Polish uprising (1830).

Young and not very large countries usually find one defining event in their histories, and this is usually the acquisition of independence. But Poland is a country with a very rich history, and in relation to it it is more correct to talk not about an event, but about a key motive that determines the way Poles think about history. And for Polish cultural memory, such a key issue is the attitude towards the insurgent tradition.

At the end of the 18th century, the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was divided by three neighboring empires - Prussia, Austria and Russia. At first, the Polish gentry, although they were very upset by this, first of all tried to somehow adapt to the new situation. At the beginning of the 19th century, she began to connect hopes for the revival of Poland with Napoleon, but he was defeated, and the gentry again had to adapt to the prevailing conditions. It must be said that these conditions were not so tragic. Thus, on the territory of Russia there existed the Kingdom of Poland, or, as the Poles like to say, the Kingdom of Poland - practically a separate state with its own constitution, its own budget, its own army, connected with the Russian Empire by a kind of personal union.

But in November 1830, an uprising began in Warsaw. It was raised by young people who studied at a school for cadets (this is something like a cadet school), and the Polish elites did not support them right away: at first they doubted whether it was worth doing. The uprising was suppressed and led to very serious consequences: the Kingdom of Poland was deprived of its autonomy, a lot of people, up to 200 thousand people, went into emigration, many ended up in Siberia, many died. Indemnities were imposed on Poland, a fortress was built over Warsaw, whose cannons looked at the city, and so on. In fact, the Russian army occupied Poland: Nicholas I said that now, after the uprising, he has the right to behave there as in a conquered country.

In the 1840s, several attempted uprisings were carried out in the Polish territories that were ceded to Austria and Prussia, and in Krakow, which by this time had the status of a free city under the care of all three states - and as a result, Having lost this status, it became part of the Austrian province of Galicia.

In the early 1860s, reforms began to unfold in Russia and serfdom was abolished. Petersburg was very concerned about preventing a new Polish uprising, and tried to come to an agreement with the Poles. To achieve this, some elements of Polish autonomy were restored anew: they were allowed to open a university, replace Russian officials with Polish ones, and so on. But in 1863, an uprising nevertheless occurred in the Kingdom of Poland. It developed differently than the uprising of 1830: Poland no longer had autonomy - and, accordingly, now not two armies fought there, but the Russian army and partisans. The uprising was again brutally suppressed.

Thus, in the 1860s, the insurgent era ended and the question of whether it was necessary to rebel at all became key for Polish society.

Criticism

As a reaction, two schools of thought about the history and, accordingly, the future of Poland arose. Firstly, the so-called Warsaw positivism is the school to which the writers Boleslaw Prus, Henryk Sienkiewicz, Eliza Orzeszko and others belonged. From their point of view, the uprisings brought the Polish nation to the brink of survival: a huge number of Polish youth were exiled to Siberia, went to the Caucasus to fight in the ranks of the Russian army, went into exile or died on the battlefields. They believed that this should be decisively stopped, and that the focus should be on what they called “organic work”: that is, work, study, develop entrepreneurship and economics, science and education, thus increasing -the “organic strength” of Polish society, and then freedom will come on its own, without desperate and reckless impulses.

This idea became popular not only in Russian Poland, but also in other parts of it. Firstly, there were also uprisings that did not help achieve anything, and secondly, the Poles there were under very severe pressure from the emerging German capitalism and rise - the Poles were afraid that they would simply be crushed.

The second version of the reaction to the uprising of 1863 arose in Galicia and was called the “Cracow historical school.”

Galicia is the most economically backward region of Poland, but it is steeped in history and has a very strong gentry tradition. And the rebel idea was very closely connected with this tradition. At the same time, one of the differences between the Polish gentry and the Russian nobility was its large number: if Russian nobles made up 1-2% of the population, then the Polish gentry made up about 10%, and in some regions, including Galicia, up to 15%. And in the 1860s, a party appeared there, whose members began to call themselves stanchiki. Stanczyk is the name of a jester who, at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries, lived at the court of the Polish king and all the time said unpleasant things to the king and the Polish nobility - he mocked their arrogance, vanity and recklessness. The Stanczyks, as if continuing such a critical tradition, question the rebel idea, considering it reckless and embodying all the negative features of the Polish gentry. At the same time, in contrast to the Warsaw positivists, who adhered to liberal views, the Stanczyks were conservatives: for them capitalism was something alien, they perceived it as an incomprehensible rotten force that deprives a person of subjectivity. From their midst came two of the greatest Polish historians of the 19th century - Józef Szuiski and Michal Bobrzyński, who described the history of Poland as a history of lack of sobriety, calculation, restraint, systematic effort, a history of gentry egoism and arrogance.

Glorification

The tradition of glorifying the insurgent movement also existed, but rather at the individual level. You can see this, for example, at the famous Polish Lychakiv cemetery, which is located in Lviv: there is a section filled with identical small iron crosses, which stand in rows, like ranks of soldiers. People who took part in the uprising of 1830-1831 are buried under these crosses. If we look at the dates written on these crosses, we see that many of these people died much later—say, in the 1880s. That is, 50 years have passed since the uprising, and a person is buried as a rebel - his identity is connected exclusively with this event. And in fact, in every subsequent generation of Poles, a certain number of people were born who identified themselves with this rebel tradition.

Arthur Grotger. On the battlefield. From the cycle "Polonia". 1866

Arthur Grotger. Forging braids From the cycle "Polonia". 1863Szépműveszeti Múzeum / Wikimedia Commons

Arthur Grotger. Defense of the estate. From the cycle "Polonia". 1863Szépműveszeti Múzeum / Wikimedia Commons

Arthur Grotger. Shelter. From the cycle "Polonia". 1863Szépműveszeti Múzeum / Wikimedia Commons

Arthur Grotger. Mourning news. From the cycle "Polonia". 1863Szépműveszeti Múzeum / Wikimedia Commons

Immediately after the uprising of 1863, the Polish artist Arthur Grotger created vivid tragic images of the rebels. He himself did not participate in the uprising and lived in Vienna at that time, but later he helped the rebels fleeing from the authorities, and painted scenes of the uprising on engravings - that is, works intended for reproduction.

On the territory of the Russian Empire, manifestations of this tradition were practically impossible, primarily due to stricter censorship than in Austria, so artists and writers did not speak directly about the uprisings. But stories reminiscent of the heroic past of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the past triumph of Polish weapons arose very often. For example, in a painting by artist Jan Matejko, Russian boyars during the Livonian War bow to the Polish king and Grand Duke of Lithuania Stefan Batory, who besieged Pskov. Of course, in 1872, when this picture was painted, it was very pleasant to see it: it reminded us that the Poles were once stronger and should become stronger in the future.

Uprising of 1944

After the end of the First World War, Poland was restored and gained independence. After this, the idea that it was the struggle - that is, the rebel tradition - that led to the restoration of independent Poland became an important motive for the historical education of youth. At the same time, no one asked the question why the Czechs, who never rebelled, gained independence in the same 1918 In 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed; many independent states were restored or created. In particular, on October 28, the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed, and on November 6, the re-establishment of Poland was announced..

During World War II, Poland had one of the most developed resistance movements: the Polish Home Army actively fought the German occupation army all the time. In 1944, when Soviet troops were already approaching Warsaw, the leaders of this army decided to raise an anti-German uprising in the city. It was as reckless or even more reckless than the uprisings of the 19th century: the Poles were very poorly armed and counted only on the fact that the Red Army would continue to advance, the Germans would continue to retreat and the rebels would greet the Red Army as the masters of Warsaw. But the Red Army stopped on the banks of the Vistula, and the Germans began to systematically destroy the rebels and Warsaw. As a result, the city, which by the summer of 1944 remained more or less intact, two months later, by the end of the uprising, was destroyed by more than 90%, killing 200 thousand civilians.

The Poles strived for restoration of independent Poland within the borders before 1772(before the first section). On November 29, 1830, a group of Polish officers broke into the residence of the leader. Prince Konstantin Pavlovich, the viceroy of the Russian emperor, with the aim of killing him and seizing power. Workers and students, having taken possession of the arsenal and weapons warehouse, began to arm themselves. The rebels created Provisional Government. On January 25, 1831, the Polish Sejm declared the independence of Poland. Nicholas I sent an army of 120 thousand people to Poland under the command of Diebitsch. Polish troops numbered 50-60 thousand people. The forces were unequal. Polish troops put up stubborn resistance, but were defeated.

In September 1831, the tsarist army took Warsaw by storm. The uprising was suppressed. Thousands of Poles were sent into exile.

Nicholas destroyed the Polish constitution. In February 1832 it was published Organic statute. According to it, the Kingdom of Poland was declared an integral part of the Russian Empire, and the Polish crown was declared hereditary in the Russian imperial house. The administration of Poland was entrusted to Administrative Council headed by the Emperor's Viceroy. The Seimas was liquidated. The Russian nobility supported the punitive policy of the Nicholas government.

After the suppression of the uprising in Poland slogan Nicholas's domestic policy became protection of the original Russian system.

After the revolutions of 1848 - 1849. Nikolai refused to carry out any changes. 1848 – 1855 characterized as " gloomy seventh anniversary» Nicholas's reign:

Russian troops in 1849.suppressed the uprising in Hungary. After this, Russia gained a reputation in Europe “ gendarme of Europe».

In 1848 Nikolai refused from his intentions to free the peasants. He stated: “Some people attribute to me the most absurd and reckless thoughts and intentions on this subject. I ... them I reject with indignation».

The French were banned from entering Russia, and then all Europeans. Travel abroad was extremely limited; Department III issued foreign passports only to persons in need of treatment.

Censorship oppression reached its apogee during these years. In 1848, an emergency censorship body was created, popularly called the Buturlinsky Committee after the name of its chief. He looked through publications that had already been cleared for publication by the censors.

The issue of closing universities was discussed in ruling circles. In 1849, Uvarov published an article in defense of universities. Nicholas sent him into retirement.

The persecution of universities intensified, and control over the teaching of professors increased. Granovsky was required to submit lecture notes to the Ministry of Public Education.

A.V. Nikitenko, censor, professor, wrote about this time in his memoirs: “Barbarism triumphs there in a wild victory over the human mind.”

T.N. Granovsky wrote about this time: “Let the present be damned, maybe the future will be bright” (1849). “Many decent people have fallen into despair and look at what is happening with dull calm - when will this world fall apart.”

A.I. Koshelev: “Nicholas’s reign from 1848 was especially difficult and suffocating.”

Chicherin B.N..: “In the last years of the reign, despotism reached its most extreme proportions, and oppression became completely unbearable. Every independent voice has fallen silent; universities were twisted; the press was suppressed; no one thought about enlightenment. Boundless servility reigned in official circles, and hidden anger began to boil below. Everyone, apparently, obeyed unquestioningly; everything was going according to plan. The monarch’s goal was achieved: the ideal of oriental despotism was established on Russian soil.”

A.I. Herzen: “Quickly in our north, wild autocracy is wearing out people... as if on a battlefield - dead and mutilated.”

The events of the Crimean War became a difficult test for society and Nicholas himself. Nikolai sincerely believed in what he was doing myth about the military-political power of Russia .A.F. Tyutcheva wrote: “...the unfortunate emperor saw how under him the stage of that illusory greatness on which he imagined that he had raised Russia collapsed».

Nicholas I could not bear the shame of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. At the beginning of February 1855, Nikolai fell ill with the flu. He was in a state of severe depression: he refused to receive ministers, sending them to the heir Alexander Nikolaevich, he prayed a lot in front of icons, he received almost no one, Nicholas was tormented by insomnia, he cried. On February 18, 1855, Nicholas I died, and on February 19, 1855, Alexander II ascended the throne.

How did Russian society perceive the news of Nicholas's death? As testified Koshelev, the news of the death of the emperor did not upset many, as people were tired of administrative and police arbitrariness.

February 19, 1855 met Granovsky and Soloviev on the porch of the church. Soloviev said only the word: “He died!”, and Granovsky answered him: “The amazing thing is not that he died, but that you and I are alive.”

F.I. Tyutchev wrote the following lines:

“You were not a king, but a performer,

You did not serve God and not Russia,

You served your vanity.”

Kropotkin wrote in his memoirs: intelligent people, having learned about Nikolai’s death, hugged on the streets of St. Petersburg, telling each other the good news. Everyone had a presentiment that the end was coming both to the war and to the terrible conditions created by the iron tyrant.”

They said that Nikolai took poison.

One said that Nicholas could not survive the failures of the Crimean War and committed suicide;

Another accused the life physician Mandt, a foreigner, of “killing the Tsar.” These legends spread with lightning speed.” The government needed to publish (March 24, 1855) the book “The Last Hours of the Life of Emperor Nicholas I” (in the printing house of the III department). It was written by D.N. Bludov, chief manager of department II. The book presented the official version Nikolai's natural death from influenza.

There is a group of memoir sources in which a version of Nikolai's poisoning is developing.

At the beginning of February 1855, Nikolai fell ill with the flu. The most accurate dating of the development of the disease is provided by the Chamber-Fourier journal, in which at the end of the day Nikolai’s daily routine was recorded. According to the magazine, on February 5 the monarch felt imperfectly healthy. The Emperor was ill for 5 days and clearly became stronger. The journal entries do not convey the alarm over Nikolai's illness. On February 12, Nicholas received a report from Yevpatoria about the defeat of the Russian troops. It became clear to the Emperor that the war was lost. The Chamber-Fourier journal noted that on the night of February 14, the sovereign slept little. Probably, insomnia was caused by Nikolai's heavy thoughts; signs of ill health were insignificant. Entries from the Chamber-Fourier journal: “February 13. The fever is less, the head is free. The 14th of February. The fever has almost stopped. The head is free. February, 15. Pulse is satisfactory. Cough and sputum production are not severe. February 16. There is no headache, mucus production is free, and there is no fever.” As you can see, Nikolai’s health gradually improved.

Nikolai was experiencing a mental crisis. According to Mandt, the news from near Evpatoria “killed him.” From February 12, Nikolai stopped accepting reports; he sent cases to the heir; refused food and suffered from insomnia. The court was concerned about the king's seclusion. P.D. Kiselev recalled: Nikolai “no matter how much he wanted to overcome mental anxiety, it was expressed on his face more than in his speeches, which, when talking about the most sorrowful events, concluded with one ordinary exclamation: “Do your will, God.” The state of mental torment was unusual for a sovereign who prided himself on his equanimity.

