The beginning of the Stalingrad defensive operation. Liberation of Stalingrad

The victory of Soviet troops over the Nazi troops at Stalingrad is one of the most glorious pages in the annals of the Great Patriotic War. For 200 days and nights - from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943 - the Battle of Stalingrad continued with continuously increasing tension on both sides. During the first four months there were stubborn defensive battles, first in the big bend of the Don, and then on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the city itself. During this period, Soviet troops exhausted the Nazi group that was rushing to the Volga and forced it to go on the defensive. In the next two and a half months, the Red Army, launching a counteroffensive, defeated enemy troops north-west and south of Stalingrad, encircled and liquidated a 300,000-strong group of Nazi troops.

The Battle of Stalingrad is the decisive battle of the entire Second World War, in which Soviet troops won their largest victory. This battle marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole. The victorious offensive of the Nazi troops ended and their expulsion from the territory of the Soviet Union began.

The Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all battles in world history at that time in terms of the duration and ferocity of the fighting, the number of people and military equipment involved. It unfolded over a vast territory of 100 thousand square kilometers. At certain stages, over 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, and up to 26 thousand guns took part in it on both sides. The results of this battle also surpassed all previous ones. At Stalingrad, Soviet troops defeated five armies: two German, two Romanian and one Italian. The Nazi troops lost more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded, and captured, as well as a large amount of military equipment, weapons and equipment.

The Battle of Stalingrad is usually divided into two inextricably linked periods: defensive (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and offensive (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943).

At the same time, due to the fact that the Battle of Stalingrad is a whole complex of defensive and offensive operations, its periods, in turn, must be considered in stages, each of which is either one completed or even several interrelated operations.

For the courage and heroism shown in the Battle of Stalingrad, 32 formations and units were given the honorary names “Stalingrad”, 5 - “Don”. 55 formations and units were awarded orders. 183 units, formations and formations were converted into guards. More than one hundred and twenty soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, about 760 thousand participants in the battle were awarded the medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad.” On the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, the hero city of Volgograd was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

The Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all battles in world history at that time in terms of the duration and ferocity of the fighting, the number of people and military equipment involved.

At certain stages, over 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, and up to 26 thousand guns took part in it on both sides. The Nazi troops lost more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded, and captured, as well as a large amount of military equipment, weapons and equipment.

Defense of Stalingrad (now Volgograd)

In accordance with the plan for the summer offensive campaign of 1942, the German command, concentrating large forces in the southwestern direction, hoped to defeat Soviet troops, enter the Great Bend of the Don, immediately capture Stalingrad and capture the Caucasus, and then resume the offensive in the Moscow direction.

For the attack on Stalingrad, the 6th Army was allocated from Army Group B (commander - Colonel General F. von Paulus). By July 17, it included 13 divisions, which included about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. They were supported by aviation from the 4th Air Fleet - up to 1,200 combat aircraft.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command moved the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from its reserve to the Stalingrad direction. On July 12, on the basis of the field command of the troops of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko. On July 23, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov was appointed commander of the front. The front also included the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasus Front. At the same time, the 57th, as well as the 38th and 28th armies, on the basis of which the 1st and 4th tank armies were formed, were in reserve. The Volga military flotilla was subordinate to the front commander.

The newly created front began to carry out the task with only 12 divisions, in which there were 160 thousand soldiers and commanders, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars and about 400 tanks; the 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft.

In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 air defense fighters were involved. In the initial period of defensive operations near Stalingrad, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops in personnel by 1.7 times, in artillery and tanks by 1.3 times, and in the number of aircraft by more than 2 times.

On July 14, 1942, Stalingrad was declared under martial law. On the approaches to the city, four defensive contours were built: external, middle, internal and urban. The entire population, including children, was mobilized to build defensive structures. The factories of Stalingrad completely switched to the production of military products. Militia units and workers' self-defense units were created in factories and enterprises. Civilians, equipment of individual enterprises and material assets were evacuated to the left bank of the Volga.

Defensive battles began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. The main efforts of the troops of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where the 62nd and 64th armies occupied the defense in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the river and breaking through by the shortest route to Stalingrad. From July 17, the forward detachments of these armies fought defensive battles for 6 days at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers. This allowed us to gain time to strengthen the defense on the main line. Despite the steadfastness, courage and tenacity shown by the troops, the armies of the Stalingrad Front were unable to defeat the invading enemy groups, and they had to retreat to the near approaches to the city.

On July 23-29, the 6th German Army attempted to encircle the flanks of the Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don, reach the Kalach area and break through to Stalingrad from the west. As a result of the stubborn defense of the 62nd and 64th armies and a counterattack by formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the enemy's plan was thwarted.

Defense of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

On July 31, the German command turned the 4th Panzer Army Colonel General G. Goth from the Caucasian to the Stalingrad direction. On August 2, its advanced units reached Kotelnikovsky, creating the threat of a breakthrough to the city. Fighting began on the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad.

To facilitate the control of troops stretched over a 500 km zone, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on August 7 formed a new one from several armies of the Stalingrad Front - the South-Eastern Front, the command of which was entrusted to Colonel General A. I. Eremenko. The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were directed towards the fight against the 6th German Army, which was attacking Stalingrad from the west and north-west, and the South-Eastern Front - towards the defense of the south-western direction. On August 9-10, troops of the South-Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the 4th Tank Army and forced it to stop.

On August 21, the infantry of the German 6th Army crossed the Don and built bridges, after which the tank divisions moved to Stalingrad. At the same time, Hoth's tanks began attacking from the south and southwest. 23 August 4th Air Army von Richthofen subjected the city to a massive bombardment, dropping more than 1,000 tons of bombs on the city.

Tank formations of the 6th Army moved towards the city, meeting almost no resistance, but in the Gumrak area they had to overcome the positions of anti-aircraft gun crews that had been deployed to fight the tanks until the evening. Nevertheless, on August 23, the 14th Tank Corps of the 6th Army managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad near the village of Latoshinka. The enemy wanted to immediately break into the city through its northern outskirts, but along with army units, militia units, Stalingrad police, the 10th division of the NKVD troops, sailors of the Volga military flotilla, and cadets of military schools stood up to defend the city.

The enemy's breakthrough to the Volga further complicated and worsened the position of the units defending the city. The Soviet command took measures to destroy the enemy group that had broken through to the Volga. Until September 10, the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the Headquarters reserves transferred to it launched continuous counterattacks from the north-west on the left flank of the 6th German Army. It was not possible to push the enemy back from the Volga, but the enemy offensive on the northwestern approaches to Stalingrad was suspended. The 62nd Army found itself cut off from the rest of the troops of the Stalingrad Front and was transferred to the South-Eastern Front.

From September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, the command of which was taken by General V.I. Chuikov, and troops of the 64th Army General M.S. Shumilov. On the same day, German troops, after another bombing, began an attack on the city from all directions. In the north, the main target was Mamayev Kurgan, from the height of which the crossing of the Volga was clearly visible; in the center, German infantry was making its way to the railway station; in the south, Hoth’s tanks, with the support of infantry, were gradually moving towards the elevator.

