Causes of the Tsushima disaster. Five reasons for the defeat in the Battle of Tsushima

The 1905 Battle of Tsushima between the Russian Pacific Flotilla and the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the naval battle, the Russian squadron was defeated and destroyed. The bulk of Russian warships were torpedoed by Japanese sailors and sunk along with their crew members. Some ships announced their capitulation, only four ships returned to the shores of their native harbor. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) ended with a major military defeat of the Russian fleet off the coast of Tsushima Island (Japan). What are the reasons for the defeat and was a different outcome possible?

Military and political situation in the Far East

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with a surprise attack by combat destroyers of the Japanese fleet on Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the torpedo attack, two heavy artillery ships and one surface vessel were damaged. The history of the Far East includes many military actions. All of them were aimed at seizing and redistributing spheres of influence in this section of Russian land. Japan's desire to dominate Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula was fiercely supported by England and the United States of America. Russia's small allies, such as France, Germany and others, strongly supported the Russian Emperor Nicholas II in the matter of preserving Russian territories. However, at decisive strategic moments they still tried to adhere to neutrality. Allied cooperation was provided only when it suited their commercial interests.

Making a strategic decision

The ever-increasing Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, the main base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, forced Emperor Nicholas II to take decisive action. The decision was made in July 1904. A squadron under the leadership of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky was sent from Kronstadt to the weakened Pacific squadron to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.

Already on the way, the Baltic ships learn that Port Arthur has been taken and all the ships in the roadstead are sunk. The Pacific Flotilla has been destroyed. This is the maritime history of the Russian Far East. Nevertheless, Nicholas II decides to continue the path of the imperial fleet to the shores of Japan. To strengthen the attacking squadron, a detachment of warships under Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov was sent from the Baltic Sea.

Unequal forces of opponents

The course of the Tsushima battle could be predicted by the number of combat units on the opposing sides. The Pacific Flotilla of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky included:

8 squadron heavy artillery ships (battleships) against 4 Japanese;

3 coastal guard battleships against 6 enemy ships;

1 cruiser battleship against 8 units of the Imperial Japanese Navy;

8 cruisers against 16 Japanese cruisers;

5 against Japan's 24 auxiliary military vessels;

9 Russian against 63 Japanese destroyers.

The clear combat advantage of Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo speaks for itself. The combat experience of the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian fleet in all respects, despite the fact that Russia had a much richer history of naval battles. Japanese combat riflemen skillfully mastered the art of hitting enemy targets at long distances, and at one target from several ships. The Russian fleet did not have such experience. The main occupation of that period was the imperial reviews (parades) of naval equipment, which were held annually by order of Emperor Nicholas II.

Mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian admiral

The strategic objective of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky’s sea campaign was to capture the Sea of ​​Japan. This condition was set by Emperor Nicholas II. However, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky saw the following as his operational goal: to break through to Vladivostok by any force, regardless of the possible losses of his fleet. It is possible that bypassing the Japanese islands from the east would have been a strategically correct decision, and the Tsushima naval battle would not have taken place.

But the naval commander chose a different, shorter route. The decision was made to go through the straits. The Korea Strait, connecting the East China and Sea of ​​Japan, goes around the island of Tsushima, which, in turn, has two routes: the western passage and the eastern (Tsushima Strait). It was there that Japanese Admiral Heitachiro Togo was waiting for the Russian sailors.

All passages are blocked

The commander of the Japanese fleet chose a strategically correct plan for possible military operations. A patrol chain of ships was organized between the islands, which could notify the commander of possible maneuvers and the approach of Russian ships. On the approaches to Vladivostok, the Japanese prudently placed minefields. Everything is ready for battle. The Japanese ships of the Tsushima battle were awaiting the approach of Russian ships. The commander of the Pacific Fleet refused naval reconnaissance, fearing that his squadron would be discovered by enemy reconnaissance cruisers.

The obvious outcome of the main battle of the Russo-Japanese War

To send such a motley armada across three oceans seemed crazy to many. Both veterans with worn-out mechanisms, who had logged hundreds of thousands of nautical miles, and the newest, hastily completed ships that had not passed tests, were sent on this doomed voyage. Sailors always treat their ships as inanimate sentient beings. The battleships with the names of famous commanders seemed to specifically not want to go to inevitable death. They got stuck on the descent during a slip, sank right next to the factory walls during repairs, and ran aground, as if they were giving clear warning signs to their crews.

How not to believe omens?

At the beginning of 1900, an assembly model of the battleship Emperor Alexander III burned down in the workshop. The launch of this ship was marked by the fall of the flagpole with the imperial standard and was accompanied by casualties.

The battleship "Eagle" sank in a civil harbor, and later ran aground several times while catching up with the squadron in the Gulf of Finland. The battleship “Slava” was never able to be sent on a campaign.

However, the high command was unaware of any premonitions. On September 26, 1904, the highest imperial review took place in Reval (formerly Tallinn). Nicholas II walked around all the ships and wished the sailors to reach Port Arthur and join the first squadron of the Pacific Fleet for joint mastery of the Sea of ​​Japan. A week later, seven battleships, a cruiser, and destroyers left their native shores forever. The 220-day, 18,000 nautical mile voyage to the Japanese shores has begun.

Unseen circumstances

The main problem faced by the squadron command was the problem with fuel. According to the international maritime law of that time, warships of a belligerent party could enter the ports of a neutral party only for a day. England, which owned most of the loading stations along the route of the squadron, closed its ports to Russian warships.

The squadron's supply of coal, provisions and fresh water had to be organized directly at sea. For repairs, a special workshop “Kamchatka” was equipped, staffed by volunteer craftsmen. By the way, they also shared the fate of military sailors. Overall, the implementation of a strategic operation of this scale deserves the highest praise.

The most difficult loading of coal on the high seas, unbearable tropical heat, when the temperature in the boiler rooms reached 70º Celsius, a severe storm at the Cape of Good Hope - all this did not stop the movement of the squadron. None of the ships turned back.

Circumnavigation across three oceans

The Russian squadron loomed like a ghost on the horizon, rarely approaching ports and harbors. The whole world watched her movements. International telegraph and telephone lines were overloaded. Correspondents and reporters guarded the squadron along the entire route:

Port Said (Egypt);

Djibouti (East Africa);

Aden (Yemen);

Dakar (Senegal);

Conakry (Guinea);

Cape Town (South Africa).

But all attempts were to no avail. The first long-term stop was in Masiba Bay (Madagascar). The cruiser detachment of Rear Admiral D. G. von Felkersam also joined there, taking a short route through the Suez Canal. During exercises in Madagascar, Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky became convinced of the inability of his subordinates to shoot accurately and maneuver correctly.

However, this did not surprise anyone. The crews were formed mostly of recruits and penal prisoners. Two months later - a jump across the Indian Ocean. The endlessly tired squadron was met by Chinese fishermen in the straits near Singapore and the Vietnamese in Cam Ranh. The last sea caravan to be seen from Jeju Island were Korean pearl divers. The Battle of Tsushima would begin very soon, and the date of the squadron's destruction was approaching.

First salvo against the enemy

At 13:40, the flagship battleship “Prince Suvorov”, under the leadership of Captain 1st Rank V.V. Ignatius, set course north-east 23. Nine minutes later, its guns opened fire on the Japanese squadron, and two minutes later flashes of response flashed volleys The Tsushima naval battle has begun. For most of the crew, the outcome was clear back in St. Petersburg.

From a letter from the commander of the battleship of the guards crew “Emperor Alexander III”, captain 3rd rank N. M. Bukhvustov: “You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory. At the same time, I guarantee that we will all die, but we will not give up.” The commander kept his word and died along with the entire crew of the battleship.

Battle of Tsushima, briefly about the main thing

At 14:15, exactly thirty-five minutes after the start of the battle, the battleship Oslyabya, led by Captain 1st Rank V.I. Behr, with a strong bow on the bow and a huge fire on the rostra, rolled out of formation and fell on the left side . Ten minutes later, he disappeared under water, leaving only wooden fragments and people floundering in the water on the surface.

A few minutes after the death of the Oslyabya, one after another, ships torpedoed by Japanese sailors broke down.

By 16 o'clock the battleship "Prince Suvorov" was out of action, which was severely mutilated by Japanese shells. Resembling a burning island, it repelled enemy attacks for about five hours. In the last minutes, the Russian sailors fired back from the only surviving three-inch gun and rifles. The battleship received seven torpedo hits and went under water.

A little earlier we managed to remove Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky with his headquarters to the destroyer “Buiny”. A total of 23 people were evacuated. No one else could be saved. The captain of the 1st rank, a talented marine painter Vasily Vasilyevich Ignatius, commanded a squadron battleship and died on it.

In general, during the Russo-Japanese War, two wonderful artists died, both of them graduates of the naval corps and, by a strange coincidence, complete namesakes. The second artist is Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, who drowned along with the battleship Petropavlovsk off the coast of Port Arthur. Then, at the same time, Admiral S. O. Makarov, who won many Russian naval battles and was the glory and pride of the Russian fleet, also died. Following the flagship "Prince Suvorov", the Russian Imperial Navy lost:

“Sisoy the Great” under the command of captain 1st rank M.P. Ozerov;

the battleship "Navarin", led by captain 1st rank Baron B. A. Fitingof;

the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which was subordinate to the later captured captain 1st rank A. A. Rodionov;

squadron battleship "Admiral Ushakov", whose commander was captain 1st rank V.N. Miklukhina (the ship was the last of the Russian squadron to die);

"Admiral Senyavin" led by Captain 1st Rank S.I. Grigoriev, who was captured by the Japanese.

