Battle for Berlin front commanders. Berlin offensive operation (1945)

BATTLE FOR BERLIN - the final strategic offensive operation carried out by Soviet troops on April 16 - May 8 with the aim of defeating the group of German troops defending in the Berlin direction, capturing Berlin and reaching the Elbe River to join the Allied forces.

Balance of power

In the spring of 1945, the armed forces of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France fought on German territory. The Soviet army was located 60 km from Berlin, and the advanced units of the American-British troops reached the Elbe 100-120 km from the German capital. made attempts to encourage the commander-in-chief of the armies of Western countries to take Berlin before the Red Army. But, fearing major losses, D. Eisenhower said in a telegram on March 28 that the Western allies were not going to take Berlin. The main forces of the Germans were still concentrated against the Soviet forces (214 divisions and 14 brigades), and only 60 divisions acted against the Allies. A total of 1 million people, 10,400 guns and mortars, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, 3,300 combat aircraft. A strategic reserve of 8 divisions was formed in the rear of the German army groups. The defense of the German capital included the Oder-Neissen line 20-40 km deep, which had 3 lanes, and the Berlin defensive area, which included 3 ring lines. The city itself was divided into 9 sectors, the garrison numbered up to 200 thousand people. The metro was widely used for covert maneuver by forces and means. Every street, house, and canal represented a defensive line.

To carry out the Berlin operation, the Soviet army attracted troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, led by a marshal, led by a marshal, led by a marshal. A total of 2.5 million people, 41,600 guns and mortars, 6,250 tanks and self-propelled guns, 7,500 aircraft. The plan of the Soviet command was to break through the enemy’s defenses along the Oder and Neisse with powerful attacks on three fronts, encircle the main group of German troops, simultaneously dismember it into several parts and destroy it, and then reach the Elbe.

Main stages of the battle

Based on the nature of the tasks performed and the results, the Berlin operation is divided into three stages. On the first (April 16-19), troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts broke through the Oder-Neissen defensive line, and the 2nd Belorussian Front completed its regrouping and conducted reconnaissance in force. At the second stage (April 19-25), troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, at the direction of Headquarters, surrounded and dismembered the Berlin enemy group. At the third stage (April 26 - May 8), the enemy was destroyed. Soviet troops captured Berlin and united with the allies. Germany capitulated.

On April 16, at 3 a.m., aviation and artillery preparation began, after which 143 anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on, and infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the enemy. The closer the Seelow Heights became, the stronger the German resistance was. The German command created on them the most powerful resistance center in the 2nd defense line, which had continuous trenches, a large number of bunkers, machine gun sites, trenches for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. An anti-tank ditch up to 3 meters deep and 3.5 meters wide was dug in front of them, and the approaches to them were mined and shot through with multi-layered cross artillery and rifle-machine gun fire. The equipment could overcome the Zelovsky Heights only along highways that were mined.

The heights were defended by troops of the 9th Army, reinforced by artillery from the Berlin zone. To speed up the advance of the troops, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, G. Zhukov, brought the 1st and 2nd Tank Army into the battle. However, they became involved in stubborn fighting and were unable to break away from the infantry. The front troops had to successively break through several lines of defense. In the main areas near the Zelovsky Heights, the troops of the 8th Guards Army (Colonel General V.I. Chuikov), in cooperation with the 1st Tank Army (Colonel General M.E. Katukov), managed to break through it only on April 17. By the end of April 19, they had completed the breakthrough of the 3rd line of the Oder line.

The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed more successfully at this time. By the end of April 18, front troops completed the breakthrough of the Niessen defense line, crossed the Spree River and provided conditions for encircling Berlin from the South. The 2nd Belorussian Front, led by Rokossovsky, crossed the Ost-Oder on April 18-19, crossed the interfluve of the Ost-Oder and West Oder and took the starting position for crossing the West Oder. Further advance was difficult due to the flooding of the river, and difficulties arose with the transfer of artillery and tanks.

On April 20, long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front opened fire on Berlin. The next day, the first Soviet units broke into the outskirts of the city.

On April 22, the last operational meeting of the German High Command, led by Hitler, took place. It was decided to withdraw the 12th Army from its positions on the Elbe and send it east to meet the troops of the 9th Army, which was striking at the Soviet troops, from the area southeast of Berlin. In an effort to delay the advance of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the German command launched a counterattack from the Görlitz area to the rear of the strike group of Soviet troops. By April 23, German troops had penetrated their position 20 kilometers, but by the end of the next day the enemy’s advance had been stopped.

Storm of Berlin

On April 24, the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front united with units of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the west, encircling the city. The next day, in the Torgau area on the Elbe River, troops of the 5th Guards Army met with units of the 1st American Army approaching from the west. At this time, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front successfully crossed the West Oder, broke through the defenses on the western bank and pinned down the forces of the enemy's 3rd Tank Army. The assault on Berlin began, every house in which was turned into a real fortress. About 200 militia units (Volkssturm) under the overall command of Himmler, armed with carbines and Faustpatrons, consisted of men aged 16 to 60 and women conscripted from the age of 18, took part in the defense of the city.

Each army operated in its own zone, consistently breaking into the city's defenses from house to house. There were hand-to-hand fights in the subway and underground tunnels. The basis of the combat formations of rifle and tank units during the fighting in the city were assault detachments and groups. Direct fire artillery and aviation were also widely used. The civilian population suffered seriously. At the same time, the feat of Sergeant N.I. went down in history. Masalov, who carried a German girl out from under fire (his feat is immortalized in a monument in Treptower Park).

On April 29, fighting began for the Reichstag (the lower house of parliament in Germany), which the Germans had turned into a powerful defense center; deep ditches were dug around the building, barriers were erected, and firing points were created. Basically, the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery were defended by SS troops: units of the 11th SS Volunteer Division "Nordland", the SS French battalion Fene from the Charlemagne division and the Latvian battalion of the 15th SS Grenadier Division (Latvian SS Division), as well as the SS security units of the Fuhrer Adolf Hitler (in total there were about 1 thousand people). On the morning of April 30, having broken stubborn resistance, Soviet units broke into the building. On the same day, A. Hitler and his wife committed suicide.

By the end of the day, the Reichstag was taken, the remaining defenders defended themselves in the basement. On its pediment are scouts of the 756th Regiment of the 150th Infantry Division M.A. Egorov and M.V. Kantaria established the Red Banner, which became. With special military honors, on a special flight on a Li-2 plane, it was delivered from Berlin to Moscow, where on June 24, at the Victory Parade, it was solemnly transported in a special equipped vehicle along Red Square in front of the combined regiments of the front.

But the fighting inside the building ended only on the morning of May 1, and individual defenders who were fighting in the basement surrendered only on the night of May 2. On the walls of the Reichstag from the floor to almost the ceiling, Soviet soldiers left their inscriptions and sayings.

Surrender of fascist troops

On May 1, only the Tiergarten park area and the government quarter remained in German hands. The imperial chancellery was located here, in the courtyard of which there was a bunker at Hitler's headquarters. On the night of May 1, by prior arrangement, the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov, the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff, General Krebs, arrived to report Hitler’s suicide and the proposal of the new German government to conclude an armistice. The message was immediately transmitted to G.K. Zhukov, who himself called Moscow. In the conversation, Stalin confirmed his categorical demand for unconditional surrender. On the evening of May 1, the new German government rejected the demand for unconditional surrender, and Soviet troops resumed the assault with renewed vigor, bringing down all their firepower on the city.

Early in the morning of May 2, the Berlin metro was flooded - a group of sappers from the SS Nordland division blew up the tunnel. Water rushed into the tunnels, where a large number of civilians and wounded were taking refuge. The number of victims is still unknown. At 6:30 a.m. on May 2, the chief of defense of Berlin, General G. Weidling, surrendered and wrote a surrender order, which was duplicated and, with the help of loudspeaker installations and radio, communicated to enemy units defending in the center of Berlin. German troops began to surrender. However, individual detachments continued to resist and fought their way towards the Western allies to surrender. A few managed to break through to the Elbe crossing area and move into the zone of occupation of the American army.

On May 8 at 22:43 (Central European time) in Berlin in Karlshort, in the building of the former military engineering school, it was signed. Present at the signing of the act were: Marshal of the USSR G.K. Zhukov, British Air Chief Marshal A. Tedder; as witnesses - the commander of the US strategic air forces, General K. Spaats, the commander-in-chief of the French army, General J.M. de Lattre de Tassigny. On behalf of Germany, the act was signed by those who had the appropriate authority to do so from (appointed by Hitler before his death as the President of the German Empire and the Minister of War) and brought to Berlin: the former head of the Wehrmacht High Command, Field Marshal W. Keitel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet H. Friedeburg and Colonel General of Aviation G. Stumpf.

To commemorate the USSR's victory over Nazi Germany, May 9 became Victory Day. On this day, a salute of 30 artillery salvoes from a thousand guns was fired in Moscow.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 23 tank and motorized divisions, captured about 480 thousand people, captured up to 11 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, and 4,500 aircraft. The Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces established the medal “For the Capture of Berlin,” which was awarded to about 1,082 thousand soldiers. The 187 units and formations that most distinguished themselves during the assault on the German capital were given the honorary name “Berlin.” More than 600 participants in the operation were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The operation plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command was to deliver several powerful blows on a wide front, dismember the enemy’s Berlin group, encircle and destroy it piece by piece. The operation began on April 16, 1945. After powerful artillery and air preparation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front attacked the enemy on the Oder River. At the same time, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to cross the Neisse River. Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, Soviet troops broke through his defenses.

On April 20, long-range artillery fire from the 1st Belorussian Front on Berlin marked the beginning of its assault. By the evening of April 21, his shock units reached the northeastern outskirts of the city.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried out a rapid maneuver to reach Berlin from the south and west. On April 21, having advanced 95 kilometers, tank units of the front broke into the southern outskirts of the city. Taking advantage of the success of tank formations, the combined arms armies of the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front quickly advanced westward.

On April 25, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian Fronts united west of Berlin, completing the encirclement of the entire Berlin enemy group (500 thousand people).

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front crossed the Oder and, having broken through the enemy’s defenses, advanced to a depth of 20 kilometers by April 25. They firmly pinned down the 3rd German Tank Army, preventing it from being used on the approaches to Berlin.

The Nazi group in Berlin, despite the obvious doom, continued stubborn resistance. In fierce street battles on April 26-28, it was cut by Soviet troops into three isolated parts.

