World War 2 loss of sides. Which peoples of the USSR suffered the heaviest losses during the Great Patriotic War?

Some fought with numbers, and some with skill. The monstrous truth about the losses of the USSR in World War II Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

The ratio of irretrievable losses of the Soviet Union and Germany in World War II

The true size of the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in deaths, including those who died in captivity, according to our estimate, may be 26.9 million people. This is approximately 10.3 times higher than the Wehrmacht losses on the Eastern Front (2.6 million dead). The Hungarian army, which fought on the side of Hitler, lost about 160 thousand killed and died, including about 55 thousand who died in captivity. The losses of Germany's other ally, Finland, amounted to about 61 thousand killed and died, including 403 people who died in Soviet captivity and about 1 thousand people died in battles against the Wehrmacht. The Romanian army lost about 165 thousand killed and died in battles against the Red Army, including 71,585 killed, 309,533 missing, 243,622 wounded and 54,612 died in captivity. 217,385 Romanians and Moldovans returned from captivity. Thus, of the missing people, 37,536 people must be classified as killed. If we assume that approximately 10% of the wounded died, then the total losses of the Romanian army in battles with the Red Army will be about 188.1 thousand dead. In the battles against Germany and its allies, the Romanian army lost 21,735 killed, 58,443 missing and 90,344 wounded. Assuming that the mortality rate among the wounded was 10%, the number of deaths from wounds can be estimated at 9 thousand people. 36,621 Romanian soldiers and officers returned from German and Hungarian captivity. Thus, the total number of Romanian military personnel killed and died in captivity can be estimated at 21,824 people. Thus, in the fight against Germany and Hungary, the Romanian army lost about 52.6 thousand dead. The Italian army lost about 72 thousand people in battles against the Red Army, of which about 28 thousand died in Soviet captivity - more than half of the approximately 49 thousand prisoners. Finally, the Slovak army lost 1.9 thousand dead in battles against the Red Army and Soviet partisans, of which about 300 people died in captivity. On the side of the USSR, the Bulgarian army fought against Germany, losing about 10 thousand dead. The two armies of the Polish Army, formed in the USSR, lost 27.5 thousand dead and missing, and the Czechoslovak corps, which also fought on the side of the Red Army, lost 4 thousand dead. The total casualty losses on the Soviet side can be estimated at 27.1 million military personnel, and on the German side at 2.9 million people, which gives a ratio of 9.1–9.3:1. In the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940, the ratio of casualties to deaths was 7.0:1, not in favor of the Red Army (we estimate Soviet casualties at 164.3 thousand. people, and Finnish - 23.5 thousand people). It can be assumed that this ratio was approximately the same in 1941–1944. Then, in battles with Finnish troops, the Red Army could have lost up to 417 thousand killed and died from wounds. It should also be taken into account that the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the war with Japan amounted to 12 thousand people. If we accept that in battles with the rest of the German allies, the losses of the Red Army were approximately equal to the losses of the enemy, then in these battles it could lose up to 284 thousand people. And in the battles against the Wehrmacht, the Red Army's casualties should have been about 22.2 million killed and died from wounds, versus about 2.1 million killed and died on the German side. This gives a loss ratio of 10.6:1.

According to Russian search engines, for every found corpse of a Wehrmacht soldier, on average there are ten corpses of Red Army soldiers. This ratio is almost equal to our estimate of the ratio of losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

It is interesting to trace at least the approximate ratio of losses of the parties over the years of the war. Using the above-established ratio between the number of Soviet military personnel killed and injured in battles and based on the data given in the book by E.I. Smirnov, the number of dead Soviet military personnel by year can be distributed as follows: 1941 - 2.2 million, 1942 - 8 million, 1943 - 6.4 million, 1944 - 6.4 million, 1945 - 2.5 million It should also be taken into account that approximately 0.9 million Red Army soldiers who were listed as irretrievably lost, but were later found in the liberated territory and called up again, occurred mainly in 1941–1942. Due to this, we reduce the losses of those killed in 1941 by 0.6 million, and in 1942 - by 0.3 million people (proportional to the number of prisoners) and with the addition of prisoners we get the total irretrievable losses of the Red Army by year: 1941 - 5, 5 million, 1942 - 7.153 million, 1943 - 6.965 million, 1944 - 6.547 million, 1945 - 2.534 million. For comparison, let’s take the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht ground forces by year, based on data from B. Müller-Hillebrand. At the same time, we subtracted losses incurred outside the Eastern Front from the final figures, approximately spreading them over the years. The result is the following picture for the Eastern Front (the figure for the total irretrievable losses of ground forces for the year is given in parentheses): 1941 (from June) - 301 thousand (307 thousand), 1942 - 519 thousand (538 thousand), 1943 – 668 thousand (793 thousand), 1944 (for this year, losses in December were taken equal to those in January) – 1129 thousand (1629 thousand), 1945 (until May 1) – 550 thousand (1250 thousand) . The ratio in all cases is in favor of the Wehrmacht: 1941 - 18.1:1, 1942 - 13.7:1, 1943 - 10.4:1, 1944 - 5.8:1, 1945 - 4, 6:1. These ratios should be close to the true ratios of irretrievable losses of the ground forces of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front, since the losses of the ground army accounted for the lion's share of all Soviet military losses, and much larger than those of the Wehrmacht, and the German aviation and navy were the main irretrievable losses in during the course of the war suffered outside the Eastern Front. As for the losses of the German allies in the East, the underestimation of which somewhat worsens the performance of the Red Army, it should be taken into account that in the fight against them the Red Army suffered relatively much smaller losses than in the fight against the Wehrmacht, and that the German allies were not active in all periods war and suffered the greatest losses of prisoners as part of the general capitulations (Romania and Hungary). In addition, on the Soviet side, the losses of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Bulgarian units operating together with the Red Army were not taken into account. So, in general, the relationships we have identified should be quite objective. They show that an improvement in the ratio of irretrievable losses for the Red Army has only occurred since 1944, when the Allies landed in the West and Lend-Lease assistance already had its maximum effect in terms of both direct supplies of weapons and equipment and the deployment of Soviet military production. The Wehrmacht was forced to send reserves to the West and was no longer able, as in 1943, to unleash active operations in the East. In addition, there were large losses of experienced soldiers and officers. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the ratio of losses remained unfavorable for the Red Army due to its inherent vices (templates, contempt for human life, inept use of weapons and equipment, lack of continuity of experience due to huge losses and inept use of marching reinforcements, etc. ).

The ratio of casualties killed for the Red Army was especially unfavorable during the period from December 1941 to April 1942, when the Red Army carried out its first large-scale counteroffensive. For example, the 323rd Infantry Division of the 10th Army of the Western Front alone lost 4,138 people in three days of fighting, from December 17 to 19, 1941, including 1,696 dead and missing. This gives an average daily loss rate of 1,346 people, including irrevocable losses of 565 people. The entire German Eastern Army, numbering more than 150 divisions, had an average daily casualty rate of only slightly more during the period from 11 to 31 December 1941 inclusive. The Germans lost 2,658 people per day, including only 686 irrevocably.

This is simply amazing! Our one division lost as much as 150 German divisions. Even if we assume that not all German formations were in battle every day during the last three weeks of December 1941, even if we assume that the losses of the 323rd Infantry Division in the three-day battles were for some reason uniquely large, the difference is too striking and cannot be explained by statistical errors. Here we need to talk about social errors, the fundamental defects of the Soviet method of warfare.

By the way, according to the testimony of the former commander of the 10th Army, Marshal F.I. Golikov, and in the preceding days the 323rd Division suffered heavy losses, and, despite the fact that Soviet troops were advancing, the losses were dominated by the missing, most of whom were most likely killed. So, in the battles of December 11, during its turn south towards the city of Epifan and the village of Lupishki, the 323rd division lost 78 people killed, 153 wounded and up to 200 missing. And on December 17–19, the 323rd Division, together with other divisions of the 10th Army, successfully, by Soviet standards, attacked the German defensive line on the Upa River. And by the next line, the Plava River, the 323rd Division was still not the most battered of the divisions of the 10th Army, which were fully equipped before the start of the Moscow counteroffensive. The 323rd Division was left with 7,613 men, while the neighboring 326th Division had only 6,238 men. Like many of the other divisions involved in the counteroffensive, the 323rd and 326th divisions were newly formed and were entering combat for the first time. The lack of experience and internal cohesion of the units led to large losses. Nevertheless, on the night of December 19-20, two divisions took Plavsk, breaking through the enemy line. At the same time, the Germans allegedly lost more than 200 people killed. In fact, taking into account the fact that at that moment most of the German divisions were operating in the Moscow direction, and Plavsk was defended by only one regiment, the latter’s losses could not exceed several dozen killed. The commander of the 323rd division, Colonel Ivan Alekseevich Gartsev, was considered a completely successful division commander and on November 17, 1942 became a major general, in 1943 he commanded the 53rd Rifle Corps, successfully ended the war, having been awarded the Commander's Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree, and died peacefully in 1961.

