Why was there a war in Chechnya? The Chechen war was beneficial to the West

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet Army, Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons of the Soviet troops in Chechnya, including aviation. Russia declared the “Dudaev regime” illegal.

Soon, a struggle for spheres of influence began among the Chechens themselves, which, with the intervention of federal authorities and security forces, resulted in a kind of civil war in 1994. On December 11, 1994, the operation of federal troops to capture Grozny began. The assault on Grozny on New Year's Eve, which left hundreds of Russian troops dead, was a disaster.

The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into a national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show statesmanship, patience, diplomatic skill, or understanding of the historical, cultural and everyday traditions of the mountain peoples.

1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.

2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.

3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering”.

Thus, oil and money became the real cause of the war.

First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin government. Negative attitudes rose sharply after the major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically took an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.

Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.

Negotiations began between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.

In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic- former chief of staff of the Chechen armed forces. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.

Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short period of time, the Chechen Republic was handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.

After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From the end of 1996 to 1999, criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-appointed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policies.

Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and in high schools they were required to wear a burqa. The study of the Arabic language was introduced, and this was not provided with personnel, teaching aids and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only join criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.

Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: taking hostages, bombing houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, and attacks on Dagestan. As a response, the Russian government led by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.

The Second Chechen War began in September 1999.

She appeared completely different in all major indicators:

By nature and method of conduct;

In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;

In relation to citizens towards the army;

By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;

Media behavior, etc.

The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.

60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion in Western countries regarding the second Chechen war was at odds with all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising of a small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya.

At the same time, the Western media hid the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and trafficking in people, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed, first of all, at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.

The group of federal forces in Chechnya numbered 90 thousand people, of which about 70 thousand were in military service, the rest served under contract. According to press reports, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov was on their side.

By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces began to pay special attention to intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.

By mid-2000, federal troops defeated most of the organized combat forces of the separatists and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.

However, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs who had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian leadership continued its policy of establishing peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya in the shortest possible time. And in general, this task is being successfully accomplished.

Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)

The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - military actions between Russian federal troops (forces) and armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

In the fall of 1991, in the context of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic declared the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The bodies of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were repealed. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, led by Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.

The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) of regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and the North Caucasus republics and etc.

On December 9, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force.

On December 11, 1994, the movement of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different areas of the city, and the combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes, 2004)

The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops; the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to complete the assigned task.

Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny on February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.

Illegal armed groups (IAF), using the negotiation process that had begun, redeployed part of their forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, and organized terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).

On August 6, 1996, federal troops, after heavy defensive battles, having suffered heavy losses, left Grozny. INVFs also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, cessation of hostilities agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in an extremely short period of time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

On May 12, 1997, a Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was concluded.

The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, took the line towards the immediate secession of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally the population of other North Caucasian republics around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis intensified.

Counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya in 1999-2009 (second Chechen war)

In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev’s militants.

Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya.

On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) - explosions of residential buildings.

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naur and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.

In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new group “Center” was created.

On February 25-27, 2000, units of the “West” blocked Kharsenoy, and the group “East” closed the militants in the area of ​​Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, and Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated.

The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelayev’s group in the area of ​​the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After this, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, hostages were taken in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, hostages were taken at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.

By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

The first Chechen war of 1994-1996: briefly about the causes, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what initially caused the conflict? What happened in those years in the troubled southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Large reserves of weapons and property of the Soviet state ended up in his hands.

The general's main goal was the creation of an independent republic of Ichkeria. The means used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence became the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons stemming from the main one:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• Chechen dissatisfaction with the invasion of Russian troops;
• The source of income for the new government was the slave trade, trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and restore lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between federal troops and the forces of an unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. The very next day, one of the groups approached settlements located near Grozny.
2. December 31, 1994 – storming of Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: poor preparedness of the Russian army, uncoordinated actions, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full Russian control only on March 6.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the lowland territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone hostilities. However, it was violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which were won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996, the Chechens attempted to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 – death of the separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, a truce was declared. According to the conditions, there should have been an exchange of prisoners, the disarmament of militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops. But no one wanted to give in, and fighting began again.
6. August 1996 – Chechen operation “Jihad”, during which the Chechens took Grozny and other significant cities. The Russian authorities decide to conclude a truce and withdraw troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. Following the results of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but no one still recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. Earning income through criminal means has begun to occupy a significant place.
4. Almost the entire civilian population fled their homes.

There was also a rise in Wahhabism.

Table “Losses in the Chechen War”

It is impossible to name the exact number of losses in the first Chechen war. Opinions, assumptions and calculations vary.

The approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the “Federal Forces” column, the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen war

According to official data, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most military personnel who took part in hostilities received their rank posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the battles in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of Chechen thugs with a tank. After which he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car until the last. Then detonation occurred and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovsky. In the spring of 1995, Dneprovsky’s unit defeated the Chechen militants who were at the height of the fortification. Andrei Dneprovsky was the only one killed in the ensuing battle. All the other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This became one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

Combat veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions differ about which side started the war. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful resolution of the situation? Here the assumptions are also different.

First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian government forces (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya until the second Chechen conflict and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

Background to the conflict

With the beginning of “perestroika” in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People, created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"Chechen Revolution" 1991

On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.

More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 missile launchers of the ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand units of small automatic weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1992)

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)

As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

In reality, the state system of the ChRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.

In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.

A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being driven out of their homes, abandoning them or selling their apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, and 300 went missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from government platforms, and desecration of Russian cemeteries.

1993 political crisis

In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. The constitution adopted last year was amended and a regime of Dudayev's personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.

Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)

After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

Beginning of the Civil War (1994)

Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, Dudayev’s supporters lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

Progress of the war

Deployment of troops (December 1994)

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and east (from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Division blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city or normal communications.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuv motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with the militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people killed, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.

Terrorist attack in Budennovsk (June 14 - 19, 1995)

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.

The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to be in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

Militant attack on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.

Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.

Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist groups, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

Khasavyurt Agreements (August 31, 1996)

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations

On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). . “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.

On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “due to his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”

In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”

As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone. The mission collected information about what was happening in the Chechen war, searched for missing persons and prisoners, and contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of the militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with the field commanders , Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.

In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.

In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.

During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.

In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign staff from Chechnya.

In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.

Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.

Results

The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Losses

According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

Commanders

Commanders of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
2. Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilievich (December 1994 - February 1995)
3. Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
4. Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
5. Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
6. Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
7. Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)

In art

Movies

• “Cursed and Forgotten” (1997) is a feature-journalistic film by Sergei Govorukhin.
• “60 Hours of the Maikop Brigade” (1995) - a documentary film by Mikhail Polunin about the “New Year’s” assault on Grozny.
• “Blockpost” (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
• “Purgatory” (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
• “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1996) is a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
• DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2

Music

• "Dead city. Christmas" - a song about Yuri Shevchuk's "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
• Yuri Shevchuk’s song “The boys were dying” is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
• The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Batyanya Battalion Commander” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step March” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
• Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is dedicated to the First Chechen War.
• Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
• The song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
• Blue berets - “New Year”, “Reflections of an officer at the hotline”, “Two turntables on Mozdok”.

Books

• “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
• “Chechen Blues” (1998) - novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
• May Day (2000) - story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the storming of the village of Pervomayskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
• “Pathologies” (novel) (2004) - novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
• I was in this war (2001) - novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.

Historians have an unspoken rule that at least 15-20 years must pass before giving a reliable assessment of certain events. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these bloodiest and most tragic pages in the newest Russian history. But society has every right to know the names of the people who started this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually marked the beginning of a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen War.

The events leading to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 90 to 91, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime bloodlessly and the second stage from the beginning of 92, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.

Stage one. How it all began.

The first impetus for the start of events can be considered Gorbachev’s promise to give all autonomous republics the status of union and Yeltsin’s subsequent phrase - “Take as much independence as you can carry.” Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to gain support from the residents of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.

Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev to overthrow the Supreme Council with its chairman Doku Zavgaev on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such no longer existed in Chechnya. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic, in which there were riflemen for an entire regiment, was looted, and all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the presidential elections to be held on October 26 of the same year, which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya to be adopted on November 1st. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.

True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, several planes with internal troops, totaling about 300 people, still landed in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny). Naturally, 300 people had no chance of completing the task and overthrowing Dudayev and, on the contrary, they themselves became hostages. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and were eventually taken out of Chechnya on buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president, and his authority and power in the republic became limitless.

Stage two. War becomes inevitable.

After Dudayev officially assumed the post of President of Chechnya, the situation in the republic was heating up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. The 173rd Grozny training center alone contained weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.

But the anarchy that was happening in the republic affected not only the Russian residents in the republic itself, but also the residents of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Advice notes and, most importantly, they made money from this not only in Chechnya itself, they received financial benefits from it in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 92-93, famous Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month? According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of “distinguished guests,” Dudayev personally gave instructions on the purchase of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.

It was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to this, and Yeltsin instructs the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), Savostyanov, to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev using the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov placed his bets on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and money and weapons began to be sent to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters remained to Dudayev’s palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to information from the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the assault on Savostyanov.
The next assault attempt by opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. After this assault, Defense Minister Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tank crews who were captured and declare that the Russian Army would have taken Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.

On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, Andrei Kozyrev, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short period of time, this will not cause any particular negative reaction from the US administration.

One way or another, the deployment of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals, to whom Grachev proposed to lead the operation, refused this and only in mid-December did Anatoly Kvashnin agree to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny...