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Government program, under which the United States of America supplied its allies in World War II with military supplies, equipment, food and strategic raw materials, including petroleum products.

For the USSR (from the English lend - to lend, lease - to rent out). The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 authorized the President of the United States, when deemed necessary, to lend or lease defense articles "to the Government of any country the defense of which the President recognizes as vital to the security of the United States." On the same day, the law was extended to the UK, which became the main recipient of American aid, and to Greece. The United States made the decision to extend the Lend-Lease law to the USSR on November 7, 1941. But on October 30, F. Roosevelt, in a message to J.V. Stalin, announced his order to begin supplies to the USSR on the basis of the law of March 11, 1941 and provide for their payment is a loan of $1 billion. The volume and types of weapons, raw materials and food for the period from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 were determined by the First Protocol, signed on October 1, 1941 by representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain at the Moscow Conference on the issue of mutual military supplies. Subsequently, three more protocols were developed. During the period of the First Protocol, assistance to the USSR was provided in a relatively small volume and fell behind planned standards. Lend-Lease did not provide serious material assistance to the Battle of Moscow and the defenders of the capital, although some types of supplies (copper, aluminum, etc.) were compensated in the end. 1941 a rare drop in domestic industrial production. The main thing is that Lend-Lease had great moral and psychological significance for the Soviet people at the front and in the rear. The shipment of goods to the USSR under the First Protocol was provided mainly by Great Britain and was carried out mainly through Iceland, the Norwegian, Barents and White Seas. The weapons were delivered to Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Molotovsk (Severodvinsk). The North Atlantic route was the most dangerous. In the harsh conditions of the Arctic, with constant enemy attacks at sea and from the air, escorting caravans with cargo was associated with great casualties. Under the Second Protocol (July 1, 1942-June 30, 1943), supplies from Great Britain and the United States were distributed approximately equally; Their obligations were also not fully fulfilled. But even in 1942, the urgent needs of the USSR for trucks, fighters and transport aircraft were met to a large extent from Western sources of supply. The PQ-17 convoy heading to the USSR suffered heavy losses from enemy bombing and submarines in July 1942 (see Arctic convoys). During one of the most difficult periods of the war for the USSR, cargo shipments were suspended. Incomplete fulfillment of the conditions of the Second and subsequent supply protocols was also caused by a number of other circumstances: the priority requirements of the Anglo-American Mediterranean strategy over the requests of the Soviet Union, delays in deliveries due to the fault of some government structures of the Western powers, and their distrust of the USSR. President Roosevelt repeatedly intervened in the procedure for providing assistance to the Soviet Union when, for one reason or another, the fulfillment of obligations was slowed down or disrupted. Presidential Advisor G. Hopkins, who headed the Soviet Protocol Committee, acted energetically in the same spirit. Due to large losses on the northern route, other, less dangerous, but longer supply routes to the USSR were developed: the Pacific (to Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other cities) and trans-African (America - West Indies - Africa - Iraq - Iran - Baku). Since the summer of 1942, the main flow of cargo for the USSR was sent to Far East and to Iran. It was supplied through the Pacific Ocean to the USSR in 1943-1945. in increasing quantities of weapons and food. To receive the American Liberty ships and other large-capacity dry cargo ships, the port in Vladivostok was reconstructed and new ports were built. Approx. arrived in Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Khabarovsk and other cities. 2 thousand cargoes. Tanks, planes, cars, aviation gasoline and other important materials were sent to the USSR along the trans-African route. For their delivery, a through route was organized by rail and highway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Western specialists reconstructed Iraqi and Iranian ports, and together with their Soviet allies, the Americans developed and exploited supply routes through Iran. The air base in Abadan, created for the reception, assembly of aircraft and their delivery by air to the USSR, became important. Beginning with the Third Protocol (July 1, 1943–June 30, 1944), supplies were provided primarily by the United States; the main part of deliveries occurred in the 2nd half. 1943 and 1944. According to the Fourth Protocol, it was planned to provide assistance in the period from July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945. But on May 12, 1945, the Americans suspended supplies without warning. After the protest declared by the Soviet side, they resumed, but in limited quantities, and were intended only for the purpose of preparing the USSR for an attack against Japan. The last batch of cargo arrived in the USSR on September 20, 1945. According to official American data, from Western Hemisphere From June 1941 to September 20, 1945, cargo in the amount of 17.6 million long tons (1 long ton = 1.016 metric tons) was sent along all routes to the USSR. Of these, 47.1% went to the Soviet Far East, 23.8% through the Persian Gulf, 22.7% to northern Russia, 3.9% to the Black Sea region and 2.5% to the Soviet Arctic. The victory over Germany was achieved by the Soviet armed forces mainly with the help of weapons and ammunition produced at domestic enterprises. Supplies to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, according to initial government estimates, amounted to 4% of the total production of the USSR. IN Lately it was clarified that in relation to the production of military aircraft (bombers and fighters), this figure reached 16-23%. Lend-Lease was not, of course, an act of charity. US pursued own interests, primarily strategic (support for the Soviet-German front as the main front of World War 2). In the spring of 1945, influential pressure groups in the United States increased demands for a reduction in aid to the Soviet Union and other countries. An amendment to the lend-lease law was passed through Congress, according to which aid funds could not be used for the purposes of reconstruction and economic recovery of recipient countries. At the same time, it would be wrong to underestimate the importance of weapons, raw materials and food received from the USA, Great Britain and Canada (Canada became involved in direct assistance to the USSR from the Third Protocol). On all routes in 1941-1945. the USSR received 18,300 aircraft from these three countries different types, 11,900 tanks, 13,000 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 427,000 vehicles, as well as a significant amount of industrial equipment, raw materials and food. The volume of cargo provided by the United States amounted to 4.8 million long tons in 1943, 6.2 million in 1944, and 3.7 million tons in 1945 (through September 20). Of the 14,126 American aircraft (including 76% of Aircobra fighters), more than half were transported along the Fairbanks (Alaska) - Krasnoyarsk route, which operated for almost 3 years, including during the war between the USSR and Japan. Significant assistance was also provided by locomotives, tractors, sea vessels and road transport (jeeps and Studebakers) received from overseas. Supplies under Lend-Lease contributed to the creation of the material foundations for the victory of the USSR and other states, the development of a new mechanism for economic and international cooperation, which previously had no analogues in world practice.

