so many years - like a shrine.

Nizhny Novgorod dragoons pursuing the Turks on the road to Kars

6. At what cost was it possible to break the resistance of the Ottomans in that war?

The war was fierce. More than 300,000 Russian soldiers took part in the fighting in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The textbook data on losses are as follows: 15,567 killed, 56,652 wounded, 6,824 died from wounds. There are also data twice as high as our losses... The Turks lost 30 thousand killed, another 90 thousand died from wounds and illnesses.

The Russian army was not superior to the Turks in weapons or equipment. But the superiority was great in the combat training of the soldiers and in the level of military art of the generals.

Another factor in the victory was the military reform developed by D.A. Milyutin. The Minister of War managed to rationalize the management of the army. And the army was grateful to him for the “Berdan” model of 1870 (Berdan rifle). The shortcomings of the reform had to be corrected during the campaign: for example, Skobelev decided to replace the inconvenient soldiers’ backpacks with canvas bags, which made life easier for the army.

The Russian soldier had to fight an unusual mountain war. They fought in the most difficult conditions. If it were not for the iron character of our soldiers, they would not have survived either Shipka or Plevna.

Monument to Freedom at Shipka Pass

7. Why did the Bulgarians find themselves in the camp of Russia’s opponents in the First World War?

What is this - deceit, treachery? Rather, it is a path of mutual mistakes. Relations between the two Orthodox kingdoms became strained during the Balkan Wars, in which Bulgaria competed for the laurels of the leading power in the region. Russia made attempts to restore influence in the Balkans, our diplomats invented various combinations. But - to no avail. Eventually, Prime Minister Radoslavov began to be depicted in angry caricatures in Russia.

The Balkans in those years turned into a tangle of contradictions, the main one of which was enmity between two Orthodox peoples - Bulgarian and Serbian.

Studying the history of mutual and cross territorial claims of neighboring peoples is instructive. So Bulgaria entered the First World War, declaring war on Serbia. That is, on the side of the “Central Powers” and against the Entente. This was a great success for German diplomacy, supported by loans that Berlin provided to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarians fought against the Serbs and Romanians, and at first they fought very successfully. As a result, we ended up as losers.