Who carried out ramming attacks during WWII? War Hero: Evgeniy Stepanov

Ram (air)

Poster from the First World War “The feat and death of the pilot Nesterov”

There were often cases when a damaged aircraft was directed by a pilot to a ground or water target (Gastello, Nikolai Frantsevich, Gribovsky, Alexander Prokofievich). In the Japanese troops during the Second World War, there were special kamikaze units - pilots rammed enemy ships in planes filled with explosives.

July 18, 1981 - the Soviet Su-15TM interceptor (pilot - Kulyapin, Valentin Aleksandrovich) rammed a CL-44 transport aircraft (number LV-JTN, Transportes Aereo Rioplatense, Argentina), which was making a secret transport flight on the route Tel Aviv - Tehran and unintentionally invaded the airspace of the USSR over the territory of Armenia. All 4 crew members of the CL-44 were killed, including a British national. Kulyapin successfully ejected, although, according to his later recollections, the plane obeyed the controls, the engine was working, so he could try to reach the airfield and land. For the ram he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. This is the second case of ramming a border violator with a jet in the history of the Soviet Air Force.

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See what “ram (air)” is in other dictionaries:

One of the air combat techniques. It consists of striking an enemy aircraft with a propeller or wing of an aircraft (after expending ammunition). It is the highest manifestation of the pilot’s courage and will. First TV by plane carried out by a Russian... ... Encyclopedia of technology

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air ram- aerial ram one of the techniques of air combat. It consists of striking an enemy aircraft with a propeller or wing of an aircraft (after expending ammunition). It is the highest manifestation of the pilot’s courage and will. First TV... ... Encyclopedia "Aviation"

RAM, in military affairs, a weapon, device or combat technique intended for the destruction of defensive structures, ships, aircraft, tanks and other equipment of the enemy. In ancient times, a siege weapon used for destruction was called a ram. encyclopedic Dictionary

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The main form of fighter aircraft operations. Air combat is carried out by single aircraft (single combat) or groups of aircraft (group combat) with the aim of destroying the enemy or repelling his attacks. Variety... ...Marine Dictionary

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This happened on June 26, 1941, on the fifth day of the war, when the plane of Captain Nikolai Gastello was shot down while bombing a column of enemy tanks. The squadron commander did not leave the battle and continued to fight the Nazis to the end. With a firm hand, the pilot directed the bomber, engulfed in flames, into the very thick of enemy tanks and gas tanks. There, in the raging fire of enemy vehicles, he finished his last flight together with the commander and his combat crew (lieutenants Grigory Skorobogaty, Anatoly Burdenyuk and Sergeant Alexey Kalinin).

The hero's name became famous. Central newspapers wrote about the feat and talked about it on the radio. The throw of a set fire bomber onto a ground target, first performed by the regimental commissar M. Yuyukin back in 1939, and the feat of Captain Gastello showed the Soviet pilots the last means of struggle, which nothing could take away from them - neither damage to the aircraft, nor a depleted supply of shells, nor heavy wound.

For many years it was believed that the crew of Captain N. Gastello was the first to ram a ground target in battles with the Nazis. But the work of historians made it possible to make adjustments. It has been established that one of the first to carry out a fiery ramming of a ground target was the bomber crew under the command of Captain G. Khrapay. The crew included navigator Lieutenant V. Filatov and gunner-radio operator Senior Sergeant G. Tikhomirov. And this happened on June 24, 1941 near the city of Brody, Lviv region. On the same day, the fire ram was carried out by senior political instructor S. Airapetov. He directed his plane at a convoy of enemy vehicles near the city of Taurage in Lithuania.

On June 27, 1941, near the Polish city of Hrubieszow, a new fiery explosion hit a fascist motorized column like a tornado. This was the farewell salute of the pilot Lieutenant D. Tarasov and the navigator Lieutenant B. Eremin, who repeated the feat of the crew of Captain Gastello. A day later, on June 29, 1941, the flames of a violent explosion now shot up on Belarusian soil. It was Senior Lieutenant I. Preiszen who brought down his bomber into the very center of a group of Nazi tanks.

On July 4, 1941, on the Rezekne-Ostrov highway, squadron commander Captain L. Mikhailov attacked enemy tanks with his bomber. On August 28, pilot junior lieutenant I. Vdovenko and navigator lieutenant N. Gomonenko sent their burning plane to the enemy’s crossing of the Dnieper and destroyed it.

On September 19, 1941, near Leningrad, junior lieutenant V. Bondarenko aimed his crippled fighter at an enemy anti-aircraft battery. On September 23, senior lieutenant I. Zolin rammed the Berislav dam on the Dnieper. On September 28, Sergeant D. Koryazin crashed his plane into a column of fascist tanks near Tula.

Recently, some military historians have begun to come across the assertion that the ground ram was caused by the accidental fall of out-of-control aircraft. But the facts tell a different story. Testimony of our pilots, who heard in their headsets through the roar of the battle the last words of the heroes: “For the Motherland, I’m going to ram!” and those who saw their fiery dive, finally, the very circumstances of the ramming convincingly prove that the wrecked vehicles were deliberately directed towards the target by the firm hand of the pilots.

“On January 17, 1945, accompanying a group of attack aircraft,” fighter pilots Major Gontarenko and Captain Makarov reported about the last combat mission of Junior Lieutenant A. Kolyado, “we observed how the fourth wingman, whose engine caught fire in the air, turned his “silt” and crashed into a concentration of enemy manpower and equipment. According to our observation, the plane was controllable, and the pilot, if desired, could land on fascist territory.”

The lines of combat documents confirm that the roar of explosions and the avalanche of flames that tore apart the tank wedges of the Nazis, raised their guns into the air, broke bridges and crossings, were not caused by the accidental fall of out-of-control aircraft. No, the planes were thrown at the target by living people who decided, even at the cost of their lives, to strike at the hated enemy.

The flames rose above the engine and fuselage of the downed bomber, rushing towards the gas tanks - senior political instructor A. Anikin did not deviate from the combat course. As if not noticing the mortal danger that threatened him, the pilot boldly attacked the fascist tanks concentrated to cross the Velikaya River. The pilots he led broke through a barrage of anti-aircraft explosions and for the second and third time brought down a deadly load on the Nazis. The fourth dive was the last for the senior political instructor - with the fiery comet of his plane, he crashed into a formation of tanks with crosses on their armor. The enemy was unable to reach the right bank of the Velikaya River on that July day in 1941.

Did those heroes, like A. Kolyado, have the opportunity to save their lives? Certainly. They could land or jump out of the burning cars using parachutes. The last target could not have been chosen at random. Otherwise, would the pilot Lieutenant V. Kovalev have been able to ram an enemy anti-aircraft battery on December 14, 1941, located away from the Rumyantsev station, over which he was shot down? The pilot saw that the battery blocked the path of his wingmen to the enemy tanks moving along the Volokolamsk Highway with a barrage of fire, and headed for it. A flying fire fell on the enemy's firing position, V. Kovalev's fighter crushed the guns along with their crews, and the fascist tanks, having lost their anti-aircraft screen, were burned by the pilots of the flight of the heroically deceased commander.

