The weapons of the medieval Mongols - ancient Rus' - I can study - what I can do myself - fair of medieval reconstruction. Warriors of Genghis Khan

Drawing by Mikhail Gorelik.

An excerpt from a review article by orientalist, researcher of the history of weapons, art critic Mikhail Gorelik - about the history of Mongolian armor. The author of more than 100 scientific works passed away almost exactly a year ago. He devoted a significant part of his scientific activity to the study of the military affairs of the ancient and medieval peoples of Eurasia.

Source - Gorelik M.V. Early Mongolian armor (IX - first half of the 14th century) // Archeology, ethnography and anthropology of Mongolia. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1987.

As shown in recent works (18), the main components of the Mongolian medieval ethnos migrated to Mongolia, previously occupied mainly by the Turks, from the Southern Amur region and Western Manchuria during the 9th-11th centuries, displacing and partially assimilating their predecessors. At the beginning of the 13th century. Under Genghis Khan, almost all Mongol-speaking tribes and the Omongolized Turks, Tungus, and Tanguts of Central Asia were consolidated into a single ethnic group.

(The extreme east of Eurasia, the claims to which the Mongols never managed to realize: Japan)

Immediately following this, during the first half of the 13th century, the gigantic conquests of Genghis Khan and his descendants immeasurably expanded the territory of settlement of the Mongolian ethnic group, while on the outskirts there was a process of mutual assimilation of aliens and local nomads - Tungus-Manchus in the east, Turks in the west, and in the latter case, linguistically the Turks assimilate the Mongols.

A somewhat different picture is observed in the sphere of material and spiritual culture. In the second half of the 13th century. The culture of the Genghisid empire is emerging, with all its regional diversity, united in socially prestigious manifestations - costume, hairstyle (19), jewelry (20) and, of course, military equipment, especially armor.

To understand the history of Mongolian armor, the following questions should be clarified: the armor traditions of the Amur region in the 8th-11th centuries, Transbaikalia, Mongolia, southwest Central Asia and the Altai-Sayan Highlands by the 13th century, as well as the nomads of Eastern Europe and the Urals by the same period.

Unfortunately, there are no published materials on the armor of the period of interest to us, which existed in the territory of Outer Mongolia and Northwestern Manchuria. But quite representative material has been published for all other regions. A fairly wide distribution of metal armor is shown by finds of armor plates in the Northern Amur region (21) (see Fig. 3, 11-14), adjacent to the original habitat of the Mongols, in Transbaikalia (22) (see Fig. 3, 1, 2, 17, 18), where the clan of Genghis Khan roamed from the period of resettlement. Few, but striking finds come from the territory of Xi-Xia (23) (see Fig. 3, 6-10), many remains of Kyrgyz shells (24) were discovered in Tuva and Khakassia.

Xinjiang is especially rich in materials, where finds of things (see Fig. 3, 3-5) and especially the abundance of exceptionally informative painting and sculpture make it possible to extremely fully and in detail present the development of armor here in the second half of the 1st millennium (25), and not only in Xinjiang, but also in Mongolia, where the center of the first khaganates of the Turks, Uighurs and Khitans was located. Thus, we can safely say that the Mongols of the 9th-12th centuries. was well known and they used metal lamellar armor quite widely, not to mention armor made of hard and soft leather.

As for the production of armor by nomads, who, according to the conviction (or rather, prejudice) of many researchers, are not capable of making it themselves on a large scale, the example of the Scythians, in whose burials hundreds of armor were found (26), the Sakas, who in a short time mastered their mass production production and creation of the original complex of protective weapons (27), the Xianbi (one of the ancestors of the Mongols), whose sculptural images of men-at-arms on armored horses fill burials in Northern China, and finally, the Turkic tribes, who brought the original lamellar armor in the middle of the 1st millennium, including and horse armor, to Central Europe (it was borrowed by the Germans, Slavs and Byzantines) (28) - all this suggests that the nomads, given military necessity, could well produce a sufficient amount of metal armor, not to mention leather.

A sample of Scythian armor from the famous golden comb from the Solokha mound.

By the way, the etiological legend of the Mongols (like the Turks) characterizes them precisely as ironworkers; their most honorable title is darkhan, as well as the name of the founder of the state - Temujin, meaning masters of ironwork (29).

Equipping the Mongols with defensive weapons during the last decades of the 12th - first decades of the 14th centuries. can be determined, albeit very approximately, from written sources.

Lubchan Danzan in “Altan Tobchi” gives the following story: once Temujin, even before he created the state, was attacked on the road by 300 Tatars. Temujin and his warriors defeated the enemy detachment, “killed a hundred people, captured two hundred... took away a hundred horses and 50 shells” (30). It is unlikely that 200 prisoners were taken on foot and undressed - it would have been enough to tie their hands and tie the reins of their horses to their torques.

Consequently, one hundred captured horses and 50 shells belonged to 100 killed. This means that every second warrior had a shell. If such a situation took place in an ordinary skirmish of the time of troubles in the depths of the steppes, then in the era of the creation of an empire, enormous conquests, and the exploitation of the productive resources of cities, the equipment with defensive weapons should have increased.

Thus, Nasavi reports that during the storming of the city, “all the Tatars put on their armor” (31) (namely, shells, as the translator of the text Z. M. Buniyatov explained to us). According to Rashid ad-Din, gunsmiths under the Hulaguid Khan Ghazan supplied the state arsenals with 2 thousand, and with good organization, 10 thousand complete sets of weapons, including protective ones, per year, and in the latter case, weapons in large quantities were also available for free sale. The fact is that by the end of the 13th century. There was a crisis in kar-khane - state-owned factories, where hundreds of craftsmen gathered by the Mongol khans worked in semi-slave conditions.

The dissolution of craftsmen, subject to a certain quota of supplies to the treasury, for free work on the market, immediately made it possible to increase the production of weapons several times (instead of distributing weapons from arsenals, soldiers were given money to buy them on the market) (32). But at first, during the era of conquest, the organization of karkhane based on the exploitation of artisans captured in areas with a settled population should have had a great effect.

Mongol siege of Baghdad in 1221

On the Mongols of the 13th century. it is possible to extrapolate data on the Oirats and Khalkhins of the 17th and early 18th centuries. The Mongol-Oirat laws of 1640 speak of armor as a usual fine: from sovereign princes - up to 100 pieces, from their younger brothers - 50, from non-ruling princes - 10, from officials and princely sons-in-law, standard bearers and trumpeters - 5 , from bodyguards, warriors of the categories lubchiten (“armor-bearer”), duulgat (“helmet-bearer”), degeley huyakt (“tegileinik” or “bearer of tegilei and metal armor”), as well as commoners, if the latter have armor, - 1 pc. (33) Armor - shells and helmets - appear as part of bridewealth, trophies, they were objects of theft, they were awarded, for the shell saved from fire and water the owner gave a horse and a sheep (34).

The production of armor in steppe conditions is also noted in the laws: “Every year, out of 40 tents, 2 must make armor; if they don’t do it, then they will be fined with a horse or a camel” (35). Later, almost 100 years later, on the lake. Texel from local ore, which the Oirats themselves had long mined and smelted in forges in the forest, they received iron, made sabers, armor, armor, helmets, they had about 100 craftsmen there, as the Kuznetsk nobleman I wrote about this. Sorokin, who was in Oirat captivity (36).

