Description of the painting the death of Pompeii. Characteristics and description of Bryullov’s painting “The Last Day of Pompeii”

Speech at the Red Army parade on November 7, 1941 (Red Square, Moscow).

Comrades, Red Army and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men and women, collective farmers and collective farmers, intellectual workers, brothers and sisters behind our enemy lines, temporarily falling under the yoke of German robbers, our glorious partisans and partisans destroying the rear of the German invaders!

On behalf of the Soviet government and our Bolshevik Party, I greet you and congratulate you on the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Comrades! IN harsh conditions We have to celebrate today the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution. The treacherous attack of German bandits and the war imposed on us created a threat to our country. We temporarily lost a number of regions, the enemy found himself at the gates of Leningrad and Moscow. The enemy hoped that after the first blow our army would be scattered and our country would be brought to its knees. But the enemy cruelly miscalculated. Despite temporary setbacks, our army and our navy heroically repulse the enemy’s attacks along the entire front, inflicting heavy damage on him, and our country - our entire country - organized itself into a single battle camp in order, together with our army and our navy, to carry out the defeat German invaders.

There were days when our country was in even more difficult situation. Remember 1918, when we celebrated the first anniversary of the October Revolution. Three quarters of our country were then in the hands of foreign interventionists. Ukraine, Caucasus, middle Asia, Ural, Siberia, Far East were temporarily lost by us. We had no allies, we did not have the Red Army - we had just begun to create it - there was not enough bread, not enough weapons, not enough uniforms. 14 states were pressing on our country at that time. But we did not lose heart, did not lose heart. In the fire of war, we then organized the Red Army and turned our country into a military camp. The spirit of the great Lenin inspired us then to fight against the invaders. And what? We defeated the invaders, returned all lost territories and achieved victory.

Now the situation of our country is much better than 23 years ago. Our country is now many times richer in industry, food, and raw materials than it was 23 years ago. We now have allies who are holding a united front with us against the German invaders. We now have the sympathy and support of all the peoples of Europe who fell under the yoke of Hitler's tyranny. We now have a wonderful army and a wonderful navy, defending with their breasts the freedom and independence of our Motherland. We have no serious shortages of food, weapons, or uniforms. Our entire country, all the peoples of our country support our army, our navy, helping them defeat the invading hordes German fascists. Our human reserves are inexhaustible. The spirit of the great Lenin and his victorious banner now inspire us to Patriotic War the same as 23 years ago.

Can there be any doubt that we can and must defeat the German invaders?

The enemy is not as strong as some frightened intellectuals portray him. The devil is not as scary as he is painted to be. Who can deny that our Red Army has more than once turned the vaunted German troops? If we judge not by the boastful statements of German propagandists, but by the actual situation in Germany, it will not be difficult to understand that the Nazi invaders are facing a catastrophe. In Germany, hunger and impoverishment now reign, in 4 months of the war, Germany lost 4 and a half million soldiers, Germany is bleeding, its human reserves are drying up, the spirit of indignation takes possession not only of the peoples of Europe who fell under the yoke of the German invaders, but also of the German people themselves, who does not see the end of the war. The German invaders are straining last strength. There is no doubt that Germany cannot withstand such tension for long. A few more months, another six months, maybe a year, and Hitler’s Germany should burst under the weight of its crimes.

Comrades, Red Army and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, partisans and partisans! The whole world is looking at you as a force capable of destroying the predatory hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe, who fell under the yoke of the German invaders, look at you as their liberators. The great liberation mission has fallen to your lot. Be worthy of this mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war. Let the courageous image of our great ancestors - Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dimitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov - inspire you in this war! Let the victorious banner of the great Lenin overshadow you!

For the complete defeat of the German invaders!

Death to the German occupiers!

Long live our glorious Motherland, its freedom, its independence!

Under the banner of Lenin - forward to victory!

Stalin in the memoirs of contemporaries and documents of the era Lobanov Mikhail Petrovich

V. Nadtochiev “Troika”, “seven”, Stalin

V. Nadtochiev

"Troika", "Seven", Stalin

“The explosion was completely unexpected for me”

This recognition belongs to Trotsky. He made it while already in distant Mexico, thirteen years after the XIV Congress of the CPSU(b).

It’s hard to believe that Lev Davidovich Trotsky, always self-confident, arrogant with everyone (except for Lenin), arrogant, categorical in his judgments, all-knowing, surrounded by numerous assistants and informants, suddenly found himself in the position of the heroes of Gogol’s “The Inspector General” - surprised, confused, amazed.