Let us compare the above monthly data on the irretrievable losses of the Red Army for 1942 with the monthly data on the losses of the German ground army, calculated from the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Army, General F. Halder. It should be noted here that Soviet data includes not only losses in the ground forces, but also losses in aviation and navy. In addition, the irretrievable losses on the Soviet side include not only those killed and missing, but also those who died from wounds. The data cited by Halder includes only losses in killed and missing, relating only to the ground forces, without the Luftwaffe and navy. This circumstance makes the loss ratio more favorable for the German side than it actually was. Indeed, taking into account the fact that in the Wehrmacht the ratio of wounded to killed was closer to the classic one - 3:1, and in the Red Army - closer to the unconventional ratio - 1:1, and also taking into account that the mortality rate in German hospitals was much higher, than in the Soviet ones, since the latter received much fewer seriously wounded, the category of those who died from wounds accounted for a much larger share of the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht than of the Red Army. Also, the share of aviation and naval losses was relatively higher for the Wehrmacht than for the Red Army, due to the extremely large losses of Soviet ground forces. In addition, we do not take into account the losses of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian armies allied with the Wehrmacht, which also makes the loss ratio more favorable for Germany. However, all these factors can inflate this figure by no more than 20–25% and are not able to distort the overall trend.

According to entries in F. Halder's diary, from December 31, 1941 to January 31, 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 87,082, including 18,074 killed and 7,175 missing. The irretrievable losses of the Red Army (killed and missing) in January 1942 amounted to 628 thousand people, which gives a loss ratio of 24.9:1. Between January 31 and February 28, 1942, German losses in the East amounted to 87,651 people, including 18,776 killed and 4,355 missing. Soviet losses in February reached 523 thousand people and turned out to be 22.6 times more than German irretrievable losses.

Between 1 and 31 March 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 102,194 people, including 12,808 killed and 5,217 missing. Soviet losses in March 1942 amounted to 625 thousand dead and missing. This gives us a record ratio of 34.7:1. In April, when the offensive began to fade, but the Soviet troops still suffered quite few losses in prisoners, German losses amounted to 60,005 people, including 12,690 killed and 2,573 missing. Soviet losses that month amounted to 435 thousand dead and missing. The ratio is 28.5:1.

In May 1942, the Red Army suffered heavy losses in prisoners as a result of its unsuccessful offensive near Kharkov and the successful German offensive on the Kerch Peninsula, its losses amounted to 433 thousand people. This figure is most likely significantly underestimated. After all, the Germans alone captured almost 400 thousand prisoners in May, and compared to April, when there were almost no prisoners, losses even decreased by 13 thousand people - while the index of those killed in battles fell by only three points. The losses of the German ground forces can only be calculated for the period from May 1 to June 10, 1942. They amounted to 100,599 people, including 21,157 killed and 4,212 missing. To establish the ratio of irretrievable losses, it is necessary to add a third of the losses for June to the Soviet May losses. Soviet losses for this month amounted to 519 thousand people. Most likely, they are overestimated due to the inclusion of underaccounted May losses in the June parts. Therefore, the total figure of losses for May and the first ten days of June of 606 thousand dead and missing seems close to reality. The ratio of irrecoverable losses is 23.9:1, not fundamentally different from the indicators of several previous months.

During the period from 10 to 30 June, the losses of German ground forces in the East amounted to 64,013 people, including 11,079 killed and 2,270 missing. The ratio of irrecoverable losses for the second and third ten days of June turns out to be 25.9:1.

During July 1942, the German Army in the East lost 96,341 people, including 17,782 killed and 3,290 missing. Soviet losses in July 1942 amounted to only 330 thousand people, and, most likely, they are somewhat underestimated. But this underestimation is largely compensated by the more significant losses of the German allies who participated in the general offensive in the south that began at the end of June. The ratio of irrecoverable losses turns out to be 15.7:1. This already means a significant improvement in this indicator for the Red Army. The German offensive turned out to be less catastrophic for the Red Army in terms of human losses than its own offensive in the winter and spring of 1942.

But the real turning point in the ratio of irretrievable losses occurred in August 1942, when German troops attacked Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and Soviet troops in the Rzhev region. Soviet losses in prisoners were significant, and there was certainly an underestimation of Soviet irretrievable losses, but most likely it was no more than in July. During August 1942, the German army in the East lost 160,294 people, including 31,713 killed and 7,443 missing. Soviet losses that month amounted to 385 thousand dead and missing. The ratio turns out to be 9.8:1, i.e., an order of magnitude better for the Red Army than in the winter or spring of 1942. Even taking into account the likely undercount of Soviet casualties in August, the change in the casualty ratio appears significant. Moreover, the likely underestimation of Soviet losses was compensated by a significant increase in losses of the German allies - Romanian, Hungarian and Italian troops who actively participated in the summer-autumn offensive. The casualty ratio improves not so much because of the reduction in Soviet casualties (although this likely occurred) but rather because of the significant increase in German casualties. It is no coincidence that it was in August 1942 that Hitler, according to V. Schellenberg, first admitted the possibility that Germany would lose the war, and in September there followed the high-profile resignations of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Army F. Halder and the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A, Field Marshal V., operating in the Caucasus. Liszt. Hitler was beginning to realize that there was no way out of the impasse into which the German offensive in the Caucasus and Stalingrad was increasingly reaching and that growing losses would soon lead to exhaustion of the Wehrmacht, but he could do nothing.

Halder's diary allows us to calculate the losses of ground forces only for the first ten days of September. They amounted to 48,198 people, including 9,558 killed and 3,637 missing. Soviet losses in September amounted to 473 thousand dead and missing. These losses not only do not seem to be underestimated, but, on the contrary, rather underestimate the true size of Soviet losses in September due to the inclusion of earlier unaccounted losses, since in this month, compared to August, the battle casualty index fell from 130 to 109. A third of 473 thousand . is 157.7 thousand. The ratio of Soviet and German irretrievable losses in the first ten days of September 1942 turns out to be equal to 11.95: 1, which proves that the August trend of improving the ratio of losses continued in September, especially taking into account the overestimation of Soviet losses in this month .

In the further course of the war, the irretrievable losses of the German ground army, with rare exceptions, only grew. The number of Soviet prisoners dropped sharply in 1943, while German troops that year suffered significant losses of prisoners on the Eastern Front for the first time as a result of the Stalingrad disaster. Soviet losses in killed after 1942 also experienced an upward trend, but the absolute value of the increase in killed was significantly less than the amount by which the average monthly number of Soviet prisoners decreased. According to the dynamics of the index of casualties in battles, the maximum losses in killed and those who died from wounds were noted in July, August and September 1943, during the Battle of Kursk and the crossing of the Dnieper (the index of casualties in battles in these months was 143, 172 and 139, respectively). The next peak in Red Army losses in killed and those who died from wounds falls in July, August and September 1944 (132, 140 and 130). The only peak in casualties in 1941–1942 occurred in August 1942 (130). There were some months when the ratio of irretrievable losses was almost as unfavorable for the Soviet side as in the first half of 1942, for example during the Battle of Kursk, but in most months of 1943–1945 this ratio was already significantly better for the Red Army than in 1941–1942.

The significant, by Soviet standards, improvement in the ratio of irretrievable losses between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht and its allies, which began in August 1942 and continued until the end of the war, was due to several factors. Firstly, Soviet mid- and senior-level commanders, starting with regimental commanders, acquired certain combat experience and began to fight somewhat more competently, adopting a number of tactics from the Germans. At lower command levels, as well as among ordinary soldiers, there was no significant improvement in the quality of combat operations, since due to huge losses, high personnel turnover remained. An improvement in the relative quality of Soviet tanks and aircraft, as well as an increase in the level of training of pilots and tank crews, also played a role, although they were still inferior to the Germans in terms of training even at the end of the war.

But an even greater role than the increase in the combat effectiveness of the Red Army in the defeat of Germany on the Eastern Front was played by the decline in the combat effectiveness of the Wehrmacht. Due to the ever-increasing irretrievable losses, the proportion of experienced soldiers and officers decreased. Due to the need to replace increasing losses, the level of training of pilots and tank crews decreased towards the end of the war, although it remained higher than that of their Soviet opponents. This drop in the level of training could not be compensated even by the increase in the quality of military equipment. But more importantly, starting in November 1942, after the Allied landings in North Africa, Germany had to send more and more aircraft, and then ground troops, to fight against the Western Allies. Germany had to make greater use of its weaker allies. The defeat of large formations of Italian, Romanian and Hungarian troops by the Red Army at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943 and in the second half of 1944 - beginning of 1945 significantly improved the ratio of irretrievable losses in favor of the Soviet side and significantly increased the numerical advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht. Another turning point here occurred after the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944. It was from July 1944 that there was a sharp increase in irretrievable losses of the German army, primarily in prisoners. In June, irrecoverable losses of ground forces amounted to 58 thousand people, and in July - 369 thousand and remained at such a high level until the end of the war. This is explained by the fact that Germany was forced to withdraw significant ground forces and the Luftwaffe from the Eastern Front, due to which the Soviet numerical superiority in men increased to seven or even eight times, which made any effective defense impossible.