The heir, the empress, the court, and the general public had no idea about the possibility of an imminent death.

On the night of February 18, 1855, Mandt, according to his memoirs, received a note from Bludova asking “not to waste time in view of the increasing danger.” At three o'clock in the morning, Mandt hurried to Nikolai and, after examining him, became convinced that his situation was extremely dangerous, that he was experiencing the onset of paralysis. Nikolai courageously listened to Mandt’s diagnosis and asked to call the heir. The cause of the paralysis is not entirely clear. The testimony of an unknown person, written from the words of Dr. Karell, Mandt’s colleague, has been preserved. This person said that on February 17, Carell “was called to Emperor Nicholas at night and found him in a hopeless state and only Mandt was not with him. The emperor wanted to reduce his intense suffering and asked Karell to alleviate it, but it was too late, and no remedy could save him. ...Carell, knowing. That not only in the city, but even in the palace, no one knew about the danger, he went to the heir’s half and demanded to be woken up. We went to wake up the empress and immediately sent two ballots for the two previous days to be printed.” All the bulletins about Nikolai’s illness were written in the Chamber-Fourier journal in the margins in a different ink; until that day, the margins remained empty. There is an assumption that these bulletins were entered into the journal later in order to create a picture of the emperor’s increasing illness.

Mandt later wrote a pamphlet about the death of the emperor and intended to publish it in Dresden, but the Moscow government, having learned about this, threatened him with deprivation of a substantial pension if he did not immediately destroy what he had written. Mandt complied with this requirement, but told a select circle of people about what happened. One of them was Pelikan Wenceslav Wenceslavovich - chairman of the medical council, director of the medical department of the Ministry of War, president of the Medical-Surgical Academy, and Savitsky Ivan Fedorovich, adjutant of Tsarevich Alexander Nikolaevich on the General Staff. Pelikan more than once told his grandson A. Pelikan, according to Mandt, the circumstances of Nikolai’s death. A. Pelikan - diplomat, later - censor. According to A. Pelikan’s note, Mandt gave poison to someone who wanted to commit suicide at all costs. In addition, Pelikan cited information that anatomy professor Gruber also claimed that Nikolai was poisoned. Gruber was invited to work at the Medical Academy from Vienna. Gruber, a famous anatomist, was tasked with embalming the body of the deceased emperor. Gruber typed up the autopsy report in Germany. For this, he was imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where he was kept for some time, until his intercessors managed to prove his lack of intent. In other works there is evidence that the embalming of the emperor’s body was carried out twice: the first time by Gruber, the second by Enokhin and Naranovich. Other sources confirm the embalming of the body by Grubber and the pressure on it. Savitsky was a friend in the Tsarevich's retinue since childhood. KN. Alexandra. He saw a lot. He later retired, took part in the Polish uprising of 1863, remained in exile, wrote memoirs, completely free from internal and external censorship. He was an informed witness to many events. In his memoirs, Savitsky wrote about Nikolai: “Surrounded by liars, flatterers, not hearing the truthful word, not hearing the truthful word, he woke up only to the thunder of the guns of Sevastopol and Evpatoria. The death of his army - the support of the throne - opened the king's eyes, revealing all the destructiveness and fallacy of his policy. But for a despot possessed by exorbitant vanity and conceit, it turned out to be easier to die, to commit suicide, than to admit his guilt. And although the war still lasted, its outcome was clear even to Nicholas. The German Mandt, forced to flee abroad, told me about the last minutes of the great ruler. After receiving a dispatch about the defeat near Yevpatoria, he summoned Mandt to himself and declared: “You have always been loyal to me, and therefore I want to speak with you confidentially - the course of the war has revealed the fallacy of my entire foreign policy, but I have neither the strength nor the desire to change and go any other way, it would be contrary to my convictions. Let my son, after my death, make this turn. It will be easier for him to do this after coming to terms with the enemy.” “Your Majesty,” I answered him. “The Almighty has given you good health, and you have the strength and time to improve things.” Nikolai: “No... Give me poison that would allow me to give up my life without unnecessary suffering, quickly enough, but not suddenly (so as not to cause misunderstandings). ... I command and ask you, in the name of your devotion, to fulfill my last request.” Further, Savikiy supplemented this story with a description of what he saw and heard himself. Savitsky wrote that Alexander, having learned about it. That his father was dying, he hurried to his father, collapsed at his feet and shed tears. Nikolai fell ill and never got up again. That same night, the palace learned that the king was seriously ill. The court doctors Karell, Rauch and Marcus were called to a consultation; the signs of poisoning were so obvious that the doctors refused to sign the previously prepared bulletin about the disease. Then they turned to the heir and, at his command, the court doctors affixed their signatures to the bulletin and sent it to the Minister of War.” (For more details, see the article by A.F. Smirnov “The solution to the death of the emperor” // Presnyakov A.E. Russian autocrats. M., 1990.). Nicholas I was buried on March 5, 1855.

Most historians give the official version of Nicholas's death from influenza.

In 1863, a new national liberation movement began in the Kingdom of Poland. Historians cite the reasons for this speech:

• the dependent position of Polish lands and the idea of ​​​​restoring their own statehood;
• feudal-serfdom remnants that hampered the development of capitalist relations;
• student and peasant protests that swept across the Russian Empire after the reform of 1861;
• unemployment associated with the introduction of machines into production, and difficult working conditions in factories;
• the growth of landownership, which grew due to the seizure of land from the peasants.

Events leading up to the uprising

After the uprising of 1848 and until the end of the Crimean War (1853-56), a harsh police regime reigned in the Kingdom of Poland. The emergence of any political circles and freethinking were suppressed. But after the Peace of Paris, the emperor decided to make a number of concessions. Many participants in the uprising returned from exile, martial law was lifted, and new universities began to open. The Polish gentry took a wait-and-see attitude. She did not care about the liberal “Alexander” reforms. The Polish nobility believed that failures in the Crimean War would sooner or later lead to concessions by the tsar and the revival of an independent Poland. Russian revolutionaries Herzen and Chernyshevsky increasingly spoke about the liberation of the Polish people.

Ideologically, the Polish opposition could be divided into two camps:

• bourgeois-gentry, who adhered to moderate liberal views;
• a student worker who was guided by the radical ideas of the populists and wanted to combine the national liberation movement with a social revolution.

The situation in the region became increasingly tense. In the early 1860s, a wave of demonstrations, speeches and assassination attempts on officials swept across Poland. Some of them were anti-feudal in nature, and some were anti-Russian. In 1861, after the abolition of serfdom in Russia, discussions began on the peasant question in Poland. Although in the Kingdom of Poland the peasants were personally free, there was a problem of corvée and landlessness. The implementation of land reforms was to be carried out by the Polish “Agricultural Society”, which included large landowners and gentry. Members of the “Society”, of course, did not want to lose their positions and unnecessarily indulge the lower classes. But the nobility had to reckon with the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and radical students. At the end of the winter of 1861, another demonstration took place in Warsaw, which ended in a clash with the tsarist troops.

In order not to aggravate the situation, Alexander II decided to move closer to the gentry. Several particularly unpopular officials were fired, and new local government bodies appeared in provinces, districts and large cities. But the gentry were not satisfied with these half-measures, and the peasants only became even more indignant at the disregard of their rights. The decree of February 19, 1861 was interpreted by the Polish peasantry as a document that abolished corvée and gave them land. The conflict between the peasants and the gentry eventually led to a large-scale peasant movement that covered all parts of the Kingdom of Poland. If in the countryside the popular uprisings were directed primarily against the landowners, in the cities the riots quickly acquired an anti-government character. Officials were forced to flee from some cities, and the rebels organized their own bodies of self-government in abandoned town halls.

Nationalist officers and intellectuals decided to take advantage of the revolutionary situation. Also in 1861, radicals founded the Central National Committee in Warsaw. The committee enjoyed great authority among the peasantry and urban lower classes. Soon its participants were able to establish their own administrative apparatus and appoint local governors. The committee set about creating a militia, established tax collection, and began to perform some government functions. The gentry and the big bourgeoisie, who did not want to lose their leading position in Polish society, also created their own organization - the Directorate. The main task of the Directorate was to resist the growth of the revolutionary movement.

However, there was no unity regarding the nature of the future revolution in the Committee. One part of its members believed that the uprising should take place with the support of Russian revolutionaries, and the other - that the Russians, no matter what views they held, should under no circumstances interfere in Polish affairs. In the end, the first point of view won. In 1862 the Committee published its program:

• restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the borders of 1772;
• transfer the land to the peasants (it was assumed that the state would pay monetary compensation for it to the landowners);
• abolish class privileges.

Progress of the uprising

In order to paralyze the actions of the Committee and get rid of radical youth, the government announced a recruitment drive in 1862. This news was met with a surge in revolutionary sentiment. Now even opponents of the uprising began to speak out for the immediate start of a rebellion right on the days of recruitment.

So, in January 1863, another Polish uprising began. The first act of the Committee was the publication of two decrees: on the gratuitous transfer of land into the ownership of peasants and the payment of compensation to landowners, as well as on the provision of land to all landless people who were ready to join revolutionary detachments.

From the very beginning, the rebels were expected to fail. The government knew about the impending revolt, so it managed to redeploy troops, arrest some influential revolutionaries and prepare the most important settlements for defense. The rebels did not have enough people, weapons and experience, and conflicts often arose among their commanders. Attempts to raise a rebellion in Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian provinces also failed.

Under these conditions, the gentry called on the lower classes and youth to abandon further unrest and even tried to put a man of moderate views at the head of the rebellion - officer M. Lyangevich, but this plan failed. Langevich failed to cope with the role of dictator and after another defeat fled to Austria.

At the end of the spring of 1863, one of the rebel leaders, Z. Padlevsky, was captured and executed. He was not only a talented military leader, but also a consistent revolutionary who sought to lead his people to the northeast, where they could receive help from Russian populists. With his death, the rebels lost their common idea and unity. The committee found itself decapitated, which the landowners and nobles decided to take advantage of. Many of them became members of the Committee and began to change its policies in a more conservative direction. The gentry sought to limit the participation of the lower classes in the uprising, break with the Russian revolutionaries and use the current situation as a way to gain independence from Russia with the help of Western powers. The uprising lost its former social orientation; only the national liberation element remained. The radicals tried several times to seize leadership from the gentry, but these attempts failed.

Active negotiations began with Vienna and Paris. By an ironic coincidence, a key role in them was played by the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Czartoryski.

However, the disappointment of the peasants and urban lower classes in the uprising led to the fact that the revolutionary movement began to decline. From October 1863, military operations became increasingly rare, chaotic and scattered.

In the spring of 1863, Russian authorities declared an amnesty to everyone who voluntarily laid down their arms. But since the popular movement only began to grow after this, a large military contingent was sent to Poland. In the winter of 1864, in order to calm the peasantry, the emperor issued a decree on land reform in the Kingdom of Poland. According to it, peasants, including landless ones, received allotments. Formally, plots were issued free of charge, but each peasant had to pay an additional land tax. Landowners received compensation for lost lands. At the same time, a reform took place that expanded peasant self-government. Despite the generally conservative nature of the reform, it greatly contributed to the growth of peasant farms and the further capitalist development of Poland.

Results

The uprising ended in failure. The most irreconcilable revolutionaries were executed, many of the rebels were sent to hard labor. Despite the fact that active Russification, the inculcation of the Orthodox faith began in the region, and martial law was introduced, reprisals against the rebels were not too severe. Moreover, a reform was carried out in Poland that put the Polish peasantry in a more advantageous position compared to the Russian one.

The reasons for the failure of the Polish uprising were:

• lack of unity among the rebels;
• the absence of a common concept of uprising for all;
• poor military training of the rebels;
• lack of real support from Western powers.

Political situation ¦ Strengths of the parties ¦ Military action plans

In 1807, Napoleon founded the Duchy of Warsaw. It did not satisfy the expectations of the majority of Poles, who dreamed of Poland “from sea to sea” with the inclusion of Lithuania and Western Rus'. Alexander I in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna formalized the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia under the name of the Kingdom of Poland and granted it a constitution. Poland received the right to have its own army of 30 thousand. Moreover, money for weapons, uniforms and food for this army was allocated not from the treasury of the Kingdom, but from the sums of the empire.

Alexander's measures regarding Poland did not meet with sympathy among the Russians. The historian Karamzin even spoke out harshly. “The Tsar,” he wrote, “corrects the division of Poland with the division of Russia; with this he will cause applause, but will plunge the Russians into despair; the restoration of Poland will either be the destruction of Russia, or the Russians will sprinkle Poland with their blood and once again take Prague by storm.”

“At one of the shows,” Paskevich, who was then passing through Warsaw, says in his notes, “I approached gr. Miloradovich and gr. Osterman-Tolstoy and ask: “What will happen from this?” Osterman answered: “But what will happen - in 10 years you and your division will storm Warsaw.” The prediction came true.

The Tsarevich Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich was appointed commander-in-chief of the Polish army, and the old veteran of the Polish army, General Zaionchek, who acted completely in accordance with the Grand Duke, was appointed viceroy of the Kingdom. Meanwhile, Adam Czartoryski hoped to take the post of governor in such an influential position and achieve cherished Polish goals. Struck by the failure, Czartoryski took the position of trustee of the Vilna educational district and curator of the Vilna University and, with his mother, Isabella, became the secret center of all Polish intrigue.

Then there was the time of Freemasonry, the Decembrist movement in Russia, the Carbonari in Italy, etc. The Kingdom of Poland and the Western Region quickly became covered with a network of secret societies. The anarchy that reigned in the government of Poland for centuries, the law of confederations, as if giving the appearance of legality to every rebellion, gave a certain political education to the nation. The Poles were imbued with an indelible passion for conspiracies - this explains their constant readiness for reckless uprisings.

The center of revolutionary ideas in Lithuania was Vilna University and churches, and in Ukraine, Volyn and Podolia - the Kremenets Lyceum, founded by Count Chatsky. The main propagandist in Vilna was the talented history professor Lelevel.