The fighting went on day and night. Breaking through to the center of Berlin, Soviet soldiers stormed every street and every house. On some days they managed to clear up to 300 blocks of the enemy. Hand-to-hand combat broke out in subway tunnels, underground communication structures and communication passages. The basis of the combat formations of rifle and tank units during the fighting in the city were assault detachments and groups. Most of the artillery (up to 152 mm and 203 mm guns) was assigned to rifle units for direct fire. Tanks operated as part of both rifle formations and tank corps and armies, promptly subordinate to the command of combined arms armies or operating in their own offensive zone. Attempts to use tanks independently led to heavy losses from artillery fire and faustpatrons. Due to the fact that Berlin was shrouded in smoke during the assault, the massive use of bomber aircraft was often difficult. The most powerful strikes on military targets in the city were carried out by aviation on April 25 and on the night of April 26; 2,049 aircraft took part in these strikes.

By April 28, only the central part remained in the hands of the defenders of Berlin, shot from all sides by Soviet artillery, and by the evening of the same day, units of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Reichstag area.

The Reichstag garrison numbered up to one thousand soldiers and officers, but it continued to continuously strengthen. It was armed with a large number of machine guns and faust cartridges. There were also artillery pieces. Deep ditches were dug around the building, various barriers were erected, and machine gun and artillery firing points were equipped.

On April 30, troops of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front began fighting for the Reichstag, which immediately became extremely fierce. Only in the evening, after repeated attacks, Soviet soldiers broke into the building. The Nazis put up fierce resistance. Hand-to-hand combat broke out on the stairs and in the corridors every now and then. The assault units, step by step, room by room, floor by floor, cleared the Reichstag building of the enemy. The entire path of Soviet soldiers from the main entrance to the Reichstag to the roof was marked with red flags and flags. On the night of May 1, the Victory Banner was hoisted over the building of the defeated Reichstag. The battles for the Reichstag continued until the morning of May 1, and individual groups of the enemy, holed up in basement compartments, capitulated only on the night of May 2.

In the battles for the Reichstag, the enemy lost more than 2 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded. Soviet troops captured over 2.6 thousand Nazis, as well as 1.8 thousand rifles and machine guns, 59 artillery pieces, 15 tanks and assault guns as trophies.

On May 1, units of the 3rd Shock Army, advancing from the north, met south of the Reichstag with units of the 8th Guards Army, advancing from the south. On the same day, two important Berlin defense centers surrendered: the Spandau citadel and the Flakturm I (Zoobunker) concrete anti-aircraft defense tower.

By 15:00 on May 2, enemy resistance had completely ceased, the remnants of the Berlin garrison surrendered with a total of more than 134 thousand people.

During the fighting, out of approximately 2 million Berliners, about 125 thousand died, and a significant part of Berlin was destroyed. Of the 250 thousand buildings in the city, about 30 thousand were completely destroyed, more than 20 thousand buildings were in a dilapidated state, more than 150 thousand buildings had moderate damage. More than a third of metro stations were flooded and destroyed, 225 bridges were blown up by Nazi troops.

The fighting with individual groups breaking through from the outskirts of Berlin to the west ended on May 5. On the night of May 9, the Act of Surrender of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany was signed.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest group of enemy troops in the history of wars. They defeated 70 enemy infantry, 23 tank and mechanized divisions and captured 480 thousand people.

The Berlin operation cost the Soviet troops dearly. Their irretrievable losses amounted to 78,291 people, and sanitary losses - 274,184 people.

More than 600 participants in the Berlin operation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 13 people were awarded the second Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

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On the eve of the 70th anniversary portal offers its readers a chapter from the forthcoming book by M. I. Frolov and V. V. Vasilik “Battles and Victories. The Great Patriotic War" about the feat of the last days of the war and the courage, fortitude and mercy of Soviet soldiers shown during the capture of Berlin.

One of the final chords of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War was the Berlin operation. It led to the occupation of the capital the German Reich, the destruction and capture of almost a million enemy forces and, ultimately, the surrender of Nazi Germany.

Unfortunately, there has been a lot of speculation surrounding it recently. The first is that the 1st Belorussian Front, under the command, supposedly could have taken Berlin in January - February 1945 after capturing bridgeheads on the Oder, 70 kilometers from Berlin, and this was prevented only by Stalin’s voluntaristic decision. In fact, there were no real opportunities to capture Berlin in the winter of 1945: the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought 500-600 km, suffering losses, and an attack on the German capital without preparation, with exposed flanks, could end in disaster.

Much in the post-war structure of the world depended on who would enter first Berlin

The operation to capture Berlin was prepared carefully and was carried out only after the destruction of the enemy Pomeranian group. The need to destroy the Berlin group was dictated by both military and political considerations. Much in the post-war structure of the world depended on who would enter first Berlin - us or the Americans. The successful offensive of Anglo-American troops in West Germany created the possibility that the Allies would be the first to capture Berlin, so Soviet military leaders had to hurry.

By the end of March, the Headquarters developed a plan for an attack on the German capital. The main role was given to the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of G.K. Zhukov. The 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I. S. Konev was assigned a supporting role - “to defeat the enemy group (...) south of Berlin,” and then strike at Dresden and Leipzig. However, as the operation progressed, I. S. Konev, wanting to gain the glory of the winner, secretly made adjustments to the original plans and redirected part of his troops to Berlin. Thanks to this, a myth was created about a competition between two military leaders, Zhukov and Konev, which was allegedly arranged by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: the prize in it was supposedly the glory of the winner, and the bargaining chip was soldiers' lives. In fact, the Stavka plan was rational and provided for the fastest possible capture of Berlin with minimal losses.

The main thing in Zhukov’s plan was to prevent the creation of a strong group in the city and the long-term defense of Berlin

The components of this plan, developed by G.K. Zhukov, were a breakthrough of the front by tank armies. Then, when the tank armies manage to break out into operational space, they must go to the outskirts of Berlin and form a kind of “cocoon” around German capital. “Cocoon” would prevent the garrison from being strengthened by the 200,000-strong 9th Army or reserves from the west. It was not intended to enter the city at this stage. With the approach of the Soviet combined arms armies, the “cocoon” opened, and Berlin could already be stormed according to all the rules. The main thing in Zhukov’s plan was to prevent the creation of a strong group in the city itself and the long-term defense of Berlin following the example of Budapest (December 1944 - February 1945) or Poznan (January - February 1945). And this plan ultimately succeeded.

A group of one and a half million people from two fronts was concentrated against the German forces, which totaled about a million people. The 1st Belorussian Front alone consisted of 3059 tanks and self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery units), 14038 guns. The forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front were more modest (about 1000 tanks, 2200 guns). The action of ground troops was supported by aviation of three air armies (4th, 16th, 2nd), with a total number of 6706 aircraft of all types. They were opposed by only 1950 aircraft of two air fleets (the 6th WF and the Reich WF). April 14 and 15 were spent in reconnaissance in force at the Kyustrin bridgehead. Careful probing of the enemy's defenses created the illusion among the Germans that the Soviet the offensive will begin only in a few days. However, at three o'clock in the morning Berlin time, artillery preparation began, lasting 2.5 hours. Of the 2,500 guns and 1,600 artillery installations, 450,000 rounds were fired.

The actual artillery preparation took 30 minutes, the rest of the time was occupied by the “barrage of fire” - fire support of the advancing troops of the 5th Shock Army (commander N.E. Berzarin) and the 8th Guards Army under the command of the hero V.I. Chuikov. In the afternoon, two tank guard armies were sent to the emerging breakthrough at once - the 1st and 2nd, under the command of M.E. Katukov and S.I. Bogdanov, for a total of 1237 tanks and self-propelled guns. Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, including divisions of the Polish Army, crossed the Oder along the entire front line. The actions of the ground forces were supported by aviation, which on the first day alone made about 5,300 sorties, destroyed 165 enemy aircraft and hit a number of important ground targets.

Nevertheless, the advance of the Soviet troops was quite slow due to the stubborn resistance of the Germans and the presence of a large number of engineering and natural barriers, especially canals. By the end of April 16, Soviet troops had reached only the second line of defense. A particular difficulty was overcoming the seemingly impregnable Seelow Heights, which our troops “gnawed through” with great difficulty. Tank operations were limited due to the nature of the terrain, and artillery and infantry were often tasked with assaulting enemy positions. Due to unstable weather, aviation was at times unable to provide full support.

However, the German forces were no longer the same as in 1943, 1944, or even at the beginning of 1945. They turned out to be no longer capable of counterattacks, but only formed “traffic jams” that, with their resistance, tried to delay the advance of the Soviet troops.

Nevertheless, on April 19, under the attacks of the 2nd Tank Guards and 8th Guards Armies, the Wotan defensive line was broken through and a rapid breakthrough to Berlin began; On April 19 alone, Katukov’s army covered 30 kilometers. Thanks to the actions of the 69th and other armies, the “Halba cauldron” was created: the main forces of the German 9th Army stationed on the Oder under the command of Busse were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin. This was one of the major defeats of the Germans, according to A. Isaev, undeservedly remaining in the shadow of the actual assault on the city.

It is customary in the liberal press to exaggerate the losses on the Seelow Heights, mixing them with losses in the entire Berlin operation (irretrievable losses of Soviet troops in it amounted to 80 thousand people, and total losses - 360 thousand people). Real total losses of the 8th Guards and 69th armies during the offensive in the Seelow Heights area amounted to about 20 thousand people. Irreversible losses amounted to approximately 5 thousand people.

During April 20-21, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, overcoming German resistance, moved to the suburbs of Berlin and closed the external encirclement. At 6 o'clock in the morning on April 21, the advanced units of the 171st division (commander - Colonel A.I. Negoda) crossed the Berlin ring highway and thereby began the battle for Greater Berlin.

Meanwhile, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Neisse, then the Spree, and entered Cottbus, which was captured on April 22. By order of I. S. Konev, two tank armies were turned to Berlin - the 3rd Guards under the command of P. S. Rybalko and the 4th Guards under the command of A. D. Lelyushenko. In stubborn battles, they broke through the Barut-Zossen defensive line and captured the city of Zossen, where the General Headquarters of the German ground forces was located. On April 23, the advanced units of the 4th Panzer The armies reached the Teltow Canal in the area of ​​Standorf, a southwestern suburb of Berlin.