In addition, as one Oirat woman told the wife of the Russian ambassador I. Unkovsky, “all summer they collect up to 300 or more women from all the uluses in Urga to the kontaisha, and after a whole summer, for their own money, they sew kuyaks and clothes into armor, which they send to the army.” (37). As we see, in the conditions of a nomadic economy, simple types of armor were made by unskilled workers, complex ones - by professional craftsmen, of whom there were quite a few, and in the era of Genghis Khan, such as, say, the wandering blacksmith Chzharchiudai-Ebugen, who descended to the khan from Mount Burkhan-Khaldun (38) . European sources of the 13th century constantly speak of Mongolian armor as something common (meaning the application itself) (39)

A. N. Kirpichnikov, who wrote about the weakness of the defensive weapons of the Tatar-Mongols, referred to information from Rubruk (40). But this eyewitness traveled in peacetime and, in addition, noting the rarity and foreign origin of the metal armor of the Mongols, casually mentioning their armor made of skins among other weapons, he singled out only the exotic, in his opinion, armor made of hard leather (41). In general, Rubruk was extremely inattentive to military realities, in contrast to Plano Carpini, whose detailed descriptions are a first-class source.

The main visual source for the study of early Mongolian armor are Iranian miniatures of the first half of the 14th century. In other works (42) we have shown that in almost all cases the miniatures depict purely Mongolian realities - hairstyle, costume and weapons, strikingly different from those that we saw in Muslim art until the middle of the 13th century, and coinciding in detail with realities in the images of the Mongols in Chinese painting of the Yuan era.

Mongol warriors. Drawing from Yuan painting.

In the latter, however, there are practically no battle scenes, but in works of religious content (43) warriors are depicted in armor that differs from the traditional Sung, with facial features reminiscent of “Western barbarians.” Most likely these are Mongol warriors. Moreover, they look like the Mongols from the painting “The Tale of the Mongol Invasion” (“Moko surai ekotoba emaki”) from the imperial collection in Tokyo, attributed to the artist Tosa Nagataka and dating back to approximately 1292 (44).

The fact that these are Mongols, and not the Chinese or Koreans of the Mongolian army, as is sometimes believed (45), is evidenced by the national Mongolian hairstyle of some warriors - braids arranged in rings, falling onto the shoulders.

- on ARD.

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Notes

18 Kyzlasov L. R. Early Mongols (to the problem of the origins of medieval culture) // Siberia, Central and East Asia in the Middle Ages. - Novosibirsk, 1975; Kychanov E.I. Mongols in the VI - first half of the XII century. // Far East and neighboring territories in the Middle Ages. - Novosibirsk, 1980.

16 Gorelik M.V. Mongols and Oghuzes in Tabriz miniature of the 14th-15th centuries // Mittelalterliche Malerei im Orient.- Halle (Saale), 1982.

20 Kramarovsky M. G. Toreutics of the Golden Horde of the XIII-XV centuries: Author's abstract. dis. ...cand. ist. Sciences. - L., 1974.

21 Derevianko E.I. Troitsky burial ground. - Table. I, 1; III. 1-6; XV,7, 8, 15-18 et al.; Medvedev V. E. Medieval monuments... - Fig. 33, 40; table. XXXVII, 5, 6; LXI et al.; Lenkov V.D. Metallurgy and metalworking... - Fig. 8.

22 Aseev I.V., Kirillov I.I., Kovychev E.V. Nomads of Transbaikalia in the Middle Ages (based on burial materials). - Novosibirsk, 1984. - Table. IX, 6, 7; XIV, 10,11; XVIII, 7; XXI, 25, 26; XXV, 7, 10, I-

23 Yang Hong. Collection of articles...- Fig. 60.

24 Sunchugashev Ya. I. Ancient metallurgy of Khakassia. The Age of Iron. - Novosibirsk, 1979. - Table. XXVII, XXVIII; Khudyakov Yu. V. Armament...-Table. X-XII.

23 Gorelik M.V. Armament of nations...

26 Chernenko E.V. Scythian armor. - Kyiv, 1968.

27 Gorelik M.V. Saki armor // Central Asia. New monuments of culture and writing. - M., 1986.

28 Thordeman V. Armour...; Gamber O. Kataphrakten, Clibanarier, Norman-nenreiter // Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien.- 1968.-Bd 64.

29 Kychanov E.I. Mongols...- P. 140-141.

30 Lubsan Danzan. Altan tobchi (“The Golden Legend”) / Trans. N. A. Shastina. - M., 1965. - P. 122.

31 Shihab ad-Din Muhammad an-Nasawi. Biography of Sultan Jalalad-Din Mankburny / Trans. 3. M. Buniyatova. - Baku, 1973. - P. 96.

32 Rashid ad-Din. Collection of chronicles / Trans. A. N. Arends. - M. - L., 1946. - T. 3. - P. 301-302.

33 Their tsaaz (“great code”). Monument to Mongolian feudal law of the 17th century/Transliteration, trans., intro. and comment. S. D. Dylykova. - M., 1981. - P. 14, 15, 43, 44.

34 Ibid. - pp. 19, 21, 22, 47, 48.

35 Ibid. - pp. 19, 47.

36 See: Zlatkin I. Ya. History of the Dzungar Khanate. - M., 1983.-P. 238-239.

37 Ibid. - P. 219.

38 Kozin A. N. Secret legend. - M. - L., 1941. - T. 1, § 211.

39 Matuzova V.I. English medieval sources of the 9th-13th centuries - Moscow, 1979. - P. 136, 137, 144, 150, 152, 153, 161, 175, 182.

40 Kirpichnikov A. N. Old Russian weapons. Vol. 3. Armor, a complex of military equipment of the 9th-13th centuries. // SAI E1-36.- L., 1971.- P. 18.

41 Travels to the eastern countries of Plano Carpini and Rubruk / Per.I. P. Minaeva. - M., 1956. - P. 186.

42 Gorelik M.V. Mongols and Oguzes...; Gorelik M. Oriental Armour...

43 Murray J. K. Representations of Hariti, the Mother of Demons and the theme of “Raising the Aims-howl” in Chinese Painting // Artibus Asiae.- 1982.-V. 43, N 4.- Fig. 8.

44 Brodsky V. E. Japanese classical art. - M., 1969. - P. 73; Heissig W. Ein Volk sucht seine Geschichte. - Dusseldorf - "Wien, 1964. - Gegentiher S. 17.

45 Turnbull S. R. The Mongols.- L., 1980.- P. 15, 39.

Reference

Mikhail Viktorovich Gorelik (October 2, 1946, Narva, ESSR - January 12, 2015, Moscow) - art critic, orientalist, researcher of the history of weapons. Candidate of Art History, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Academy of Arts of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The author of more than 100 scientific works, he devoted a significant part of his scientific activity to the study of the military affairs of the ancient and medieval peoples of Eurasia. He played a big role in the development of artistic scientific and historical reconstruction in the USSR, and then in Russia.

The 13th century Mongol army was a terrible instrument of war. It was, without a doubt, the best military organization in the world during this period. It consisted mainly of cavalry, accompanied by engineering troops. Historically, the Mongol army and military art followed the ancient military traditions of the steppe nomads. Under Genghis Khan, the Mongols brought ancient stereotypes to perfection. Their strategy and tactics were the culmination of the development of the cavalry armies of the steppe peoples - the best ever known.