Of course, all this was known to the Russian government, but it either did not take any measures, or these measures were extremely unsuccessful. Since the annexation of Lithuania to Russia, nothing has been done to unite it with other parts of the empire. When it was reported that at Vilna University a professor of philosophy was giving lectures in a revolutionary direction, the police captain was ordered to attend the lectures. In 1823, Czartoryski was replaced by Novosiltsev, and Lelewel was transferred to Warsaw, where he indulged in propaganda with even greater convenience.

The political mood of Poland was so clear to everyone that Nicholas I, leaving Warsaw in 1829 after being crowned Tsar of Poland, told the Empress that they were on a volcano that had been threatening to erupt for ten years. It is clear after this that the explosion of 1830 was not a surprise, and it is completely naive to assert that the revolution was made by second lieutenants Vysotsky, Zalivsky and Urbanasy and the school of second ensigns, “snots” (snots), as the Polish Minister of War Gauke called them.

The July Revolution of 1830 in Paris and the August Revolution in Brussels added fuel to the Polish fire. The final impetus for the uprising was the expulsion of Polish troops along with the Russians to suppress the revolution in Belgium. With the removal of the national troops, all hope for the success of the revolution disappeared, and therefore the Poles decided to act. Thus, for the sake of political dreams, unfulfilled only because their implementation affected the interests of three powerful states (Russia, Austria and Prussia), which included the former Polish provinces, the already granted institutions and the material well-being of the country achieved under Russian rule were sacrificed, which had made such remarkable progress in 15 years that the treasury, instead of the previous constant deficit, now had free cash of 66 million zlotys (15 kopecks).

On the evening of November 17, the conspirators attacked the residence of the Tsarevich Belvedere. Thanks to the valet Frieza, the Grand Duke escaped, and the Russian troops and part of the Polish gradually joined him and on the evening of November 18 left the city.

According to the Poles themselves, the uprising was easy to suppress at the very beginning, but the crown prince was at a loss. He kept repeating that “every drop of blood shed will only spoil the matter,” and released the Polish troops who remained loyal (these excellent regiments joined the rebels), retreated with the Russian detachment through Pulawy to Wlodaw within the borders of the empire and surrendered to the Poles the fortress of Lublin, which had important strategic importance, and large artillery reserves, and Zamosc. The uprising spread throughout the region.

General Chłopicki, a famous veteran of Napoleonic troops, a man with great military talents, a favorite of the troops and the people, was declared commander-in-chief of the Polish troops. On January 13, 1831, the Sejm declared the Romanov dynasty deprived of the Polish throne. Czartoryski, who became the open head of the revolutionary government, entered into negotiations with foreign powers to provide assistance to the Poles. The calculations turned out to be wrong. For Austria and Prussia, the restoration of Poland was dangerous; the sovereign rejected the petitions of England and France, declaring that he considered the Polish question to be internal; other states could not exert any influence.

The Poles responded to Nicholas' calls for submission by demanding that the western provinces join the kingdom. The fight became inevitable.

Strengths of the parties. Poles. The Polish army consisted of 35 thousand (28 thousand infantry and 7 thousand cavalry) with 106 guns. The revolutionary government: firstly, called up old-serving soldiers and dismissed officers - 20 thousand; secondly, it announced the recruitment of 100 thousand, of which 10 thousand into the cavalry; thirdly, they took draft horses for the cavalry, and then they had to take peasant horses as well; fourthly, to form five 8-gun batteries, they took howitzers from Modlin, Prussian cannons left over from the time of Prussian rule, Turkish cannons and cast 20 cannons from bells; fifthly, from the school of ensigns and from the Kalisz cadet corps they made an intensified graduation of officers, and in addition, they appointed nobles who had never served in the army to officer positions - an unsuccessful measure, because the servants were bad, and as revolutionaries they introduced a corrupting element into the army.

By the beginning of hostilities there were up to 140 thousand in total, but 55 thousand could be deployed in the field. The active army was divided into 4 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions; in addition, there were troops in fortresses and in detachments that had a separate purpose. The infantry regiments consisted of 4 battalions, the cavalry regiments - of 6 squadrons; the battalions were strong, much stronger than the Russian battalions.

The old troops were excellently trained thanks to the constant care of the crown prince. The new ones were significantly inferior to the old ones in terms of training, discipline and endurance. The mistake was that strong enough personnel were not allocated from the old units that would give strength and stamina to the new troops. The armament was good thanks to the supply of guns that had accumulated in the arsenal: the Tsarevich handed over all the more or less damaged guns to the Russian arsenal, and in return demanded new ones from the empire.

After Khlopitsky’s refusal, Prince Radziwill was appointed commander-in-chief, who had neither military talents nor the appropriate character, so he was entirely under the influence of Khlopitsky, who was assigned to him as an adviser. However, the power of the commander-in-chief does not tolerate any division, and therefore the position of the seemingly all-powerful Khlopitsky was still false and led to harm in the battle of Grokhov. In addition, Chlopicki, although he had all the data to stand at the head of the army, did not sympathize with the uprising - he refused offensive actions and believed that an honorary grave could only be prepared for the Polish army under the walls of Warsaw.

The chief of staff was Khrzhanovsky, an excellent officer of the General Staff. Quartermaster General Prondzinski, in addition to his extensive education as an officer of the General Staff, was distinguished by the brilliance and courage of his insightful strategic considerations.

Although many Polish officers served in Napoleonic troops, the Polish divisions there were usually commanded by the French, and therefore there were not enough experienced generals among them during the revolution.

The Poles were distinguished by their ardor in attacks and their staunchness in defense. The Pole is active, hot-tempered, brave, enterprising, but he has no moral fortitude. He considers his impulse irresistible, but if he fails, then cowardice sets in and he loses heart. In addition, partisanship brought a lot of harm. Over the centuries, love for the fatherland has turned into devotion to one's party. The triumph of the latter became the main goal - for it they were ready to sacrifice the interests of the state. All this led to disagreement among the higher-ups and destroyed the unity that was so necessary in the war.

Russians. The infantry corps (as the norm) consisted of 3 infantry divisions, 3 two-regiment brigades each, regiments of 3 four-company battalions, but the third battalions (reserve) were left in the rear to occupy more important places in the border country.

Cavalry: 5 reserve cavalry corps, 2 divisions each, and 10 light cavalry divisions, one attached to the infantry corps. Cavalry regiments - 6 squadrons. Each infantry division has 3 artillery companies with 12 guns; with the cavalry - 2 horse companies. The engineering troops have 11 sapper battalions, and the guards corps and the first reserve cavalry corps have one cavalry pioneer division each. The guns were mostly bad, damaged by careless cleaning, with bent barrels and faulty locks.

In no way inferior to the Poles in mass maneuvering, the Russians turned out to be less prepared in single actions, in skirmish combat, etc. Frequent battle fire in deployed formation was considered panache. Arakcheev's system had a detrimental effect on the development of entrepreneurship and the ability to act independently in managers.

The following were assigned to the active army: 6th Infantry Corps (Lithuanian) Rosen; The Tsarevich's guards detachment was also assigned to him; 1st Infantry Corps of Palen 1st; Witt's 3rd Reserve Caucasian Corps and Kreutz's 5th Reserve Cavalry Corps; Shakhovsky's Grenadier Corps; Guards of Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich; 2nd Infantry Corps of Palen 2nd. A total of 183 thousand (of which 41 thousand were cavalry) and, in addition, 13 Cossack regiments.

The spirit of the troops, however, was the same; in this war the usual virtues were displayed. In all clashes with the enemy, the regiments maintained their old glory and showed their characteristic courage and fortitude. The Prussian General Brandt, who was then in the Russian army and knew it well, writes that Russian soldiers are the first in the world. The Grenadier Corps and the famous 13th and 14th Jaeger Regiments were especially distinguished by their exploits. This was not the spirit of Rosen's 6th (Lithuanian) Corps. There were many Polish officers serving in it who participated in secret societies, and therefore sympathy for the Poles was noticed in the corps, “the entire Lithuanian corps was looking at Warsaw.”

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the troops were given “Rules for observation during the march, in bivouacs, in cramped quarters and in the battle itself.” This field manual was compiled on the basis of the combat experience of that era by people who knew the war, and therefore has great value even for the present time. Unfortunately, the tactical training of the Russian army, under the influence of parade ground masters who had no knowledge of war, was far from up to par and did not meet the basic requirements of the “Rules.”

The troops had provisions for only 15 days and fodder for the cavalry for 12 days. Replenishing these reserves was extremely difficult, because there was a crop failure in the country, and the inhabitants were either hostile or indifferent. They resorted to requisitions - and the tariff was set low - and residents avoided the concession of food. The only way to extinguish the patriotism of the regiments was with money. In addition, the requisitions were not without abuses and violence. The best way to ensure food supply would have been to have a reliable transportation unit for the army, but the Russians hoped to finish off the Poles right away and then spread out in wide apartments with allowance from the residents, and therefore neglected this part. Shortcomings in the organization of food had a detrimental effect on military operations.

Field Marshal Count Dibich-Zabalkansky, 45 years old, with enormous military abilities, extensive combat experience and recognized authority, was appointed commander-in-chief. However, in 1831 he did not fully live up to the hopes placed on him. He did not always show sufficient determination and set himself too complex combinations. After the death of his beloved wife, Dibich began to notice a loss of spirit and an addiction to alcoholic beverages. To complete Diebitsch's misfortune, at a time when the Russian army had survived all the crises, when the most important part of the campaign was over and the enemy was weakened, so that it remained to strike the final blow and reap the fruits of his labors, the commander-in-chief suddenly died of cholera - all the glory went to his successor Paskevich.

The chief of staff, Count Tol, is talented, educated, determined, energetic, went through the combat school of Suvorov and Kutuzov, and was on excellent terms with Dibich.

Military action plans. Poles. Around December 20, 1830, the Poles could muster about 55 thousand ready troops. Meanwhile, on the Russian side, only the 6th (Lithuanian) Corps was ready (38 thousand, and with the Tsarevich’s detachment 45 thousand), which Baron Rosen concentrated in two places (Brest and Bialystok), 120 versts distant from each other. It is clear that it was more profitable for the Poles to attack in order to defeat the Russians piecemeal and capture as much territory as possible (Lithuania) to expand the sources of army recruitment and material resources.

Khlopitsky, for his political reasons, did not want to take any offensive actions and decided: the Polish army would position itself in echelons in two directions leading to Warsaw from Kovna and from Brest-Litovsk; when the Russians advance, retreat to the position at Grokhov and take the battle there. They believed that it was risky to move far forward to cover Warsaw, for fear of being bypassed and cut off from the bridges in Prague and Molina. At the Grokhov position it was impossible to be surrounded; the Russians, due to the terrain conditions, could not deploy all their forces and take advantage of their superiority; finally, the Poles relied on the extensive sources of Warsaw and the Prague tete-de-pont. However, it should be noted that the vastness of the Poles’ position did not correspond to the number of their troops, it was surrounded by the left flank, and in the rear there was a large river with one bridge.

According to this plan, Krukovetsky's 1st Infantry Division positioned itself on the Kovensky Highway to Serock, and Yankovsky's cavalry division advanced to Rozhan. Zhimirsky's 2nd Infantry Division is on the Brest Highway, with advanced regiments on the Livets River, and Sukhorzhevsky's Uhlan Division ahead on the Veprzh River. Skrzhinecki's 3rd Infantry Division stood between these two directions at Stanislavov and Dobre. The general reserve (Schembek's 4th Infantry Division and three Caucasian divisions) is ahead of Warsaw. Separate detachments of Serovsky, Dwernitsky, Dziekonsky, and Kazakovsky were assigned to guard the upper Vistula.

Russians. All forces intended against the Poles could not be immediately opposed to the enemy. The Lithuanian corps could only assemble at the end of December; It took the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps (from Podolia) a month to join the Lithuanian; by the beginning of January the 1st Corps could approach Brest; at the beginning of February - grenadier; at the beginning of March - guards; at the end of March - the 2nd Corps, that is, the entire army - in 3–4 months.

By January 20, 126 thousand were actually collected (of which 28 thousand were cavalry); leaving 12 thousand in the rear, there were 114 thousand for the offensive - quite significant forces.

Diebitsch's goal is to defeat the enemy army and capture Warsaw. To do this, he intended to concentrate between Narew and Bug, between Lomza and Nur and act depending on the circumstances, trying to cut off the enemy from Warsaw. If this fails, then cross the upper Vistula, surround Warsaw and force it, by starvation or storm, to capitulate.

The plan corresponded to the situation and pursued important goals (the army, the capital), but it did not take into account the possibility of weather changes, that is, that during a thaw the Bug and Narev would present an obstacle to the crossing. In addition, if it was already planned to cross the upper Vistula, then some advised choosing Brest-Litovsk as the center of action and from there to act according to circumstances either to Warsaw or to the upper Vistula. But the execution of this plan was associated with various inconveniences, and most importantly, with a loss of time, meanwhile, the field marshal hoped to quickly end the uprising and, moreover, with one blow.

Then Toll proposed a compromise: move through Drogiczyn to Siedlce and from there to Warsaw, or to the upper Vistula; in this case, the troops would further move near the border, and therefore food supplies would be easier; but the path lengthened, and the army moved away from the grenadier and guards corps, coming from the north from Kovna. Diebich did not agree and began to act according to the original version.

Crossing of the Polish border by the Russians ¦ Change of line of action ¦ Advance of the Russian army to Wavre ¦ Battle of Wavre on February 7 ¦ Battle of Bialolenka on February 12 ¦ Battle of Grochow on February 13 ¦ Location of the Russians in the apartments

On January 24 and 25, the Russian army crossed the Polish border in 11 columns over a vast area from Kovna through Grodna, Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk to Ustilug. Despite the apparent scattering, the entire movement and distribution of troops was calculated in such a way that in the main forces in any place it was possible to concentrate 80 thousand in 20 hours, while the Poles could not oppose more than 55 thousand.

On January 27, the main forces reached the line of Lomza, Zambrov (1st Corps of Palen), Chizhev (6th Corps of Rosen), that is, in three days they covered only 60 versts, and meanwhile the transitions were forced. Due to the thaw, the roads turned into swamps; walked no more than two miles per hour; The carts placed on the sleigh track stopped. They gave the troops a rest. On January 27, rain removed all the snow from the fields; On the 29th the thaw intensified; small rivers opened up, and the ice on the Bug melted in places. It was impossible to be drawn into the wooded and swampy space between the Bug and the Narev.