Explaining the enormous Soviet casualties, German generals usually point to the disregard for the lives of soldiers on the part of the high command, the poor tactical training of middle and lower command personnel, the stereotyped techniques used during the offensive, and the inability of both commanders and soldiers to make independent decisions. Such statements could be considered a simple attempt to belittle the dignity of the enemy, who nevertheless won the war, if not for numerous similar evidence from the Soviet side. Thus, Zhores Medvedev recalls the battles near Novorossiysk in 1943: “The Germans near Novorossiysk had two lines of defense, perfectly fortified to a depth of about 3 km. Artillery bombardment was considered to be very effective, but it seems to me that the Germans adapted to it quite quickly. Noticing that the equipment was concentrated and powerful shooting began, they went to the second line, leaving only a few machine gunners on the front line. They left and watched all this noise and smoke with the same interest as we did. Then we were ordered to go forward. We walked, blew up mines and occupied the trenches - already almost empty, only two or three corpses were lying there. Then the order was given to attack the second line. This is where up to 80% of the attackers died - after all, the Germans were sitting in well-fortified structures and shot us all almost point-blank.” American diplomat A. Harriman relays Stalin’s words that “in the Soviet Army one must have more courage to retreat than to advance” and comments on it this way: “This phrase by Stalin shows well that he was aware of the state of affairs in the army. We were shocked, but we understood that this was forcing the Red Army to fight... Our military, who consulted with the Germans after the war, told me that the most destructive thing about the Russian offensive was its massive nature. The Russians came wave after wave. The Germans literally mowed them down, but as a result of such pressure, one wave broke through.”

And here is a testimony about the battles in December 1943 in Belarus by the former platoon commander V. Dyatlov: “A chain of people in civilian clothes with huge “sidors” behind their backs passed by, along the course of the message.” “Slavs, who are you, where are you from?” – I asked. - “We are from the Oryol region, new additions.” - “What kind of reinforcement is this when in civilian clothes and without rifles?” - “Yes, they said that you would get it in battle...”

The artillery strike on the enemy lasted about five minutes. 36 guns of the artillery regiment “hollowed” the front line of the Germans. Visibility became even worse due to shell discharges...

And here comes the attack. The chain rose, wriggling like a black crooked snake. The second one is behind her. And these black wriggling and moving snakes were so absurd, so unnatural on the gray-white earth! Black on the snow is a perfect target. And the German “poured” these chains with dense lead. Many firing points came to life. Large-caliber machine guns fired from the second line of the trench. The chains are stuck. The battalion commander shouted: “Forward, motherfucker!” Forward!.. Into battle! Forward! I’ll shoot you!” But it was impossible to get up. Try to tear yourself off the ground under artillery, machine gun and machine gun fire...

The commanders still managed to raise the “black” village infantry several times. But it's all in vain. The enemy fire was so dense that, after running a couple of steps, people fell as if they had been knocked down. We, the artillerymen, also could not reliably help - there was no visibility, the Germans had heavily camouflaged the firing points, and, most likely, the main machine-gun fire was fired from bunkers, and therefore the firing of our guns did not give the desired results.”

The same memoirist very colorfully describes the reconnaissance in force carried out by the penal battalion, so praised by many memoirists among marshals and generals: “Two divisions of our regiment took part in a ten-minute fire raid - and that’s all. After the fire there was silence for some seconds. Then the battalion commander jumped out of the trench onto the parapet: “Guys! For the Motherland! For Stalin! Behind me! Hurray!" The penalty soldiers slowly crawled out of the trench and, as if waiting for the last ones, raised their rifles and ran. A groan or cry with a drawn-out “ah-ah-ah” flowed from left to right and again to the left, now fading, now intensifying. We also jumped out of the trench and ran forward. The Germans threw a series of red rockets towards the attackers and immediately opened powerful mortar and artillery fire. The chains lay down, and so did we, a little behind in the longitudinal furrow. It was impossible to raise my head. How to detect and who to detect enemy targets in this hell? His artillery fired from covered positions and far from the flanks. Heavy guns also struck. Several tanks fired direct fire, their blank shells screaming overhead...

The penalty soldiers lay in front of the German trench in an open field and in small bushes, and the German “threshed” this field, plowing up the earth, the bushes, and the bodies of people... Only seven people withdrew from the battalion of penalty soldiers, but there were 306 of us all together.”

By the way, there was never an attack in this area.

We have stories about such senseless and bloody attacks in the memoirs and letters of German soldiers and junior officers. One nameless witness describes an attack by units of the 37th Soviet Army by A.A. Vlasov to the heights occupied by the Germans near Kiev in August 1941, and his description in detail coincides with the story of the Soviet officer given above. Here there is a useless artillery barrage past German positions, and an attack in thick waves, dying under German machine guns, and an unknown commander, unsuccessfully trying to raise his people and dying from a German bullet. Similar attacks at an unimportant height continued for three days in a row. What amazed the German soldiers most of all was that when the entire wave was dying, single soldiers still continued to run forward (the Germans were incapable of such senseless actions). These failed attacks nonetheless left the Germans physically exhausted. And, as a German soldier recalls, he and his comrades were most shocked and depressed by the methodical nature and scale of these attacks: “If the Soviets can afford to spend so many people trying to eliminate such insignificant results of our advance, then how often and in what numbers Will they attack people if the object is really very important?” (The German author could not imagine that the Red Army simply did not and could not attack otherwise.)

And in a letter from a German soldier home during the retreat from Kursk in the second half of 1943, he describes, as in the quoted letter from V. Dyatlov, an attack by almost unarmed and ununiformed reinforcements from the newly liberated territories (the same Oryol region), in which the vast majority died participants (according to an eyewitness, even women were among those called up). The prisoners said that the authorities suspected the residents of collaborating with the occupation authorities, and mobilization served as a form of punishment for them. And the same letter describes the attack of Soviet penal officers through a German minefield to detonate mines at the cost of their own lives (Marshal G.K. Zhukov’s story about a similar practice of Soviet troops is given in his memoirs by D. Eisenhower). And again, the German soldier was most struck by the obedience of the mobilized and penal prisoners. Penal prisoners, “with rare exceptions, never complained about such treatment.” They said that life is difficult and that “you have to pay for mistakes.” Such obedience of Soviet soldiers clearly shows that the Soviet regime raised not only commanders capable of giving such inhumane orders, but also soldiers capable of carrying out such orders unquestioningly.

There is also evidence from high-ranking Soviet military leaders about the inability of the Red Army to fight except at the cost of very great blood. So, Marshal A.I. Eremenko characterizes the features of the “art of war” of the famous (deservedly?) “Marshal of Victory” G.K. in the following way. Zhukov: “It should be said that Zhukov’s operational art is a 5-6 times superiority in forces, otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight without numbers and builds his career on blood.” By the way, in another case the same A.I. Eremenko conveyed his impression of his acquaintance with the memoirs of German generals: “The question naturally arises, why did Hitler’s “heroes”, who “defeated” our squad together, and the whole platoon with five of them, were unable to complete their tasks in the first period of the war, when the undeniable numerical and Was technical superiority on their side? It turns out that the irony here is ostentatious, because A.I. Eremenko in fact knew well that the German military leaders did not exaggerate the balance of forces in favor of the Red Army. After all, G.K. Zhukov headed the main operations in the main directions and had an overwhelming superiority of forces and means. Another thing is that other Soviet generals and marshals hardly knew how to fight differently than G.K. Zhukov, and A.I. himself Eremenko was no exception here.

We also note that the huge irretrievable losses of the Red Army did not allow, to the same extent as in the Wehrmacht and especially in the armies of the Western Allies, to retain experienced soldiers and junior commanders, which reduced the cohesion and durability of the units and did not allow the replacement fighters to adopt combat experience from veterans , which further increased losses. Such an unfavorable ratio of irretrievable losses for the USSR was a consequence of the fundamental flaw of the communist totalitarian system, which deprived people of the ability to make independent decisions and act, taught everyone, including the military, to act according to a template, to avoid even reasonable risks and, more than the enemy, to fear responsibility before by their higher authorities.

As former intelligence officer E.I. recalls. Malashenko, who after the war rose to the rank of lieutenant general, even at the very end of the war, Soviet troops often acted very ineffectively: “A few hours before the offensive of our division on March 10, a reconnaissance group ... captured a prisoner. He showed that the main forces of his regiment were withdrawn to a depth of 8-10 km... By telephone, I reported this information to the division commander, who reported this information to the commander. The division commander gave us his car to deliver the prisoner to army headquarters. Approaching the command post, we heard the roar of the artillery barrage that had begun. Unfortunately, it was carried out on unoccupied positions. Thousands of shells delivered with great difficulty through the Carpathians (this happened on the 4th Ukrainian Front. - B.S.), were spent in vain. The surviving enemy stopped the advance of our troops with stubborn resistance.” The same author gives a comparative assessment of the fighting qualities of German and Soviet soldiers and officers - not in favor of the Red Army: “German soldiers and officers fought well. The rank and file were well trained and skillfully acted offensively and defensively. Well-trained non-commissioned officers played a more prominent role in battle than our sergeants, many of whom were almost indistinguishable from privates. Enemy infantry constantly fired intensely, acted persistently and swiftly in the offensive, stubbornly defended and carried out rapid counterattacks, usually supported by artillery fire and sometimes air strikes. The tankers also attacked aggressively, fired on the move and from short stops, skillfully maneuvered and conducted reconnaissance. In case of failure, we quickly concentrated our efforts in another direction, often striking at the junctions and flanks of our units. The artillery quickly opened fire and sometimes fired very accurately. She had a large amount of ammunition. German officers skillfully organized the battle and controlled the actions of their units and units, skillfully used the terrain, and promptly maneuvered to a favorable direction. When there was a threat of encirclement or defeat, German units and subunits made an organized retreat into the depths, usually to occupy a new position. Enemy soldiers and officers were intimidated by rumors of reprisals against prisoners and rarely surrendered without a fight...