Steiner's army group was made up of motley and very shabby units, right down to a battalion of translators

Anticipating his imminent end, on April 21, Hitler ordered SS General Steiner to assemble a group to relieve Berlin and restore communications between the 56th and 110th Corps. Steiner's so-called army group was a typical "patchwork quilt", made up of motley and very shabby units, right down to a battalion of translators. According to the Fuhrer's order, she was supposed to set out on April 21, but was able to go on the offensive only on April 23. The offensive was unsuccessful; moreover, under the pressure of Soviet troops from the east, German troops had to retreat and leave a bridgehead on the southern bank of the Hohenzollern Canal.

Only on April 25, having received more than modest reinforcements, Steiner’s group resumed its offensive in the direction of Spandau. But at Hermannsdorf it was stopped by Polish divisions, which launched a counteroffensive. Steiner’s group was finally neutralized by the forces of P. A. Belov’s 61st Army, which on April 29 came to its rear and forced its remnants to retreat to the Elbe.

Another failed savior of Berlin was Walter Wenck, commander of the 12th Army, hastily assembled from recruits in order to plug the hole on the Western Front. By order of Reichsmarschall Keitel on April 23, the 12th Army was to leave its positions on the Elbe and go to relieve Berlin. However, although clashes with units of the Red Army began on April 23, the 12th Army was able to go on the offensive only on April 28. The direction was chosen to Potsdam and the southern suburbs of Berlin. Initially, it met with some success due to the fact that units of the 4th Guards Tank Army were on the march and the 12th Army managed to somewhat push back the Soviet motorized infantry. But soon the Soviet command organized a counterattack with the forces of the 5th and 6th mechanized corps. Near Potsdam, Wenck's army was stopped. Already on April 29, he radioed to the General Staff of the Ground Forces: “The army... is under such strong pressure from the enemy that an attack on Berlin is no longer possible.”

Information about the situation of Wenck's army accelerated Hitler's suicide.

The only thing that parts of the 12th Army were able to achieve was to hold positions near Beelitz and wait for a small part of the 9th Army (about 30 thousand people) to leave the “Halba cauldron”. On May 2, Wenck's army and parts of the 9th Army began to retreat towards the Elbe in order to surrender to the Allies.

Berlin buildings were being prepared for defense, bridges across the Spree River and canals were mined. Pillboxes and bunkers were built, machine gun nests were equipped

On April 23, the assault on Berlin began. At first glance, Berlin was a fairly powerful fortress, especially considering that the barricades on its streets were built at an industrial level and reached a height and width of 2.5 m. The so-called air defense towers were a great help in defense. Buildings were being prepared for defense, bridges across the Spree River and canals were mined. Pillboxes and bunkers were built everywhere, and machine gun nests were equipped. The city was divided into 9 defense sectors. According to the plan, the garrison size of each sector was supposed to be 25 thousand people. However, in reality there were no more than 10-12 thousand people. In total, the Berlin garrison numbered no more than 100 thousand people, which was affected by the miscalculation of the command of the Vistula Army, which focused on the Oder Shield, as well as the blocking measures of the Soviet troops, which did not allow a significant number of German units to withdraw to Berlin. The withdrawal of the 56th Panzer Corps provided little reinforcement to the defenders of Berlin, as its strength was reduced to a division. For 88 thousand hectares of the city there were only 140 thousand defenders. Unlike Stalingrad and Budapest, there could be no talk of occupying every house; only the key buildings of the neighborhoods were defended.

In addition, the garrison of Berlin was an extremely motley sight, there were up to 70 (!) types of troops. A significant part of the defenders of Berlin were Volkssturm (people's militia), among them there were many teenagers from the Hitler Youth. The Berlin garrison was in dire need of weapons and ammunition. The entry of 450 thousand battle-hardened Soviet soldiers into the city left no chance for the defenders. This led to a relatively quick assault on Berlin - about 10 days.

However, these ten days, which shocked the world, were filled with hard, bloody labor for the soldiers and officers of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. Significant difficulties associated with large losses were the crossing of water barriers - rivers, lakes and canals, the fight against enemy snipers and faustpatronniks, especially in the ruins of buildings. At the same time, it should be noted that there was a lack of infantry in the assault troops, due to both general losses and those suffered before the direct assault on Berlin. The experience of street fighting, starting from Stalingrad, was taken into account, especially during the storming of the German “festungs” (fortresses) - Poznan, Konigsberg. In the assault detachments, special assault groups were formed, consisting of blocking subgroups (a motorized infantry platoon, a sapper squad), a support subgroup (two motorized infantry platoons, an anti-tank rifle platoon), two 76 mm and one 57 mm guns. The groups moved along the same street (one on the right, the other on the left). While the blocking subgroup was blowing up houses and blocking firing points, the support subgroup supported it with fire. Often assault groups were assigned tanks and self-propelled guns, which provided them with fire support.

In street battles in Berlin, tanks acted as a shield for advancing soldiers, covering them with their fire and armor, and with a sword in street battles

The question was repeatedly raised in the liberal press: “Was it worth entering Berlin with tanks?” and even a kind of cliché was formed: tank armies burned by Faustpatrons on the streets of Berlin. However, the participants in the battle for Berlin, in particular the commander of the 3rd Tank Army P.S. Rybalko, have a different opinion: “The use of tank and mechanized formations and units against populated areas, including cities, despite the undesirability of limiting their mobility in these battles, as the extensive experience of the Patriotic War has shown, very often becomes inevitable. Therefore, our tank and mechanized troops need to be well trained in this type of combat.” In the conditions of street fighting in Berlin, tanks were at the same time a shield for the advancing soldiers, covering them with their fire and armor, and with a sword in street battles. It is worth noting that the importance of Faustpatrons is greatly exaggerated: under normal conditions, the losses of Soviet tanks from Faustpatrons were 10 times less than from the actions of German artillery. The fact that in the battles for Berlin half of the losses of Soviet tanks were caused by Faust cartridges once again proves the huge level of German losses in equipment, primarily in anti-tank artillery and tanks.

Often, assault groups showed miracles of courage and professionalism. So, on April 28, soldiers of the 28th Rifle Corps captured 2021 prisoners, 5 tanks, 1380 vehicles, freed 5 thousand prisoners of different nationalities from a concentration camp, losing only 11 killed and 57 wounded. Soldiers of the 117th battalion of the 39th Infantry Division took a building with a garrison of 720 Nazis, destroying 70 Nazis and capturing 650. The Soviet soldier learned to fight not with numbers, but with skill. All this refutes the myths that we took Berlin, filling the enemy with corpses.

Let us briefly touch upon the most remarkable events of the storming of Berlin from April 23 to May 2. The troops that stormed Berlin can be divided into three groups - northern (3rd shock, 2nd Guards Tank Army), southeastern (5th shock, 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Army) and south- western (troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front). On April 23, the troops of the southeastern group (5th Army) unexpectedly crossed the Spree River for the enemy, captured a bridgehead and transported as many as two divisions to it. The 26th Rifle Corps captured the Silesian railway station. On April 24, the 3rd Shock Army, advancing on the center of Berlin, captured the suburb of Reinickendorf. Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front captured a number of bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the Spree River and linked up with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Schenefeld area. On April 25, the 2nd Panzer Army launched an offensive from the bridgeheads captured the day before on the Berlin-Spandauer-Schiffarts canal. On the same day, Tempelhof airfield was captured, thanks to which Berlin was supplied. The next day, April 26, while trying to recapture it, the German tank division “Munchenberg” was defeated. On the same day, the 9th Corps of the 5th Shock Army cleared 80 enemy quarters of the enemy. On April 27, troops of the 2nd Tank Army captured the area and Westend station. On April 28, troops of the 3rd Shock Army cleared the Moabit district and the political prison of the same name from the enemy, where thousands of anti-fascists were tortured, including the great Soviet poet Musa Jalil. On the same day, Anhalt station was captured. It is noteworthy that it was defended by the SS Nordland division, partly consisting of French and Latvian “volunteers”.

On April 29, Soviet troops reached the Reichstag, the symbol of German statehood, which was stormed the next day. The first to rush into it were the soldiers of the 171st Division, led by Captain Samsonov, who at 14.20 hoisted the Soviet flag in the window of the building. After fierce fighting, the building (with the exception of the basement) was cleared of the enemy. At 21.30, according to the traditional point of view, two soldiers - M. Kantaria and A. Egorov hoisted the Victory Banner on the dome of the Reichstag. On the same day, April 30, at 15.50, having learned that the armies of Wenck, Steiner and Holse would not come to the rescue, and the Soviet troops were only 400 m from the Reich Chancellery, where the possessed Fuhrer and his associates had taken refuge. They tried to delay their end with the help of numerous new victims, including among the German civilian population. To slow down the advance of Soviet troops, Hitler ordered the floodgates in the Berlin subway to be opened, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Berlin civilians fleeing bombing and shelling. In his will, Hitler wrote: “If the German people are unworthy of their mission, then they must disappear.” Soviet troops sought to spare the civilian population whenever possible. As participants in the battles recall, additional difficulties, including moral ones, were caused by the fact that German soldiers dressed in civilian clothes and treacherously shot our soldiers in the back. Because of this, many of our soldiers and officers died.

After Hitler's suicide, the new German government, led by Dr. Goebbels, wanted to enter into negotiations with the command of the 1st Belorussian Front, and through it, with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin. However, G.K. Zhukov demanded unconditional surrender, to which Goebbels and Bormann did not agree. The fighting continued. By May 1, the area occupied by German troops was reduced to only 1 square. km. The commander of the German garrison, General Krebs, committed suicide. The new commander, General Weidling, commander of the 56th Corps, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, accepted the terms of unconditional surrender. At least 50 thousand German soldiers and officers were captured. Goebbels, fearing retribution for his crimes, committed suicide.

The assault on Berlin ended on May 2, which fell on Maundy Tuesday in 1945 - a day dedicated to the remembrance of the Last Judgment

The capture of Berlin was, without exaggeration, an epochal event. The symbol of the German totalitarian state was defeated and the center of its control was struck. It is deeply symbolic that the assault on Berlin ended on May 2, which in 1945 fell on Maundy Tuesday, a day dedicated to the remembrance of the Last Judgment. And the capture of Berlin truly became the Last Judgment of occult German fascism, of all its lawlessness. Nazi Berlin was quite reminiscent of Nineveh, about which the holy prophet Nahum prophesied: “Woe to the city of blood, the city of deceit and murder!<…>There is no cure for your wound, your ulcer is painful. Everyone who heard the news about you will applaud you, for to whom has your malice not continually extended?” (Nahum 3:1,19). But the Soviet soldier was much more merciful than the Babylonians and Medes, although the German fascists were no better in their deeds than the Assyrians with their refined atrocities. Food was immediately provided to the two million population of Berlin. The soldiers generously shared the latter with their yesterday's enemies.