In ancient times, the Iranians boasted the strongest cavalry in the world: the Parthias and Sassanids in Iran, as well as the Alans in the Eurasian steppes. The Iranians made a distinction between heavy cavalry, armed with sword and spear as their main weapons, and light cavalry, armed with bow and arrow. The Alans mainly depended on heavy cavalry. Their example was followed by the East German tribes associated with them - the Goths and Vandals. The Huns, who invaded Europe in the 5th century, were primarily a nation of archers. Due to the superiority of the Alan and Hun cavalry, the mighty Roman Empire found itself helpless when faced with the gradual onslaught of the steppe peoples. After the settlement of the Germans and Alans in the western part of the Roman Empire and the formation of the German states, the example of the Alan cavalry was followed by medieval knights. On the other hand, the Mongols developed and perfected Hunnic equipment and devices. But Alan traditions also played an important role in Mongol military art, as the Mongols used heavy cavalry in addition to light cavalry.

When assessing the Mongol military organization, the following aspects should be considered: 1. people and horses; 2. weapons and equipment; 3. training; 4. organization of the army; 5. strategy and tactics.

1. People and horses.“Horse culture” is the main feature of the life of the steppe nomads and the basis of their armies. Ancient authors who describe the lifestyle of the Scythians, Alans and Huns, as well as medieval travelers who dealt with the Mongols, present essentially the same picture of nomadic society. Any nomad is a born cavalryman; boys begin to ride horses in early childhood; every young man is an ideal rider. What is true of the Alans and Huns is also true of the Mongols. In addition, the Mongols were stronger. This was partly explained by the remoteness of their country and the very insignificant, during this period, softening influence of more cultured peoples; partly due to a more severe climate than in Turkestan, Iran and Southern Rus', where the Iranians lived.

In addition to this, every steppe Mongol or Turk is a born intelligence officer. During nomadic life, visual acuity and visual memory regarding every detail of the landscape develop to the highest degree. As Erendzhen Khara-Davan notes, even in our time “ a Mongol or Kyrgyz notices a person trying to hide behind a bush, at a distance of five or six miles from the place where he is. It is able to detect the smoke of a fire in a parking lot or the steam of boiling water from afar. At sunrise, when the air is transparent, he is able to distinguish the figures of people and animals at a distance of twenty-five miles" Thanks to their powers of observation, the Mongols, like all true nomads, have a deep knowledge of climatic and seasonal conditions, water resources and vegetation of the steppe countries.

The Mongols - at least those who lived in the 13th century - were endowed with amazing endurance. They could remain in the saddle for many days in a row with a minimum of food.

The Mongolian horse was a valuable companion for the rider. He could cover long distances with short breaks and subsist on tufts of grass and leaves he found along the way. The Mongol took good care of his horse. During the campaign, the rider changed from one to four horses, riding each in turn. The Mongolian horse belonged to a breed known to the Chinese since ancient times. In the second century BC. both the Chinese and the Huns became acquainted with the breed of Central Asian horses used by the Iranians. The Chinese highly valued these horses, and the Chinese envoy to Central Asia told the emperor that the best horses were sires of “heavenly stallions.” Many Central Asian horses were imported to China and, presumably, also to Mongolia. Mongolian horses of the 13th century were apparently hybrids. The Mongols attached special importance not only to the breed, but also to the color of horses. Whites were considered sacred. Each division of the imperial guard used horses of a special color; the warriors of the bagatur detachment, for example, rode black horses. This sheds light on Batu’s order to the population of the Ryazan principality at the beginning of the Russian campaign to give the Mongols a tenth of “the whole.” A tenth of the horses were to be selected separately for each color: black, tan, bay and piebald were mentioned.194

2. Weapons and equipment. The bow and arrow were the standard weapon of the Mongol light cavalry. Each archer usually carried two bows and two quivers. The Mongolian bow was very wide and belonged to a complex type; it required at least one hundred and sixty-six pounds of draw weight, which was more than an English longbow; its striking distance ranged from 200 to 300 steps.

The heavy cavalry warriors were armed with a saber and a spear, and in addition - a battle ax or mace and a lasso. Their defensive weapons consisted of a helmet (originally made of leather, and later of iron) and a leather cuirass or chain mail. The horses were also protected by leather headplates and armor that protected the upper torso and chest. The saddle was made durable and suitable for long-distance riding. Strong stirrups provided good support for the rider holding the bow.

During winter campaigns, the Mongols wore fur hats and fur coats, felt socks and heavy leather boots. After conquering China, they wore silk underwear year-round. Each Mongol warrior had with him a supply of dried meat and milk, a leather jug ​​for water or kumiss, a set for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle and thread.

Before Genghis Khan, the Mongols did not have artillery. They became acquainted with siege mechanisms in China and met them again in Central Asia. The mechanisms used by the Mongols were mainly of the Near Eastern type and had a range of 400 meters. Those that threw blocks or stones at a high trajectory worked with a heavy counterweight (like trebuchets in the West). Devices for throwing spears (ballistae) were much more accurate.

3. Training. Preparation for camp life began for any Mongol in early childhood. Each boy or girl had to adapt to the seasonal migration of the clan, tending its herds. Horseback riding was considered not a luxury, but a necessity. Hunting was an additional activity that, if the herd was lost, could become necessary for survival. Every Mongolian boy began to learn to hold a bow and arrow in his hands at the age of three.

Hunting was also considered an excellent training school for adult warriors, as we know from the hunting statute included in the Great Yasa. Yasa's rules regarding large hunting make it clear that this activity played the role of army maneuvers.

« Anyone who must fight must be trained in the use of weapons. He must be familiar with stalking in order to know how hunters approach the game, how they maintain order, how they surround the game depending on the number of hunters. When they begin the chase, they must first send scouts to get information. When (the Mongols) are not engaged in war, they must indulge in hunting and train their army to do so. The goal is not persecution as such, but the training of warriors who must gain strength and become proficient in handling the bow and other exercises"(Juvaini, section 4).

The beginning of winter was defined as the big hunting season. Orders were previously sent to the troops attached to the headquarters of the Great Khan, and to the horde or to the camps of the princes. Each army unit was required to provide a certain number of men for the expedition. The hunters deployed like an army - with a center, right and left flanks, each of which was under the command of a specially appointed leader. Then the imperial caravan - the Great Khan himself with his wives, concubines and food supplies - headed towards the main hunting theater. Around the vast territory designated for hunting, which covered thousands of square kilometers, a roundup circle was formed, which gradually narrowed over a period of one to three months, driving the game to the center where the Great Khan awaited. Special envoys reported to the khan on the progress of the operation, the availability and number of game. If the circle was not properly guarded and any game disappeared, the commanding officers - thousanders, centurions and foremen were personally responsible for this and were subjected to severe punishment. Finally, the circle closed, and the center was cordoned off with ropes around a ten-kilometer circumference. Then the khan rode into the inner circle, which by this time was full of various stunned, howling animals, and began shooting; he was followed by the princes, and then the ordinary warriors, each rank firing in turn. The massacre continued for several days. Finally, a group of old men approached the khan and humbly begged him to grant life to the remaining game. When this was accomplished, the surviving animals were released from the circle in the direction of the nearest water and grass; the dead were collected and counted. Each hunter, according to custom, received his share.

4. Organization of the army. The two main features of Genghis Khan's military system - the imperial guard and the decimal system of army organization - have already been discussed by us. A few additional points need to be made. The Guard, or horde troops, existed before Genghis Khan in the camps of many nomadic rulers, including the Khitans. However, never before has it been so closely integrated with the army as a whole as it happened under Genghis Khan.

Additionally, each member of the imperial family who was given an allotment had his own guard troops. It should be remembered that a certain number of yurts or families were associated with the horde of each member of the imperial family who was the owner of the plot. From the population of these yurts, any khatun or any prince had permission to recruit troops. These horde troops were under the command of a military commander (noyon), appointed by the emperor as manager of the allotment's economy, or by the prince himself in the case when he occupied a high position in the army. Presumably, a unit of such troops, depending on its size, was considered a battalion or squadron of one of the “thousands” of regular service troops, especially when the prince himself had the rank of thousand and himself commanded this thousand.

In conventional army troops, smaller units (tens and hundreds) usually corresponded to clans or groups of clans. A thousand-strong unit could be a combination of clans or a small tribe. In most cases, however, Genghis Khan created every thousand unit from warriors belonging to various clans and tribes. Ten-thousandth connection ( Tumen) almost always consisted of various social units. Perhaps this, at least in part, was the result of the conscious policy of Genghis Khan, who tried to make large army units loyal to the empire rather than to the old clans and tribes. In accordance with this policy, the leaders of large formations - thousanders and temniks - were appointed personally by the emperor, and Genghis Khan’s principle was the promotion of every talented individual, regardless of social origin.

Soon, however, a new trend became apparent. The head of a thousand or ten thousand, if he had a capable son, could try to transfer his position to him. Similar examples were frequent among the commanders of the horde troops, especially when the military leader was a prince. There are known cases of transfer of office from father to son. However, such an action required the personal approval of the emperor, which was not always given.

The Mongolian armed forces were divided into three groups - the center, the right and the left. Since the Mongols always pitched their tents facing south, the left hand signified the eastern group and the right hand the western group. Special officers ( yurtchi) were appointed to plan the disposition of troops, the direction of movement of armies during campaigns and the location of camps. They were also responsible for the activities of intelligence officers and spies. The position of chief yurtchi can be compared to the position of chief quartermaster in modern armies. Cherbi had commissariat services as their duty.

During the reign of Genghis Khan, the entire military organization was under constant supervision and inspection by the emperor himself, and the Great Yasa recommended this to future emperors.

« He ordered his heirs to personally check the troops and their weapons before the battle, supply the troops with everything necessary for the campaign and observe everything, down to the needle and thread, and if any warrior did not have the necessary thing, then he was to be punished"(Makrizi, section 18).

The Mongol army was united from top to bottom by iron discipline, to which both officers and ordinary soldiers obeyed. The head of each unit was responsible for all his subordinates, and if he himself made a mistake, then his punishment was even more severe. Discipline and training of troops and a line system of organization kept the Mongol army in constant readiness for mobilization in the event of war. And the imperial guard - the heart of the army - was in a state of readiness even in peacetime.

5. Strategy and tactics. Before the start of a major campaign, a kurultai met to discuss the plans and goals of the war. It was attended by the heads of all major army formations, they received the necessary instructions from the emperor. Scouts and spies arriving from the country chosen as the target of attack were questioned, and if the information was insufficient, then new scouts were sent to collect additional information. Then the territory where the army was to concentrate before the march was determined, and the pastures along the roads along which the troops would march.

Much attention was paid to propaganda and psychological treatment of the enemy. Long before the troops reached the enemy country, secret agents stationed there tried to convince religious dissenters that the Mongols would establish religious toleration; the poor, that the Mongols will help them in the fight against the rich; rich merchants that the Mongols would make the roads safer for trade. Everyone was promised peace and safety if they surrendered without a fight, and terrible punishment if they resisted.

The army entered enemy territory in several columns, carrying out operations at some distance from each other. Each column consisted of five parts: the center, the right and left hands, the rear guard and the vanguard. Communication between the columns was maintained through messengers or smoke signals. When an army advanced, an observation contingent was posted at every major enemy fortress, while mobile units hurried forward to engage the enemy field army.

The main goal of the Mongol strategy was to encircle and destroy the main enemy army. They tried to achieve this goal - and usually succeeded - using the big hunt tactic - the ring. Initially, the Mongols surrounded a large territory, then gradually narrowed and compacted the ring. The ability of the commanders of individual columns to coordinate their actions was amazing. In many cases, they gathered forces to achieve the main goal with the precision of a clockwork mechanism. Subedai's operations in Hungary can be considered a classic example of this method. If the Mongols, when confronted with the main enemy army, were not strong enough to break through its lines, they pretended to retreat; in most cases, the enemy took this for a disorderly flight and rushed forward in pursuit. Then, taking advantage of their maneuvering skills, the Mongols suddenly turned back and closed the ring. A typical example of this strategy was the Battle of Liegnitz. At the Battle of the River Sit, the Russians were surrounded before they could mount any serious counterattack.

The Mongol light cavalry was the first to enter the battle. She wore down the enemy with constant attacks and retreats, and her archers hit the enemy ranks from a distance. The movements of the cavalry in all these maneuvers were directed by their commanders with the help of pennants, and at night lanterns of various colors were used. When the enemy was sufficiently weakened and demoralized, heavy cavalry was rushed into battle against the center or flank. The shock of her attack usually broke resistance. But the Mongols did not consider their task completed, even after winning the decisive battle. One of the principles of Genghis Khan's strategy was to pursue the remnants of the enemy army until its final destruction. Since one or two tumens in this case were quite enough to completely stop the enemy’s organized resistance, other Mongol troops were divided into small detachments and began to systematically plunder the country.

It should be noted that since their first Central Asian campaign, the Mongols had acquired very effective techniques for siege and final assault of fortified cities. If a long siege was expected, a wooden wall was erected around the city at some distance from the city in order to prevent supplies from outside and cut off the garrison from communication with the local army outside the city territory. Then, with the help of prisoners or recruited local residents, the ditch around the city wall was filled with fascines, stones, earth and whatever was at hand; siege mechanisms were brought into a state of readiness to bombard the city with stones, containers filled with resin and spears; Ram installations were pulled close to the gate. Eventually, in addition to the engineering corps, the Mongols began to use infantry troops in siege operations. They were recruited from residents of foreign countries that had previously been conquered by the Mongols.

The high mobility of the army, as well as the endurance and frugality of the soldiers, greatly simplified the task of the Mongol quartermaster service during campaigns. Each column was followed by a camel caravan with the minimum necessary. Basically, the army was expected to live off the conquered land. It can be said that in every major campaign the Mongol army had a potential base of necessary supplies in front rather than in its rearguard. This explains the fact that, according to Mongol strategy, the capture of large enemy territories was also considered a profitable operation, even if the armies were small. As the Mongols advanced, their army grew by using the population of the conquered country. Urban artisans were recruited to serve in the engineering corps or to produce weapons and tools; peasants had to supply labor for the siege of fortresses and the movement of carts. Turkic and other nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, previously subordinate to hostile rulers, were accepted into the Mongol brotherhood in arms. From them, regular army units were formed under the command of Mongol officers. As a result, more often than not the Mongol army was numerically stronger at the end than on the eve of the campaign. In this regard, it can be mentioned that by the time of the death of Genghis Khan, the Mongol army itself consisted of 129,000 fighters. Its numbers have probably never been greater. Only by recruiting troops from the countries they conquered could the Mongols subjugate and control such vast territories. The resources of each country were, in turn, used to conquer the next.