Matching the feat of V. Kovalev was the fiery ram of the squadron commander, Captain V. Shiryaev. On September 4, 1942, during an attack by Nazi tanks rushing across the Kalmyk steppe towards Stalingrad, his plane was overtaken by a volley of anti-aircraft guns. The pilot separated from his group and, finding a large concentration of enemy vehicles, directed the wounded attack aircraft at them. On October 21, 1943, mortally wounded by a fragment of an anti-aircraft shell, the pilot dived onto enemy firing points that were hindering the advance of our advancing infantry near the city of Melitopol.

In the name of Victory, Lieutenant V. Aleinikov, Captain S. Borodkin, Captain K. Zakharov, Lieutenant P. Kriven, Senior Lieutenant P. Nadezhdin and other Soviet pilots rammed ground targets. A ground ram is a feat that only Soviet pilots, brought up with a sense of patriotism and the habit of putting the interests of the country above personal ones, were able to accomplish.

The path to this feat can be traced along the battle routes of Major D. Zhabinsky. On October 9, 1943, in one of the sorties on the Western Front, under continuous anti-aircraft fire, together with his wingmen, he attacked an enemy artillery battery seven times and still suppressed its fire. Wounded in the chest, neck, and right arm, D. Zhabinsky fights with his last strength for life, for the preservation of the plane, believing that in the formidable “silt” he will “iron” the Nazis more than once. And the pilot, in spite of all the deaths, returned to duty.

When, on February 15, 1945, during the assault on the Nazi airfield, D. Zhabinsky’s plane was hit by an anti-aircraft machine gun, the pilot rejected the opportunity to escape, because this could only mean captivity. Zhabinsky decided to bring down all the steel power of his “silt” on the enemy - to die in such a way that there would be benefit from death. "Farewell, Motherland!" - with these words, heard on the radio by his comrades in arms, the pilot gave away the control stick of the burning car.

Yes, ramming of ground targets was carried out at the end of the war. And D. Zhabinsky was not the only one. On March 19, 1945, during an attack on a fascist airfield in Heiligenbeil (East Prussia), the plane of Captain K. Ivanov was shot down. The fearless pilot deliberately, without hesitation, directed his attack aircraft towards a concentration of enemy aircraft.

The self-sacrifice of the heroes of the fiery rams was the highest manifestation of heroism, moreover, collective heroism. After all, in bombers or attack aircraft, pilots led towards the enemy, all crew members were united with them by hatred of the enemy and front-line friendship. Navigators and gunners-radio operators Nazar Gubin, Boris Eremin, Boris Kapustin, Semyon Kosinov, Sergei Kovalsky, Nikolai Pavlov, Pyotr Sologubov, Stepan Shcherbakov and others - all of them fulfilled their duty until the last second of their lives, until their last breath. During the war, Soviet pilots carried out 446 fire rams. Almost all of these heroes did not return from the war, but their memory lives on in the names of streets, factories, schools and courts.

Sources:
Gulyas I. Fragments of the combat use of IL-4 // Aviation and time. 1998. No. 1. P. 17-18.
Kotelnikov V., Medved A., Khazanov D. Pe-2 dive bomber // Aviation and Cosmonautics. 2004. No. 5-6. P.29-30.
Mikhailov V. Shield and Sword of the Fatherland // Aviation and Cosmonautics. 2002. No. 8. P.8.
Zaitsev A. For the honor, freedom and independence of the Motherland // Wings of the Motherland: collection. articles. M.: DOSAAF USSR, 1983. P. 162-164.
Larintsev R., Zabolotsky A., Kotlobovsky A. To the ram! // Aviation and time. 2003. No. 5. P. 25.
Kovalenko A., Sgibnev A. Immortal feats. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980. pp. 102-110.

For a long time, the authorship of the first air ram of the Great Patriotic War was attributed to various pilots, but now the studied documents of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation leave no doubt that the first at 04:55 on the morning of June 22, 1941 was the flight commander of the 46th IAP, Senior Lieutenant I. I. Ivanov , who destroyed a German bomber at the cost of his life. Under what circumstances did this happen?

The details of the ram were examined by the writer S.S. Smirnov back in the 60s of the last century, and 50 years later, a detailed book about the life and feat of a fellow countryman-pilot was written by Georgy Rovensky, a local historian from Fryazino near Moscow. However, in order to objectively cover the episode, both lacked information from German sources (although Rovensky tried to use data on Luftwaffe losses and a book on the history of the KG 55 squadron), as well as an understanding of the general picture of the air battle on the first day of the war in the Rivne region, in the area Dubno – Mlynów. Taking as a basis the research of Smirnov and Rovensky, archival documents and memories of participants in the events, we will try to reveal both the circumstances of the ram and the events that took place around.

The 46th Fighter Wing and its enemy

The 46th IAP was a personnel unit formed in May 1938 in the first wave of deployment of Red Army Air Force regiments at the Skomorokhi airfield near Zhitomir. After the annexation of Western Ukraine, the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the regiment were relocated to the Dubno airfield, and the 3rd and 4th to Mlynow (modern Mlynov, Ukrainian Mlyniv).

By the summer of 1941, the regiment arrived in pretty good shape. Many commanders had combat experience and had a clear idea of ​​how to shoot down the enemy. Thus, the regiment commander, Major I. D. Podgorny, fought at Khalkhin Gol, the squadron commander, Captain N. M. Zverev, fought in Spain. The most experienced pilot, apparently, was the deputy commander of the regiment, Captain I. I. Geibo - he even managed to take part in two conflicts, flew more than 200 combat missions at Khalkhin Gol and Finland and had downed enemy aircraft.

High-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Ju 86, which made an emergency landing in the Rovno area on April 15, 1941, and was burned by the crew

Actually, one of the proofs of the fighting spirit of the pilots of the 46th IAP is the incident with the forced landing of a high-altitude German reconnaissance aircraft Ju 86, which occurred on April 15, 1941 northeast of Rivne - the flag navigator of the regiment, senior lieutenant P. M. Shalunov, distinguished himself. This was the only case when a Soviet pilot managed to land a German reconnaissance aircraft from the “Rovel group”, which flew over the USSR in the spring of 1941.

By June 22, 1941, the regiment was based with all units at the Mlynów airfield - construction of a concrete runway had begun at the Dubno airfield.

The weak point was the condition of the equipment of the 46th IAP. The 1st and 2nd squadrons of the regiment flew I-16 type 5 and type 10, whose service life was ending, and their combat characteristics could not be compared with the Messerschmitts. In the summer of 1940, the regiment, according to the plan for the rearmament of the Red Army Air Force, was among the first to receive modern I-200 (MiG-1) fighters, but due to delays in the development and deployment of mass production of new machines, the unit never received them. Instead of the I-200, the personnel of the 3rd and 4th squadrons in the summer of 1940 received the I-153 instead of the I-15bis and rather sluggishly worked on mastering this “newest” fighter. By June 22, 1941, there were 29 I-16s (20 serviceable) and 18 I-153 (14 serviceable) available at the Mlynów airfield.

Commander of the 46th IAP Ivan Dmitrievich Podgorny, his deputy Iosif Ivanovich Geibo and commander of the 14th SAD Ivan Alekseevich Zykanov

By June 22, the regiment was not fully provided with personnel, since at the end of May - beginning of June 12 pilots were transferred to newly formed units. Despite this, the unit’s combat effectiveness remained virtually unchanged: of the remaining 64 pilots, 48 ​​served in the regiment for more than a year.