On September 13, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 13th Guards Rifle Division to the city. Having crossed the Volga for two nights, the guards pushed back German troops from the area of ​​the central crossing across the Volga and cleared many streets and neighborhoods of them. On September 16, troops of the 62nd Army, supported by aviation, stormed Mamaev Kurgan. Fierce battles for the southern and central parts of the city continued until the end of the month.

On September 21, at the front from Mamayev Kurgan to the Zatsaritsyn part of the city, the Germans launched a new offensive with five divisions. A day later, on September 22, the 62nd Army was cut into two parts: the Germans reached the central crossing north of the Tsaritsa River. From here they had the opportunity to view almost the entire rear of the army and conduct an offensive along the coast, cutting off Soviet units from the river.

By September 26, the Germans managed to come close to the Volga in almost all areas. Nevertheless, Soviet troops continued to hold a narrow strip of the coast, and in some places even individual buildings at some distance from the embankment. Many objects changed hands many times.

The fighting in the city became protracted. Paulus’s troops lacked the strength to finally throw the city’s defenders into the Volga, and the Soviet troops lacked the strength to drive the Germans out of their positions.

The fight was fought for each building, and sometimes for part of the building, floor or basement. Snipers were actively working. The use of aviation and artillery became almost impossible due to the proximity of enemy formations.

From September 27 to October 4, active hostilities were carried out on the northern outskirts for the villages of the Red October and Barricades factories, and from October 4 - for these factories themselves.

At the same time, the Germans launched an attack in the center on Mamayev Kurgan and on the extreme right flank of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area. By the evening of September 27, Mamayev Kurgan fell. An extremely difficult situation developed in the area of ​​the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, from where Soviet units, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food and having lost control, began to cross to the left bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army responded with counterattacks from newly arriving reserves.

They were rapidly melting, however, the losses of the 6th Army were taking on catastrophic proportions.

It included almost all the armies of the Stalingrad Front, except the 62nd. The commander was appointed General K.K. Rokossovsky. From the South-Eastern Front, whose troops fought in the city and to the south, the Stalingrad Front was formed under the command of General A.I. Eremenko. Each front reported directly to Headquarters.

Commander of the Don Front Konstantin Rokossovsky and General Pavel Batov (right) in a trench near Stalingrad. Reproduction of a photograph. Photo: RIA Novosti

By the end of the first ten days of October, enemy attacks began to weaken, but in the middle of the month Paulus launched a new assault. On October 14, German troops, after powerful air and artillery preparation, went on the attack again.

Several divisions were advancing on an area of ​​about 5 km. This enemy offensive, which lasted almost three weeks, led to the most fierce battle in the city.

On October 15, the Germans managed to capture the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and break through to the Volga, cutting the 62nd Army in half. After this, they began an offensive along the Volga bank to the south. On October 17, the 138th Division arrived in the army to support Chuikov’s weakened formations. Fresh forces repulsed enemy attacks, and from October 18, Paulus's ram began to noticeably lose its power.

To ease the situation of the 62nd Army, on October 19, troops of the Don Front went on the offensive from the area north of the city. The territorial success of the flank counterattacks was insignificant, but they delayed the regrouping undertaken by Paulus.

By the end of October, the offensive actions of the 6th Army had slowed down, although in the area between the Barrikady and Red October factories there was no more than 400 m to go to the Volga. Nevertheless, the tension of the fighting eased, and the Germans mostly consolidated the captured positions.

On November 11, the last attempt was made to capture the city. This time the offensive was carried out by five infantry and two tank divisions, reinforced by fresh sapper battalions. The Germans managed to capture another section of the coast 500-600 m long in the area of ​​the Barricades plant, but this was the last success of the 6th Army.

In other areas, Chuikov’s troops held their positions.

The advance of German troops in the Stalingrad direction was finally stopped.

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Barricades plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center. The 64th Army defended the approaches.

During the period of defensive battles for Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet data, lost up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1,000 tanks, over 2,000 guns and mortars, and more than 1,400 aircraft in July - November. The total losses of the Red Army in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 643,842 people, 1,426 tanks, 12,137 guns and mortars, and 2,063 aircraft.

Soviet troops exhausted and bled the enemy group operating near Stalingrad, which created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive.

Stalingrad offensive operation

By the fall of 1942, the technical re-equipment of the Red Army was basically completed. At factories located deep in the rear and evacuated, mass production of new military equipment was established, which was not only not inferior, but often superior to the equipment and weapons of the Wehrmacht. During the past battles, Soviet troops gained combat experience. The moment came when it was necessary to wrest the initiative from the enemy and begin their mass expulsion from the borders of the Soviet Union.

With the participation of the military councils of the fronts at Headquarters, a plan for the Stalingrad offensive operation was developed.

Soviet troops had to launch a decisive counter-offensive on a front of 400 km, encircle and destroy the enemy strike force concentrated in the Stalingrad area. This task was entrusted to the troops of three fronts - Southwestern ( Commander General N.F. Vatutin), Donskoy ( Commander General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad ( Commander General A. I. Eremenko).

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, although the Soviet troops already had a slight superiority over the enemy in tanks, artillery and aviation. In such conditions, for the successful completion of the operation, it was necessary to create a significant superiority in forces in the directions of the main attacks, which was achieved with great skill. Success was ensured primarily due to the fact that special attention was paid to operational camouflage. The troops moved to the given positions only at night, while the radio points of the units remained in the same places, continuing to work, so that the enemy would have the impression that the units remained in the same positions. All correspondence was prohibited, and orders were given only orally, and only to the immediate executors.

The Soviet command concentrated more than a million people on the main attack in a 60 km sector, supported by 900 T-34 tanks fresh from the production line. Such a concentration of military equipment at the front has never happened before.

One of the centers of battles in Stalingrad was the elevator. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The German command did not show due attention to the position of its Army Group B, because... expected an offensive by Soviet troops against Army Group Center.

Commander of Group B, General Weichs did not agree with this opinion. He was concerned about the bridgehead prepared by the enemy on the right bank of the Don opposite his formations. At his urgent request, by the end of October, several newly formed Luftwaffe field units were transferred to the Don to strengthen the defensive positions of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian formations.

Weichs' predictions were confirmed in early November when aerial photographs showed several new crossings in the area. Two days later, Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer and two infantry divisions to be transferred from the English Channel to Army Group B as reserve reinforcements for the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies. It took about five weeks to prepare them and transport them to Russia. Hitler, however, did not expect any significant action from the enemy until early December, so, according to his calculations, reinforcements should have arrived on time.

By the second week of November, with the appearance of Soviet tank units on the bridgehead, Weichs no longer doubted that a major offensive was being prepared in the zone of the 3rd Romanian Army, which, possibly, would be directed against the German 4th Panzer Army. Since all his reserves were at Stalingrad, Weichs decided to form a new group within the 48th Panzer Corps, which he placed behind the Romanian 3rd Army. He also transferred the 3rd Romanian Armored Division to this corps and was going to transfer the 29th Motorized Division of the 4th Panzer Army to the same corps, but changed his mind because he expected an offensive also in the area where the Gotha formations were located. However, all the efforts made by Weichs turned out to be clearly insufficient, and the High Command was more interested in increasing the power of the 6th Army for the decisive battle for Stalingrad, rather than in strengthening the weak flanks of General Weichs' formations.