Our infantry was less trained than the German infantry. However, she fought bravely. Of course, there were cases of panic and premature withdrawal, especially at the beginning of the war. The infantry was greatly helped by artillery; the most effective was Katyusha fire when repelling enemy counterattacks and striking areas where troops were concentrated and concentrated. However, the artillery in the initial period of the war had few shells. It must be admitted that tank units did not always act skillfully in attacks. At the same time, in operational depth during the development of the offensive, they showed themselves brilliantly.”

The exorbitant losses of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War were recognized even then by some Soviet generals, although this was by no means safe. For example, Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin, who previously commanded the army and then was involved in training reserves, had the imprudence to write in his diary that the Supreme High Command “does not care about preserving human reserves and allows large losses in individual operations.” This, along with others, “anti-Soviet” statement cost the general a sentence of 25 years in the camps. And another military leader is Aviation Major General A.A. Turzhansky - in 1942 he received only 12 years in the camps for a completely fair opinion about the reports of the Sovinformburo, which “are intended only to calm the masses and do not correspond to reality, since they underestimate our losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy.”

It is interesting that the ratio of irretrievable losses between Russian and German troops in the First World War was approximately the same as in the Great Patriotic War. This follows from a study conducted by S.G. Nelipovich. In the second half of 1916, the troops of the Russian Northern and Western Fronts lost 54 thousand killed and 42.35 thousand missing. The German troops operating on these fronts, and the few Austro-Hungarian divisions fighting on the Western Front, lost 7.7 thousand killed and 6.1 thousand missing. This gives a ratio of 7.0:1 for both killed and missing. On the Southwestern Front, Russian losses amounted to 202.8 thousand killed. The Austrian troops operating against him lost 55.1 thousand killed, and the German troops lost 21.2 thousand killed. The ratio of losses turns out to be very indicative, especially taking into account the fact that in the second half of 1916, Germany had far from the best divisions on the Eastern Front, most of them second-rate. If we assume that the ratio of Russian and German losses here was the same as on the other two fronts, then from the Russian Southwestern Front approximately 148.4 thousand soldiers and officers were killed in battles against the Germans, and approximately 54.4 thousand - in battles against Austro-Hungarian troops. Thus, with the Austrians, the ratio of casualties was even slightly in our favor - 1.01:1, and the Austrians lost significantly more prisoners than the Russians - 377.8 thousand missing in action against 152.7 thousand for the Russians throughout the South -The Western Front, including in battles against German troops. If we extend these coefficients to the entire war as a whole, the ratio between the total losses of Russia and its opponents killed and those who died from wounds, diseases and in captivity can be estimated as 1.9:1. This calculation is made as follows. German losses on the Eastern Front of the First World War amounted to, including losses on the Romanian Front, 173.8 thousand killed and 143.3 thousand missing. In total, according to official data, there were 177.1 thousand prisoners of war in Russia, of which more than 101 thousand people were repatriated by the end of 1918. 15.5 thousand people died in captivity before the spring of 1918. It is possible that some of the German prisoners were repatriated later or died. The official Russian figure of German prisoners is probably inflated by the subjects of the German Empire interned in Russia. In any case, almost all missing German soldiers on the Eastern Front can be classified as prisoners. If we assume that during the entire war there were an average of seven Russian soldiers per German soldier killed, the total losses of Russia in the fight against Germany can be estimated at 1,217 thousand killed. The losses of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Russian front in 1914–1918 amounted to 311.7 thousand killed. The losses of Austro-Hungarian missing persons reached 1194.1 thousand people, which is less than Russian data on the number of Austro-Hungarian prisoners - 1750 thousand. The excess was probably formed due to civilian prisoners in Galicia and Bukovina, as well as double counting in reports. As in the case of Germany, in the case of Austria-Hungary one can be sure that almost all those missing in action on the Russian front are prisoners. Then, extending the proportion between Russian and Austrian killed, which we established for the second half of 1916, to the entire period of the First World War, Russian losses killed in the fight against the Austro-Hungarian troops can be estimated at 308.6 thousand people. Turkey's losses in the First World War were killed by B.Ts. Urlanis estimates 250 thousand people, of which, in his opinion, there are probably up to 150 thousand people on the Caucasian Front. However, this figure is questionable. The fact is that the same B.Ts. Urlanis cites data that there were 65 thousand Turks in Russian captivity, and 110 thousand in British captivity. It can be assumed that the actual combat activity in the Middle East (including the Thessaloniki Front) and the Caucasian theaters of combat operations varied in the same proportion, given that since the beginning of 1917 there were no active military operations on the Caucasian Front. Then the number of Turkish military personnel killed in combat operations against the Caucasian Front, as well as against Russian troops in Galicia and Romania, can be estimated at 93 thousand people. The losses of the Russian army in the fight against Turkey are unknown. Considering that the Turkish troops were significantly inferior to the Russians in terms of combat effectiveness, the losses of the Russian Caucasus Front can be estimated at half the Turkish losses - at 46.5 thousand killed. The losses of the Turks in the fight against the Anglo-French troops can be estimated at 157 thousand killed. Of these, approximately half died at the Dardanelles, where Turkish troops lost 74.6 thousand people, British troops, including New Zealanders, Australians, Indians and Canadians - 33.0 thousand killed, and French troops - about 10 thousand killed. This gives a ratio of 1.7:1, close to what we assumed for the losses of the Turkish and Russian armies.

The total losses of the Russian army killed in the First World War can be estimated at 1601 thousand people, and the losses of its opponents - at 607 thousand people, or 2.6 times less. For comparison, let us determine the ratio of casualties on the Western Front of the First World War, where German troops fought with the British, French and Belgian. Here Germany lost 590.9 thousand people killed before August 1, 1918. Over the last 3 months and 11 days of the war, German casualties can be estimated at approximately one quarter of the previous 12 months of the war, taking into account that in November there was almost no fighting. German losses in the period from August 1, 1917 to July 31, 1918, according to the official sanitary report, amounted to 181.8 thousand killed. Taking this into account, losses in the last months of the war can be estimated at 45.5 thousand people, and all German losses in killed on the Western Front can be estimated at 636.4 thousand people. The losses of the French ground forces killed and died from wounds in the First World War amounted to 1104.9 thousand people. If we subtract from this number the 232 thousand who died from wounds, the casualty losses can be estimated at 873 thousand people. Probably about 850 thousand killed occurred on the Western Front. British troops in France and Flanders lost 381 thousand people killed. The total loss of killed British dominions amounted to 119 thousand people. Of these, at least 90 thousand died on the Western Front. Belgium lost 13.7 thousand people killed. American troops lost 37 thousand people killed. The total losses of the Allies killed in the West are approximately 1,372 thousand people, and in Germany - 636 thousand people. The loss ratio turns out to be 2.2:1, which turns out to be three times more favorable for the Entente than the ratio between Russia and Germany.

The extremely unfavorable ratio of losses between Russia and Germany is equalized by the losses of the German allies. To get the total irretrievable losses of Russia in the First World War, it is necessary to add to the losses killed the losses of those who died from wounds, died from diseases and died in captivity - respectively 240 thousand, 160 thousand (together with victims of suicides and accidents) and 190 thousand. Human. Then the total irretrievable losses of the Russian army can be estimated at 2.2 million people. The total number of Russian prisoners is estimated at 2.6 million people. About 15.5 thousand German and at least 50 thousand Austro-Hungarian soldiers, as well as about 10 thousand Turks, died in Russian captivity. The total number of deaths from wounds in the German army is estimated at 320 thousand people. Considering that the Eastern Front accounts for about 21.5% of all killed German soldiers, Germany's losses in the fight against Russia in those who died from wounds can be estimated at 69 thousand people. The number of deaths from diseases and accidents in the German army is determined at 166 thousand people. Of these, up to 36 thousand people may be on the Russian front. The Austrians lost 170 thousand people who died from wounds and 120 thousand people who died from diseases. Since the Russian front accounts for 51.2% of all losses of Austria-Hungary (4273.9 thousand people out of 8349.2 thousand), the number of deaths from wounds and deaths from diseases related to the Russian front can be estimated at 87 thousand respectively .and 61 thousand people. The Turks lost 68 thousand who died from wounds and 467 thousand who died from disease. Of these, the Russian front accounts for 25 thousand and 173 thousand people, respectively. The total irretrievable losses of Russia's opponents in the First World War amounted to about 1133.5 thousand people. The ratio of total irrecoverable losses turns out to be 1.9:1. It becomes even more favorable for the Russian side than the ratio of those killed only, due to the significant mortality from disease in the Turkish army.

The ratio of losses in the First World War was much more favorable for the Russian army than in the Second World War, only due to the fact that in 1914–1918 it was not the Germans who fought on the Russian front, but the much less combat-ready Austro-Hungarian troops.

