Lend Lease first deliveries. Mark corned beef

Lend-Lease is a program under which the United States provided its allies in World War II with everything they needed - weapons, food, production equipment and raw materials.

Most often, however, “Lend-Lease” is understood specifically as the supply of weapons, without paying attention to other goods.

Causes and conditions

The American leadership rightly believed that in World War II, assistance should be given to those countries whose defense was of vital importance to the United States.

Initially, the Lend-Lease program included China and the British Empire, but then other countries, including the USSR, joined it.

The Lend-Lease Law adopted in March 1941 established the following supply rules:

• Equipment, weapons, food, materials and other goods used or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment.
• Supplies left over from the war, if they could be useful for civilian purposes, were paid for on the basis of credits provided by the United States.
• If the United States is interested in returning a particular product after the war, it should be returned.

Thus, supplies were a kind of “gift” to the allies during the war, and in peacetime they turned into goods and could be purchased at quite reasonable prices.

Lend-Lease in the USSR

Lend-Lease in the USSR is still the subject of fierce debate between opponents and supporters of Soviet power. The former claim that without American supplies the USSR was unlikely to win the war, while the latter argue that supplies were insignificant and did not play a special role in the fight against fascism.

Both of them are cruelly mistaken. The Western “superpower” organized large-scale supplies of weapons and other goods to European countries due to the fact that the US GDP was several times higher than that of any developed European country, including the USSR.

Hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were imported into the Soviet Union. More than 12 percent of the tanks and aircraft available in the Red Army were American and British-made, and armored personnel carriers were completely imported: such equipment had not yet been produced in our country.

But this Lend-Lease also had weaknesses. Firstly, agreements on the supply of weapons and equipment were not fully implemented. Of the 800 aircraft and 1000 tanks intended for the USSR in 1941, only 669 aircraft and 487 tanks were sent. The situation more or less returned to normal only in 1943.

Secondly, a large amount of foreign aid to the Soviet Union did not mean better quality. And here the point is not only that the United States deliberately supplied not its most modern and best equipment, but also that American military production generally lagged behind Soviet and European ones.

The USSR and Germany at that time invested most of their production forces in the development of weapons, including tanks, as a result of which they surpassed all other states in this; therefore, against the background of Soviet and German technology, American and even British technology often looked weak.

A more acceptable situation developed with the supply of aircraft, a less acceptable situation with tanks. The share of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns was very small, since the USSR had enough of its own similar equipment. Small arms were also supplied, but on an absolutely microscopic scale - the share of American “barrels” in the Red Army was less than 1 percent.

Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?

It is known that most of the Lend-Lease deliveries occurred in the period after 1943, when a turning point came in the war. That is, in the most terrible period of the war, the early period, the help of the allies was minimal, and in more successful years it was not so noticeable.

There are those who ask: if the Allies produced large quantities of weapons, why didn't they send more of them? In fact, the reason was not the stinginess of the “capitalist comrades”, but the tonnage of the American and British cargo fleet - it was very insufficient for mass deliveries.

There is another version that deliveries were simply delayed. And one more thing, the Americans were waiting for someone to help, either the USSR or Germany. Depending on the progress of the war. The more losses the parties have, the greater the investment. As always, they have calculations.

Could the Soviet Union even do without Lend-Lease? It seems like he could. It was enough to redistribute our own production capacities. However, this would require mobilizing a huge amount of manpower, which would mean weakening the army. Let us remember that America was an ally of the USSR.

One could turn a blind eye to the lack of necessary equipment, but then the army would also be weakened. The war for the USSR would have turned into an even more protracted conflict; the Soviet Army would have won the war anyway, perhaps later. R. Sherwood (American historian) quoted Harry Hopkins, who did not consider American assistance important in the USSR’s victory over fascism. He said: "The victory was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army."

Americans' benefit

Many political scientists, and even politicians themselves, do not hide the benefits to states from the supply of weapons that are not entirely new and in good working order. But they received their debt from Russia since World War 2. The exhausted and destroyed USSR could not give it up, and there were all sorts of other reasons, for example, tension between the two countries. We profited in full.

“Few people know that military supplies under Lend-Lease (lend-lease) were not free at all - Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, paid the last debts on them already in 2006,” writes historian and publicist Evgeny Spitsyn.

In the issue of Lend-Lease (from English lend - to lend and lease - to rent, to rent - ed.) for the USSR, there are many subtleties that it would be nice to understand - on the basis of historical documents.

Part I

Not entirely free

The Lend-Lease Act, or "Act for the Defense of the United States", which was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, gave the President of the United States "the power to loan or lease to other states various goods and materials necessary for the conduct of war operations" if these actions, as determined by the President, were vital to the defense of the United States. Various goods and materials were understood as weapons, military equipment, ammunition, strategic raw materials, ammunition, food, civilian goods for the army and rear, as well as any information of important military importance.

The Lend-Lease scheme itself provided for the fulfillment by the recipient country of a number of conditions:1) materials destroyed, lost or lost during hostilities were not subject to payment, and property that survived and was suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid in whole or in part in order to repay a long-term loan issued by the United States itself; 2) the surviving military materials could remain with the recipient country until the United States requests them back; 3) in turn, the tenant agreed to help the United States with all the resources and information available to him.

With the help of Lend-Lease, the administration of President F.D. Roosevelt was going to solve a number of urgent problems, both foreign policy and domestic. Firstly, such a scheme made it possible to create new jobs in the United States itself, which had not yet fully emerged from the severe economic crisis of 1929-1933. Secondly, Lend-Lease allowed the American government to have a certain influence on the recipient country of Lend-Lease assistance. Finally, thirdly, by sending his allies only weapons, materials and raw materials, but not manpower, President F.D. Roosevelt fulfilled his campaign promise: “Our guys will never participate in other people’s wars.”

Immediately after President Roosevelt signed this program, his adviser and special representative Averell Harriman flew to London, and from there to Moscow, where on October 1, 1941, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov, the British Minister of Reserves and Supply Lord W.E. Beaverbrook and Presidential Special Representative A. Harriman signed the First (Moscow) Protocol, which marked the beginning of the extension of the Lend-Lease program to the Soviet Union.

Collocation Lend-lease comes from English words: lend- lend and lease- rent out. The article offered to readers by P. S. Petrov, candidate of historical sciences, sets out the views of American political and military leaders, as well as gives assessments of Western researchers, drawn from various US sources, on issues of Soviet-American cooperation within the framework of Lend-Lease, which largely determined the policy towards the Soviet ally during the last war.

