What armed conflicts did Russia have with China? Soviet-Chinese armed conflict: Damansky Island

The Soviet leadership failed to take advantage of Khrushchev's removal to normalize relations with China. On the contrary, under Brezhnev they worsened even more. The blame for this falls on both sides - from the second half of 1966, the Chinese leadership, led by Mao Zedong, organized a number of provocations on transport and the Soviet-Chinese border. Claiming that this border was forcibly established by the Russian tsarist government, it laid claim to several thousand square kilometers of Soviet territory. The situation was especially acute on the river border along the Amur and Ussuri, where over a hundred years after the signing of the border treaty, the river fairway changed, some islands disappeared, others moved closer to the opposite bank.

Bloody events took place in March 1969 on Damansky Island on the river. Ussuri, where the Chinese fired on the Soviet border guard, killing several people. Large Chinese forces landed on the island, well prepared for combat. Attempts to restore the situation with the help of Soviet motorized rifle units were unsuccessful. Then the Soviet command used the Grad multiple launch rocket system. The Chinese were virtually wiped out on this small island (about 1700 m long and 500 m wide). Their losses numbered in the thousands. At this point, active hostilities virtually ceased.

But from May to September 1969, Soviet border guards opened fire on intruders in the Damansky area more than 300 times. In the battles for the island from March 2 to March 16, 1969, 58 Soviet soldiers were killed and 94 were seriously injured. For their heroism, four servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The Battle of Damansky was the first serious clash between the USSR Armed Forces and regular units of another major power since World War II. Moscow, despite its local victory, decided not to aggravate the conflict and give Damansky Island to the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side subsequently filled up the channel separating the island from their shores, and since then it has become part of China.

On September 11, 1969, on the Soviet initiative, a meeting of the heads of government of the USSR (A.N. Kosygin) and the PRC (Zhou Enlai) took place, after which protracted negotiations on border issues began in Beijing. After 40 meetings in June 1972, they were interrupted. The Chinese government chose to improve relations with the United States, Western European countries and Japan. In 1982-85. Soviet-Chinese political consultations were held alternately in Moscow and Beijing at the level of government representatives with the rank of deputy foreign ministers. There were no results for a long time. Soviet-Chinese relations were settled only by the end of the 80s.

SAILORS LIVE!

Our special correspondents V. Ignatenko and L. Kuznetsov report from the area of ​​Damansky Island

Here, on the front line, as soon as the smoke of the last battle cleared, we were told about the exceptional courage of the Far Eastern border guard sailors. It was not on distant ocean meridians, nor on cruises on supercruisers and submarines that the sailors distinguished themselves these days. In the mortal battle with Maoist provocateurs on March 2 and 15, guys in pea coats stood shoulder to shoulder with the officers and soldiers of the outposts.

It is not difficult to recognize them among the military people of the border region: only the sailors have black sheepskin coats, and their hats and caps with anchors are pulled down somehow in a special way, seemingly casually, but within the framework of the regulations.

Fortunately, the sailors came out of the fire without losses. Shells and lead bursts lay nearby and lay over their heads. But, alive and unharmed, the guys rose to their height, shook off the hot, steaming earth and rushed into a counterattack... We saw these young Komsomol guys, in whose veins flows the blood of their fathers, the defenders of the legendary Malaya Zemlya.

We want to tell you about one sailor in particular. Long before dawn, on March 15, when there were all the signs of preparing a new provocation at Damansky, captain Vladimir Matrosov took up an observation post on a spit a few meters from the gently sloping shore of the island. He could see the provocateurs fussing about on the Chinese shore in the pre-dawn twilight. From time to time, the annoying sounds of engines could be heard: it must have been the guns being brought to the firing lines. Then silence again, viscous, cold.

A few hours later, the first burst hit from the Chinese side, then the second, the first shells exploded... The Maoists rushed in chains towards Damansky. Our fire weapons began to speak, and the vanguard of the Soviet border guards moved to the island.

I am "Break"! I am "Break"! How do you hear? The enemy is in the southern part of the island,” Sailors shouted into the radiotelephone. It was the turn of his combat mission. - How did you understand?

I am "Burav". You are understood!

A minute later our fire became more accurate, the Chinese wavered.

I am "Break"! I am "Break"! The enemy moved to the northeast. - Sailors did not have time to finish: a mine struck nearby. He fell into the snow. It's gone! And the phone is intact.

I am "Break"! I am "Break"! - Volodya continued. - How did you understand me?

And the earth shook again. Again the elastic wave pushed the sailor. And again I just had to shake the earth off myself.

Then Sailors got used to it. True, he had an unpleasant feeling that someone invisible from the other shore was watching him, as if he knew how much now depended on his, Volodina’s, adjustment of the fire. But again the call signs of “Obryv” were flying on the air...

He saw our border guards fighting on the island. And if suddenly one of our people stumbled and fell, he knew: it was Mao Zedong’s lead that threw the soldier to the ground. This was already the second battle in Matrosov’s life...

Captain Sailors kept in touch with the command post for several hours. And all this time he was the epicenter of a barrage of fire.

Vladimir, one might say, is a border guard from the cradle. His father, Stepan Mikhailovich, only recently retired with the rank of colonel of the border troops, and the younger Sailors, as long as he can remember, lived all the time on the edges of his native land, at outposts. From childhood, he knew the anxieties of the front line, and this region planted good seeds of masculinity and goodness in his soul, and over time, having become stronger, these seeds began to grow. When the time came for Vladimir to choose his fate, there was no doubt: he chose his father’s path. He studied and became an officer. He is now 31 years old. He's a communist. He received border training before being assigned to this area in the Kuril Islands. Probably, not one of the eleven sailors who took part in the battle on Damansky is now dreaming of receiving Matrosov’s party recommendation. After all, Vladimir became a communist at their age, and they went through their first baptism of fire together: a communist and Komsomol members.

In the division, senior officers told us: “Did you notice how similar our Sailors are…” And we, without listening to the end, agreed: “Yes, he is very similar to that legendary Alexander Matrosov.” Everything seems to happen on purpose. It seems that the journalistic move is naked to the limit. But no, what’s more important is not this amazing external similarity. The kinship of their characters - heroic, truly Russian - is seen a hundred times more clearly. More important is the identity of their high spirit, the fieryness of their hearts in difficult times.

Historians of the Great Patriotic War find new evidence of many exploits of privates, sergeants, and officers who repeated Matrosov’s feat. They died gloriously, and they became immortal, for the Russian warrior has this “sailor” vein, this spirit of victory even at the cost of his life.

Sailors Vladimir is alive!

May he live happily into old age. Let there be peace and harmony in his home, where his daughters are growing up: second-grader Sveta and five-year-old Katya. May they always have a dad...

N-division of maritime border guards
Red Banner Pacific
border district, March 20

YURI VASILIEVICH BABANSKY

Babansky Yuri Vasilievich - commander of the Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya border outpost section of the Ussuri Order of the Red Banner of Labor border detachment of the Pacific Border District, junior sergeant. Born on December 20, 1948 in the village of Krasny Yar, Kemerovo region. After finishing an eight-year school, he graduated from a vocational school, worked in production, and then was drafted into the border troops. Served on the Soviet-Chinese border in the Pacific Border District.