The tragedy continues

The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 increasingly carried Russian sailors and their ships into the abyss of the sea. Another mortally mutilated battleship went under water with the entire crew on board. Until the last minute, people - from the commander to the fireman - had a glimmer of hope that they would be able to overcome this terrible battle of Tsushima (1905) and the Russian coast would appear on the north-east 23 course. The main thing is to survive. Many people died with this thought. Russian sailors on the following battleships followed with their gaze the place where their comrades died. They whispered with lips black from burning: “Rest their souls, Lord.”

The battleship Emperor Alexander III and its entire crew perished, and a little later the Borodino. Miraculously, only one sailor escaped. The outcome of the battle was predetermined. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 made us think about the indestructibility of the Russian fleet. The next morning, the remnants of the Russian squadron that survived the night torpedo attacks were surrendered to the Japanese by Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. Subsequently, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was sentenced to ten years in prison by the decision of the Naval Court of His Imperial Majesty.

The fate of the commander

The commander of the destroyer "Buiny", who saved Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was captain 2nd rank Nikolai Nikolaevich Kolomiytsev. The fate of this man is very amazing. Before the Russo-Japanese War, he was a prominent hydrographer, traveler, explorer of Taimyr, and commander of the icebreaker Ermak. He participated in the Russian polar expedition of Baron Eduard Tol. Returning to Russia after Tsushima, where he distinguished himself as one of the best commanders of the Russian fleet, N. N. Kolomiytsev commanded various ships. In World War I he became a vice admiral. In 1918, he was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In most Soviet-era publications, biographical information about N.N. Kolomiytsev ends with the words: “He died in Petrograd, presumably in 1918.” In 1972, his name was assigned to a new hydrographic vessel. Only very recently it became clear that Nikolai Kolomiytsev fled to Finland in 1918. Later he fought in the Black Sea on the side of Baron Wrangel. Then he moved to France, and died in the United States of America under the wheels of a military truck at the end of 1944. Thus, the ship “Nikolai Kolomiytsev” was the only ship in the Soviet fleet bearing the name of the White Guard admiral and emigrant.

Historical reference

From the lists of naval fleets of that time, two ships that took part in the Battle of Tsushima have survived to this day. These are the well-known cruiser Aurora and the Japanese battleship Mikasa, the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. The armored deck "Aurora" at Tsushima fired about two thousand shells at the enemy, receiving, in turn, twenty-one hits. The cruiser was seriously damaged, sixteen people from its crew, including the commander, captain 1st rank E.R. Egoriev, were killed, another 83 people were wounded. Unable to move forward, the Aurora, along with the cruisers Oleg and Zhemchug, disarmed in Manila (Philippines). According to some military experts, participation in the Battle of Tsushima gives more reason for the cruiser Aurora to serve as a memorial than the famous blank shot in October 1917.

In the city of Yokosuka, the battleship Mikasa stands as a museum ship. For a very long time, on the anniversaries of Tsushima, meetings of veterans and participants of the Russian-Japanese War were held there. The Japanese treat this historical monument with great reverence.

Memory of the lost sailors at Tsushima

Of the 36 units of the Russian squadron, three arrived in Vladivostok. The messenger ship "Almaz", the destroyers "Grozny" and "Bravey". Most of the ships and 5 thousand sailors found eternal peace at the bottom of the Korea Strait near the islands of Tsushima and Dazhelet. The graves of Russian sailors who died of wounds in captivity are still carefully preserved by the Japanese in Nagasaki. In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the snow-white Church of the Savior on Water, dedicated to the victims of Tsushima, was built with people's money and widows' contributions. The temple did not stand for long, until the mid-30s. The Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of Tsushima - these two terms will forever remain in the eternal memory of the Russian people.

Retired captain 1st rank P.D. BYKOV

Underestimation of the enemy's strength and military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained dominance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take measures to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.

The need to strengthen the squadron, which was inferior to the Japanese fleet, especially in the number of cruisers and destroyers, was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was commander of the fleet. But all his representations and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was reconsidered with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue of sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, called the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

The squadron was supposed to include ships that were nearing the end of construction, as well as some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite seaworthy. In addition, it was planned to buy 7 cruisers abroad.

Due to the fact that the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to solve independent problems, its sending was mainly aimed at strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of Chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships Rear Admirals Felkersam and Enquist.

Ship composition of the squadron

The battleships “Sisoi the Great” and “Navarin” were old ships, and the second had old short-range 305 mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, armed with 203 mm cannons, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had very different armament, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were reduced due to construction defects, and the remaining ships were of outdated design.

The cruisers that were part of the squadron were even more diverse in their tactical and technical elements. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, the modern ones were “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearl” and “Emerald”. The first and last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it already on the way. Of the other cruisers, “Svetlana” and “Dmitry Donskoy” were old ships, and “Almaz” was an armed yacht.

Of the cruisers, two - “Pearl” and “Emerald” - were of the same type, high-speed (24 knots), but unprotected ships. “Oleg” and “Aurora” had deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. “Svetlana” had a speed of 20 knots, and “Almaz” - 18. The oldest of the cruisers, “Dmitry Donskoy” had only 16 knots. The weakness and inadequacy of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to assign five armed high-speed steamers to the squadron as high-speed reconnaissance ships - “Ural”, “Kuban”, “Terek”, “Rion” and “Dnepr”, which at different times joined the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very little. The squadron included nine destroyers - “Bravey”, “Bodriy”, “Bystryy”, “Bedovyy”, “Stormy”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”, “Loudy” and “Groznyy”, which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and reached a speed of no more than 26 knots.

Despite the fact that the decision to send a squadron was made in April, its formation and equipment took a very long time.

The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new ships and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, work on the squadron was completed so much that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.

Personnel

Preparation and organization of the squadron

The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the shores of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the situation of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationships and influence of detachment commanders on their subordinates and on the training of ship crews. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the headquarters of the squadron commander had to deal with resolving various minor issues that could have been resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander itself did not have proper organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag captain was only the executor of the commander's orders. There was no coordination in the work of the flagship specialists, and each one worked on his own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.

Thus, when the squadron entered the theater of operations, it did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.

Organization and conditions of transition

First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repairs and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible enemy attempts to attack en route.

The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.

Due to the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that did not allow passage through the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the commander of the squadron decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on the island. Madagascar. For greater safety of the transition, Rozhdestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments regarding the squadron’s entry into any specific ports, since this would make its route known in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements on this issue were concluded. There were only negotiations with the French government on some private issues, such as the length of stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for the squadron’s anchorage, and the possibility of relations with the squadron en route, etc. Some private issues, such as the security of ships traveling through the Suez Canal, were resolved with other foreign governments. But in general, no diplomatic preparations for the transition were made.

Because of this, the transition of the squadron became extremely complicated due to protests from foreign countries when the squadron entered a particular port, a reduction in the stay period, and the impossibility of performing routine repairs and resting personnel.

A matter of particular importance was the timely supply of coal, water and provisions, since the time of arrival of the squadron to the Far East depended entirely on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal would have to be made abroad, it was decided to involve foreign companies in this.

Thus, the possibility of the squadron moving to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their fulfillment of contracts. As one would expect, such an organization of supplies could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on the island. Madagascar.

The squadron commander was so concerned about supplying the squadron with coal that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships took increased food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be made on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign companies. To repair ships en route, the squadron was assigned a specially equipped ship-workshop “Kamchatka”. This steamer and several other transports with cargo for various purposes formed the floating base of the squadron.

The news of the Russian government sending such large reinforcements as the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed in the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was very likely to assume that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire route of the squadron’s movement, up to and including a direct attack on the squadron and acts of sabotage.

The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian Naval Ministry, and it was looking for ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where the squadron could expect various surprises. The Danish Straits, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.

After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to the foreign political agents of the security department of the police department, which willingly took upon itself the organization of protecting the squadron’s route in the Danish Straits. To organize security in other places, special people were sent who were supposed to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.

All of the above measures did not guarantee uninterrupted supply of the squadron ships, nor provision of parking, repairs and rest, nor. finally, protecting the squadron from the possibility of a surprise attack. The extent to which the established organization for guarding the squadron along the way did not meet its purpose was shown by the incident during the squadron’s passage of the North (German) Sea, known as the “Hullic Incident.”

Departure of the squadron and the Gull incident

The squadron made its first transition to Cape Skagen (the northern tip of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here Admiral Rozhdestvensky received information about suspicious ships spotted and about an allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the parking at Cape Skagen dangerous under these conditions, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to move on. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were supposed to weigh anchor sequentially and follow each other at a distance of 20-30 miles. The first two detachments were destroyers, the next two were cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last to weigh anchor was a detachment of new battleships. Admiral Rozhestvensky considered this dismemberment of the squadron to be the most appropriate from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - the battleships.

However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of them colliding at night, in case of any unforeseen delays along the way. The lead detachments were not given the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would have given the main forces, who were also marching without security, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhestvensky in no way met the requirements for organizing the transition of the squadron in wartime.

The detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky held the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22:00. About 0 o'clock. 55 min. On October 9, the detachment was approaching the Dogger Bank area. Shortly before this, the Kamchatka transport workshop reported on the radio that it was being attacked by destroyers.