According to the established opinion, when supplying supplies to the parties fighting against Germany, the United States of America was guided primarily by its own interests - to protect itself with the help of others and preserve its own forces as much as possible. At the same time, the US monopoly bourgeoisie pursued certain economic goals, bearing in mind that supplies under Lend-Lease would contribute to a significant expansion of production and its enrichment through government orders.

The Lend-Lease Act (officially called the American Defense Assistance Act) was passed by the American Congress on March 8, 1941. Initially it extended to Great Britain and a number of other countries against which Germany fought.

According to this act, the head of state received the authority to transfer, exchange, rent, lend or otherwise supply military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food, provide various goods and services, as well as information to the government of any country, “defense” which the President deems vital to the defense of the United States."

States receiving assistance under Lend-Lease signed agreements with the US government. According to them, delivered vehicles, various military equipment, weapons, and other items destroyed, lost or consumed during the war were not subject to payment after its end. The goods and materials remaining after the war that could be used for civilian consumption were supposed to be paid for in whole or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by America. And the United States could demand the return of military materials, although, as A.A. Gromyko, who was the USSR ambassador to the United States in 1943-1946, the American government has repeatedly stated that it will not use this right.

It is important to note that countries that entered into agreements with the United States, in turn, assumed obligations to “assist in the defense of the United States” and to assist them with materials that they had, to provide various services and information. The United States thus received counter, or reverse, Lend-Lease: machine tools, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, equipment for military factories, as well as various services, military information, strategic raw materials, precious metals, etc.

By supplying military equipment and materials to countries fighting against Germany, the United States primarily pursued its own selfish interests. Many American authors testify to this, because the government provided Lend-Lease as an alternative to war. For example, R. Dawson wrote that in the US Congress and the country at the end of October 1941, there was a firm conviction, despite neutralist, isolationist and even anti-Soviet sentiments, that “dollars, even transferred to Soviet Russia, were a much more favorable contribution than sending American Army". On the other hand, the supply of goods contributed to the expansion of production and greater profits. Thus, the prudence underlying Lend-Lease was a characteristic feature of all types of US assistance and policy in the war, which was especially clearly manifested in relations with the USSR.

The US government, which declared after the attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 by Nazi Germany and its satellites, that it intended to provide assistance to it, nevertheless, before doing this, it took a number of months to understand for itself what “Russia’s ability to resist” was, and then has already determined its position.

The USA proceeded from the danger Germany posed, first of all, to them and whether Great Britain and the USA would be able to continue to rule the world or whether Germany and Japan would take their place. They understood that a German victory in the war against the USSR would result in “a catastrophe of the first importance for England and America,” because if it established control over all of Europe and Asia, the Third Reich “would threaten the United States from both shores.” At the same time, they were also worried about the following question: “Suppose we help Russia and she defeats Hitler, who will dominate Europe..?” .

Only after calculating all the pros and cons, the American leadership decided to provide assistance to the USSR. A week after the start of hostilities on the eastern front, a special committee was created at the US State Department from representatives of various services, which prepared a small list of goods, including military ones, for export to the USSR. The Soviet side was given the opportunity to purchase materials in cash. However, red tape and bureaucratic obstacles immediately stood in the way of this undertaking, because various departments, sending applications from the USSR to each other, argued for a long time about how to get Russian gold.

US Secretary of State Harry Hopkins at a meeting with Stalin, summer 1941.

At the same time, the United States, recognizing that the Russians also defend America, considered it necessary to assure our country of their desire to help, since they also took into account the need to have a friendly Russia in the Japanese rear. To this end, US leaders began to visit Moscow. The first to arrive was Presidential Assistant Harry Hopkins, who understood the situation in the USSR and its ability to withstand Hitler. Based on an analysis of the information he received, the president became convinced “that helping the Russians is money well spent.”

In negotiations between Hopkins and Stalin at the end of July 1941, it was determined that the Red Army especially needed anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, rifles, high-octane aviation gasoline and aluminum for aircraft production. The United States assessed these requests as insignificant, but nevertheless did not rush to satisfy them. “Nearly six weeks have passed since the outbreak of war with Russia, but we have done practically nothing to deliver the necessary materials to them,” Roosevelt wrote in one document. In addition, he believed that aircraft intended for sale to the Soviet Union did not necessarily have to be the latest models, and deliveries could be of a “symbolic nature.”

Former US Secretary of the Interior G. Ickes wrote that according to the request for 3,000 bombers, only five were sent.

From June to August 1941, only 128 tons of materials purchased for cash were delivered to the USSR. It was the third month of the war, and the United States supplied us only with tools and industrial equipment purchased earlier. The situation has not changed even after several months. As G. Ickes testifies, the American leadership sought to ensure that “the Russians would transfer to us all their gold, which would be used to pay for the supply of goods until (it) was exhausted. From now on, we will apply the Lend-Lease law to Russia." In payment for supplies, the USSR also transferred strategic raw materials to the United States - manganese, chromium, asbestos, platinum, etc.

It must be assumed that England began real supplies of military materials to the Soviet Union before the United States, because on September 6, 1941, W. Churchill announced the first limited supplies to the USSR on terms similar to the American Lend-Lease.

On October 1, 1941, in Moscow, the representative of the US President A. Harriman signed the first supply protocol for a period of 9 months - until June 30, 1942. The value of imported goods was $1 billion. For payment, an interest-free loan was provided, which was supposed to begin to be repaid 5 years after the end of the war - within 10 years. On November 7, 1941, that is, four and a half months after Germany’s attack on the USSR, Roosevelt finally signed a document based on the permission adopted by Congress to extend the Lend-Lease Act to the Soviet Union.

The first deliveries from the USA date back to October 1941. That year, the USSR received $545,000 worth of various weapons and military materials, which was less than one-tenth of one percent of the total cost of American supplies to other countries. In addition, the USSR purchased goods for cash in the amount of $41 million. By the end of 1941, the United States had supplied the USSR with 204 aircraft instead of the 600 provided for under the protocol, and 182 tanks instead of 750. According to Harriman, the United States fulfilled only a quarter of its obligations under the first protocol. All this was done with the goal not so much of helping the USSR as of keeping Russia in a state of war, maintaining the front at a considerable distance from American territory with minimal human losses and minimizing direct military material costs. During the fighting near Moscow at the end of 1941, American weapons were just beginning to arrive. The front was provided with Soviet-made weapons, the production of which, after the evacuation of the country's enterprises from west to east, began to increase steadily in the summer of 1942.