The commander of the Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya border outpost (Damansky Island) of the Ussuri Order of the Red Banner of Labor border detachment, junior sergeant Babansky Yu.V. showed heroism and courage during the border conflict of March 2 - 15, 1969. Then, for the first time in the history of the border troops after June 22, 1941, the detachment’s border guards took on battles with units of the regular army of a neighboring state. On that day, March 2, 1969, Chinese provocateurs, who invaded Soviet territory, from an ambush shot a group of border guards who came out to meet them, led by the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant I.I. Strelnikov.

Junior Sergeant Yuri Babansky took command of the group of border guards remaining at the outpost and boldly led them into the attack. The Maoists unleashed heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars and artillery fire on the brave handful. Throughout the entire battle, Junior Sergeant Babansky skillfully led his subordinates, shot accurately, and provided assistance to the wounded. When the enemy was driven out of Soviet territory, Babansky went on reconnaissance missions to the island more than 10 times. It was Yuri Babansky with the search group who found the executed group of I.I. Strelnikov, and at gunpoint from the enemy’s machine guns he organized their evacuation; it was he and his group, on the night of March 15-16, who discovered the body of the heroically deceased head of the border detachment, Colonel D.V. Leonov and carried him off the island...

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 21, 1969, junior sergeant Yu.V. Babansky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Gold Star medal No. 10717).

After graduating from the military-political school, Babansky Yu.V. continued to serve in the border troops of the KGB of the USSR in various officer positions, including during the fighting in Afghanistan. In the 90s, he was deputy chief of troops of the Western Border District, was a member of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, and was elected as a deputy of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Currently, Lieutenant General of the Reserve Yu.V. Babansky is a military pensioner and is involved in social activities. He is the chairman of the all-Russian organizing committee for the “Argun Outpost” action and at the same time is the chairman of the public organization “Union of Heroes”, Honorary Citizen of the Kemerovo Region. Lives in Moscow.

THE COUNTRY DID NOT KNOW YET

...They loved fire training at the outpost. We often went out shooting. And in recent months, time for study has become less and less. The Red Guards gave no rest.

Since childhood, Yuri Babansky was taught to consider the Chinese as brothers. But when he first saw the angry, hooting crowd, waving clubs and weapons, shouting anti-Soviet slogans, he could not understand what was happening. It took him a while to learn to understand that faith in the sacred bonds of brotherhood had been trampled upon by the Maoists, that people deceived by Mao’s clique were capable of committing any crime. The Chinese staged demonstrations with slogans of the “great helmsman.” Then they attacked the Soviet border guards with their fists. “This is how they were fooled,” thought Babansky. “But the fathers of our guys fought for the liberation of China and died for the People’s China.” There was a strict order: do not give in to provocations. Machine guns on your back. And only the courage and restraint of the Soviet border guards prevented the incidents from turning into a bloody conflict.

The Maoists acted more and more boldly. Almost every morning they went out onto the ice of Ussuri and behaved cheekily. provocative.

On March 2, 1969, border guards, as usual, had to expel the rampaging Maoists who crossed the border. As always, the head of the outpost, Ivan Ivanovich Strelnikov, came out to meet them. Silence. You can only hear the snow creaking under your felt boots. These were the last minutes of silence. Babansky ran up the hill and looked around. From the cover group, only Kuznetsov and Kozus ran after him. “I broke away from the guys.” Ahead, a little to the right, stood the first group of border guards - the one that followed Strelnikov. The head of the outpost protested to the Chinese, demanding to leave Soviet territory.

And suddenly the dry, frosty silence of the island was ripped open by two shots. Behind them are frequent bursts of machine gun fire. Babansky didn’t believe it. I didn't want to believe it. But the snow was already scorched by bullets, and he saw how the border guards from Strelnikov’s group fell one after another. Babansky pulled out a machine gun from behind his back and a magazine closed in:

Get down! Fire! - he commanded and in short bursts began to mow down those who had just shot his comrades point-blank. Bullets whistled nearby, and he shot and shot. In the excitement of the battle, I didn’t notice how I had used up all the cartridges.

Kuznetsov,” he called the border guard, “give me the store!”

They'll give you a ride. There's enough for everyone. Be on the left, and I'll go to the tree.

He dropped to his knee, raised his machine gun and fired aimed fire from behind a tree. Cool, calculating. Eat! One, two, three...

There is an invisible connection between the shooter and the target, as if you are sending a bullet not from a machine gun, but from your own heart and it hits the enemy. He got so carried away that Sergeant Kozushu had to shout several times:

Yurka! Who is it in camouflage suits, ours or the Chinese?

Kozus was firing to Babansky’s right; a large group of Maoists, who had taken refuge on the island since the evening, was moving towards him. They walked straight ahead. The distance was getting shorter every minute. Kozus fired several bursts and just had time to think that there weren’t enough cartridges when he heard Babansky’s command: “Save your cartridges!” and turned the lever to single fire.

Kozus! Be careful not to get passed on the right!

Like Babansky, he did not remain in place, changed positions and fired aimed fire. The cartridges were running out.

Kuznetsov! And Kuznetsov! - he called and looked towards where the border guard had just fired. Kuznetsov sat bent over with his head in his hands. The face is bloodless, the lower lip is slightly bitten. Lifeless eyes. A spasm squeezed her throat, but there was no time to grieve. I took the remaining cartridges from Kuznetsov. And then right in front of him, about thirty meters away, he saw a Chinese machine gun. Babansky fired and killed the machine gunner. Now we need to help Kozushu. Babansky acted quickly and accurately. He shot through the channel and fired at the enemy advancing from the right. The Chinese machine gun has a soldier again. Yuri fired again. He was glad that the machine gun never fired a single burst.

Kozus! Cover up! - Babansky commanded hoarsely and crawled towards his group, lying down in the lowland. He crawled along a pitted island, blackened by fire and iron. Mines howled, whistled, explosions roared. It flashed in my head: “How are the guys? Are they alive? How much longer can they hold out? The main thing is ammunition...” The guys lay in the lowlands, pinned down by fire. Babansky did not have time to feel fear - there was only rage in him. I wanted to shoot, to destroy the killers. He commanded the border guards:

Razmakhnin, to the tree! Observe! Bikuzin! Fire towards the parapet!

The border guards lay down in a semicircle, six meters from each other. The cartridges were divided equally. Five or six per brother. Shells and mines exploded. It seemed as if you took off from the ground - and you were gone. One bullet whistled past Babansky's ear. “Sniper,” flashed through my head. “We need to be careful.” But Kozus, who was covering him, had already removed the Chinese shooter. Suddenly the fire died down. In preparation for a new attack, the Chinese regrouped. Babansky decided to take advantage of this:

One at a time, a distance of eight to ten meters, dashing to the leading signs! Yezhov - to the armored personnel carrier! Let him support!

Babansky did not yet know that the river bed was under fire. I didn’t know whether Eremin, who he sent to the outlet (“Let them send cartridges!”) managed to inform the outpost of the commander’s order. The Maoists pressed on. Five Soviet border guards led by junior sergeant Yuri Babansky against an enemy battalion. The border guards took a more advantageous position - at the leading signs. The Chinese are no more than a hundred meters away. They opened heavy fire. This fire was supported by a mortar battery from the shore. For the first time for twenty-year-old boys, armed combat became a reality: life next to death, humanity next to treachery. You are against the enemy. And you must defend justice, you must defend your native land.