One can, however, assume that he needed such a technique in order to somehow explain his position of silence, which he took at the congress. He, a member of the Politburo, undoubtedly knew that in the internal party struggle that had unfolded by this time on the problems of socialist construction, two camps were clearly identified: the “majority” led by Stalin and Bukharin and the “new opposition” with its leaders Zinoviev and Kamenev. Both of them had their loyal supporters. Their ideological differences were also aggravated by the struggle for power, for personal leadership in the party. Both Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and, of course, Trotsky made the process of developing politically correct decisions dependent on success in this struggle. All this taken together dictated their choice of supporters and political position. Only one thing can be added: unlike other members of the Politburo (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky), Trotsky did not condemn the actions of the opposition and did not take a single step to somehow eliminate the existing disagreements within the Central Committee. And they were serious.

In the first years after Lenin, discussions in the party became especially acute. Perhaps their goal was not to collectively develop decisions, but to identify those who expressed a special opinion or position, sometimes not similar to the “general course.” As a rule, these were individual members of the party or group who were critical of the official course, but at the same time, as it seemed to them, they sought to bring their program of action to the discussion of the party, to offer their “working hypotheses” for solving certain problems of socialist construction. Regrettably, it was in 1924–1925 that they began to be counted among the enemies of the party, and their thoughts were subjected to harsh and sometimes cruel condemnation. But let's return to the XIV Party Congress...

Stalin and Molotov made the Political and Organizational reports of the Central Committee. The delegates were already preparing to discuss the reports, when an unexpected circumstance arose - the opposition nominated its co-rapporteur in the person of Zinoviev. And although the regulations provided for such a possibility, this fact extremely surprised and puzzled most of the congress participants.

An emergency situation has arisen.

The overwhelming majority of the congress supported Stalin and Bukharin. It branded, exposed, proved, attacked. The opposition minority, in turn, fought back, accused, and put forward their demands. Trotsky silently watched, weighed, and wondered. Logical conclusion fierce polemics on controversial ideological and theoretical issues became the demand of the opposition expressed through the mouth of Kamenev, to the loud noise of those gathered in the hall: “...Stalin cannot fulfill the role of the unifier of the Bolshevik headquarters... we are against the theory of one-man rule, we are against creating a leader.”

This was the culmination of the congress. This was the “time bomb” that the opposition had prepared and which Trotsky recalled.

It is interesting to return to the origins of this story. Where and how did it all begin? And what did all this lead to?

After Lenin

The gravest loss for the party and the country was the death of V.I. Lenin. In order to at least partially compensate for the absence of a leader, it was important to maintain cohesion within the Central Committee and especially in its Politburo. In addition to Lenin, the Politburo then included Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Tomsky, Trotsky and Bukharin, who was transferred in June 1924 after the death of Ilyich from candidate members of the Politburo.

In the party environment, more and more often they spoke about the core that had formed by this time in the Central Committee of the party, that this core was called upon to lead the entire party along the path bequeathed by Lenin. It included three “veterans” based on their length of service in the Politburo - Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev, between whom there were not only party, but also comradely, personal relationships dating back to the times of joint exile in the Turukhansk region, February and October revolutions And civil war. All three were connected by another thread - the struggle with their common political enemy, who claimed special roles in the party and state after Lenin, - Trotsky.

Each member of the “troika” performed certain functions and responsibilities. Thus, Zinoviev was the main speaker and speaker at almost all political forums at this time: at the XII and XIII party congresses, at party conferences, congresses of Soviets, trade unions, congresses of the Comintern and others. During Lenin’s lifetime, Kamenev took over the post of chairman of Politburo meetings; his characteristic feature was the ability to formulate proposals made. Stalin, being general secretary Since 1922, the Central Committee has focused its attention on the work of the Central Committee apparatus, on the selection and placement of leading and local party personnel.

A dramatic situation in the party arose in connection with Lenin’s political testament, and primarily with the “Letter to the Congress.” This key document, as is known, gave final, laconic, but extremely succinct in content assessments of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee, and spoke about possible relapses of their previous mistakes. Naturally, this could not but affect the very nature of the relationship between the party leaders noted by Lenin. None of those mentioned in the “Letter” were interested in entering into conflict with each other on the platform of this Leninist document. Moreover, Kamenev and Zinoviev made attempts to interpret Lenin’s assessments and expressed thoughts in their own way. As the director of the Lenin Institute, which had Lenin’s documents at its disposal, Kamenev, together with Zinoviev, also a member of the commission for receiving Lenin’s papers, made every effort to leave Stalin as Secretary General, hoping to use his organizational abilities in the fight against Trotsky.