Historical sources:

Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with US Presidents and British Prime Ministers during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Ed. 2nd. T 2. M., 1976.

Just numbers that visibly reveal to any sane person, whose brain is not yet completely filled with redneck patriotic shit, the true scale of material and resource assistance from the USA and England for the USSR, from which a simple fact is obvious, which sickles Russian patriots in the balls: without this help, the victory of the USSR over Germany would be ABSOLUTELY impossible.

Because there would be nothing to transport cargo and people with, nothing to shoot with, nothing to treat the wounded with and
there would be nothing to eat at all.

TRUCKS (pcs.):
Deliveries from the USA - 427,284
Deliveries from the British Empire - 5,232
Production in the USSR (1941-45) - 265,600
Ratio (Supply/Production) - 163%

The redneck patriots-"repeaters" forgot that most of the famous Soviet Katyushas stood on American Studebaker truck chassis

“... when American stew, shortening, egg powder, flour, and other products began to arrive to us, what significant additional calories our soldiers immediately received! And not only the soldiers: some also fell to the rear.

Or let's take the supply of cars. After all, we received, as far as I remember, taking into account losses along the way, about 400 thousand first-class cars for that time such as Studebaker, Ford, Willys cars and amphibians. Our entire army actually found itself on wheels, and what wheels! As a result, its maneuverability increased and the pace of the offensive increased noticeably.

Yes... - Mikoyan said thoughtfully. “Without Lend-Lease, we would probably have fought for another year and a half.”

G. A. Kumanev, A. I. Mikoyan “Stalin’s People’s Commissars Speak” (2005).

This is precisely what Nikolai Rabichev means when he revealed to the world (in East Prussia) that “by this time we had machines.”

LOCOMOTIVES (pcs):
Deliveries from the USA - 1977
Supplies from the British Empire - 4
Production in the USSR (1941-45) - 825
Ratio (Supply/Production) - 240%

MOTORCYCLES (pcs.):
Deliveries from the USA - 35,170
Deliveries from the British Empire - 1,721
Production in the USSR (1941-45) - 27,216
Ratio (Supply/Production) - 130%

THE SAME
(Ratio of supplies to own production in the USSR):

Armored vehicles (tanks, self-propelled guns, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers) 16.3%
Airplanes 11.7%
Railway cars 1020% (!!!)
Railway rails, thousand tons 57%
Car tires, thousand pieces 62%

At the same time, it is important to talk not only about the quantity, but also the quality of supplies. Yesterday one stupid redneck patriot wrote in the comments that the USA and England “they fused to the USSR what they themselves did not need, in particular, outdated airplanes.” Especially for the redneck patriots, I remind you that the Russian ace Pokryshkin, who shot down the most enemy aircraft (more than 60), flew precisely on the Lend-Lease American Bell P-39N Airacobra. These same “airplanes,” if possible, were also preferred by other pilots - there was a queue for them in the Soviet regiments.

As a 2/3 pilot, I naturally took a special interest in the issue of military aircraft construction in the USSR. To summarize:

a) Soviet aircraft were significantly more technically backward than those of the USA, England, and, especially, Germany. German fighters were built from duralumin, Soviet ones - from wood, plywood and fabric (!), respectively, they burned like candles, their wings fell off on turns, the pilots in them were absolutely not protected even from rifle bullets. At the beginning of the war, they were predominantly equipped with engines of Spanish and English production (their outdated models). Serial Soviet cars almost never showed the parameters stated in their characteristics.