Veteran Kirill Vasilyevich Zakharov told an amazing story. His brother Mikhail Vasilyevich Zakharov died in the Tallinn crossing, two uncles were killed near Leningrad, his father lost his sight. He himself survived the blockade and miraculously escaped. And since 1943, when he went to the front, starting from Ukraine, he kept dreaming about how he would get to Berlin and take revenge. And during the battles for Berlin, during a respite, he stopped in the gateway to have a snack. And suddenly I saw the hatch rising, an elderly hungry German leaning out of it and asking for food. Kirill Vasilyevich shared his rations with him. Then another German civilian came out and also asked for food. In general, that day Kirill Vasilyevich was left without lunch. So he took revenge. And he did not regret this action.

Courage, perseverance, conscience and mercy - these Christian qualities were demonstrated by a Russian soldier in Berlin in April - May 1945. Eternal glory to him. A low bow to those participants in the Berlin operation who have survived to this day. For they gave freedom to Europe, including the German people. And they brought long-awaited peace to earth.

One of the last strategic operations of Soviet troops in the European Theater of Operations, during which the Red Army occupied the capital of Germany and victoriously ended the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War in Europe. The operation lasted 23 days - from April 16 to May 8, 1945, during which Soviet troops advanced westward to a distance of 100 to 220 km. The width of the combat front is 300 km. As part of the operation, the following frontal offensive operations were carried out: Stettin-Rostok, Seelow-Berlin, Cottbus-Potsdam, Stremberg-Torgau and Brandenburg-Ratenow.

The military-political situation in Europe in the spring of 1945

In January-March 1945, troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, during the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian, Upper Silesian and Lower Silesian operations, reached the border of the Oder and Neisse rivers. The shortest distance from the Küstrin bridgehead to Berlin was 60 km. Anglo-American troops completed the liquidation of the Ruhr group of German troops and by mid-April advanced units reached the Elbe. The loss of the most important raw material areas caused a decline in industrial production in Germany. Difficulties in replacing the casualties suffered in the winter of 1944/45 increased. Nevertheless, the German armed forces still represented an impressive force. According to the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army, by mid-April they included 223 divisions and brigades.

According to the agreements reached by the heads of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in the fall of 1944, the border of the Soviet occupation zone was to pass 150 km west of Berlin. Despite this, Churchill put forward the idea of ​​getting ahead of the Red Army and capturing Berlin.

Goals of the parties

Germany

The Nazi leadership tried to prolong the war in order to achieve a separate peace with England and the United States and split the anti-Hitler coalition. At the same time, holding the front against the Soviet Union became crucial.

USSR

The military-political situation that had developed by April 1945 required the Soviet command to prepare and carry out an operation in the shortest possible time to defeat a group of German troops in the Berlin direction, capture Berlin and reach the Elbe River to join the Allied forces. The successful completion of this strategic task made it possible to thwart the plans of the Nazi leadership to prolong the war.

To carry out the operation, the forces of three fronts were involved: the 1st Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian, as well as the 18th Air Army of Long-Range Aviation, the Dnieper Military Flotilla and part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet.

1st Belorussian Front

• Capture the capital of Germany, Berlin
• After 12-15 days of the operation, reach the Elbe River

1st Ukrainian Front

• Deliver a cutting blow south of Berlin, isolate the main forces of Army Group Center from the Berlin group and thereby ensure the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front from the south
• Defeat the enemy group south of Berlin and operational reserves in the Cottbus area
• In 10-12 days, no later, reach the Belitz - Wittenberg line and further along the Elbe River to Dresden

2nd Belorussian Front

• Deliver a cutting blow north of Berlin, protecting the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front from possible enemy counterattacks from the north
• Press to the sea and destroy German troops north of Berlin

Dnieper military flotilla

• Two brigades of river ships will assist the troops of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies in crossing the Oder and breaking through the enemy defenses of the Nakustrin bridgehead
• The third brigade will assist the troops of the 33rd Army in the Furstenberg area
• Ensure mine defense of water transport routes.

Red Banner Baltic Fleet

• Support the coastal flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, continuing the blockade of Army Group Courland pressed to the sea in Latvia (Courland Pocket)

Operation plan

The operation plan provided for the simultaneous transition of troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts to the offensive on the morning of April 16, 1945. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in connection with the upcoming major regrouping of its forces, was supposed to launch an offensive on April 20, that is, 4 days later.

The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of five combined arms (47th, 3rd Shock, 5th Shock, 8th Guards and 3rd Army) and two tank armies from the Küstrin bridgehead in the direction of Berlin. The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle after the combined arms armies had broken through the second line of defense on the Seelow Heights. In the main attack area, an artillery density of up to 270 guns (with a caliber of 76 mm and above) was created per kilometer of the breakthrough front. In addition, front commander G.K. Zhukov decided to launch two auxiliary strikes: on the right - with the forces of the 61st Soviet and 1st Army of the Polish Army, bypassing Berlin from the north in the direction of Eberswalde, Sandau; and on the left - by the forces of the 69th and 33rd armies to Bonsdorf with the main task of preventing the retreat of the enemy 9th Army to Berlin.

The 1st Ukrainian Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of five armies: three combined arms (13th, 5th Guards and 3rd Guards) and two tank armies from the area of ​​the city of Trimbel in the direction of Spremberg. An auxiliary strike was to be delivered in the general direction of Dresden by the forces of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and part of the forces of the 52nd Army.

The dividing line between the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts ended 50 km southeast of Berlin in the area of ​​the city of Lübben, which allowed, if necessary, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to strike Berlin from the south.

The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, K.K. Rokossovsky, decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 65th, 70th and 49th armies in the direction of Neustrelitz. Separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps of front-line subordination were to develop the success after the breakthrough of the German defense.

Preparing for surgery

USSR

Intelligence support

Reconnaissance aircraft took aerial photographs of Berlin, all approaches to it and defensive zones 6 times. In total, about 15 thousand aerial photographs were obtained. Based on the results of the shooting, captured documents and interviews with prisoners, detailed diagrams, plans, and maps were drawn up, which were supplied to all command and staff authorities. The military topographical service of the 1st Belorussian Front produced an accurate model of the city with its suburbs, which was used in studying issues related to the organization of the offensive, the general assault on Berlin and battles in the city center.

Two days before the start of the operation, reconnaissance in force was carried out throughout the entire zone of the 1st Belorussian Front. Over the course of two days on April 14 and 15, 32 reconnaissance detachments, each with a force of up to a reinforced rifle battalion, clarified the placement of enemy fire weapons, the deployment of his groups, and determined the strong and most vulnerable places of the defensive line.

Engineering support

During the preparation for the offensive, the engineering troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Lieutenant General Antipenko carried out a large amount of sapper and engineering work. By the beginning of the operation, often under enemy fire, 25 road bridges with a total length of 15,017 linear meters had been built across the Oder and 40 ferry crossings had been prepared. In order to organize a continuous and complete supply of the advancing units with ammunition and fuel, the railway track in the occupied territory was changed to a Russian track almost all the way to the Oder. In addition, military engineers of the front made heroic efforts to strengthen the railway bridges across the Vistula, which were in danger of being demolished by the spring ice drift.

On the 1st Ukrainian Front, 2,440 sapper wooden boats, 750 linear meters of assault bridges and over 1,000 linear meters of wooden bridges for loads of 16 and 60 tons were prepared to cross the Neisse River.

At the beginning of the offensive, the 2nd Belorussian Front had to cross the Oder, the width of which in some places reached six kilometers, so special attention was also paid to the engineering preparation of the operation. The engineering troops of the front, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blagoslavov, in the shortest possible time pulled up and securely sheltered dozens of pontoons and hundreds of boats in the coastal zone, transported timber for the construction of piers and bridges, made rafts, and laid roads through the marshy areas of the coast.

Disguise and disinformation

When preparing the operation, special attention was paid to the issues of camouflage and achieving operational and tactical surprise. The front headquarters developed detailed action plans for disinformation and misleading the enemy, according to which preparations for an offensive by the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were simulated in the area of ​​​​the cities of Stettin and Guben. At the same time, intensified defensive work continued in the central sector of the 1st Belorussian Front, where the main attack was actually planned. They were carried out especially intensively in areas clearly visible to the enemy. It was explained to all army personnel that the main task was stubborn defense. In addition, documents characterizing the activities of troops in various sectors of the front were planted at the enemy’s location.

The arrival of reserves and reinforcement units was carefully disguised. Military trains with artillery, mortar, and tank units on Polish territory were disguised as trains transporting timber and hay on platforms.

When conducting reconnaissance, tank commanders from the battalion commander to the army commander dressed in infantry uniforms and, under the guise of signalmen, examined crossings and areas where their units would be concentrated.

The circle of knowledgeable persons was extremely limited. In addition to army commanders, only the chiefs of army staffs, heads of operational departments of army headquarters and artillery commanders were allowed to familiarize themselves with the Headquarters directive. Regimental commanders received tasks verbally three days before the offensive. Junior commanders and Red Army soldiers were allowed to announce the offensive mission two hours before the attack.

Regrouping of troops

In preparation for the Berlin operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front, which had just completed the East Pomeranian operation, in the period from April 4 to April 15, 1945, had to transfer 4 combined arms armies over a distance of up to 350 km from the area of ​​​​the cities of Danzig and Gdynia to the line of the Oder River and replace the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front there. The poor condition of the railways and the acute shortage of rolling stock did not allow full use of the capabilities of railway transport, so the main burden of transportation fell on road transport. The front was allocated 1,900 vehicles. The troops had to cover part of the route on foot.

Germany

The German command foresaw the offensive of the Soviet troops and carefully prepared to repel it. From the Oder to Berlin, a deeply layered defense was built, and the city itself was turned into a powerful defensive citadel. First-line divisions were replenished with personnel and equipment, and strong reserves were created in the operational depths. A huge number of Volkssturm battalions were formed in Berlin and near it.

Nature of defense

The basis of the defense was the Oder-Neissen defensive line and the Berlin defensive region. The Oder-Neisen line consisted of three defensive lines, and its total depth reached 20-40 km. The main defensive line had up to five continuous lines of trenches, and its front edge ran along the left bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers. A second defense line was created 10-20 km from it. It was the most equipped in engineering terms at the Seelow Heights - in front of the Küstrin bridgehead. The third stripe was located 20-40 km from the front edge. When organizing and equipping the defense, the German command skillfully used natural obstacles: lakes, rivers, canals, ravines. All settlements were turned into strong strongholds and were adapted for all-round defense. During the construction of the Oder-Neissen line, special attention was paid to the organization of anti-tank defense.