It so happened that the 14th Air Force Aviation Division of the 5th Army KOVO, which included the 46th IAP, was right at the forefront of the German attack. The two main “Panzerstrasse”, allocated by the German command for the movement of the 3rd and 48th motorized corps of the 1st Panzer Group of Army Group South, passed through the directions Lutsk - Rivne and Dubno - Brody, i.e. through populated areas where the division's command and control and its 89th IAP, 46th IAP and 253rd ShAP were based.

The opponents of the 46th IAP on the first day of the war were the bomber group III./KG 55, which was part of the V Air Corps of the 4th Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe, whose formations were supposed to operate against the KOVO Air Force. To do this, on June 18, 25 Heinkel He 111 groups flew to the Klemensov airfield, 10 km west of the city of Zamosc. The group was commanded by Hauptmann Heinrich Wittmer. The other two groups and the squadron headquarters were located at the Labunie airfield, 10 km southeast of Zamosc - literally 50 km from the border.

Commander of Bomber Group III./KG 55 Hauptmann Heinrich Wittmer (1910–1992) at the helm of the Heinkel (right). On November 12, 1941, Wittmer was awarded the Knight's Cross and ended the war with the rank of colonel.

The headquarters of the V Air Corps, the fighter group III./JG 3 and the reconnaissance squadron 4./(F)121 were located in Zamosc. Only units of JG 3 were based closer to the border (headquarters and II group 20 km away at the Khostun airfield, and I group 30 km away at the Dub airfield).

It is difficult to say what the fate of the 46th IAP would have been if all these German units had been sent to gain air superiority over the axis of advance of the 48th Motorized Corps, which ran through the Dubno-Brody area. Most likely, the Soviet regiments would have been destroyed like the ZapOVO Air Force units that came under crushing blows from the aircraft of the II and VIII Air Corps, but the command of the V Air Corps had broader goals.

Hard first day of the war

Units concentrated in the Zamosc area were to attack airfields from Lutsk to Sambir, focusing on the Lvov area, where the Messerschmitts from JG 3 were first sent on the morning of June 22, 1941. In addition, for some fantastic reasons I. /KG 55 was sent in the morning to bomb airfields in the Kiev area. As a result, the Germans were able to detach only III./KG 55 to attack airfields in Brody, Dubno and Mlynów. A total of 17 He 111s were prepared for the first flight, each equipped to attack airfields and carrying 32 50-kg SD-50 fragmentation bombs . From the combat log of III./KG 55:

“...The start of 17 cars of the group was envisaged. Due to technical reasons, two cars were unable to start, and another one returned due to engine problems. Start: 02:50–03:15 (Berlin time - author's note), target - airfields Dubno, Mlynov, Brody, Rachin (north-eastern outskirts of Dubno - author's note). Attack time: 03:50–04:20. Flight altitude – low level flight, method of attack: links and pairs...”

As a result, only 14 aircraft out of 24 combat-ready ones took part in the first flight: six aircraft from the 7th, seven from the 8th and one from the 9th squadrons, respectively. The group commander and headquarters made a serious mistake when they decided to operate in pairs and units to maximize target coverage, and the crews had to pay a high price for it.

Takeoff of a pair of He 111s from the KG 55 squadron on the morning of June 22, 1941

Due to the fact that the Germans operated in small groups, it is impossible to determine exactly which crews attacked which Soviet airfield. In order to restore the picture of events, we will use Soviet documents, as well as the memories of participants in the events. Captain Geibo, who actually led the regiment on June 22 in the absence of Major Podgorny, indicates in his post-war memoirs that the first collision occurred on the approaches to the Mlynow airfield at about 04:20.

A combat alert was declared in all units of the KOVO Air Force around 03:00–04:00 after the district headquarters received the text of Directive No. 1, and the personnel of the units and formations managed to prepare equipment for combat operations even before the first raids of German aviation. The planes were dispersed at the airfields as early as June 15. However, it is not possible to talk about full combat readiness, primarily due to the controversial text of Directive No. 1, which, in particular, stated that Soviet pilots should not succumb to “provocations” and have the right to attack enemy aircraft only in response to fire from the German side.

These instructions on the morning of the first day of the war were literally fatal for a number of units of the Kaliningrad Air Force, whose aircraft were destroyed on the ground before they could take off. Several dozen pilots died, shot down in the air while trying to oust Luftwaffe aircraft from Soviet territory with evolutions. Only a few commanders of various ranks took responsibility and gave orders to repel German attacks. One of them was the commander of the 14th SAD, Colonel I. A. Zykanov.

Aerial photograph of Mlynów airfield taken on June 22, 1941 from a He 111 bomber from the KG 55 squadron

In the post-war years, through the efforts of unscrupulous authors, this man was unfairly denigrated and accused of non-existent mistakes and crimes. It should be noted that there were reasons for this: in August 1941, Colonel Zykanov was under investigation for some time, but was not convicted. True, he was not restored to his previous position, and in January 1942 he headed the 435th IAP, then commanded the 760th IAP, was an inspector pilot of the 3rd Guards IAK and, finally, became the commander of the 6th ZAP.

In the post-war memoirs of Aviation Major General I. I. Geibo, it is clearly seen that the division commander announced the alarm in time, and after the VNOS posts reported that German planes were crossing the border, he ordered them to be shot down, which brought even such an experienced fighter as Geibo into a state of prostration. It was this firm decision of the division commander that literally at the last moment saved the 46th IAP from a sudden attack:

“The interrupted sleep came back with difficulty. Finally, I began to doze off a little, but then the telephone came to life again. Cursing, he picked up the phone. Divisional commander again.

- Announce a combat alert to the regiment. If German planes appear, shoot them down!

The phone rang and the conversation was interrupted.

- How to shoot down? – I got worried. - Repeat, Comrade Colonel! Not to expel, but to shoot down?

But the phone was silent..."

Considering that we have before us memoirs with all the inherent shortcomings of any memoir, we will make a short comment. Firstly, Zykanov’s order to sound the alarm and shoot down German planes actually consists of two, received at different times. The first, an alarm, was apparently given around 03:00. The order to shoot down German planes was clearly received after receiving data from VNOS posts, around 04:00–04:15.

I-16 fighters type 5 (above) and type 10 (below) from the 46th IAP (reconstruction from photo, artist A. Kazakov)

In this regard, the further actions of Captain Geibo become clear - before this, the duty unit was raised into the air in order to expel border violators, but Geibo took off after him with the order to shoot down German planes. At the same time, the captain was clearly in great doubt: within an hour he was given two completely contradictory orders. However, in the air he understood the situation and attacked the German bombers they met, repelling the first strike:

“At approximately 4:15 a.m., the VNOS posts, which were constantly monitoring the airspace, received a message that four twin-engine aircraft at low altitude were heading east. The duty unit of Senior Lieutenant Klimenko rose into the air according to routine.

–You know, commissioner,–I told Trifonov,–I'll fly myself. And then you see, the darkness is falling, as if something, like Shalunov, had been messed up again. I'll figure out what kind of planes it is. And you are in charge here.