In patriotic Soviet and Russian cinema The pilots are actively talking to each other. In reality this was not the case. Even in 1944, only 1 aircraft out of 10 (!!), usually command planes, was equipped with a full-fledged radio station. The rest of the pilots could only listen to him. If the commander was shot down, the entire group was left without communication. Full communication was only on "not needed by the USA and England airplanes" supplied under Lend-Lease.

b) The rate of climb and acceleration of Soviet fighters as a whole was at the level of the baseboard. Taking into account the skill of the German pilots, which was four times superior to the skill of the Soviet "aces", as well as the progressive type of combat "on the vertical" (Soviet pilots, until 1943, tried to fight "on turns"; their low-power engines simply did not "pull" vertical combat) , Hitler’s pilots drove them into the ground by the hundreds. The number of German pilots, who had more than 100 enemy kills to their credit, numbered in the hundreds; two German aces shot down more than 350 Soviet aircraft each. ...More than twenty thousand Soviet fighters on the Soviet-German front crushed only 700 German Messerschmitts and Foke-Wulfs. As one German pilot wrote in his diary: "It doesn't look like air battle, but for the work of the firing squad."

Copper, thousand tons 76%
Aluminum, thousand tons 106%
Tin, thousand tons 223%
Cobalt, tons 138%

Explosives, thousand tons 53%
Aviation gasoline, thousand tons 55%
Wool, thousand tons 10%

Sugar, thousand tons 66%
Canned meat, million cans 480% (!!!)
Animal fats, thousand tons 107%

THE USA AND ENGLAND WAS SUPPLIED TO THE USSR:

anti-submarine ships 105 units;
torpedo boats 202 units;
submarines 4 units;
cargo ships 90 units;
7,784 engines for ships;

1,981 locomotives (2.4 times more than those produced during the war years in the USSR);
11,075 freight cars (10.2 times more);
railway rails 622.1 thousand tons (56.5% of own production),
8,071 tractors;
tires 3,786,000 pieces;

more than 5,000 anti-tank guns;
rifles 8,218;
automatic weapons 131,633;
12,997 pistols;

explosives: 345,735 tons
(including
dynamite 31,933 tons;
toluene 107,683 tons;
TNT 123,150 tons);

gunpowder 127,000 tons;
highly purified ethanol (for the manufacture of explosives) 331,066 liters;
detonators 903,000 pieces;

radars 2074 units;
radio stations 4,338 units + 9,351 American radio stations for installation on Soviet-made fighters,
telephones 2,500,000 pieces;

metal-cutting machines 38,100 pieces;
machinery and equipment for $1,078,965,000 (in 1940 prices);
building equipment for $10,910,000;

food 4,478,000 tons;

The entire Russian north survived EXCLUSIVELY on American canned meat (beef stew). Based on the calorie content of this food, based on wartime standards, it should have been enough to support a 10 million army for more than three years.

steel 2,800,000 tons;
non-ferrous metals 802,000 tons;
petroleum products 2,670,000 tons;
chemicals 842,000 tons;
cotton 106,893 tons;
leather 49,860 tons;

army boots 15,417,000 pairs;
blankets 1,541,590 pieces;
buttons 257 million.

Almost all sulfonamides and penicillins, which saved millions of lives and were used in Red Army and civilian hospitals, were supplied under Lend-Lease.

The United States supplied 2 million 13 thousand tons of aviation gasoline (together with the allies - 2 million 586 thousand tons) - almost 2/3 of the fuel used by Soviet aviation during the war years.

In addition to the finished aviation gasoline, oil refining equipment was supplied for its production on the territory of the USSR, and the volume of these supplies was such that the company’s own annual production of aviation gasoline increased from 110,000 tons in 1941 to 1,670,000 tons in 1944.

Along with airplanes, the USSR received hundreds of tons of aviation spare parts, aviation ammunition, fuel, special airfield equipment and equipment, including 9351 American radio stations for installation on Soviet-made fighters, and aircraft navigation equipment (radio compasses, autopilots, radars, sextants, attitude indicators).

Due to the fact that most shipyards were under occupation or blockade and due to the long production cycle, Soviet shipbuilding was practically stopped during the war, and the Soviet fleet received more than 400 new ships under Lend-Lease, of which 80% were military - anti-submarine ships, destroyers and submarines.

LEND-LEASE DEBT AND THEIR PAYMENT:

Immediately after the war, the United States sent countries that received Lend-Lease assistance an offer to return surviving military equipment and pay off the debt in order to obtain new loans. Because the The Lend-Lease law provided for the write-off of used (lost during hostilities) military equipment and materials; the Americans insisted on payment only for civilian supplies: railway transport, power plants, ships, trucks and other equipment located in the recipient countries as of September 2, 1945, taking into account its wear and tear. The United States did not demand compensation for military equipment destroyed during the battles.

The volume of American supplies to the USSR under Lend-Lease amounted to about $10.8 billion (1940 prices). To agree on the final amount, Soviet-American negotiations began immediately after the end of the war.

In the USA, it was initially calculated that the amount to be paid for surviving civilian equipment and equipment, taking into account their wear and tear, was $2.6 billion; for negotiations, this amount was halved, to $1.3 billion.

At the 1948 negotiations, Soviet representatives agreed to pay only $170 million (13% of the invoice) and were met with a predictable refusal from the American side.

Negotiations in 1949 also did not lead to anything (the Soviet side increased the proposed amount to $200 million, with installments for 50 years, the American side reduced it to $1 billion, with installments for 30 years).

In 1951, the Americans twice reduced the payment amount, which became equal to $800 million, but the Soviet side agreed to pay only $300 million.