Such an unfavorable ratio of losses for Russia (USSR) in the two world wars in relation to the losses of German troops is explained primarily by the general economic and cultural backwardness of Russia in comparison with Germany and the Western allies. In the case of World War II, the situation worsened due to the characteristics of Stalinist totalitarianism, which destroyed the army as an effective instrument of warfare. Stalin failed, as he called for, to overcome the ten-year gap from the leading capitalist countries, which he defined as 50-100 years. But he completely remained in line with the late imperial tradition; he preferred to win not with skill, but with great blood, since he saw the creation of a highly professional army as a potential threat to the regime.

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The Soviet Union suffered the most significant losses in World War II - about 27 million people. At the same time, dividing the dead along ethnic lines has never been welcomed. Nevertheless, such statistics exist.

Counting history

For the first time, the total number of victims among Soviet citizens in World War II was named by the Bolshevik magazine, which published the figure of 7 million people in February 1946. A month later, Stalin cited the same figure in an interview with the Pravda newspaper.

In 1961, at the end of the post-war population census, Khrushchev announced the corrected data. “Can we sit with our hands folded and wait for a repeat of 1941, when the German militarists launched a war against the Soviet Union, which claimed two tens of millions of lives of Soviet people?” wrote the Soviet Secretary General to Swedish Prime Minister Fridtjof Erlander.

In 1965, on the 20th anniversary of the Victory, the new head of the USSR, Brezhnev, stated: “Such a brutal war that the Soviet Union endured has never befallen any nation. The war claimed more than twenty million lives of Soviet people.”

However, all these calculations were approximate. Only at the end of the 1980s, a group of Soviet historians under the leadership of Colonel General Grigory Krivosheev was allowed to access the materials of the General Staff, as well as the main headquarters of all branches of the Armed Forces. The result of the work was the figure of 8 million 668 thousand 400 people, reflecting the losses of the security forces of the USSR during the entire war.

The final data on all human losses of the USSR for the entire period of the Great Patriotic War was published by a state commission working on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee. 26.6 million people: this figure was announced at the ceremonial meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1990. This figure remained unchanged, despite the fact that the methods for calculating the commission were repeatedly called incorrect. In particular, it was noted that the final figure included collaborators, “Hiwis” and other Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Nazi regime.

By nationality

For a long time, no one was counting those killed in the Great Patriotic War by nationality. Such an attempt was made by historian Mikhail Filimoshin in the book “Human Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR.” The author noted that the work was significantly complicated by the lack of a personal list of the dead, dead or missing, indicating nationality. Such a practice was simply not provided for in the Table of Urgent Reports.

Filimoshin substantiated his data using proportionality coefficients, which were calculated on the basis of reports on the number of military personnel of the Red Army according to socio-demographic characteristics for 1943, 1944 and 1945. At the same time, the researcher was unable to establish the nationality of approximately 500 thousand conscripts who were called up for mobilization in the first months of the war and went missing along the way to their units.

1. Russians – 5 million 756 thousand (66.402% of the total number of irretrievable losses);

2. Ukrainians – 1 million 377 thousand (15.890%);

3. Belarusians – 252 thousand (2.917%);

4. Tatars – 187 thousand (2.165%);

5. Jews – 142 thousand (1.644%);

6. Kazakhs – 125 thousand (1.448%);

7. Uzbeks – 117 thousand (1.360%);

8. Armenians – 83 thousand (0.966%);

9. Georgians – 79 thousand (0.917%)

10. Mordovians and Chuvashs – 63 thousand each (0.730%)

Demographer and sociologist Leonid Rybakovsky, in his book “Human Losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War,” separately counts civilian casualties using the ethnodemographic method. This method includes three components:

1. Death of civilians in combat areas (bombing, artillery shelling, punitive operations, etc.).

2. Failure to return part of the ostarbeiters and other population who served the occupiers voluntarily or under duress;

3. an increase in population mortality above the normal level from hunger and other deprivations.

According to Rybakovsky, the Russians lost 6.9 million civilians in this way, the Ukrainians - 6.5 million, and the Belarusians - 1.7 million.

Alternative estimates

Historians of Ukraine present their methods of calculation, which relate primarily to the losses of Ukrainians in the Great Patriotic War. Researchers on Square refer to the fact that Russian historians adhere to certain stereotypes when counting victims; in particular, they do not take into account the contingent of correctional labor institutions, where a significant part of the dispossessed Ukrainians were located, for whom the serving of their sentences was replaced by being sent to penal companies.

Head of the research department of the Kyiv “National Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” Lyudmila Rybchenko refers to the fact that Ukrainian researchers have collected a unique fund of documentary materials on recording the human military losses of Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War - funerals, lists of missing persons, correspondence on the search for the dead, loss accounting books.

In total, according to Rybchenko, more than 8.5 thousand archival files were collected, in which about 3 million personal certificates about dead and missing soldiers called up from the territory of Ukraine. However, the museum worker does not pay attention to the fact that representatives of other nationalities also lived in Ukraine, who could well have been included in the number of 3 million victims.

Belarusian experts also provide estimates of the number of losses during the Second World War, independent of Moscow. Some believe that every third resident of the 9 million population of Belarus became a victim of Hitler's aggression. One of the most authoritative researchers on this topic is considered to be Professor of the State Pedagogical University, Doctor of Historical Sciences Emmanuel Ioffe.

The historian believes that in total in 1941-1944, 1 million 845 thousand 400 inhabitants of Belarus died. From this figure he subtracts 715 thousand Belarusian Jews who became victims of the Holocaust. Among the remaining 1 million 130 thousand 155 people, in his opinion, about 80% or 904 thousand people are ethnic Belarusians.

There are different estimates of the losses of the Soviet Union and Germany during the war of 1941-1945. The differences are associated both with the methods of obtaining initial quantitative data for different groups of losses, and with the methods of calculation.

In Russia, official data on losses in the Great Patriotic War are considered to be those published by a group of researchers led by Grigory Krivosheev, a consultant at the Military Memorial Center of the Russian Armed Forces, in 1993. According to updated data (2001), the losses were as follows:

  • Human losses of the USSR - 6.8 million military personnel killed, and 4.4 million captured and missing. Total demographic losses (including civilian deaths) - 26.6 million Human;
  • German casualties - 4.046 million military personnel killed, died from wounds, missing in action (including 442.1 thousand died in captivity), more 910.4 thousand returned from captivity after the war;
  • Human losses of Germany's allied countries - 806 thousand military personnel killed (including 137.8 thousand died in captivity), also 662.2 thousand returned from captivity after the war.
  • Irreversible losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany (including prisoners of war) - 11.5 million And 8.6 million people (not to mention 1.6 million prisoners of war after May 9, 1945) respectively. The ratio of irretrievable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany with their satellites is 1,3:1 .

History of calculation and official state recognition of losses

Research into the Soviet Union's losses in the war actually began only in the late 1980s. with the advent of glasnost. Before this, in 1946, Stalin announced that the USSR had lost during the war 7 million people. Under Khrushchev this figure increased to "more than 20 million". Only in 1988-1993. a team of military historians under the leadership of Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev conducted a comprehensive statistical study of archival documents and other materials containing information about human losses in the army and navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD. In this case, the results of the work of the General Staff commission to determine losses, headed by Army General S. M. Shtemenko (1966-1968) and a similar commission of the Ministry of Defense headed by Army General M. A. Gareev (1988), were used. The team was also cleared to be declassified in the late 1980s. materials of the General Staff and main headquarters of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, border troops and other archival institutions of the former USSR.

The final figure of human losses in the Great Patriotic War was first published in rounded form (“ almost 27 million people."") at the ceremonial meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1990, dedicated to the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. In 1993, the results of the study were published in the book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed. Losses of the USSR Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Statistical study,” which was then translated into English. In 2001, a reissue of the book “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century” was published. Losses of the Armed Forces: A Statistical Study."

To determine the scale of human losses, this team used various methods, in particular:

  • accounting and statistical, that is, by analyzing existing accounting documents (primarily reports on losses of personnel of the USSR Armed Forces),
  • balance, or the method of demographic balance, that is, by comparing the size and age structure of the population of the USSR at the beginning and end of the war.

In the 1990-2000s. Both works proposed amendments to official figures (in particular, by clarifying statistical methods) and completely alternative studies with very different data on losses appeared in the press. As a rule, in works of the latter type, the estimated loss of life far exceeds the officially recognized 26.6 million people.

For example, the modern Russian publicist Boris Sokolov estimated the total human losses of the USSR in 1939-1945. V 43,448 thousand people, and the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945. V 26.4 million people (of which 4 million people died in captivity). If you believe his calculations about the loss 2.6 million German soldiers on the Soviet-German front, the loss ratio reaches 10:1. At the same time, the total human losses of Germany in 1939-1945. he rated it at 5.95 million people (including 300 thousand Jews, Gypsies and anti-Nazis who died in concentration camps). His estimate of the dead Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS personnel (including foreign formations) is 3,950 thousand Human). However, it must be taken into account that Sokolov also includes demographic losses in the losses of the USSR (that is, those who could have been born, but were not born), but does not keep such a calculation for Germany. The calculation of the total losses of the USSR is based on outright falsification: the population of the USSR in mid-1941 was taken at 209.3 million people (12-17 million people higher than the real one, at the level of 1959), at the beginning of 1946 - at 167 million (3. 5 million higher than the real one), - which in total gives the difference between the official and Sokolov figures. B.V. Sokolov’s calculations are repeated in many publications and media (in the NTV film “Victory. One for All”, interviews and speeches of writer Viktor Astafiev, book by I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada “Russia on the eve of the 21st century”, etc.)