The saturation of defensive positions with enemy troops was uneven. The greatest density of troops was observed in front of the 1st Belorussian Front in a 175 km wide zone, where the defense was occupied by 23 divisions, a significant number of individual brigades, regiments and battalions, with 14 divisions defending against the Kyustrin bridgehead. In the 120 km wide offensive zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front, 7 infantry divisions and 13 separate regiments defended. There were 25 enemy divisions in the 390 km wide zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

In an effort to increase the resilience of their troops in defense, the Nazi leadership tightened repressive measures. So, on April 15, in his address to the soldiers of the eastern front, A. Hitler demanded that everyone who gave the order to withdraw or would withdraw without an order be shot on the spot.

Composition and strengths of the parties

USSR

1st Belorussian Front (commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov, chief of staff Colonel General M.S. Malinin) consisting of:

1st Ukrainian Front (commander Marshal I. S. Konev, chief of staff General of the Army I. E. Petrov) consisting of:

• 3rd Guards Army (Colonel General V. N. Gordov)
• 5th Guards Army (Colonel General Zhadov A.S.)
• 13th Army (Colonel General N.P. Pukhov)
• 28th Army (Lieutenant General A. A. Luchinsky)
• 52nd Army (Colonel General Koroteev K. A.)
• 3rd Guards Tank Army (Colonel General P. S. Rybalko)
• 4th Guards Tank Army (Colonel General D. D. Lelyushenko)
• 2nd Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation Krasovsky S.A.)
• 2nd Army of the Polish Army (Lieutenant General Sverchevsky K.K.)
• 25th Tank Corps (Major General of Tank Forces Fominykh E.I.)
• 4th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces P. P. Poluboyarov)
• 7th Guards Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Korchagin I.P.)
• 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General V.K. Baranov)

2nd Belorussian Front (commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, chief of staff Colonel General A.N. Bogolyubov) consisting of:

• 2nd Shock Army (Colonel General I. I. Fedyuninsky)
• 65th Army (Colonel General Batov P.I.)
• 70th Army (Colonel General Popov V.S.)
• 49th Army (Colonel General Grishin I.T.)
• 4th Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation Vershinin K.A.)
• 1st Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Panov M.F.)
• 8th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Popov A.F.)
• 3rd Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Panfilov A.P.)
• 8th Mechanized Corps (Major General of Tank Forces Firsovich A. N.)
• 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky N.S.)

18th Air Army (Air Chief Marshal A. E. Golovanov)

Dnieper Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev)

Red Banner Baltic Fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs)

Total: Soviet troops - 1.9 million people, Polish troops - 155,900 people, 6,250 tanks, 41,600 guns and mortars, more than 7,500 aircraft

In addition, the 1st Belorussian Front included German formations consisting of former captured Wehrmacht soldiers and officers who agreed to participate in the fight against the Nazi regime (Seydlitz troops)

Germany

Army Group "Vistula" under the command of Colonel General G. Heinrici, from April 28, General K. Student, consisting of:

• 3rd Tank Army (General of Tank Forces H. Manteuffel)
• 32nd Army Corps (Infantry General F. Schuck)
• Army Corps "Oder"
• 3rd SS Panzer Corps (SS Brigadeführer J. Ziegler)
• 46th Tank Corps (Infantry General M. Garais)
• 101st Army Corps (Artillery General W. Berlin, from April 18, 1945 Lieutenant General F. Sikst)
• 9th Army (Infantry General T. Busse)
• 56th Tank Corps (Artillery General G. Weidling)
• 11th SS Corps (SS-Obergruppenführer M. Kleinheisterkamp)
• 5th SS Mountain Corps (SS-Obergruppenführer F. Jeckeln)
• 5th Army Corps (Artillery General K. Weger)

Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal F. Scherner, consisting of:

• 4th Tank Army (General of Tank Forces F. Gräser)
• Panzer Corps "Great Germany" (General of Panzer Forces G. Jauer)
• 57th Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Forces F. Kirchner)
• Part of the forces of the 17th Army (Infantry General W. Hasse)

Air support for the ground forces was provided by the 4th Air Fleet, 6th Air Fleet, and Reich Air Fleet.

Total: 48 infantry, 6 tank and 9 motorized divisions; 37 separate infantry regiments, 98 separate infantry battalions, as well as a large number of separate artillery and special units and formations (1 million people, 10,400 guns and mortars, 1,500 tanks and assault guns and 3,300 combat aircraft).

On April 24, the 12th Army entered the battle under the command of Infantry General W. Wenck, which had previously occupied the defense on the Western Front.

General course of hostilities

1st Belorussian Front (April 16-25)

At 5 a.m. Moscow time (2 hours before dawn) on April 16, artillery preparation began in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front. 9,000 guns and mortars, as well as more than 1,500 BM-13 and BM-31 RS installations, crushed the first line of German defense in the 27-kilometer breakthrough area for 25 minutes. With the start of the attack, artillery fire was transferred deep into the defense, and 143 anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on in the breakthrough areas. Their dazzling light stunned the enemy and at the same time illuminated the way for the advancing units. (German night vision systems Infrarot-Scheinwerfer detected targets at a distance of up to one kilometer and posed a serious threat during the assault on the Seelow Heights, and the searchlights disabled them with powerful illumination.) For the first one and a half to two hours, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully, individual formations reached the second defense line. However, soon the Nazis, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Intense fighting broke out along the entire front. Although in some sectors of the front the troops managed to capture individual strongholds, they failed to achieve decisive success. The powerful resistance unit equipped on the Zelovsky Heights turned out to be insurmountable for rifle formations. This jeopardized the success of the entire operation. In such a situation, the front commander, Marshal Zhukov, decided to bring the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into battle. This was not provided for in the offensive plan, however, the stubborn resistance of the German troops required strengthening the penetrating ability of the attackers by introducing tank armies into battle. The course of the battle on the first day showed that the German command attached decisive importance to holding the Seelow Heights. To strengthen the defense in this sector, by the end of April 16, the operational reserves of Army Group Vistula were deployed. All day and all night on April 17, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought fierce battles with the enemy. By the morning of April 18, tank and rifle formations, with the support of aviation from the 16th and 18th Air Armies, took the Zelovsky Heights. Overcoming the stubborn defense of German troops and repelling fierce counterattacks, by the end of April 19, front troops broke through the third defensive line and were able to develop an offensive on Berlin.

The real threat of encirclement forced the commander of the 9th German Army, T. Busse, to come up with a proposal to withdraw the army to the suburbs of Berlin and establish a strong defense there. This plan was supported by the commander of Army Group Vistula, Colonel General Heinrici, but Hitler rejected this proposal and ordered the occupied lines to be held at all costs.

April 20 was marked by an artillery strike on Berlin, delivered by long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army. It was a kind of birthday gift for Hitler. On April 21, units of the 3rd Shock, 2nd Guards Tank, 47th and 5th Shock Armies, having overcome the third line of defense, broke into the outskirts of Berlin and started fighting there. The first to break into Berlin from the east were the troops that were part of the 26th Guards Corps of General P. A. Firsov and the 32nd Corps of General D. S. Zherebin of the 5th Shock Army. On the same day, Corporal A.I. Muravyov planted the first Soviet banner in Berlin. On the evening of April 21, the advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of P. S. Rybalko approached the city from the south. On April 23 and 24, fighting in all directions became especially fierce. On April 23, the greatest success in the assault on Berlin was achieved by the 9th Rifle Corps under the command of Major General I.P. Rosly. The warriors of this corps took possession of Karlshorst and part of Kopenick with a decisive assault and, reaching the Spree, crossed it on the move. The ships of the Dnieper military flotilla provided great assistance in crossing the Spree, transferring rifle units to the opposite bank under enemy fire. Although the pace of Soviet advance had slowed by April 24, the Nazis were unable to stop them. On April 24, the 5th Shock Army, fighting fiercely, continued to successfully advance towards the center of Berlin.

Operating in the auxiliary direction, the 61st Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army, having launched an offensive on April 17, overcame the German defenses with stubborn battles, bypassed Berlin from the north and moved towards the Elbe.

1st Ukrainian Front (16-25 April)

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed more successfully. On April 16, early in the morning, a smoke screen was placed along the entire 390-kilometer front, blinding the enemy's forward observation posts. At 6:55 a.m., after a 40-minute artillery strike on the front edge of the German defense, reinforced battalions of the first echelon divisions began crossing the Neisse. Having quickly captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, they provided conditions for building bridges and crossing the main forces. During the first hours of the operation, 133 crossings were equipped by front engineering troops in the main direction of attack. With each passing hour, the amount of forces and means transported to the bridgehead increased. In the middle of the day, the attackers reached the second line of German defense. Sensing the threat of a major breakthrough, the German command, already on the first day of the operation, threw into battle not only its tactical, but also operational reserves, giving them the task of throwing the advancing Soviet troops into the river. However, by the end of the day, front troops broke through the main defense line on the 26 km front and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

By the morning of April 17, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies crossed the Neisse in full force. All day long, the front troops, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, continued to widen and deepen the gap in the German defense. Aviation support for the advancing troops was provided by pilots of the 2nd Air Army. Attack aircraft, acting at the request of ground commanders, destroyed fire weapons and manpower of the enemy at the front line. Bomber aircraft destroyed suitable reserves. By the middle of April 17, the following situation had developed in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the tank armies of Rybalko and Lelyushenko were marching west along a narrow corridor penetrated by troops of the 13th, 3rd and 5th Guards armies. By the end of the day they approached the Spree and began crossing it. Meanwhile, in the secondary, Dresden, direction, the troops of the 52nd Army of General K.A. Koroteev and the 2nd Army The troops of Polish General K.K. Swierchevsky broke through the enemy’s tactical defenses and in two days of fighting advanced to a depth of 20 km.

Taking into account the slow advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, as well as the success achieved in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, on the night of April 18, the Headquarters decided to turn the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to Berlin. In his order to the army commanders Rybalko and Lelyushenko for the offensive, the front commander wrote:

Following the orders of the commander, on April 18 and 19 the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front marched uncontrollably towards Berlin. The rate of their advance reached 35-50 km per day. At the same time, the combined arms armies were preparing to eliminate large enemy groups in the area of ​​Cottbus and Spremberg.