After a discussion at the military council, the field marshal decided to move to the left bank of the Bug at Brock and Nur, gather troops at Vengrov and Siedlce, then use the Brest highway and continue moving towards Warsaw. The road to Drogichin could serve as a means of communication.

Change of line of action. Thus, it was necessary to make a flank march and change the line of action. On January 30, the crossing began. The difficulties during the crossing were great. If the Poles had shown proper activity, they could have greatly interfered with Diebitsch. After the crossing, the army moved to the Livets River, where it established itself almost without resistance from the Poles - there were small vanguard skirmishes. By February 2, the army stood in two masses at Vengrove and Siedlce, having advanced the vanguards.

The march of 100 miles along disgusting roads was accomplished extremely quickly, but with great effort. Rest was given for February 2, 3 and 4 - it was also necessary to bring up the convoys.

On February 2, the head of the cavalry-jaeger division, Baron Geismar, from the 5th reserve cavalry corps, advancing from Kiev to Pulawy, allowed himself to be defeated in parts near the village of Stoczek by the Polish general Dwernitsky (3 battalions, 17 squadrons and 6 guns).

Tall cavalry rangers on massive horses could not act quickly against the evasive Polish lancers on light horses. Taking advantage of superior forces, Dvernitsky alternately defeated both Russian regiments, which were panicked. The Poles did not pursue them. The Russians lost 280 people and 8 guns, the Poles 87 people.

Geismar went to Siedlce. Dvernitsky, having formed a battery from the taken cannons and using the horses captured from the Russians, went back across the Vistula. This matter, unimportant in itself, had a very great moral significance for the Poles: it instilled in the people confidence in their troops and reinforced the belief in the possibility of fighting Russia. Dvernitsky immediately became a folk hero, and volunteers began to flock to him. In general, the significance of Stochek’s case is determined by the fact that it was the first in the upcoming campaign.

The advance of the Russian army towards Wavre. On February 5, the 6th Corps moved to Dobra; 1st Corps - from Liwa to Kalushin; for communication between them, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade (Muravyova) - along the old Warsaw road to Zimnovody (then the road goes to Stanislavov, Okunev); reserves, under the command of Tol, - from Siedlce along the Brest highway. In the rear, the armies of Nur, Vengerov and Siedlce were occupied by garrisons. With this direction of movement, clashes between Skrzhinetsky and Rosen at Dobre and Zhimirsky with Tol and Palen at Kalushin were inevitable.

Battle at Kalushin. Only earlier Palena reached Kalushina and bypassed Zhimirsky’s position from both flanks. Zhimirsky managed to retreat to Minsk without major losses.

Battle at Dobre. Skrzhinetsky took a strong position in a forest clearing, relying on the village of Dobre. He stubbornly held out against Rosen’s vanguard and even went on the offensive with the 4th regiment (who enjoyed the fame of the “Chvartaki”), but with the arrival of the main forces of the 6th Corps, after a hot 4-hour battle, they were overturned; however, he retreated to Okunev in order. Russian losses were 750 people, Poles 600 people.

Skrzhinetsky had 12 battalions, 12 guns, 4 squadrons; Rosen - 19 battalions, 56 guns, 2 Uhlan regiments and a Cossack regiment, but he brought troops into battle in parts and still did not bring all of them. In addition, the Poles had an advantageous position, and the Russians could not deploy their numerous artillery.

On February 6, pressed by the Russians, Skrzhinetsky retreated to the Grokhov position to the Alder Grove, and Zhimirsky settled down before reaching Wavre. Rosen advanced to Okunev (avant-garde), Palen - to Milosna (avant-garde); The left flank of the army was guarded by Geismar at Schennitsa.

Battle of Wavre on February 7. The battle was accidental for both sides. On February 7, the field marshal did not count on a battle. He ordered the 1st and 6th corps to set out at 7 a.m. and seize the exits from the forest gorges to the Grokhov Plain. The 1st corps had to travel 8 versts along the highway, and the 6th corps 12 versts to the Benefit tavern along the bad old Warsaw road. It is clear that the movement of the columns was not uniform.

Khlopitsky also did not think of accepting battle, but since Zhimirsky was strongly pressed by Palen, Shembek’s division was sent to replace him and provide support; they had only 18 battalions.

Battle of Wavre in 1831

In the main forces of Palen's vanguard there was a brigade of mounted rangers between the infantry, in addition, in the tail there were another 22 squadrons and 16 corps.

Khlopitsky ordered to attack Palen, moving forward mainly with the left flank, Krukovetsky ordered to occupy Vygoda, Skrzhinetsky stood behind Krukovetsky. Thus, almost the entire Polish army found itself on the battlefield. Polish artillery opened frequent fire.

The head of the vanguard, Palen Lopukhin, was quickly overthrown. The Black Sea Cossack Regiment barely rescued Ataman Vlasov, who had already fallen under sabers. Palen immediately moved the 1st cavalry artillery company to the left of the highway, ordered the cavalry to clear space for the infantry and move to the left in order to hold the pressure of the right flank of the Poles. The arriving regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division quickly deployed onto the highway and to the right; They delayed the enemy a little, but still Zhimirsky, leaning forward, pressed the right flank of the 1st Corps and threatened to cut it off from the 6th. Palen advances the New Ingermanland regiment to the right flank. Arriving Tol moved the Old Ingermanland regiment and other infantry units to the right, and placed the artillery of the 3rd division in a ledge behind the cavalry.

At about 11 o'clock Diebitsch arrived. He ordered the mounted rangers to let the infantry through. But while the cavalry was clearing the highway, the Poles made a new attack on the right flank. The horse company suddenly doused them with grapeshot; The Poles retreated, but the skirmishers rushed to the battery. Diebitsch sent his convoy against them (a half-squadron of Lubensky hussars) and supported it with a sapper battalion, that is, to the extreme he brought into action even these units that were at hand, regardless of their special purpose. The skirmishers were repulsed and disappeared into the forest.

It was already 12 o'clock. Diebitsch sent to hurry Rosen, who managed to turn around only at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. It was necessary, out of necessity, to bring Palen's troops into battle in parts, as they approached: Lopukhin's haste put the Russian army in a critical situation.

Meanwhile, the head of the vanguard of the 6th Corps, Vladek, having passed Gribovskaya Volya, heard shots from Palen and immediately moved 3 battalions of rangers towards him into the forest, which attacked the enemy along with Palen’s right flank. The field marshal, having heard the cannonade at Rosen, no longer fearing for his right flank, ordered a general offensive to begin, and sent Saken to the extreme left flank to lead the numerous cavalry. The Poles are driven back everywhere; Lubensky, overthrown by Saken, tries to find protection behind the infantry, but Zhimirsky and Shembek are also being pushed back. Then Khlopitsky himself sends the Guards Grenadier Regiment.

Diebitsch orders the mounted rangers to attack directly along the highway. They are happy to make amends for their failure with Stocek in front of the field marshal. The Württemberg horse-jaeger regiment overthrew the 3rd Polish horse-jaeger regiment, then cut into a square of guards grenadiers, threw them into the swamps, scattering and cutting down some of the people. Gradually pushing back the enemy, the Russians occupied Wavre.

Khlopitsky also had Skrzhinetsky's division, which he did not use. If he did not have in mind a decisive attack and intended to give the final battle at the Grokhov position, then it is not clear for what purpose he fought the battle at Wavre on such a large scale. Krukovetsky tried to hold Rosen, but, attacked by significant forces and seeing the retreat of the remaining troops, he retreated to the Alder Grove, occupied by Skrzhinetsky. Rosen also occupied Kavenchin, driving out a small Polish detachment from there. At 4 o'clock Dibich had already taken possession of the exits from the forest, which he considered the goal of the battle achieved.

The Russians lost 3,700 people, the Poles lost no less, counting the 600 people taken prisoners by the Russians.

On February 8, a shootout broke out at the forward posts near Alder Grove. Rosen sent Reibnitz's 25th Division to drive the Poles out of there. Reibnitz was repulsed with the loss of 1,620 men.

Diebitsch, having learned about this useless bloodshed, confirmed the order to refrain from any clashes with the enemy.

Battle of Bialolenka on February 12. Prince Shakhovskoy with the grenadier corps marched from Kovna (starting on January 24) to Mariampol, Kalwaria, Suwalki, Raigrod, Shchuchin, Lomza and on February 8 reached Ostroleka. Here he crossed the Narew and went further to Pultusk, Serock and Zegrz. Having crossed the Bugo-Narev here on February 11, Shakhovskoy at Neporent united with Saken (1st battalion, uhlan regiment, sapper company, 2 guns), sent by the field marshal to facilitate Shakhovsky’s movement. At this time, Khlopitsky sent a detachment of Yankovsky to the north of Warsaw to collect food. Yankovsky attacked Shakhovsky early in the morning of February 12 and was repulsed. Then Shakhovskoy went to Byalolenka, intending to cut off Yankovsky.

Diebitsch, meanwhile, created a plan for the Grokhovsky battle, and intended to advance, as suddenly and secretly as possible, Shakhovsky with part of the other troops against the left flank and rear of the Polish army and inflict the main blow on it in this direction.

Field Marshal did not explain his plan to Shakhovsky, but simply sent an order (in essence, this is not an order, but a command) to stop in Neporent or wherever the messenger finds him. A Cossack with a note came across Yankovsky, was late and arrived at Shakhovsky when he was already approaching Byalolenka, which was heavily occupied by Malakhovsky and Yankovsky. Shakhovskoy attacked; The Poles retreated to Brudno, where Krukovetsky united his division and 18 guns, that is, forces equal to those of Shakhovsky. Losses on both sides were 650 people.

The battle at Bialolenka showed the field marshal that his calculations for surprise were violated. Fearing that the Poles would not attack Shakhovsky with superior forces, that same night he sent him an order, again without explaining the purpose, to remain and not engage in battle again, and if the Poles attack him, then our main forces will attack the enemy with front. The adjutant who brought the order reported that Dibich was extremely dissatisfied with the occupation of Byalolenka. This greatly excited old Shakhovsky, he began to consult what should be done, but nothing was decided.

On the morning of February 13, Shakhovskoy, imagining that the entire Polish army could rush at him, decided to retreat through Grodzisk and Marki to join Diebitsch. Krukovetsky, seeing the Russians retreating, opened artillery fire and moved to attack. Shakhovskoy left safely, losing only one gun, which got stuck in a swamp. The battle ended at 11 o'clock in the morning.

Dibich, having heard Shakhovsky’s cannonade, decided to attack the Poles with his main forces to save him. As a result, the Battle of Grokhov took place a day earlier than expected - on the 13th instead of the 14th, and not at all according to the previously worked out plan.

Battle of Grokhov on February 13. The Grokhov position was located on a vast low-lying plain, crossed by swamps and drainage ditches. From M. Grokhov past Kavenchin and Zombka to Byalolenka there stretches a swampy strip 1-2 versts wide.

Shembek's division was located south of B. Grokhov, and abatis were set up in the grove. Zhimirsky's division occupied the Alder Grove, north of M. Grokhov (about 1 verst along the front and? a verst in depth, cut through by a fathom ditch). The marshy soil was frozen and allowed movement. Roland's brigade scattered a thick chain of skirmishers along the edge with strong reserves behind. The main body of the brigade stood behind the ditch in deployed formation with intervals between units so that the overthrown front troops could move back and settle under the cover of battle fire and the bayonets of deployed units. Chizhevsky's other brigade stood behind, in reserve. Nearby, behind the grove, epalements for the batteries that ran through the entire grove were dug up. 2 batteries fired at the area to the left from the grove to Kavenchin. Behind Zhimirsky's division stood Skrzhinetsky, who was also intended to defend the grove.

Battle of Grokhov in 1831

Lubensky's cavalry stood between the highway and the village of Targuvek. Uminsky Cavalry Corps (2 divisions with 2 horse batteries) - at the count. Elsner. Krukovetsky acted against Shakhovsky at Brudno; near Prague - militias with scythes (cosigners) and parks. There was no general reserve, because cosigners could not be counted as it.

Benefits of the position: Russian troops did not have sufficient space for deployment and had to do so when leaving the forest under artillery and even rifle fire. Flaws: the left flank hung in the air, which gave Dibich the basis for his bypass of this flank with Shakhovsky's corps, but it was unsuccessful - in the rear there is a large river with one bridge, so retreat is dangerous.

Poles' forces - 56 thousand; of which 12 thousand were cavalry; without Krukovetsky - 44 thousand; Russians - 73 thousand, of which 17 thousand cavalry; without Shakhovsky - 60 thousand.

AT 9? o'clock the Russians began a cannonade, and then their right flank began to move to the right to attack the Alder Grove. The attacks were carried out incorrectly: troops were brought into battle in parts, there was no artillery preparation and through encirclement. At first, 5 battalions burst into the edge, but ran into reserves behind a ditch and were driven out of the grove by Roland's battalions. Reinforced by 6 battalions. The Russians broke in again, but Chizhevsky, together with Roland (12 battalions), again forced them to retreat. The Russians bring in 7 more battalions. A long line (18 battalions) of Russians quickly rushes towards the Poles and knocks out the entire division from the grove at about 11 o'clock in the morning. Zhimirsky himself is mortally wounded. But, not supported by sufficient artillery, the Russians suffered greatly from Polish grapeshot. Khlopitsky brings Skrizhenetsky's division into action. 23 Polish battalions take possession of the grove.

At 12 noon, Dibich strengthens the attack with another 10 battalions and begins to surround the grove on the right and left, where new batteries are deployed on the flanks. Having successfully pushed out from the edge, the Russians on the right could only reach a large ditch; but on the left, the fresh regiments of the 3rd division went around the grove and went far ahead, but came under the closest fire from the batteries.

Khlopitsky, wanting to take advantage of this moment, brings into action both divisions (Zhimirsky and Skrzhinetsky) and 4 fresh battalions of guards grenadiers, which he personally leads into the attack. Seeing their beloved leader in their midst - calm, with a pipe in his teeth - the Poles, singing “Poland has not yet perished,” with uncontrollable force attack the tired, frustrated Russian regiments. The latter begin to retreat. The Poles gradually capture the entire grove, their columns approach the very edge, the skirmishers run forward.

