How did the Soviet-Finnish war end? Soviet-Finnish War

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that a major war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finland. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. To resolve the issue peacefully, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and presented a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved him from starting a war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

• The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
• The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
• It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident a world war was already underway, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is a brief table that describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was the following - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

• Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
• Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
• Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
• Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in the initial days of the war, until approximately December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, the armies of the eastern front (near Lake Suvantojärvi), on December 6 - the central front (Summa direction), and on December 10 - the western front (Gulf of Finland) entered it. And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
3. Roads. While retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

• Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
• Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
• Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
• Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
• Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
• Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
• Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of its formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this fortification system that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, it should be noted the difficult terrain conditions of the Mannerheim Line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore the defense line did not require a large number of fortifications.

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and no active operations were carried out until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful attacks on the Mannerheim line began. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. At the beginning of March, the Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

This effectively ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have much strength and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced them to start a war, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

• Poor organization of troops. This concerns the poor performance of the command staff, but the bigger problem is coherence between the branches of the military. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
• Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
• Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
• Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

• During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
• On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
• When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

• In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass enemy fortifications. This could not be done, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
• The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people are wearing summer uniforms.
• The 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived to replenish the 9th Army. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 are in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% of the personnel are not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

• Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
• Italy - number unknown.
• Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
• England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
6. On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of USSR soldiers killed during the Soviet-Finnish War is still open. The official history does not answer the question, speaking in veiled terms about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives were achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

• Commanders - 240.
• Privates - 3536.
• Rifles - 3575.
• Light machine guns – 160.
• Heavy machine guns – 150.
• Tanks – 5.
• Armored vehicles – 2.
• Tractors – 10.
• Trucks – 14.
• Horse train - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians give different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of its army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites now (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

• Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
• Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
• Junior officers.
• Privates.
• National minorities
• Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

Finland was included in the Soviet sphere of influence by secret protocols to the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. But, unlike other Baltic countries, it refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, since it ran 32 km from the “northern capital”. In exchange, the USSR offered larger and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland during the Second World War, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.

The Finnish leadership, led by Prime Minister A. Kajander and the head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor, the Finnish line of fortifications became known as the “Mannerheim Line”), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. From October 12 to November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached a dead end.

On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of ​​the Soviet border point Mainila, a provocative shelling of Soviet positions was carried out from the Soviet side, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for an attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th Division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha area, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Even further south, the 9th Army was advancing on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would have cut Finland in two. North of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim line. And finally, on the main direction 7, the army was supposed to break through the Mannerheim Line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.

On December 6-12, troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim Line, but were unable to take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.

An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and were better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of equipment. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. This is how several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the battles between December and January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe defeat was the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.

Frosts hit, snow covered the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.

Volunteers of various views went to the country - from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with weapons and food.

On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.

The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that Helsinki could fall in a few days. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became stricter. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not withdraw its demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.

Sources:

On both sides of the Karelian Front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;

Secrets and lessons of the Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. St. Petersburg, 2000.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was undergoing intense discussions about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of ​​Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of ​​​​attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases. On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union's demands on Finland - the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.

Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations “on specific political issues.” The negotiations took place in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9. For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen . On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.

At these negotiations, the proximity of the border to Leningrad was discussed for the first time. Joseph Stalin remarked: " We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it" The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked like this:

Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.

Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.

The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja (Finnish) Russian.

Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytjarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.

The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.

Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.

The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km²).

The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.

The USSR proposed a territorial exchange in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and Porajärvi. These were the territories that declared [ source not specified 656 days] independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty they remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted, and that one should not hope for German help. The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and those closest to Leningrad territories in Teriokki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939. Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.

Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.

Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and from mid-September the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.

In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - while at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and Soviet consent to armament of the Åland Islands, whose demilitarized status was regulated by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.

The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /V.Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.

On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions [ source not specified 937 days ] .

Causes of the war

According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably be captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinate to the Leningrad City Council was also the border between the USSR and Finland.

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require moving the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. The only constant in the demands was the following: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and to oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.

Already during the war, two concepts emerged that are still being debated: one, that the USSR pursued its stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second, that the true goal of the USSR was the Sovietization of Finland. M.I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war both countries had claims against each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians in the late 30s, the closure of Finnish schools, etc. The USSR, in turn, knew about the activities of ultranationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to “return” Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland’s unilateral rapprochement with Western countries and, above all, with Germany, which Finland agreed to, in turn, because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhuvud said in Berlin in 1937 that “Russia’s enemy must always be Finland’s friend.” In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) it began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated the preparation of a military solutions

Progress of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.

In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.

1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:

5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of the corps commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a corps commander group V.D. Grendal(4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).

Front Commander: 1st Rank Army Commander S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov

9. The main task during this period was to actively prepare the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as to prepare the command of the troops for the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day. Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy’s front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves. In the near rear, the troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

Second period of the war: Assault on the Mannerheim Line. February 11 - March 12, 1940

11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification site. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola. Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay , they set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km. By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one. Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13. Mannerheim Line(Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) - a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920 - 1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created. In addition to the Finnish territory in the Leningrad region, areas in the region of northern Karelia and the Rybachy Peninsula, as well as part of the islands of the Gulf of Finland and the Hanko region were transferred to the USSR. Territorial changes 1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build 2. fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km. 3. Part of Lapland (Old Salla). 4. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland. 5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island). 6. Lease of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years. Mannerheim Line - an alternative point of view Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify the long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth of the “incredibly strongly fortified” “Mannerheim Line” was firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the literally glorification of the line by the Finnish side - in the song Mannerheimin linjalla (“On the Mannerheim Line”). It is believed that the Mannerheim Line consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located along the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other, and rarely had cannon armament.