Soon I was already catching up with Klimenko’s flight in my I-16. As he approached, he gave the signal: “Get close to me and follow me.” I glanced at the airfield. A long white arrow stood out sharply at the edge of the airfield. It indicated the direction to intercept unknown aircraft... A little less than a minute passed, and ahead, a little lower, in the right bearing, two pairs of large aircraft appeared...

“I’m attacking, cover!”–I gave a signal to my people. A quick maneuver - and in the center of the crosshairs is the leading Yu-88 (an identification error typical even for experienced pilots of all countries - author's note). I press the trigger of the ShKAS machine guns. Tracer bullets rip open the fuselage of the enemy plane, it somehow reluctantly rolls, makes a turn and rushes towards the ground. A bright flame rises from the place of its fall, and a column of black smoke stretches towards the sky.

I glance at the onboard clock: 4 hours 20 minutes in the morning...”

According to the combat log of the regiment, Captain Geibo was credited with victory over the Xe-111 as part of the flight. Returning to the airfield, he tried to contact division headquarters, but was unable to do so due to communication problems. Despite this, further actions of the regiment command were clear and consistent. Geibo and the regiment's political commander no longer doubted that war had begun, and they clearly assigned their subordinates tasks to cover the airfield and the settlements of Mlynow and Dubno.

Simple name - Ivan Ivanov

Judging by the surviving documents, by order of the regiment headquarters, the pilots began to take off for combat duty at about 04:30. One of the units that was supposed to cover the airfield was led by Senior Lieutenant I. I. Ivanov. Extract from the ZhBD regiment:

“At 04:55, being at an altitude of 1500–2000 meters, covering the Dubno airfield, we noticed three Xe-111s going to bomb. Going into a dive, attacking the Xe-111 from behind, the flight opened fire. After expending its ammunition, Senior Lieutenant Ivanov rammed the Xe-111, which crashed 5 km from the Dubno airfield. Senior Lieutenant Ivanov died the death of the brave during the ramming, having defended the Motherland with his chest. The task of covering the airfield was completed. Xe-111s went west. 1500 pcs used. ShKAS cartridges."

The ram was seen by Ivanov’s colleagues, who at that moment were on the road from Dubno to Mlynow. This is how the former technician of the 46th IAP squadron, A.G. Bolnov, described this episode:

“...Machine gun fire was heard in the air. Three bombers were heading towards the Dubno airfield, and three fighters dived at them and fired. A moment later the fire stopped on both sides. A couple of fighters fell off and landed, having shot all their ammunition... Ivanov continued to pursue the bombers. They immediately bombed the Dubna airfield and went south, while Ivanov continued the pursuit. Being an excellent shooter and pilot, he did not shoot - apparently there was no more ammunition: he shot everything. A moment, and... We stopped at the turn of the highway to Lutsk. On the horizon, to the south of our observation, we saw an explosion - clouds of black smoke. I shouted: “We collided!”– the word “ram” has not yet entered our vocabulary ... "

Another witness to the ram, flight technician E.P. Solovyov:

“Our car was rushing from Lviv along the highway. Having noticed the exchange of fire between the “bombers” and our “hawks”, we realized that this was war. The moment when our “donkey” hit the “Heinkel” on the tail and it fell down like a stone, everyone saw it, and so did ours. Arriving at the regiment, we learned that Bushuev and Simonenko had left in the direction of the subsided battle without waiting for the doctor.

Simonenko told reporters that when he and the commissioner carried Ivan Ivanovich out of the cabin, he was covered in blood and unconscious. We rushed to the hospital in Dubno, but there we found all the medical staff in panic - they were ordered to urgently evacuate. Ivan Ivanovich was nevertheless accepted, and the orderlies carried him away on a stretcher.

Bushuev and Simonenko waited, helping to load equipment and patients into cars. Then the doctor came out and said: “The pilot died.” "We buried him in the cemetery,–recalled Simonenko,–They put up a post with a sign. We thought that we would drive the Germans away quickly,–Let's erect a monument."

I. I. Geibo also recalled the ram:

“Even in the afternoon, during a break between flights, someone reported to me that the flight commander, senior lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov, had not returned from the first combat mission... A group of mechanics was equipped to search for the fallen aircraft. They found the I-16 of our Ivan Ivanovich next to the wreckage of the Junkers. An examination and stories from the pilots who took part in the battle made it possible to establish that Senior Lieutenant Ivanov, having used up all the ammunition in the battle, went to ram..."

With the passage of time, it is difficult to establish why Ivanov carried out the ramming. Eyewitness accounts and documents indicate that the pilot fired all the cartridges. Most likely, he piloted an I-16 type 5, armed with only two 7.62 mm ShKAS guns, and it was not easy to shoot down a He 111 with a more serious weapon. In addition, Ivanov did not have much shooting practice. In any case, this is not so important - the main thing is that the Soviet pilot was ready to fight to the last and destroyed the enemy even at the cost of his own life, for which he was deservedly posthumously nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov and the pilots of his flight on the morning flight on June 22: Lieutenant Timofey Ivanovich Kondranin (died 07/05/1941) and Lieutenant Ivan Vasilyevich Yuryev (died 09/07/1942)

Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov was an experienced pilot who graduated from the Odessa Aviation School back in 1934 and served for five years as a light bomber pilot. By September 1939, already as a flight commander of the 2nd Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, he took part in the campaign against Western Ukraine, and at the beginning of 1940 he carried out several combat missions during the Soviet-Finnish War. After returning from the front, the best crews of the 2nd LBAP, including Ivanov’s crew, took part in the May Day parade of 1940 in Moscow.

In the summer of 1940, the 2nd LBAP was reorganized into the 138th SBAP, and the regiment received SB bombers to replace the outdated P-Z biplanes. Apparently, this retraining served as a reason for some of the pilots of the 2nd LBAP to “change their role” and retrain as fighters. As a result, I. I. Ivanov, instead of the SB, retrained on the I-16 and was assigned to the 46th IAP.

Other pilots of the 46th IAP acted no less bravely, and the German bombers were never able to bomb accurately. Despite several raids, the regiment's losses on the ground were minimal - according to the report of the 14th SAD, by the morning of June 23, 1941 “...one I-16 was destroyed at the airfield, one did not return from the mission. One I-153 was shot down. 11 people were wounded, one was killed. Regiment at the Granovka airfield." Documents from III./KG 55 confirm the minimal losses of the 46th IAP at the Mlynów airfield: “Result: Dubno airfield is not occupied (by enemy aircraft - author’s note). At the Mlynow airfield, bombs were dropped on approximately 30 biplanes and multi-engine aircraft standing in a group. Hit between planes..."

Downed Heinkel He 111 from the 7th squadron of the KG 55 Greif bomber squadron (artist I. Zlobin)

The greatest losses in the morning flight were suffered by 7./KG 55, which lost three Heinkels due to the actions of Soviet fighters. Two of them did not return from the mission along with the crews of Feldwebel Dietrich (Fw. Willi Dietrich) and Non-Commissioned Officer Wohlfeil (Uffz. Horst Wohlfeil), and the third, piloted by Oberfeldwebel Gründer (Ofw. Alfred Gründer), burned out after landing at the airfield Labunie. Two more bombers of the squadron were seriously damaged, and several crew members were injured.