As Dogger-bapka passed ahead of the detachment of battleships, the silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which were crossing the detachment’s course and approaching it. The squadron decided that the battleships were under attack and opened fire. But when the spotlights were turned on, it turned out that fishing boats had been shot. The fire was stopped. However, during the 10 minutes during which the shooting continued, several fishing boats were damaged. Suddenly, on the left abeam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were noticed, on which fire was also opened. But after the first shots, it became clear that these were the Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. On the Aurora, two people were wounded and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.

Having passed the Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel and arrived in Vigo (Spain) on October 13. Here the squadron stayed until the conflict between England and Russia, caused by the so-called “Hull Incident,” was resolved.

There is reason to believe that England, which took a hostile position towards Russia and was in an alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could be to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which would worsen Russia's position in the Far East.

After the “Ghull Incident,” the British government threatened to sever diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to eliminate the conflict that arose, agreeing to compensate for losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.

Transition of the squadron to the island. Madagascar

The voyage of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way took place without any particular complications. By December 15, all ships had reached their destination.

The remaining ships are the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Orel”, “Oslyabya”, the cruisers “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Aurora” with the transports “Kamchatka”, “Anadyr”. “Korea”, “Malaya” and “Meteor”, led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky, went around Africa.

The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable stopover along the way, and coal loading was carried out on the open sea. In addition, wanting to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to make long transitions. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves that far exceeded normal ones. So, for example, new battleships took double the amount of coal - instead of one thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To accept such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in living decks, cockpits, mine artillery batteries and other places, which extremely constrained the lives of personnel. In addition, loading in intense heat on the ocean swell and waves was very difficult and time-consuming. On average, battleships took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and thus, the parking time was spent on loading and urgent repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, were left without rest. Moreover, in conditions when all the rooms on the ships were filled with coal, it was impossible to conduct any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment arrived in Madagascar. Here Admiral Rozhestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.

On December 27, both detachments of the squadron united in Nosi-be Bay (west coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to stay. Here the squadron stayed from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.

1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron and the need to strengthen it.

2. The need to repair some ships in the roadstead.

3. Complications in the further supply of fuel to the squadron.

The situation at the time of the squadron's arrival in Madagascar and the change in the goals of the squadron's campaign

The moment the 2nd Pacific Squadron arrived in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron the 2nd Pacific Squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the advisability of the squadron's further movement, since after Russia lost Port Arthur the squadron was forced to move. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,

Rozhdestvensky believed that due to the changed strategic situation, the squadron’s immediate task was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. He telegraphed this to St. Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, considered the squadron as a force with which to change the situation in the theater of war, and set Rozhdestvensky the task not of breaking through to Vladivostok, but of mastering the Sea of ​​Japan. However, it was recognized that Admiral Rozhestvensky’s squadron was not strong enough to achieve this goal, and it was decided to strengthen it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had completely failed. In this regard, Rozhestvensky was ordered to wait for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov in Madagascar.

The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers “Oleg” and “Izumrud” and destroyers “Gromky” and “Grozny”, was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was given the name 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after Rozhestvensky left. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.

This squadron included the old squadron battleship “Nikolai I”, coastal defense battleships “Admiral General Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov” and the old armored cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh”. “Nicholas I” was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305 mm guns. Coastal defense battleships were armed with 256 mm guns, which, although long-range, were not entirely successful in their design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. There was not a single modern ship in this squadron.

Transition from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina

Unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy repair work, nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with forced inaction due to the lack of coal and shells for practical shooting - all this had an extremely negative impact on the personnel and did not at all contribute to increasing the combat readiness of the squadron.

Discipline, which had noticeably decreased by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insulting commanding officers and disobedience became more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violation of discipline by officers.

The lack of a supply of shells did not make it possible to make up for the most important deficiency—teaching the squadron to shoot. The Irtysh transport, which was loaded with additional ammunition for firing practice, was delayed when the squadron left Libau. There was an accident on it and it was abandoned for repairs. At the same time, the ammunition was unloaded from it, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by rail. But Rozhestvensky was not notified about this. After the repairs were completed, the Irtysh set out to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of much-needed ammunition for firing training en route. During their stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firings from distances not exceeding 30 cable lengths. The results of these shootings were completely unsatisfactory. The squadron's joint maneuvering showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.

Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and stay on the island. Madagascar did not improve at all and it remained as before unprepared for the task.

On March 3, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was able to move on and weighed anchor.

When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not communicate his further route in order to achieve secrecy of the transition. And at this time, the 3rd Pacific Squadron, which had left Libau in February, was en route to join him. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, going to the East with the same goal, knew where and when they would meet, because the place of their meeting was not determined.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Along the way, coal was accepted six times on the open sea. On March 26, the squadron passed Singapore and in April, after a 28-day passage, dropped anchor in Cam Ranh Bay, where the ships had to carry out repairs, load coal and accept materials for further travel. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, it was joined by the 3rd Pacific Squadron.

The stops in Cam Ranh Bay and then in Van Phong Bay were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, and on the other, a Japanese attack could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg in which, citing poor health, he asked to be replaced by another commander upon arrival in Vladivostok.

Transition from Indochina to the Korea Strait

The squadron could enter the Sea of ​​Japan through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or Laperuzov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to choose the shortest route through the Korean Strait, the widest and deepest of all the others. However, this route lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before arriving in Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great difficulties in navigation, and besides, the strait could be mined (the depths allowed this). The passage through the Strait of La Perouse in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhdestvensky due to the prevailing fogs, navigational difficulties and lack of coal for this longer passage.

The decision to go through the Korean Strait created the most favorable conditions for the battle for the Japanese fleet, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron through other straits, however, did not guarantee it from meeting the Japanese, but still the latter would have been in less favorable conditions, further from their bases, and would have been able to concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The route through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific Squadron at the most disadvantageous position.

Having decided to go through the Korean Strait, Admiral Rozhdestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific coast of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus divert part of the Japanese fleet. For the same purpose, the auxiliary cruisers “Rion” and “Dnepr” were sent to the Yellow Sea, separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports as the squadron approached the Sedelny Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were supposed to go to Shanghai, the busiest trading port, connected by telegraph cables to all major port cities, including Japanese ones.

The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned about their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freed from transports, would take the shortest route, i.e. through the Korea Strait.

After the separation of the auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: in the right column were the battleships - 1st armored detachment - “Prince Suvorov” (Rozhestvensky flag), “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”; 2nd armored detachment - “Oslyabya” (Felkerzam’s flag), “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”; on the left - the 3rd armored detachment - “Nikolai I” (Nebogatov’s flag), coastal defense battleships “Apraksin”, “Senyavin”, “Ushakov”, cruisers “Oleg” (Enkvist flag), “Aurora”, “Dmitry Donskoy” , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, consisting of the cruisers “Svetlana” (the pennant of captain 1st rank Shein), “Almaz” and “Ural”, walked ahead in a wedge formation - at a distance of 3-4 cabins. from the squadron. The cruisers “Pearl” and “Emerald” stayed on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left with the squadron walked in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the lead Anadyr, followed by the Irtysh, Kamchatka, Korea, tugs Rus and Svir. The destroyers walked on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships “Orel” and “Kostroma” were at the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The progress of the squadron was determined by the progress of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward of the formation; On hospital ships, not only all navigation lights were lit, but also additional ones to illuminate Red Cross signs.

In this order, the squadron approached the Korean Strait. The squadron was in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming steamships, only one was detained; the rest were not even inspected. The location of the squadron was unmasked by hospital ships that had full coverage. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any kind of secrecy in the movement of the squadron. Admiral Rozhestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korean Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet there. In addition, he believed that the deployment of reconnaissance officers would only help the enemy detect the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that given the Japanese superiority in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by reconnaissance to carry out any maneuver.

Refusal of intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s reference to the desire to maintain the secrecy of the squadron’s movement does not stand up to criticism at all, since the squadron could easily have been detected by the enemy by the hospital ships that were with it, which in fact happened.

There was no compelling justification for leaving six transports with the squadron, since they did not carry any vital cargo. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruisers for their defense. In addition, the presence of the low-speed transport Irtysh reduced squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to conceal the movement, did not organize reconnaissance of the enemy, and did not speed up the movement of the squadron itself.

On the night of May 13–14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to the large number of ships included in the squadron, its marching order was very complex. The squadron marched in formation of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one - from transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex formation, the ships inevitably had to fire at night to prevent the possibility of a collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides facing inward and in the wake; The masthead lights were extinguished. On hospital ships sailing at the tail of the squadron, all lights were open, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and progress.

Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, whose proximity it knew from intercepted radiograms.

On the night of May 14, the ships were ready for battle. The artillery crew rested in places provided for by the combat schedule.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron at that time included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. The flag of Admiral Rozhestvensky was on the squadron battleship “Prince Suvorov”. The junior flagships, rear admirals Nebogatov and Enquist, were: the first on the battleship “Nicholas I”, and the second on the cruiser “Oleg”. Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship Oslyabya was not lowered.

The tactical data of the ships that were part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were the 4 new Borodino-class battleships. These ships were intended for navigation in limited areas, and heavy overloading of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long passages, sharply reduced their combat qualities, since the armor belt was immersed in water and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship Oslyabya was very different from them - a seaworthy ship, but weak in armor and artillery (Oslyabya was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - “Sisoi the Great”, “Navarin” and “Nicholas I” had nothing in common either with each other or with the previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, the three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.