In February 1942, Roosevelt advanced a second billion dollars and wanted to renegotiate the terms of the loan, and then wrote to Stalin about the planned use of American military forces. These issues were discussed in Washington during Molotov's visit to the United States in May 1942. A second protocol was prepared for one year, according to which it was initially planned to supply 8 million tons of materials. However, the president, citing the need to ensure the promised, but not opened in 1942, second front, reduced the volume of supplies to 2.5 million tons. The signed “Agreement between the USSR and the USA on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression” provided the extension of the most favored nation regime to the Soviet Union and regulated issues related to supplies. The United States abandoned the formal requirement to pay for loans and transferred Lend-Lease for the USSR to the same Lend-Lease basis as for England.

It must also be said about the quality of American equipment and its suitability for combat. Stalin, in correspondence with Roosevelt, noted that American tanks burn very easily from anti-tank rifles hitting from behind and from the side, because they run on high-grade gasoline. He also wrote that the Soviet side is ready to temporarily completely abandon the supply of tanks, artillery, ammunition, pistols and other things, but it urgently needs to increase the supply of modern fighter aircraft, but not Kittyhawk aircraft, which cannot withstand the fight against German fighters. Preference was given to Airacobra fighters, but it turned out that they often went into a tailspin, and this did not make the Americans themselves want to fly them and risk their lives. Marshal G.K. Zhukov also wrote that tanks and aircraft from the United States were not distinguished by high combat qualities.

In 1942, the following were delivered to the USSR: 2,505 aircraft, 3,023 tanks, 78,964 vehicles. 12% of the total amount of equipment sent was lost on the way to our country (this is exactly how much was sunk at sea, which is why deliveries stopped in the spring and summer). Also in 1942, the Soviet Union produced 25,436 aircraft and 24,446 tanks.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, to which the Allies’ contribution was insignificant, a radical turning point in the war came and the United States slightly increased the supply of military equipment.

In the spring of 1943, the United States and England decided to suspend the sending of convoys with cargo to the Soviet northern ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, citing preparations for an operation against Italy and a landing on its territory. As a result, by the end of the second protocol, 1.5 million tons of cargo were underdelivered. Only towards the end of November, after an eight-month break, another convoy arrived via the northern route. Thus, in the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, almost entirely domestically produced military equipment took part.

On July 1, 1943, the third protocol came into force. Canada joined in supplies to the Soviet Union, and Great Britain began to take a more active part in them. By this time, the needs of the USSR had changed somewhat. More vehicles, communications equipment, clothing, medical equipment, explosives and food were needed than tanks, guns, and ammunition.

Aid to the Soviet Union, despite a delay in mid-1943, increased overall for the year to 63% of 1942 levels.

As for the supply of food products, and some American authors, proving the decisive role of the United States in supplying the Soviet Army, focus on this, then not all was well here either. According to Roosevelt's promise, in 1943 food supplies were to account for 10% of the total amount of food produced in the United States. In the first six months of the year, food supplies to the Soviet Union accounted for only one third. It follows that the USSR received a little more than 3% of the food that was produced in the USA. Could this play an important role for such a large country as the USSR?

For 1941 -1944 Our country received 2 million 545 thousand tons of food from the USA, Canada and Great Britain under Lend-Lease. At the same time, since 1944, the Soviet Union had to feed both the western regions of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe liberated by the Soviet Army, robbed and devastated by the fascists.

However, the Soviet Union appreciated the help of the allies, especially since since the summer of 1943, American military equipment and various equipment could increasingly be seen on the fronts of the Soviet Army. American military supplies were based on increased production in the United States by that time (by 35% compared to the 1935-1939 average). Under the third protocol, in 1944, well-known and much needed trucks and other motor vehicles, various metals, machinery and equipment, fuels and lubricants, steam locomotives, rails, and wagons were supplied to the USSR.

Lend-Lease. Dodge WF32.

At the beginning of 1944, negotiations began on the contents of the fourth supply protocol. Although Roosevelt considered the USSR to be the main factor ensuring the defeat of fascism, in the United States forces that slowed down supplies and advocated a revision of relations with the Soviet Union, since the crisis in the war with Germany had been overcome, gained increasing influence. Congress feared that some of the supplied materials, machinery, and equipment could be used by our country to restore the economy after the war.

On May 2, 1945, i.e. after the death of Roosevelt (in April), a group of people in the US administration, which included, in particular, Deputy Secretary of State J. Grew and the head of the foreign economic administration L. Crowley, insisted on limiting and even ending supplies to the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the fact that the anti-Soviet-minded G. Truman became the president of the country, she reported this opinion to him. And on May 10, a decision was made to revise the policy towards the USSR, expressed in a memorandum. According to this document, supplies under Lend-Lease were permitted only for military operations against Japan. Purchases of other materials were possible only in cash. Supplies to the Soviet Union were finally stopped after the surrender of Japan in August 1945.

“This policy of change was one of many harbingers of a new period in Soviet-American relations.” Therefore, it is obviously no coincidence that in the United States a number of studies related to the end of Lend-Lease include the concept of “Cold War”.

Having interrupted deliveries under Lend-Lease, the United States signed an agreement with the USSR in October 1945 to sell previously ordered goods to it on credit. But in January 1947, the American government stopped supplies under this agreement.

Summarizing the assistance provided to our country by the United States, Great Britain and Canada, it should be noted that the share of their supplies in relation to domestic production was only about 4%. In total, during the war, 42 convoys arrived at Soviet ports, and 36 were sent from the USSR. According to American sources, which differ in indicators, for the period from October 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, 2,660 ships were sent to the USSR with a total cargo volume of 16.5- 17.5 million tons, of which 15.2-16.6 million tons were delivered to their destination (77 ships with 1.3 million tons of cargo were lost at sea). In value terms, supplies to the Soviet Union, transport costs and services amounted to 10.8-11.0 billion dollars, that is, no more than 24% of the total dollars spent by the United States on Lend-Lease assistance to all countries (more than 46 billion) . This amount is equal to approximately 13% of all US military expenditures, of which aid to the eastern front accounted for only 3.3%. During the war, the USSR received: 401.4 thousand vehicles and 2 million 599 thousand tons of petroleum products, 9.6 thousand guns (that is, about 2% of the production volume of this type of weapon in our country in the amount of 489.9 thousand artillery guns), 14-14.5 thousand aircraft (taking into account losses during transportation - about 10% of the total number, equal to 136.8 thousand aircraft produced by Soviet industry), tanks and self-propelled guns - 12.2 thousand, or 12% (according to other sources, 7 thousand, or 6.8%), against 102.5 thousand Soviet-made tanks and self-propelled guns, 422 thousand field telephones, over 15 million pairs of shoes, about 69 million m2 of woolen fabrics, 1860 steam locomotives (6.3% of the total steam locomotive fleet of the USSR), 4.3 million tons of food, which amounted to approximately 25% of the total tonnage of supplies.