Prondzinsky, pointing to the Russian battery, shouts: “Children, another 100 steps - and these guns are yours.” Two of them were taken and directed to the height where Diebitsch stood.

This was the last desperate effort of the Poles. The field marshal sends what infantry he can (2nd Grenadier Division) into the grove; strengthens the artillery: more than 90 guns operated on the sides of the grove and, moving forward from the right side (from the north), heavily hit the Polish batteries behind the grove; To bypass the grove on the right, the 3rd Cuirassier Division was moved with His Highness's Life Guards Uhlan Regiment and 32 guns in order to facilitate the capture of the grove, and at the same time break the front of the retreating Poles and try to throw back at least their right flank to the swamps near the Brest Highway. Even further to the right, the Lithuanian grenadier brigade of Muravyov with the Uhlan division occupied the colonies of Metsenas and Elsner, advanced forward, connecting with the cuirassiers on the left flank.

The excited Dibich gave spurs to his horse and, galloping up to the retreating troops, shouted loudly: “Where are you going, guys, the enemy is there!” Forward! Forward!" - and, standing in front of the regiments of the 3rd division, led them into the attack. A huge avalanche hit the grove from all sides. The grenadiers, not responding to the Polish fire and lowering their bayonets, burst into the grove; they were followed by the 3rd Division, followed by Rosen's 6th Corps. In vain Khlopitsky, already wounded in the leg, personally goes around the front line and tries to inspire the Poles. The Russians cross the ditch over the piles of bodies and finally take possession of the grove.

Khlopitsky orders Krukovetsky to move to the grove, and Lubensky with the cavalry to support the upcoming attack. Lubensky replied that the terrain was inconvenient for cavalry operations, that Khlopitsky was an infantry general and did not understand cavalry affairs, and that he would carry out the order only after receiving it from the official commander-in-chief Radziwill. This is the critical moment at which Khlopitsky’s position was incorrect. He went to Radziwill. On the way, the grenade hit Khlopitsky's horse, exploded inside and injured his legs. His activities ceased. The entire Poles' business fell into disarray, general management disappeared. Radziwill was completely at a loss, whispered prayers and answered questions with texts from the Holy Scriptures. The faint-hearted Shembek cried. Uminsky quarreled with Krukovetsky. Only Skrzhinetsky retained his presence of mind and showed management.

Diebich entrusted the leadership of the actions of the cavalry mass to Tol, who became carried away by details and scattered his cavalry across the field; only one cuirassier regiment of Prince Albert, headed by the division of Lieutenant Colonel von Sohn, rushed to pursue the randomly retreating Poles. The regiment went through the entire enemy battle formation, and only near Prague itself did 5 Polish Lancer squadrons take the Zone in the flank. But he deftly led his cuirassiers onto the highway and escaped from the fire of the infantry and rocket battery. The attack lasted 20 minutes for 2? versts. Although the losses of the cuirassiers reached half of their strength (Zon was mortally wounded and captured), the moral effect of the attack was enormous. Radzwill and his retinue galloped off to Warsaw.

The Olviopol hussars dashingly attacked Shembek, pinned two regiments to the Vistula and scattered them. The Poles were pushed back everywhere. Skrzyniecki gathered and arranged the remnants behind the position on the sandy hills.

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Shakhovsky finally appeared, who had shown complete inactivity that day. The delighted Dibich did not make any reproach, he only announced that the honor of completing the victory belonged to them, and he himself became the grenadier at the head. But when they approached the enemy position, it was 5 o’clock, the day was approaching evening. The field marshal thought for a moment and, after some hesitation, ordered the battle to stop.

Poles losses - 12 thousand, Russians 9400 people.

Meanwhile, the Poles were in terrible disorder. Troops and convoys crowded around the bridge, and only by midnight the crossing ended, under the cover of Skrzhinetsky.

Under such conditions, it would not be difficult for the Russians to cope with Skrzhinetsky, and then storm the Prague tete-de-pont. It is completely unclear why Diebitsch did not do this. His plan was to end the uprising with one blow and as quickly as possible. The opportunity just presented itself, and the field marshal did not take advantage of it. The dark question of the causes has not yet been clarified by history.

Location of Russians in apartments. The next day the Poles occupied and heavily armed the Prague fortifications. It was possible to attack only with the help of siege weapons, and their delivery required 4 months. Crossing the upper Vistula in order to then attack Warsaw from the west also took time. Therefore, Diebitsch positioned the army in wide flats (Okunev, Kolbel, Zhelechov, Radzyn, Siedlce), about 40 miles along the front and 40 in depth, in order to facilitate food supplies through requisition.

Meanwhile, by March 10, the Vistula was cleared of ice and the crossing could begin. For this they chose Tyrchin (outside the sphere of influence of the Polish army, the width is only 400 steps, the fairway is closer to the right bank, the Veprz flows nearby, which can be used for harvesting and rafting of materials). Although the mud had reached its extreme limit, Dibich was in a hurry and on March 15 he ordered the army to move to the crossing.

Dvernitsky's expedition ¦ Skrzhinetsky's offensive

The Poles took advantage of the suspension of the Russian main army for private enterprises. Since the Lublin Voivodeship was weakly occupied by the Russians, and the cr. Zamość could serve as a support for a partisan detachment, then at the insistence of Lelewel, Dvernitsky’s detachment (2 battalions, 22 squadrons, 12 guns - 6,500 people) was assigned to move to Volyn with the aim of inciting an uprising there. On February 19, Dwernitsky crossed the Vistula and at Kurov attacked the cavalry detachment of General Cover, overthrew the Finnish dragoons and captured 4 guns. On February 21, Dibich moved significant forces from different directions, and entrusted Tolya with the leadership of the entire matter. Then Dwernicki took refuge in Zamość on March 4.

At the end of March, Dvernitsky decided to continue the expedition to Volyn: he quickly moved to Krylov and crossed the Bug there on March 29. Against the Poles in Volyn were Ridiger’s troops - 11 thousand with 36 guns.

Dvernitsky, moving along the Austrian border, became convinced that in this side with the dominant Russian population there was nothing to think about regarding a general uprising, and therefore decided to make his way to Podolia. On Styri near Boremlya (Mikhailovka) Ridiger blocked his path.

Dvernitsky secretly withdrew from his position at night: he walked along the border, and Ridiger pursued in parallel. On April 15, Dvernitsky took a strong position at the Lyulinsky tavern, with his rear to the Austrian border. Ridiger attacked, but at the last minute Dvernitsky did not accept the attack, crossed the border and was disarmed by Austrian troops.

Skrzhinecki's offensive. To support the army moving towards the crossing, Rosen's 6th Corps was temporarily left on the Brest highway, which was ordered to: observe Prague, cover the rear of the movement, secure the edge and especially guard Siedlce and communications with Brest. If the Poles advance in superior forces, retreat to Kalushin and even to Siedlce.

Adjutant General Count Karl Fedorovich Tol

On March 17, the army moved out of the quarters. The march was very difficult: the people were exhausted from fatigue, the artillery was dragged by the infantry, the convoys fell behind, the pontoons got stuck in the mud. But still, on March 19, the army approached the crossing. It took another 2-3 days to pull up the convoy. The field marshal was already ready to begin the crossing when the Poles went on the offensive and dealt Rosen a blow, which upset Diebitsch’s entire plan.

On March 19, Rosen's corps consisted of 18 thousand, of which 6 thousand were in the vanguard of Geismar at Wavre. Despite the field marshal's instructions, Rosen did not pull back the vanguard. The Poles, aware of all the difficulties of the direct defense of the Vistula, decided to suddenly attack Rosen with 40 thousand and thereby distract Diebitsch from the crossing. All secrecy measures were taken. At 3 o'clock in the morning on March 10, in the midst of thick fog, the Poles began to rush out of Prague.

Although Geismar acted energetically, the attack was partly sudden, and the Poles pressed Geismar for 8 hours in a row, who retreated to Dembe Wielka.

Rosen managed to withdraw his troops from the apartments, but in three places: at Dembe-Welke (10 thousand together with Geismar), at Ryshe (3 versts to the right) and at Mistov (in the rear). The terrain in front of the position was swampy, difficult for the enemy to reach, but the swamps stretched at an angle to the retreat route (highway), which ran along the left flank. Meanwhile, Rosen didn't even break the bridge here.

The battle went very well for the Russians; numerous attempts by the Poles were repelled. However, a brilliant attack by a cavalry division led by Skarzynski, carried out in the evening, forced Rosen to retreat. The corps retreated to Minsk. Losses: Russians - 5,500 people and 10 guns, Poles - 500 people.

On March 20, the retreat continued towards Siedlce, the rearguard stopped at Yagodne. Skrzhinetsky settled down with Latovich.

Movement of the main Russian army. On March 23, Diebich convened a military council, at which it was decided, at Tol’s suggestion, to temporarily abandon the crossing and move against the Polish main army and its communications. The disposition was already given for the movement of the army on March 28 to Garwolin, as the quartermaster general d.s. With. Abakumov reported to Dibich that the troops’ food supply was not at all ensured, since due to the lack of roads, the waiting transports were far behind; The military reserves were already mostly spent, and it was impossible to replenish them through requisitions due to the depletion of the country. Diebitsch decided on March 28 with a flank march to Lukov to get closer to reserves in Siedlce and Mendzierzec and with transports from Brest and Drogichin. On March 31, the field marshal entered Siedlce.

Prondzinski convinced Skrzynetski to finish off Rosen near Siedlce, advance to Brest and cut off Diebitsch from communications with the north. Plan: from the front, from Boime, Skrzhinetsky himself; on the left, through Sucha, Lubensky and on the right, through Vodyne, Prondzinsky, who is entrusted with the main role (12 thousand). This led to the battle on March 29 at Igane, where the 13th and 14th Jaeger regiments were badly damaged and Prondzinsky managed to scatter 2 regiments of General Fezi’s rearguard.

Losses: Russians - 3 thousand, Poles - much less. Only late in the evening did Polish troops appear from Sucha, and then Skrzhinecki himself. He arrived to the troops on the morning of March 29, who were waiting for him under arms. Without leaving the carriage, he began to complain of fatigue, had breakfast in the nearest village and lay down to rest; they didn’t dare wake him up. The commander-in-chief slept through the battle. The troops from Sukha did not receive any instructions.

Diebitsch's stay at Siedlce. During the forced inactivity, the field marshal took measures to provide food to the army in order to satisfy current needs and create another two-week supply for 120 thousand people. For this purpose, by the way, 450 regimental wagons and 7 mobile artillery parks were sent from the army to Brest for food, which were ordered to lay down military supplies in Brest and bring grain fodder. Transports from Volyn began to approach Kotsk.

To provide the rear, Brest-Litovsk was fortified, equipped with a significant garrison of 12 battalions, 10 squadrons and 60 guns under the command of Rosen. This should have calmed the already worried Lithuania.

Diebitsch's first offensive. Finally, it was decided to move with the army through Vodyne and Yeruzalem to Kuflev in order to bypass the Polish vanguard from the south, suddenly attack the main forces of the enemy and overturn them from the highway to the north.

The preparations were quite long, no measures of secrecy were taken during the march on April 12, and, however, the Poles were already aware of the Russian enterprise. As a result, Skrzynetsky managed to escape and retreated to Dembe Wielka, where the position was well fortified. The whole enterprise culminated in a rearguard action near Minsk, where the Poles lost 365 people.

After a day between Minsk and Dembe-Welke, the Russian army (60 thousand) retreated.

Diebitsch's second offensive - Cholera

Emperor Nicholas himself indicated the plan of military action. Dibich's difficulties consisted of providing the rear of the active army and supplying it with food. Providing the rear was entrusted to the newly formed reserve army of Count Tolstoy and to the 1st Army, which existed before. Thus, Diebitsch's hands were untied. His army was ordered to move to the lower Vistula, securing food supplies initially by purchase in Prussia, and subsequently by water delivery from Russia through Danzig and further along the Vistula.

Thus, the line of action had to be completely changed, that is, the Brest highway had to be cleared of hospitals and warehouses and everything had to be re-arranged on the line from the Narev to the lower Vistula.

Soon the Poles learned about these new proposals.

Diebitsch's second offensive. Khrzhanovsky's movement in Zamosc worried the field marshal, who received false information that Skrzhinetsky intended to move against the left flank of the Russian army on May 1 and attack Siedlce. Then, at dawn on May 1, Dibich himself moved along the highway. The first Polish troops retreated non-stop. The Russians stopped at Yanov for the night, and the next day they retreated. From the prisoners they learned that the troops belonged to Uminsky’s detachment. Diebitsch concluded that Skrzynetsky had slipped away again. In fact, the Polish commander-in-chief went against the guard, which Diebitsch remained unknown.

Cholera. If the month-long stop at Siedlce helped the Russian army to get settled, then the Poles also equipped their troops, completed the formation of new regiments, and believed in their strength and in the significance of their private successes. Now Skrzhinetsky had at his disposal 5 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, very well equipped.

At the same time, cholera was rapidly developing in the Russian army. It appeared on the northern shore of the Caspian Sea back in 1830, and the following year it spread throughout Russia and even in Western Europe. It entered the army through Brest, where transports and supplies converged from everywhere. It appeared on March 6, but at first it was weak, so that in March only 233 patients were counted, in April, due to the crowded and stationary parking, there were 5 thousand of them. At the beginning of April, cholera penetrated into the Polish army, which suffered from it no less than the Russian one.

The Guards Corps under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich stood separately from the main army between the Bug and Narev and was not completely subordinate to Dibich. This situation was harmful. If, during the advance to the crossings on the upper Vistula, Diebitsch could have commanded the guard, then perhaps the disaster with Rosen’s corps would not have happened.

Now the Poles planned to defeat the guard before Diebitsch came to its aid, and then join forces with the Lithuanian insurgents through the Augustow Voivodeship. Uminski (11 thousand), stopped on the Brest highway to protect Warsaw, united with Dziekonski’s detachment, which was on the upper Vistula, and Khozanowski from Zamosc, could collect 25 thousand and act in the rear of Diebitsch or unite with Skrzynetski for a general attack, in the event that Diebitsch will go to the aid of the guard.