The first European who properly understood the grim significance of the organization of the Mongol army and gave its description was the monk John of Plano Carpini. Marco Polo described the army and its operations during the reign of Kublai Kublai. In modern times, until recently, it attracted the attention of not many scientists. The German military historian Hans Delbrück completely ignored the Mongols in his History of the Art of War. As far as I know, the first military historian who tried - long before Delbrück - to adequately assess the courage and ingenuity of the Mongol strategy and tactics was the Russian Lieutenant General M.I. Ivanin. In 1839 - 40 Ivanin took part in Russian military operations against the Khiva Khanate, which resulted in defeat. This campaign was waged against the semi-nomadic Uzbeks of Central Asia, i.e. against a background reminiscent of Genghis Khan's Central Asian campaign, which stimulated Ivanin's interest in the history of the Mongols. His essay “On the Military Art of the Mongols and Central Asian Peoples” was published in 1846. In 1854, Ivanin was appointed Russian commissar responsible for relations with the internal Kyrgyz horde and thus had the opportunity to collect more information about the Turkic tribes of Central Asia. Later he returned to his historical studies; in 1875, after his death, a revised and expanded edition of the book he wrote was published. Ivanin's work was recommended as a textbook for students of the Imperial Military Academy.

Only after the First World War did Western military historians turn their attention to the Mongols. In 1922, an article by Henri Morel appeared on the Mongol campaign of the 13th century. in the French Military Review. Five years later Captain B.H. Liddell Hart dedicated the first chapter of his book “Great Military Leaders Unvarnished” to Genghis Khan and Subedei. At the same time, a study of the “period of the great campaigns of the Mongols” was recommended by the head of the British General Staff to the officers of the mechanized brigade. During 1932 and 1933 squadron chief K.K. Volker published a series of articles about Genghis Khan in the Canadian Defense Quarterly. In revised form, they were later published in the form of a monograph entitled “Genghis Khan” (1939). In Germany, Alfred Pawlikowski-Cholewa published a study on the military organization and tactics of Central Asian horsemen in an appendix to the Deutsche Kavaleri Zeitung (1937) and another on Eastern armies in general in Beitrag zur Geschichte des Naen und Fernen Osten ( 1940) William A. Mitchell, in his Essays on World Military History, which appeared in the United States in 1940, devoted as much space to Genghis Khan as to Alexander the Great and Caesar. So, paradoxically, interest in Mongolian tactics and strategy was revived during the era of tanks and aircraft. "Isn't it Is there a lesson here for modern armies? » – asks Colonel Liddell Hart. From his point of view, " the armored vehicle or light tank looks like a direct successor to the Mongolian horseman.... Further, the aircraft seem to have the same properties to an even greater extent, and maybe in the future they will be the heirs of the Mongolian horsemen" The role of tanks and airplanes in World War II revealed that Liddell Hart's predictions were at least partially correct. The Mongolian principle of mobility and aggressive force still seems to be correct, despite all the differences between the world of nomads and the modern world of technological revolution.

The nomadic empire emerged as a result of a confluence of many circumstances. However, the main one could be the invention of the bow, the effectiveness of which is comparable to firearms.
After the unification of the nomadic tribes in 1206, Temujin was proclaimed Genghis Khan. By 1215, the Mongols had conquered most of the Chinese Jin Empire. In 1221 Urgench was taken, Khorezm ceased to exist. In 1234, the rest of the Jin Empire passed into history. From 1237 to 1241, most of the Russian principalities were destroyed. In 1241, nomads invaded Eastern Europe, and in 1243 they conquered Anatolia. Baghdad fell in 1258, and the famous stronghold of the Assassins - the fortress of Alamut - was surrendered in 1256.

All Mongol commanders could not be as talented as Genghis Khan, and their armies were not the most numerous. However, the rapid expansion of the nomads' possessions did not stop for several decades after the death of Genghis Khan, regardless of who led their armies. How then did the Mongols manage to change the course of history?

New battle tactics

Contemporaries often left memories of the great victories of the Mongol warriors. Historical sources note the unusual manner of fighting of the nomads: horsemen quickly moved across the battlefield, changing the direction of movement, often their tactic was to retreat. At the same time, the warriors, who rode perfectly on horseback, did not stop shooting at the enemy for a minute, even during the retreat. The pursuing enemy lost strength and concentration. The Mongols, seeing that the advantage was already on their side, immediately changed the direction of movement and launched a counterattack.

Other scenarios prepared by the Mongols were: splitting the enemy forces into parts and organizing an ambush. The enemy, exhausted and carried away by the pursuit of the main forces of the nomads, received a side blow from a detachment hiding in an ambush.

The fighting efficiency of the Mongol horsemen during the retreat was higher than that of most warriors of the time when they fought face to face. Chroniclers paid special attention to the ability of the Mongols to conduct archery. Cases of targeted shooting at hundreds of meters were described. Not only people, but also horses became victims of deadly arrows. The power of this type of weapon made it possible to immediately kill animals, which influenced the battle with enemy cavalry: due to its size, it was much easier to hit a horse, and once the horse was killed, the rider was also incapacitated. The Horde hundreds brilliantly used their trump cards: mobility, the ability to keep their distance and possession of small arms.

The invention that changed the course of history

Many historians (here it is worth highlighting the famous Russian specialist, Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergei Nefedov) point out that the invention of a new bow design played a decisive role in the victories of the nomads. Warriors of the Eurasian steppe have been using a bow with a composite (multi-component) design for quite a long time. The craftsmen tightened the wooden arch on the sides in the center of the bow with bone plates. The revolutionary invention of the Mongols was that they got rid of one plate and placed the second one frontally: previously, the linings strengthened the structure, but now the bow has become much more elastic. Sedentary peoples did not take advantage of this advantage, since the tensile strength of the wood they most often took to make bows was several times lower than that of parts made from animal bones.

In addition to increasing power, the innovation made it possible to greatly reduce the size of the weapon and use it with maximum benefit when riding. Having a sufficient number of arrows, riders could conduct intense shooting on the move, which in effect was comparable to the use of automatic firearms. Moreover, the force of an arrow fired from a new type of weapon was so great that it was not inferior to the power of the first guns.

Coincidence

The peculiarities of the Mongolian bow were also the complexity of production and operation, which also prevented its use by other peoples. Making Mongolian compound bows can be compared to forging samurai swords. Layers of wood and bone plates, like layers of metal in Japanese swords, were connected to each other using a special technology. The production of weapons required significant effort. Moreover, this was not feasible everywhere. In a humid climate, for example, it was impossible to achieve the required structural strength: it was impossible to dry the glued parts.

The special way of life of the nomads also gave them an advantage in mastering a new type of weapon. In order to pull the bowstring as tightly and often as possible (riders could do this hundreds of times during hours of battle), it is necessary to have special training. Nomads learned to shoot and ride horses from childhood. As a result of many years of hard training, the reflex skill of shooting on horseback was developed. Neither the Europeans nor the Arabs could use the new weapons at the same level.