Guys, help is coming! Bubenin should come up. We must stand, because our land!

And Bubenin came to their aid. Using his armored personnel carrier, he invaded the rear of the Chinese, caused panic in their ranks and essentially decided the outcome of the battle. Babansky did not see the armored personnel carrier, he only heard the roar of its engines on the river, right opposite them, and understood why the enemy faltered and retreated back.

Run after me! - Yuri commanded and led the fighters to the northern part of the island, where the Bubeninites who arrived in time were fighting. “Five machine guns is also strength!” Babansky fell, froze, then crawled. Bullets whistled from all sides. The body tensed. Even if there was some kind of pothole, crater - no, the snow-covered meadow spread out like a tablecloth. Apparently, Yuri Babansky was not destined to die; apparently, he was “born in a vest.” And this time the shells and mines spared him. He reached the bushes and looked around: the guys were crawling behind him. I saw: help was coming from the Soviet shore in a deployed chain. Babansky sighed with relief. I wanted to smoke. It took some time for someone to find two cigarettes. He smoked them one after another. The tension of the battle had not yet subsided. He still lived with the excitement of the fight: he picked up the wounded, looked for the dead, and carried them out of the battlefield. It seemed to him that he was numb, unable to feel. But tears came to my eyes when I saw the face of Kolya Dergach, a fellow countryman and friend, disfigured by the Chinese. Late in the evening, completely tired, he turned on the radio at the outpost. There was music on the air. It seemed unthinkable, impossible, unnatural. And then suddenly the meaning of the border service was revealed in a new way: for the sake of children sleeping peacefully, for the sake of this music to sound, for the sake of life, happiness, justice, guys in green caps stand at the border. They stand to death. The country did not yet know what happened at Damansky...

The beginning and development of the border confrontation between the USSR and the PRC in 1949-1969.

By the time the People's Republic of China was formed, the issue of the border line between the USSR and China was not raised at the official level. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, Mutual Assistance (1950), the Soviet-Chinese border, before the start of the revision of bilateral relations, was the border of good neighborliness, where active ties were maintained between the population of the border areas, lively trade was conducted, and cultural exchange was established. Cooperation agreements were concluded in a number of border areas, including the “Agreement on the procedure for navigation along the border rivers Amur, Ussuri, Argun, Sungacha, and Lake Khanka and on the establishment of a navigation situation on these waterways” (1951), on forestry , about joint fight against forest fires in border areas, etc. Within the framework of these agreements, the actually protected border line was not questioned.
In the early 50s. The USSR handed over topographic maps to the PRC indicating the entire border line. There were no comments from the Chinese side regarding the border line. During the years when Soviet-Chinese relations were on the rise, and China’s economic development and security largely depended on the USSR, border issues were not raised at the official level.
But already from the second half of the 50s. Difficulties began to appear in relations between the USSR and the PRC. In 1957 Under the motto of the Maoist campaign “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools compete,” there was dissatisfaction with the USSR’s policy towards China, including in the form of claims to certain areas under the jurisdiction of the USSR. An interesting fact is that, in general, the positions of circles whose opinions differed from the official policy of the CCP were subject to significant criticism, but their vision of the territorial border problem was not affected.
Another evidence of the existence of differences in the border issue was the so-called “cartographic aggression”, which was carried out already in the 50s. In maps, textbooks and atlases, the borders of China include territories under the actual jurisdiction of the USSR and other countries. In the “Atlas of the Provinces of the People's Republic of China,” which was published in Beijing in 1953, an area in the Pamirs and several areas in the eastern area, including two islands near Khabarovsk, were designated as Chinese territories.
In 1956-1959. cases of border violations by Chinese citizens are becoming more frequent, but then these issues were resolved successfully at the level of local authorities. The general tone of bilateral relations remained favorable.
In the mid-50s. The USSR invited China to resolve border issues. However, due to events in Poland and Hungary, this initiative was not developed.
Until 1960, the issue of the border was no longer raised at the interstate level. However, at the moment when the issue of the Soviet-Chinese border again appeared on the agenda, relations between the two countries were no longer so smooth. In the late 50s, early 60s. A number of prerequisites arise for the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China.
China's unilateral military-political actions, carried out without consultation with the USSR, put the Soviet Union, as an ally of the PRC, in a very difficult position. Such actions primarily include the provocation against India (1959) and the incident in the Taiwan Strait (1958). During the same period, China's desire to gain a leading place in the international communist and labor movement, as well as to get rid of the tutelage of the CPSU, intensified.
In addition, starting with the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), ideological differences began to grow between the two countries. Later, on their basis, the CPC accused the CPSU of revisionism and restoration of capitalist relations. The Chinese leadership reacted negatively to the condemnation of Stalin's personality cult. Personal enmity between Khrushchev N.S. and Mao Zedong also played a role in the deterioration of bilateral relations.
Some foreign authors note the Chinese leadership's dissatisfaction with Soviet influence in Manchuria and especially in Xinjiang.
Let us recall that one of the first results of the flaring conflict between the CPSU and the CPC was the unexpected withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China in 1960. Almost simultaneously, the first episode on the border occurred, which showed the existence of disagreements between the USSR and China on the issue of the border line and the ownership of those or other areas. We are talking about an incident in 1960 when Chinese herders were grazing livestock in territory under Soviet jurisdiction, in the area of ​​the Buz-Aigyr pass in Kyrgyzstan. When the Soviet border guards arrived, the shepherds declared that they were on the territory of the People's Republic of China. It later turned out that they were acting on a directive from the authorities of their province.
On this occasion, the foreign ministries of China and the USSR sent each other several notes and made oral statements, in which for the first time since the founding of the PRC, a different understanding of the border line with the Soviet Union was revealed at the official, diplomatic level. The parties never came to an agreement, but in 1960, at a press conference in Kathmandu, Zhou Enlai, when asked about the presence of unidentified areas on the Soviet-Chinese border, answered the following: “There are minor discrepancies on the maps... it is very easy to resolve peacefully.”
However, in the autumn of 1960, Chinese citizens began systematically going to the islands on the border rivers of the Far East, which were under Soviet control, for the purpose of conducting economic activities (mowing grass, collecting brushwood). They told the Soviet border guards that they were on Chinese territory. The reaction of Soviet border guards to incidents has changed. If previously they ignored the trades of Chinese peasants in a number of territories under Soviet jurisdiction, then, starting in 1960, they tried to suppress violations. It should be noted that during the demarcation of the border in the 80-90s. most of these islands, including o. Damansky, legally transferred to the PRC.
In the current situation, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to create an interdepartmental commission consisting of specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, whose task was to select and study treaty acts on the border with the PRC. The commission identified 13 areas where there were discrepancies in the maps of the parties and 12 where the distribution of islands was not carried out.
The border line itself was not clearly marked on the ground, because Of the 141 border signs, 40 were preserved in their original form, 77 were in a destroyed state, and 24 were missing altogether. It was also noted that the description of the boundary in treaty acts is often general in nature, and many treaty maps are drawn up on a small scale at a primitive level. In general, according to the conclusion of the commission, it was noted that the entire border line with the PRC, except for the section in the Pamirs south of the Uz-Bel pass, was determined by treaties. In the case of border negotiations, the commission proposed drawing the border not along the banks of rivers, but along the line of the middle of the main fairway on navigable rivers and along the line of the middle of the river on non-navigable rivers, and not as it was indicated by the red line on the map attached to the Beijing Treaty, according to which the border ran along the Chinese coast. Fortune telling with Tarot cards, available online at gadanieonlinetaro.ru, will help you find out your fate.
Systematic violations of the protected border line by Chinese citizens in the 1960s and demonstrative conduct of economic activities were probably intended to consolidate the so-called “status status” in practice. Moreover, the statistics of violations showed that from 1960 to 1964 their number grew rapidly, and in the second half of the 60s the incidents became more acute.
Thus, in 1960 the number of violations was about 100, in 1962 there were already about 5 thousand. In 1963, more than 100 thousand Chinese civilians and military personnel took part in illegally crossing the Soviet-Chinese border.
As the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated, the exchange of notes and oral statements continued, in which the parties constantly blamed each other. The Soviet side expressed its dissatisfaction with the violation of the border by Chinese citizens; Chinese documents, as a rule, stated that Soviet border guards did not allow economic activity to be carried out where it had been carried out previously or declared that a particular area belonged to the territory of the PRC. Despite the increase in the number of incidents at the borders, the matter did not reach wide publicity. Relations between the Soviet Union and China have not yet moved from polemics to open confrontation. This is evidenced by reviews of the Chinese and Soviet central press for 1962-1963.
In 1963, the parties agreed to hold consultations to clarify the border line. They began on February 25, 1964. Negotiations were held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The Soviet delegation was headed by Colonel General P.I. Zyryanov, commander of the country's border troops. The Chinese delegation was headed by acting. Head of the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Zeng Yongquan. Negotiations continued until August 22 of the same year. During the meeting, different approaches of the parties to the problem of border settlement were revealed.
The Chinese position in the negotiations boiled down to three points, which the Chinese side invariably insisted on:

• Only contracts should serve as the basis for negotiations.
• Negotiations must consider the entire border, and not just individual sections.
• As a result of negotiations, a new agreement must be concluded with reference to existing agreements, which should be qualified as unequal.

Soviet border guards are preparing to drive out Chinese intruders. January 1969

The Chinese reacted quite sharply to tactics of this kind. They expressed bewilderment at how the historical border line was determined: “What do you mean by a historically formed border line? Do you mean the line that developed in the 16th or 19th century, or the line that developed a minute before your speech?” The head of the Chinese delegation, Zeng Yongquan, commented on it as follows: “In those areas where you have not crossed the border line defined by the treaties, you apparently will not object to acting in accordance with the treaties, but in those areas where you have crossed the boundary line defined by the treaties border line, you will insist that the issue be resolved in accordance with the “actually protected line.” In his own words, the “actually protected, historically established border line” appeared when there were not much more than 200 PRC border guards on the border between China and the USSR and the Soviet side sent troops wherever they pleased.
At the same time, the Chinese side emphasized that, while abandoning the “big register,” it must return back what was “captured” by Russia and the Soviet Union in addition to it. It sounded like this: “You should know that we do not require you to give up 1,540 thousand sq. km of Chinese territory seized by Tsarist Russia. We have shown maximum generosity and good will. Apart from this territory seized from China, you will not be able to to seize another inch of Chinese territory."
The Chinese side, moreover, insisted on recognizing the Russian-Chinese treaties that defined the border as unequal. It was indicated that these agreements were concluded during a period of China’s weakness and as a result more than 1,500 thousand square meters were rejected. km. Chinese territory in favor of Russia, including 1 million square meters. km. in Primorye and Amur region and 0.5 million sq. km. in Central Asia. Thus, according to the Aigun Treaty, 600 thousand square meters passed to Russia. km., according to Beijing 400 thousand sq. m. km., along Chuguchaksky more than 440 thousand square meters. km., in St. Petersburg more than 70 thousand sq. m. km. The Chinese side also insisted that in the 1920s. Soviet Russia renounced all unequal treaties, and since the border treaties with Russia were viewed in the PRC as unequal, the Chinese delegation more than once stated that it had the right to recognize their insignificance.
At the same time, it was stipulated that recognition of the treaties as unequal would not lead to new territorial claims. However, Soviet experts saw a trap in such a proposal. The Chinese have repeatedly emphasized that although the treaties are unequal in nature, given the nature of relations between socialist states, China will not demand the return of these lands, but is only seeking recognition of the “unequal rights” of the Russian-Chinese treaties. The problem was that China could in the future declare the Soviet Union a non-socialist state, which happened after some time, and therefore recognize the treaties as void and, thus, raise the question of ownership of 1,500 thousand square meters. km.
On the issue of the “inequality” of Russian-Chinese treaties, both delegations were repeatedly drawn into unjustified polemics, which took a lot of time and did not bring practical results. It is natural that in the end the Soviet side rejected this point.
Nevertheless, the Chinese were ready to recognize the Russian-Chinese treaties of the 19th century as the basis for negotiations. But at the same time, they argued that the Soviet Union did not comply with these agreements and was “biting into” Chinese territory.
The Chinese side insisted that the Soviet Union recognize the disputed areas and demanded that troops, including border troops, be withdrawn from there after their designation. The total area of ​​the “disputed areas” was approximately 40 thousand square meters. km., incl. 28 thousand sq. km. in the Pamirs. The total length of the “disputed” sections of the border line exceeded half the length of the border between the USSR and China and mainly ran along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Representatives of the USSR argued that we could only talk about clarifying the border line (demarcation) in some areas and did not recognize the existence of “disputed areas.”
During the negotiations, it was possible to reach a certain compromise on the eastern section of the border, 4,200 km long, but with the exception of the issue of two islands (Bolshoy Ussuriysky and Tarabarov). In April 1964, the parties exchanged topographic maps indicating their understanding of the border line and created a working group, after which they began to directly consider the border line. As a result of studying Chinese maps and comparing them with Soviet ones, it was found that there are discrepancies in drawing the border line on these maps in 22 areas, of which 17 are located on the western part of the Soviet-Chinese border (now the Central Asian republics of the former USSR) and 5 areas on eastern part of the border. These areas approximately coincided with the areas that the interdepartmental commission indicated in its note in 1960. Chinese maps indicated 3 more areas that did not appear in the commission’s materials, including a fairly large area in the area of ​​the Bedel Pass (Kyrgyzstan), as well as islands near Khabarovsk. The greatest discrepancies were identified in the Pamir section.
Based on the results of the review of the maps in Moscow, it was concluded that it was possible to hold negotiations not on individual sections, as previously assumed, but along the entire border, as the Chinese delegation insisted. This approach became possible because along most of the length of the border line there were no vital differences in the border. Along the longest line that required clarification—the river border in the Far East—the parties had the same understanding that the border had to run along the main fairway. In this regard, the delegation was given additional instructions to confirm the border line in areas where the parties understand it equally. As part of this approach, the parties were able to come to an understanding on the entire eastern section of the border, with the exception of the issue of the Kazakevichev channel.
When the Soviet delegation proposed to record the results of clarifying the border in the eastern section, leaving the issue of the Kazakevichev Channel for later, the Chinese side agreed to this option. However, the Soviet leadership showed integrity in this matter. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev insisted on the position of “either all or nothing.”
Mao’s statement, made during negotiations in the open press on a territorial register of 1.5 million square meters, also did not help achieve agreement. km.
As a result of the consultations, no agreements were reached. After their end, which never continued, border incidents resumed. Since October 1964 to March 1965 the Soviet-Chinese border was violated 36 times with the participation of 150 Chinese civilians and military personnel, and in 15 days of April 1965. the border was violated 12 times involving more than 500 Chinese civilians and military personnel. Number of violations of the Soviet-Chinese border in 1967 noted approximately 2 thousand times. At the height of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, Chinese border guards and Red Guard detachments rammed Soviet patrol ships, tried to seize patrols, and started fights with Soviet border guards.
According to some Chinese data, from October 15, 1964 to March 15, 1969, the number of border conflicts amounted to 4,189 cases. At the same time, border violations on the Chinese side were, as a rule, provocative and well-organized. Chinese leaders openly spoke about the possibility of military action. The Chinese press continued to criticize the Soviet leadership. The entire domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was attacked, which was defined as a policy of revisionism, hegemonism and social-imperialism, and was placed on a par with American imperialism. Any actions of the USSR in the international arena, covered in the Chinese press, were subjected to a series of harsh attacks and were considered hostile to the PRC.
Tensions also intensified because a number of islands on the Ussuri River, located on the Chinese side of the main channel, were under the actual control of Soviet border troops, and the Chinese side, asserting their belonging to the PRC, indicated its presence on them by demonstrably conducting economic activities and the presence of its own people there. border patrols. The Soviet side quite often motivated its presence on the Chinese side of the fairway by the presence of a “red line” on the map of the Beijing Boundary Treaty of 1860, where it marked the line of the border and on river sections and ran along the Chinese bank. In addition, until a formal agreement was reached and delimitation was made, the USSR continued to extend its jurisdiction to the “historically established and actually protected” border line
In general, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, relations between the two states acquired a character rarely encountered before in the practice of international relations. Provocations against the USSR occurred not only on the border. There were illegal detentions of Soviet civil courts "Svirsk" and "Komsomolets of Ukraine", provocations of Chinese citizens on Red Square and at the American embassy in Moscow, as well as at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
In comparison with the 50s, two significant features of the situation on the border in the 60s. became, firstly, military construction, and secondly, continuous incidents.
The peak of confrontation was 1969. Beginning on March 2, clashes took place between Soviet border guards and Chinese military personnel on the Ussuri River on Damansky Island (Zhenbaodao). Before this, clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards also took place, however, they rarely went beyond hand-to-hand combat and did not lead to casualties. But during the fighting on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 people were injured. From the Chinese side, approximately 300 people took part in this action. There was the use of artillery and mortars, as well as heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Chinese military also suffered heavy losses. The fighting continued on March 14-15. Only after the Soviet side used the Grad multiple launch rocket systems, which covered Chinese territory over 20 square meters. km. in depth and caused serious losses to the Chinese armed forces clashes on the island. Damansky stopped. To the notes of protest and the Statement of the Soviet government, the leadership of the PRC responded in the usual style, that the USSR must recognize the unequal nature of the treaties defining the border between the USSR and the PRC and called the USSR an aggressor that “encroached” on Chinese territory. Participants in the fighting on the Chinese side were viewed as heroes in their homeland.
It should be noted that formally the Chinese side had good reasons to claim Fr. Damansky (Zhenbaodao) and a number of other islands, because they were on the Chinese side of the main fairway, which, according to international law, is accepted as the border line on border rivers. However, the Chinese side knew that this and other islands had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR for many years. The Chinese side also knew that the Soviet Union, in principle, did not object to the transfer of these islands to China. As further negotiations showed, the issue of ownership of the islands was resolved, and in the conditions of confrontation, the actions of the PRC in relation to these islands were aimed at aggravating the situation and could be considered provocative, which indicates that the initiator of the bloodshed was the Chinese side.
Regarding events on the island. Damansky there is a version that they were deliberately provoked by the Chinese armed forces on the orders of Lin Biao, in order to strengthen his position at the 1st Congress and increase the role of the PLA in Chinese politics.
On March 29, the Soviet government made a statement in a harsh tone, in which it proposed resuming negotiations that began in 1964. In this document, the PRC leadership was asked to refrain from actions on the border that could cause complications, and to resolve differences that had arisen in a calm atmosphere. In conclusion, it was noted that “attempts to talk with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet people, in the language of weapons will meet with firm resistance.” At the IX Congress of the CPC, in his speech, Marshal Lin Biao said that the proposals of the Soviet government of March 29 would be considered and a response would be given to them. At the same time, it was said that “Our party and government (CCP) have always advocated and advocate for resolving these issues through diplomatic channels through negotiations in order to resolve them on a fair and rational basis.” On April 11, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs again sent a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in which it was proposed to resume consultations between plenipotentiary representatives of the governments of the People's Republic of China and the USSR "in ... the very near future." The response was received in May 1969. It again contained allegations that Fr. Damansky (Zhenbao Dao) is Chinese territory, and the incidents in Ussuri were deliberately provoked by the Soviet side. At the same time, it was confirmed that the PRC opposes the use of military force, and it was proposed to agree on the place and date of negotiations through diplomatic channels. These Soviet and Chinese statements indicated that both sides were trying to present themselves as victims of aggression and absolve themselves of responsibility for the bloodshed.
Despite the formal readiness to resume the negotiation process and reduce the level of tension, incidents at the border did not stop until the end of the summer of 1969, and speeches at party meetings and in the press of both countries sounded increasingly harsh. During July and the first half of August, there were more than 488 cases of border violations and armed incidents involving 2.5 thousand Chinese citizens. On July 8, Chinese border guards attacked Soviet rivermen on the island. Goldinsky. On August 13, in the Kazakh SSR in the Semipalatinsk region in the area of ​​Lake Zhalanashkol, the largest armed incident since the March events occurred with casualties on both sides. Only after this the parties managed to agree on a meeting at a sufficiently high level.
On September 11, 1969, the head of the Soviet government, A.N. Kosygin, visited the PRC and met with the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. The result of the “meeting at the airport” was an agreement on further negotiations on the border, starting from October 19, 1969, as well as on the implementation of a number of measures in order to normalize the situation on the border. During the conversation, which lasted 3.5 hours, issues were also discussed about the exchange of ambassadors (instead of chargé d'affaires), the intensification of trade relations and the normalization of interstate relations.
The heads of government also agreed that any threat of the use of force should be excluded during the negotiations.
As a result, Soviet border guards were instructed to guard the borders on rivers up to the middle of the fairway. They were also charged with maintaining normal relations with the border troops and the PRC authorities; consider all border issues through consultations in a spirit of goodwill and taking into account the mutual interests of the population of the border areas of both countries in the field of economic activities.
Despite the fact that the situation on the border has stabilized, no significant progress has been achieved in relations between the two states, and border settlement issues remain open.

Original taken from parker_111 in Conflict on Damansky Island. 1969

After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a provision emerged that borders between states should, as a rule (but not necessarily), run along the middle of the main channel of the river. But it also provided for exceptions, such as drawing a border along one of the banks, when such a border was formed historically - by treaty, or if one side colonized the second bank before the other began to colonize it.