On November 19, at 8:50 a.m., after a powerful, almost one and a half hour artillery preparation, despite fog and heavy snowfall, the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts, located northwest of Stalingrad, went on the offensive. The 5th Tank, 1st Guards and 21st Armies acted against the 3rd Romanian Army.

The 5th Tank Army alone consisted of six rifle divisions, two tank corps, one cavalry corps and several artillery, aviation and anti-aircraft missile regiments. Due to the sharp deterioration of weather conditions, aviation was inactive.

It also turned out that during the artillery barrage, the enemy’s fire weapons were not completely suppressed, which is why the advance of the Soviet troops at some point slowed down. Having assessed the situation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, decided to introduce tank corps into the battle, which made it possible to finally break into the Romanian defenses and develop the offensive.

On the Don Front, especially fierce battles took place in the offensive zone of the right-flank formations of the 65th Army. The first two lines of enemy trenches, running along the coastal hills, were captured on the move. However, the decisive battles took place over the third line, which ran along the chalk heights. They represented a powerful defense unit. The location of the heights made it possible to bombard all approaches to them with crossfire. All the hollows and steep slopes of the heights were mined and covered with wire fences, and the approaches to them were crossed by deep and winding ravines. The Soviet infantry that reached this line was forced to lie down under heavy fire from dismounted units of the Romanian cavalry division, reinforced by German units.

The enemy carried out fierce counterattacks, trying to push the attackers back to their original position. It was not possible to bypass the heights at that moment, and after a powerful artillery attack, the soldiers of the 304th Infantry Division launched an assault on enemy fortifications. Despite hurricane machine-gun and machine gun fire, by 16:00 the enemy's stubborn resistance was broken.

As a result of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved the greatest successes. They broke through the defenses in two areas: southwest of the city of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. A gap up to 16 km wide opened in the enemy defenses.

On November 20, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive south of Stalingrad. This came as a complete surprise to the Germans. The offensive of the Stalingrad Front also began in unfavorable weather conditions.

It was decided to begin artillery training in each army as soon as the necessary conditions for this were created. It was necessary to abandon its simultaneous implementation on a front-line scale, however, as well as aviation training. Due to limited visibility, it was necessary to fire at unobservable targets, with the exception of those guns that were deployed for direct fire. Despite this, the enemy's fire system was largely disrupted.

Soviet soldiers are fighting in the streets. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

After artillery preparation, which lasted 40-75 minutes, formations of the 51st and 57th armies went on the offensive.

Having broken through the defenses of the 4th Romanian Army and repelled numerous counterattacks, they began to develop their success in a western direction. By mid-day, conditions had been created for introducing army mobile groups into the breakthrough.

Rifle formations of the armies advanced after the mobile groups, consolidating the success achieved.

To close the gap, the command of the 4th Romanian Army had to bring its last reserve into the battle - two regiments of the 8th Cavalry Division. But this could not save the situation. The front collapsed, and the remnants of the Romanian troops fled.

The messages received painted a bleak picture: the front was cut, the Romanians were fleeing the battlefield, and the counterattack of the 48th Tank Corps was thwarted.

The Red Army went on the offensive south of Stalingrad, and the 4th Romanian Army defending there was defeated.

The Luftwaffe command reported that due to bad weather, aviation could not support ground troops. On the operational maps, the prospect of encircling the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht clearly emerged. The red arrows of the attacks of the Soviet troops hung dangerously over its flanks and were about to close in between the Volga and Don rivers. During almost continuous meetings at Hitler's headquarters, there was a feverish search for a way out of the current situation. It was urgent to make a decision about the fate of the 6th Army. Hitler himself, as well as Keitel and Jodl, considered it necessary to hold positions in the Stalingrad area and limit ourselves only to a regrouping of forces. The OKH leadership and the command of Army Group B found the only way to avoid disaster was to withdraw the troops of the 6th Army beyond the Don. However, Hitler's position was categorical. As a result, it was decided to transfer two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to Stalingrad.

The Wehrmacht command still hoped to stop the advance of the Soviet troops with counterattacks from tank formations. The 6th Army received orders to remain in its original location. Hitler assured her command that he would not allow the army to be encircled, and if this did happen, he would take all measures to relieve the blockade.

While the German command was looking for ways to prevent the impending catastrophe, Soviet troops were building on the success they had achieved. During a daring night operation, a unit of the 26th Tank Corps managed to capture the only surviving crossing across the Don near the city of Kalach. The capture of this bridge was of enormous operational significance. The rapid overcoming of this major water barrier by Soviet troops ensured the successful completion of the operation to encircle enemy troops at Stalingrad.

By the end of November 22, the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts were separated by only 20-25 km. On the evening of November 22, Stalin ordered the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Eremenko, to link up tomorrow with the advanced troops of the Southwestern Front, which had reached Kalach, and close the encirclement.

Anticipating such a development of events and in order to prevent the complete encirclement of the 6th Field Army, the German command urgently transferred the 14th Tank Corps to the area east of Kalach. Throughout the night of November 23 and the first half of the next day, units of the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps held back the onslaught of enemy tank units rushing south and did not let them through.

The commander of the 6th Army already at 18:00 on November 22 radioed to the headquarters of Army Group B that the army was surrounded, the ammunition situation was critical, fuel reserves were running out, and there would only be enough food for 12 days. Since the Wehrmacht command on the Don did not have any forces that could relieve the encircled army, Paulus turned to Headquarters with a request for an independent breakthrough from the encirclement. However, his request remained unanswered.

Red Army soldier with a banner. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Instead, he received orders to immediately head to the cauldron, where he would organize a perimeter defense and wait for outside help.

On November 23, troops from all three fronts continued their offensive. On this day the operation reached its culmination.

Two brigades of the 26th Tank Corps crossed the Don and launched an attack on Kalach in the morning. A stubborn battle ensued. The enemy resisted fiercely, realizing the importance of holding this city. Nevertheless, by 2 p.m. he was driven out of Kalach, where the main supply base for the entire Stalingrad group was located. All the numerous warehouses with fuel, ammunition, food and other military equipment located there were either destroyed by the Germans themselves or captured by Soviet troops.

At about 16:00 on November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts met in the Sovetsky area, thus completing the encirclement of the enemy’s Stalingrad group. Despite the fact that instead of the planned two or three days, the operation took five days to complete, success was achieved.