There is no need to repeat to readers the contents of the “Letter to the Congress” or the history of its appearance. However, let us recall that it was Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with Stalin, who held meetings of delegations at the XIII Party Congress. They read out this Leninist document, made comments on it, they advocated leaving Stalin as Secretary General. That is, they had the opportunity, and a considerable one, to shape the opinion of delegations and influence the development of their decisions.

Stalin's position at this moment was preferable to others. In a fierce discussion with Trotsky on issues of party building and the economic policy of the party, which took place shortly before Lenin’s death in the fall of 1923, he relied on the apparatus, on the mistrust that existed in the party towards Trotsky and his political past.

As a result, Stalin’s authority grew noticeably, and the delegates of the XIII Congress of the RCP(b), who spoke in favor of his candidacy for the post Secretary General The Central Committee of the party actually predetermined the resolution of this issue at the organizational Plenum of the Central Committee in June 1924, which had no choice but to “formalize” Stalin’s re-election. This procedure contributed to a certain elevation of the Secretary General over the other members of the Politburo. There was an increase in his influence, a certain protrusion of his personality.

It seems that in this situation Stalin had the opportunity to make it clear that he no longer identifies himself with the activities of Zinoviev and Kamenev, who, like himself, pursued a policy of “cutting off” Trotsky. At this stage, Stalin fully identified with the position of the majority of the Central Committee, which believed that, along with Trotsky, the “special position” of Zinoviev and Kamenev, which in essence also boiled down to attempts to strengthen their position by removing other political leaders, was becoming increasingly threatening to the unity of the party.

By this time the situation had already cleared up. For example, Zinoviev managed to do a lot in terms of strengthening his own position in Leningrad. He surrounded himself with people selected on the basis of personal loyalty who were ready to defend Zinoviev’s claims and challenge Moscow, that is, Stalin and the party leaders grouped around him.

In this situation, Stalin decided to take advantage of his position and made an attempt to consolidate it. On June 17, 1924, in a report “On the results of the XIII Congress of the RCP (b)” at the courses of secretaries of the committees under the Central Committee of the party, he accused Kamenev of “carelessness about theory, about the exact theoretical definitions" Zinoviev also got it, especially for putting forward the thesis about “the dictatorship of the party as a function of the dictatorship of the proletariat.” At one time, this Zinovievian thesis, according to Stalin, caused heated debate, “confusion and confusion” and, as a consequence, disagreement and negative reaction of the party masses. On June 20, part of Stalin's report was published in Pravda.

From this speech the beginning of an open struggle for power between these members of the Politburo begins. As Zinoviev would later write, from that moment his (Stalin’s) began. Author) two years of work to create their own group of Central Committee members and remove Kamenev and Zinoviev from leadership.

And what about Trotsky?

Really, what was he doing? Putting forward more and more acute political and theoretical issues, requiring long-term discussions and discussions, Trotsky kept the party in polemical tension all the time. This gave grounds to accuse him of trying to distract the communists from solving urgent practical problems of socialist construction. In addition to his desire, he increasingly strengthened Stalin's authority as the leader of the party. “This conclusion is paradoxical,” writes Colonel General D. Volkogonov, “but, perhaps, no one contributed as much to strengthening Stalin’s position at the head of the party column as Trotsky.” One cannot but agree with this.

The party majority had the right to believe that his supporters were grouping around Trotsky, that he had become the center of sympathetic attention of all non-Bolshevik elements. Zinoviev and Kamenev declared that “as true Leninists” they could not talk on basic issues with Trotsky, with “this Menshevik, with this destroyer of Leninism” (like them, Trotsky was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee!). They argued that they could work only on the condition that the main issues were discussed in the close circle of the Leninist core, Ya. E. Rudzutak later recalled.

For several years, Trotsky, according to Tomsky, was busy recording all the mistakes, clashes of points of view, inaccurately dropped words, phrases in the Politburo and from time to time burst out with documents addressed to the party, his like-minded people and the Politburo. The majority preferred a different method of action to the open and principled - in the spirit of Lenin - way of resolving the disagreements that arose. A special body is being created (“a group from among the Leninists,” as Zinoviev said then) to ensure normal working conditions for the party leadership, to coordinate actions in opposition to Trotsky, whom everyone was wary of and did not trust.