6. Expansion of the western borders of the USSR in 1939-1941. Baltic countries. Bessarabia. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. On August 23, 1939, after three hours of negotiations in Moscow, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed. Attached to the non-aggression treaty was a secret additional protocol, which provided for “the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe.” The sphere of influence of the USSR included Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia. These documents radically changed both Soviet foreign policy and the situation in Europe. From now on, the Stalinist leadership turned into an ally of Germany in the division of Europe. The last obstacle to attacking Poland and thus starting World War II had been removed. In 1939, Germany in any case could not start a war against the USSR, since it did not have common borders on which it was possible to deploy troops and carry out an attack. Moreover, she was completely unprepared for a “big” war.

September 1, 1939 Hitler attacked Poland. The Second World War began.. On September 17, when the outcome of the battle in Poland was no longer in doubt, the Red Army occupied the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, which were part of this state.

On July 31, 1940, Hitler announced that the primary goal from now on was war with Russia, the outcome of which was to decide the fate of England. On December 18, 1940, the plan for an attack on the USSR (Barbarossa Plan) was signed. In deep secrecy, troops began to be transferred to the east. In 1939-1940. Stalin was concerned, first of all, with the annexation of the territories of Eastern Europe, assigned to him under secret agreements with Nazi Germany, into the USSR, and with further rapprochement with Hitler

On September 28, an agreement on friendship and borders with Germany and three secret protocols to it were signed. In these documents, the parties pledged to wage a joint fight against “Polish agitation” and clarified their spheres of influence. In exchange for Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship, the USSR received Lithuania. Based on these agreements, Stalin demanded that the Baltic states conclude agreements on mutual assistance and locate Soviet military bases on their territory. In September-October 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forced to agree to this. On June 14-16, 1940, after the actual defeat of France by Nazi Germany, Stalin gave these Baltic states an ultimatum to introduce contingents of Soviet troops into their territories (to “ensure security”) and form new governments ready to “honestly” fulfill treaties concluded with the USSR. Within a few days, “people’s governments” were created in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which, with the help of local communists, established Soviet power in the Baltic states. At the end of June 1940 Stalin achieved the return of Bessarabia, occupied by Romania in 1918. Then in June 1940, at the request of the USSR, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, occupied by Romania in 1918, were returned to him. In August 1940, the Moldavian SSR was formed, into which Bessarabia entered, and Northern Bukovina was included in the Ukrainian SSR. As a result of all the mentioned territorial acquisitions, the borders of the USSR were moved west by 200-300 km, and the country's population increased by 23 million people.

7.German attack on the Soviet Union. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Activities of the Soviet government during the initial period of the war.

On June 22, at 3:30 a.m., the German army began its powerful invasion along the entire border of our country from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. The Patriotic War broke out. The aggressor's invasion was preceded by powerful artillery preparation. Thousands of guns and mortars opened fire on border outposts, troop areas, headquarters, communications centers, and defensive structures. Enemy aircraft launched the first strike across the entire border strip. Murmansk, Liepaja, Riga, Kaunas, Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir were subjected to massive aerial bombardment; naval bases (Kronstadt, Izmail, Sevastopol). In order to paralyze the control of Soviet troops, saboteurs were dropped by parachute. The most powerful attacks were carried out on airfields, since air supremacy was the main task of the German Air Force. Due to crowded deployment of units, Soviet aviation in the border districts lost about 1,200 aircraft on the first day of the war. In addition, front-line and army aviation were given an order: not to fly over borders under any circumstances, to destroy the enemy only over their territory, to keep aircraft in constant readiness to withdraw from attack. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commanded by General M. Popov), and the Southern Front (commanded by General I. Tyulenev) was formed from the 9th and 18th armies. On June 23, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

The sudden invasion of Germany into the territory of the USSR required quick and precise action from the Soviet government. First of all, it was necessary to ensure the mobilization of forces to repel the enemy. On the day of the fascist attack, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree on the mobilization of those liable for military service in 1905-1918. birth. In a matter of hours, detachments and units were formed. Soon the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council

The People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution approving the mobilization national economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941, which provided for an increase in the production of military equipment and the creation of large tank-building enterprises in the Volga region and the Urals. Circumstances forced the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the beginning of the war to develop a detailed program for restructuring the activities and life of the Soviet country on a military basis, which was set out in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941 to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions. The slogan “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” became the motto of the life of Soviet people. The Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Party called on the people to renounce their mood and personal desires, go over to a sacred and merciless fight against the enemy, fight to the last drop of blood, rebuild the national economy on a war footing, and increase the output of military products. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, and disrupt all their activities.” Among other things, local conversations were held with the population. The nature and political goals of the outbreak of the Patriotic War were explained. The main provisions of the directive of June 29 were outlined in a radio speech on July 3, 1941 by J.V. Stalin. Addressing the people, he explained the current situation at the front, revealed the program for defending the goals that had already been achieved, and expressed unshakable faith in the victory of the Soviet people against the German occupiers.” Together with the Red Army, many thousands of workers, collective farmers, and intellectuals are rising to war against the attacking enemy. The millions of our people will rise up.” On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was formed for strategic leadership of military operations. Later it was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC), headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars I.V. Stalin, who was also appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and then Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Military victory over Nazi Germany and its allies would have been impossible without victory on the front of economic confrontation with the aggressor. Germany began to surpass the USSR in total industrial production by three to four times. An Operational Bureau for monitoring the implementation of military orders, an evacuation council, a transport committee and other permanent or temporary working bodies were established under the State Defense Committee. The powers of local representatives of the State Defense Committee were, if necessary, received by the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, regional committees, leading economic and scientific workers.