In total, the pilots of the 46th IAP declared three aerial victories in the morning. In addition to the Heinkels shot down by Senior Lieutenant I. I. Ivanov and Captain I. I. Geibo’s flight, another bomber was credited to Senior Lieutenant S. L. Maksimenko. The exact timing of this application is not known. Considering the consonance between “Klimenko” and “Maksimenko” and that there was no pilot with the surname Klimenko in the 46th IAP, we can confidently say that in the morning it was Maksimenko who headed the duty unit mentioned by Geibo, and as a result of the attacks it was his unit that was shot down and burned “ Heinkel" Chief Sergeant Major Gründer, and two more aircraft were damaged.

Hauptmann Wittmer's second attempt

Summing up the results of the first flight, the commander of III./KG 55, Hauptmann Wittmer, had to be seriously concerned about the losses - out of 14 aircraft that took off, five were out of action. At the same time, entries in the group’s ZhBD about supposedly 50 Soviet aircraft destroyed at airfields seem to be a banal attempt to justify heavy losses. We must pay tribute to the commander of the German group - he made the right conclusions and tried to take revenge on the next flight.

Heinkel from the 55th squadron in flight over Mlynów airfield, June 22, 1941

At 15:30, Hauptmann Wittmer led all 18 serviceable Heinkels of III./KG 55 in a decisive attack, the only target of which was the Mlynów airfield. From the ZhBD group:

“At 15:45, a group in close formation attacked the airfield from a height of 1000 m... Details of the results were not observed due to strong attacks by fighters. After the bombs were dropped, no further launch of enemy aircraft took place. It was a good result.

Defense: a lot of fighters with retreat attacks. One of our vehicles was attacked by 7 enemy fighters. Boarding: 16:30–17:00. One I-16 fighter was shot down. The crews watched him fall. Weather conditions: good, with some clouds in places. Ammo used: 576SD 50.

Losses: Corporal Gantz's plane disappeared, being attacked by fighters after dropping bombs. He disappeared downstairs. The further fate could not be observed due to strong attacks by fighters. Non-Commissioned Officer Parr has been wounded."

A later note in the description of the raid mentions a real triumph: “According to clarification on the spot, after the capture of Mlynów, complete success was achieved: 40 aircraft were destroyed in the parking lot.”

Despite another “success” both in the report and later in the note, it is obvious that the Germans again received a “warm welcome” over the Mlynów airfield. Soviet fighters attacked the bombers as they approached. Due to the continuous attacks, the German crews were unable to record either the results of the bombing or the fate of the lost crew. This is how I. I. Geibo, who led the interception group, conveys the atmosphere of the battle:

“At an altitude of about eight hundred meters, another group of German bombers appeared... Three of our flights went out to intercept, and with them I did. As we approached, I saw two nines in the right bearing. The Junkers also noticed us and instantly closed ranks, huddled together, preparing for defense - after all, the denser the formation, the denser, and therefore more effective, the air gunners’ fire...

I gave the signal: “We go on the attack all at once, everyone chooses their own target.” And then he rushed at the leader. Now he's already in sight. I see flashes of return fire. I press the trigger. The fiery path of my bursts goes towards the target. It’s time for the Junkers to fall on its wing, but as if enchanted it continues to follow its previous course. The distance is rapidly closing. We need to get out! I make a sharp and deep turn to the left, preparing to attack again. And suddenly - a sharp pain in the thigh..."

Results of the day

Summing up and comparing the results, we note that the pilots of the 46th IAP managed to cover their airfield this time, not allowing the enemy to stay on the combat course and bomb accurately. We must also pay tribute to the courage of the German crews - they acted without cover, but the Soviet fighters did not manage to break up their formation, and they were able to shoot down one and damage another He 111 only at the cost of the same losses. One I-16 was hit by rifle fire, and Junior Lieutenant I.M. Tsibulko, who had just shot down a bomber, jumped out with a parachute, and Captain Geibo, who damaged the second He 111, was wounded and had difficulty landing the damaged plane.

I-16 fighters type 5 and 10, as well as training UTI-4, were destroyed as a result of flight accidents or abandoned due to malfunctions at the Mlynów airfield. Perhaps one of these vehicles was piloted by Captain Geibo in the evening battle on June 22, and then made an emergency landing due to combat damage

Together with the downed Heinkel from 9./KG 55, the crew of Corporal Ganz (Gefr. Franz Ganz) of five people was killed, another aircraft of the same squadron was damaged. This effectively ended the fighting of the first day of the war in the air in the area of ​​Dubno and Mlynów.

What have the opposing sides achieved? Group III./KG 55 and other units of the V Air Corps failed to destroy the materiel of the Soviet air units at the Mlynów airfield, despite the possibility of a first surprise strike. Having destroyed two I-16s on the ground and shot down another one in the air (except for Ivanov’s plane, which was destroyed during the ramming), the Germans lost five He 111s destroyed, and three more damaged, which is a third of the number available on the morning of June 22. In fairness, it should be noted that the German crews operated in difficult conditions: their targets were located 100–120 km from the border, they operated without fighter cover, being about an hour above the territory controlled by Soviet troops, which, along with the tactically illiterate organization of the first flight, led to big losses.

The 46th IAP was one of the few air force regiments whose pilots were able to not only reliably cover their airfield on June 22 and suffer minimal losses from assault strikes, but also inflict serious damage on the enemy. This was a consequence of both competent management and the personal courage of the pilots, who were ready to repel enemy attacks at the cost of their lives. Separately, it is necessary to note the outstanding leadership qualities of Captain I. I. Geibo, who fought superbly and was an example for young pilots of the 46th IAP.

The pilots of the 46th IAP who distinguished themselves on June 22, 1941, from left to right: deputy squadron commander, senior lieutenant Simon Lavrovich Maksimenko, an experienced pilot who took part in combat operations in Spain. In the memoirs, Geibo is listed as Klimenko’s “commander.” Later - squadron commander of the 10th IAP, died on 07/05/1942 in an air battle; junior lieutenants Konstantin Konstantinovich Kobyzev and Ivan Methodievich Tsibulko. Ivan Tsibulko died in a plane crash on 03/09/1943, being the commander of the 46th IAP squadron with the rank of captain. Konstantin Kobyzev was wounded in September 1941, and after recovery did not return to the front - he was an instructor at the Armavir pilot school, as well as a pilot at the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry

The number of victories declared by Soviet pilots and actually destroyed German aircraft is almost the same, even without taking into account damaged aircraft. In addition to the losses mentioned, in the afternoon in the Dubno area a He 111 from 3./KG 55 was shot down, along with which five members of the crew of non-commissioned officer Behringer (Uffz. Werner Bähringer) were killed. Probably the author of this victory was junior lieutenant K.K. Kobyzev. For his successes in the first battles (he was the only pilot of the regiment to claim two personal victories in the June battles), on August 2, 1941, he was awarded the highest award of the USSR - the Order of Lenin.

It is gratifying that all other pilots of the 46th IAP, who distinguished themselves in the battles of the first day, were awarded government awards by the same decree: I. I. Ivanov posthumously became a Hero of the Soviet Union, I. I. Geibo, I. M. Tsibulko and S. L. Maksimenko received the Order of the Red Banner.

The mighty will of the Creator of the world.
She called him to a great feat.
And crowns the hero with eternal glory.
She chose him as an instrument of vengeance...