“Our supplies,” admits the head of the military mission, General Dean, “may not have won the war, but they were supposed to support the Russians.”

After the end of World War II, negotiations began between the USSR and the United States to settle Lend-Lease payments, as the American government continued to seek maximum benefits in the form of payments or reimbursement of goods in kind. The administration initially valued its claims at $2.6 billion, but the following year reduced the amount to $1.3 billion. These claims showed discrimination against the Soviet Union, since, for example, Great Britain, which received twice as much aid, had to pay only $472 million, i.e., about 2% of the cost of military supplies.

Finally, on October 18, 1972, an agreement was reached to resolve the Lend-Lease issue. The Soviet Union had to pay $722 million, subject to the American side providing it with most favored nation treatment in trade with the United States, as well as export credits and guarantees. However, due to the unacceptable position for the USSR that the United States subsequently took on the agreements reached, the implementation of the agreement remains incomplete.

It must be said that the United States became greatly enriched from the war. Their national income by the end of the war was one and a half times higher than before the war. The total capacity of industrial production increased by 40% compared to 1939. The losses of the Soviet Union in that war reached 485 billion dollars (US military spending amounted to approximately 330 billion dollars).

Leskie R. The Wars of America. - New York, Evanston and London. 1968. - p. 719.
Leighton R. M. and Soakley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1940-1943. - Washington, 1955. - p. 259.
Dawson R. H. The Decision to Aid Russia 1941. - Chapel Hill, 1959. - p. 287.
The New York Times. - 1941. - June, 26. - p. 18.
Wall Street Journal. - 1941. June, 25. - p. 4.
Kimball W. F. Churchill and Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence I. Alliance Emerging. October 1933. - November 1942. - Princeton, New Jersey, 1984. - p. 226.
Ickes H.L. The Secret Diary - Vol. 3 - New York, 1954. - p. 595
Ibid. — p. 320.
Leighton R. M. and Coalley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1943-1945. - Washington, 1968. - P. 699.
Deane J.R. The Strange Alliance, - New York, 1947. - P. 95.

Supply value

Your decision, Mr. President, to provide the Soviet Union with an interest-free loan in the amount of $ 1,000,000,000 to ensure the supply of military equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union was accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude, as urgent assistance to the Soviet Union in its huge and difficult struggle against a common enemy - bloody Hitlerism.

Original text(English)

Your decision, Mr. President, to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan to the value of $1,000,000,000 to meet deliveries of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendous and onerous struggle against our common enemy-bloody Hitlerism.

The first official historical assessment of the role of Lend Lease was given by the Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nikolai Voznesensky in his book “The Military Economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War,” published in 1948:

...if we compare the size of the allies' supplies of industrial goods to the USSR with the size of industrial production at socialist enterprises of the USSR for the same period, it turns out that the share of these supplies in relation to domestic production during the war economy period will be only about 4%.

The 4% figure was published without further comment and raised many questions. In particular, it was unclear how Voznesensky and his collaborators calculated these percentages. It was difficult to estimate Soviet GDP in monetary terms due to the lack of convertibility of the ruble. If the count was based on units of production, then it is not clear how tanks were compared with airplanes, and food with aluminum.

Voznesensky himself was soon arrested in connection with the Leningrad case and executed in 1950, so he could not give any comments. Nevertheless, the figure of 4% was subsequently widely cited in the USSR as reflecting the official point of view on the significance of Lend-Lease.

The role of Lend-Lease was also highly appreciated by A. I. Mikoyan, who during the war was responsible for the work of the seven allied People's Commissariats (trade, procurement, food, fish and meat and dairy industries, maritime transport and river fleet) and, as the People's Commissar of the country's foreign trade, with 1942, in charge of receiving allied supplies under Lend-Lease:

- ... when American stew, shortening, egg powder, flour, and other products began to arrive to us, what significant additional calories our soldiers immediately received! And not only the soldiers: something also fell to the rear.

Or let's take the supply of cars. After all, we received, as far as I remember, taking into account losses along the way, about 400 thousand first-class cars for that time such as Studebaker, Ford, Willys cars and amphibians. Our entire army actually found itself on wheels, and what wheels! As a result, its maneuverability increased and the pace of the offensive increased noticeably.

Yes... - Mikoyan said thoughtfully. - Without Lend-Lease, we would probably have fought for another year and a half.

The Lend-Lease program was mutually beneficial for both the USSR (and other recipient countries) and the USA. In particular, the United States gained the necessary time to mobilize its own military-industrial complex.

Lend-Lease debts and their payment

Immediately after the war, the United States sent countries that received Lend-Lease assistance an offer to return surviving military equipment and pay off the debt in order to obtain new loans. Since the Lend-Lease Act provided for the write-off of used military equipment and materials, the Americans insisted on paying only for civilian supplies: railways, power plants, ships, trucks and other equipment that were in the recipient countries as of September 2, 1945. The United States did not demand compensation for military equipment destroyed during the battles.

Great Britain

The volume of Great Britain's debts to the United States amounted to $4.33 billion, to Canada - $1.19 billion. The last payment in the amount of $83.25 million (to the United States) and $22.7 million (Canada) was made on December 29.

China

China's debt to the United States for supplies under Lend-Lease amounted to $187 million. Since 1979, the United States has recognized the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China, and therefore the heir to all previous agreements (including supplies under Lend-Lease). However, in 1989, the United States demanded that Taiwan (not the People's Republic of China) repay the Lend-Lease debt. The further fate of the Chinese debt is unclear.