In addition, international treaties and agreements do not have retroactive effect. However, in the late 1950s, when the PRC, seeking to increase its international influence, entered into conflict with Taiwan (1958) and participated in the border war with India (1962), the Chinese used the new border regulations as a reason to revise the Soviet -Chinese border.

The leadership of the USSR was ready to do this; in 1964, a consultation was held on border issues, but it ended without results.

Due to ideological differences during the Cultural Revolution in China and after the Prague Spring of 1968, when the PRC authorities declared that the USSR had taken the path of “socialist imperialism,” relations became particularly strained.

Damansky Island, which was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri. Its dimensions are 1500–1800 m from north to south and 600–700 m from west to east (area about 0.74 km²).

During flood periods, the island is completely hidden under water and has no economic value.

Since the early 1960s, the situation in the island area has been heating up. According to statements from the Soviet side, groups of civilians and military personnel began to systematically violate the border regime and enter Soviet territory, from where they were expelled each time by border guards without the use of weapons.

At first, at the direction of the Chinese authorities, peasants entered the territory of the USSR and demonstratively engaged in economic activities there: mowing and grazing livestock, declaring that they were on Chinese territory.

The number of such provocations increased sharply: in 1960 there were 100, in 1962 - more than 5,000. Then Red Guards began to attack border patrols.

Such events numbered in the thousands, each of them involving up to several hundred people.

On January 4, 1969, a Chinese provocation was carried out on Kirkinsky Island (Qiliqindao) with the participation of 500 people.

According to the Chinese version of events, the Soviet border guards themselves staged provocations and beat up Chinese citizens engaged in economic activities where they had always done so.

During the Kirkinsky incident, they used armored personnel carriers to oust civilians and killed 4 of them, and on February 7, 1969, they fired several single machine gun shots in the direction of the Chinese border detachment.

However, it was repeatedly noted that none of these clashes, no matter whose fault they occurred, could result in a serious armed conflict without the approval of the authorities. The assertion that the events around Damansky Island on March 2 and 15 were the result of an action carefully planned by the Chinese side is now the most widespread; including directly or indirectly recognized by many Chinese historians.

For example, Li Danhui writes that in 1968-1969, the response to Soviet provocations was limited by the directives of the CPC Central Committee; only on January 25, 1969, it was allowed to plan “response military actions” near Damansky Island with the help of three companies. On February 19, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China agreed to this.

Events of March 1-2 and the following week
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, about 300 Chinese troops in winter camouflage, armed with AK assault rifles and SKS carbines, crossed to Damansky and lay down on the higher western shore of the island.

The group remained unnoticed until 10:40, when the 2nd outpost “Nizhne-Mikhailovka” of the 57th Iman border detachment received a report from an observation post that a group of armed people of up to 30 people was moving in the direction of Damansky. 32 Soviet border guards, including the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, went to the scene of events in GAZ-69 and GAZ-63 vehicles and one BTR-60PB. At 11:10 they arrived at the southern tip of the island. The border guards under the command of Strelnikov were divided into two groups. The first group, under the command of Strelnikov, headed towards a group of Chinese military personnel standing on the ice southwest of the island.

The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov’s group from the southern coast of the island. Strelnikov protested the violation of the border and demanded that Chinese military personnel leave the territory of the USSR. One of the Chinese servicemen raised his hand up, which served as a signal for the Chinese side to open fire on the groups of Strelnikov and Rabovich. The moment of the start of the armed provocation was captured on film by military photojournalist Private Nikolai Petrov. Strelnikov and the border guards who followed him died immediately, and a squad of border guards under the command of Sergeant Rabovich also died in a short battle. Junior Sergeant Yuri Babansky took command of the surviving border guards.

Having received a report about the shooting on the island, the head of the neighboring 1st outpost “Kulebyakiny Sopki”, senior lieutenant Vitaly Bubenin, went to the BTR-60PB and GAZ-69 with 20 soldiers to help. In the battle, Bubenin was wounded and sent the armored personnel carrier to the rear of the Chinese, skirting the northern tip of the island along the ice, but soon the armored personnel carrier was hit and Bubenin decided to go out with his soldiers to the Soviet coast. Having reached the armored personnel carrier of the deceased Strelnikov and boarded it, Bubenin’s group moved along the Chinese positions and destroyed their command post. They began to retreat.

In the battle on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 were injured. The losses of the Chinese side (according to the USSR KGB commission) amounted to 247 people killed

Around 12:00 a helicopter arrived at Damansky with the command of the Iman border detachment and its chief, Colonel D.V. Leonov, and reinforcements from neighboring outposts. Reinforced squads of border guards were deployed to Damansky, and the 135th Motorized Rifle Division of the Soviet Army with artillery and installations of the BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system was deployed in the rear. On the Chinese side, the 24th Infantry Regiment, numbering 5,000 people, was preparing for combat.

On March 3, a demonstration took place near the Soviet embassy in Beijing. On March 4, the Chinese newspapers People's Daily and Jiefangjun Bao (解放军报) published an editorial "Down with the New Tsars!", blaming the incident on the Soviet troops, who, according to the author of the article, "moved by a clique of renegade revisionists, brazenly invaded Zhenbaodao Island on the Wusulijiang River in Heilongjiang Province of our country, opened rifle and cannon fire on the border guards of the People's Liberation Army of China, killing and wounding many of them." On the same day, the Soviet newspaper Pravda published an article “Shame on the provocateurs!” According to the author of the article, “an armed Chinese detachment crossed the Soviet state border and headed towards Damansky Island. Fire was suddenly opened on the Soviet border guards guarding this area from the Chinese side. There are dead and wounded." On March 7, the Chinese Embassy in Moscow was picketed. Demonstrators also threw ink bottles at the building.

Events March 14-15
On March 14 at 15:00 an order was received to remove border guard units from the island. Immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet border guards, Chinese soldiers began to occupy the island. In response to this, 8 armored personnel carriers under the command of the head of the motorized maneuver group of the 57th border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel E. I. Yanshin, moved in battle formation towards Damansky; The Chinese retreated to their shore.



At 20:00 on March 14, the border guards received an order to occupy the island. That same night, Yanshin’s group of 60 people in 4 armored personnel carriers dug in there. On the morning of March 15, after broadcasting through loudspeakers on both sides, at 10:00 from 30 to 60 Chinese artillery and mortars began shelling Soviet positions, and 3 companies of Chinese infantry went on the offensive. A fight ensued.

Between 400 and 500 Chinese soldiers took up positions near the southern part of the island and prepared to move behind Yangshin's rear. Two armored personnel carriers of his group were hit, and communication was damaged. Four T-62 tanks under the command of D.V. Leonov attacked the Chinese at the southern tip of the island, but Leonov’s tank was hit (according to various versions, by a shot from an RPG-2 grenade launcher or was blown up by an anti-tank mine), and Leonov himself was killed by a shot from a Chinese sniper when trying to leave a burning car.

What made the situation worse was that Leonov did not know the island and, as a result, Soviet tanks came too close to the Chinese positions. However, at the cost of losses, the Chinese were not allowed to enter the island.

Two hours later, having used up their ammunition, the Soviet border guards were nevertheless forced to withdraw from the island. It became clear that the forces brought into the battle were not enough and the Chinese significantly outnumbered the border guard detachments. At 17:00, in a critical situation, in violation of the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee not to introduce Soviet troops into the conflict, on the orders of the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Oleg Losik, fire was opened from the then-secret Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).