Staff Captain P.N. Nesterov

Aerial ramming as a form of air combat

In 1908, a large article “On the military significance of airplanes” appeared on the pages of the newspaper “Russian Invalid”, the official publication of the military department. In it, the author put forward the idea of ​​​​bringing in special combat airplanes, “intended for squadron combat in the air,” to fight “for state supremacy in the air.”

At the same time, the author believed that: “(an airplane is) a flying machine ... is generally fragile and therefore any collision with opponents in the air, chest to chest, must inevitably end in the death of both aircraft colliding on board. There can be neither a winner nor a loser here, therefore, it must be a battle with maneuvering.” A few years later, the author of the article’s prediction was confirmed. In June 1912, the first air collision in the history of world aviation took place at a military airfield in Douai (France). While performing morning flights in the air at an altitude of 50 m, biplanes piloted by Captain Dubois and Lieutenant Penian collided. When they fell, both aviators died. In October 1912, a similar incident occurred in Germany, in May 1913 - in Russia. At the Gatchina airfield of the aviation department of the Officers' Aeronautical School (JSC OVSh), during training flights at an altitude of 12 - 16 m, the Nieuport of Lieutenant V.V. collided. Dybovsky and “Farman” Lieutenant A.A. Kovanko. The pilots escaped with minor bruises.

In total, during the period from 1912 to the start of the First World War, air collisions accounted for 6% of the total number of accidents in world aviation.

In order to avoid an air collision during troop maneuvers, Russian and foreign pilots were strongly recommended to fight at a certain distance from each other. The idea of ​​an air battle itself was not rejected by the military department. To conduct it, it was proposed to arm airplanes with guns or automatic weapons. This idea was reflected in the already mentioned article “On the military significance of airplanes”: “A gun, maybe a light machine gun, a few hand grenades - that’s all that can make up the armament of a flying projectile. Such weapons are quite sufficient to disable an enemy airplane and force it to descend, because a rifle bullet that hits successfully will stop the engine or put an aeronaut out of action, as will a successfully hit hand grenade, at close ranges thrown by hand, and at longer distances. long distance - from the same gun.”

In the fall of 1911, during large maneuvers of the troops of the Warsaw Military District, according to a pre-approved plan, two airplanes carried out a successful attack on a mock enemy airship. According to the district command, the presence of on-board weapons could lead to the destruction of the controlled balloon. But the absence of this urgently required the search for other forms of influence on the enemy aircraft.

A certain sensation among pilots was caused by the proposal of one of the theorists of domestic military aviation, mechanical engineer Lieutenant N.A. Yatsuka. In the summer of 1911, he published an article “On Air Combat” in the journal “Bulletin of Aeronautics”, where he wrote: “It is possible that in exceptional cases pilots will decide to ram someone else’s airplane with their airplane.”

In his work “Aeronautics in Naval Warfare” (1912), Nikolai Alexandrovich supported the idea of ​​​​an “air ram” that he had previously voiced, but with a different meaning. “It is not impossible,” wrote Yatsuk, “that the next war will show us cases when an aeronautical vehicle, in order to interfere with the reconnaissance of an enemy air force, will sacrifice itself by hitting it in order to cause its fall, at least at the cost of its death. Techniques of this kind are, of course, extreme. The fight in the air will be the bloodiest in terms of the number of people participating in it, since the damaged vehicles will, for the most part, quickly fall to the ground with all their crews.” However, his views remained unclaimed due to insufficient knowledge of the very nature of air combat.

The acting military pilot perceived the idea of ​​an air ram differently than others. commander of the 11th corps aviation detachment of the 3rd aviation company, Lieutenant P.N. Nesterov, seeing in it the possibility of turning an aircraft into a military weapon.

At the autumn large maneuvers of the troops of the Kyiv Military District in 1913, he showed in practice how it was possible to force an air enemy to refuse to carry out his mission. Taking advantage of the advantage in speed (about 20 km/h), Pyotr Nikolaevich, in his Nieuport-IV apparatus, imitated the attack of Farman-VII, piloted by Lieutenant V.E. Hartmann, forcing the latter to periodically change the course of his flight. “After the fourth attack, Hartmann shook his fist at Nesterov and flew back without completing reconnaissance.” This was the first simulation of air combat in domestic practice.

Lieutenant P. N. Nesterov near the Nieuport IV aircraft.
11th Corps Aviation Detachment

After landing, Nesterov was told that such an attack on an enemy airplane was only possible in peacetime, and in war these maneuvers were unlikely to have any effect on the enemy. Pyotr Nikolaevich thought for a moment and then answered with conviction: “It will be possible to hit him from above with the wheels.” Subsequently, the pilot repeatedly returned to the issue of ramming and proved its possibility, while allowing for two options.

The first is to rise above the enemy airplane, and then, in a steep dive, hit the end of the enemy’s wing with its wheels: the enemy airplane will be shot down, but you can glide safely. The second is to crash the propeller into the enemy’s tail and break his rudders. The propeller will shatter into pieces, but it is possible to glide safely. We must not forget that there were no parachutes yet.

In foreign countries in the pre-war years, air combat between airplanes was initially denied. For example, in Germany, where the rapid development of aviation began in 1912, the latter were considered only as means of reconnaissance and communications. The airplanes were armed with light small arms in the form of a revolver or carbine in case of a forced landing behind enemy lines. Meanwhile, the first successful tests of aviation as an air strike weapon during the Tripolitan (1911 - 1912) and 1st Balkan (1912 - 1913) wars convinced many leading European countries of the need to create special combat airplanes. At this time, information appeared that a special metal, high-speed fighter airplane had been built in Germany, which had undergone successful experimental tests. This was the reason for the Frenchman R. Esnault-Peltry to develop, together with artillery specialists, a project for the same fighter. Detailed characteristics were strictly confidential.

After the maneuvers of the St. Petersburg Military District in Russia in August 1913, the question openly arose about the need to form fighter aviation in the Russian army and arm airplanes with automatic weapons to combat enemy reconnaissance aircraft. However, by the beginning of the war, the aviation units of the Russian army remained practically unarmed.

The airplane as a means of armed struggle

The beginning of the First World War was characterized by the intensity of flights by aircraft of the warring parties, mainly for reconnaissance purposes. Already at the beginning of the war, their first combat clashes in the air were recorded. The main means of defeating the enemy used in air combat was the pilot's personal weapon. For pistol fire to be effective, it was necessary to get close to the enemy airplane at a distance of up to 50 m. Simultaneously with the fire, the pilots used the so-called. “intimidation technique,” ​​that is, active maneuvering near an enemy vehicle with the threat of colliding with it in the air in order to force the enemy to abandon the assigned task.

On August 17, 1914, the following information was published on the pages of the daily newspaper “Russkoe Slovo”: “An interesting message has been received about an air fight between Russian and German pilots. An enemy airplane unexpectedly appeared above the line of Russian troops. Our pilot expressed a desire to force the German to come down. He quickly took off, approached the enemy and forced him to land with a series of turns. The German pilot has been arrested." Subsequently, this technique was used repeatedly.