In total, Skrzhinetsky had 46 thousand, and the Russian guard with Saken’s detachment reinforcing it had only 27 thousand. It is clear that the chances of success were significant, but Skrzhinetsky still hesitated. First, on April 30, the Poles left their location near Kalushin to Serock, from where they divided into three columns: 1) Dembinsky (4200 people) - along the highway along the right bank of the Narev to Ostroleka against Saken; 2) Lubensky (12 thousand) - up the Bug to Nur to destroy bridges and interrupt Dibich’s communications with the guard; 3) Skrzynetsky (30 thousand) - in the middle between the two previous ones on Lomza.

The guard concentrated at Zambrov, the vanguard of Bistrom at Vonsev, the advance detachment of General Poleshka at Przhetyche.

On May 4, Jankowski’s Polish vanguard pushed back the Cossacks, but at Przhetyche they met stubborn resistance from the guards rangers. Poleshko is fine, step by step, he went to Sokolov. The Grand Duke at this time concentrated his main forces at Snyadov.

On May 5, the Russian vanguard retreated to Yakots. Lubensky occupied Nur. Skrzhinetsky, to help the Lithuanians, sent in the intervals between Diebitsch and the guard of General Khlapovsky with an Uhlan regiment, 100 infantrymen and 2 guns, in the form of personnel for future Polish troops.

Prondzinski insisted on attacking the guard (23 thousand), taking advantage of the superiority of the Polish forces (30 thousand). Skrzhinetsky did not agree, but went with Gelgud’s division to Ostrolenka. Saken managed to retreat to Lomza; Gelgud pursued him and occupied Myastkovo, that is, almost in the rear of the guard. On May 7, the Grand Duke reached Bialystok.

So, Skrzhinetsky’s blow hit the air; Moreover, by going so far, he put the army in a risky position. Moving to join the guard, Dibich defeated Lubensky at Nur on May 10.

The field marshal continued to move to join the guard; on May 12 he reached Wysoko-Mazowiecki, and the guard was already in Menzhenin. Skrzhinecki hastily retreated to Ostroleka.

On May 13, Diebitsch made an extraordinary forced march. Palen's troops marched 50 versts, Shakhovsky's - 40 versts, and yet, after a short night halt, the field marshal continued to move.

Battle of Ostroleka on May 14. The city of Ostrolenka lies on the left bank of the Narev and is connected to the right by two bridges, about 120 fathoms long: permanent on stilts and floating. Sandy hills covered with small and sparse bushes stretch 700 fathoms from the shore. The whole area is somewhat swampy. The battlefield offered many advantages for passive defense, especially if the bridges were destroyed. But this could not be done, since there were still many Polish troops on the other side of the river: Gelgud’s division in Lomza and Lubensky’s rearguard. Prondzinsky planned to hide the troops in the bushes, crush those who crossed with artillery fire, and then, with a joint attack from several sides, throw them back into the Narew, and due to the crowded conditions, the Russians would not be able to turn around or use significant forces, especially cavalry. Skrzhinetsky, counting on the usual slowness of the Russians, did not expect a battle the next day and, completely reassured, allowed Prondzinsky to make the necessary orders; he himself went to Kruki and spent the night at an inn, enjoying champagne.

The 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions took up positions on the sandy hills. In front of the left flank on the hill are 10 Tursky guns; Bielitsky with 12 guns advanced to the bridge itself; The cavalry initially moved to the right, beyond the river. Omulev.

Already at 6 o'clock in the morning on May 14, Bistrom appeared in sight of Lubensky, who, after some resistance, began to retreat to Ostrolenko. At about 11 o'clock in the morning the head of the Russian army approached the city, having covered 70 versts at 32 o'clock, and the troops maintained excellent order and good spirits. In the Polish main camp there was complete carelessness: the horses of the cavalry were unsaddled, the infantry scattered for firewood, water and for bathing.

Opening artillery fire, the grenadiers quickly attacked Lubensky. Despite the deep sands, they quickly burst into the city and passed right through it, overturning or cutting off the enemy. Even the famous 4th regiment (“chvartaki”) was pushed back and completely upset by the guards horse-chasseurs and lancers. A total of 1,200 people were captured.

Although the army was greatly stretched, Dibich ordered the battle to continue and the bridges to be captured. Immediately, 3 guns were placed along the street opposite the bridge, 4 guns to the right of the city and 2 to the left. Then these batteries, which were very important, increased to 28 and 34 guns, respectively.

The Poles tried to destroy the bridge, but Russian grapeshot forced them to retreat. The Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment, led by the Knights of St. George, rushes, despite the grapeshot of Bielitsky's two guns, along the crossbars and captures the cannons. Patz with the remnants of the rearguard falls on the Astrakhanites, but General Martynov with the battalion of the Suvorov (Phanagorian) regiment ran across the floating bridge; another battalion heads across the pile bridge, and with a joint effort the enemy is driven back. Skrzhinetsky, who arrived on the battlefield, was completely puzzled by what had happened and began to throw his troops piecemeal into an attack on the Russians who had crossed to the left bank.

Meanwhile, the Suvorovites and Astrakhan troops burst into the battery and took possession of several guns, but were unable to take them away, because Polish horse huntsmen appeared on the left. The Suvorov soldiers, without a rank, lined up in a heap and met the enemy with fire. The mounted rangers were not embarrassed by the fire, they galloped up from the battalion and, trying to break into the square, cut down the Russians with sabers. Then the battalion commander ordered to sound the alarm and shout “hurray”; the frightened horses rushed back.

Thrown forward by Skrzhinetsky, the Hungarian brigade grappled hand-to-hand with the Russians near the highway. The Suvorov battalion that crossed the bridge struck the Poles on the flank - they were driven back. Artillery from the left bank provides the Russians with the strongest support.

The Hungarian put his brigade in order and again led the attack. But Martynov also received help: two more regiments crossed the bridge. They attacked Hungarian from the flank, drove him back and captured one gun. The Hungarian lost half his men and went into the bushes. Then Skrzhinetsky ordered Langerman’s brigade not only to push the Russians back across the river, but also to capture the city. The attack was unsuccessful.

In indescribable excitement, the Polish commander-in-chief galloped along the front and shouted: “Malakhovsky, forward! Rybinsky, go ahead! All forward! He continued to successively defeat the brigades against Russian grenadiers. Finally, he took Krasitsky’s brigade, reinforced it with an infantry regiment and several squadrons, and led the attack himself. Inspired by the presence of the commander-in-chief, the Poles sang “Poland has not yet perished” and rushed at the Russians. Proud of their already accomplished feats, the grenadiers overturned this attack, and inflicted severe damage, for they had 4 cannons. Krasicki, knocked off his horse by the butt of his horse, was captured.

At 4 o'clock, 17 battalions had already gathered on the right bank. They advanced and pushed the enemy back. The 2nd Polish Lancer Regiment, famous for its bravery, tried to attack, but all its attacks were repulsed.

Skrzhinecki retained unshakable firmness; For 8 hours he was exposed to fire, seeking death. “Here we must win or all perish,” he said. “The fate of Poland is being decided here.” He planned to carry out a general attack with the remnants of all divisions. The decision was late - the Russians had already established themselves on the right bank, and the Poles were greatly weakened. Skrzhinetsky himself became the leader, and yet he had to retreat with the loss of 250 people captured.

Private attacks were repeated several more times, and in the end half of the troops were out of action. Now Skrzhinetsky is only trying to prolong the fight until the night. He ordered that all scattered units and individuals be collected, organized into battalions, at the head of which all available officers should be placed. A long line of battalion columns, without reserve, moved forward, and the battery rode up to the closest distance to the troops of the 3rd Division, which had just crossed the bridge, and doused them with grapeshot. The stunned Old and New Ingermanland regiments ran back to the bridge. But the commanders managed to restore order, and the same regiments bravely attacked the Poles and pursued them.

At 7 o'clock in the afternoon the battle stopped. At 8 o'clock, due to a misunderstanding, the artillery firefight resumed, but immediately died down. The Polish army was in complete disarray; a Russian launch of a decisive offensive could lead to complete annihilation. But the field marshal, under the influence of some secondary thoughts, or regarding the unknown where Gelgud’s division was located, did not dare to pursue with all his might and sent out 3 regiments of Cossacks at night. Already on the afternoon of the 15th, 7 thousand were sent under the command of Witt, and even he moved so slowly that he covered 56 miles in 5 days.

The retreat of the Poles had the appearance of the most disorderly flight; To take away the guns, they demanded cabs from Warsaw. Diebitsch himself with the main forces only left Ostroleka on May 20 and moved to Pułtusk. Russian losses - up to 5 thousand, Poles - up to 9,500 people.

Death of Dibich. The field marshal was energetically preparing to cross the lower Vistula. Significant supplies of food, transportation facilities, artillery and hospital supplies, and materials for setting up a crossing were prepared. Finally, reconnaissance of crossing points and routes to them was carried out. Thus, when all the difficulties had been experienced, everything was prepared for a decisive blow to the weakened enemy, when victory was supposed to crown the field marshal’s entire work and his glory would shine with new splendor, at this time, on May 29, Count Diebitsch died of cholera within a few hours. On the basis of the law, the chief of staff, Count Tol, took command of the army, but only before the arrival of the newly appointed commander-in-chief, Count Paskevich-Erivansky.

The uprising in Lithuania spread everywhere, and only the cities of Vilna, Kovna and Vizda were in Russian hands. The organization of the rebel troops advanced especially far in Samogitia, Rossieny and Telshi. For the Russian troops, the fight against the insurgents, despite constant successes in battles, was painful, because the enemy was downright elusive.

Khlapovsky, who skillfully made his way between the Russian troops, gathered a detachment of up to 5 thousand people and organized it into several infantry and cavalry regiments.

After the battle of Ostroleka, a detachment of General Gelgud was sent to Lithuania, with a force of up to 12 thousand with 26 guns. Gelgud was a brave, but spineless and incapable man. General Saken acted against him with a detachment of up to 6 thousand. On May 21, he reached Kovna, having covered 150 versts in 4 days, and on the night of May 31, Saken came to the Vistula with 7 thousand and took a position 7 versts to the west on the Ponar Heights .

Gelgud's forces increased to 24 thousand. Under the influence of Khlapovsky, Gelgud decided to attack the Russians on the Ponar Heights, but was slow in executing this plan. Meanwhile, the detachments of Sulima, Prince Khilkov and others converged on Vilna. Finally, on June 4, Kuruta approached. A total of 24 thousand gathered with 76 guns.

On June 7, a battle took place on the Ponar Heights, in which Saken was in charge, although General Kuruta was the eldest. The Poles acted ineptly and piecemeal, the Russians - decisively (the Life Guards Volyn and Orenburg Uhlan regiments especially distinguished themselves). The Poles were completely defeated and began to hastily retreat.

Among the retreating Poles there were signs of panic. Saken was preparing to inflict a decisive defeat with energetic pursuit, but... at this time Kuruta declared his seniority and decisively told Saken: “No, you will not pursue.” The Russians lost 364 people, the Poles, including those who fled, 2 thousand.

With Tolstoy's reserve army approaching Vilna, Gelgud made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city of Shavli, where Lieutenant Colonel Kryukov was with 5 battalions and 5 guns, after which his detachment scattered: Khlapovsky, pursued by the Russians, crossed the Russian border at Gudaun on June 30, and Roland - 3 July at Degutse.

During the confusion at the Prussian border on June 30, Gelgud was on horseback; the officers showered him with reproaches and curses. The adjutant of the 7th regiment, Lieutenant Skulsky, killed Gelgud outright with a pistol shot in the chest and calmly joined his regiment.

Dembinski's campaign represents an excellent example of partisan action. In total there were up to 4 thousand. Dembinski avoided open spaces and significant cities; he made his way through the forests between Russian detachments, defeating small ones and bypassing stronger ones. On June 28 he set out towards Belovezhskaya Pushcha and reached it on July 15. Having successfully acted and happily slipped past the detachment of generals Savoini and Rosen, Dembinski through Rudnya, Sterdyn arrived on July 22 at Marky near Warsaw.

The uprising in Podolia flared up mainly among the gentry, because it was not possible to outrage the mass of the Russian peasant population. The banner of the uprising was raised by the Sabansky brothers, landowners near Olgopol. By the end of April, the number of rebels reached 5 thousand under the command of retired General Kolyshko. The commander of the 5th Corps, Roth, arrived from Bessarabia by forced marches and routed them completely near Dashev (the Poles lost 1,600 people). The remnants were once again defeated by General Sheremetyev at Majdanek (near Derazhnya). The remnants, numbering 700 people, crossed the Austrian border at Satanov on May 14.

Toll was planning to make a flank march from Pułtusk past the Polish army, based on Lublin, along convenient roads that had already been explored earlier. But Paskevich, who arrived in Pułtusk on June 13, sent the army north, ostensibly for safety. On June 22, the movement began in four columns. The march along the bad roads was very difficult; everything was drowned in impenetrable mud. There were no roads for communication between the columns, and therefore, in case of need, one could not give help to the other.

Osek was chosen for the crossing, near the Prussian border. The construction of bridges by Palen the 1st began on July 1, as well as the construction of tete-de-ponts on both banks. On July 8, the crossing of the entire army, which was located in the vicinity of Neshava, was completed.

Actions on the Brest highway. Paskevich ordered Rosen to advance the vanguard under the command of General Golovin in order to: 1) alarm the enemy, 2) distract the Poles from crossing the main army, but at the same time avoid a decisive clash with the strongest enemy, 3) demonstrate to Prague and Lublin. Less than 7 thousand was given for all this. Golovin advanced to Kalushin and on July 2 decided to attack the enemy with several small columns, capturing the roads adjacent to the highway. On the same day, Khrzhanovsky, having concentrated 22 thousand under his command, also decided to attack. Of course, the Poles overthrew the Russians, but only with such audacity could Golovin achieve the goal of reconnaissance and distraction of the enemy.

Paskevich's movement towards Warsaw. The plan of the cautious field marshal, who was afraid to risk his newly acquired laurels, was to bring the army to Warsaw without a fight, if possible, and then force it to surrender by blockade.

Having provided himself with an abundance of food delivered from Prussia, the field marshal moved on July 15 through Brest-Kujawski, Gostynin, Gombin (July 18). The Poles occupied a well-known position near Sokhachev across the river. Bauroy; you can get around it through Łowicz. The Poles did not appreciate the importance of Lovich, and therefore the advanced units of the Russian army occupied Lovich on July 20, and on the 21st the entire army concentrated there. Having pushed the Poles beyond the river. Ravka, the Russians stopped, and so both armies remained until the first days of August.