A depressing atmosphere reigned at Hitler's headquarters after the news of the encirclement of the 6th Army arrived. Despite the obviously catastrophic situation of the 6th Army, Hitler did not even want to hear about the abandonment of Stalingrad, because... in this case, all the successes of the summer offensive in the south would have been nullified, and with them all hopes of conquering the Caucasus would have disappeared. In addition, it was believed that a battle with superior forces of Soviet troops in an open field, in harsh winter conditions, with limited means of transportation, fuel supplies and ammunition, had too little chance of a favorable outcome. Therefore, it is better to gain a foothold in your positions and strive to unblock the group. This point of view was supported by the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Reichsmarschall G. Goering, who assured the Fuhrer that his aircraft would provide supplies to the encircled group by air. On the morning of November 24, the 6th Army was ordered to take up a perimeter defense and wait for a relief attack from the outside.

Violent passions also flared up at the headquarters of the 6th Army on November 23. The encirclement ring around the 6th Army had just closed, and a decision had to be made urgently. There was still no response to Paulus’s radiogram, in which he requested “freedom of action.” But Paulus did not dare to take responsibility for the breakthrough. By his order, corps commanders gathered for a meeting at army headquarters to develop a plan for further action.

Commander of the 51st Army Corps General W. Seydlitz-Kurzbach spoke in favor of an immediate breakthrough. He was supported by the commander of the 14th Tank Corps General G. Hube.

But the majority of corps commanders, led by the Chief of Army Staff General A. Schmidt spoke out against. Things got to the point that during the heated argument, the commander of the 8th Army Corps, who became enraged, General W. Geitz threatened to shoot Seydlitz himself if he insisted on disobeying the Fuhrer. In the end, everyone agreed that they should approach Hitler for permission to break through. At 23:45, such a radiogram was sent. The answer came the next morning. In it, the troops of the 6th Army, surrounded in Stalingrad, were called “troops of the Stalingrad fortress”, and a breakthrough was denied. Paulus again gathered the corps commanders and conveyed the Fuhrer's order to them.

Some of the generals tried to express their counterarguments, but the army commander rejected all objections.

An urgent transfer of troops from Stalingrad began to the western sector of the front. In a short time, the enemy managed to create a group of six divisions. To pin down his forces in Stalingrad itself, on November 23, the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov went on the offensive. Its troops attacked the Germans at Mamayev Kurgan and in the area of ​​the Red October plant, but met fierce resistance. The depth of their advance during the day did not exceed 100-200 m.

By November 24, the encirclement ring was thin, an attempt to break through it could bring success, it was only necessary to remove troops from the Volga Front. But Paulus was too cautious and indecisive a man, a general who was used to obeying and carefully weighing his actions. He obeyed the order. He subsequently admitted to his staff officers: “It is possible that the daredevil Reichenau after November 19, he would have made his way to the west with the 6th Army and then told Hitler: “Now you can judge me.” But, you know, unfortunately, I am not Reichenau.”

On November 27, the Fuhrer ordered Field Marshal von Manstein prepare a relief blockade for the 6th Field Army. Hitler relied on new heavy tanks, the Tigers, hoping that they would be able to break through the encirclement from the outside. Despite the fact that these vehicles had not yet been tested in combat and no one knew how they would behave in the Russian winter, he believed that even one Tiger battalion could radically change the situation at Stalingrad.

While Manstein was receiving reinforcements arriving from the Caucasus and preparing the operation, Soviet troops expanded the outer ring and strengthened it. When Hoth's tank group made a breakthrough on December 12, it was able to break through the positions of the Soviet troops, and its advanced units were separated from Paulus by less than 50 km. But Hitler forbade Friedrich Paulus to expose the Volga Front and, leaving Stalingrad, to fight his way towards Hoth’s “tigers,” which finally decided the fate of the 6th Army.

By January 1943, the enemy was driven back from the Stalingrad “cauldron” to 170-250 km. The death of the encircled troops became inevitable. Almost the entire territory they occupied was covered by Soviet artillery fire. Despite Goering’s promise, in practice, the average daily power of aviation in supplying the 6th Army could not exceed 100 tons instead of the required 500. In addition, the delivery of goods to the encircled groups in Stalingrad and other “cauldrons” caused huge losses in German aviation.

The ruins of the Barmaley fountain, which became one of the symbols of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

On January 10, 1943, Colonel General Paulus, despite the hopeless situation of his army, refused to capitulate, trying to pin down the Soviet troops surrounding him as much as possible. On the same day, the Red Army began an operation to destroy the 6th Field Army of the Wehrmacht. In the last days of January, Soviet troops pushed the remnants of Paulus's army into a small area of ​​the completely destroyed city and dismembered the Wehrmacht units continuing to defend. On January 24, 1943, General Paulus sent Hitler one of the last radiograms, in which he reported that the group was on the verge of destruction and proposed to evacuate valuable specialists. Hitler again forbade the remnants of the 6th Army to break through to his own and refused to remove anyone from the “cauldron” except the wounded.

On the night of January 31, the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 329th Engineer Battalion blocked the area of ​​the department store where Paulus' headquarters was located. The last radiogram that the commander of the 6th Army received was an order to promote him to field marshal, which the headquarters regarded as an invitation to suicide. Early in the morning, two Soviet envoys made their way into the basement of a dilapidated building and gave the field marshal an ultimatum. In the afternoon, Paulus rose to the surface and went to the headquarters of the Don Front, where Rokossovsky was waiting for him with the text of surrender. However, despite the fact that the field marshal surrendered and signed the capitulation, in the northern part of Stalingrad the German garrison under the command of Colonel General Stecker refused to accept the terms of surrender and was destroyed by concentrated heavy artillery fire. At 16.00 on February 2, 1943, the terms of surrender of the 6th Wehrmacht Field Army came into force.

Hitler's government declared mourning in the country.

For three days the funeral ringing of church bells sounded over German cities and villages.

Since the Great Patriotic War, Soviet historical literature has stated that a 330,000-strong enemy group was surrounded in the Stalingrad area, although this figure is not confirmed by any documentary data.

The German side's point of view on this issue is ambiguous. However, with all the diversity of opinions, the figure most often cited is 250-280 thousand people. This value is consistent with the total number of evacuees (25 thousand people), captured (91 thousand people) and enemy soldiers killed and buried in the battle area (about 160 thousand). The vast majority of those who surrendered also died from hypothermia and typhus, and after almost 12 years in Soviet camps, only 6 thousand people returned to their homeland.

Kotelnikovsky operation Having completed the encirclement of a large group of German troops near Stalingrad, the troops of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front (commander - Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) in November 1942 came from the north to the approaches to the village of Kotelnikovsky, where they gained a foothold and went on the defensive.

The German command made every effort to break through a corridor to the 6th Army surrounded by Soviet troops. For this purpose, in early December in the area of ​​the village. Kotelnikovsky, a strike force was created consisting of 13 divisions (including 3 tank and 1 motorized) and a number of reinforcement units under the command of Colonel General G. Goth - the army group "Goth". The group included a battalion of heavy Tiger tanks, which were first used on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In the direction of the main attack, which was delivered along the Kotelnikovsky-Stalingrad railway, the enemy managed to create a temporary advantage over the defending troops of the 51st Army in men and artillery by 2 times, and in the number of tanks by more than 6 times.

They broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and on the second day reached the area of ​​​​the village of Verkhnekumsky. In order to divert part of the forces of the shock group, on December 14, in the area of ​​​​the village of Nizhnechirskaya, the 5th Shock Army of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. She broke through the German defenses and captured the village, but the position of the 51st Army remained difficult. The enemy continued the offensive, while the army and the front no longer had any reserves left. The Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, trying to prevent the enemy from breaking through and releasing the encircled German troops, allocated the 2nd Guards Army and the Mechanized Corps from its reserve to strengthen the Stalingrad Front, giving them the task of defeating the enemy’s strike force.

On December 19, having suffered significant losses, Goth's group reached the Myshkova River. There were 35-40 km left to the encircled group, but Paulus’s troops were ordered to remain in their positions and not launch a counterattack, and Hoth was no longer able to advance further.

On December 24, having jointly created approximately double superiority over the enemy, the 2nd Guards and 51st armies, with the assistance of part of the forces of the 5th Shock Army, went on the offensive. The main blow against the Kotelnikov group was delivered by the 2nd Guards Army with fresh forces. The 51st Army attacked Kotelnikovsky from the east, while simultaneously enveloping the Gotha group from the south with tank and mechanized corps. On the first day of the offensive, troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the enemy's battle formations and captured crossings across the Myshkova River. Mobile formations were introduced into the breakthrough and began to rapidly advance towards Kotelnikovsky.

On December 27, the 7th Tank Corps approached Kotelnikovsky from the west, and the 6th Mechanized Corps bypassed Kotelnikovsky from the southeast. At the same time, the tank and mechanized corps of the 51st Army cut off the enemy group’s escape route to the southwest. Continuous attacks on the retreating enemy troops were carried out by aircraft of the 8th Air Army. On December 29, Kotelnikovsky was released and the threat of an enemy breakthrough was finally eliminated.

As a result of the Soviet counteroffensive, the enemy's attempt to relieve the 6th Army encircled at Stalingrad was thwarted, and German troops were thrown back 200-250 km from the outer front of the encirclement.

Starting the war against the USSR, the German command planned to complete hostilities during one short-term campaign. However, during the winter battle of 1941-1942. The Wehrmacht was defeated and was forced to surrender part of the occupied territory. By the spring of 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive had in turn stopped, and the headquarters of both sides began developing plans for the summer battles.

Plans and powers

In 1942, the situation at the front was no longer as favorable for the Wehrmacht as in the summer of 1941. The surprise factor was lost, and the overall balance of forces changed in favor of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). An offensive along the entire front to great depth, similar to the 1941 campaign. became impossible. The Wehrmacht High Command was forced to limit the scope of operations: in the central sector of the front it was planned to go on the defensive, in the northern sector a strike was planned to bypass Leningrad with limited forces. The main direction of future operations became the south. On April 5, 1942, in Directive No. 41, Supreme Commander Adolf Hitler outlined the goals of the campaign: “To finally destroy the manpower still remaining with the Soviets, to deprive the Russians of as many of the most important military-economic centers as possible.” The immediate task of the main operation on the Eastern Front was the withdrawal of German troops to the Caucasus Range and the capture of a number of economically important areas - primarily the oil fields of Maykop and Grozny, the lower reaches of the Volga, Voronezh and Stalingrad. The offensive plan was codenamed "Blau" ("Blue").

Army Group South played the main role in the offensive. It suffered less than others during the winter campaign. It was reinforced with reserves: fresh infantry and tank formations were transferred to the army group, some formations from other sectors of the front, some motorized divisions were reinforced with tank battalions seized from Army Group Center. In addition, the divisions involved in Operation Blau were the first to receive modernized armored vehicles - medium tanks Pz. IV and StuG III self-propelled guns with reinforced weapons, which made it possible to effectively fight against Soviet armored vehicles.

The army group had to operate on a very wide front, so contingents of Germany's allies were involved in the operation on an unprecedented scale. The 3rd Romanian, 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies took part in it. The Allies made it possible to hold a long front line, but they had to take into account their relatively low combat effectiveness: neither in terms of the level of training of soldiers and the competence of officers, nor in the quality and quantity of weapons, the Allied armies were on the same level with either the Wehrmacht or the Red Army. To make it easier to control this mass of troops, already during the offensive, Army Group South was divided into Group A, advancing on the Caucasus, and Group B, advancing on Stalingrad. The main striking force of Army Group B was the 6th Field Army under the command of Friedrich Paulus and the 4th Panzer Army of Hermann Hoth.

At the same time, the Red Army was planning defensive actions in the southwestern direction. However, the Southern, Southwestern and Bryansk Fronts in the direction of the first Blau attack had mobile formations for counterattacks. The spring of 1942 was the time of restoration of the tank forces of the Red Army, and before the 1942 campaign, tank and mechanized corps of a new wave were formed. They had fewer capabilities than German tank and motorized divisions, had a small artillery fleet and weak motorized rifle units. However, these formations could already influence the operational situation and provide serious assistance to rifle units.

Preparations for the defense of Stalingrad began in October 1941, when the command of the North Caucasus Military District received instructions from Headquarters to build defensive contours around Stalingrad - lines of field fortifications. However, by the summer of 1942 they were still not completed. Finally, supply problems seriously affected the capabilities of the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1942. The industry has not yet produced enough equipment and consumables to cover the needs of the army. Throughout 1942, the Red Army's ammunition consumption was significantly lower than that of the enemy. In practice, this meant that there were not enough shells to suppress the Wehrmacht’s defenses with artillery strikes or counter it in counter-battery warfare.

Battle in the Don Bend

On June 28, 1942, the main summer offensive of German troops began. Initially it developed successfully for the enemy. Soviet troops were thrown back from their positions in the Donbass to the Don. At the same time, a wide gap appeared in the front of the Soviet troops to the west of Stalingrad. In order to fill this gap, the Stalingrad Front was created on July 12 by a directive from Headquarters. Mainly reserve armies were used to defend the city. Among them was the former 7th Reserve, which, after entering the active army, received a new number - 62. It was she who was to defend Stalingrad directly in the future. In the meantime, the newly formed front was moving to the line of defense west of the big bend of the Don.

The front initially had only small forces. The divisions that were already at the front managed to suffer heavy losses, and some of the reserve divisions were only moving to their designated lines. The front's mobile reserve was the 13th Tank Corps, which was not yet equipped with equipment.

The main forces of the front advanced from the depths and had no contact with the enemy. Therefore, one of the first tasks set by Headquarters to the first commander of the Stalingrad Front, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, consisted of sending forward detachments to meet the enemy 30-80 km from the front line of defense - for reconnaissance and, if possible, occupation of more advantageous lines. On July 17, the forward detachments first encountered the vanguards of the German troops. This day marked the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Front collided with the troops of the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht.