USSR (Russia)

The volume of American supplies under Lend-Lease amounted to about 11 billion US dollars. According to the Lend-Lease law, only equipment that survived the war was subject to payment; To agree on the final amount, Soviet-American negotiations began immediately after the end of the war. At the 1948 negotiations, Soviet representatives agreed to pay only a small amount and were met with a predictable refusal from the American side. The 1949 negotiations also came to nothing. In 1951, the Americans twice reduced the payment amount, which became equal to $800 million, but the Soviet side agreed to pay only $300 million. According to the Soviet government, the calculation should have been carried out not in accordance with the actual debt, but on the basis of precedent. This precedent should have been the proportions in determining the debt between the United States and Great Britain, which were fixed back in March 1946.

An agreement with the USSR on the procedure for repaying debts under Lend-Lease was concluded only in 1972. Under this agreement, the USSR agreed to pay $722 million, including interest, by 2001. By July 1973, three payments were made for a total of $48 million, after which payments were stopped due to the introduction of discriminatory measures by the American side in trade with the USSR (Jackson-Vanik Amendment). In June 1990, during negotiations between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing debt. A new deadline for final debt repayment was set - 2030, and the amount - $674 million.

Thus, out of the total volume of American deliveries under Lend-Lease of $11 billion, the USSR and then Russia paid $722 million, or about 7%.

It should be noted, however, that taking into account the inflationary depreciation of the dollar, this figure will be significantly (several times) less. Thus, by 1972, when the amount of debt for Lend-Lease in the amount of $722 million was agreed upon with the United States, the dollar had depreciated 2.3 times since 1945. However, in 1972, only $48 million was paid to the USSR, and an agreement to pay the remaining $674 million was reached in June 1990, when the purchasing power of the dollar was already 7.7 times lower than at the end of 1945. Subject to the payment of $674 million in 1990, the total volume of Soviet payments in 1945 prices amounted to about 110 million US dollars, i.e. about 1% of the total cost of Lend-Lease supplies. But most of what was supplied was either destroyed by the war, or, like shells, was spent for the needs of the war, or, at the end of the war, in accordance with the Lend-Lease law, was returned to the United States.

France

On May 28, 1946, France signed a package of agreements with the United States (the so-called Blum-Byrnes accords) that settled the French debt for supplies under Lend-Lease in exchange for a number of trade concessions from France. In particular, France has significantly increased quotas for the screening of foreign (primarily American) films on the French film market.

Notes

1. Using the example of the USSR, $11.3 billion worth of materials were received under Lend Lease, of which less than 1% was paid. The remaining 99% was received virtually free of charge - for more details, see the section Lend-Lease debts and their payment
2. Mutual Aid Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: June 11, 1942
3. For example, by refusing to supply the USSR with such acutely scarce raw materials as duralumin and tungsten, the United States supplied them to the Third Reich.
4. The recalculation was based on official inflation data in the United States for 1913-2008 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (USA)
5. "The Big "L"--American Logistics in World War II", Alan Gropman, 1997, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC
6. Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
7. “The USSR has more than once recognized the enormous importance of the equipment and materials necessary for combat operations that came from the United States with the participation of England to the Soviet Union. But in 1942, the agreed plans for these deliveries were only 55 percent fulfilled. During the most difficult time of preparation for the Kursk operation (Washington and London knew about this work), supplies were interrupted for 9 months and resumed only in September 1943. Such a long break is not a technical issue, but a political one!” (O. B. Rakhmanin,). See also .
8. Vishnevsky A. G. Sickle and ruble. Conservative modernization in the USSR. Moscow, 1998, ch. 10
9. The First Lend-Lease Protocol was signed between the USSR and the USA, in the amount of $1 billion, valid until 06/30/1942.
10. The Reichstag speech of December 11, 1941: Hitler’s declaration of war against the United States
11. http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/K/KUMANEV_Georgiy_Aleksandrovich/Govoryat_stalinskie_narkomy.(2005).%5Bdoc%5D.zip
12. Paperno A.L. Lend-Lease. Pacific Ocean. M., 1998. P. 10
13. Zaostrovtsev G. A. “Northern Convoys: Research, memories, documents”, Arkhangelsk 1991. Part 27
14. V. Zimonin “Lend-Lease: how it was,” 10/26/2006, newspaper “Red Star”
15. Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
16. Correspondence of Roosevelt and Truman with Stalin on Lend Lease and Other Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945
17. Voznesensky N. Military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. - M.: Gospolitizdat, 1948
18. Artem Krechetnikov, Franklin Roosevelt's "Garden Hose", June 29, 2007, BBCRussian.com
19. From a report from KGB Chairman V. Semichastny to N. S. Khrushchev; classified “top secret” // Zenkovich N. Ya. Marshals and general secretaries. M., 1997. pp. 161-162
20. G. Kumanev “Stalin’s People’s Commissars Speak”, p. 70 - Smolensk: Rusich, 2005
21. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
22. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
23. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
24. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
25. Federal Agency for State Reserves, “Reserves during the Great Patriotic War”
26. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
27. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
28. V. Gakov “The Green Price of Victory”, “Money” Magazine No. 23, 06/2002

“Few people know that military supplies under Lend-Lease (lend-lease) were not free at all - Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, paid the last debts on them already in 2006,” writes historian and publicist Evgeny Spitsyn.

In the issue of Lend-Lease (from English lend - to lend and lease - to rent, to rent - ed.) for the USSR, there are many subtleties that it would be nice to understand - on the basis of historical documents.

Not entirely free

The Lend-Lease Act, or "Act for the Defense of the United States", which was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, gave the President of the United States "the power to loan or lease to other states various goods and materials necessary for the conduct of war operations" if these actions, as determined by the President, were vital to the defense of the United States. Various goods and materials were understood as weapons, military equipment, ammunition, strategic raw materials, ammunition, food, civilian goods for the army and rear, as well as any information of important military importance.

The Lend-Lease scheme itself provided for the fulfillment by the recipient country of a number of conditions: 1) materials destroyed, lost or lost during hostilities were not subject to payment, and property that survived and was suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid in full or in part in order to repay a long-term loan issued by themselves USA; 2) the surviving military materials could remain with the recipient country until the United States requests them back; 3) in turn, the tenant agreed to help the United States with all the resources and information available to him.

By the way, and few people know about this either, the Lend-Lease law obliged countries that applied for American assistance to submit a comprehensive financial report to the United States. It is no coincidence that US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., during hearings in the Senate Committee, called this provision unique in all world practice: “For the first time in history, one state, one government provides another with data on its financial position.”