An agreement with the USSR on the procedure for repaying debts under Lend-Lease was concluded only in 1972 (!!). Under this agreement, the USSR agreed to pay $722 million, including interest, by 2001.

By July 1973, three payments were made totaling $48 million, after which payments were stopped due to the introduction of discriminatory measures by the American side in trade with the USSR (Jackson-Vanik Amendment).

In June 1990, during negotiations between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing debt. Was installed new term the final repayment of the debt is 2030, and the amount is $674 million.

After the collapse of the USSR, the question arose: to whom did the obligations on the debts of the former USSR (including debts under Lend-Lease) pass?

On December 4, 1991, 8 republics of the USSR, including the RSFSR, signed the “Agreement on Succession in Respect to the External Public Debt and Assets of the USSR,” which fixed the share of each republic in the debts (and assets) of the former USSR. At the same time, the Russian share was set at 61.34%. The treaty, however, was signed only by part of the republics of the former USSR; the Baltic countries, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan never signed it.

In 1992-1994, however, Russian Federation signed bilateral agreements with the successor countries of the USSR on the “zero option”, according to which the Russian Federation assumed servicing of the entire public debt of the former USSR in exchange for the refusal of other republics from their almost half share in all assets of the USSR (gold and foreign exchange reserves, property abroad, property of the armed forces, etc.). In this regard, on April 2, 1993, the Russian government announced that it would assume responsibility for all debts of the USSR.

Technically, the USSR's debts were divided into debts to governments (Paris Club) and debts to private banks (London Club); the debt for Lend-Lease was a debt to the US government, that is, part of the debt to the Paris Club. Russia fully repaid its debt to the Paris Club in August 2006.

Thus, out of the total volume of American supplies under Lend-Lease of $10.8 billion, for the surviving equipment, according to the United States, it was necessary to pay $1.3 billion, or about 12%.

As a result, the USSR, and then the Russian Federation, of the amount of 1.3 billion dollars, recognized and then partially paid 722 million dollars, or about 55%, that is, 6.5% of total cost supplies received by the USSR. It must also be taken into account that the amount of debt was not indexed for inflation, and in 2015 prices the cost of supplies under Lend-Lease was $160 billion and, thus, the real payment amounted to 0.4% of all assistance.

(Especially for the stupid redneck patriots, I explain: it’s the same as someone borrowing a thousand rubles from your grandfather to buy a cow, and after 50 years his grandson returned you 4 rubles, which you best case scenario enough for two onions.)

If the debtor pays the creditor 50 years later 0.4% of the actual amount of the debt, then we can reasonably say two things:

1) The USSR cheated the United States regarding payment for material and raw material assistance received under Lend-Lease;

2) Microscopic The size of the “reimbursement” for Lend-Lease allows us to say that in fact there was no compensation, and all material and raw material assistance under Lend-Lease was actually received by the USSR for free.

The size of this assistance is such that we can clearly say that without its provision the USSR would not have been able to win this war.

Still, do you want to “repeat”, my stupid Russian redneck patriots? Do you still think that the USA and England will provide you with assistance worth 10 billion dollars, fill you with railway cars, trucks, engines, medicines, canned food, pills and buttons, and then you will “throw them away” again? Oh well...

This is naked truth life.

According to Wikipedia:

As a rule, in a dispute about the significance of Lend-Lease for the USSR during the Great Patriotic War There are only two absolutely “polar” points of view – “patriotic” and “liberal”. The essence of the first is that the influence of the Allied material assistance was very small and did not have any significant role, the second is that Soviet Union was able to win the war solely thanks to the United States.

So, Lend-Lease is a program under which the United States provided various types of financial assistance to its allies in World War II. The first steps in this direction were taken at the end of 1940, when the USA and Great Britain concluded the so-called. the “destroyers for bases” agreement, under which 50 destroyers were transferred to England in exchange for a 99-year “lease” of a number of British bases in various areas of the World Ocean. Already in January 1941, the Lend-Lease bill was approved by the US Senate, and this program was actually given a “start”.

This law assumed that the United States would supply its allies with weapons, equipment and various industrial resources. At the same time, equipment lost in battles is not subject to payment, and the remaining equipment after the end of the war must be fully or partially paid for.

Let us briefly consider the situation in which it began this program. By the beginning of 1941, Germany had defeated all its opponents in European continent, the last “stronghold of resistance” at that time was England, which was from being captured by German troops saved the island situation. However, for her the situation did not look at all joyful - most of the available equipment and weapons ground forces was lost at Dunkirk, the economy could barely “pull” the war, in Africa and in the Mediterranean theater of operations, British troops could not withstand the onslaught of Germany, the fleet worked under hellish overstrain, “torn” between several key “directions” and was forced to defend extremely stretched communications, "Empires where the sun never sets."

The communications themselves were under the threat of being completely cut off - “wolf packs” of German submarines, which at that moment had reached the peak of their success, were “atrocious” in the Atlantic. In general, despite the victory in the Battle of Britain, England was under threat of military and economic collapse.