The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian one, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers and two Nisshin-class armored cruisers. With the exception of the last two, all the ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the characteristics of the Far Eastern theater.

According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were significantly stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.

Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosive, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, Japanese shells were superior to Russian ones in terms of high-explosive effect. In addition, the strength of the explosive (shimoza) in Japanese shells was approximately twice as strong as the pyroxylin used in Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that Japanese ships were significantly superior to Russian ships in terms of artillery preparation, and also that Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than Japanese ships (60 versus 39 percent) .

In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. The Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers against 9 Russians. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number of various types of obsolete and auxiliary ships.

When the 2nd Squadron entered the Korea Strait, the Japanese fleet was at its base in Mozampo. The fleet commander, Admiral Togo, was on the battleship Mikasa. The flag of the head of the 2nd squadron, Vice Admiral Kamimura, was on the armored cruiser Izumo. The observation line was deployed between the island. Kvelpart and the Goto Island group.

About 2 o'clock. 25 min. The auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, the left flank ship of the patrol chain, discovered the lights of the hospital ship Eagle, and then identified the entire squadron. At 4 o'clock. 25 min. a radiogram was given about the appearance of the Russian squadron. The Japanese fleet immediately began preparing for deployment. The reconnaissance cruisers began to converge on the spot where the Russian squadron was discovered. By dawn they had taken positions around her. At 5 o'clock. all warships went to the places assigned according to deployment near the island. Okinoshima.

The Russian squadron, based on the intensive work of Japanese telegraph stations, concluded that it had been discovered, however, Admiral Rozhdestvensky made no attempts to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

At dawn, Japanese cruisers were discovered, sailing on a course parallel to the Russian squadron. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. Counting, ; Because the distance to the Japanese cruisers was too great to fire successfully, he decided not to send his cruisers out of fear that they might encounter superior Japanese forces in the fog.

Day fight May 14

Having no doubt that the Japanese cruisers observing the squadron were reporting to Togo all the data about its movement, on the basis of which the Japanese commander was also preparing for a corresponding deployment before the battle, Rozhdestvensky decided, using the finding stripes of fog, to shoot down the enemy’s crews. To do this, he thought to change the formation at the moment when he found fog and the Japanese cruisers lost sight of him. But as soon as the rebuilding began, the fog cleared, and it was not possible to fulfill the plan. Without finishing the started rebuilding, Rozhdestvensky raised the cancellation signal. The squadron found itself in two wake columns: on the right - four new battleships, on the left - all the rest.

Since the movement of the Russian squadron continued to take place in front of Japanese reconnaissance officers, Admiral Togo had all the information about the composition of the Russian squadron, its course and formations. After weighing everything, he decided to strike at the left column, which consisted of weaker ships. Admiral Togo's plan was to attack the head of the Russian column with armored ships, and for this purpose, taking advantage of his advantage in speed, he crossed its course. At the same time, the light cruisers were supposed to attack the transports and the cruisers covering them.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into two detachments: the 1st detachment (4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Togo and the 2nd detachment (6 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Kamimura.

At 1 p.m. 30 min. from the Russian squadron, on the right bow, the Japanese fleet was discovered, heading to cross the course. Admiral Rozhdestvensky immediately began to line up his ships in one wake column. This restructuring was not yet completed when the Japanese, having moved to the left side of the Russian squadron, began to make a consistent turn to the left in order to cross its course. This turn put the Japanese ships in a risky position. Turning successively at 24 points, they described a loop almost in one place, without being able to shoot.

At the moment of the turn, the distance between the lead ships of the Russian squadron and Togo’s flagship, the Mikasa, was no more than 38 cables. At this moment, at 13 o'clock. 49 minutes, the flagship battleship of the Russian squadron “Suvorov” opened fire. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron had the opportunity to strike the enemy’s lead ships at the very beginning of the battle. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky failed to take advantage of the unfavorable position of the Japanese during the turn. Remaining in one wake column, he deprived his new high-speed battleships of the opportunity to get close to the enemy at a distance favorable to them. In addition, in the middle of the Russian squadron, some ships prevented each other from firing, and the end ones fell behind. Therefore, the fire from Russian ships did not cause much damage to the Japanese.

Three minutes later, the Japanese ships returned fire. The distance by this time had decreased to 35 cables. Four lead Japanese ships concentrated fire on the Suvorov, six on the Oslyaba, and two on the Nicholas I. Having an advantage in progress, the Japanese began to overtake the Russian squadron, entering its head.

Japanese artillery caused great destruction on Russian ships; The two flagships especially suffered. At 2 p.m. 25 min. The battleship Oslyabya, having a large list, failed and after 25 minutes capsized and sank. At 2 p.m. 30 min. Due to damage to the rudder, the battleship Suvorov was disabled to the right. Its masts and yards were knocked down, all the halyards were burned, so it was impossible to raise any signals. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was wounded. The lead was the battleship "Alexander III", which, not knowing why the "Suvorov" was out of action, first followed it, but then turned left, intending to pass to the north under the stern of the Japanese battleships, which were on the right of the Russians.

This was the decisive moment of the battle. After the failure of the flagship battleship, the Russian squadron, which had no battle plan and was now also deprived of leadership, was doomed to defeat. Valiantly fighting the Japanese, she tried to somehow get through to Vladivostok.

Noticing the turn of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned “all of a sudden” to the opposite course in order to again reach the head of the Russian squadron. At the moment of the turn, they were covered by their armored cruisers, which increased fire on the Russian ships, remaining on the same course, and then turned behind the battleships. Due to the fact that the darkness thickened and visibility decreased, the battle temporarily stopped. All attempts by the Russian squadron to break through to the north failed. Each time the Japanese crossed the course, hitting mainly the lead ships.

At 16 o'clock. 20 minutes. The fog again thickened so much that the battle stopped. The Russian squadron, now with Borodino as its lead, turned south. The Japanese temporarily lost the Russians. In search of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned north, and the armored cruisers headed south. Russian battleships, following south, approached their transports and cruisers, which were fighting off Japanese cruisers. With their fire they drove away the Japanese cruisers, and one of them was so badly damaged that it had to go to the nearest port. Japanese armored cruisers approaching the battlefield opened fire on the Russians. “Borodino,” and behind it the entire squadron, gradually turned north.

At 6 p.m. 06 min. Japanese battleships approached and, walking on an almost parallel course, concentrated 32 cabs from a distance. fire on “Borodino” and “Alexander III”. The Russian ships veered to the left. At this time, the destroyer “Buiny” was approaching the squadron, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky was located, photographed together with his headquarters at about 17:00. from “Suvorov”. The signal was raised on the destroyer to transfer command to Admiral Nebogatov. Although this signal was rehearsed by some ships, it was not noticed on “Nicholas I”, and therefore at about 19:00. The destroyer Bezuprechny approached him, from which Rozhdestvensky’s order was transmitted to lead the squadron to Vladivostok.

Meanwhile, the squadron continued to move north. At about 19 o'clock she lost two more battleships: at 18 o'clock. 50 min. "Alexander III" capsized and died at 19:00. 10 min. “Borodino” died in the same way. At 7 p.m. 10 min. Japanese destroyers attacked the broken Suvorov and sank it.

The moment of the death of these ships coincided with the end of the day's battle. The sun set, dusk was coming, and Admiral Togo led his armored ships north, to about. Evenlet, lying on the way from Tsushima to Vladivostok, hoping that Russian ships would go this way. He sent destroyers for night attacks against Russian ships.

During the daytime battle, the Russian cruisers, following the orders of Admiral Rozhestvensky, stayed close to the transports, guarding them, and did not conduct reconnaissance. Therefore, the Russian squadron had absolutely no idea where the Japanese fleet had gone.

In the growing darkness, Japanese destroyers were visible from the Russian squadron approaching from the north, east and south, and only in the southwest was it clear.

Admiral Nebogatov, who took command of the squadron at this time, went to the head of the squadron and turned to the southwest in order to evade the attack. The cruisers also turned and walked ahead of the armored squadron, the formation of which was broken, and the ships only approximately held their positions.

This ended the day's battle. On this day, the Russian squadron lost three new battleships and one old one. Many ships received heavy damage.

Of the Japanese ships, the cruiser Kasagi, which was out of action, received the most severe damage. Of the other ships, Admiral Togo's flagship battleship Mikasa was the most damaged, being hit by more than thirty shells. The inside of the front conning tower, the front and rear bridges were damaged, all the servants of one gun were killed and wounded, several casemates were broken, and the decks were pierced. More than ten Russian shells hit the Shikishima. The Nissin suffered several hits to its gun turrets, destroying three large guns and demolishing part of the bridge. There were 95 sailors and officers killed and wounded on this ship; Vice Admiral Misu, who was holding the flag on the Nissin, was wounded.