From the first days of hostilities, four main lines for creating a coherent military economy were determined

Evacuation of industrial enterprises, material assets and people from the front-line zone to the east.

The transition of thousands of factories in the civilian sector to the production of military equipment and other defense products.

Accelerated construction of new industrial facilities capable of replacing those lost in the first months of the war, establishment of a system of cooperation and transport communications between and within individual industries, disrupted as a result of the unprecedented scale of movement of productive forces to the east.

Reliable supply of the national economy, especially industry, with workers in new emergency conditions.

8. Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

The reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war were not only that the Soviet troops, attacked suddenly, were forced to engage in heavy battles without proper strategic deployment, that many of them were understaffed to wartime levels, had limited material and vehicles and communications, often operated without air and artillery support. The damage suffered by our troops in the first days of the war also had a negative impact, but it cannot be overestimated, since in fact only 30 divisions of the first echelon of the covering army were attacked by the aggressor troops on June 22. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of three fronts - Western, North-Western and South-Western - emerged later, during counter-fighting on June 23-30, 1941 between the new and old borders. The entire course of border battles showed that our troops at all levels - from the Headquarters of the Main Command to the tactical level command staff - were for the most part not prepared not only for the first, unexpected attacks of German troops, but also for war in general. The Red Army had to master the skills of modern warfare during battles, while suffering enormous losses in manpower and military equipment. The deficiencies in the combat readiness of our troops, revealed at Khalkhin Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish War, were not and could not be eliminated in a short time. The army grew quantitatively, but to the detriment of the quality of training, and especially of officers and non-commissioned officers. The main emphasis in combat training was on the infantry: the training of armored forces and aviation was not given due attention, and therefore our troops could not become a striking force like the Wehrmacht, mainly due to a lack of personnel, professional command staff and headquarters. Our troops were unable to realize the technical and human potential that exceeded the potential of the aggressor at the beginning of the war. The disruption of constant communication between troops and headquarters deprived the command, right up to the General Staff and Headquarters, of the opportunity to receive regular information about the state of affairs at the front. The order of the Headquarters to hold occupied lines at all costs, even in the conditions of a deep flanking bypass of the enemy, often became the reason for exposing entire groups of Soviet troops to enemy attacks, which forced heavy fighting in the encirclement, entailed large losses in men and military equipment, and increased panic in the troops. A significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have the necessary military and combat experience. Headquarters also lacked the necessary experience, hence the most serious miscalculations at the very beginning of the war. The more successful the campaign to the east developed, the more boastful the statements of the German command became. Noting the steadfastness of the Russian soldier, they, however, did not consider him as a decisive factor in the war. They considered their main success, in accordance with the “Blitzkrieg” plan, to be the rapid advance of German troops, the capture of vast territories and trophies, and huge human losses. losses. The resilience of the Russian warrior was demonstrated during the defense of the Brest Fortress. The heroism of the defenders of the fortress will appear even more obvious if we consider that the German troops had superiority in experience, manpower and technology, while our fighters did not have a harsh and long school of war behind them, were cut off from their units and mandates, experienced an acute shortage of water and food, ammunition, and medicine. And yet we continued to fight the enemy.

The Red Army was not prepared for the conditions of modern industrial war - the war of engines. This is the main reason for its defeats in the initial period of hostilities.

9. The situation on the fronts of the Soviet Union in June 1941. – November 1942 Moscow battle. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commanded by General M. Popov), and the Southern Front (commanded by General I. Tyulenev) was formed from the 9th and 18th armies. On June 23, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