The fighting with front-line advanced detachments lasted until July 22. It is interesting that Paulus and Hoth were not yet aware of the presence of large forces of Soviet troops - they believed that only weak units were ahead. In reality, the Stalingrad Front numbered 386 thousand people, and was numerically little inferior to the advancing troops of the 6th Army (443 thousand people as of July 20). However, the front defended a wide zone, which allowed the enemy to concentrate superior forces in the breakthrough area. On July 23, when fighting for the main line of defense began, the Wehrmacht’s 6th Army quickly broke through the front of the Soviet 62nd Army, and a small “cauldron” formed on its right flank. The attackers were able to reach the Don north of the city of Kalach. The threat of encirclement hung over the entire 62nd Army. However, unlike the encirclements of the autumn of 1941, the Stalingrad Front had a maneuverable reserve at its disposal. To break through the encirclement, the 13th Tank Corps of T.S. was used. Tanaschishin, who managed to pave the way to freedom for the surrounded detachment. Soon, an even more powerful counterattack fell on the flanks of the German wedge that had broken through to the Don. To defeat the German units that had broken through, two tank armies were sent in - the 1st and 4th. However, each of them consisted of only two rifle divisions and one tank corps capable of participating in a counterattack.

Unfortunately, the battles of 1942 were characterized by the Wehrmacht's advantage at the tactical level. German soldiers and officers had, on average, a better level of training, including in technical terms. Therefore, the counterattacks launched from both sides by tank armies in the last days of July crashed against the German defenses. The tanks advanced with very little support from infantry and artillery, and suffered unreasonably heavy losses. There was undoubtedly an effect from their actions: the forces of the 6th Field Army that entered the breakthrough could not build on their success and cross the Don. However, the stability of the front line could only be maintained until the forces of the attackers were exhausted. On August 6, the 1st Tank Army, having lost almost all its equipment, was disbanded. Within a day, Wehrmacht units, striking in converging directions, surrounded the large forces of the 62nd Army west of the Don.

The surrounded troops in several separate detachments managed to break out of the ring, but the battle in the Don bend was lost. Although German documents constantly emphasize the fierce resistance of the Red Army, the Wehrmacht managed to defeat the opposing Soviet units and cross the Don.

Fighting on the defensive lines of Stalingrad

At the moment when the battle in the great bend of the Don was developing, a new threat loomed over the Stalingrad front. It came from the southern flank, occupied by weak units. Initially, Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army did not aim at Stalingrad, but stubborn resistance on the Don forced the Wehrmacht command to turn it from the Caucasus direction to the rear of the Stalingrad Front. The front's reserves were already drawn into the battle, so the tank army could quickly advance to the rear of the defenders of Stalingrad. On July 28, the Headquarters ordered the new commander of the Stalingrad Front, A.I. Eremenko take measures to protect the southwest outer defense circuit. However, this order was somewhat late. On August 2, Goth's tanks reached the Kotelnikovsky district . Due to the dominance of German aviation in the air, Soviet reserves were crushed on the approaches, and entered the battle already seriously battered. On August 3, the Germans, having easily broken through the front, rushed to the northeast and deeply bypassed the positions of the defenders of Stalingrad. They were stopped only in the Abganerovo area - geographically this is already south, and not west of Stalingrad. Abganerovo was held for a long time thanks to the timely arrival of reserves, including the 13th Tank Corps. T.I. building Tanaschishina became the “fire brigade” of the front: the tankers eliminated the consequences of a serious failure for the second time.

While the fighting was going on south of Stalingrad, Paulus was planning a new encirclement, already on the eastern bank of the Don. On August 21, on the northern flank, the 6th Army crossed the river and began an offensive east to the Volga. The 62nd Army, already battered in the “cauldron,” was unable to contain the blow, and the vanguards of the Wehrmacht rushed towards Stalingrad from the north-west. If German plans were implemented, Soviet troops were to be surrounded west of Stalingrad and die in the flat steppe. So far this plan has been carried out.

At this time, the evacuation of Stalingrad was underway. Before the war, this city with a population of more than 400 thousand people was one of the most important industrial centers of the USSR. Now Headquarters was faced with the question of evacuating people and industrial facilities. However, by the time the fighting for the city began, no more than 100 thousand Stalingrad residents had been transported across the Volga. There was no talk of banning the export of people, but a huge amount of cargo and people awaiting crossing had accumulated on the western bank - from refugees from other areas to food and equipment. The capacity of the crossings did not allow everyone to be taken out, and the command believed that they still had time left. Meanwhile, events developed rapidly. Already on August 23, the first German tanks reached the northern outskirts. On the same day, Stalingrad was subjected to a devastating air strike.

Back on July 23, Hitler pointed out the need for the “early” destruction of Stalingrad. On August 23, the Fuhrer's order was carried out. The Luftwaffe carried out attacks in groups of 30-40 aircraft, in total they made more than two thousand sorties. A significant part of the city consisted of wooden buildings; they were quickly destroyed by fire. The water supply was destroyed, so fire crews could not fight the fire. In addition, oil storage facilities caught fire as a result of the bombing. (On this day?) In Stalingrad, about 40 thousand people died, mostly civilians, and the city was almost completely destroyed.

Since Wehrmacht units reached the city with a quick dash, the defense of Stalingrad was disorganized. The German command considered it necessary to quickly unite the 6th Field Army, advancing from the north-west, and the 4th Tank Army from the south. Therefore, the main task of the Germans was to close the flanks of the two armies. However, the new environment did not materialize. Tank brigades and front corps launched counterattacks against the northern strike group. They did not stop the enemy, but allowed the main forces of the 62nd Army to be withdrawn to the city. The 64th Army defended to the south. It was they who became the main participants in the subsequent battle in Stalingrad. By the time the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht united, the main forces of the Red Army had already escaped from the trap.

Defense of Stalingrad

On September 12, 1942, a major personnel change took place: the 62nd Army was headed by General Vasily Chuikov. The army retreated to the city seriously battered, but it still had more than 50 thousand people, and now it had to hold a bridgehead before the Volga on a narrow front. Moreover, the German advance was inevitably slowed by the obvious difficulties of street fighting.

However, the Wehrmacht had no intention of getting involved in two months of street fighting. From Paulus's point of view, the task of capturing Stalingrad was solved within ten days. From the standpoint of post-knowledge, the Wehrmacht’s persistence in destroying the 62nd Army seems difficult to explain. However, at that particular moment, Paulus and his staff believed that the city could be occupied within a reasonable time with moderate losses.

The first assault began almost immediately. During September 14-15, the Germans took the dominant height - Mamayev Kurgan, combined the forces of their two armies and cut off the 62nd Army from the 64th Army operating to the south. However, in addition to the stubborn resistance of the city garrison, two factors influenced the attackers. Firstly, reinforcements regularly arrived across the Volga. The course of the September assault was turned by the 13th Guards Division of Major General A.I. Rodimtseva, who managed to regain some of the lost positions with counterattacks and stabilized the situation. On the other hand, Paulus did not have the opportunity to recklessly throw all his available forces into capturing Stalingrad. The positions of the 6th Army north of the city were subject to constant attacks by Soviet troops, who were trying to pave a land corridor to their own. A series of offensive operations in the steppe northwest of Stalingrad resulted in heavy losses for the Red Army with minimal progress. The tactical preparation of the attacking troops turned out to be poor, and the superiority of the Germans in firepower made it possible to effectively disrupt the attacks. However, pressure on Paulus's army from the north did not allow him to concentrate on completing the main task.