At the same time, the United States remained a neutral country; the dominant policy in the country was isolationism. On the other hand, the prospect of Germany establishing complete control over Europe did not at all appeal to the Americans. The logical conclusion was to provide large quantities of material and military assistance necessary to “stay afloat” for England, especially since America had enormous economic power behind it, and this assistance could be provided without significant “strain.” Yes, initially Lend-Lease was focused primarily on Britain, and throughout the Second World War it was its main “consumer,” receiving an amount of aid several times greater than all the other countries of the Anti-Hitler Coalition combined.

After the German attack on the USSR, the US and British governments approved an aid program for the Soviet Union and Lend-Lease was “extended” to the USSR. Deliveries began already in October 1941, when the first convoy, designated “Dervish,” departed from England to the North of the USSR; the following “Atlantic” convoys were called the abbreviation PQ.

Let's consider what significance this had for the Soviet Union. The “main sides” of the Lend-Lease controversy focus on those points where Lend-Lease’s contribution was large, and vice versa. First of all, it is worth noting that Lend-Lease is not so much about supplies military equipment and weapons, as well as the supply of various industrial equipment and resources. When the Lend-Lease program started, the situation for the USSR was almost catastrophic - most of the “pre-war” army was destroyed, the Wehrmacht was getting closer and closer to Moscow, huge territories were lost, on which a colossal part of the industrial potential was concentrated.

The industry itself has been largely evacuated and scattered across echelons located in the vast expanses of the country, moving into the deep regions of the Soviet Union; accordingly, the possibilities of replenishing losses and producing new equipment are significantly limited. The main contribution of Lend-Lease is that at a critical time - the end of 1941 and the first half of 1942, it allowed the evacuated industry to “turn around” much faster, thanks to the supply of scarce raw materials, machine tools, equipment, etc., which this, to a certain extent, compensated for the “distortions” of Soviet industry, as well as the inevitable losses during its evacuation.

Moreover, throughout the war, for a number of resources, supplies under Lend-Lease were comparable to their actual production in the USSR. This is, for example, the production of rubber, explosives, aluminum, etc. Without Lend-Lease, there was a significant risk that many sectors of Soviet industry would have to “swing” much longer.

As for equipment and weapons, the contribution here in general statistics is really small, but it was very, very significant in the first years of the Great Patriotic War. There were 4 routes for the supply of military equipment and resources:

1, “Arctic route”. He is the most famous. This route ran from England or Iceland (where convoys were formed) to the northern ports of the USSR, from where the cargo was sent to its destination. In the first years of the war, this route was the most significant, because the journey along it took only two weeks, and in conditions of 41-42, every day counted. The convoys that moved along it received the name PQ - when the convoy went to the USSR, and when it went back, the abbreviation changed to QP.

The first five convoys passed without losses, but starting with convoy PQ-5, losses became regular. The Germans, quickly realizing the significance of this route, transferred all their large surface forces to Norway, also significantly increased the group of submarines and aircraft in Norway and began an active fight against allied convoys. Their biggest success was the beating of convoy PQ-17, which lost 2/3 of its strength and, along with its ships, equipment and weapons that could have equipped an entire army of 50 thousand people were lost.

2. Iranian route. It was the safest, but at the same time the most long haul delivery of military equipment. In total, from dispatch from the USA to the destination, the cargo journey along it took about 3 months.

3. Alaska-Siberian Railway or ALSIB. This route was used for ferrying aircraft - the Americans ferryed the aircraft to Chukotka, and the Soviet pilots already received them and transported them to the Far East, from where they dispersed to the required parts. The delivery time for aircraft this way was very fast, but at the same time this route was extremely dangerous - if the ferry pilot fell behind the group, got lost, or something happened to the plane, it was a guaranteed death.

4. Pacific route. It ran from the ports West Coast The USA to the Far Eastern ports of the USSR was relatively safe - transports traveling through the North Pacific Ocean were significantly safe, as a rule, Japanese submarines simply did not sail here, and in addition, a considerable part of the cargo was carried by Soviet transports, which the Japanese could not attack. This route was relatively long, but it was along it that more than half of the supplied resources and materials arrived.

As already mentioned, at the end of 1941, the USSR’s ability to make up for losses was very meager, and Lend-Lease equipment played a significant role here. However, in key directions (for example, near Moscow) there was very little of it. At the end of 19441, it was possible to form two reserve armies, equipped primarily with Lend-Lease weapons, but they were never brought into battle even at the critical moments of the Battle of Moscow, they managed “on their own.”

On the contrary, in “minor” theaters of operations the percentage of “foreign” equipment was huge. For example, most of the fighters in the “northern” theater of operations of the Eastern Front (Leningrad and the North of the USSR) consisted of Hurricanes and Tomahawks. Of course, they were inferior in quality to the German ones, but in any case it was much better than the I-16 and I-153. Lend-Lease equipment was very useful there, especially considering that one of the main supply routes passed through the North, and these fronts were supplied on a residual basis.

Lend-Lease technology played a particularly important role in the Battle of the Caucasus. Because of critical situation near Stalingrad, all Soviet reserves went there, and the Caucasian Front received equipment in extremely small quantities, and even then, outdated.