On June 22 at 7:15 a.m., the Main Military Council issued a directive to Soviet troops to begin active military operations. When it was received at the front headquarters, the first echelon divisions were already drawn into defensive battles, but the tank and motorized formations were not ready to deliver a quick powerful strike due to the great distance from the border. By the end of the first day of the war, a difficult situation had arisen at the junction of the North-Western and Western fronts, on the left wing of the Western Front. The corps and division commanders could not act on the situation, since they had no data on the number of forces and military actions enemy. There was no constant relationship between the units, no one knew anything about the true losses, it was assumed that the troops raised on alert would be sufficiently combat-ready. But by the end of the day on June 22, under enemy attacks, our units were driven back from the state border by about 40 km. As a result, in just two days, with heavy losses in manpower and equipment, the troops moved 100 km from the border. A similar situation was observed in other sectors of the front. The operational results of the counterattacks, despite the selfless actions of our soldiers, were insignificant, and the losses incurred were incredibly large. At best, individual formations of the Western Front managed to delay the enemy's offensive only for a short time. After successful breakthroughs of the border defenses in the Western Front, enemy tank groups, with the support of large air forces, managed to complete the encirclement and defeat of the backbone of the Western Front's troops by July 9. As a result, 323 thousand people were in German captivity in the Bialystok-Minsk region, and the casualties of the troops of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla amounted to 418 thousand people. However, the main Wehrmacht group suffered significant damage, and the pace of its advance on Smolensk and Moscow was slowed down. Having suffered heavy losses in the first days of the war, the troops of the Northwestern Front were unable to organize a stable defense either on the right bank of the Western Dvina or at the last major defensive line near Pskov - the Velikaya River. Pskov was captured by the Nazis on July 9, which resulted in a real danger of their breakthrough to Luga and further to Leningrad, but the Wehrmacht failed to destroy the large Kra Ar forces in this direction. A more favorable situation developed on the South-Western Front. Despite enormous difficulties, the command managed to pull up large forces in the direction of the enemy’s main attack and bring them into battle in a fairly organized manner, although not simultaneously. On June 23, in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne area, the largest tank battle in the entire initial period of the war unfolded. Here the enemy was not only detained for a whole week, but also his plan to encircle the main forces of the front in the Lvov salient was thwarted. Enemy aircraft carried out air strikes simultaneously on the front line and the outback. The bombing was carried out methodically and clearly, which greatly exhausted the Soviet troops. The power of the enemy suppressed the hearts, desertion from the battlefield, self-mutilation, and sometimes suicide took place. By the end of June, it became obvious that the troops of the South-Western, as well as other fronts, were unable to defeat the intervening enemy group. Enemy aircraft firmly maintained air supremacy. Our aviation suffered serious damage; The mechanized corps suffered heavy losses in personnel and tanks. The results of military operations on the Soviet-German front were catastrophic for the Red Army. During the three weeks of the war, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and a significant part of Ukraine and Moldova were abandoned. During this period, the German army advanced 450-500 km deep into the country in the northwestern direction, 450-600 km in the western direction, and 300-350 km in the southwestern direction. The hastily withdrawn strategic reserves of the High Command were only able to detain the enemy for the shortest possible time in certain sectors of the front, but did not eliminate the threat of his breakthrough to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev. Moscow battle. On September 6, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive to attack Moscow. The main focus in it was on tank formations and aviation. Particular attention was paid to the secrecy of the preparation of the operation. Initially, it was planned to defeat Soviet troops in the areas of Vyazma and Bryansk, then, pursuing the formations of the Western Front retreating to Moscow in the zone from the upper Volga to the Oka, to capture the capital. The general offensive on Moscow began on September 30 with a strike from the enemy’s 2nd Tank Army on the left wing Bryansk Front in the Shostka region, and on October 2, the main forces of the Germans attacked the positions of the Western Front troops. The fight immediately became fierce. As a result of the breakthrough of the defenses in the sector of the 43rd Army and in the center of the Western Front, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Soviet troops. An attempt to withdraw the army from the attack failed due to the rapid advance of the enemy's motorized corps, which cut off the escape route. On October 7, the Germans in the Vyazma area completed the encirclement of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies. Heavy fighting broke out in the Bryansk Front. On October 3, the Germans broke into Orel and, moving along the Orel-Tula highway, occupied Karachev and Bryansk on October 6. The armies of the Bryansk Front were cut into pieces, and their escape routes were intercepted. Units of the 3rd, 13th, and 50th armies fell into the cauldron near Bryansk. Tens of thousands, including volunteers of the people's militia divisions, died on the battlefield. Among the main reasons for the disaster of this period are the enemy's superiority in technology, maneuverability of troops, air supremacy, possession of the initiative, blunders of the headquarters and front command in organizing defense Lack of a continuous line defense in the western direction and the necessary reserves to close the gap created a real threat of the appearance of enemy tanks near Moscow. The current situation required tough measures to control troops at all command levels. During this time, the Soviet command managed to take urgent measures to organize defense on the Mozhaisk line, which the GKO in the current situation chose as the main bridgehead of resistance. To concentrate troops covering the approaches to Moscow and for clearer control, the Headquarters transferred the armies of the Reserve Front to the Western Front. The command was entrusted to G. Zhukov. Combat-ready formations transferred to Moscow from the Far East and Central Asia, as well as reserve formations from the European part of the country, were hastily moving towards the front, but were still at a considerable distance. Zhukov, having only insignificant reserves at his disposal, built his defenses in such a way that the most vulnerable areas along highways and railways were covered, hoping that as he moved towards Moscow his forces would become denser, since the capital is a major transport hub. By October 13, the troops of the Western Front deployed on the following approaches to Moscow: Volokolamsk fortified area - 16th Army (commander K. Rokossovsky), Mozhaisky - 5th Army (commander L. Govorov), Maloyaroslavetsky - 43rd Army (commander K. Golubev ), Kaluga -49 Army (commander I. Zakharkin). To strengthen the immediate approaches to the capital, another line was created, which also included the city defense line. Particularly fierce fighting broke out in the Moscow direction on October 13-18. The Nazis were rushing towards Moscow with all their might. On October 18, they took Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Tarusa, and there was a threat of their reaching Moscow. On the morning of October 17, volunteer formations began to take up defensive positions on the immediate approaches to the capital. The fighter battalions created in July, which had previously patrolled the city, also moved here. Moscow enterprises switched to working in three shifts; The labor of women and teenagers began to be used increasingly. On October 15, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution “On the evacuation of the capital of the USSR, Moscow,” according to which part of the party and government institutions and the entire diplomatic corps accredited to the Soviet government were transferred to Kuibyshev. Alarming rumors about the surrender of the capital began to spread, and thousands of residents began to leave the city. The situation was aggravated by the lack of reliable information about events at the front. On October 19, the State Defense Committee adopted a decree introducing a state of siege in Moscow and its surrounding areas. The defense of the capital on lines located 100-120 km west of Moscow is entrusted to G. Zhukov. On November 15-16, the enemy resumed the attack on Moscow. The balance of power was still unequal. German troops tried to bypass Moscow from the north - through Klin and Solnechnogorsk, from the south through Tula and Kashira. Bloody battles ensued. On the night of November 28, the Germans crossed the Moscow-Volga canal in the Yakhroma area, but their further advance on this section of the front was thwarted. According to von Bock, the command of Army Group Center saw the further offensive on Moscow as “having neither purpose nor meaning, since the moment when the group’s forces would be completely exhausted was approaching very close.” The end of November - beginning of December 1941 became the culmination of the battle: it was by this time that the Germans' miscalculations exceeded a critical level; for the first time in the entire war the enemy was faced with the fact of his powerlessness before the enemy; the huge losses of the ground forces had an overwhelming effect on him. At the beginning of December, about 47 divisions of Army Group Center, while continuing to rush towards Moscow, could not withstand the counterattacks of the Soviet troops and went on the defensive. Only on December 8, having received reports from the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 2nd Panzer Armies about the intensification of the Red Army's attacks, Hitler gave the order for strategic defense on the entire Eastern Front. By the beginning of December, the enemy on the immediate approaches to the capital was completely stopped. In the Moscow direction, the reserve armies of the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts advanced to the areas of upcoming operations, thanks to which it was possible to create a new strategic grouping, larger in composition than the previous one, which began defensive operations near Moscow. Simultaneously with the counteroffensive, our troops conducted active military operations southeast of Lenin and in the Crimea, which deprived the Germans of the opportunity to transfer reinforcements to their troops near Moscow. at dawn on December 5, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (commander I. Konev) delivered a powerful blow to the enemy, and the next morning the strike groups of the Western and right wing of the Southwestern (commander S. Timoshenko) fronts went on a counter-offensive. At the beginning of February 1942, the Western Front reached the Naro-Fominsk - Maloyaroslavets line, then west of Kaluga to Sukhinichi and Belev.