This circumstance led the Russian command to think about the possibility of using captured equipment for the needs of the Russian army. The commanders of aviation detachments at the front were now strongly recommended, if possible, not to destroy, but to forcibly land enemy aircraft. Later, within the walls of the capital’s plant of the Joint Stock Aeronautics Company of V. A. Lebedev, they received a new life. There were reasons for this. Firstly, the military department assessed the cost of restoration and newly built airplanes in the same way. Secondly, familiarity with foreign technologies and technical solutions made it possible to enrich one’s own design experience.

However, according to the pilots themselves, a forced landing could only affect a single enemy aircraft, while their group raid required other methods of influence, up to and including the destruction of the latter. This opinion was also shared by the staff captain of the 9th Siberian Rifle Brigade P.N. Nesterov, at the beginning of the war, commander of the 11th corps aviation detachment of the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front (SWF). He believed that if the enemy does not stop flying over our territory and refuses to surrender, he must be shot down. To resolve this issue, it was necessary to arm the airplanes with light machine guns, which was confirmed in one of the orders of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It stated, in particular: “In order to combat enemy aircraft, it seems necessary to arm the most heavy-duty of our airplanes. For which it is recognized that it is necessary to use Madsen automatic rifles.” However, at that time there were not enough automatic weapons to reach the established kit in field units.

The lack of reliable weapons in aviation, the absurd “valuable instructions” of military officials “to shoot buckshot from hand ...” forced Nesterov and other aviators to invent exotic weapons like a bomb “suspended on a long cable ... to destroy enemy airships”, to lower “thin copper wire from the tail of the aircraft with a load, so that, cutting off the path of an enemy plane, break its propeller”, “adapt a saw-tooth knife to the tail of the plane and ... rip open the shell of airships and tethered observation balloons with it”, throw “artillery shells instead of bombs”.

Without abandoning the views of N.A. Yatsuk on the use of power (ramming) strikes, Pyotr Nikolaevich was still a supporter of technical and maneuverable methods of fighting the enemy. Unfortunately, the tragic death of a remarkable pilot excluded the possibility of implementing his inventions in the Russian school of air combat.

Hunting for the "Albatross" - a step into immortality

During the Battle of Gorodok (September 5 - 12, 1914), the Austro-Hungarian command attempted to defeat the Russian 3rd and 8th armies of the Southwestern Front. But the counteroffensive that followed on September 4 in the zone of our three armies (9th, 4th and 5th) forced the enemy troops to begin a hasty retreat. Within a few days, our advanced units reached and captured the important center of Eastern Galicia - Lvov. Preparations for the upcoming operations required a large regrouping of troops. To reveal their new positions, locations of military command and control bodies, firing points, field airfields, and transport networks, the enemy made extensive use of his air forces. In addition to collecting intelligence information in the near rear of the Russian troops, enemy pilots, whenever possible, bombed our military installations, including the airfield of the 11th corps air detachment. On September 7, one of the Austrian airplanes dropped a bomb on his airfield “(a sample of an artillery shell), which, having fallen, was buried in the sand and did not explode.”

One of the prominent Austrian observer pilots, Lieutenant Baron von Friedrich Rosenthal, owner of vast lands in Eastern Galicia, was involved in combat work. He made his flights on an Albatross-type airplane, designed and built with his personal participation. In the area of ​​special attention of the enemy apparatus was the city of Zholkiev, Lviv region, where the estate of Baron F. Rosenthal was located, temporarily occupied by the headquarters of the 3rd Russian Army. The appearance of enemy aircraft in this area caused extreme irritation among the army command. Senior commanders immediately accused the flight crew of the 3rd Aviation Company of insufficient activity in the fight against enemy air.

On September 7, 1914, Quartermaster General of the Army Headquarters, Major General M.D. Bonch-Bruevich demanded that the pilots exclude Austrian flights in the Russian rear. Staff Captain P.N. Nesterov promised to take drastic measures to solve this problem.

Initially, the issue of air ramming was not raised at all. Considering the possibility of the Albatross appearing unescorted (previously it had flown in a group of three airplanes), it was decided to capture it by force landing. For this purpose, on the morning of September 8, P.N. Nesterov with his deputy lieutenant A.A. Kovanko worked out this option over the airfield. However, further events began to develop according to a different scenario. Already at the start, Nesterov’s single-seat airplane lost its load with a cable, which he expected to use when meeting with the enemy. During landing after a training flight, the engine suddenly malfunctioned, and at the direction of Pyotr Nikolaevich, the mechanics began checking its valves. The appearance of an enemy Albatross in the sky was an unpleasant surprise for Russian pilots. Without waiting for the troubleshooting on his device, Nesterov rushed to Kovanko’s car. In order not to risk his life, Pyotr Nikolaevich categorically refused to fly with his deputy.

Rapidly gaining a height of up to 1500 m on the Morane-Saulnier type (Morane-Saulnier G) (according to other sources - up to 2000 m), he attacked the Albatross from top to bottom. Witnesses of this unusual battle saw that after a sharp collision the enemy airplane nosed down and began to fall randomly. Nesterov’s apparatus swept further, then began to descend in a spiral. At an altitude of about 50 m, the Moran swayed sharply and it fell down like a stone. At that moment, the figure of the pilot separated from the apparatus.

Scheme of P. N. Nesterov’s ram

Map of the airplane crash site

Air ram. World War I period poster. 1914

When examining Nesterov’s corpse, doctors witnessed a fracture of his spine and minor damage to his skull. According to their conclusion, the spinal fracture could not have been caused by a fall on soft ground. Staff Captain P.N. Nesterov died in the air as a result of an airplane collision. The pilots who knew Pyotr Nikolaevich closely immediately doubted his deliberate ramming of the enemy air force. They believed that Nesterov had intentions to force the Albatross crew to land on the airfield, holding it through skillful maneuvering under the threat of using a ram. Pyotr Nikolaevich himself, who was well aware of the statistics of air collisions in the pre-war period and the high percentage of deaths, did not see the ram as a particular benefit for the small Russian aviation, where each device was worth its weight in gold. During the period August - September 1914 alone, the loss of airplanes in the active Russian army amounted to 94 airplanes (45% of the total).

The “Report of the Investigation into the Circumstances of the Heroic Death of the Head of the 11th Corps Aviation Detachment, Staff Captain Nesterov” stated: “Staff Captain Nesterov has long expressed the opinion that it is possible to shoot down an enemy aircraft by hitting the wheels of your own aircraft from above on the supporting surfaces of the enemy aircraft, Moreover, he admitted the possibility of a successful outcome for the ramming pilot.”

Therefore, most experts agreed that he made an attempt to attack the enemy airplane with a glancing blow, counting on the psychological effect. According to theoretical calculations, the tangential impact of a light single-seat aircraft could not lead to the destruction of a heavier airplane, such as the three-seat Albatross with a bomb load. This required either an apparatus of equal weight or a strike with the entire body of the attacking airplane. It seems that Nesterov had technical calculations for carrying out an aerial ramming in relation to a single-seater vehicle based on the attack of an enemy aircraft of equal mass. The possibility of an air attack in this way by heavy types of airplanes was not even discussed. But, ironically, this is exactly the situation that has developed in the skies of Eastern Galicia. Directing his car at the Austrian airplane, Nesterov lost sight of the fact that he had a heavier and less maneuverable two-seater Moran-Saulnier type “J”. As a result, instead of a tangential impact with the wheels on the wings of the enemy car, he crashed into it with the engine between two supporting surfaces, which led to a complete loss of control and destruction of the latter. This blow, according to the official version, caused the death of the Russian pilot himself.