Casualties

Overall rating

A group of researchers led by G. F. Krivosheev estimates the total human losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, determined by the demographic balance method, in 26.6 million people. This includes all those killed as a result of military and other enemy actions, those who died as a result of the increased mortality rate during the war in the occupied territory and in the rear, as well as persons who emigrated from the USSR during the war and did not return after its end. For comparison, according to the same team of researchers, the population decline in Russia in the First World War (losses of military personnel and civilians) was 4.5 million people, and a similar decline in the Civil War was 8 million people.

As for the gender composition of the dead and deceased, the overwhelming majority, naturally, were men (about 20 million). In general, by the end of 1945, the number of women aged 20 to 29 years was twice the number of men of the same age in the USSR.

Considering the work of G. F. Krivosheev’s group, American demographers S. Maksudov and M. Elman come to the conclusion that their estimate of human losses of 26-27 million is relatively reliable. They, however, indicate both the possibility of underestimating the number of losses due to incomplete accounting of the population of the territories annexed by the USSR before the war and at the end of the war, and the possibility of overestimating losses due to failure to take into account emigration from the USSR in 1941-45. In addition, official calculations do not take into account the drop in the birth rate, due to which the population of the USSR by the end of 1945 should have been approximately 35-36 million people more than in the absence of war. However, they consider this figure to be hypothetical, since it is based on insufficiently strict assumptions.

According to another foreign researcher M. Haynes, the figure of 26.6 million obtained by G. F. Krivosheev’s group sets only the lower limit of all USSR losses in the war. The total population decline from June 1941 to June 1945 was 42.7 million people, and this figure corresponds to the upper limit. Therefore, the real number of military losses lies in this interval. However, he is opposed by M. Harrison, who, based on statistical calculations, comes to the conclusion that even taking into account some uncertainty in estimating emigration and the decline in the birth rate, the real military losses of the USSR should be estimated within 23.9 to 25.8 million people.

Military personnel

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, irretrievable losses during combat operations on the Soviet-German front from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 amounted to 8,860,400 Soviet troops. The source was data declassified in 1993 - 8,668,400 military personnel and data obtained during the search work of the Memory Watch and in historical archives. Of these (according to 1993 data):

  • Killed, died from wounds and illnesses, non-combat losses - 6,885,100 people, including
    • Killed - 5,226,800 people.
    • Died from wounds - 1,102,800 people.
    • Died from various causes and accidents, were shot - 555,500 people.

According to M.V. Filimoshin, during the Great Patriotic War, 4,559,000 Soviet military personnel and 500 thousand persons liable for military service, called up for mobilization, but not included in the lists of troops, were captured and went missing.

According to G.F. Krivosheev: during the Great Patriotic War, a total of 3,396,400 military personnel were missing and captured; 1,836,000 military personnel returned from captivity, 1,783,300 did not return (died, emigrated).

Civilian population

A group of researchers led by G. F. Krivosheev estimated the losses of the civilian population of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War at approximately 13.7 million people. The final figure is 13,684,692 people. consists of the following components:

  • were deliberately exterminated in the occupied territory - 7,420,379 people.
  • died and perished from the cruel conditions of the occupation regime (hunger, infectious diseases, lack of medical care, etc.) - 4,100,000 people.
  • died in forced labor in Germany - 2,164,313 people. (another 451,100 people for various reasons did not return and became emigrants)

However, the civilian population also suffered heavy losses from enemy combat in front-line areas, besieged and besieged cities. There are no complete statistical materials on the types of civilian casualties under consideration.

According to S. Maksudov, about 7 million people died in the occupied territories and in besieged Leningrad (of which 1 million in besieged Leningrad, 3 million were Jewish victims of the Holocaust), and about 7 million more people died as a result of increased mortality in non-occupied areas. territories.

Property losses

During the war years, 1,710 cities and towns and more than 70 thousand villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 98 thousand collective farms, and 1,876 state farms were destroyed on Soviet territory. The State Commission found that material damage amounted to about 30 percent of the national wealth of the Soviet Union, and in areas subject to occupation, about two-thirds. In general, the material losses of the Soviet Union are estimated at about 2 trillion. 600 billion rubles. For comparison, the national wealth of England decreased by only 0.8 percent, France - by 1.5 percent, and the United States essentially avoided material losses.

Losses of Germany and their allies

Casualties

The German command involved the population of the occupied countries in the war against the Soviet Union by recruiting volunteers. Thus, separate military formations appeared from among citizens of France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Croatia, as well as from citizens of the USSR who were captured or in occupied territory (Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, Muslim, etc.). How exactly the losses of these formations were taken into account is not clear in German statistics.

Also, a constant obstacle to determining the real number of military personnel losses was the mixing of military casualties with civilian casualties. For this reason, in Germany, Hungary, and Romania, the losses of the armed forces are significantly reduced, since some of them are included in the number of civilian casualties. (200 thousand people lost military personnel, and 260 thousand lost civilians). For example, in Hungary this ratio was “1:2” (140 thousand - military casualties and 280 thousand - civilian casualties). All this significantly distorts the statistics on the losses of troops of the countries that fought on the Soviet-German front.

A German radio telegram emanating from the Wehrmacht casualty department dated May 22, 1945, addressed to the OKW Quartermaster General, provides the following information:

According to a certificate from the OKH organizational department dated May 10, 1945, the ground forces alone, including the SS troops (without the Air Force and Navy), lost 4 million 617.0 thousand people during the period from September 1, 1939 to May 1, 1945.

Two months before his death, Hitler announced in one of his speeches that Germany had lost 12.5 million killed and wounded, half of whom were killed. With this message, he actually refuted the estimates of the scale of human losses made by other fascist leaders and government agencies.

General Jodl, after the end of hostilities, stated that Germany, in total, lost 12 million 400 thousand people, of which 2.5 million were killed, 3.4 million missing and captured and 6.5 million wounded, of which approximately 12-15% did not return to duty for one reason or another.

According to the annex to the German law “On the Preservation of Burial Sites,” the total number of German soldiers buried in the USSR and Eastern Europe is 3.226 million, of which the names of 2.395 million are known.

Prisoners of war of Germany and its allies

Information on the number of prisoners of war of the armed forces of Germany and its allied countries, recorded in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR as of April 22, 1956.

Nationality

Total prisoners of war counted

Released and repatriated

Died in captivity

Austrians

Czechs and Slovaks

French people

Yugoslavs

Dutch

Belgians

Luxembourgers

Norse

Other Nationalities

Total for the Wehrmacht

Italians

Total for allies

Total prisoners of war

Alternative theories

In the 1990-2000s, publications appeared in the Russian press with data on losses that were very different from those accepted by historical science. As a rule, the estimated Soviet losses far exceed those cited by historians.

For example, the modern Russian publicist Boris Sokolov estimated the total human losses of the USSR in 1939-1945 at 43,448 thousand people, and the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945. 26.4 million people (of which 4 million people died in captivity). According to his calculations about the loss of 2.6 million German soldiers on the Soviet-German front, the loss ratio reaches 10:1. At the same time, he estimated the total human losses of Germany in 1939-1945 at 5.95 million people (including 300 thousand Jews, Gypsies and anti-Nazis who died in concentration camps). His estimate of the dead Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS personnel (including foreign formations) is 3,950 thousand people). However, it must be taken into account that Sokolov also includes demographic losses in the losses of the USSR (that is, those who could have been born, but were not born), but does not keep such a calculation for Germany. The calculation of the total losses of the USSR is based on outright falsification: the population of the USSR in mid-1941 was taken at 209.3 million people (12-17 million people higher than the real one, at the level of 1959), at the beginning of 1946 - 167 million (3. 5 million below the real one), which in total gives the difference between the official and Sokolov’s figures. B.V. Sokolov’s calculations are repeated in many publications and media (in the NTV film “Victory. One for All”, interviews and speeches of writer Viktor Astafiev, book by I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada “Russia on the eve of the 21st century”, etc.)

In contrast to Sokolov’s highly controversial publications, there are works by other authors, many of whom are driven by establishing the real picture of what happened, and not by the requirements of the modern political situation. The work of Igor Lyudvigovich Garibyan stands out from the general series. The author uses open official sources and data, clearly pointing out inconsistencies in them, and focuses on the methods used to manipulate statistics. Interesting are the methods that he used for his own assessment of Germany’s losses: the female preponderance in the age-sex pyramid, the balance method, the method of assessment based on the structure of prisoners, and the assessment based on the rotation of army formations. Each method produces similar results - from 10 before 15 million people of irretrievable losses, excluding losses of satellite countries. The results obtained are often confirmed by indirect and sometimes direct facts from official German sources. The work deliberately focuses on the indirectness of multiple facts. Such data is more difficult to falsify, because the totality of facts and their vicissitudes during falsification cannot be foreseen, which means attempts at falsification will not stand up to scrutiny under different methods of assessment.