But fortunately, the “Iranian route” passed nearby, which made it possible to quickly make up for losses. It was Lend-Lease that provided 2/3 of the Caucasian Front’s needs for equipment, moreover, “increasing” its quality level. In particular, the Matilda and Valentine tanks that arrived at that time looked clearly better than the hopelessly outdated T-26 and BT that equipped the front at the beginning of the Battle of the Caucasus.

The quality level of equipment supplied under Lend-Lease was generally equivalent to similar Soviet models. However, one can trace very interesting point- equipment that showed mediocre results in the armies of the “producing countries” operated extremely successfully on the Eastern Front. For example, the American P-39 Airacobra fighters in the Pacific theater of operations were very mediocre machines, hated by pilots, but on the Eastern Front they gained enormous military glory, many Guards air regiments were armed with them, many famous fighters fought in them Soviet aces. And it was these aircraft that became the most popular of the Lend-Lease aircraft.

The situation is similar with the A-20 Boston bombers - in the Pacific Ocean it showed itself to be a very mediocre machine, but in the USSR up to 70% of the mine-torpedo regiments were armed with them, and the planes themselves became the “favorites” of Soviet bomber pilots. On the contrary, the legendary Spitfires did not “take root” at all in the USSR and were sent mainly to air defense regiments, without actually taking part in hostilities.

Of military equipment, the largest contribution of Lend-Lease is trucks and cars. The Soviet automobile industry was less developed than other powers, and the Americans supplied them in huge quantities. By the 44th, this made it possible to significantly increase the maneuverability of tank and mechanized corps, in particular. And if for tanks and aircraft the share of Lend-Lease equipment was about 12%, then here it is all 45-50.

In general, Lend-Lease, yes, really was of great importance in the first two years of the war for the USSR, and without it it would have been at least very bad. Most likely, the USSR would have won the war, but with much heavier losses, or could not achieve such impressive results by 1945. However, it is worth noting the following points:

As a rule, indicating the percentage of deliveries under Lend-Lease serves as some kind of hint at the economic weakness of the USSR, they say, look, without the Allies, the USSR would have died, etc. However, it is worth noting that the USSR received assistance under Lend-Lease that was FOUR times LESS than Great Britain, which, unlike the USSR, was extremely tight on the Lend-Lease needle, and the percentage of American equipment in the British army was many times greater. For example, the USSR received 18 thousand aircraft, while Great Britain received about 32 thousand.

As a result, if the USSR managed not only to survive in the bloodiest war in the history of mankind, taking the main blow, but also to end the war in the status of a Superpower, then England, on the contrary, lost its “imperial” status, after the war quickly sliding to the level of a completely ordinary European country, and actually became a “semi-satellite” of the United States.

In general, history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, and with no less success one can argue about, for example, what Germany would do without Swedish ore and rare metals.

Most importantly, by helping the USSR with supplies under Lend-Lease, the Allies also helped themselves, because The more successful the Soviet army was, and the more German forces it “attracted” to itself, the easier it was for the Allies themselves. Namely, the diversion of most of the German forces against the USSR made it possible to achieve victories in Africa and Italy, successfully land in France, bomb German industry with an acceptable level of losses, etc.

Payment of debts under Lend-Lease became a significant stumbling block between the USSR and the USA already when the former allies were separated by the curtain of the Cold War. Despite a significant restructuring of debts, the then Soviet leadership refused to pay them. Stalin rightly stated that Soviet soldiers paid all their debts in full with their blood. Unfortunately, after the collapse of the USSR, the debts were “re-issued” to Russia, and in currently Russia still owes about $100 million; the repayment period for the remaining debt is set until 2030.

Almost everyone knows about American supplies to the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Studebakers and American stew, nicknamed “the second front” by Soviet soldiers, immediately come to mind. But these are rather artistic and emotional symbols, which are actually the tip of the iceberg. The purpose of this article is to create a general idea of ​​Lend-Lease and its role in the Great Victory.

In the initial period of World War II, the so-called neutrality act was in force in the United States, according to which the only way to provide assistance to any of the warring parties was the sale of weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and transportation was also entrusted to the customer - the “pay and take” system (cash). and carry). Great Britain then became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its foreign exchange funds. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt understood perfectly well that in the current situation the best way out for the United States was to provide all possible economic support to the countries fighting against Nazi Germany. Therefore, on March 11, 1941, he actually “pushed through” the “Act for the Defense of the United States,” also called the Lend-Lease Act, in Congress. Now any country whose defense was considered vital to the United States and strategic raw materials was provided under the following conditions:

1. Weapons and materials lost during hostilities are not subject to payment.

2. The remaining property suitable for civilian purposes after the end of the war must be paid for in whole or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.

3. Any equipment not lost after the war must be returned to the United States.

Joseph Stalin and Harry Hopkins, 1941

However, the inclusion of the USSR in the Lend-Lease program occurred only in October-November 1941 (until that moment, our country paid for all American military supplies). It took Roosevelt such a long period of time to overcome the resistance sufficiently large number American politicians.

The first (Moscow) protocol, signed on October 1, 1941, provided for the supply of aircraft (fighters and bombers), tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, trucks, as well as aluminum, toluene, TNT, petroleum products, wheat and sugar. Further, the quantity and range of supplies constantly expanded.