The battleships Fiji and the armored cruisers Asama, Yakumo, Iwate, and Kassuga were also damaged. This day of battle was replete with many examples of endurance and courage of Russian sailors, who showed knowledge of their business and fulfilled their duty to the end. Thus, artillery conductor Kalashnikov from the “Sisoi the Great” caused a large fire on the Japanese cruiser “Iwate” with a successful hit from a shell. The artillery quartermaster from the same ship, Dolinin, and the sailor of the 1st class, Molokov, when the ship’s magazine with ammunition was flooded, took turns diving into the water and taking out shells. The helmsman of the cruiser “Oleg” Belousov and signalmen Chernov and Iskrich promptly noticed a torpedo fired by a Japanese destroyer. The cruiser managed to turn away. and the torpedo passed by. The Aurora, which was heading in the wake, was also “warned by signalmen from Oleg” and managed to evade the torpedoes. One of the officers of the cruiser “Aurora” wrote about the behavior of the sailors in battle: “Our teams behaved in battle above all praise. Every sailor showed remarkable composure, resourcefulness and fearlessness. Golden people and hearts! They cared not so much about themselves as about their commanders, warning about every enemy shot, covering the officers at the moment of the explosion. Covered with wounds and blood, the sailors did not leave their places, preferring to die at the guns. They didn’t even go to bandages! You send it, and they say, “It’ll be in time, later, now there’s no time!” It was only thanks to the dedication of the crew that we forced the Japanese cruisers to retreat, sinking two of their ships and putting four out of action, with a large list.” What the officer from the Aurora wrote about the sailors was typical not only for this cruiser, but also for all the ships of the Russian squadron.

Battle on the night of May 14-15

Only Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment held together, with which the only surviving new battleship “Eagle” and the cruiser “Izumrud” were sailing. Having retreated to the southwest, Admiral Nebogatov turned north at about 21 o'clock to go to Vladivostok. Taking into account the experience of Port Arthur, Admiral Nebogatov did not open searchlights at night and evaded attacks from destroyers; none of the ships were damaged. However, on the morning of May 15, at about 10 o'clock, the detachment found itself surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet. Without offering any resistance, Nebogatov surrendered his ships (4 battleships). And only the cruiser “Emerald”, having heard the signal of surrender, gave full speed and, breaking through the ring of Japanese ships, headed towards Vladivostok. On the way there, he entered Vladimir Bay, where he ran into rocks and, on the orders of his commander, was blown up. The team arrived in Vladivostok by land.

The cruising detachment led by the cruiser “Oleg”, evading Japanese destroyers, went south. Some of the cruisers fell behind and, having lost their flagship, turned north to go to Vladivostok.

Only the cruisers Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug remained united. They walked south all night and in the morning they found themselves south of the Korea Strait. The commander of the cruisers, Rear Admiral Enquist, intending to independently break through to Vladivostok, tentatively decided to call at a neutral port to make some corrections. Believing that Shanghai was too close to Japan, Enquist went to the Philippine Islands, where he arrived on May 21. Here in the port of Manila the cruisers were interned.

The remaining Russian ships sailed in single order. The ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron, repelling attacks from destroyers, unmasked themselves by turning on searchlights, and as a result received torpedo hits.

The cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was the first to be torpedoed at about 21:00, then the battleships Sisoy the Great, Navarin and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. However, at night only one battleship Navarin was killed by a torpedo; the rest survived on the water until the morning and were then destroyed by their crews.

On May 15, at about 4 p.m., the destroyer Bedovy, to which the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his staff were transferred, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and, without making any attempt to fight or escape, surrendered. Thus, the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, along with his entire staff, was captured.

The destroyer “Grozny”, traveling together with “Bedov”, seeing that the latter raised the signal of surrender, gave full speed and went to Vladivostok, pursued by a stronger Japanese destroyer. Having entered into battle with him, “Grozny” caused him such severe damage that the Japanese destroyer was forced to stop pursuing him. Without a compass, with serious damage, “Grozny” nevertheless arrived in Vladivostok.

Around the same time that “Grozny” was fighting, the battleship “Admiral Ushakov” died valiantly. This old ship, due to damage received in the day's battle, fell behind and was heading north alone. At 5 p.m. 30 min. Two Japanese armored cruisers approached him and offered to surrender. The commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Miklukha-Maclay, opened fire in response to the Japanese proposal. At 6 p.m. 10 minutes, when all the combat reserves were used up, by order of the commander, the battleship was destroyed by its crew.

Somewhat later, at about 7 p.m., the cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, approaching the island. Dazhelet was overtaken by six Japanese light cruisers. Despite this inequality of forces, the commander of the Dmitry Donskoy, Captain 1st Rank Lebedev, entered the battle, firing on both sides. With the onset of darkness, the cruiser, having a number of serious damages, took refuge under the shore of the island. It even flies. The Japanese ships lost it and retreated to sea. Although this heroic ship fought off an enemy superior in strength, the damage it received in this battle was so significant that the Dmitry Donskoy could not go further and was scuttled at great depths, and the crew was brought ashore.

In addition to the destroyer Grozny, the 2nd rank cruiser Almaz and the destroyer Bravy arrived in Vladivostok. The latter, having been separated from the squadron, evaded the shores of Japan and thus avoided meeting with Japanese ships. This was all that remained of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Results of the battle

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the ships in the squadron were outdated, the shells were poor, and the incompetent tsarist admirals were essentially unable to control the battle, the Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities in the fight against a strong and treacherous enemy. They heroically and selflessly fought the Japanese.

This battle completely revealed the incompetence of the squadron's high command.

1) The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who ignored all the experience of the battles at Port Arthur, did not prepare his ships for the battle, which he himself considered inevitable.

2) There was no battle plan. Therefore, the only desire of the squadron was to get to Vladivostok one way or another.

3) There was no reconnaissance, so the appearance of the main forces of the Japanese fleet caught the Russian squadron having not completed its combat formation.

4) Battle management and transfer of command were not organized.

5) The Russian squadron entered the battle at a disadvantage; only the lead ships could fire.

6) The combination of new and old ships in one wake column was impractical, since it made it impossible to fully use the most powerful ships.

7) Maneuvering in one wake column, which was the only thing the squadron was capable of, allowed the Japanese to encircle the head.

8) The incorrect use of searchlights on the ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron helped the Japanese destroyers successfully attack the Russians.

9) The personnel of the Russian squadron entered the battle in extremely difficult conditions, having completed a seven-month journey.

Regarding the Japanese fleet, it should be noted:

1) The Japanese squadron was more of the same type, modernly equipped, faster and better trained. This provided more flexible maneuvering.

2) The personnel of the Japanese fleet had eleven months of combat experience.

However, despite these advantages, the Japanese made a number of major mistakes in battle.

1) Reconnaissance during the battle was not properly organized; the Japanese cruisers did not follow the main forces of the Russians, being carried away by the battle with transports. Because of this, the Russian battleships were separated from the Japanese fleet several times, and the Japanese only accidentally found the Russian battleships again.

2) The deployment of Japanese destroyers was incomplete. Admiral Nebogatov's maneuver confused their crews, and they temporarily lost the Russian column. Four squads never found her.

The results of the attacks show insufficient preparation of the destroyers: of all the torpedoes fired, only six hit, and three hit the same ship.

conclusions

The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima had a huge impact on the further course of the entire war. All hopes for a favorable outcome were completely destroyed.

The government of Nicholas II hastened to conclude peace, which was signed in Portsmouth on August 23, 1905.

The Battle of Tsushima took place on May 14-15, 1905 in the Tsushima Strait between the East China and Sea of ​​Japan. In this grandiose naval battle, the Russian squadron was completely defeated by the Japanese squadron. The Russian ships were commanded by Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky (1848-1909). The Japanese naval forces were led by Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934). As a result of the battle, most of the ships of the Russian squadron were sunk, others capitulated, some broke through to neutral ports, and only 3 ships managed to complete the combat mission. They reached Vladivostok.

Campaign of the Russian squadron to Vladivostok

The battle was preceded by an unprecedented transition of the Russian squadron from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of ​​Japan. This path was 33 thousand km. But why would a large number of a wide variety of ships perform such a feat? The idea of ​​creating the 2nd Pacific Squadron arose in April 1904. They decided to form it to strengthen the 1st Pacific Squadron, based in Port Arthur.

On January 27, 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, without declaring military action, attacked Port Arthur and opened fire on the warships stationed in the outer roadstead. Access to the open sea was blocked. Twice the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron tried to break out into operational space, but these attempts ended in failure. Thus, Japan gained complete naval superiority. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and gunboats were locked in Port Arthur. There are 44 warships in total.

At that time, there were 3 cruisers and 6 old-style destroyers in Vladivostok. 2 cruisers were blown up by mines, and the destroyers were only suitable for short-term naval operations. In addition, the Japanese blocked the port of Vladivostok, which led to the complete neutralization of the naval forces of the Russian Empire in the Far East.

That is why they began to form a new squadron in the Baltic. If Russia had seized primacy at sea, the course of the entire Russo-Japanese War could have changed dramatically. By October 1904, a new powerful naval formation was formed, and on October 2, 1904, the great sea voyage began.

The squadron, headed by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, consisted of 8 squadron battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 1 battleship cruiser, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 6 transport ships and 2 hospital ships. The squadron was armed with 228 guns. Of these, 54 guns had a caliber of 305 mm. There were a total of 16,170 personnel, but this includes those ships that joined the squadron already during the voyage.

Campaign of the Russian squadron

The ships reached Cape Skagen (Denmark), and then divided into 6 detachments, which were supposed to unite in Madagascar. Some of the ships moved through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. And the other part was forced to go around Africa, since these ships had a deep landing and could not pass through the canal. It should be immediately noted that during the voyage, tactical exercises and live firing were carried out very rarely. Neither the officers nor the sailors believed in the success of the event. Hence the low morale, which is crucial in any company.