By the end of the day on April 20, the main strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front was deeply wedged into the enemy’s position and completely cut off the German Army Group Vistula from Army Group Center. Sensing the threat caused by the rapid actions of the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the German command took a number of measures to strengthen the approaches to Berlin. To strengthen the defense, infantry and tank units were urgently sent to the area of ​​​​the cities of Zossen, Luckenwalde, and Jutterbog. Overcoming their stubborn resistance, Rybalko’s tankers reached the outer Berlin defensive perimeter on the night of April 21. By the morning of April 22, Sukhov's 9th Mechanized Corps and Mitrofanov's 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army crossed the Notte Canal, broke through the outer defensive perimeter of Berlin, and by the end of the day reached the southern bank of the Teltovkanal. There, encountering strong and well-organized enemy resistance, they were stopped.

On the afternoon of April 22, a meeting of the top military leadership was held at Hitler's headquarters, at which it was decided to remove W. Wenck's 12th Army from the Western Front and send it to join the semi-encircled 9th Army of T. Busse. To organize the offensive of the 12th Army, Field Marshal Keitel was sent to its headquarters. This was the last serious attempt to influence the course of the battle, since by the end of the day on April 22, the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts had formed and almost closed two encirclement rings. One is around the enemy’s 9th Army east and southeast of Berlin; the other is to the west of Berlin, around the units directly defending in the city.

The Teltow Canal was a fairly serious obstacle: a water-filled ditch with high concrete banks forty to fifty meters wide. In addition, its northern coast was very well prepared for defense: trenches, reinforced concrete pillboxes, tanks dug into the ground and self-propelled guns. Above the canal is an almost continuous wall of houses, bristling with fire, with walls a meter or more thick. Having assessed the situation, the Soviet command decided to carry out thorough preparations for crossing the Teltow Canal. All day on April 23, the 3rd Guards Tank Army prepared for the assault. By the morning of April 24, a powerful artillery group was concentrated on the southern bank of the Teltow Canal, with a density of up to 650 guns per kilometer of front, intended to destroy German fortifications on the opposite bank. Having suppressed the enemy defenses with a powerful artillery strike, the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Corps of Major General Mitrofanov successfully crossed the Teltow Canal and captured a bridgehead on its northern bank. On the afternoon of April 24, Wenck's 12th Army launched the first tank attacks on the positions of General Ermakov's 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (4th Guards Tank Army) and units of the 13th Army. All attacks were successfully repulsed with the support of the 1st Assault Aviation Corps of Lieutenant General Ryazanov.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event occurred. An hour and a half later, on the Elbe, the 34th Guards Corps of General Baklanov of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops.

From April 25 to May 2, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought fierce battles in three directions: units of the 28th Army, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies took part in the assault on Berlin; part of the forces of the 4th Guards Tank Army, together with the 13th Army, repelled the counterattack of the 12th German Army; The 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army blocked and destroyed the encircled 9th Army.

All the time from the beginning of the operation, the command of Army Group Center sought to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. On April 20, German troops launched the first counterattack on the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front and pushed back the troops of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army. On April 23, a new powerful counterattack followed, as a result of which the defense at the junction of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army was broken through and German troops advanced 20 km in the general direction of Spremberg, threatening to reach the rear of the front.

2nd Belorussian Front (April 20-May 8)

From April 17 to 19, troops of the 65th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel General P.I. Batov, conducted reconnaissance in force and advanced detachments captured the Oder interfluve, thereby facilitating subsequent crossings of the river. On the morning of April 20, the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive: the 65th, 70th and 49th armies. The crossing of the Oder took place under the cover of artillery fire and smoke screens. The offensive developed most successfully in the sector of the 65th Army, which was largely due to the engineering troops of the army. Having established two 16-ton pontoon crossings by 1 p.m., the troops of this army captured a bridgehead 6 kilometers wide and 1.5 kilometers deep by the evening of April 20.

More modest success was achieved on the central sector of the front in the 70th Army zone. The left-flank 49th Army met stubborn resistance and was unsuccessful. All day and all night on April 21, front troops, repelling numerous attacks by German troops, persistently expanded bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder. In the current situation, front commander K.K. Rokossovsky decided to send the 49th Army along the crossings of the right neighbor of the 70th Army, and then return it to its offensive zone. By April 25, as a result of fierce battles, front troops expanded the captured bridgehead to 35 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth. To build up striking power, the 2nd Shock Army, as well as the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Corps, were transported to the western bank of the Oder. At the first stage of the operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front, through its actions, shackled the main forces of the 3rd German Tank Army, depriving it of the opportunity to help those fighting near Berlin. On April 26, formations of the 65th Army took Stettin by storm. Subsequently, the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, breaking enemy resistance and destroying suitable reserves, stubbornly advanced to the west. On May 3, Panfilov's 3rd Guards Tank Corps southwest of Wismar established contact with the advanced units of the 2nd British Army.

Liquidation of the Frankfurt-Guben group

By the end of April 24, formations of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front came into contact with units of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, thereby encircling the 9th Army of General Busse southeast of Berlin and cutting it off from the city. The surrounded group of German troops began to be called the Frankfurt-Gubensky group. Now the Soviet command was faced with the task of eliminating the 200,000-strong enemy group and preventing its breakthrough to Berlin or to the West. To accomplish the last task, the 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front took up active defense in the path of a possible breakthrough of German troops. On April 26, the 3rd, 69th, and 33rd armies of the 1st Belorussian Front began the final liquidation of the encircled units. However, the enemy not only put up stubborn resistance, but also repeatedly made attempts to break out of the encirclement. By skillfully maneuvering and skillfully creating superiority in forces on narrow sections of the front, German troops twice managed to break through the encirclement. However, each time the Soviet command took decisive measures to eliminate the breakthrough. Until May 2, the encircled units of the 9th German Army made desperate attempts to break through the battle formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the west, to join the 12th Army of General Wenck. Only a few small groups managed to penetrate through the forests and go west.

Assault on Berlin (April 25 - May 2)

At 12 noon on April 25, the ring closed around Berlin when the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army crossed the Havel River and linked up with units of the 328th Division of the 47th Army of General Perkhorovich. By that time, according to the Soviet command, the Berlin garrison numbered at least 200 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and 250 tanks. The city's defense was carefully thought out and well prepared. It was based on a system of strong fire, strongholds and resistance units. The closer to the city center, the denser the defense became. Massive stone buildings with thick walls gave it particular strength. The windows and doors of many buildings were sealed and turned into embrasures for firing. The streets were blocked by powerful barricades up to four meters thick. The defenders had a large number of faustpatrons, which in the context of street battles turned out to be a formidable anti-tank weapon. Of no small importance in the enemy’s defense system were underground structures, which were widely used by the enemy to maneuver troops, as well as to shelter them from artillery and bomb attacks.

By April 26, six armies of the 1st Belorussian Front (47th, 3rd and 5th shock, 8th Guards, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies) and three armies of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the assault on Berlin. th Ukrainian Front (28th, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank). Taking into account the experience of capturing large cities, assault detachments were created for battles in the city, consisting of rifle battalions or companies, reinforced with tanks, artillery and sappers. The actions of assault troops, as a rule, were preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation.

By April 27, as a result of the actions of the armies of two fronts that had deeply advanced to the center of Berlin, the enemy grouping in Berlin stretched out in a narrow strip from east to west - sixteen kilometers long and two or three, in some places five kilometers wide. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. Block after block, Soviet troops “gnawed through” the enemy’s defenses. So, by the evening of April 28, units of the 3rd Shock Army reached the Reichstag area. On the night of April 29, the actions of the forward battalions under the command of Captain S.A. Neustroev and Senior Lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov the Moltke Bridge was captured. At dawn on April 30, the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, adjacent to the parliament building, was stormed at the cost of considerable losses. The path to the Reichstag was open.

On April 30, 1945, at 21.30, units of the 150th Infantry Division under the command of Major General V.M. Shatilov and the 171st Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A.I. Negoda stormed the main part of the Reichstag building. The remaining Nazi units offered stubborn resistance. We had to fight for every room. In the early morning of May 1, the assault flag of the 150th Infantry Division was raised over the Reichstag, but the battle for the Reichstag continued all day, and only on the night of May 2 did the Reichstag garrison capitulate.

On May 1, only the Tiergarten and the government quarter remained in German hands. The imperial chancellery was located here, in the courtyard of which there was a bunker at Hitler's headquarters. On the night of May 1, by prior agreement, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Krebs, arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army. He informed the army commander, General V.I. Chuikov, about Hitler’s suicide and the proposal of the new German government to conclude a truce. The message was immediately transmitted to G.K. Zhukov, who himself called Moscow. Stalin confirmed his categorical demand for unconditional surrender. At 18:00 on May 1, the new German government rejected the demand for unconditional surrender, and Soviet troops resumed the assault with renewed vigor.

At one o'clock in the morning on May 2, the radio stations of the 1st Belorussian Front received a message in Russian: “We ask you to cease fire. We are sending envoys to the Potsdam Bridge.” A German officer who arrived at the appointed place, on behalf of the commander of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling, announced the readiness of the Berlin garrison to stop resistance. At 6 a.m. on May 2, Artillery General Weidling, accompanied by three German generals, crossed the front line and surrendered. An hour later, while at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army, he wrote a surrender order, which was duplicated and, with the help of loudspeaker installations and radio, delivered to enemy units defending in the center of Berlin. As this order was communicated to the defenders, resistance in the city ceased. By the end of the day, the troops of the 8th Guards Army cleared the central part of the city from the enemy. Individual units that did not want to surrender tried to break through to the west, but were destroyed or scattered.

Losses of the parties

USSR

From April 16 to May 8, Soviet troops lost 352,475 people, of which 78,291 were irretrievable. The losses of Polish troops during the same period amounted to 8,892 people, of which 2,825 were irretrievable. The losses of military equipment amounted to 1,997 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,108 guns and mortars, 917 combat aircraft, 215.9 thousand small arms.

Germany

According to combat reports from the Soviet fronts:

• Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the period from April 16 to May 13

killed 232,726 people, captured 250,675

• Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the period from April 15 to 29

killed 114,349 people, captured 55,080 people

• Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the period from April 5 to May 8:

killed 49,770 people, captured 84,234 people

Thus, according to reports from the Soviet command, the losses of German troops were about 400 thousand people killed and about 380 thousand people captured. Part of the German troops was pushed back to the Elbe and capitulated to the Allied forces.

Also, according to the assessment of the Soviet command, the total number of troops that emerged from the encirclement in the Berlin area does not exceed 17,000 people with 80-90 units of armored vehicles.