The shells destroyed most of the material and technical resources of the Chinese group and military, including reinforcements, mortars, and stacks of shells. At 17:10, motorized riflemen of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 199th motorized rifle regiment and border guards under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov and Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinov went on the attack in order to finally suppress the resistance of the Chinese troops. The Chinese began to retreat from their occupied positions. At about 19:00 several firing points came to life, after which three new attacks were launched, but they were repulsed.

Soviet troops again retreated to their shores, and the Chinese side no longer took large-scale hostile actions on this section of the state border.

In total, during the clashes, Soviet troops lost 58 people killed or died from wounds (including 4 officers), 94 people were wounded (including 9 officers).

The irretrievable losses of the Chinese side are still classified information and, according to various estimates, range from 100-150 to 800 and even 3000 people. In Baoqing County there is a memorial cemetery where the remains of 68 Chinese soldiers who died on March 2 and 15, 1969 are located. Information received from a Chinese defector suggests that other burials exist.

For their heroism, five military personnel received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Colonel D. Leonov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant I. Strelnikov (posthumously), Junior Sergeant V. Orekhov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin, Junior Sergeant Yu. Babansky.

Many border guards and military personnel of the Soviet Army were awarded state awards: 3 - Orders of Lenin, 10 - Orders of the Red Banner, 31 - Orders of the Red Star, 10 - Orders of Glory III degree, 63 - medals "For Courage", 31 - medals "For Military Merit" .

Settlement and aftermath
Soviet soldiers were unable to return the destroyed T-62 due to constant Chinese shelling. An attempt to destroy it with mortars was unsuccessful, and the tank fell through the ice. Subsequently, the Chinese were able to pull it to their shores and now it stands in the Beijing military museum.

After the ice melted, the exit of the Soviet border guards to Damansky turned out to be difficult and it was necessary to prevent Chinese attempts to capture it with sniper and machine-gun fire. On September 10, 1969, a ceasefire was ordered, apparently to create a favorable background for the negotiations that began the next day at Beijing airport.

Immediately, Damansky and Kirkinsky were occupied by Chinese armed forces.

On September 11 in Beijing, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, who was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh, and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai agreed to stop hostile actions and that the troops would remain in their occupied positions. In fact, this meant the transfer of Damansky to China.

On October 20, 1969, new negotiations between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC were held, and an agreement was reached on the need to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. Then a series of negotiations were held in Beijing and Moscow, and in 1991, Damansky Island finally went to the PRC.

The largest armed conflict in the 20th century between China and the USSR occurred in 1969. For the first time, the general Soviet public was shown the atrocities of the Chinese invaders on Damansky Island. However, people learned the details of the tragedy only many years later.

Why did the Chinese abuse the border guards?

According to one version, the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and China began after unsuccessful negotiations on the fate of Damansky Island, which arose in the fairway of the Ussuri River as a result of the shallowing of a small part of the river. According to the Paris Peace Agreement of 1919, the state border of the countries was determined along the middle of the river fairway, but if historical circumstances indicated otherwise, then the border could be determined based on priority - if one of the countries was the first to colonize the territory, then it was given preference when resolving the territorial issue .

Strength tests

A priori, it was assumed that the island created by nature should have come under the jurisdiction of the Chinese side, but due to unsuccessful negotiations between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev and the leader of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong, the final document on this issue was not signed. The Chinese side began to use the “island” issue to improve relations with the American side. A number of Chinese historians argued that the Chinese were going to give the Americans a pleasant surprise, to show the seriousness of the break in relations with the USSR.

For many years, the small island - 0.74 square kilometers - was a tasty morsel that was used to test tactical and psychological maneuvers, the main purpose of which was to test the strength and adequacy of the reaction of Soviet border guards. Minor conflicts have occurred here before, but it never came to an open clash. In 1969, the Chinese committed more than five thousand recorded violations of the Soviet border.

The first landing went unnoticed

A secret directive of the Chinese military leadership is known, according to which a special operation plan was developed for the armed seizure of the Damansky Peninsula. The first from the Chinese side to move to break through was the landing force, which took place on the night of March 1-2, 1969. They took advantage of the prevailing weather conditions. Heavy snow fell, which allowed 77 Chinese soldiers to pass unnoticed along the frozen Ussuri River. They were dressed in white camouflage robes and armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles. This group was able to cross the border so secretly that its passage was unnoticed. And only the second group of Chinese, numbering 33 people, was discovered by an observer - a Soviet border guard. A message about a major violation was transmitted to the 2nd Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya outpost, which belongs to the Iman border detachment.

The border guards took a cameraman with them - Private Nikolai Petrov filmed the events taking place with a camera until the last moment. But the border guards did not have an accurate idea of ​​the number of violators. It was assumed that their number did not exceed three dozen. Therefore, 32 Soviet border guards were sent to eliminate it. Then they split up and moved into the area of ​​the violation in two groups. The first task is to neutralize the intruders peacefully, the second task is to provide reliable cover. The first group was led by twenty-eight-year-old Ivan Strelnikov, who was already preparing to enter the military academy in Moscow. As cover, the second group was led by Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich.

The Chinese clearly understood in advance the task of destroying the Soviet border guards. While the Soviet border guards planned to resolve the conflict peacefully, as was the case more than once: after all, minor violations constantly occurred in this area.

A raised Chinese hand is a signal to attack

Strelnikov, as the most experienced commander and head of the outpost, was ordered to negotiate. When Ivan Strelnikov approached the violators and offered to leave Soviet territory peacefully, the Chinese officer raised his hand - this was the signal to open fire - the first line of Chinese fired the first salvo. Strelnikov was the first to die. Seven border guards accompanying Strelnikov died almost immediately.

Private Petrov filmed everything that was happening until the last minute.

Gray hair and gouged out eyes

Rabovich's covering group was unable to come to the aid of their comrades: they were ambushed and died one after another. All border guards were killed. The Chinese were already mocking the dead border guard with all their sophistication. The photographs show that his eyes were gouged out and his face was mutilated with bayonets.

The surviving corporal Pavel Akulov faced a terrible fate - torture and painful death. They captured him, tortured him for a long time, and then threw him out of a helicopter into Soviet territory only in April. Doctors counted 28 puncture wounds on the body of the deceased; it was clear that he had been tortured for a long time - all the hair on his head had been pulled out, and a small strand was all gray.

True, one Soviet border guard managed to survive in this battle. Private Gennady Serebrov was seriously wounded in the back, lost consciousness, and a repeated blow to the chest with a bayonet was not fatal. He managed to survive and wait for help from his comrades: the commander of the neighboring outpost Vitaly Bubenin and his subordinates, as well as the group of junior sergeant Vitaly Babansky, were able to provide serious resistance to the Chinese side. Having a small supply of forces and weapons, they forced the Chinese to retreat.

31 dead border guards put up worthy resistance to the enemy at the cost of their lives.

Losik and Grad stopped the conflict

The second round of the conflict occurred on March 14. By this time, the Chinese military deployed a five-thousandth regiment, the Soviet side - the 135th motorized rifle division, equipped with Grad installations, which were used after receiving a number of conflicting orders: the party leadership - the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - urgently demanded that Soviet troops be removed and not brought into island. And as soon as this was accomplished, the Chinese immediately occupied the territory. Then the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Oleg Losik, who went through the Second World War, ordered the Grad multiple launch rocket system to open fire on the enemy: in one salvo, 40 shells within 20 seconds were capable of destroying the enemy within a radius of four hectares. After such a shelling, the Chinese military no longer took any large-scale military actions.