December 20, 1904 Port Arthur fell, and the naval forces going to the Far East were clearly not enough. Therefore, it was decided to create the 3rd Pacific Squadron. And before that, on November 3, a detachment of ships under the command of captain 1st rank Dobrotvorsky Leonid Fedorovich (1856-1915) was poisoned in pursuit of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron. Under his command were 4 cruisers and 5 destroyers. This detachment arrived in Madagascar on February 1st. But 4 destroyers were sent back due to systematic breakdowns.

In February, the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov (1849-1922) left Libau. The detachment included 4 battleships, 1 battleship cruiser and several auxiliary ships. On February 26, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was caught up by the Irtysh transport with large reserves of coal. At the beginning of the journey, the legendary Lieutenant Schmidt was his senior mate. But in the Mediterranean Sea he began to develop renal colic, and the future hero of the revolutionary uprising was sent to Sevastopol on the cruiser Ochakov.

In March, the squadron crossed the Indian Ocean. Warships were replenished with coal using longboats that transported it from transport ships. On March 31, the squadron arrived in Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam). Here she waited for Nebogatov’s detachment, which joined the main forces on April 26.

On May 1, the last tragic stage of the campaign began. Russian ships left the coast of Indochina and headed towards Vladivostok. It should be noted that Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky accomplished a real feat. Under his command, the most difficult 220-day transition of a huge squadron was carried out. She crossed the waters of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. We must also pay tribute to the courage of the officers and sailors. They survived this transition, and yet there was not a single naval base on the ships’ route.

Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Heihachiro Togo

On the night of May 13-14, 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Tsushima Strait. The ships sailed darkened and could easily pass through a dangerous place unnoticed. But the Japanese patrol cruiser Izumi discovered the hospital ship Orel, which was sailing at the end of the squadron. All the lights were on on it in accordance with maritime regulations. The Japanese ship approached and spotted other ships. The commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was immediately notified of this.

The Japanese naval forces included 4 battleships, 8 battleship cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers, 42 destroyers and 21 destroyers. The squadron consisted of 910 guns, 60 of which had a caliber of 305 mm. The entire squadron was divided into 7 combat detachments.

Russian ships sailed through the Tsushima Strait, leaving the island of Tsushima on the left side. The Japanese cruisers began to follow a parallel course, hiding in the fog. At about 7 o'clock in the morning the enemy was discovered. Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the squadron to form into 2 wake columns. Transport ships, covered by cruisers, remained in the rearguard.

At 13:20, at the exit from the Tsushima Strait, Russian sailors saw the main forces of the Japanese. These were battleships and battleship cruisers. They walked perpendicular to the course of the Russian squadron. The enemy cruisers began to fall behind in order to position themselves behind the Russian ships.

The defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait

Rozhestvensky rebuilt the squadron into one wake column. After the rebuilding was completed, the distance between the opponents was 38 cables (just over 7 km). The Vice Admiral ordered to open fire. The Japanese returned fire a couple of minutes later. They concentrated it on the lead ships. Thus began the Battle of Tsushima.

Here you need to know that the squadron speed of the Japanese fleet was 16-18 knots. And for the Russian fleet this value was 13-15 knots. Therefore, it was not difficult for the Japanese to stay ahead of the Russian ships. At the same time, they gradually shortened the distance. At 14 o'clock it became equal to 28 cables. It is approximately 5.2 km.

The artillery on Japanese ships had a high rate of fire (360 rounds per minute). And Russian ships fired only 134 shots per minute. In terms of high-explosive capabilities, Japanese shells were 12 times superior to Russian ones. As for the armor, it covered 61% of the area of ​​Japanese ships, while for the Russians this figure was 41%. All this already predetermined the outcome of the battle from the very beginning.

At 14:25 the flagship "Prince Suvorov" was disabled. Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, who was on it, was wounded. At 14:50, having received numerous holes in the bow, the battleship Oslyabya sank. The Russian squadron, having lost its overall leadership, continued to move in a northerly direction. She tried to maneuver to increase the distance between herself and the enemy ships.

At 6 p.m., Rear Admiral Nebogatov took command of the squadron, and the Emperor Nicholas I became the flagship ship. By this time, 4 battleships had been destroyed. All ships were damaged. The Japanese also suffered damage, but none of their ships were sunk. Russian cruisers walked in a separate column. They also repelled enemy attacks.

As darkness fell, the battle did not subside. Japanese destroyers systematically fired torpedoes at the ships of the Russian squadron. As a result of this shelling, the battleship Navarin sank and 3 battleship cruisers lost control. The teams were forced to scuttle these ships. During the same time, the Japanese lost 3 destroyers. The situation was aggravated by the fact that at night the Russian ships lost contact with each other, so they had to act independently. Under the leadership of Nebogatov, 4 battleships and 1 cruiser remained.

From the early morning of May 15, the main part of the Russian squadron tried to break through to the north to Vladivostok. 3 cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist turned south. Among them was the cruiser Aurora. They managed to break through the Japanese defenses and escape to Manila, but at the same time they abandoned the transport ships without protection.

The main detachment, led by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, was surrounded by the main Japanese forces. Nikolai Ivanovich was forced to give the order to stop resistance and surrender. It happened at 10:34 am. The destroyer Bedovy, on which the wounded Rozhdestvensky was located, also surrendered. Only the cruiser "Izumrud" managed to break through the encirclement and went towards Vladivostok. It ran aground near the shore and was blown up by the crew. Thus, it did not fall to the enemy.

Losses for May 15 were as follows: the Japanese sunk 2 battleships that fought independently, 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer. 3 destroyers were sunk by their crews, and one managed to break through and go to Shanghai. Only the cruiser Almaz and 2 destroyers managed to reach Vladivostok.

Russian and Japanese losses

The Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian fleet lost 5,045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were captured, including 2 admirals. 2,110 people went to foreign ports and were then interned. 910 people managed to break through to Vladivostok.

Of the ships, 7 battleships, 1 battleship-cruiser, 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 3 vehicles were sunk and blown up. The enemy got 4 battleships, 1 destroyer and 2 hospital ships. 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 2 transport ships were interned. Of the entire squadron of 38 ships, only the cruiser "Almaz" and 2 destroyers - "Grozny" and "Brave" - ​​remained. They managed to break through to Vladivostok. From this it is clear that the defeat was complete and final.

The Japanese suffered significantly fewer losses. 116 people were killed and 538 were injured. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. The remaining ships escaped with only damage.

Reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron

For the Russian squadron, it would be more correct to call the Battle of Tsushima the Tsushima disaster. Experts see the main reason for the total destruction in the movement of ships in a wake column at low speed. The Japanese simply shot the lead battleships one by one and thereby predetermined the death of the entire squadron.

Here, of course, the main blame falls on the shoulders of the Russian admirals. They didn't even make a battle plan. Maneuvers were carried out hesitantly, the battle formation was inflexible, and control of the ships was lost during the battle. And the combat training of the personnel was at a low level, since practically no tactical training was conducted with people during the campaign.

But for the Japanese it was not like that. They seized the initiative from the first minutes of the battle. Their actions were distinguished by decisiveness and courage, and the ship commanders showed initiative and independence. The personnel had extensive combat experience behind them. We should also not forget about the technical superiority of Japanese ships. All this together brought them victory.

One cannot help but mention the low morale of Russian sailors. He was influenced by fatigue after a long march, the capitulation of Port Arthur, and revolutionary unrest in Russia. People felt the complete meaninglessness of this entire grand expedition. As a result, the Russian squadron lost the battle even before it began.

The finale of the whole epic was the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed on August 23, 1905. But the main thing was that Japan felt its strength and began to dream of great conquests. Her ambitious dreams continued until 1945, when Soviet troops put an end to them, completely defeating the Kwantung Army.

Alexander Arsentiev

Valery Shilyaev. Triptych Tsushima. Left side. 2005
Illustration from the artist’s website http://www.shilaev.ru/

Tsushima naval battle (May 14-15, 1905). Fight at Fr. Tsushima warships of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons consisting of 30 warships with the Japanese fleet (120 ships). The main goal of the Russian fleet (squadron commanders were admirals Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov) was a breakthrough to Vladivostok. The Japanese fleet (commander - Admiral Togo) had the task of completely defeating the Russian fleet. The greater concentration of forces of the Japanese fleet, its better equipment and maneuverability led to military success. Despite the courage and heroism of the Russian officers and sailors, who had previously traveled 33 thousand kilometers from Kronstadt to Tsushima and entered the battle on the move, their losses were catastrophic: 19 ships were sunk, 3 cruisers broke through to neutral ports and were interned, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers reached Vladivostok. Of the 14 thousand personnel of the squadrons, more than 5 thousand died.

Chronicle of the battle

1905.05.27 (May 14, old style) Japanese Sea. The Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky (11 battleships, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 1 auxiliary cruiser) met with the Japanese fleet of Adm. H. Togo (4 battleships, 24 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 42 destroyers, 24 auxiliary cruisers) in the Tsushima Strait.

7 .14. A Japanese cruiser was spotted from the Russian squadron.

9 .40. A detachment of Japanese cruisers has been discovered.

13 .15. The Russian squadron met with the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

13 .49. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of 38 cables (over 7 km).

13 .52. The Japanese fleet responded with concentrated fire at the battleships Knyaz Suvorov and Oslyabya.

14 .00. The Japanese cruiser Asama was damaged by the Russians and removed from the battle.