German losses according to German sources

According to German data, 45 thousand German troops took part in the defense of Berlin itself, of which 22 thousand people died. Germany's losses in killed during the entire Berlin operation amounted to about one hundred thousand military personnel. It is necessary to take into account that data on losses in 1945 in the OKW were determined by calculation. Due to violations of systematic documentation and reporting, violations of troop control, the reliability of this information is very low. In addition, according to the rules adopted in the Wehrmacht, the losses of personnel only took into account the losses of military personnel and did not take into account the losses of troops of allied states and foreign formations that fought as part of the Wehrmacht, as well as paramilitary formations serving the troops.

Overestimation of German losses

According to combat reports from the fronts:

• The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the period from April 16 to May 13: destroyed - 1184, captured - 629 tanks and self-propelled guns.
• Between April 15 and April 29, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front destroyed 1,067 tanks and captured 432 tanks and self-propelled guns;
• Between April 5 and May 8, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front destroyed 195 and captured 85 tanks and self-propelled guns.

In total, according to the fronts, 3,592 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed and captured, which is more than 2 times the number of tanks available on the Soviet-German front before the start of the operation.

In April 1946, a military-scientific conference was held dedicated to the Berlin offensive operation. In one of his speeches, Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin cited data according to which the total number of tanks allegedly destroyed during the operation by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was more than 2 times greater than the number of tanks the Germans had against the 1st Belorussian Front front before the start of the operation. The speech also spoke of a slight overestimation (by about 15%) of the casualties suffered by German troops.

These data allow us to talk about the overestimation of German losses in equipment by the Soviet command. On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account that the 1st Ukrainian Front, during the operation, had to fight with the troops of the 12th German Army, which before the start of the battle took up defensive positions against American troops and whose tanks were not taken into account in the initial calculation. In part, the excess of the number of destroyed German tanks over the number available at the beginning of the battle is also explained by the high “returnability” of German tanks to service after being knocked out, which was due to the efficient work of the services for evacuation of equipment from the battlefield, the presence of a large number of well-equipped repair units and the good maintainability of German tanks .

Results of the operation

• Destruction of the largest group of German troops, capture of the capital of Germany, capture of the highest military and political leadership of Germany.
• The fall of Berlin and the loss of the German leadership's ability to govern led to the almost complete cessation of organized resistance on the part of the German armed forces.
• The Berlin operation demonstrated to the Allies the high combat capability of the Red Army and was one of the reasons for the cancellation of Operation Unthinkable, the Allied war plan against the Soviet Union. However, this decision did not subsequently influence the development of the arms race and the beginning of the Cold War.
• Hundreds of thousands of people were released from German captivity, including at least 200 thousand citizens of foreign countries. In the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front alone, in the period from April 5 to May 8, 197,523 people were released from captivity, of which 68,467 were citizens of the allied states.

Enemy recall

The last commander of the defense of Berlin, artillery general G. Weidling, while in Soviet captivity, gave the following description of the actions of the Red Army in the Berlin operation:

Historical facts

• The Berlin operation is listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the largest battle in history. About 3.5 million people, 52 thousand guns and mortars, 7,750 tanks and 11 thousand aircraft took part in the battle on both sides.
• Initially, the command of the 1st Belorussian Front planned to carry out an operation to capture Berlin in February 1945.
• Among the prisoners of the concentration camp near Babelsberg liberated by the guardsmen of the 63rd Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade M. G. Fomichev was the former Prime Minister of France Edouard Herriot.
• On April 23, Hitler, based on a false denunciation, gave the order to execute the commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, Artillery General G. Weidling. Having learned about this, Weidling arrived at headquarters and obtained an audience with Hitler, after which the order to shoot the general was canceled, and he himself was appointed commander of the defense of Berlin. In the German feature film “Bunker,” General Weidling, receiving an order for this appointment at the chancellery, says: “I would prefer to be shot.”
• On April 22, tank crews of the 5th Guards Tank Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army freed the commander of the Norwegian Army, General Otto Ruge, from captivity.
• On the 1st Belorussian Front, in the direction of the main attack, there were 358 tons of ammunition per kilometer of front, and the weight of one front-line ammunition exceeded 43 thousand tons.
• During the offensive, soldiers of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of Lieutenant General V.K. Baranov managed to find and capture the largest breeding stud farm, stolen by the Germans from the North Caucasus in 1942.
• The food rations given to Berlin residents at the end of hostilities, in addition to basic food products, included natural coffee delivered by a special train from the USSR.
• The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front freed from captivity almost the entire senior military leadership of Belgium, including the chief of the general staff of the Belgian army.
• The Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces established the medal “For the Capture of Berlin,” which was awarded to more than 1 million soldiers. 187 units and formations that most distinguished themselves during the assault on the enemy capital were given the honorary name “Berlin”. More than 600 participants in the Berlin operation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 13 people were awarded the 2nd Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union.
• Episodes 4 and 5 of the film epic “Liberation” are dedicated to the Berlin operation.
• The Soviet army involved 464,000 people and 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns in the assault on the city itself.

Berlin operation 1945

After the end of the Vistula-Oder operation, the Soviet Union and Germany began preparations for the Battle of Berlin as the decisive battle on the Oder, as the culmination of the war.

By mid-April, the Germans concentrated 1 million people, 10.5 thousand guns, 1.5 thousand tanks and 3.3 thousand aircraft on a 300-kilometer front along the Oder and Neisse.

The Soviet side accumulated enormous forces: 2.5 million people, over 40 thousand guns, more than 6 thousand tanks, 7.5 thousand aircraft.

Three Soviet fronts operated in the Berlin direction: 1st Belorussian (commander - Marshal G.K. Zhukov), 2nd Belorussian (commander - Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky) and 1st Ukrainian (commander - Marshal I.S. Konev).

The attack on Berlin began on April 16, 1945. The heaviest battles took place in the sector of the 1st Belorussian Front, where the Seelow Heights were located, covering the central direction. (The Seelow Heights are a ridge of heights on the North German Lowland, 50–60 km east of Berlin. It runs along the left bank of the old riverbed of the Oder River with a length of up to 20 km. At these heights, a well-equipped 2nd defense line was created in engineering terms Germans, which was occupied by the 9th Army.)

To capture Berlin, the Soviet High Command used not only a frontal attack by the 1st Belorussian Front, but also a flank maneuver by formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which broke through to the German capital from the south.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced towards the Baltic coast of Germany, covering the right flank of the forces advancing on Berlin.

In addition, it was planned to use part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs), the Dnieper Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev), the 18th Air Army, and three air defense corps.

Hoping to defend Berlin and avoid unconditional surrender, the German leadership mobilized all the country's resources. As before, the German command sent the main forces of the ground forces and aviation against the Red Army. By April 15, 214 German divisions were fighting on the Soviet-German front, including 34 tank and 14 motorized and 14 brigades. 60 German divisions, including 5 tank divisions, acted against the Anglo-American troops. The Germans created a powerful defense in the east of the country.

Berlin was covered to great depth by numerous defensive structures erected along the western banks of the Oder and Neisse rivers. This line consisted of three stripes 20–40 km deep. In engineering terms, the defense in front of the Küstrin bridgehead and in the Kotbu direction, where the strongest groups of Nazi troops were concentrated, was especially well prepared.

Berlin itself was turned into a powerful fortified area with three defensive rings (outer, inner, city). The central sector of the capital, where the main government and administrative institutions were located, was especially carefully prepared in terms of engineering. There were more than 400 reinforced concrete permanent structures in the city. The largest of them were six-story bunkers dug into the ground, each holding up to a thousand people. The subway was used for covert maneuver of troops.

The German troops occupying the defensive position in the Berlin direction were united into four armies. In addition to the regular troops, Volkssturm battalions, which were formed from young people and old men, were involved in the defense. The total number of the Berlin garrison exceeded 200 thousand people.

On April 15, Hitler addressed the soldiers of the Eastern Front with an appeal to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops at all costs.

The plan of the Soviet command envisaged powerful strikes by troops from all three fronts to break through the enemy’s defenses along the Oder and Neisse, encircle the main group of German troops in the Berlin direction, and reach the Elbe.

On April 21, the advanced units of the 1st Belorussian Front broke into the northern and southeastern outskirts of Berlin.

On April 24, southeast of Berlin, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front met with formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The next day, these fronts were united to the west of the German capital - thus completing the encirclement of the entire Berlin enemy group.

On the same day, units of the 5th Guards Army of General A.S. Zhadov met on the banks of the Elbe in the Torgau region with reconnaissance groups of the 5th Corps of the 1st American Army of General O. Bradley. The German front was cut. The Americans have 80 km left to Berlin. Since the Germans willingly surrendered to the Western allies and stood to the death against the Red Army, Stalin feared that the Allies might capture the capital of the Reich before us. Knowing about these concerns of Stalin, the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Europe, General D. Eisenhower, forbade the troops to move to Berlin or take Prague. Nevertheless, Stalin demanded that Zhukov and Konev clear Berlin by May 1. On April 22, Stalin gave them orders for a decisive assault on the capital. Konev had to stop parts of his front on a line that ran through the railway station just a few hundred meters from the Reichstag.

Since April 25, there have been fierce street battles in Berlin. On May 1, the red flag was raised over the Reichstag building. On May 2, the city garrison capitulated.

The struggle for Berlin was life and death. From April 21 to May 2, 1.8 million artillery shots (more than 36 thousand tons of metal) were fired at Berlin. The Germans defended their capital with great tenacity. According to the memoirs of Marshal Konev, “German soldiers still surrendered only when they had no choice.”

As a result of the fighting in Berlin, out of 250 thousand buildings, about 30 thousand were completely destroyed, more than 20 thousand were in a dilapidated state, more than 150 thousand buildings had moderate damage. City transport did not work. More than a third of metro stations were flooded. 225 bridges were blown up by the Nazis. The entire public utility system stopped functioning - power plants, water pumping stations, gas plants, sewage systems.

On May 2, the remnants of the Berlin garrison, numbering more than 134 thousand, surrendered, the rest fled.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 23 tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht, captured about 480 thousand people, captured up to 11 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, and 4,500 aircraft. (“The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Encyclopedia.” P. 96).

Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in this final operation - about 350 thousand people, including over 78 thousand - irrevocably. 33 thousand Soviet soldiers died on the Seelow Heights alone. The Polish army lost about 9 thousand soldiers and officers.

Soviet troops lost 2,156 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 1,220 guns and mortars, and 527 aircraft. (“The classification of secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts.” M., 1993. P. 220.)