“Of course,” Zinoviev said a little later, “we were convinced—including myself—that we were acting in the interests of the party. We considered the internal state of affairs in the party to be such that such a measure seemed necessary to us.” He formulated the task this way: “We must have at least some place where, in our midst of old Leninists, we could, on the most important issues on which disagreements with Trotsky and his supporters are possible, have the right to hesitate, make mistakes, correct each other, together collectively work through this or that issue. Before Trotsky we are deprived of this opportunity.” This was one of the reasons that forced Zinoviev to insist so long and persistently on the removal of Trotsky from the Politburo, in order to subsequently remove him from work in the Central Committee.

The situation in the party leadership became increasingly confused and at the same time tense. The “above-water” part, the visible part, consisted of an uncompromising ideological struggle against Trotsky and his followers, and the invisible, “underwater” part also corresponded to the increasingly aggravated and growing rivalry in the struggle for power, for personal leadership in the party, in the leadership - between Stalin, with one on the other hand, Zinoviev and Kamenev on the other.

Urgent questions were put on the agenda: what to do? What should I do? What measures can be taken to save the situation and overcome the impending crisis?

Exit found

“We formed a fully organized faction from the beginning of 1924, at first poorly formed, and then fully formed,” Zinoviev admits.

During the August (1924) Plenum of the Central Committee, a meeting of a group of like-minded people, members of the Central Committee (Stalin, Bukharin, Rudzutak, Rykov, Tomsky, Kalinin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Petrovsky, Kuibyshev, Uglanov and several others) took place comrades), which, in order to strengthen the leadership of the party and to prevent the emerging split, decided to consider itself the leadership team. Having first been one of the initiators of its creation, Zinoviev later began to call it a “factional center.”

The meeting singled out from its midst an executive body - the "seven" consisting of members of the Politburo (Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Stalin, Tomsky - with the exception of Trotsky) and Kuibyshev as the chairman of the Central Control Commission. Its candidates were Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin, Molotov, Uglanov, Frunze.

The meeting developed a special document, like a Charter, regulating all the activities of the created management team. One of the main provisions of the document was the clause on the strictest discipline. The “Seven” was accountable only to the plenum-meeting of this collective, which met simultaneously (in parallel or on the eve of the next Plenum of the Central Committee. All disagreements within the “Seven” had to be resolved either by the plenum-meeting, or by the “Seven” itself. The order of the day of the “Seven” was the following: the same as at the upcoming meeting of the Politburo, that is, it previously discussed the same issues. At the request of one of its members, it could be convened immediately. Also, at the request of one of its members, any issue could be removed from the agenda of the Politburo meeting. “Seven” met on Tuesdays, the Politburo - on Thursdays every week, and sometimes more often.

All this was done in order to come to a meeting of the Politburo, to be ready for a unanimous rebuff to Trotsky and to speak with a single opinion on the issues discussed. And almost all issues of internal party life on which there were disagreements with Trotsky or other comrades were discussed in the “seven” and decided. In the field of view were economic, foreign policy and Comintern issues, the most important decisions of the Central Control Commission. The “Seven” predetermined almost all organizational issues, as well as issues of distribution and placement of party personnel.

Being, according to the testimony of the same Zinoviev, secret from the party, the de facto leader of the Central Committee, the “seven” had a pseudonym - “leadership collective” and had a special code. Speaking in his defense at the July (1926) joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Zinoviev shook a folder of official, in his words, documents of all kinds related to the work of the “seven”. As one example of its activities, he cited a document concerning the dispute over the grain and feed balance. The resolution of the “seven” read: “Since the opening of a discussion, especially on the eve of the opening of the plenum of the faction, is considered undesirable, the “seven” considers it necessary to transfer the issue to the discussion of the plenum faction.” Next came the signatures of members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Moreover, very often, Zinoviev continued, the decisions of the “seven” were transmitted in encrypted form from Moscow to Leningrad. “As you can see,” Zinoviev asserted, “this was a complete organization: a faction of the plenum and its executive body - the “seven”, in which the chairman of the Central Control Commission, Comrade Kuibyshev, participated.”