Another factor that influenced the success of the use of the Mongolian bow by a certain community of tribes, historians consider the inaccessibility of heavy weapons to most nomads. Metal armor and swords are found only in a few burials of the Horde: most likely, they were available only to rich warriors. As a result, special battle tactics were predetermined. The army, mostly consisting of lightly armed archers, could constantly avoid a head-on collision with the enemy, exhaust and shoot him, and often on the battlefield it did not even come to the use of swords and spears.

The new battle tactics that appeared along with the Mongolian bow made it possible for the nomads to make a qualitative leap in the art of war and create an empire on a scale unprecedented before that time.

Bow and arrows are distance combat weapons that played a primary role in the weaponry of the Horde warriors. Tatar-Mongol archers were distinguished by almost incredible shooting accuracy, and the lethal force of the shot was extremely high.
Like Russian bows, Mongol bows were composite and had a draw weight of 60 to 80 kilograms.

According to sources, the Mongol bows were of two types: large “Chinese”, up to 1.4 m long, with a clearly defined and bent handle, shoulders and long, close to straight, horns, and small, “Near and Middle Eastern” type", up to 90 centimeters, with a weakly defined handle and small curved horns. The shooting kit was called "saadak", which included a quiver and a bow. They were attached to a special belt, which, according to steppe tradition, was fastened with a hook, with the quiver attached to the right and the bow on the left. The quiver was a narrow birch bark box, richly decorated with carved bone plates, into which the arrows were inserted with their points up, or a flat leather box, in which the arrows lay with their tips down and their feathers facing out. Leather quivers were often decorated with embroidery, appliques, plaques, and sometimes with a leopard's tail. The bow was decorated in a similar way.
The arrows were long and the shafts were usually painted red. The tips of Tatar-Mongol arrows are surprisingly varied in shape - from wide leaf-shaped and chisel-shaped to narrow armor-piercing ones.
Almost as important as ranged combat weapons was the role played by the spears of the Mongol horsemen: after the first “suim” strike with arrows, inflicted by light cavalry, the heavily armed and medium cavalry overthrew the disordered ranks of the enemy with a second “suim” - a spear strike.
The spears fully reflected the specifics of the Mongolian martial art: the spear tips were mostly narrow, faceted, and rarely leaf-shaped. Sometimes below the blade on the spear there was also a hook for catching the enemy and pulling him off the horse. The shaft below the tip was decorated with a short bunchuk and a narrow vertical flag, from which one to three tongues extended.
The bladed weapons of the Tatar-Mongols were represented by broadswords and sabers. The broadswords had long single-edged blades, a straight handle with a pommel in the form of a flattened ball or horizontal disk. Broadswords were usually used by the nobility, and the main bladed weapon was the saber. During this period, the saber becomes longer and more curved, the blade becomes wider, but narrow and slightly curved blades are also often found. There are blades with both fullers and rhombic cross-sections. Sometimes the blade had an extension in the lower third, which is called "elman". On North Caucasian blades the end is often faceted and bayonet-shaped. The crosshairs on Horde sabers have upward curved and flattened ends. Under the crosshair, a clip with a tongue covering part of the blade was often welded - a characteristic feature of the work of Horde gunsmiths. The handle ended with a pommel in the form of a flattened thimble, and the scabbard was crowned in the same way. The sheath has clips with rings for attaching the sheath to the belt. Often the leather of the scabbard was embroidered with gold thread, and the belts were even more richly decorated. Sabers were also richly decorated, sometimes with precious stones, more often with engraving, carved and chased metal.
The Horde also actively used impact and crushing weapons - maces, six-fingers, coins, klevets and flails. Earlier maces - in the form of a steel ball or polyhedron, sometimes with spikes, were practically replaced by a six-feather - that is, a mace with several feathers along the axis. The stunning effect of this weapon was as powerful as that of a mace, but the ability to break through armor was slightly higher. Most often, such weapons had six feathers, which is where its name comes from.

DEFENSIVE WEAPONS

The complex of defensive weapons of the Horde warrior included helmets, armor, protection for arms and legs, as well as shields.
The helmets of the Horde mostly have a spheroconic shape, sometimes spherical, and are distinguished by significant diversity. Both riveted helmets and seamless ones with chainmail aventail are in use. The helmet could have brow cutouts, a movable arrow nosepiece and disc-shaped ears. The top of the helmet could be crowned with feathers or leather blades traditional for the Mongols. Probably, helmets with a forged movable face were also used during this period. It can be assumed that the Horde also used European-style helmets.

During this period, the Tatar-Mongols also used chain mail armor; finds of chain mail were extremely numerous on the territory of the Golden Horde, but by the time of the Battle of Kulikovo, progressive ring-plate armor also appeared. That is, the steel plates are no longer fastened with straps or braid or attached to the base, but are fastened together with rings. Soon this type of armor will become dominant in the post-Chinggisid space. Already in the time of Mamai, it was probably possible to find armor similar to the later kolontars and yushmans.
The Mongols usually called armor made of hard materials “khuyag”, so perhaps chain mail also bore this name. All types of plate armor, including lamellar armor, are usually called “khudesutu huyag” in the “Secret History of the Mongols,” that is, “shell pierced with straps.” From time immemorial, lamellar armor was the favorite armor of the Mongols, and in the territory of the former Genghisid Empire, such armor existed practically unchanged until the 15th century. During the Battle of Kulikovo, lamellar armor made of plates connected to each other by straps or cords was still used, however, it is obvious that in the western part of the empire they were found less and less by this time. The cross boards of such armor were also made from separate metal plates, but they could also be made of leather. Leather plates were usually painted and varnished.
Shells made of soft materials were also very popular. Tegilai, or, as the Mongols called it, “khatangu degel,” which meant “caftan, strong as steel,” was a quilted armor cut in the form of a robe with sleeves up to the elbow or in the form of blades. Sometimes tegilai was made with slits on the sides, as well as with long sleeves, and sometimes it was combined with shoulder guards and leg guards made of metal plates riveted onto leather belts. By the end of the 14th century, “khatanga degel” was often hidden under a hard shell. In the same XIV century, the “hatangu degel” was reinforced with a lining made of metal plates, with the heads of the rivets facing outward. Armor and similar brigandines were used, where the base of the shell was cut from leather, to which metal plates were also riveted from the inside.

Paired round or rectangular polished metal plates - mirrors - are often worn on the chest and back, usually attached to belts.
The Mongols often used plate necklaces that covered the upper chest, shoulders and back. In the time of Mamai, such necklaces were no longer made only on a leather basis, but were also assembled from metal plates using rings.
Many Horde folding bracers of this period, made of two metal parts connected by straps and loops, have also been found.
To protect the legs, as can be seen in the miniatures, steel three-part greaves were used, where the parts were connected by rings, as well as knee pads. The foot was covered with plates.
The Nikon Chronicle notes an interesting detail: “The Tatar power of seeing is gloomy and dark, but the Russian power of seeing is in light armor... and the sun is shining brightly on them, and emitting rays, and like lamps I can see from afar.” How to understand this passage? On the one hand, it is easy to notice that the Russian army was illuminated by the rising sun, while Mamai’s army had the sun almost behind its back. But it is likely that the chain mail, and possibly other metal parts of the Horde armor, were blued or painted, which is quite realistic. On the other hand, it is obvious from here that Russian armor was polished, silvered or gold plated, which perfectly protects against corrosion.