The final point in the conflict was put by the politicians of the two countries: already in September 1969, an agreement was reached that neither Chinese nor Soviet troops would occupy the disputed island. This meant that Damansky de facto passed to China; in 1991, de jure the island became Chinese.

In the early spring of 1969, a conflict began on the Soviet-Chinese border. During the clashes, 58 Soviet soldiers and officers were killed. However, at the cost of their lives, the big war was stopped.

0.74 square km

The two most powerful socialist powers at that time - the USSR and the PRC - almost started a full-scale war over a piece of land called Damansky Island. Its area is only 0.74 square kilometers. Moreover, during a flood on the Ussuri River, it was completely hidden under water.
There is a version that Damansky became an island only in 1915, when the current washed away part of the spit on the Chinese coast. Be that as it may, the island, which was called Zhenbao in Chinese, was closer to the coast of the People's Republic of China. According to the international regulations adopted at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the borders between states should pass through the middle of the main channel of the river. This agreement provided for exceptions: if the border had historically formed along one of the banks, with the consent of the parties it could be left unchanged. In order not to aggravate relations with its neighbor, which was gaining international influence, the leadership of the USSR allowed the transfer of a number of islands on the Soviet-Chinese border. On this issue, 5 years before the conflict on Damansky Island, negotiations took place, which, however, ended in nothing both because of the political ambitions of the leader of the PRC, Mao Zedong, and because of the inconsistency of the USSR Secretary General Nikita Khrushchev.

Five thousand provocations

For the USSR, which, by and large, has not yet recovered either demographically or economically after a series of wars and revolutions in the first half of the twentieth century and especially after the Second World War, an armed conflict, and especially full-scale military action with a nuclear power, in which, moreover, at that time, every fifth inhabitant of the planet lived, they were unnecessary and extremely dangerous. Only this can explain the amazing patience with which the Soviet border guards endured constant provocations from the “Chinese comrades” in the border areas.
In 1962 alone, there were more than 5 thousand (!) various violations of the border regime by Chinese citizens.

Originally Chinese territories

Gradually, Mao Zedong convinced himself and the entire population of the Middle Kingdom that the USSR illegally owned vast territories of 1.5 million square kilometers, which supposedly should belong to China. Such sentiments were actively fanned in the Western press - the capitalist world, strongly frightened by the red-yellow threat during the period of Soviet-Chinese friendship, was now rubbing its hands in anticipation of the clash of two socialist “monsters”.
In such a situation, only a pretext was needed to start hostilities. And such a reason was the disputed island on the Ussuri River.

“Put them in as many as possible...”

The fact that the conflict on Damansky was carefully planned is indirectly recognized even by Chinese historians themselves. For example, Li Danhui notes that in response to “Soviet provocations,” it was decided to conduct a military operation using three companies. There is a version that the leadership of the USSR was aware of the upcoming Chinese action in advance through Marshal Lin Biao.
On the night of March 2, about 300 Chinese troops crossed the ice to the island. Thanks to the snowfall, they managed to remain undetected until 10 am. When the Chinese were discovered, the Soviet border guards did not have an adequate idea of ​​their numbers for several hours. According to the report received at the 2nd outpost “Nizhne-Mikhailovka” of the 57th Iman border detachment, the number of armed Chinese was 30 people. 32 Soviet border guards went to the scene of events. Near the island they split into two groups. The first group, under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, went straight to the Chinese, who were standing on the ice southwest of the island.

The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov’s group from the southern coast of the island. As soon as Strelnikov’s detachment approached the Chinese, heavy fire was opened on it. Rabovich's group was also ambushed. Almost all border guards were killed on the spot. Corporal Pavel Akulov was captured in an unconscious state. His body, with signs of torture, was later handed over to the Soviet side. The squad of junior sergeant Yuri Babansky entered the battle, which was somewhat delayed when moving out of the outpost and therefore the Chinese were unable to destroy it using the factor of surprise. It was this unit, together with the help of 24 border guards who arrived in time from the neighboring Kulebyakiny Sopki outpost, that in a fierce battle showed the Chinese how high the morale of their opponents was. “Of course, it was still possible to retreat, return to the outpost, wait for reinforcements from the detachment. But we were seized with such fierce anger at these bastards that in those moments we wanted only one thing - to kill as many of them as possible. For the guys, for ourselves, for this inch that no one needs, but still our land,” recalled Yuri Babansky, who was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his heroism.
As a result of the battle, which lasted about 5 hours, 31 Soviet border guards died. The irretrievable losses of the Chinese, according to the Soviet side, amounted to 248 people.
The surviving Chinese were forced to retreat. But in the border area, the 24th Chinese Infantry Regiment, numbering 5 thousand people, was already preparing for combat. The Soviet side brought the 135th motorized rifle division to Damansky, which was equipped with installations of the then secret Grad multiple launch rocket systems.

Preventive "Grad"

If the officers and soldiers of the Soviet army demonstrated determination and heroism, then the same cannot be said about the top leadership of the USSR. In the following days of the conflict, border guards received very contradictory orders. For example, at 15-00 on March 14 they were ordered to leave Damansky. But after the island was immediately occupied by the Chinese, 8 of our armored personnel carriers advanced from the Soviet border post in battle formation. The Chinese retreated, and the Soviet border guards at 20:00 on the same day were ordered to return to Damansky.
On March 15, about 500 Chinese attacked the island again. They were supported by 30 to 60 artillery pieces and mortars. On our side, about 60 border guards in 4 armored personnel carriers entered the battle. At the decisive moment of the battle they were supported by 4 T-62 tanks. However, after several hours of battle, it became clear that the forces were too unequal. The Soviet border guards, having shot all the ammunition, were forced to retreat to their shore.
The situation was critical - the Chinese could launch an attack on the border post, and according to the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, under no circumstances could Soviet troops be brought into the conflict. That is, the border guards were left alone with units of the Chinese army many times superior in numbers. And then the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Colonel General Oleg Losik, at his own peril and risk, gives an order that greatly sobered the belligerence of the Chinese, and, perhaps, forced them to abandon full-scale armed aggression against the USSR. Grad multiple launch rocket systems were introduced into battle. Their fire practically wiped out all the Chinese units concentrated in the Damansky area. Just 10 minutes after the Grad shelling, there was no talk of organized Chinese resistance. Those who survived began to retreat from Damansky. True, two hours later, the approaching Chinese units unsuccessfully tried to attack the island again. However, the “Chinese comrades” learned their lesson. After March 15, they no longer made serious attempts to take control of Damansky.

Surrendered without a fight

In the battles for Damansky, 58 Soviet border guards and, according to various sources, from 500 to 3,000 Chinese troops were killed (this information is still kept secret by the Chinese side). However, as has happened more than once in Russian history, diplomats surrendered what they managed to hold by force of arms. Already in the fall of 1969, negotiations took place, as a result of which it was decided that Chinese and Soviet border guards would remain on the banks of the Ussuri without going to Damansky. In fact, this meant the transfer of the island to China. Legally, the island passed to the People's Republic of China in 1991.