This was the first major offensive operation of strategic importance, as a result of which enemy strike groups were thrown back 100, and in some places - 250 km west of the capital. The immediate threat to Moscow was eliminated and Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire line of the Western direction. The plan of Hitler’s “blitzkrieg” was thwarted, and during the war a turn in favor of the USSR began.

10. Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive at Stalingrad November 19, 1942 Military and international significance.

The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. As part of this strategic operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943), the November encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy group (Uran), Kotelnikovskaya and Middle Don ( “Little Saturn”) operations that deprived the enemy of the opportunity to support the group encircled at Stalingrad from the west and weakened its offensive from the south, as well as Operation “Ring” to eliminate the enemy group that was surrounded in Stalingrad itself.

The decision to launch a counteroffensive was made by the Headquarters in mid-September 1942 after an exchange of views between I. Stalin, G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The military’s plan was to defeat the enemy in a 400-kilometer zone in the Stalingrad area, wrest the initiative from him and create conditions for conducting offensive operations on the southern wing,

The operation was entrusted to the troops of the newly formed Southwestern Front (commander N. Vatutin), Don and Stalingrad (commanders K. Rokossovsky and A. Eremenko). In addition, long-range aviation units, the 6th Army and the 2nd Air Army of the neighboring Voronezh Front (front commander F. Golikov), and the Volga Military Flotilla were involved here. The success of the operation largely depended on the surprise and thoroughness of the preparation of the strike; all events were carried out in the strictest secrecy. Headquarters entrusted the leadership of the counteroffensive to G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The Soviet command managed to create powerful groups superior to the enemy in the direction of the main attacks.

The offensive of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front began at 7:30 a.m. on November 19, 1942. Heavy fog and snowfall that day prevented the departure of Soviet attack aircraft, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. And yet, on the very first day, the enemy’s defense was broken through. On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. His tank and mechanized corps, without getting involved in battles for populated areas and skillfully maneuvering, moved forward. Panic began in the enemy camp. On November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed in the area of ​​​​the cities of Kalach and Sovetsky. Units of the enemy's 6th field and 4th tank armies with a total number of 330 thousand people. were surrounded. The same fate befell the Romanian group of troops. In parallel with the internal one, the external encirclement of the enemy was also envisaged. It was clear that the enemy would try to break out of the “cauldron.” Therefore, the Headquarters ordered the Don and Stalingrad fronts, in cooperation with aviation, to eliminate the enemy group, and the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts to push the encirclement line to the west by about 150-200 km. Initially, the idea of ​​​​Operation Saturn boiled down to the delivery of attacks by the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts in converging directions: one to the south in the direction of Rostov, the other from east to west in the direction of Likhaya. To unblock the ring, the German command created the Gotha strike group from a tank corps, a number of infantry and remnants of cavalry divisions. On December 12, it went on the offensive from the Kotelnikovsky area along the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad railway and on December 19, overcoming the fierce resistance of the few Soviet troops in this direction, it reached the line of the Myshkova River. On December 16, 1942, Operation Little Saturn began. As a result of 3 days of fierce fighting, troops of the Southwestern and left wing of the Voronezh front broke through the heavily fortified enemy defenses in several directions and crossed the Don and Bogucharka with battles. In order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold, it was decided not to slow down the pace of the offensive, strengthening the troops of the Southwestern Front at the expense of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, especially tank and mechanized formations. The offensive was carried out in harsh winter conditions, it was difficult, however, the 24th Tank Corps under the command of V. Badanov advanced 240 km in depth in five days, smashing the rear of the 8th Italian Army, and on December 24, with a surprise attack, took Tatsinskai station, destroying the airfield and capturing over 300 enemy aircraft as trophies. The most important communication line between Likhai and Stalingrad, along which the German command was concentrating the troops of the Hollidt group and supplying them with everything necessary for combat operations, was interrupted. The advance of the Goth group was put to an end. The Germans began to strengthen their positions in particularly threatened areas of the front. But by the end of December, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of about 200 km and firmly established themselves on new frontiers. As a result, the main forces of the Hollidt task force, the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies were defeated. The position of the German troops at Stalingrad became hopeless. The final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was Operation Ring. According to Rokossovsky, her plan provided for the defeat of the enemy in the western and southern parts of the encirclement, followed by the dissection of the enemy group into two parts and their liquidation separately. The difficulty of completing the task was due to the fact that the necessary reserves were transferred by the Headquarters to other fronts, as required by the actual situation. surrounded by troops - was thwarted. Despite enormous hardships, the German side rejected the Soviet command’s offer of surrender; on January 10, our troops launched a round-the-clock offensive and on the morning of January 15 captured the Pitomnik airfield. On January 31, 1943, the southern enemy group surrendered, and on February 2, the northern group of the enemy. During three operations - "Uranus", "Little Saturn" and "Ring" - 2 German, 2 Romanian and 1 Italian armies were defeated. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep political crisis in Germany. Three days of mourning were declared in the country. Faith in victory was undermined, defeatist sentiments gripped wide sections of the population. The morale of the German soldier fell, he became increasingly afraid of being surrounded, and believed less and less in victory. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep military-political crisis in the fascist coalition. Italy, Romania, and Hungary faced serious difficulties associated with large losses at the front, a drop in the combat effectiveness of troops, and growing discontent among the masses. The victory at Stalingrad seriously influenced the relations of the USSR with Great Britain and the USA. Both sides were well aware that the Red Army could achieve a decisive turning point in the war and defeat the Germans before the Allies transferred troops to Western France. Since the spring of 1943 The American General Staff, taking into account the changing military situation, began to instruct F. Roosevelt that the United States, in the event of the defeat of Germany, should have a large military contingent in Great Britain. The victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war and had a decisive influence on its further move. The Red Army seized the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end. The people believed in the final victory over fascism, although it came at the cost of heavy losses.

10.Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive at Stalingrad November 19, 1942 Military and international significance. The radical turning point in the war came at Staling. In this large industrial center, named after the leader, German motorized groups of troops met the most fierce resistance, which had never been seen before, even in this brutal war of “total annihilation.” If the city could not withstand the onslaught and fell, then the German troops could cross the Volga, and this, in turn, would allow them to completely surround Mos and Lenin, after which Sov. the union would inevitably have turned into a truncated northern Asian state, pushed beyond the Ural Mountains. But Sta did not fall. Soviet troops defended their positions, proving their ability to fight in small units. Sometimes the territory they controlled was so small that German aircraft and artillery were afraid to bombard the city for fear of causing damage to their own troops. Street fighting prevented the Wehrmacht from using its usual advantages. Tanks and other equipment in narrow streets got stuck and turned into a good target for Soviet soldiers. In addition, the German troops were now fighting in conditions of extreme overstrain of resources, which were supplied to them only by one railway line and by air. The battles for the city exhausted and bled the enemy, creating the conditions for the Red Army to launch a counteroffensive. In the offensive operation "Uranus" near Stalingrad, two stages were envisaged: in the first it was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses and create a strong encirclement ring, in the second - to destroy the encircled fascist troops if they did not accept the ultimatum to surrender. For this, the forces of three fronts were involved: the Southwestern (commander - General N.F. Vatutin), Don (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Staling (General A.I. Eremenko). The equipment of Kra Ar with new military equipment was accelerated. To its superiority over the enemy in tanks, achieved in the spring of 1942, at the end of the year was added a predominance in guns, mortars, and aircraft. The counterattack began on November 19, 1942, and five days later the advanced units of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed in, encircling more than 330 thousand German soldiers and officers. On January 10, Soviet troops under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky began to eliminate the group blocked in the Steel area. On February 2, its remnants surrendered. More than 90 thousand people were taken prisoner, including 24 generals led by Field General F. Paulus. As a result of the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the Nazi 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army, the 3rd and 4th Armies and the 8th Italian Army were defeated. During the Battle of Steel, which lasted 200 days and nights, the fascist bloc lost 25% of the forces operating at that time on the Soviet-German front. The victory at Stalingrad was of great military and political significance. She made a huge contribution to achieving a radical turning point in the war and had a decisive influence on the further course of the entire war. As a result of Stalin's battle, the armed forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and retained it until the end of the war. The outstanding significance of the Stalin battle was highly appreciated by the USSR's allies in the war with Germany. Prime Minister Great W. Churchill in November 1943, at a conference of leaders of the Allied powers in Tehran, handed over to the Soviet delegation an honorary sword - a gift from King George VI to the citizens of Stal in commemoration of the victory over the fascist invaders. In May 1944, US President Franklin Roosevelt, on behalf of the American people, sent a letter to Stalin. By this time, Soviet industry had established the production of a sufficient number of tanks and other weapons of various types, and did this with unprecedented success and in huge quantities. Steel was defeated and the victory of the Soviet troops in it contributed to the liberation of most of the North Caucasus, Rzhev, Voronezh, Kursk were liberated , most of Donbass.