With the help of Lend-Lease, the administration of President F.D. Roosevelt was going to solve a number of urgent problems, both foreign policy and domestic. Firstly, such a scheme made it possible to create new jobs in the United States itself, which had not yet fully emerged from the severe economic crisis of 1929-1933. Secondly, Lend-Lease allowed the American government to have a certain influence on the recipient country of Lend-Lease assistance. Finally, thirdly, by sending his allies only weapons, materials and raw materials, but not manpower, President F.D. Roosevelt fulfilled his campaign promise: “Our guys will never participate in other people’s wars.”

The initial delivery period under Lend-Lease was set until June 30, 1943, with further annual extensions as necessary. And Roosevelt appointed the former Secretary of Commerce, his assistant Harry Hopkins, as the first administrator of this project.

And not only for the USSR

Contrary to another common misconception, the Lend-Lease system was not created for the USSR. The British were the first to ask for military assistance on the basis of special lease relations (analogous to operational leasing) at the end of May 1940, since the actual defeat of France left Great Britain without military allies on the European continent.

The British themselves, who initially requested 40-50 “old” destroyers, proposed three payment schemes: gratuitous gift, cash payment and leasing. However, Prime Minister W. Churchill was a realist and understood perfectly well that neither the first nor the second proposals would arouse enthusiasm among the Americans, since the warring England was actually on the verge of bankruptcy. Therefore, President Roosevelt quickly accepted the third option, and in the late summer of 1940 the deal went through.

Then, in the depths of the American Department of the Treasury, the idea was born to extend the experience of one private transaction to the entire sphere of all interstate relations. Having involved the War and Navy Ministries in the development of the Lend-Lease bill, the US presidential administration on January 10, 1941 submitted it for consideration by both houses of Congress, which was approved by it on March 11. Meanwhile, in September 1941, the US Congress, after long debates, approved the so-called “Victory Program”, the essence of which, according to the American military historians themselves (R. Layton, R. Coakley), was that “America’s contribution to the war will be weapons, not armies."

Immediately after President Roosevelt signed this program, his adviser and special representative Averell Harriman flew to London, and from there to Moscow, where on October 1, 1941, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov, the British Minister of Reserves and Supply Lord W.E. Beaverbrook and Presidential Special Representative A. Harriman signed the First (Moscow) Protocol, which marked the beginning of the extension of the Lend-Lease program to the Soviet Union.

Then, on June 11, 1942, the “Agreement between the governments of the USSR and the USA on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression” was signed in Washington, which finally regulated all the fundamental issues of military-technical and economic cooperation between the two main participants in the “anti-Hitler coalition” " In general, in accordance with the signed protocols, all Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR are traditionally divided into several stages:

Pre-Lend-Lease - from June 22, 1941 to September 30, 1941 (before the signing of the protocol); The first protocol - from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 (signed on October 1, 1941); Second protocol - from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943 (signed on October 6, 1942); Third Protocol - from July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944 (signed on October 19, 1943); The fourth protocol is from July 1, 1944 to September 20, 1945 (signed on April 17, 1944).

On September 2, 1945, with the signing of the act of surrender of militaristic Japan, World War II was ended, and already on September 20, 1945, all Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR were stopped.

What, where and how much

The US government never published detailed reports of what and how much was sent under the Lend-Lease program to the USSR. But according to updated data from Doctor of Historical Sciences L.V. Pozdeeva (“Anglo-American relations during the Second World War 1941-1945”, M., “Science”, 1969; “London - Moscow: British public opinion and the USSR. 1939 -1945”, M., Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999), which were extracted by her from closed American archival sources dating back to 1952, Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR were carried out along five routes:

Far East - 8,244,000 tons (47.1%); Persian Gulf - 4,160,000 tons (23.8%); Northern Russia - 3,964,000 tons (22.7%); Soviet North - 681,000 tons (3.9%); Soviet Arctic - 452,000 tons (2.5%).

His compatriot, the American historian J. Herring, wrote just as frankly that “Lend-Lease was not the most selfless act in the history of mankind... It was an act of calculated selfishness, and the Americans were always clear about the benefits that they could derive from it.”

And this was indeed the case, since Lend-Lease turned out to be an inexhaustible source of enrichment for many American corporations. After all, in fact, the only country in the anti-Hitler coalition that received significant economic benefits from the war was the United States. It is not without reason that in the United States itself, World War II is sometimes called the “good war,” which, for example, is evident from the title of the work of the famous American historian S. Terkeli “The Good War: An Oral History of World War II.” World War" (1984)). In it, he frankly, with cynicism, noted: “Almost the entire world during this war experienced terrible shocks, horrors and was almost destroyed. We came out of the war with incredible technology, tools, labor and money. For most Americans, the war turned out to be fun... I'm not talking about those unfortunate people who lost their sons and daughters. But for everyone else, it was a damn good time."

Almost all researchers of this topic unanimously say that the Lend-Lease program noticeably revived the economic situation in the United States, in the balance of payments of which Lend-Lease operations became one of the leading items during the war. To carry out deliveries under Lend-Lease, the administration of President Roosevelt began to widely use so-called “fixed profitability” contracts (cost-plus contracts), when private contractors could themselves set a certain level of income in relation to costs.

In cases where significant volumes of specialized equipment were required, the US government acted as the lessor, purchasing all the necessary equipment for subsequent leasing.

Only numbers

Of course, supplies under Lend-Lease brought victory over the enemy closer. But here are some real numbers that speak for themselves.

For example, during the war, more than 29.1 million units of small arms of all main types were produced at the enterprises of the Soviet Union, while only about 152 thousand units of small arms were supplied to the Red Army from American, British and Canadian factories. that is 0.5%. A similar picture was observed for all types of artillery systems of all calibers - 647.6 thousand Soviet guns and mortars against 9.4 thousand foreign ones, which was less than 1.5% of their total number.

For other types of weapons, the picture was somewhat different, but also not so “optimistic”: for tanks and self-propelled guns, the ratio of domestic and allied vehicles was, respectively, 132.8 thousand and 11.9 thousand (8.96%), and for combat aircraft - 140.5 thousand and 18.3 thousand (13%).