Special mention should be made of the strictest discipline in the “seven”. Its observance was valued much higher than adherence to general party discipline. Trying to somehow justify and explain his speech with a co-report at the XIV Party Congress, Zinoviev admitted at the aforementioned Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission that he also bears part of the blame for the fact that at the XIV Party Congress, disagreements within the Central Committee suddenly arose, that before the congress during For a long time they would not have been known to broad layers of the party and even members of the Central Committee. “Here a mistake was made on my part, as well as on the part of some other comrades. We hoped that questions which experience had now shown could only be resolved collective wisdom all members of our party, especially the working part of our party, we hoped to resolve these issues within the walls of one room” (Stalin’s office, where the “seven” met. - Auth.). This is evidence of our myopia. But we did not do this because, being bound by “factional discipline”, we did not want to bring disagreements to wide discussion, we obeyed the decisions of the “seven”.

So, before Lenin’s illness, until December 1922, the concentration of power in the hands of Stalin did not occur so clearly. However, soon after the death of the leader, the situation began to change dramatically.

Very little time passed, and, already being part of the “seven,” Stalin and his entourage began to implement new methods of mechanical reprisal, now against former like-minded people - Zinoviev and Kamenev. The pretext is still the same - Trotsky, the attitude towards him.

Are people silent?

Let me remind you that as a result of the internal party discussion with Trotsky that took place in the fall of 1924, three categories of resolutions of local party organizations emerged, which were reported in Pravda. Some advocated the expulsion of Trotsky from the party. Others demanded Trotsky's removal from the posts of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and member of the Politburo. The third category of resolutions (from Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals, Ukraine, etc.) demanded the removal of Trotsky from the leadership of the Revolutionary Military Union and his conditional retention in the Politburo. But at the same time, everyone was unanimous on the issue of the ideological and political assessment of Trotskyism in general.

Within the Central Committee, the first opinion did not have a single supporter. Differences were only between supporters of the second and third opinions. Zinoviev and Kamenev advocated the immediate removal of Trotsky from his posts as a member of the Politburo and the Pre-Revolutionary Military Council.

Stalin, who remained at the will of the party as General Secretary, explained his position towards Trotsky by the desire to correct his “rudeness and disloyalty,” which Vladimir Ilyich pointed out in his “Letter to the Congress.” Later, at the July 1926 joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Stalin said that when the discussion with Trotsky unfolded in 1923–1924, when “one part of our party demanded the use of extreme measures against Trotsky, and I was against the removal of Trotsky from Politburo, I then occupied a place not on the extreme flank against Trotsky, but on the moderate one... I defended his retention in the Politburo, defended it together with the majority of the Central Committee - and defended it... In any case, I tried to take into account the instructions given by Lenin to me regarding Trotsky, and I took all possible measures to moderate the ardor of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who demanded Trotsky’s expulsion from the Politburo.”

Stalin, however, was not in favor of Trotsky’s unconditional retention in the Politburo. The only question was about the timing and the moment when it could be “squeezed out” under a successful pretext. At the January (1925) meeting of the leadership team, as we now know, on the eve of the Plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin’s proposal was adopted to “carefully prepare” Trotsky’s conclusion. Stalin voted for this proposal, that is, he spoke only in favor of not removing Trotsky from the Politburo at the January Plenum of the Central Committee.

As a result of heated debates, already at the Plenum of the Central Committee, the overwhelming majority of members of the Central Committee (with two votes against) and all members of the Central Control Commission (with one abstention) voted for the removal of Trotsky from the post of the pre-revolutionary military council, and adopted, as Manuilsky put it, a “conciliatory” resolution.

The decision to “partially” remove Trotsky and the refusal to support the proposal of Zinoviev and Kamenev (to remove Trotsky from the Central Committee) indicated a decline in their authority and the defeat of anti-Stalinist sentiments in the Central Committee of the party. The attempts of Zinoviev and Kamenev, who expressed disagreement with the mild, in their opinion, decision of the January Plenum, could not shake Stalin’s position and accuse the majority of the Central Committee and Stalin personally of liberalism in relation to Trotsky, as well as the fact that the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission not only do not lead fight against Trotskyism, and even join forces with it.

From that moment on, the disengagement of forces went into full swing. It began, in the words of Trotsky himself, new stage in the implementation of a long-planned and systematically carried out plan by Stalin. Already soon after the XIV Congress, in the leading circles of the party there were insistent conversations about the need to reorganize the Politburo in the sense of cutting off a number of workers (primarily meaning Zinoviev and Kamenev) who took part in leadership work under Lenin, and replacing them with new personnel , which could constitute a proper support for Stalin's leadership role. His plan met with full support from a closely knit group of closest supporters. This explains the decision of the steering group to carry out the plan piecemeal, taking advantage of every opportunity. There was a gradual slide towards authoritarian rule, towards the creation of an administrative-command system and the formation of Stalin’s personality cult.