Surprisingly, 70 years after our Victory, one of the most important questions has not been settled - how many of our fellow citizens died during the Great Patriotic War. Official figures have changed several times. And always in one direction – the direction of increasing losses. Stalin called 9 million dead (which is close to the truth, if we take into account military losses); under Brezhnev, the figure of 20 million lives given for the freedom of the Motherland was introduced. At the end of Perestroika, figures appeared that historians and politicians use today - 27 million USSR citizens died during the Great Patriotic War. Voices are already being heard that “more than 33 million people actually died.”

So who and why is constantly increasing our losses, why is the myth of “being showered with corpses” maintained? And why did the Immortal Regiment appear, as the first step towards a new version of the “inhuman leadership of the USSR” during the Second World War, “saving itself at the expense of ”.

On the eve of Victory Day, I received two letters that are an excellent illustration of the question of the true losses of our people in the war against fascism.

From these two letters from readers we got material about the war and our losses.

Letter one.

“Dear Nikolai Viktorovich!

I agree with you that history is like the rules of the road (). Failure to follow the rules leads to a dead end or worse... In history, not only facts are important, but also numbers (not just dates).

Since “perestroika and glasnost” a lot of figures have appeared, but not achievements, but losses. And one of these figures is 27 million who died in the Great Patriotic War (WWII).

At the same time, this is not enough for some “politicians” and they begin to voice larger numbers.

Remember what a shock (as they say nowadays) the number of many millions of “victims of repression” causes in people. For some, it is obligatory and with clarification - “Stalinist”. And the real figure for normal researchers is from 650 thousand to 680 thousand people. By the way, in Grover Furr’s book “Shadows of the 20th Congress, or anti-Stalinist meanness” (M. Eksmo, Algorithm, 2010) the following figures are given for those executed in 1937 - 353,074 people, 1938 - 328,618 people, a total of 681,692 people. But this number includes not only political, but also criminals.

The study of WWII losses itself indicates a figure of 26.6 million people. It is indicated that 1.3 million are emigrants. That is, they left the country. This means that there are still 25.3 million dead.

It is very difficult to directly establish the losses of the USSR. The number of casualties of the Red Army alone was established in a study conducted by the Min. Defense in 1988-1993 under the leadership of Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev.

Estimates of the direct physical extermination of the civilian population, according to the ChGK data from 1946, amounted to 6,390,800 people on the territory of the USSR. This number also includes prisoners of war. What about the number of deaths from hunger, bombing, and artillery shelling? I have not seen such studies.

The assessment of USSR losses is carried out according to a completely logical formula:

Losses of the USSR = Population of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 - Population of the USSR at the end of the war + Number of children who died due to increased mortality (from those born during the war) - The population would have died in peacetime, based on the mortality rate of 1940 .

We substitute the numbers into the above formula and get:

196.7 million - 159.5 million + 1.3 million - 1 1.9 million = 26.6 million people

There is almost no discrepancy between the researchers in two figures - these are:

Number of children who died due to increased mortality (among those born during the war). The figure cited is 1.3 million people.

The population would have died in peacetime, based on the 1940 mortality rate = 11.9 million people.

But there are questions about the other two numbers. The population of the USSR at the end of the war (those born before June 22, 1941) was determined to be 159.5 million people based on data for December 1945. It is worth remembering the following facts: in 1944, Tuva became part of the USSR. Moreover, since 1943, Tuvan volunteers took part in battles on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. In 1939 and 1940, the lands of Western Belarus, Ukraine, and the Carpathian region became part of the USSR. The population of these regions was included in the population of the USSR. But in 1945 Poland and

Czechoslovakia, and also defined new borders for them (and for Hungary and Romania). And many Poles, Slovaks, Romanians, Hungarians (former citizens of the USSR) decided to return to their states. This raises the question: how were these people counted in the post-war census? Researchers are silent about this.

Now the population of the USSR as of June 22, 1941. How did this figure come about?

To the population of the USSR as of January 1939, we added the population of the annexed territories and the population growth over 2.5 years, i.e.

170.6 million + 20.8 million + 4.9 million and another + 0.4 million due to the “infant mortality reduction coefficient” and received 196.7 million people by June 22, 1941.

Wherein:

The population of the USSR according to the 1926 census is 147 million people

The population of the USSR according to the 1937 census is 162 million people.

The population of the USSR according to the 1939 census is 170.6 million people.

The 1926 census took place in December, the 1937 and 1939 censuses took place in early January, that is, all three censuses were carried out within the same boundaries. Population growth from 1926 to 1937 amounted to 15 million people over 10 years, or 1.5 million per year. And suddenly, over the 2 years of 1937 and 1938, it was calculated that the population growth was 8.6 million. And this was at the time of urbanization and the “demographic echo” of the First World War and the Civil War. By the way, the average annual population growth of the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s was approximately 2.3-2.5 million people per year.

In statistical reference books of the 50s, the population of the USSR in 1941 was generally indicated as 191.7 million people. Even a democrat and officially called a traitor, Rezun-Suvorov, in his books about the Second World War, writes that “The population of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1941 was 191 million people” (Viktor Suvorov. About half a billion. Chapter from a new book. http://militera. lib.ru/research/pravda_vs-3/01.html).

(The question of why, when calculating the population of the USSR, they decided to increase the population figure by 5 million remains unanswered).

By indicating in the calculation a figure that is closer to the real value, i.e. 191.7 million people at the beginning of the Second World War we get:

The population of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 was 191.7

The population of the USSR as of December 31, 1945 was 170.5

Incl. born before June 22, 1941 - 159.5

Total population decline among those living on June 22, 1941 (191.7 million - 159.5 million = 32.2 million people) - 32.2

Number of children who died due to increased mortality (of those born during the war) - 1.3

The population would have died in peacetime, based on the mortality rate of 1940 - 11.9

Total human losses of the USSR as a result of the war: 32.2 million + 1.3 million - 1 1.9 million = 21.6 million people.

Firstly, we must take into account that non-military mortality in 1941-1945 It is incorrect to calculate based on mortality in 1940. During the war years 1941-1945. non-military mortality should have been much HIGHER than in the peaceful year of 1940.

Secondly, this “general population decline” also includes the so-called. “second emigration” (up to 1.5 million people) and the loss of collaborationist formations that fought on the side of the Germans (Estonian and Latvian SS men, “ostbattalions”, policemen, etc.) - they also consisted, as it were, of citizens of the USSR! This is still up to 400,000 people.

And if these numbers are subtracted from 21.6 million, you get about 19.8 million.

That is, in round numbers - the same “Brezhnev” 20 million.

Therefore, until researchers have been able to provide reasonable calculations, I propose not to use the figures that appeared during Gorbachev’s time. The purpose of these calculations was certainly not to establish the truth. I wrote to you about this because I heard several times in your speeches about the USSR’s losses of 27 million people.

Sincerely, Matvienko Gennady Ivanovich

P.S. According to estimates, the losses (minimal) of Germans alone in World War 2 were no less than 12 million people (while the maximum estimate of losses of the German civilian population does not exceed 3 million). And they completely forgot the Hungarians, Romanians, Italians, Finns.

At Stalingrad in September 1942, Paulus’s army was 270 thousand people, and 2 Romanian and 1 Hungarian armies were about 340 thousand people.”

Thank you very much to Gennady Ivanovich for his letter. But the letter from another reader sent a little earlier is simply an illustration of what is written above.

Letter two.

“Dear Nikolai Viktorovich

Let me introduce myself. My name is Berkaliev Askar Abdrakhmanovich. I live in Kazakhstan in Almaty, a pensioner, but I continue to be interested in social and political life in the territory of the former USSR. I try to follow the television battles that our television broadcasts. I am impressed by your interpretation of the History of the Great Patriotic War and the fact that you examine the most controversial moments of this war. I would not bother you and take up your time if I had not accidentally stumbled upon facts that shook the established (for me personally) information about the losses of our country in the last war.

Until the 70s of the last century, it was believed that our country’s losses in the Great Patriotic War amounted to 20 million dead. Then the figure of 27 million appeared out of nowhere and there is a strong trend towards an increase in the number of our losses.

Some sections of society (especially the intelligentsia) have a point of view that the Soviet army showered the Germans with the corpses of its soldiers and won not by skill, but by numbers. I think that such an opinion contributes to belittling the merits of our people in winning that war. As well as regularly expressed points of view that without supplies under Lend-Lease we would not have won, that without the second front we would not have won, etc.

I'll tell you a little about what facts I found.

In the fall of 2013, I made a trip to Ukraine. My older brother Nariman Berkaliev died there at the end of 1943. For a long time we did not know the exact place of death and burial. The death notice stated that he died in the Kirovograd region on December 20, 1943, without indicating the exact place of burial. In 1991, the “Book of Memory” was published in our regional newspaper. The names of our fellow countrymen who died on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War were listed there, and the specified places of their burial were indicated.

Due to various circumstances, none of the remaining family members were able to travel to Ukraine. The parents were no longer alive, the older brothers were aged and their health did not allow them to travel to Ukraine. I was the youngest of the brothers and, putting aside other matters, I still went to the Kirovograd region and found the village of Sukhodolskoye in the Dolinsky district (during the war it was called Batyzman). Found a mass grave. The brother's name and surname were on the list engraved on granite stones. The mass grave is kept in good condition, thanks to the village residents. I laid flowers and handfuls of earth brought from my homeland.