At this time there was great unrest in Warsaw. Instead of Skrzynetsky, Dembinsky was appointed commander-in-chief, crowned with the glory of the recent skillful movement from Lithuania. On the night of August 3, he withdrew the army to Warsaw and took a position behind Wola. On August 3, indignation among the street mob broke out in Warsaw; They looked for traitors and killed many suspects and innocent people. The old intriguer Krukovetsky was elected president of the board, and old Malakhovsky was elected commander-in-chief. On August 6, the taxation of Warsaw began; the army moved to Nadarzhin and the surrounding area.

Ridiger's actions. He occupied the Lublin Voivodeship. Paskevich invited him to also cross the Vistula. Field Marshal Sacken, commander of the 1st Army, to whom Ridiger was subordinate, agreed, and Ridiger (12,400 men and 42 guns) crossed the Vistula and Józefow on July 26. The Polish general Rozhitsky, who had no more than 5 thousand people in several detachments, acted against Ridiger. On July 31, Riediger occupied Radom.

At the beginning of August, Rozhitsky strengthened to 8 thousand and began to act offensively. On August 10, Ridiger destroyed Gedroits' detachment and captured him. Then Rozhitsky calmed down, but Ridiger, who had sent a division to him at Paskevich’s invitation and left guarding the bridge, was left with 4 battalions and could not do anything.

Actions on the Brest highway. On the night of August 10, Romarino set out from Prague with 20 thousand and went to Garvolin and Zhelekhov with the goal of defeating Golovin and Rosen separately. Romarino managed to achieve small private successes and even reach Terespol (near Brest), but failed to defeat Golovin and Rosen. On August 24, Romarino stopped in Miedzierzec, as he learned about the negotiations between Krukowiecki and Paskevich.

Assault on Warsaw on August 25 and 26. Paskevich managed to concentrate 70 thousand and 362 guns at Nadorzhin. In Warsaw there were 35 thousand Poles with 92 guns. If you count Romarino 20 thousand, then the largest amount will be 55 thousand. True, Rozhitsky also had 8 thousand, in the Plock voivodeship Lubensky had 4 thousand, in the garrisons of Lublin and Zamosc 10 thousand, which in total would give 77 thousand and 151 guns. But all these troops did not take part in the defense of the capital, nor did Romarino.

To strengthen Warsaw, Khrzhanovsky proposed building several strong forts at intervals to go on the offensive. To occupy them, he considered it necessary to appoint 15 thousand, and 10 thousand in reserve, a total of 25 thousand would be enough. The engineering committee rejected this project and sketched out a whole hundred small fortifications, which they did not even have time to finish by the day of the assault. To occupy all the fortifications it would take at least 60 thousand. The troops, scattered in small units behind weak parapets that did not protect the numerous Russian artillery from fire, could not provide lasting resistance, especially in the absence of an external reserve.

The fortifications formed three circles. The strongest fortification in the 1st line was the Volya redoubt (No. 56) with half-bastions on the corners, a redoubt in the southwestern corner and flank defense of ditches. The internal fortifications were divided into two parts by retrenchment: the larger of them had a garden, and the smaller one had a stone church with a stone fence, adapted for defense. The approaches to Wola were defended by lunette No. 57. The second line was especially strong near the Kalisz highway, fortifications No. 22 and 23. The third line was a city rampart, 10 feet high and thick, built opposite the smuggling area, without any consideration of the conditions of defense; only later was it reinforced with lunettes and flushes. The Jerusalem outpost is the strongest place of the third line, fortifications No. 15, 16, 18. In addition to field guns, there were 130 serfs, but widely scattered.

Uminsky's corps (20 thousand) defended the territory from the Chernyakovskaya outpost to No. 54, and Dembinsky (13 thousand) defended the rest.

The Russians decided to attack Volya. With the fall of this strongest fortification, the assault on the rest seemed easy. In addition, during a battle inside the city in this direction it would be faster to get to the Prague Bridge.

1st day of the assault, August 25. According to the will of the sovereign, Paskevich invited the Poles to submit under the condition of a general amnesty. Krukovetsky answered about the desire to restore the fatherland within its ancient borders. On the evening of August 24, the troops occupied the following places: 1) Palen (11 thousand) near the Kalisz highway at the height of Khrzhanov; the target is a Will attack. 2) Kreutz (12 thousand) near the village. Fleas; attack the fortifications to the right of Volya. 3) Ants (3 thousand) at Rakov; distract the enemy's attention along the Krakow highway. 4) Strandman (2 thousand) at Sluzhevets; for a false attack on the Lublin highway. 5) Khilkov (2800 cavalry) near Khrzhanov, to the left of Palen, to guard the left flank. 6) Nostits (2100 light guards cavalry) behind Zbarzh, for communication between Strandman and Muravyov and to repel attacks. 7) Guards and grenadiers (2700) reserve, behind Palen and Kreutz. 8) cutting artillery (198 guns) and Witt’s reserve cavalry (8 thousand) at Solibsa, not far from Kreutz. 9) The Cossacks are distributed to different points. At 5 o'clock in the morning the artillery opened fire, and an hour later two troops rushed to attack. Kreutz captured fortifications Nos. 54 and 55 on the fly. Palen No. 57 had a more difficult time. The Poles met the attacker, who had passed through the wolf pits and crossed the ditch, with heavy rifle fire. The stuck bayonets served as steps for the brave men to climb onto the parapet. Despite desperate resistance, the lunette was taken, most of the garrison was killed on the spot, and 80 people were taken prisoner.

There was an assault on Volya, which was occupied by the elderly General Sovinsky with 5 battalions and 12 guns. The Russians advanced 76 guns, and then selected infantry came from three sides. She burst through the rampart, but was stopped by desperate resistance. Finally, the Poles were driven out of the garden, but the reduit remained in their hands; it was impossible to shoot them with artillery fire, so as not to shoot at their own. Paskevich sent several more regiments, with Tol leading the grenadiers. Under heavy enemy fire, the Russians overcame a number of obstacles, but the proximity of the goal inflamed everyone. Having climbed over the fence of the church, the soldiers approached the palisades that protected the entrance to the church. Having made a breach, they found themselves in front of the blocked doors of the church, which had to be knocked down. Finally, at 11 o'clock they managed to break into the church, where, after a fierce battle, the enemy was exterminated or captured. Sovinsky fell under the bayonets of a grenadier at the altar. There were 30 officers and 1,200 lower ranks prisoners, including one of the instigators of the mutiny, Vysotsky.

Muravyov took Rakovets, Shtrandman took Shopy. Meanwhile, Uminsky staged a demonstration against them. Then Paskevich sent Muravyov support, and at the same time ordered, despite Tol’s representations, to suspend all offensive actions for the time being. This was completely wrong: the more troops Uminsky sent against Muravyov and Strandman, the easier it would be to attack in the main direction. The Poles took advantage of the suspension to correct errors in the distribution of their troops, which caused unnecessary effort and casualties on the part of the Russians the next day. Finally, the Poles mistook the pause for the depletion of Russian forces and immediately went on the offensive against Volya, and approached her within half-gunshot. Then two carabinieri regiments, without any orders, with desperate swiftness rushed forward with bayonets and overthrew the Poles. But the battle did not end there - we had to fight with hostility 3 times, we made our way behind the second line of fortifications and even into the Volskoye Suburb, but, by order of the field marshal, we were called back. This was one of the bloodiest episodes of the day.

Uminsky took Shopa from Shtrandman, but Muravyov held on to Rakovets. It was still only 3 o'clock in the afternoon, but the field marshal did not want to continue the assault that day. The troops spent the night without overcoats and warm food, many even without a piece of bread, since there was only enough supply for one day.

2nd day of the assault, August 26. The next day, Paskevich had a meeting with Krukovetsky, but it did not lead to anything. Polish troops gathered mainly towards the center between the Volsk and Jerusalem outposts. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon the Russians began a cannonade. At the very beginning of the case, Paskevich was shell-shocked in the arm by a cannonball and, pale, with a distorted face, he fell to the ground. He transferred unlimited command of the army to Tolya.

A 120-gun battery was immediately concentrated and began to fight the Polish battery of 112 field and fortress guns. Muravyov was ordered to advance vigorously. Muravyov, reinforced by a guards brigade, led the attack in two columns. One, after a stubborn battle, captured fortification No. 81, and the other rushed to No. 78. Uminsky sent infantry and cavalry regiments against it. Then Nostitz sent to the aid of the Guards Dragoons, who covered themselves here and the Life Hussars came to their aid with unfading glory in the fight against an enemy four times stronger.

At about 5 o'clock Kreutz went in two columns to fortifications No. 21 and 22: the 4th cavalry company of Colonel Zhitov jumped 200 steps to redoubt No. 21 and showered the enemy with such cruel grapeshot that he fled without waiting for the attack, and the horse artillery hunters rushed on horseback into redoubt and captured the gun. Thus, Zhitov showed an extremely rare example of an independent attack with artillery without the help of other branches of the military.

No. 22 with two battalions was occupied by Kreutz's troops after a stubborn battle, and the garrison was almost completely destroyed.

Palen captured numbers 23 and 24, and then, after a fierce battle, the Evangelical cemetery. It was already about 6 o'clock in the evening, dusk was coming. Some generals suggested that Tolya postpone the assault until the morning. “Now or never,” answered Tol and ordered the troops to be put in order, reinforced with reserves, artillery sent and the city rampart stormed. After a 3-hour struggle, the Jerusalem outpost was taken, and at about 10 pm the Volskaya outpost was taken. At night, half of the troops rested, while the other was under arms, having advanced forward posts only 50 paces in front of the rampart. Sappers cut embrasures for guns for tomorrow. However, there was no need to fight: at night, Commander-in-Chief Malazovsky sent a letter to Paskevich that Warsaw would be cleared by 5 o’clock in the morning.

Having cleared Warsaw, the Poles moved towards Modlin. On August 27, the Russian army entered the enemy capital. Russian losses amounted to 10? thousand, Poles - 11 thousand and 132 guns.

It seemed that the fight with the Poles was over and the defeated Polish army should surrender to the mercy of the winner. However, the Poles had barely escaped the death that threatened them when the board members gathered in Zakroczym (near Modlin) declared their unwillingness to unconditionally obey. Paskevich had 60 thousand, but 12 thousand had to be allocated to the Warsaw garrison, and a detachment to secure the Brest Highway, that is, 45 thousand would have remained, which he did not want to risk and go against 30 thousand Poles, although defeated and disorganized. He wanted to wait until Rosen and Ridiger dealt with Romarino and Rozhitsky.

Malakhovsky ordered Romarino to arrive in Modlin, but the latter, pursuing his personal goals and obeying the wishes of the magnates who were with his detachment, did not carry out the orders of the commander-in-chief under the pretext of the danger of moving to Modlin. He decided to retreat to the Upper Vistula, cross at Zavichost and unite with Rozhitsky. Romarino took a strong position at Opole, but was overthrown there on September 3 by Rosen, who eventually pressed him to the Austrian border. On September 5, near Borov, Romarino with 14 thousand and 42 guns crossed the border and surrendered to the Austrians.

In early September, Ridiger, reinforced from Rosen's detachment, had 9 thousand with 24 guns. Rozhitsky also had 9 thousand, but retreated to Pinchov and, intending to hold on to the river here. Nidoy, separated Kamensky to Stopnitsa with most of the cavalry, 3 battalions and 2 guns. On September 11, Ridiger sent Krasovsky against Kamensky with 2 thousand, and he himself went to Pinchov. On September 12, Krasovsky overtook and defeated Kamensky at Shkalmberzh (2 thousand prisoners alone), and General Plakhovo with Ridiger’s vanguard inflicted a strong defeat on Rozhitsky, who was retreating to Mekhov. On September 14, Rozhitsky decided to move to Krakow possessions. Riediger followed him and drove him into Galicia, where the Austrians disarmed the Poles; however, only 1,400 of them remained.

Death of Colonel Kozlinikov in the vicinity of Plock

Seeing the successes against Romarino and Rozhitsky, Paskevich decided to act by force of arms against the main Polish army. It was impossible for the Poles to continue the war in the north; all that remained was to move the war south to wooded, mountainous and rugged terrain, where they could rely on Krakow and Galicia, which sympathized with the Poles. However, moving the army south past the Russians required speed, energy and secrecy.

The new Polish commander-in-chief Rybinsky, leaving the garrison in Lublin, arrived on September 11 at Plock. The crossing began safely, but Rybinsky returned the troops back, and the terms of submission accepted by the majority at the military council were returned from Paskevich. But such a decision caused indignation, especially among young officers, and therefore the proposal was rejected. Paskevich sent most of his forces after the Poles on both banks of the Vistula.

On September 16, the crossing of the Poles began safely at Wloclawsk, but Rybinsky, having learned about the fate of Rozhitsky (they could no longer count on a connection with him), again refused the crossing. Immediately Mühlberg, who negotiated with Paskevich, brought his new proposal, more severe, from the oath the words “constitutional” and “fatherland” were excluded. The offer was rejected and they decided to leave for Prussia.

On September 20, the Polish army (21 thousand, 95 guns and 9 thousand horses) crossed the Prussian border at Soberzyn, Shutov and Gurzno (east of Thorn). Ragged, in canvas trousers, without overcoats and many even without shoes, the Poles inspired compassion in the Prussian troops who were prepared to receive them. While the troops had weapons in their hands, they still seemed calm, but when they had to give up their guns, dismount from their horses, unfasten and put away their sabers, some began to cry. After a few days, however, the Poles indulged in a carefree and distracted life. Their restless behavior, constant desire for intrigue and gossip, hatred of everything that bore a sign of order, and finally, their boasting and vanity - all this was the reason that those who crossed the border fell even further in general opinion.

During the uprising, the Kingdom of Poland lost 326 thousand people, of which 25 thousand were Warsaw alone, and over 600 million zlotys, not counting private losses. But most importantly, the Poles lost the significant privileges they enjoyed before the uprising.

Notes:

Before Napoleon's invasion, there were 9,257 monasteries, churches, government and private buildings in Moscow; 6496 of them burned down; all the others were more or less plundered. Losses of individuals amounted to 83,372,000 rubles. real estate and 16,585,000 rub. movable property. This did not include losses of the palace, ecclesiastical, military and other government and public departments.