And one more thing: out of almost 46 billion dollars, which all Lend-Lease aid cost, for the Red Army, which defeated the lion's share of the divisions of Germany and its military satellites, the United States allocated only 9.1 billion dollars, that is, a little more than one-fifth of the funds .

At the same time, the British Empire received more than 30.2 billion, France - 1.4 billion, China - 630 million, and even the countries of Latin America (!) received 420 million. In total, 42 countries received supplies under the Lend-Lease program.

It must be said that recently total supplies under Lend-Lease have begun to be assessed somewhat differently, but this does not change the essence of the overall picture. Here are the updated data: out of 50 billion dollars, almost 31.5 billion were spent on supplies to the UK, 11.3 billion to the USSR, 3.2 billion to France and 1.6 billion to China .

But perhaps, given the overall insignificance of the volume of overseas assistance, it played a decisive role precisely in 1941, when the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad, and when there were only some 25-40 km left before the victorious march across Red Square?

Let's look at the statistics on arms supplies for this year. From the beginning of the war to the end of 1941, the Red Army received 1.76 million rifles, machine guns and machine guns, 53.7 thousand guns and mortars, 5.4 thousand tanks and 8.2 thousand combat aircraft. Of these, our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition supplied only 82 artillery pieces (0.15%), 648 tanks (12.14%) and 915 aircraft (10.26%). Moreover, a fair portion of the military equipment sent, in particular 115 of the 466 English-made tanks, never reached the front in the first year of the war.

If we translate these supplies of weapons and military equipment into monetary equivalent, then, according to the famous historian, Doctor of Science M.I. Frolov (“Vain attempts: against belittling the role of the USSR in the defeat of Nazi Germany,” Lenizdat, 1986; “The Great Patriotic War of 1941 -1945 in German historiography", SP, LTA publishing house, 1994), which for many years successfully and worthily polemicized with German historians (W. Schwabedissen, K. Uebe), "until the end of 1941 - at the very a difficult period for the Soviet state - materials worth 545 thousand dollars were sent to the USSR under Lend-Lease from the USA, with the total cost of American supplies to the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition being 741 million dollars. That is, less than 0.1% of American aid was received by the Soviet Union during this difficult period.

In addition, the first deliveries under Lend-Lease in the winter of 1941-1942 reached the USSR very late, and in these critical months the Russians, and the Russians alone, offered real resistance to the German aggressor on their own soil and with their own means, without receiving any significant assistance from Western democracies. By the end of 1942, the agreed supply programs to the USSR were completed by the Americans and British by 55%. In 1941-1942, only 7% of the cargo sent from the United States during the war years arrived in the USSR. The main amount of weapons and other materials was received by the Soviet Union in 1944-1945, after a radical turning point in the course of the war.”

Part II

Now let's see what the fighting vehicles of the allied countries that were originally part of the Lend-Lease program were like.

Of the 711 fighters that arrived from England to the USSR before the end of 1941, 700 were hopelessly outdated machines such as the Kittyhawk, Tomahawk and Hurricane, which were significantly inferior to the German Messerschmitt and the Soviet Yak in speed and maneuverability and not They even had cannon weapons. Even if a Soviet pilot managed to catch an enemy ace in his machine gun sight, their rifle-caliber machine guns often turned out to be completely powerless against the rather strong armor of German aircraft. As for the newest Airacobra fighters, only 11 of them were delivered in 1941. Moreover, the first Airacobra arrived in the Soviet Union in disassembled form, without any documentation and with a fully exhausted engine life.

This, by the way, also applies to two squadrons of Hurricane fighters, armed with 40-mm tank guns to combat enemy armored vehicles. The attack aircraft made from these fighters turned out to be completely worthless, and they stood idle in the USSR throughout the war, since there were simply no people willing to fly them in the Red Army.

A similar picture was observed with the vaunted English armored vehicles - the light tank "Valentine", which Soviet tankers dubbed "Valentina", and the medium tank "Matilda", which the same tankers called even more harshly - "Farewell, Motherland", Thin armor, fire-hazardous carburetor engines and antediluvian transmission made them easy prey for German artillery and grenade launchers.

According to the authoritative testimony of V.M. Molotov’s personal assistant V.M. Berezhkov, who, as a translator for I.V. Stalin, participated in all negotiations of the Soviet leadership with Anglo-American visitors, Stalin was often indignant that, for example, the British supplied land -lized obsolete Hurricane-type aircraft and avoided deliveries of the latest Spitfire fighters. Moreover, in September 1942, in a conversation with the leader of the US Republican Party, W. Wilkie, in the presence of the American and British ambassadors and W. Standley and A. Clark Kerr, the Supreme Commander directly posed the question to him: why did the British and American governments supply the Soviet Union low-quality materials?

And he explained that we are talking, first of all, about the supply of American P-40 aircraft instead of the much more modern Airacobra, and that the British are supplying worthless Hurricane aircraft, which are much worse than the German ones. There was a case, Stalin added, when the Americans were going to supply the Soviet Union with 150 Airacobras, but the British intervened and kept them for themselves. “The Soviet people... know very well that both the Americans and the British have aircraft of equal or even better quality than German machines, but for unknown reasons some of these aircraft are not delivered to the Soviet Union.”

The American ambassador, Admiral Standley, had no information on this matter, and the British ambassador, Archibald Clark Kerr, admitted that he was aware of the matter with the Airacobras, but began to justify their sending to another place by the fact that these 150 vehicles in the hands of the British would bring “much more benefit to the common cause of the Allies than if they had ended up in the Soviet Union.”

Wait three years for the promised one?

The United States promised to send 600 tanks and 750 aircraft in 1941, but sent only 182 and 204, respectively.

The same story repeated itself in 1942: if Soviet industry produced that year more than 5.9 million small arms, 287 thousand guns and mortars, 24.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 21.7 thousand aircraft, then under Lend-Lease in January-October 1942, only 61 thousand small arms, 532 guns and mortars, 2703 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1695 aircraft were delivered.

Moreover, since November 1942, i.e. in the midst of the battle for the Caucasus and Stalingrad and the conduct of Operation Mars on the Rzhev salient, the supply of weapons almost completely ceased. According to historians (M.N. Suprun “Lend-Lease and Northern Convoys, 1941-1945”, M., St. Andrew’s Flag Publishing House, 1997), these interruptions began already in the summer of 1942, when German aviation and The submarines destroyed the notorious Caravan PQ-17, abandoned (by order of the Admiralty) by British escort ships. The result was disastrous: only 11 out of 35 ships reached Soviet ports, which was used as an excuse to suspend the departure of the next convoy, which sailed from British shores only in September 1942.