Having the goal of visiting the grave of my older brother, I wanted to look at the land for the liberation of which my father fought. My father was drafted into the army in the summer of 1942 and ended up in the Stalingrad area. He was awarded the rank of sergeant (he had experience in the Civil War). He served in the 706th Infantry Regiment of the 204th Division, which was part of the 64th Army. On January 18, 1943, during the liquidation of an encircled German group, he was wounded. He was in a hospital in the city of Buzuluk and in the summer of 1943 he returned to the active army. He ended up in the 983rd regiment of the 253rd division, which was part of the 40th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. He took part in the battles for the liberation of the Poltava region, walked through Gogol’s places, was in Dikanka, and almost drowned in the Psel River there. In November 1943, part of them crossed the Dnieper in the area of ​​the Bukrin bridgehead, simulating that the main attack would come from here. In fact, the main attack was made from the Lyutezh bridgehead. For two days, their regiment, which moved to the right bank, held out under fire from the Germans, who were entrenched on the high bank of the Dnieper. On the third day, my father was wounded by a German mine explosion and evacuated to the rear. They wanted to amputate his legs, but he did not allow it, endured six months of treatment in a rear hospital and returned home in the summer of 1944. My father died in 1973 at the age of 70.

After a trip to Ukraine, I began to study in more detail the combat path of my closest relatives. From close relatives, my father, older brother, and six older cousins ​​took part in that war.

I am now retired, I have enough time and after a trip to Ukraine I decided to compose something like memoirs for the younger generation. Of course, a lot of space in the memoirs is devoted to how the older generation showed itself in the war. Of the eight close relatives who went to war, only four returned alive.

In the course of compiling my notes, which later grew into memoirs, I had to rummage through my home archives. It turned out that a lot of information can be found on the Internet. There are special sites “Feat of the People” and OBD “Memorial”. You, of course, know about this, but for me it was a big find. It turns out that having information about the number of a military unit, you can trace its combat path. You can find information about awards and even awards submissions. I remember my father talking about his last battle - crossing the Dnieper in early November 1943. On the third day after the crossing, already on the right bank, my father was wounded and was taken to the rear. Before being sent to the hospital, the commander told my father that he would nominate him for the Order of Glory, 2nd class (my father already had the Order of Glory, 3rd class). But he never received the promised order. On the Internet I found an award sheet (nomination for an award). My father was nominated not for the order, but only for the medal “For Courage,” but he didn’t receive that either. The award sheet indicated the circumstances and location of the battle. It was near the village of Khodorovka on the famous Bukrinsky bridgehead.

I started digging more thoroughly on the Internet. I entered the Memorial OBD website and found out that my father was considered killed on January 18, 1943 during the liquidation of an encircled German group (that is, during the first wound).

After discovering an obvious discrepancy between the information received and reality, I checked whether the Memorial OBD contained information about my other relatives who died at the front.

  1. Two older cousins ​​died back in 1941. There is no information about them. They were ordinary soldiers. In addition, I do not know exactly the years of birth and surnames (for Kazakhs, the surname is often taken from the name of the father, grandfather or distant ancestor).
  2. Another older cousin of Kairov, Salim, was a career military man who fought on the Kalinin Front. His name is listed on the Memorial OBD list of irretrievable losses three times. All three information contain the same last name and first name. Even the numbers of the military unit and division are the same. The difference is that somewhere he was recorded as a lieutenant, and somewhere as a senior lieutenant. In one case he was considered killed on January 9, 1943, and in another information on January 8, 1943. Somewhere he was considered to have been born in the Ashgabat region, and somewhere in the West Kazakhstan region. Although they were clearly talking about the same person (too many coincidences in details). But at the same time, each information from the Memorial OBD has a separate folder and file.

  1. My actually deceased elder brother Nariman also appears on the lists of the dead in the Memorial OBD three times. In one case, he is considered a fighter of the 68th brigade and is buried in the village. Batyzman, Dolinsky district. In other information, he is identified as a fighter who only has field mail 32172, without indicating the place of death. In the third case, he is recorded as a fighter of the 68th brigade. But the burial place is named the village of Batyzman, Novgorodkovsky district.

  1. There was another participant in the war in our family - the father of my wife Seidalin Mukash, born in 1910. When searching for data about him, the Memorial OBD indicated that senior sergeant of the 1120th Infantry Regiment Mukash Seydalin died in hospital from wounds in December 1942. In fact, he was wounded on December 6, 1942. After being wounded, he was given a commission and from 1943 worked as a teacher in the city of Chu, Dzhambul region. He died in 1985 at the age of 75.

I got a bunch of contradictory information.

  • My father returned from the war wounded but alive. According to information from Memorial OBD, he is considered dead.
  • My wife's father returned from the war wounded but alive. There is information about him that he died in the hospital.
  • My brother Nariman really died, but according to information from the Memorial OBD, he is on three lists, that is, he is listed as three different dead people.
  • Another brother (cousin) was also really killed, but according to information from the Memorial OBD, he was killed three times and there are three separate records about this.

It turns out that for four people there are eight reports of death, although only two actually died.

It seems to me that errors in the information could have arisen at the first stage, i.e. when filling out reports of irrecoverable losses. I saw the original military field records on the Internet. These are certainly genuine documents, written on yellowed paper which confirms the authenticity of the originals. But we must take into account that the recordings were made in conditions of hostilities, and by people who did not always themselves witness what happened, they often wrote from the words of other people. I cannot explain the appearance of information about the death of people who were in fact only wounded by other reasons. Ordinary human factor.

The appearance of errors associated with repeated inclusion in lists of irretrievable losses, I think, occurred at the digitization stage. Probably the information was not filtered enough to repeat the information. The computer is not able to detect the identity of the information if, for example, if there is the same last name and first name, the burial place does not match. For the computer, this is a different person. Here we can talk not about the human factor, but about its absence or insufficiency. A person would definitely guess that the information contained information about the same person. Too many matching details.

To objectively assess my doubts, it is necessary to conduct a study of a large sample of hundreds and thousands of people. I can’t do this, and besides, I’m not an expert in digging through archives and the Internet. Here we need professional historians who know how to understand archives and have access to large amounts of archival documents. I ask you to clarify whether my doubts are justified. If the facts that I encountered are widespread, then it is necessary to find out, at least to a first approximation, the percentage of errors. The usual human factor could greatly exaggerate our losses in the war. To my letter I attach information about my relatives who died in the war (and are considered dead). Maybe this will help you get a more objective picture.

I congratulate you on the upcoming 70th anniversary of Victory, I wish you creative success in the necessary work that you are carrying out.”

Thank you very much, dear Gennady Ivanovich and Askar Abdrakhmanovich, for your important and extremely interesting letters. Health and happiness to you!

So what is it, the true price of our Victory? When will speculation about the feat of our people come to an end and “new research” and “independent researchers” will stop exaggerating the number of victims that our multinational people brought to the altar of Victory?

And as a postscript, material about the Immortal Regiment as an inappropriate and harmful reform of the established order of celebrating Victory Day:

Let the Immortal Regiment become an attribute

Losses during the Second World War can be estimated differently, depending on the methods of obtaining source data and calculation methods. In our country, official data were recognized as those calculated by a research group working under the guidance of a consultant from the Military Memorial Center of the Russian Armed Forces. In 2001, the data was clarified, and at the moment it is believed that during the Great Patriotic War, 8.6 million Soviet military personnel died and another 4.4 million were missing or captured. The total loss of population, not only military personnel, but civilians, amounted to 26.6 million people.

Germany's losses in this war were somewhat smaller - a little more than 4 million military personnel killed, including those who died in captivity. Germany's allied countries lost 806 thousand military personnel killed, and 662.2 thousand military personnel returned from captivity after the war.

Answering the question about how many military personnel died in the Second World War, we can say that according to official data, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet Union and Germany amounted to 11.5 million people on the one hand and 8.6 million people on the other, i.e. . the ratio of losses of the opposing sides was 1.3:1.

In past years, completely different numbers were considered official data on the losses of the Soviet Union. Thus, until the end of the 80s of the 20th century, studies of losses during the war years were virtually not conducted. This information was not publicly available at that time. Official losses were considered to be those named in 1946 by Joseph Stalin, which amounted to 7 million people. During the reign of Khrushchev, the figure was more than 20 million people.

And only in the late 1980s, a group of researchers was able, based on archival documents and other materials, to estimate the losses of the Soviet Union in various types of troops. The work also used the results of commissions of the Ministry of Defense conducted in 1966 and 1988, as well as a number of materials declassified in those years. For the first time, the figure obtained by this research group and now considered official was published in 1990 at the celebration of the 45th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The losses of the Soviet Union significantly exceeded similar losses in the First World War or the Civil War. The vast majority of deaths, naturally, were among the male population. After the end of the war, the number of women from 20 to 30 years old exceeded the number of men of the same age by twice.

Foreign experts generally agree with the Russian assessment. However, some of them say that this figure may be only the lower limit of real losses in 1941-1945. The upper limit is 42.7 million people.