11.Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1943. Battle of Kursk . Crossing of the Dnieper. Tehran Conference. The question of opening a second front. In preparation for the summer campaign, Nazi strategists concentrated their attention on the Kursk Bulge. This was the name given to the protrusion of the front line facing west. It was defended by troops of two fronts: Central (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (General N.F. Vatutin). It was here that Hitler intended to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. Two powerful tank wedges were supposed to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops at the base of the ledge, encircle them and create a threat to Moscow. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having received timely information from intelligence about the planned offensive, was well prepared for defense and response actions. When the Wehrmacht attacked the Kursk Bulge on July 5, 1943, the Red Army managed to withstand it, and seven days later launched a strategic offensive along a front of 2 thousand km. The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to July 23, 1943, and victory in it, Soviet troops had enormous military and political significance. It became the most important stage on the path to the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany. More than 4 million people took part in the battles on both sides. 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. In this battle, the offensive strategy of the German armed forces finally collapsed. The victory at Kursk and the subsequent advance of Soviet troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the course of the war. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts of the Second World War, which had a huge impact on its course. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the Resistance movement in the countries occupied by the Nazis became increasingly active. By this time, all the resources of the Soviet state were mobilized as fully as could be done in war conditions. By government decree of February 1942, the entire working population of the country was mobilized for military purposes. People worked 55 hours a week, with only one day off a month, and sometimes no days off at all, sleeping on the floor of the workshop. As a result of the successful mobilization of all resources, by mid-1943, Soviet industry was already far superior to German, which, moreover, was partially destroyed by aerial bombing. In areas where industry was still weak, shortages were made up by constant supplies from Great Britain and the United States under the Lend-Lease agreement. The Soviet Union received a significant amount of tractors, trucks, car tires, explosive materials, field telephones, telephone wires, and food products. This superiority allowed the Red Army to confidently conduct combined military operations in the same spirit as the German troops were able to do at the initial stage of the war. In August 1943, Orel, Belgorod, and Kharkov were liberated, and in September, Smolensk. At the same time, the crossing of the Dnieper began; in November, Soviet units entered the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and by the end of the year they had advanced far to the west. By mid-December 1943, Soviet troops liberated part of the Kalinin, all of Smolensk regions, part of the Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Gomel regions; crossed the Desna, Sozh, Dnieper, Pripyat, and Berezina rivers and reached Polesie. By the end of 1943, Soviet troops liberated about 50% of the territory occupied by the enemy. The partisans caused great damage to the enemy. In 1943, the partisans carried out major operations to destroy communication lines under the code names “Rail War” and “Concert”. In total, during the war, over 1 million partisans operated behind enemy lines. As a result of the victories of the Red Army, the prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena and its role in resolving the most important issues of world politics increased immeasurably. This was also evident at the Tehran Conference of 1943, where the leaders of the three powers - the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain - agreed on plans and deadlines for joint actions to defeat the enemy, as well as agreements on the opening of a second front in Europe during May 1944. The Tehran Conference took place in the capital of Iran on November 28 – December 1, 1943. One of the main topics of the conference was the question of opening a second front. By this time, a radical change had occurred on the eastern front. The Red Army went on the offensive, and the Allies saw the real prospect of a Soviet soldier appearing in the heart of Europe, which was by no means part of their plans. This especially irritated the leader of Great Britain, who did not believe in the possibility of cooperation with Soviet Russia. At the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to open a second front, although resolving this issue was not easy for them. Churchill tried to convince the Allies of the extreme importance of military operations in Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean. Stalin, on the contrary, demanded the opening of a second front in Western Europe. In choosing the direction of the main attack of the allied forces, Stalin found support from Roosevelt. The political and military leadership of England and the United States agreed to open a second front in the spring of 1944 in Normandy. Stalin promised to launch a powerful offensive operation on the eastern front by this time. The Big Three also discussed future borders in Europe. The most painful question was Polish. Stalin proposed moving the Polish border west, to the Oder. The Soviet-Polish border was supposed to run along the line established in 1939. At the same time, Stalin announced Moscow's claims to Konigsberg and new borders with Finland. The Allies decided to agree to Moscow's territorial demands. Stalin, in turn, promised to enter the war against Japan after Germany signed the act of surrender. The Big Three were discussing the future of Germany, which was generally agreed to be divided. However, no concrete decision was made, since each side had its own view on the future borders of the German lands. Starting from the Tehran Conference, the issue of borders in Europe became the most important for all subsequent meetings. Implementing the decisions of the Tehran Conference, with some delay, on June 6, 1944, the Allied landing in Normandy began (Operation Overlord) with simultaneous support for the Allied landing in the south of France ( Operation Dragoon). On August 25, 1944, they liberated Paris. At the same time, the offensive of Soviet troops, launched along the entire front, continued in northwestern Russia, Finland, and Belarus. The joint actions of the allies confirmed the effectiveness of the coalition and led to the collapse of the fascist bloc in Europe. Particular attention should be paid to the interaction of the allies during the Ardennes counter-offensive of Germany (December 16, 1944 - January 26, 1945), when Soviet troops launched an offensive from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians earlier than planned (January 12, 1945), at the request of the allies, thereby saving Anglo-American troops from defeat in the Ardennes. It should be noted that in 1944-1945. The Eastern Front continued to be the main one, with 150 German divisions operating there versus 71 divisions and 3 brigades on the Western Front and 22 divisions in Italy.