The new PQ-18 Caravan lost 10 out of 37 transports on the road, and the next convoy was sent only in mid-December 1942. Thus, in 3.5 months, when the decisive battle of the entire Second World War was taking place on the Volga, less than 40 ships with Lend-Lease cargo arrived individually in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. In connection with this circumstance, many had a legitimate suspicion that in London and Washington all this time they were simply waiting to see in whose favor the battle of Stalingrad would end.

Meanwhile, since March 1942, i.e. just six months after the evacuation of more than 10 thousand industrial enterprises from the European part of the USSR, military production began to grow, which by the end of this year exceeded pre-war figures five times (!). Moreover, it should be noted that 86% of the entire workforce were old people, women and children. It was they who in 1942-1945 gave the Soviet army 102.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 125.6 thousand aircraft, more than 780 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, etc.

Not just weapons. And not only allies...

Supplies not related to the main types of weapons were also supplied under Lend-Lease. And here the numbers turn out to be really solid. In particular, we received 2,586 thousand tons of aviation gasoline, which amounted to 37% of what was produced in the USSR during the war, and almost 410 thousand cars, i.e. 45% of all vehicles of the Red Army (excluding captured vehicles). Food supplies also played a significant role, although during the first year of the war they were extremely insignificant, and in total the United States supplied approximately 15% of meat and other canned goods.

And there were also machine tools, rails, locomotives, carriages, radars and other useful equipment, without which you couldn’t fight much.

Of course, having familiarized yourself with this impressive list of Lend-Lease supplies, one could sincerely admire the American partners in the anti-Hitler coalition,” if not for one nuance: At the same time, American industrial corporations also supplied supplies to Nazi Germany...

For example, the Standard Oil oil corporation, owned by John Rockefeller Jr., sold $20 million worth of gasoline and lubricants to Berlin through the German concern I.G. Farbenindustry alone. And the Venezuelan branch of the same company monthly sent 13 thousand tons of crude oil to Germany, which the powerful chemical industry of the Third Reich immediately processed into first-class gasoline. Moreover, the matter was not limited to precious fuel, and the Germans from overseas received tungsten, synthetic rubber and a lot of different components for the automotive industry, which the German Fuhrer was supplied with by his old friend Henry Ford Sr. In particular, it is well known that 30% of all tires manufactured at its factories were supplied to the German Wehrmacht.

As for the total volume of Ford-Rockefeller supplies to Nazi Germany, there is still no complete information on this matter, since this is a strictly trade secret, but even the little that has become known to the public and historians makes it possible to understand that trade with Berlin in those years was by no means did not calm down.

Lend-Lease is not charity

There is a version that Lend-Lease assistance from the United States was almost of a charitable nature. However, upon closer examination, this version does not stand up to criticism. First of all, because already during the war, within the framework of the so-called “reverse Lend-Lease,” Washington received the necessary raw materials with a total value of almost 20% of the transferred materials and weapons. In particular, 32 thousand tons of manganese and 300 thousand tons of chrome ore were sent from the USSR, the importance of which in the military industry was extremely great. Suffice it to say that when, during the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog offensive operation of the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts in February 1944, German industry was deprived of Nikopol manganese, the 150-mm frontal armor of the German “Royal Tigers” began to withstand the blow of Soviet artillery shells where worse than the similar 100 mm armor plate that was previously installed on conventional Tigers.

In addition, the USSR paid for allied supplies in gold. Thus, only one British cruiser Edinburgh, which was sunk by German submarines in May 1942, contained 5.5 tons of precious metal.

A significant part of the weapons and military equipment, as expected under the Lend-Lease agreement, was returned by the Soviet Union at the end of the war. Having received in return a bill for the round sum of $1,300 million. Against the backdrop of writing off Lend-Lease debts to other powers, this looked like outright robbery, so J.V. Stalin demanded that the “allied debt” be recalculated.

Subsequently, the Americans were forced to admit that they were mistaken, but added interest to the final amount, and the final amount, taking into account these interests, recognized by the USSR and the USA under the Washington Agreement in 1972, amounted to 722 million greenbacks. Of these, 48 million were paid to the United States under L.I. Brezhnev, in three equal payments in 1973, after which payments were stopped due to the introduction of discriminatory measures by the American side in trade with the USSR (in particular, the notorious “Jackson-Vanik Amendment” - author).

Only in June 1990, during new negotiations between Presidents George W. Bush and M.S. Gorbachev, the parties returned to discussing the Lend-Lease debt, during which a new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was established - 2030, and the remaining amount of the debt — 674 million dollars.

After the collapse of the USSR, its debts were technically divided into debts to governments (Paris Club) and debts to private banks (London Club). The Lend-Lease debt was a debt obligation to the US government, that is, part of the debt to the Paris Club, which Russia fully repaid in August 2006.

According to my own estimates

US President F.D. Roosevelt directly said that “helping the Russians is money well spent,” and his successor in the White House, G. Truman, back in June 1941, on the pages of the New York Times, stated: “If we see, that Germany wins, we must help Russia, and if Russia wins, we must help Germany, and thus let them kill each other as much as possible”...

The first official assessment of the role of Lend-Lease in the overall victory over Nazism, which was then replicated in different interpretations in many encyclopedias and scientific works, was given by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky, who in the work “War Economy” USSR during the Patriotic War" (M., Gospolitizdat, 1948) wrote: "If we compare the size of the allies' supplies of industrial goods to the USSR with the size of industrial production at socialist enterprises of the USSR, it turns out that the share of these supplies in relation to domestic production in the period of the war economy will be only about 4%.”

American scientists, military men and officials themselves (R. Goldsmith, J. Herring, R. Jones) admit that “all allied assistance to the USSR did not exceed 1/10 of Soviet arms production,” and the total volume of Lend-Lease supplies, taking into account the famous American stewed meat “Second Front”, amounted to about 10-11%.

Moreover, the famous American historian R. Sherwood in his famous two-volume book “Roosevelt and Hopkins. Through the Eyes of an Eyewitness" (Moscow, "Foreign Literature", 1958), written at the height of the Cold War, quoted Harry Hopkins, who said that "the Americans never believed that Lend-Lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler at Eastern Front. The victory was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army."

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