Cargo delivery took place along three main routes: the Pacific, Trans-Iranian and Arctic. The fastest, but at the same time dangerous, was the Arctic route to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The ships were escorted by the British fleet, and on the approaches to Murmansk, security was reinforced by ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At first, the Germans practically did not pay attention to the northern convoys - so great was their confidence in an imminent victory, but as fighting became protracted, the German command pulled more and more forces to bases in Norway. The result was not long in coming.

In July 1942, the German fleet, in close cooperation with aviation, practically destroyed convoy PQ-17: 22 transport ships out of 35 were killed. Heavy losses, as well as the need to attract a large number of ships to escort ships with supplies for besieged Malta, and then prepare the landing in North Africa forced the British to stop escorting northern convoys before the onset of the polar night. Beginning in 1943, the balance of power in Arctic waters gradually began to shift towards the Allies. There were more convoys, and their escort was accompanied by fewer losses. In total, there are 4027 thousand tons of cargo along the Arctic route to the USSR. Losses did not exceed 7% of the total.

The Pacific route was less dangerous, along which 8,376 thousand tons were delivered. Transportation could only be carried out by ships flying the Soviet flag (the USSR, unlike the United States, was not at war with Japan at that time). Then the resulting cargo had to be transported by rail through almost the entire territory of Russia.

The trans-Iranian route served as a definite alternative to the northern convoys. American transport ships delivered cargo to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and then they were delivered to Russia using rail and road transport. In order to ensure complete control over transport routes, the USSR and Great Britain occupied Iran in August 1941.

To increase throughput, carried out large-scale modernization of the ports of the Persian Gulf and Trans-Iranian railway. General Motors also built two factories in Iran where they assembled cars intended for delivery to the USSR. In total, during the war years, these enterprises produced and sent 184,112 cars to our country. The total cargo flow through the ports of the Persian Gulf for the entire period of existence of the trans-Iranian route amounted to 4227 thousand tons.

Aircraft under the Lend-Lease program

In addition to those noted above, there were two more air routes along which aircraft were ferried “under their own power” to the USSR. The most famous was the Alsib air bridge (Alaska - Siberia), over which 7925 aircraft were transferred. Airplanes also flew from the USA to the USSR via the South Atlantic, Africa and the Persian Gulf (993 aircraft).

For many years, the works of domestic historians indicated that deliveries under Lend-Lease accounted for only about 4% of the total production of Soviet industry and Agriculture. And, although there is no reason to doubt the reliability of this figure, nevertheless, “the devil is in the details.”

It is well known that the strength of a chain as a whole is determined by the strength of its weakest link. Therefore, when determining the range of American supplies, the Soviet leadership sought first of all to close “weak spots” in the army and industry. This can be seen especially clearly when analyzing the volumes of strategic raw materials supplied to the USSR. In particular, the 295.6 thousand tons of explosives received by our country amounted to 53% of all produced at domestic enterprises. Even more impressive is this ratio for copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138%, wool - 102%, sugar - 66% and canned meat - 480%.

General A.M. Korolev and Major General Donald Connelly shake hands in front of a train arriving as part of Lend-Lease deliveries.

The role of Lend-Lease vehicles in combat operations is difficult to overestimate. To a large extent, they ensured the success of the victorious operations of 1944, which went down in history as “Stalin’s ten strikes.”

Considerable credit goes to allied supplies for the successful functioning of Soviet railway transport during the war. The USSR received 1,900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives (these figures look especially clear against the background of its own production in 1942–1945 of 92 locomotives), as well as 11,075 cars (own production - 1,087 cars).

“Reverse Lend-Lease” also functioned in parallel. During the war years, the Allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chrome and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as wood, gold and platinum.

During discussions on the topic “Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?” many copies were broken. The author believes that, most likely, he could. Another thing is that now it is not possible to calculate what the price of this would be. If the volume of weapons supplied by the allies, to one degree or another, could well be compensated by domestic industry, then with regard to transport, as well as the production of a number of types of strategic raw materials, without supplies from the allies, the situation would very quickly become critical.

The lack of rail and road transport could easily paralyze the supply of the army and deprive it of mobility, and this, in turn, would slow down the pace of operations and increase the growth of losses. A shortage of non-ferrous metals, especially aluminum, would lead to a decrease in the production of weapons, and without food supplies it would be much more difficult to fight hunger. Surely our country would be able to survive and win even in such a situation, but it is not possible to determine how much the price of victory would increase.

The Lend-Lease program ended at the initiative of the American government on August 21, 1945, although the USSR asked to continue supplies on credit terms (it was necessary to restore the country destroyed by the war). However, by that time F. Roosevelt was no longer among the living, and there was loud knocking on the door new era"Cold War".

During the war, payments for supplies under Lend-Lease were not made. In 1947, the United States estimated the USSR's debt for supplies at $2.6 billion, but a year later the amount was reduced to $1.3 billion. It was planned that repayment would be made over 30 years with an interest rate of 2.3% per annum. I.V. Stalin rejected these accounts, saying that “the USSR paid off the Lend-Lease debts in full with blood.” To substantiate its point of view, the USSR cited the precedent of writing off debts for deliveries under Lend-Lease to other countries. In addition, I.V. Stalin quite reasonably did not want to give the funds of a war-ravaged country to a potential enemy in the Third World War.