These facts, stated in the work of Count York von Wartenburg, are incomprehensible; Napoleon, undoubtedly, had already decided to retreat to Smolensk and, in relation to this, echeloned his troops; under such conditions it was impossible to even think about battle.

It is very difficult to decide to retreat, especially for someone who imagined himself to be a superman and before whom almost the whole world was in awe.

On the same day, October 16, behind Napoleon's lines, Admiral Chichagov moved from the outskirts of Pruzhany to Minsk and the river. Berezina, leaving Saken against Schwarzenberg and Rainier, pushed beyond the river. Bug.

The Sejm is a class representative institution; representative assembly in the former Poland and later in Finland. - Note ed.

Previously, oddly enough, Czartoryski was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia.

Sub-ensign - a rank to which lower ranks were promoted who passed the ensign examination after completing a course at the school for sub-ensigns and remained in extended service. - Note ed.

Shlyakhtich is a Polish small nobleman. - Note ed.

A skirmisher is a soldier in the front line. - Note ed.

Tete de pont< tete голова + pont мост) - предмостное укрепление. - Note ed.

Here: “four” (from Polish cwiartka - four, quarter. - Note ed.

A fence is a barrier made of littered trees. - Note ed.

Epaulements are parapets of a special design that serve to cover troops where the terrain does not have convenient natural cover. - Note ed.

Cosigners - during the uprising, a Polish army armed with scythes, which were attached to poles. - Note ed.

It is this attack of the Poles that is depicted in Kossak’s painting, where the patriotic artist entirely depicted triumphant Poles and only in the right corner of one Russian staff officer, thrown into the dust. Khlopitsky - in a civilian gray coat and top hat, on horseback, followed by Prondzinsky in the uniform of the General Staff. In general, there are a lot of portraits. The Piontek battery is visible on the highway. He spent the shells, but did not want to leave his position, sat down on the cannon, lit a pipe and decided to wait until the shells came. Warsaw is visible in the distance.

01/10/1863 (01/23). – Beginning of the Polish uprising of 1863–1864.

About the Polish uprising of 1863–1864.

Rebellion 1863–1864 in the Kingdom of Poland was organized by an anti-Russian part of the Polish gentry and was aimed at separating the Kingdom of Poland from Russia along with the Western Russian lands - the former occupation possessions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Thirty years have passed since the suppression of the previous one (it was similar in spirit, as a result of which the Poles lost the legislative Sejm, an independent court, their own Polish army and the monetary system granted to them in 1815). Life gradually returned to a peaceful imperial course. granted amnesty to participants in the uprising of 1830-1831. The publication of works by previously banned writers (A. Mickiewicz and others) was allowed. In 1847, as a result of an agreement between Russia and the Vatican, the Catholic Church again received special rights. In essence, after the return of Western Russian lands from Poland to Russia, the Russian autocracy initially wanted the autonomous development of the sovereign Kingdom of Poland on the model - this was aimed at

Apparently, it is no coincidence that the new Polish rebellion coincided with the beginning of the liberal reforms of the Tsar-Liberator. It was the gradual introduction of liberal principles by Alexander II that was interpreted by the Poles as their own won achievement and as an opportunity to demand more, while their church again became the inspiration for the opposition, demanding the return of full independence to Poland within its former borders. At first, the strict regime of the governor, Prince Paskevich, did not allow serious unrest. After his death (1856), a number of governors were replaced in a short time: Prince Gorchakov, Sukhozanet, Count Lambert, Count Leaders (seriously wounded in an assassination attempt in June 1862), whose actions were not successful.

In 1860, anti-Russian protests began in Warsaw and other cities with acts of vandalism against Orthodox cemeteries. In February 1861, clashes occurred between demonstrators and the police, 5 people were killed, and these victims added fuel to the fire. To reassure Viceroy M.D. Gorchakov had to release arrested demonstrators, remove troops and police from the streets, and replace the Russian police chief with a Pole.

In March 1861, Alexander II issued a decree returning autonomy to the Kingdom of Poland. The State Council of the Kingdom of Poland, the highest advisory and control body, was restored. The Polish civil administration and elected local self-government at the provincial, district and city levels were formed.
However, anti-Russian unrest in Warsaw continued. The autumn elections to self-government bodies brought victory to the nationalists, among whom the so-called “red” revolutionaries, who differed from the “white” nationalists in their socialist ideology, became increasingly visible. The Reds created the Central National Committee (CNC).

In May 1862, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich was appointed governor of the Kingdom of Poland, and the Pole Marquis A. Wielopolsky became the head of the civil administration. They had to jointly implement measures to restore autonomy. The liberal-minded Grand Duke in his plans provided for the complete autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, the opening of elected councils in cities, districts and provinces, the transfer of peasants from corvee to quitrent, and the granting of rights to Jews. At the same time, Wielopolsky appointed only Poles to all key posts in the region, Russian officials were recalled from Poland. However, on the evening of June 21, the young socialist L. Yaroshinsky shot at the governor point-blank on the street and wounded him in the shoulder. Then there were two unsuccessful attempts on Wielopolsky's life. The terrorists were arrested and the court sentenced them to death.

The gentry demanded the creation of a purely Polish government, the return of the constitution of 1815 and the transfer of the former possessions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Kingdom. A corresponding written demand was drawn up, under which signatures were collected. Demonstrations and murders did not stop in the cities. Signs written in Russian and any other language except Polish were torn down from stores. Russian residents of Warsaw were inundated with threatening letters. The CNK prepared an armed uprising, created an underground “government” and introduced a mandatory uprising tax for all Poles. From the end of 1862, the Catholic clergy led the Poles to the revolutionary oath, and a large number of weapons arrived from abroad. Combat training was carried out by hundreds of experienced specialists - foreign emissaries, emigrants, and former officers.

The reason for the uprising was the beginning of recruitment into the army in early January 1863, which was boycotted. The CNK declared itself the National Government (Zhond) and called on the Poles to take armed action. They started on January 10th. The rebels destroyed railways, bridges, and telegraph communications. The authorities declared martial law, but by March the rebels had also spread partially to Lithuania and Belarus. By the summer of 1863, the rebel army had reached 50 thousand people. At the same time, Russian troops numbering 90 thousand soldiers were stationed in the Kingdom of Poland. At first they were in a position of passive defense, being pulled into the most important strategic points, and suffered losses. Only later did the Russian army go on the offensive and act successfully, crushing the rebel troops.

The first commander of the Polish troops was General L. Mieroslawski, who was brought back from the Polish emigration to Paris with the rank of “dictator”. He assembled a small detachment, led by foreign officers, and crossed the border from Poznań, counting on the population joining him as he advanced. On February 7, this detachment of about 500 people was defeated by the Russian detachment of Colonel Schilder-Schuldner. Mieroslawski fled to Paris. The next commander was M. Langevich with a detachment of several thousand people, he was also quickly defeated and fled to Austria.

Zhond declared himself the legitimate Polish government and established the collection of donations from the population. However, not all Poles sympathized with the uprising. Polish peasants were reluctant to obey the orders of the rebels and gave them food only under threat of death. Often they openly collaborated with Russian troops. Already at the very beginning of the war, the peasants of one of the villages brought General A.P. Khrushchev had 20 rebels led by his own priest. Later they caught armed partisans in the hundreds. In retaliation, the rebels carried out brutal reprisals against the peasant population hostile to them.

In the Western Russian provinces, the rebellious gentry could not count on success at all - they encountered the general hatred of the Russian peasants, who still remembered the times of the former Polish oppression. In May 1863, Count M.N. was appointed Governor-General of the Northwestern Territory (Lithuania and Belarus). Muravyov. He decisively arrested opposition leaders and destroyed rebel bands. Polish nobles and clergy were subject to indemnity for the damage caused. The Russian population of the region - peasants and landowners, the Orthodox clergy - was taken under protection.

At the same time, the rebel Poles were supported by Russian revolutionaries who lived in exile, in particular, with their “Bell”. Nihilist Mason M.A. Bakunin organized a detachment of volunteers, which in March 1863 traveled by steamer from England to Poland, also carrying weapons and ammunition for the Polish rebels. The revolutionary landing party led by Bakunin was supposed to land in Lithuania, but in April, in the Swedish port of Malmo, at the request of Russia, the ship was detained, and Bakunin returned to England.

In the Polish territories proper, the uprising was given strength by Catholic propaganda and the hope of intervention from England and France (Russia’s opponents in the recently ended war). Zhond appointed his foreign representative offices in many European countries. Among the volunteers and instructors on the side of the Polish rebels there were many French. Only Prussia, a member of the so-called, fearing that the uprising would spread to its territory, supported the actions of the Russian government. Already in January 1863, the Adjutant General of the Prussian King G. von Alvensleben signed an agreement in St. Petersburg with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prince, on joint military actions against the rebels. Russian troops received the right to pursue rebels in adjacent Prussian territory, and Prussian troops in the Kingdom of Poland. England's reaction to this was to demand the restoration of the Polish constitution of 1815; France threatened to break off relations. Austria joined England and France: on April 5, 1863, their ambassadors conveyed to Gorchakov demands to stop hostilities in Poland and restore peace. Gorchakov replied that Russia would secure autonomy for the Kingdom of Poland, but achieving peace was possible only through the complete suppression of the rebellion. Then other European countries also condemned Russia.

On March 31, 1863, on the day of the Orthodox holiday of Easter, Alexander II announced a complete amnesty for the rebels who would “lay down their arms and return to the duty of obedience” by May 1. But the rebels ignored this opportunity and continued the bloodshed for the sake of their constant demands.

On June 5, 1863, Gorchakov was given new European demands: to declare an amnesty for the rebels, restore the constitution of 1815 and transfer power to an independent Polish administration. The future status of Poland should be decided not by Russia, but by a European conference. Gorchakov sent reply dispatches strongly protesting Russia against interference in its internal affairs. The right to consider the Polish question was recognized only by the participants in the partitions of Poland - Russia, Prussia and Austria, but only after the rebellion was pacified. Europe was faced with a choice: to fight or not to fight with Russia over Poland. But due to its own intra-European contradictions, the anti-Russian coalition did not come together.

The plans of the Polish rebels to return the Western Russian lands liberated from them and the possibility of European military intervention alarmed Russian society, especially since the emotions from it had not yet completely subsided. Assemblies of the nobility, city councils, deputations from estates, and universities throughout Russia spoke out in defense of the Western Russian population. Emperor Alexander II stated: “I have not yet lost hope that it will not come to a general war; but if it is destined for us, then I am sure that with God’s help we will be able to defend the borders of the Empire and the areas inseparably connected with it.” The newspaper Moskovskie Vedomosti had great influence in this matter. Katkov demanded decisive action from the government to suppress the “priest-gentry rebellion,” which, swearing allegiance to advanced Europe, plunged the region into darkness and turmoil.

Meanwhile, Grand Duke Constantine was ready to make maximum concessions to the rebels. With only a formal subordination of the region to the “power of the Russian Emperor,” he proposed to transfer power into the hands of the Polish gentry “on the basis of their Polish, not Russian laws.” But Wielopolsky's administration was falling apart, many members of the State Council resigned. Officials and police often ran over to the rebels. At the end of May 1863, 3.5 million rubles were stolen from the Main Treasury - this is how all the finances of the Kingdom of Poland ended up in the hands of the rebels. The theft was committed by the chief treasurer himself and his employees, all of whom managed to escape. After this, Wielopolski himself left Poland forever.

At the end of July, the rebels managed to win a small military victory: near the Ivangorod fortress, 2 Russian companies were defeated, 2 guns and vans with 200 thousand rubles were captured. Given the current situation, the Russian military command was not even confident in the possibility of defending Warsaw. Something had to be changed.

Alexander II was dissatisfied with the behavior of his brother-governor. In March 1863, Count F.F. was appointed his military assistant (in fact, his successor). Berg is the former Governor-General of Finland. In August 1863, the Emperor recalled Grand Duke Constantine to the capital. All ministers approved the policy of “the strictest military dictatorship” in Poland, introduced by Minister of War D.A. Milyutin. The new governor, Berg, replaced the Polish administration with a Russian one and established a military dictatorship.

The Russian army also intensified its active actions, the strength of which by June 1863 was increased to 164 thousand people. In December 1863, the Polish General Kruk was defeated in the Lublin province, and in March 1864, General Bosak was defeated near Sandomierz. On March 29, 1864, the leaders of the uprising were arrested and executed a few months later; many fled abroad. Russian military police restored order in the cities. An indemnity was imposed on the gentry. The military campaign ended on May 1, 1864, although minor skirmishes continued until the beginning of 1865. Of the 70 thousand rebels, about 20 thousand died (these data are estimates), about 7 thousand fled abroad, 128 people were executed, 800 were sent to hard labor, 12,500 was sent to Siberia and other provinces of central Russia. The losses of Russian troops amounted to 3,343 people (of which 2,169 were wounded).

In 1864–1866 In Poland, an agrarian reform was carried out on more favorable terms for peasants than in the rest of Russia. Agrarian laws of Poland, prepared by N.A. Milyutin, and V.A. Cherkassky, were approved by Alexander II on February 19, 1864 - exactly three years after. The land that was in the use of the peasants became their full property without redemption; the state paid the landowners. The land confiscated from the rebellious gentry (1660 estates) was also transferred to the peasants. The implementation of agrarian reform put an end to the unrest.

Thus ended this last conflict between Russians and Poles in pre-revolutionary Russia. Only as a result, Poland not only gained independence, but also, according to the Treaty of Riga with the Bolsheviks (March 18, 1921), again seized Western Russian lands - this was the payment of the communists for the Poles’ betrayal of the White armies. In the 1930s Under Pilsudski, in the newly occupied territories, the Poles committed genocide of the Russian population and destroyed hundreds of Orthodox churches. brought a new misfortune to these long-suffering Russian lands: Marxist-God-fighting occupation and Ukranization (Belarusization) - such was Stalin’s “return of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.” After the USSR, the Poles were compensated for these losses by German gifts cut off in the West. However, several historical Russian districts (in the area of ​​Bialystok and Przemysl) still remain part of Poland.

The full complexity of Russian-Polish relations and conflicts between our two Slavic peoples can only be understood on the larger scale of history. See materials in the Holy Rus' calendar related to Poland.