The invincible army of the Mongols

In the 13th century, the peoples and countries of the Eurasian continent experienced a stunning onslaught of the victorious Mongol army, sweeping away everything in its path. The armies of the Mongols' opponents were led by honored and experienced commanders; they fought on their own land, protecting their families and peoples from a cruel enemy. The Mongols fought far from their homeland, in unfamiliar terrain and unusual climatic conditions, often being outnumbered by their opponents. However, they attacked and won, confident in their invincibility...

Throughout the victorious path, the Mongol warriors were opposed by troops from different countries and peoples, among whom were warlike nomadic tribes and peoples who had extensive combat experience and well-armed armies. However, the indestructible Mongol whirlwind scattered them across the northern and western outskirts of the Great Steppe, forced them to submit and stand under the banners of Genghis Khan and his descendants.

The armies of the largest states of the Middle and Far East, which had multiple numerical superiority and the most advanced weapons for their time, the states of Western Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, could not resist either. Japan was saved from the Mongolian sword by the Kamikaze typhoon - the “divine wind” that scattered Mongolian ships on the approaches to the Japanese islands.

The Mongol hordes stopped only at the borders of the Holy Roman Empire - either due to fatigue and increased resistance, or due to the intensification of the internal struggle for the throne of the Great Khan. Or maybe they mistook the Adriatic Sea for the limit that Genghis Khan bequeathed to them to reach...

Very soon the glory of the victorious Mongol weapons began to outstrip the boundaries of the lands they had reached, remaining for a long time in the memory of many generations of different peoples of Eurasia.

Fire and strike tactics

Initially, the Mongol conquerors were considered people from hell, an instrument of God's providence to punish irrational humanity. The first judgments of Europeans about Mongol warriors, based on rumors, were not complete and reliable. According to the description of contemporary M. Paris, the Mongols “dress in bull skins, are armed with iron plates, are short, portly, hefty, strong, invincible, with<…>backs and chests covered with armor.” The Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II claimed that the Mongols knew no other clothing than ox, donkey and horse skins, and that they had no other weapons than crude, poorly made iron plates (Carruthers, 1914). However, at the same time, he noted that the Mongols are “combat-ready shooters” and could become even more dangerous after rearming with “European weapons.”

More accurate information about the weapons and military art of the Mongol warriors is contained in the works of D. Del Plano Carpini and G. Rubruk, who were envoys of the Pope and the French king to the court of the Mongol khans in the middle of the 13th century. The attention of Europeans was drawn to weapons and protective armor, as well as military organization and tactics of warfare. There is also some information about the military affairs of the Mongols in the book of the Venetian merchant M. Polo, who served as an official at the court of the Yuan emperor.

The events of the military history of the formation of the Mongol Empire are most fully covered in the Mongolian “Secret Legend” and the Chinese chronicle of the Yuan dynasty “Yuan shi”. In addition, there are Arabic, Persian and Old Russian written sources.

According to the outstanding orientalist Yu. N. Roerich, the Mongol warriors were well-armed horsemen with a varied set of weapons of distance, close combat and means of defense, and the Mongol equestrian tactics were characterized by a combination of fire and strike. He believed that much of the military art of the Mongol cavalry was so advanced and effective that it continued to be used by generals until the beginning of the 20th century. (Khudyakov, 1985).

In recent decades, archaeologists and weapons specialists have begun to actively study finds from Mongolian monuments in Mongolia and Transbaikalia, as well as images of warriors in medieval Persian, Chinese and Japanese miniatures. At the same time, researchers encountered some contradiction: in descriptions and miniatures, Mongol warriors were depicted as well-armed and equipped with armor, while during excavations of archaeological sites it was possible to discover mainly only the remains of bows and arrowheads. Other types of weapons were very rare.

Experts in the history of weapons of Ancient Rus', who found Mongolian arrows in ruined settlements, believed that the Mongol army consisted of lightly armed horse archers, who were strong with the “massive use of bows and arrows” (Kirpichnikov, 1971). According to another opinion, the Mongol army consisted of armored warriors who wore practically “impenetrable” armor made of iron plates or multi-layer glued leather (Gorelik, 1983).

Arrows are raining down...

In the steppes of Eurasia, and primarily on the “indigenous lands” of the Mongols in Mongolia and Transbaikalia, many weapons were found that were used by the soldiers of the invincible army of Genghis Khan and his commanders. Judging by these finds, the main weapon of the Mongols in the XIII-XIV centuries. there really were bows and arrows.

Mongolian arrows had a high flight speed, although they were used for shooting at relatively short distances. In combination with rapid-fire bows, they made it possible to conduct massive shooting in order to prevent the enemy from approaching and engaging in hand-to-hand combat. For such shooting, so many arrows were required that there were not enough iron tips, so the Mongols in the Baikal region and Transbaikalia also used bone tips.

According to Plano Carpini, Mongol horsemen always started the battle from arrow range: they "wound and kill horses with arrows, and when men and horses are weakened, then they engage in battle." As Marco Polo observed, the Mongols “shoot back and forth even when driven. They shoot accurately, hitting both enemy horses and people. Often the enemy is defeated because his horses are killed.”

The Hungarian monk Julian described the Mongol tactics most graphically: during a clash in war, their arrows, as they say, do not fly, but seem to pour like a shower.” Therefore, as contemporaries believed, it was very dangerous to start a battle with the Mongols, because even in small skirmishes with them there were as many killed and wounded as other peoples in large battles. This is a consequence of their dexterity in archery, as their arrows penetrate almost all types of defenses and armor. In battles, in case of failure, they retreat in an orderly manner; however, it is very dangerous to pursue them, since they turn back and know how to shoot while fleeing and injure soldiers and horses.

Mongol warriors could hit a target at a distance in addition to arrows and darts - throwing spears. In close combat, they attacked the enemy with spears and palms - tips with a single-edged blade attached to a long shaft. The latter weapon was common among soldiers who served on the northern periphery of the Mongol Empire, in the Baikal region and Transbaikalia.

In hand-to-hand combat, Mongol horsemen fought with swords, broadswords, sabers, battle axes, maces and daggers with one or two blades.

On the other hand, details of defensive weapons are very rare in Mongolian monuments. This may be due to the fact that many shells were made of multi-layered hard leather. However, in Mongol times, metal armor appeared in armored warriors' arsenal.

In medieval miniatures, Mongol warriors are depicted in armor of lamellar (from narrow vertical plates) and laminar (from wide transverse stripes) structures, helmets and with shields. Probably, in the process of conquering agricultural countries, the Mongols mastered other types of defensive weapons.

Heavily armed warriors also protected their war horses. Plano Carpini gave a description of such protective clothing, which included a metal forehead and leather parts that served to cover the neck, chest, sides and croup of the horse.

As the empire expanded, the Mongol authorities began to organize large-scale production of weapons and equipment in state workshops, which was carried out by craftsmen from the conquered peoples. The Chinggisid armies widely used weapons traditional to the entire nomadic world and the countries of the Near and Middle East.

“Having participated in a hundred battles, I was always ahead”

In the Mongol army during the reign of Genghis Khan and his successors, there were two main types of troops: heavily armed and light cavalry. Their ratio in the army, as well as weapons, changed during many years of continuous wars.

The heavily armed cavalry included the most elite units of the Mongol army, including detachments of the Khan's guard, formed from Mongol tribes that had proven their loyalty to Genghis Khan. However, the majority of the army was still lightly armed horsemen; the great role of the latter is evidenced by the very nature of the military art of the Mongols, based on the tactics of massive shelling of the enemy. These warriors could also attack the enemy with lava in close combat, and pursue during retreat and flight (Nemerov, 1987).

As the Mongol state expanded, auxiliary infantry detachments and siege units were formed from subject tribes and peoples accustomed to the conditions of foot combat and fortress warfare, armed with pack and heavy siege weapons.

The Mongols used the achievements of sedentary peoples (primarily the Chinese) in the field of military equipment for siege and storming of fortresses for other purposes, using stone-throwing machines for the first time to conduct field battles. The Chinese, Jurchens, and natives of Muslim countries of the Middle East were widely recruited into the Mongolian army as “artillerymen.”

The Mongol army also created a quartermaster service, special detachments to ensure the passage of troops and the construction of roads. Particular attention was paid to reconnaissance and disinformation of the enemy.

The structure of the Mongol army was traditional for the nomads of Central Asia. According to the “Asian decimal system” of dividing troops and people, the army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tumens (ten-thousand-strong units), as well as into wings and a center. Each combat-ready man was assigned to a specific detachment and was obliged to report to the gathering place at the first notice in full equipment, with a supply of food for several days.

At the head of the entire army was the Khan, who was the head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces of the Mongol Empire. However, many important matters, including plans for future wars, were discussed and outlined at the kurultai - a meeting of military leaders chaired by the khan. In the event of the death of the latter, a new khan was elected and proclaimed at the kurultai from members of the ruling “Golden Family” of the Borjigins, descendants of Genghis Khan.

The thoughtful selection of command personnel played an important role in the military successes of the Mongols. Although the highest positions in the empire were occupied by the sons of Genghis Khan, the most capable and experienced commanders were appointed commanders of the troops. Some of them in the past fought on the side of Genghis Khan's opponents, but then went over to the side of the founder of the empire, believing in his invincibility. Among the military leaders there were representatives of different tribes, not only Mongols, and they came not only from the nobility, but also from ordinary nomads.

Genghis Khan himself often stated: “I treat my warriors as brothers. Having participated in a hundred battles, I was always ahead.” However, in the memory of his contemporaries, the most severe punishments to which he and his commanders subjected their soldiers to maintain harsh military discipline were preserved much more. The soldiers of each unit were bound by mutual responsibility, answering with their lives for the cowardice and flight from the battlefield of their colleagues. These measures were not new to the nomadic world, but during the time of Genghis Khan they were observed with particular rigor.

They killed everyone without any mercy

Before starting military operations against a particular country, Mongol military leaders tried to learn as much as possible about it in order to identify the weaknesses and internal contradictions of the state and use them to their advantage. This information was collected by diplomats, traders or spies. Such focused preparation contributed to the eventual success of the military campaign.

Military operations, as a rule, began in several directions at once - in a “round-up”, which did not allow the enemy to come to his senses and organize a unified defense. The Mongolian cavalry armies penetrated far into the interior of the country, destroying everything in their path, disrupting communications, routes for the approach of troops and the supply of equipment. The enemy suffered heavy losses even before the army entered the decisive battle.

Genghis Khan convinced his commanders that during the offensive they could not stop to seize booty, arguing that after victory “the booty will not leave us.” Thanks to its high mobility, the vanguard of the Mongol army had a great advantage over the enemies. Following the vanguard, the main forces moved, destroying and suppressing all resistance, leaving only “smoke and ashes” in the rear of the Mongol army. Neither mountains nor rivers could hold them back - they learned to easily cross water obstacles, using waterskins inflated with air to cross.

The basis of the offensive strategy of the Mongols was the destruction of enemy personnel. Before the start of a big battle, they gathered their troops into a powerful single fist to attack with as many forces as possible. The main tactical technique was to attack the enemy in loose formation and massacre him in order to inflict as much damage as possible without large losses of his soldiers. Moreover, the Mongol commanders tried to throw detachments formed from subject tribes first into the attack.

The Mongols sought to decide the outcome of the battle precisely at the shelling stage. It did not escape the observers that they were reluctant to engage in close combat, since in this case losses among the Mongol warriors were inevitable. If the enemy stood firm, they tried to provoke him into an attack by feigning flight. If the enemy retreated, the Mongols intensified their attack and sought to destroy as many enemy soldiers as possible. The horse battle was completed by a ramming attack by armored cavalry, which swept away everything in its path. The enemy was pursued until complete defeat and destruction.

The Mongols waged wars with great ferocity. Those who resisted most steadfastly were especially brutally exterminated. They killed everyone, indiscriminately, old and small, beautiful and ugly, poor and rich, resisting and submissive, without any mercy. These measures were aimed at instilling fear in the population of the conquered country and suppressing their will to resist.

Many contemporaries who experienced the military power of the Mongols, and after them some historians of our time, see precisely this unparalleled cruelty as the main reason for the military successes of the Mongol troops. However, such measures were not the invention of Genghis Khan and his commanders - acts of mass terror were characteristic of the conduct of wars by many nomadic peoples. Only the scale of these wars was different, so the atrocities committed by Genghis Khan and his successors remained in the history and memory of many peoples.

It can be concluded that the basis for the military successes of the Mongolian troops were the high combat effectiveness and professionalism of the soldiers, the enormous combat experience and talent of the commanders, the iron will and confidence in victory of Genghis Khan himself and his successors, the strict centralization of the military organization and a fairly high level of weapons for that time. and equipping the army. Without mastering any new types of weapons or tactical techniques of mounted combat, the Mongols were able to perfect the traditional military art of the nomads and use it with maximum efficiency.

The strategy of wars in the initial period of the creation of the Mongol Empire was also common for all nomadic states. As his primary task - quite traditional for the foreign policy of any nomadic state in Central Asia - Genghis Khan proclaimed the unification under his rule of “all peoples living behind felt walls,” that is, nomads. However, then Genghis Khan began to put forward more and more new tasks, striving to conquer the whole world within the limits known to him.

And this goal was largely achieved. The Mongol Empire was able to subjugate all the nomadic tribes of the steppe belt of Eurasia and conquer many sedentary agricultural states far beyond the borders of the nomadic world, which no nomadic people could do. However, the human and organizational resources of the empire were not unlimited. The Mongol Empire could exist only as long as its troops continued to fight and win victories on all fronts. But as more and more lands were captured, the offensive impulse of the Mongol troops gradually began to fizzle out. Having encountered stubborn resistance in Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle East and Japan, the Mongol khans were forced to abandon their ambitious plans for world domination.

The Genghisids, who ruled individual uluses of a once united empire, eventually became involved in internecine wars and tore it apart into separate pieces, and then completely lost their military and political power. The idea of ​​world domination of Genghis Khan remained an unfulfilled dream.

Literature

1. Plano Carpini D. History of the Mongols; Rubruk G. Travel to Eastern countries; Book of Marco Polo. M., 1997.

2. Khara-Davan E. Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy. Elista, 1991.

3. Khudyakov Yu. S. Yu. N. Roerich on the art of war and the conquests of the Mongols // Roerich readings of 1984. Novosibirsk, 1985.

4. Khudyakov Yu. S. Armament of Central Asian nomads in the era of the early and developed Middle Ages. Novosibirsk, 1991.