In his book “Khodynka: Russian Aviation Runway,” aviation history specialist A. A. Demin cites an assessment of the tragic event made by the famous Soviet scientist V. S. Pyshnov.

Analyzing the ram, he, in particular, noted that the Moran had a very poor forward-down view and it was difficult to accurately determine the distance and “jewelfully” hit the Albatross with just its wheels. It is possible that turbulent flows from both airplanes and their mutual influence could have contributed. And then, according to Pyshnov, the following could happen: “If the Moran-Zh aircraft had only one elevator of a symmetrical profile, without a fixed part - a stabilizer, the aircraft could not fly with the handle thrown. Since a diving moment acted on the wing in the absence of lift, in the event of a thrown stick, the plane had to go into a dive with a further transition to inverted flight. As is known, after the ramming, which occurred at an altitude of about 1000 m, to the height of P.N. Nesterov was performing a spiral descent, but then the plane went into a dive and fell in an inverted position. This behavior of the aircraft indicates that P. Nesterov lost consciousness and released the control stick; after going into negative angles of attack and negative value... (G) he was thrown out of the aircraft because he was not tied down...".

Based on the analysis, it can be assumed that the pilot lost consciousness not at the moment of the ramming strike, but much later, during a steep spiral due to weakness of the vestibular apparatus. About P.N.’s health problems Nesterov at the front was later mentioned by his colleagues, in particular the military pilot V.G. Sokolov, who witnessed Pyotr Nikolaevich's deep fainting after another flight. The intensity of his work is reflected in the combat activity log of the 11th Corps Aviation Detachment. During the period from August 10 to September 8, 1914, he completed 12 combat missions, the total flight time was 18 hours 39 minutes. The last of them (September 8) took only 15 minutes and cost the Russian pilot his life.

Nesterov’s body was soon discovered 6 km from the town of Zholkiev in a dry field near a swamp between an airplane and a motor. 400 m away from him lay a downed Albatross, partially buried in swampy soil. The corpses of two members of his crew (Lieutenant F. Rosenthal and non-commissioned officer F. Malina) were discovered immediately. According to some reports, the body of the third crew member, whose name has not been established, was found much later.

For his unprecedented feat, staff captain P.N. Nesterov was the first among Russian pilots to be posthumously awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree, and promoted to the rank of captain. The deceased hero was buried on September 13, 1914 at Askold’s grave in Kyiv. Later, the ashes of the Russian pilot were transferred to the Lukyanovskoe cemetery in the capital of Ukraine.

Nesterov's legacy

The tragic outcome of Nesterov’s air ramming at the beginning cast doubt on the possibility of the pilot who carried it out to survive.

Doubts were dispelled by another Russian pilot - Lieutenant of the 12th Uhlan Belgorod Regiment A. A. Kozakov, who during an air battle with the two-seater German “Albatross” S.I on March 31, 1915, managed to shoot it down with a “Nesterov” sliding impact with wheels from above. During the First World War, Kozakov was recognized as the most successful pilot in Russia.

He became acquainted with the advanced views of P. N. Nesterov on the fight against enemy aircraft thanks to the hero’s younger brother Mikhail, a pilot of the Brest-Litovsk corps air squad, who tragically died in the fall of 1914 in a plane crash.

Later, the Allies (the British) recognized the air ram (we are talking about a tangential strike) as one of the forms of Russian air combat, pointing out that when they (Russian pilots) do not have bombs, they rise above the enemy airplane, and, flying over it, they hit him with the bottom of their airplane.

The subsequent equipping of aircraft with automatic weapons relegated aerial rams to the background. It would seem that they inevitably had to go down in history. But in our country they did not abandon the ideas of Pyotr Nesterov, and for a long time the air ram terrified enemies, and the fearlessness of Soviet pilots aroused sincere admiration and respect in the world. The practice of aerial boarding (ramming) was inherent in the flight personnel of fighter aircraft of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces for a long time and has not lost its relevance today (in exceptional cases, such a method of air combat is quite possible).

Back in the fall of 1914, Russian society came up with a proposal to perpetuate the memory of the brave pilot. Mr. A. S. Zholkevich (editor of the newspaper “Novoye Vremya”) took the initiative, starting to collect money with the aim of acquiring several acres of land at the site of the hero’s death for the construction of a memorial obelisk. In the same year, a memorial cross was erected in the area of ​​Zholkiev, and later a monument was erected.

Nowadays, monuments to the brave Russian pilot have been unveiled in Kiev and Nizhny Novgorod, a memorial bust has been erected in Kazan, asteroid No. 3071 has been named after him. A special state award of the Russian Federation has been established in honor of P. N. Nesterov - the Nesterov Medal.

The grave of P. N. Nesterov in Kyiv. Modern look

Monument to P. N. Nesterov in Kyiv on Pobeda Avenue.
Sculptor E. A. Karpov, architect A. Snitsarev

Memorial plaque in Kyiv on a house on Moskovskaya street,
where the pilot P. N. Nesterov lived in 1914

Monument to P.N. Nesterov in Nizhny Novgorod.
The authors of the project are sculptors Honored Artist of the RSFSR A. I. Rukavishnikov and People’s Artist of the RSFSR, Corresponding Member
Academy of Arts of the USSR I. M. Rukavishnikov

Memorial sign at the site of the death of P. N. Nesterov

Alexey Lashkov,
senior researcher at the Research Institute
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

"I want everything..."

Russian pilot Pyotr Nesterov; Nesterov's ram (postcard from the 1st World War); Russian pilot Alexander Kozakov

Canadian ace William Bishop; Coppens's HD-1 "Henrio" breaks away from the "Draken" it rammed; Belgian ace Willie Coppens

Soviet pilot Evgeny Stepanov; Japanese pilot Shogo Saito; Polish pilot Leopold Pamula

Ray Holmes in the cockpit of his Hurricane; Ray Holmes ram

"Killer Fau" Joseph Berry
so Berry and many other British pilots rammed German V-1 missiles

Bulgarian pilots Dimitar Spisarevski and Nedelcho Bonchev

Predecessor of the "kamikaze" Yoichi Tomonaga
Attack of the torpedo bomber "Kate", filmed from the aircraft carrier "Yorktown" during the Battle of Midway Atoll.
This is what Tomonaga's last attack looked like (it is quite possible that it was his plane that was filmed)

Similar kamikaze attacks terrified American sailors

German pilots: fighter ace Hermann Graf and attack ace Alvin Boerst

Commander of fighter-attack squadrons Walter Dahl; Werner Gert, who rammed 3 Fortresses;
Vili Maksimovich, who destroyed 7 “Fortresses” with rams

The assault version of the FW-190 fighter, equipped with a fully armored cabin and solid armored glass, allowed German pilots
get close to the “Flying Fortresses” and carry out a killer ram

A manned analogue of the V-1 rocket - Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg, and the inspiration for the idea of ​​​​the “German kamikaze” Hana Reich

Conclusion:

Alexey Stepanov, Petr Vlasov
Samara

Hubert Heckmann 25.05. 1944 rams Captain Joe Bennett's Mustang, depriving the American fighter squadron of leadership