According to Colonel General A.V. Gorbatov, “from a military point of view, there was no need to storm Berlin... It was enough to encircle the city, and it would have surrendered in a week or two. Germany would inevitably capitulate. And during the assault, at the very end of the victory, in street battles, we killed at least a hundred thousand soldiers...” “This is what the British and Americans did. They blocked German fortresses and waited for months for their surrender, sparing their soldiers. Stalin acted differently." (“History of Russia in the 20th century. 1939–2007.” M., 2009. P. 159.)

The Berlin operation is one of the largest operations of the Second World War. The victory of the Soviet troops in it became a decisive factor in completing the military defeat of Germany. With the fall of Berlin and other vital areas, Germany lost the ability to organize resistance and soon capitulated.

On May 5-11, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts advanced towards the capital of Czechoslovakia - Prague. The Germans were able to hold the defense in this city for 4 days. On May 11, Soviet troops liberated Prague.

On May 7, Alfred Jodl signed an unconditional surrender to the Western Allies in Reims. Stalin agreed with the allies to consider the signing of this act as a preliminary protocol of surrender.

The next day, May 8, 1945 (more precisely, at 0 hours 43 minutes on May 9, 1945), the signing of the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Germany was completed. The act was signed by Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral von Friedeburg and Colonel General Stumpf, who were authorized to do so by Grand Admiral Dönitz.

The first paragraph of the Act read:

"1. We, the undersigned, acting on behalf of the German High Command, agree to the unconditional surrender of all our armed forces on land, sea and air, as well as all forces currently under German command, to the Supreme Command of the Red Army and at the same time to the Allied High Command expeditionary forces."

The meeting to sign the Act of German Surrender was led by the representative of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Forces, Marshal G.K. Zhukov. British Air Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, U.S. Strategic Air Commander General Carl Spaats, and French Army Commander General Jean Delattre de Tassigny were present as representatives of the Allied Supreme Command.

The price of victory was the undeserved losses of the Red Army from 1941 to 1945. (Information from the declassified storage facilities of the General Staff, published in Izvestia on June 25, 1998.)

The irretrievable losses of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War amounted to 11,944,100 people. Of these, 6,885 thousand people were killed or died from wounds, various diseases, died in disasters, or committed suicide. Missing, captured or surrendered - 4,559 thousand. 500 thousand people died on the way to the front under bombing or for other reasons.

The total demographic losses of the Red Army, including losses from which 1,936 thousand people returned from captivity after the war, military personnel re-conscripted into the army who found themselves in occupied and then liberated territory (they were considered missing in action), 939 thousand people are subtracted, amount to 9,168 400 people. Of these, the payroll (i.e., those who fought with weapons in their hands) is 8,668,400 people.

Overall, the country lost 26,600,000 citizens. The civilian population suffered the most during the war - 17,400,000 killed and died.

By the beginning of the war, 4,826,900 people served in the Red Army and Navy (the state numbered 5,543 thousand military personnel, taking into account 74,900 people serving in other formations).

34,476,700 people were mobilized to the fronts (including those who had already served at the time of the German attack).

After the end of the war, 12,839,800 people remained on the army lists, of which 11,390 thousand people were in service. There were 1,046 thousand people undergoing treatment and 400 thousand people in the formation of other departments.

21,636,900 people left the army during the war, of which 3,798 thousand were dismissed due to injury and illness, of which 2,576 thousand remained permanently disabled.

3,614 thousand people were transferred to work in industry and local self-defense. It was sent to staff the troops and bodies of the NKVD, the Polish Army, the Czechoslovak and Romanian armies - 1,500 thousand people.

More than 994 thousand people were convicted (of which 422 thousand were sent to penal units, 436 thousand were sent to places of detention). 212 thousand deserters and stragglers from the echelons on their way to the front have not been found.

These numbers are amazing. At the end of the war, Stalin said that the army had lost 7 million people. In the 60s, Khrushchev called “more than 20 million people.”

In March 1990, the Military Historical Journal published an interview with the then Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General M. Moiseev: gratuitous losses among military personnel amounted to 8,668,400 people.

In the first period of fighting (June - November 1941), our daily losses at the fronts were estimated at 24 thousand (17 thousand killed and 7 thousand wounded). At the end of the war (from January 1944 to May 1945 - 20 thousand people a day: 5.2 thousand killed and 14.8 thousand wounded).

During the war, our army lost 11,944,100 people.

In 1991, the work of the General Staff to clarify losses in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 was completed.

Direct losses.

The direct losses of the Soviet Union in the Second World War are understood as the losses of military personnel and civilians who died as a result of hostilities and their consequences, due to an increase in the mortality rate compared to peacetime, as well as those people from the population of the USSR on June 22, 1941, who left territory of the USSR during the war and did not return. The human losses of the Soviet Union do not include indirect demographic losses due to a decrease in the birth rate during the war and an increase in mortality in the post-war years.

A complete assessment of all human losses can be obtained using the demographic balance method, by comparing the size and structure of the population at the beginning and end of the war.

The assessment of human losses in the USSR was carried out for the period from June 22, 1941 to December 31, 1945 in order to take into account the deaths of the wounded in hospitals, the repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced civilians to the USSR, and the repatriation of citizens of other countries from the USSR. For the calculation, the borders of the USSR were taken as of June 21, 1941.

According to the 1939 census, the population on January 17, 1939 was determined to be 168.9 million people. About 20.1 million more people lived in the territories that became part of the USSR in the pre-war years. The natural increase over the 2.5 years to June 1941 amounted to about 7.91 million people.

Thus, in mid-1941 the population of the USSR was approximately 196.7 million people. The population of the USSR as of December 31, 1945 was estimated at 170.5 million people, of which 159.6 million were born before June 22, 1941. The total number of people who died and found themselves outside the country during the war was 37.1 million people (196.7-159.6). If the mortality rate of the USSR population in 1941–1945 had remained the same as in pre-war 1940, the number of deaths during this period would have been 11.9 million people. Subtracting this value (37.1-11.9 million), the human losses of generations born before the start of the war amounted to 25.2 million people. To this figure it is necessary to add the losses of children born during the war, but who died due to an increased level of infant mortality compared to the “normal” level. Of those born in 1941–1945, approximately 4.6 million did not live to see the beginning of 1946, or 1.3 million more than would have died at the 1940 mortality rate. These 1.3 million should also be attributed to losses as a result of the war.

As a result, the direct human losses of the USSR population as a result of the war, estimated by the demographic balance method, amount to approximately 26.6 million people.

According to experts, the net increase in mortality as a result of deteriorating living conditions can be attributed to 9-10 million deaths during the war.

Direct losses of the population of the USSR during the war years amounted to 13.5% of its population by mid-1941.

Irreversible losses of the Red Army.

By the beginning of the war, there were 4,826,907 military personnel in the army and navy. In addition, 74,945 military personnel and military construction workers served in the formations of civilian departments. Over the 4 years of the war, minus those re-conscripted, another 29,574 thousand were mobilized. In total, together with personnel, 34,476,700 people were recruited into the army, navy and paramilitary forces. Of these, about one third were in service annually (10.5-11.5 million people). Half of this composition (5.0–6.5 million people) served in the active army.

In total, according to the General Staff commission, during the war, 6,885,100 military personnel were killed, died from wounds and illnesses, or died as a result of accidents, which amounted to 19.9% ​​of those conscripted. 4,559 thousand people were missing or captured, or 13% of those conscripted.

In total, the total losses of personnel of the Soviet armed forces, including border and internal troops, during the Second World War amounted to 11,444,100 people.

In 1942–1945, in the liberated territory, 939,700 military personnel from among those previously in captivity, surrounded and in occupied territory were re-conscripted into the army.

About 1,836,600 former military personnel returned from captivity at the end of the war. These military personnel (2,775 thousand people) were rightly excluded by the commission from the irretrievable losses of the armed forces.

Thus, the irretrievable losses of personnel of the USSR Armed Forces, taking into account the Far Eastern campaign (killed, died from wounds, went missing and did not return from captivity, as well as non-combat losses) amounted to 8,668,400 people.

Sanitary losses.

The commission established them in the amount of 18,334 thousand people, including: 15,205,600 people were wounded and shell-shocked, 3,047,700 people were sick, 90,900 people were frostbitten.

In total, 3,798,200 people were demobilized from the army and navy during the war due to injury or illness.

Every day on the Soviet-German front, an average of 20,869 people were out of action, of which about 8 thousand were irretrievably lost. More than half - 56.7% of all irretrievable losses - occurred in 1941–1942. The largest average daily losses were noted in the summer-autumn campaigns of 1941 - 24 thousand people and 1942 - 27.3 thousand per day.

The losses of Soviet troops in the Far Eastern campaign were relatively small - over 25 days of fighting, losses amounted to 36,400 people, including 12,000 killed, died or went missing.

About 6 thousand partisan detachments - more than 1 million people - operated behind enemy lines.

Head of the Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for perpetuating the memory of fallen defenders of the Fatherland, Major General A.V. Kirilin, in an interview with the weekly “Arguments and Facts” (2011, No. 24), provided the following data on the losses of the Red Army and Germany during the war of 1941–1945:

From June 22 to December 31, 1941, the losses of the Red Army exceeded 3 million people. Of these, 465 thousand were killed, 101 thousand died in hospitals, 235 thousand people died from illnesses and accidents (military statistics included those shot by their own in this category).

The disaster of 1941 was determined by the number of missing and captured people - 2,355,482 people. Most of these people died in German camps on the territory of the USSR.

The figure for Soviet military losses in the Great Patriotic War is 8,664,400 people. This is a figure that is confirmed by documents. But not all the people listed as casualties died. For example, in 1946, 480 thousand “displaced persons” went to the West - those who did not want to return to their homeland. In total, 3.5 million people are missing.

Approximately 500 thousand people drafted into the army (mostly in 1941) did not make it to the front. They are now classified as general civilian losses (26 million) (disappeared during the bombing of trains, remained in the occupied territory, served in the police) - 939.5 thousand people re-conscripted into the Red Army during the liberation of Soviet lands.

Germany, excluding its allies, lost 5.3 million killed, died of wounds, missing in action, and 3.57 million prisoners on the Soviet-German front. For every German killed, there were 1.3 Soviet soldiers. 442 thousand captured Germans died in Soviet captivity.

Of the 4,559 thousand Soviet soldiers captured by Germans, 2.7 million people died.

Chapter 48 Berlin Operation April–May 1945 On the night of April 14, German troops dug in on the Seelow Heights, west of the Oder, heard the roar of tank engines. Music and ominous statements of Soviet propaganda, sounding at full volume from loudspeakers, could not