An agreement on the procedure for repaying debts was concluded only in 1972. The USSR pledged to pay $722 million by 2001. But after the transfer of $48 million, payments stopped again due to the adoption by the United States of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment.

This issue was raised again in 1990 at a meeting of the presidents of the USSR and the USA. A new amount was set - $674 million - and the final repayment date was 2030. After the collapse of the USSR, obligations on this debt passed to Russia.

Summing up, we can conclude that for the United States, Lend-Lease was, first of all, in the words of F. Roosevelt, “a profitable investment of capital.” Moreover, it is not the profits directly from supplies that should be assessed, but the numerous indirect benefits that the American economy received after the end of World War II. History would have it that the post-war prosperity of the United States was largely paid for in blood Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, Lend-Lease became practically the only way reduce the number of casualties on the way to Victory. This is a “marriage of convenience”...

Lend-Lease is a program under which the United States provided its allies in World War II with everything they needed - weapons, food, production equipment and raw materials.

Most often, however, “Lend-Lease” is understood specifically as the supply of weapons, without paying attention to other goods.

Causes and conditions

The American leadership rightly believed that in World War II, assistance should be given to those countries whose defense was of vital importance to the United States.

Initially, the Lend-Lease program included China and the British Empire, but then other countries, including the USSR, joined it.

The Lend-Lease Law adopted in March 1941 established the following supply rules:

• Equipment, weapons, food, materials and other goods used or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment.
• The goods left over from the war, if they could be useful for civilian purposes, were paid for on the basis of credits provided by the United States.
• If the United States is interested in returning a particular product after the war, it should be returned.

Thus, supplies were a kind of “gift” to the allies during the war, and in peacetime they turned into goods and could be purchased at quite reasonable prices.

Lend-Lease in the USSR

Lend-Lease in the USSR is still the subject of fierce debate between opponents and supporters Soviet power. The former claim that without American supplies the USSR was unlikely to win the war, while the latter argue that supplies were insignificant and did not play a special role in the fight against fascism.

Both of them are cruelly mistaken. The Western “superpower” organized large-scale supplies of weapons and other goods to European countries due to the fact that the US GDP was several times higher than that of any developed country. European country, including in the USSR.

Hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were imported into the Soviet Union. More than 12 percent of the tanks and aircraft available in the Red Army were American and British-made, and armored personnel carriers were completely imported: such equipment had not yet been produced in our country.

But this Lend-Lease also had weaknesses. Firstly, agreements on the supply of weapons and equipment were not fully implemented. Of the 800 aircraft and 1000 tanks intended for the USSR in 1941, only 669 aircraft and 487 tanks were sent. The situation more or less returned to normal only in 1943.

Secondly, a large number of foreign aid to the Soviet Union did not mean better quality. And here the point is not only that the United States deliberately supplied not the most modern and best of its equipment, but also that American military production generally lagged behind Soviet and European ones.

The USSR and Germany at that time invested most of their production forces in the development of weapons, including tanks, as a result of which they surpassed all other states in this; therefore, against the background of Soviet and German technology, American and even British technology often looked weak.

A more acceptable situation developed with the supply of aircraft, a less acceptable situation with tanks. The share of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns was very small, since the USSR had enough of its own similar equipment. Small arms were also supplied, but on an absolutely microscopic scale - the share of American “barrels” in the Red Army was less than 1 percent.

Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?

It is known that most of the Lend-Lease deliveries occurred in the period after 1943, when a turning point came in the war. That is, in the most terrible period of the war, the early period, the help of the allies was minimal, and in more successful years it was not so noticeable.

There are those who ask: if the Allies produced large quantities of weapons, why didn't they send more of them? In fact, the reason was not the stinginess of the “capitalist comrades”, but the tonnage of the American and British cargo fleet - it was very insufficient for mass deliveries.

There is another version that deliveries were simply delayed. And one more thing, the Americans were waiting for someone to help, either the USSR or Germany. Depending on the progress of the war. The more losses the parties have, the greater the investment. As always, they have calculations.

Could the Soviet Union even do without Lend-Lease? It seems like he could. It was enough to redistribute our own production capacities. However, this would require mobilizing great amount work force, which means a weakening of the army. Let us remember that America was an ally of the USSR.

It would be possible to close for absence the necessary equipment eyes, but then the army would also be weakened. The war for the USSR would have turned into an even more protracted conflict, Soviet army would have won the war anyway, perhaps later. R. Sherwood (American historian) quoted Harry Hopkins, who did not consider American assistance important in the USSR’s victory over fascism. He said: "The victory was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army."

Americans' benefit

Many political scientists, and even politicians themselves, do not hide the benefits to states from the supply of weapons that are not entirely new and in good working order. But they received their debt from Russia since World War 2. The exhausted and destroyed USSR could not give it up, and there were all sorts of other reasons, for example, tension between the two countries. We profited in full.