In October, the left flank of the 6th Army, stretched far to the west, was covered by Romanian troops, which made it possible to use two additional divisions in a new assault on Stalingrad. This time, an industrial zone in the north of the city was attacked. As during the first assault, the Wehrmacht was faced with reserves approaching from other sectors of the front. The headquarters closely monitored the situation in Stalingrad and gradually transferred fresh units to the city. Transportation took place in an extremely difficult situation: the watercraft were attacked by Wehrmacht artillery and aircraft. However, the Germans failed to completely block traffic along the river.

The advancing German troops suffered high casualties in the city and advanced very slowly. The extremely stubborn battles made Paulus's headquarters nervous: he began to make openly controversial decisions. Weakening the positions across the Don and handing them over to Romanian troops was the first risky step. Next is the use of tank divisions, the 14th and 24th, for street fighting. Armored vehicles did not have a significant impact on the course of the battle in the city, and the divisions suffered heavy losses and got involved in a hopeless confrontation.

It should be noted that in October 1942, Hitler already considered the goals of the campaign as a whole achieved. The order of October 14 stated that “the summer and autumn campaigns of this year, with the exception of certain ongoing operations and planned offensive actions of a local nature, are completed.”

In reality, the German forces had not so much completed the campaign as lost the initiative. In November, freeze-up began on the Volga, which greatly worsened the situation of the 62nd Army: due to the situation on the river, the delivery of reinforcements and ammunition to the city was difficult. The defense line in many places narrowed to hundreds of meters. However, stubborn defense in the city allowed Headquarters to prepare the decisive counter-offensive of the Great Patriotic War.

To be continued...

The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad in history is very great. It was after its completion The Red Army launched a full-scale offensive, which led to the complete expulsion of the enemy from the territory of the USSR, and the Wehrmacht allies abandoned their plans ( Türkiye and Japan planned a full-scale invasion in 1943 to the territory of the USSR) and realized that it was almost impossible to win the war.

In contact with

The Battle of Stalingrad can be briefly described if we consider the most important things:

• background of events;
• a general picture of the disposition of enemy forces;
• progress of the defensive operation;
• progress of the offensive operation;
• results.

Brief background

German troops invaded the territory of the USSR and, moving quickly, winter 1941 found themselves near Moscow. However, it was during this period of time that the Red Army troops launched a counteroffensive.

At the beginning of 1942, Hitler's headquarters began to develop plans for the second wave of the offensive. The generals suggested continue the attack on Moscow, but the Fuhrer rejected this plan and proposed an alternative - an attack on Stalingrad (modern Volgograd). The attack to the south had its reasons. If you're lucky:

• control of the oil fields of the Caucasus passed into the hands of the Germans;
• Hitler would have access to the Volga(which would cut off the European part of the USSR from the Central Asian regions and Transcaucasia).

If the Germans captured Stalingrad, Soviet industry would have suffered serious damage from which it would have been unlikely to recover.

The plan to capture Stalingrad became even more realistic after the so-called Kharkov disaster (complete encirclement of the Southwestern Front, loss of Kharkov and Rostov-on-Don, complete “opening” of the front south of Voronezh).

The offensive began with the defeat of the Bryansk Front and from a positional stop of German forces on the Voronezh River. At the same time, Hitler could not decide on the 4th Tank Army.

The transfer of tanks from the Caucasus to the Volga direction and back delayed the start of the Battle of Stalingrad for a whole week, which gave the opportunity for Soviet troops to better prepare for the defense of the city.

Balance of power

Before the start of the offensive on Stalingrad, the balance of enemy forces looked as follows*:

*calculations taking into account all nearby enemy forces.

Start of the battle

The first clash between the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the 6th Army of Paulus took place July 17, 1942.

Attention! Russian historian A. Isaev found evidence in military journals that the first clash took place a day earlier - on July 16. One way or another, the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad was mid-summer 1942.

Already by July 22–25 German troops, having broken through the defenses of Soviet forces, reached the Don, which created a real threat to Stalingrad. By the end of July, the Germans successfully crossed the Don. Further progress was very difficult. Paulus was forced to resort to the help of allies (Italians, Hungarians, Romanians), who helped surround the city.

It was during this very difficult time for the southern front that I. Stalin published order No. 227, the essence of which was reflected in one short slogan: “ No step back! He called on the soldiers to strengthen their resistance and prevent the enemy from getting closer to the city.

In August Soviet troops saved three divisions of the 1st Guards Army from complete disaster who entered the battle. They launched a timely counterattack and slowed down the enemy's rapid advance, thereby foiling the Fuhrer’s plan to rush to Stalingrad.

In September, after certain tactical adjustments, German troops went on the offensive, trying to take the city by storm. The Red Army could not resist this onslaught, and was forced to retreat to the city.

Street fighting

August 23, 1942 Luftwaffe forces launched a powerful pre-assault bombardment of the city. As a result of the massive attack, ¼ of the city’s population was destroyed, its center was completely destroyed, and severe fires began. On the same day shock the 6th Army group reached the northern outskirts of the city. At this moment, the defense of the city was carried out by the militia and forces of the Stalingrad air defense, despite this, the Germans advanced into the city very slowly and suffered heavy losses.

On September 1, the command of the 62nd Army decided to cross the Volga and entering the city. The crossing took place under constant air and artillery fire. The Soviet command managed to transport 82 thousand soldiers to the city, who in mid-September stubbornly resisted the enemy in the city center; a fierce struggle to maintain bridgeheads near the Volga unfolded on Mamayev Kurgan.

The battles in Stalingrad entered world military history as one of the most brutal. They fought for literally every street and every house.

Firearms and artillery weapons were practically not used in the city (for fear of ricochet), only piercing and cutting weapons. often went hand-to-hand.

The liberation of Stalingrad was accompanied by a real sniper war (the most famous sniper was V. Zaitsev; he won 11 sniper duels; the story of his exploits still inspires many).

By mid-October the situation had become extremely difficult as the Germans launched an attack on the Volga bridgehead. On November 11, Paulus’s soldiers managed to reach the Volga and force the 62nd Army to take a tough defense.

Attention! Most of the city's civilian population did not have time to evacuate (100 thousand out of 400). As a result, women and children were taken out under fire across the Volga, but many remained in the city and died (counts of civilian casualties are still considered inaccurate).

Counteroffensive

A goal such as the liberation of Stalingrad became not only strategic, but also ideological. Neither Stalin nor Hitler wanted to retreat and could not afford defeat. The Soviet command, realizing the complexity of the situation, began preparing a counteroffensive back in September.

Marshal Eremenko's plan

September 30, 1942 was The Don Front was formed under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky.

He attempted a counteroffensive, which completely failed by early October.

At this time A.I. Eremenko proposes to Headquarters a plan to encircle the 6th Army. The plan was fully approved and received the code name "Uranus".

If it were 100% implemented, all enemy forces concentrated in the Stalingrad area would be surrounded.