14 .25. Having received heavy damage and lost control, the battleship Oslyabya broke down.

14 .thirty. The battleship "Prince Suvorov" was disabled and lost control.

14 .40. The Russian battleship Oslyabya capsized and sank.

15 .40. The squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III" was seriously damaged.

16 .20. On the battleship Suvorov, only the 75-mm gun in the aft casemate survived from the artillery, which continues to fire at the enemy. The ship is a continuous fire from bow to stern.

17 .20. The Russian auxiliary cruiser "Ural" was sunk.

17 .thirty. The destroyer "Buiny" removed the surviving headquarters officers and the adm. wounded in the head from the battleship "Suvorov". Z. Rozhdestvensky.

18 .50. The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" was sunk.

2 .15 the battleship Navarin was sunk, the Russians sank 3 Japanese destroyers and damaged 12.

5 .00. South of Tsushima Island, the Russian destroyer "Brilliant" was scuttled by its crew.

5 .23. The Russian destroyer Bezuprechny was sunk by a Japanese cruiser.

8 .00. To the north of Tsushima Island the battleship Admiral Nakhimov was sunk.

10 .05. The battleship Sisoi the Great was sunk by a Japanese torpedo.

10 .38. A detachment of ships of Adm. Nebogatov (battleships "Emperor Nicholas I", "Eagle", "Admiral General Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin"), surrounded by a Japanese squadron, capitulated. Only the cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.

11 .00. After a battle with 2 Japanese auxiliary cruisers and 1 destroyer, the cruiser "Svetlana" was scuttled by its crew.

11 .thirty. The destroyer "Buiny" was sunk.

11 .50. The destroyer "Bystry" was sunk. 12 .43. Off the coast of Korea, the destroyer Gromky, encountered by 3 Japanese destroyers, was scuttled by its crew.

14 .00. The team scuttled the battleship "Vladimir Monomakh"

17 .05. On the destroyer "Bedovy" the commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Adm. Z. Rozhestvensky, surrendered to Japanese captivity.

18 .10. Japanese cruisers "Yakumo" and "Iwate" sunk the Russian battleship "Admiral Ushakov" (cap. 1st r. Miklouho-Maclay). In the Battle of Tsushima on May 27-28, 1905, the Russians lost 10 thousand people, Japanese losses - 3 destroyers and 1 thousand people. Of the entire 2nd Pacific Squadron, only a few ships managed to escape. The cruisers "Aurora", "Oleg" and "Pearl" broke through to Manila (Philippines; USA), the destroyer "Bodriy", the transports "Svir" and "Korea" to Shanghai ( China) where they were interned, the Anadyr transport went to the island of Madagascar (Fr). Only the cruisers Almaz and Izumrud and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny broke through to Vladivostok.

Analysis of the progress of the battle

The final stage of the 2nd Pacific Squadron's campaign to the Far East was the Battle of Tsushima on May 14, 1905 in the Korea Strait. By this time, the Russian squadron included eight squadron battleships (of which three were old), three coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, eight cruisers, five auxiliary cruisers and nine destroyers. The main forces of the squadron, consisting of 12 armored ships, were divided into three detachments of four ships each. The cruisers were divided into two detachments - cruising and reconnaissance. The squadron commander, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, held his flag on the battleship Suvorov. The Japanese fleet, commanded by Admiral Togo, consisted of four battleships, six coastal defense battleships, eight armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. It was divided into eight combat detachments, of which the first and second, consisting of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, represented the main forces. The first detachment was commanded by Admiral Togo, the second by Admiral Kamimura.

The Russian squadron was not inferior to the Japanese in terms of the number of armored ships (squadron battleships and armored cruisers), but in terms of quality, the superiority was on the side of the enemy. The main forces of the Japanese fleet had significantly more large and medium caliber guns; Japanese artillery had almost three times the rate of fire of Russian artillery, and Japanese shells had five times more explosive than Russian high-explosive shells. Thus, the armored ships of the Japanese fleet had higher tactical and technical data than the Russian squadron battleships and armored cruisers. To this we must add that the Japanese had many times superiority in cruisers and especially in destroyers.

The great advantage of the Japanese fleet was that it had combat experience, while the Russian squadron, lacking it, after a long and difficult transition had to immediately engage in battle with the enemy. The Japanese had extensive experience in conducting live firing at long distances, gained in the first period of the war. They were well trained in conducting concentrated fire from multiple ships at a single target over long distances. Russian artillerymen did not have experience-tested rules for shooting at long distances and did not have the practice of conducting such shooting. The experience of the Russian Port Arthur squadron in this regard was not studied and was even ignored by both the leaders of the main naval headquarters and the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

By the time the Russian squadron arrived in the Far East, the main forces of the Japanese fleet, consisting of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments, were concentrated in the Korean port of Mozampo, and the cruisers and destroyers were at the island. Tsushima. 20 miles south of Mozampo, between the islands of Goto and Quelpart, the Japanese deployed a patrol of cruisers, which was supposed to timely detect the Russian squadron as it approached the Korean Strait and ensure the deployment of its main forces along its route. Thus, the initial position of the Japanese fleet before the battle was so favorable that any possibility of the Russian squadron passing through the Korean Strait without a fight was excluded. Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route through the Korean Strait. Considering that the Japanese fleet was much stronger than the Russian squadron, he did not draw up a battle plan, but decided to conduct it depending on the actions of the enemy fleet. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron abandoned active actions, giving the initiative to the enemy. Literally the same thing happened as in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait and formed a night march order. The cruisers were deployed ahead along the course, followed by squadron battleships and transports between them in two wake columns. Behind the squadron, two hospital ships followed at a distance of one mile. While moving through the Strait, Rozhdestvensky, contrary to the elementary requirements of tactics, refused to conduct reconnaissance and did not darken the ships, which helped the Japanese discover the Russian squadron and concentrate their fleet on its path. The first, at 2 hours 25 minutes, noticed the Russian squadron by the lights and reported to Admiral Togo the auxiliary cruiser "Shinano-Maru", which was on patrol between the Goto-Quelpart islands. Soon, from the intensive work of Japanese radiotelegraph stations on Russian ships, they realized that they had been discovered. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky abandoned any attempts to interfere with the negotiations of Japanese ships.

Having received a report of the discovery of the Russians, Admiral Togo left Mozampo and deployed the main forces of his fleet along the route of the Russian squadron. The tactical plan of the commander of the Japanese fleet was to envelop the head of the Russian squadron with the main forces and, with concentrated fire on the flagships, disable them and thereby deprive the squadron of control, and then use night attacks by destroyers to develop the success of the day's battle and complete the defeat of the Russian squadron.

With the onset of the morning of May 14, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt his squadron first into a wake formation, and then two wake columns, leaving the transports behind the squadron under the protection of cruisers. Following the formation of two wake columns through the Korean Strait, the Russian squadron at 13:30 on the right bow discovered the main forces of the Japanese fleet, which were heading to cross its course.

Admiral Togo, trying to cover the head of the Russian squadron, did not calculate his maneuver and passed at a distance of 70 cabs. from the lead Russian ship. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky, believing that the Japanese were trying to attack the left column of the squadron, which consisted of old ships, again rebuilt his fleet from two wake columns into one. The main forces of the Japanese fleet, maneuvering as part of two combat detachments, came out to the left side and began a successive turn of 16 points to cover the head of the Russian squadron. This turn, made at a distance of 38 cab. from the lead Russian ship and lasting 15 minutes, put the Japanese ships at an extremely disadvantageous position. Making a successive turn for the return flight, the Japanese ships described the circulation almost in one place, and if the Russian squadron had opened fire in time and concentrated it on the turning point of the Japanese fleet, the latter could have suffered serious losses. However, this favorable moment was not used.

The lead ships of the Russian squadron opened fire only at 13:49. The fire turned out to be ineffective, since due to improper control it was not concentrated on those Japanese ships that were turning around on the spot. As they turned, the enemy ships opened fire, concentrating it on the flagship ships Suvorov and Oslyabya. Each of them was simultaneously fired upon by four to six Japanese battleships and cruisers. Russian squadron battleships also tried to concentrate their fire on one of the enemy ships, but due to the lack of appropriate rules and experience in such firing, they could not achieve positive results.

The superiority of the Japanese in artillery and the weakness of the armor of Russian ships had an immediate effect. At 14:23, the battleship Oslyabya, having received serious damage, broke down and soon sank. At about 14:30 the battleship Suvorov broke down. Having serious damage and completely engulfed in flames, it repelled continuous attacks from enemy cruisers and destroyers for another five hours, but at 19:30 it also sank.

After the failure of the battleships Oslyabya and Suvorov, the battle order of the Russian squadron was disrupted and it lost control. The Japanese took advantage of this and, going to the head of the Russian squadron, intensified their fire. The Russian squadron was led by the battleship Alexander III, and after its death - by the Borodino.

Trying to break through to Vladivostok, the Russian squadron followed a general course of 23 degrees. The Japanese, having a great advantage in speed, covered the head of the Russian squadron and concentrated the fire of almost all of their battleships on the leading ship. Russian sailors and officers, finding themselves in a difficult situation, did not leave their combat posts and, with their characteristic courage and steadfastness, repelled enemy attacks to the last.