Attention! A strategic mistake during the implementation of this plan at the initial stage was made by K.K. Rokossovsky, who tried to take the Oryol ledge with the forces of the 1st Guards Army (which he saw as a threat to the future offensive operation). The operation ended in failure. The 1st Guards Army was completely disbanded.

Chronology of operations (stages)

Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe command to transfer cargo to the Stalingrad ring in order to prevent the defeat of the German troops. The Germans coped with this task, but the fierce opposition of the Soviet air armies, which launched a “free hunt” regime, led to the fact that German air traffic with the blocked troops was interrupted on January 10, just before the start of Operation Ring, which ended defeat of German troops at Stalingrad.

Results

The following main stages can be distinguished in the battle:

• strategic defensive operation (defense of Stalingrad) - from June 17 to November 18, 1942;
• strategic offensive operation (liberation of Stalingrad) - from 11/19/42 to 02/02/43.

The Battle of Stalingrad lasted in total 201 days. It is impossible to say exactly how long the further operation to clear the city of Khivi and scattered enemy groups took.

Victory in the battle affected both the state of the fronts and the geopolitical balance of power in the world. The liberation of the city was of great importance. Brief results of the Battle of Stalingrad:

• Soviet troops acquired invaluable experience in encircling and destroying the enemy;
• were established new schemes for military-economic supply of troops;
• Soviet troops actively prevented the advance of German groups in the Caucasus;
• the German command was forced to devote additional forces to the implementation of the Eastern Wall project;
• Germany's influence on the Allies was greatly weakened, neutral countries began to take a position of non-acceptance of German actions;
• The Luftwaffe was greatly weakened after attempting to supply the 6th Army;
• Germany suffered significant (partly irreparable) losses.

Losses

The losses were significant for both Germany and the USSR.

The situation with the prisoners

At the end of Operation Cauldron, 91.5 thousand people were in Soviet captivity, including:

• ordinary soldiers (including Europeans from among the German allies);
• officers (2.5 thousand);
• generals (24).

German Field Marshal Paulus was also captured.

All prisoners were sent to a specially created camp No. 108 near Stalingrad. For 6 years (until 1949) surviving prisoners worked on construction sites in the city.

Attention! The captured Germans were treated quite humanely. After the first three months, when the mortality rate among prisoners reached its peak, they were all placed in camps near Stalingrad (some in hospitals). Those who were able to work worked a regular working day and received wages for their work, which they could spend on food and household items. In 1949, all surviving prisoners, except war criminals and traitors

There is a saying in Russian: “I disappeared like a Swede near Poltava.” In 1943, it was replaced by an analogue: “disappeared, like a German at Stalingrad.” The victory of Russian weapons in the Battle of Stalingrad on the Volga clearly turned the tide of the Second World War.

Reasons (oil and symbolism)

The area between the Volga and Don rivers in the summer of 1942 became the target of the main attack of the Nazis. There were several different reasons for this.

1. By that time, the original plan for the war with the USSR had already been completely disrupted and was no longer suitable for action. It was necessary to change the “edge of attack”, choosing new promising strategic directions.
2. The generals offered the Fuhrer a new blow to Moscow, but he refused. One can understand him - hopes for a “blitzkrieg” were finally buried near Moscow. Hitler motivated his position by the “obviousness” of the Moscow direction.
3. The attack on Stalingrad also had real goals - the Volga and Don were convenient transport arteries, and through them there were routes to the oil of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, as well as to the Urals, which Hitler considered as the main frontier of German aspirations in this war.
4. There were also symbolic goals. The Volga is one of the symbols of Russia. Stalingrad is a city (by the way, representatives of the anti-Hitler coalition stubbornly saw the word “steel” in this name, but not the name of the Soviet leader). The Nazis failed to strike at other symbols - Leningrad did not surrender, the enemy was driven away from Moscow, the Volga remained to solve ideological problems.

The Nazis had reason to expect success. In terms of the number of soldiers (about 300 thousand) before the start of the offensive, they were significantly inferior to the defenders, but they were 1.5-2 times superior to them in aviation, tanks and other equipment.

Stages of the battle

For the Red Army, the Battle of Stalingrad was divided into 2 main stages: defensive and offensive.

The first of them lasted from July 17 to November 18, 1942. During this period, battles took place on the distant and near approaches to Stalingrad, as well as in the city itself. It was virtually wiped off the face of the earth (first by bombing, then by street fighting), but never came completely under enemy rule.

The offensive period lasted from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. The essence of the offensive actions was to create a huge “cauldron” for the German, Italian, Croatian, Slovak and Romanian units concentrated near Stalingrad, followed by their defeat by compressing the encirclement. The first stage (the actual creation of the “cauldron”) was called Operation Uranus. On November 23, the encirclement closed. But the surrounded group was too strong and it was impossible to defeat it immediately.

In December, Field Marshal Manstein attempted to break through the blockade ring near Kotelnikov and come to the aid of those surrounded, but his breakthrough was stopped. On January 10, 1943, the Red Army launched Operation Ring - the destruction of the encircled German group. On January 31, Hitler promoted von Paulus, the commander of the German formations at Stalingrad and who found himself in the “cauldron,” to field marshal. In his congratulatory letter, the Fuhrer transparently indicated that not a single German field marshal had ever surrendered. On February 2, von Paulus became the first, surrendering along with his entire army.

Results and significance (radical fracture)

The Battle of Stalingrad in Soviet historiography is called the “moment of a radical turning point” in the course of the war, and this is true. At the same time, the course of not only the Great Patriotic War, but also the Second World War was turned around. As a result of the battle, Germany

• lost 1.5 million people, more than 100 thousand only as prisoners;
• lost the trust of its allies (Italy, Romania, Slovakia thought about leaving the war and stopped sending conscripts to the front);
• suffered colossal material losses (on the scale of 2-6 months of production);
• lost hope of Japan's entry into the war in Siberia.

The USSR also suffered huge losses (up to 1.3 million people), but did not allow the enemy into strategically important areas of the country, destroyed a huge number of experienced soldiers, deprived the enemy of offensive potential and finally seized the strategic initiative from him.

Steel City

It turned out that all the symbolism in the battle went to the USSR. Destroyed Stalingrad became the most famous city in the world. The entire Anti-Hitler coalition was proud of the residents and defenders of the “steel city” and tried to help them. In the USSR, any schoolchild knew the names of the heroes of Stalingrad: sergeant Yakov Pavlov, signalman Matvey Putilov, nurse Marionella (Guli) Koroleva. The son of the leader of the Spanish Republic Dolores Ibarruri, Captain Ruben Ibarruri, and the legendary Tatar pilot Amet Khan Sultan received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for Stalingrad. Such outstanding Soviet military leaders as V.I. Chuikov, N.F. distinguished themselves in planning the battle. Vatutin, F.I. Tolbukhin. After Stalingrad, “parades of prisoners” became traditional.

And Field Marshal von Paulus then lived in the USSR for quite a long time, taught at higher military educational institutions and wrote memoirs. In them, he very highly appreciated the feat of those who defeated him at Stalingrad.