At 15:05, fog began, and visibility decreased so much that the opponents, having dispersed on counter courses, lost each other. At about 15:40, the Japanese again discovered Russian ships heading to the north-east and resumed battle with them. At about 16 o'clock the Russian squadron, evading encirclement, turned south. Soon the battle stopped again due to fog. This time, Admiral Togo could not find the Russian squadron for an hour and a half and was eventually forced to use his main forces to find it.

Well organized reconnaissance before the battle. Togo neglected it during the battle, as a result of which he twice lost visibility of the Russian squadron. During the daytime phase of the Battle of Tsushima, Japanese destroyers, staying close to their main forces, launched several torpedo attacks against Russian ships damaged in the artillery battle. These attacks were carried out simultaneously by a group of destroyers (four ships in a group) from different directions. Torpedoes were fired from a distance of 4 to 9 cabs. Out of 30 torpedoes, only five hit the target, and three of them hit the battleship Suvorov.

At 17 hours 51 minutes, the main forces of the Japanese fleet, having discovered the Russian squadron, which at that time was fighting with Japanese cruisers, attacked it again. This time the Japanese commander abandoned the head-covering maneuver and fought on parallel courses. By the end of the day's battle, which lasted until 19 hours 12 minutes, the Japanese sank two more Russian battleships - "Alexander III" and "Borodino". With the onset of darkness, Admiral Togo stopped the artillery battle and headed with his main forces towards the island. Ollyndo (Dazhelet), and ordered the destroyers to attack the Russian squadron with torpedoes.

At about 20 o'clock, up to 60 Japanese destroyers, divided into small detachments, began to cover the Russian squadron. Their attacks began at 20:45 from three directions simultaneously and were unorganized. Of the 75 torpedoes fired from a distance from 1 to 3 cabins, only six hit the target. Reflecting torpedo attacks, Russian sailors destroyed two Japanese destroyers and damaged 12. In addition, as a result of collisions between their ships, the Japanese lost another destroyer, and six destroyers were seriously damaged.

By the morning of May 15, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized force. As a result of frequent evasions from Japanese destroyer attacks, Russian ships were dispersed throughout the Korean Strait. Only individual ships tried to break through to Vladivostok on their own. Encountering superior Japanese forces on their way, they boldly entered into a decisive battle with them and fought it until the last shell. The crews of the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov, under the command of Captain 1st Rank Miklouho-Maclay, and the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy, commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Lebedev, fought heroically with the enemy. These ships died in an unequal battle, but did not lower their flags to the enemy. The junior flagship of the Russian squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, acted completely differently, surrendering to the Japanese without a fight.

In the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian fleet lost 8 armored ships, 4 cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports. Four armored ships and a destroyer, along with Rozhdestvensky (he was unconscious due to injury) and Nebogatov surrendered. Some of the ships were interned in foreign ports. And only the cruiser Almaz and two destroyers broke through to Vladivostok. The Japanese lost 3 destroyers in this battle. Many of their ships were seriously damaged.

The defeat of the Russian squadron was due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in strength and the unpreparedness of the Russian fleet for battle. Much of the blame for the defeat of the Russian squadron lies with Rozhestvensky, who as a commander made a number of serious mistakes. He ignored the experience of the Port Arthur squadron, refused reconnaissance and led the squadron blindly, did not have a battle plan, misused his cruisers and destroyers, refused active actions and did not organize the control of forces in battle.

The Japanese fleet, having sufficient time and operating in favorable conditions, was well prepared for the meeting with the Russian squadron. The Japanese chose an advantageous position for the battle, thanks to which they discovered the Russian squadron in a timely manner and concentrated their main forces on its route. However, Admiral Togo also made serious mistakes. He miscalculated his maneuvering before the battle, as a result of which he was unable to cover the head of the Russian squadron when it was discovered. Having made a sequential turn in 38 cab. from the Russian squadron. Togo exposed his ships to her attack, and only Rozhdestvensky’s inept actions saved the Japanese fleet from the serious consequences of this incorrect maneuver. Togo did not organize tactical reconnaissance during the battle, as a result of which he repeatedly lost contact with the Russian squadron, incorrectly used cruisers in the battle, resorting to searching for the Russian squadron with the main forces.

The experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Due to the increase in combat distance, medium-caliber artillery did not justify its worth. It became clear that there was a need to develop new, more advanced methods of controlling artillery fire, as well as the possibility of using torpedo weapons from destroyers in day and night conditions to develop the success achieved in artillery combat. An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing shells and the destructive effect of high-explosive shells required an increase in the armoring area of ​​the ship's side and strengthening of the horizontal armor. The battle formation of the fleet - a single-wing column with a large number of ships - did not justify itself, as it made it difficult to use weapons and control forces in battle. The advent of radio increased the ability to communicate and control forces over distances of up to 100 miles.

Materials used from the book: “One Hundred Great Battles”, M. “Veche”, 2002

Literature

1. Bykov P.D - Battle of the island. Tsushima // Russian naval art. Sat. Art. / Rep. ed. R.N. Mordvinov. - M., 1951. P. 348-367.

2. History of naval art / Rep. ed. ON THE. St. Petersburg. - M., 1953. - T.Z. - P. 66-67.

3. History of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. / Ed. I.I. Rostunova. - M., 1977. P. 324-348.

4. Kilichenkov A. Togo’s mistake and the last chance of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. [On the tactics of the naval battle of Tsushima, 1905]. // Marine collection. - 1990. -No. 3.-S. 80-84.

5. Marine atlas. Descriptions for cards. - M., 1959. - T.Z, part 1. - P. 698-704.

6. Marine Atlas / Rep. ed. G.I. Levchenko. - M., 1958. - T.Z, part 1. - L. 34.

7. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military historical commission to describe the Russo-Japanese War. -T.I-9. -SPb., 1910.

8. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military historical commission to describe the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. under Marine General Headquarters. - KN.1-4, 6, 7. - St. Petersburg-Pg., 1912-1917.

Read further:

War in the context of world politics.

Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905(chronological table).

Defense of Port Arthur(detailed chronicle of the battle and its analysis).

Continuing the topic started in the previous post Russian - Japanese War 1904 - 1905 and her final battle Tsushima naval battle May 14 - 15, 1905 . This time we will talk about the warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron that took part in the battle with the Japanese fleet and their fate. (The date in brackets after the name of the ship means its launching after construction)
In addition, I think it will be interesting for everyone who is interested in the history of the Fatherland to see what Russian warships looked like more than a hundred years ago.

1. Flagship - squadron battleship "PRINCE SUVOROV" (1902)
Killed in battle

2. Armored cruiser "OSLYABYA" (1898)
Killed in battle

3. Armored cruiser "ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV" ( 1885)
Killed in battle

4. 1st rank cruiser "DIMITRY DONSKOY" (1883)
Sunk by crew

5. 1st rank cruiser "VLADIMIR MONOMAKH" (1882)
Sunk by crew

6. Battleship "NAVARIN" (1891)
Killed in battle

7. Squadron battleship "EMPEROR NICHOLAY THE FIRST" (1889)
Surrendered. Later joined the Japanese Navy

8. Coast Guard battleship "ADMIRAL USHAKOV" (1893)
Sunk by crew

9. Coast Guard battleship "ADMIRAL SENYAVIN" (1896)

10. Coast Guard battleship "ADMIRAL GENERAL APRAXIN" (1896)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese fleet

11. Squadron battleship "SISOY VELIKIY" (1894)
Killed in battle

12. Battleship "BORODINO" (1901)
Killed in battle

13. 2nd rank cruiser "ALMAZ" (1903)
Was the only cruiser to break through to Vladivostok

14. Armored cruiser of the 2nd rank "PEARL" (1903)
He went to Manila, where he was interned, and after the end of the war he returned to the Russian fleet.
(The same applies to all Russian ships that were able to break away from the pursuit of the Japanese
fleet and reached the ports of neutral states)

15. Armored cruiser 1st rank "AURORA" (1900)
Gone to Manila

16. Battleship "EAGLE" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

17. Armored cruiser 1st rank "OLEG" (1903)
Gone to Manila

18. Battleship "EMPEROR ALEXANDER THE THIRD" (1901)
Killed in battle

19. Armored cruiser 1st rank "SVETLANA" (1896)
Sunk by crew

20. Auxiliary cruiser "URAL" (1890)
Sunk by crew

21. Destroyer "BEDOVIY" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

22. Destroyer "FAST" (1902)
Blown up by the crew

23. Destroyer "BUYNYY" (1901)
Killed in battle

24. Destroyer "BRAVE" (1901)

25. Destroyer "BRILLIANT" (1901)
Sunk by crew

26. Destroyer "LOUD" (1903)
Sunk by crew

27. Destroyer "GROZNY" (1904)
Managed to break into Vladivostok

28. Destroyer "IMPRECIABLE" (1902)
Killed in battle

29. Destroyer "BODRY" (1902)
Went to Shanghai

Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, out of 29 warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, 17 ships were killed in battle, fighting to the end (including those that, not wanting to surrender to the enemy and not being able to continue the fight, were blown up by their own crew or sunk by the discovery of kingstons, so as not to fall to the enemy). 7 ships valiantly fought the Japanese, after it was all over, in different ways they managed to survive as combat units, leaving for neutral ports, or breaking through to their own in Vladivostok. And only 5 ships surrendered to the Japanese.
This time there will be no conclusion. Do it yourself if you are interested in the history of our country, which consists not only of victories, but also of defeats.

Sergey Vorobiev.