12.Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1944-May 1945. Crimean (Yalta) conference. The third period of the Great Patriotic War - the defeat of the fascist bloc, the expulsion of enemy troops from the USSR, liberation from the occupation of European countries - began in January 1944. This year was marked by a series of new grandiose and victorious operations of the Red Army. In January, the offensive of the Leningrad (General L. A. Govorov) and Volkhov (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts began, finally lifting the blockade of heroic Leningrad. In February-March, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian (General N.F. Vatutin) and 2nd Ukrainian (General I.S. Konev) fronts, having defeated Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya and a number of other powerful enemy groups, reached the border with Romania. In the summer, major victories were won in three strategic directions at once. As a result of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation, the forces of the Leningrad (Marshal L. A. Govorov) and Karelian (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts drove the Finnish units out of Karelia. Finland stopped hostilities on the side of Germany, and in September the USSR signed an armistice agreement with it. In June - August, troops of four fronts (1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian, 1st Baltic) under the command of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, and I.Kh. Bagramyan expelled the enemy from the territory of Belarus during Operation Bagration. In August, the 2nd Ukrainian (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and 3rd Ukrainian (General F. I. Tolbukhin) fronts, having carried out a joint Iasi-Kishinev operation, liberated Moldova. In early autumn, German troops retreated from Transcarpathian Ukraine and the Baltic states. Finally, in October, a German group on the extreme northern section of the Soviet-German front was defeated by a strike on Pechenga. The state border of the USSR was restored all the way from the Barents to the Black Sea. In general, the Soviet armed forces in 1944 carried out about 50 offensive operations that had enormous military and political significance. As a result, the main groups of Nazi troops were defeated. In the summer and autumn of 1944 alone, the enemy lost 1.6 million people. Nazi Germany lost almost all of its European allies, the front approached its borders, and in East Prussia crossed them. With the opening of the second front, Germany's military-strategic position worsened. However, Hitler's leadership launched a large-scale offensive in the Ardennes (Western Europe). As a result of the German offensive, the Anglo-American troops found themselves in a difficult situation. In this regard, at the request of Winston Churchill, Soviet troops in January 1945 earlier than planned, they went on the offensive along the entire Soviet-German front. The offensive of the Red Army was so powerful that already at the beginning of February its separate formations reached the approaches to Berlin. In January - the first half of April 1945, Soviet troops carried out the East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, Vienna, East Pomeranian, Lower Silesian and Upper Silesian offensive operations. The student needs to talk about the liberation campaign of the Red Army - the liberation of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. The final strategic offensive operation in the Great Patriotic War was the Berlin operation, carried out by the Red Army on April 16 - May 8, 1945. In the spring of 1945, On the territory of Germany, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France conducted military operations. During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 23 tank and motorized divisions, most of the aviation, and captured about 480 thousand people. On May 8, 1945, in Karlhorst (a suburb of Berlin), an act of unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was signed. With the surrender of Germany, the war in Europe ended, but the war with Japan in the Far East and the Pacific, waged by the USA, Great Britain and their allies, continued . Having fulfilled its allied obligations adopted at the Crimean Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8. The Manchurian strategic offensive operation lasted from August 9 to September 2, 1945. Its goals were the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army, the liberation of Manchuria and North Korea, and the elimination of the bridgehead of aggression and the military-economic base of Japan on the Asian continent. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay on board the American battleship Missouri, Japanese representatives signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, which led to the end of World War II. The southern part of Sakhalin and the islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to the Soviet Union. His sphere of influence extended to North Korea and China. Successful actions in 1944 led to the need to convene a new Allied conference on the eve of Germany's surrender. The Yalta (Crimean) Conference, held on February 4-11, resolved issues primarily related to the post-war structure of Europe. An agreement was reached on the occupation of Germany, its demilitarization, denazification and demonopolization, and on German reparations. It was decided to create four occupation zones on German territory and create a special control body of the commanders-in-chief of the three powers, headquartered in Berlin. In addition to the three great powers, France was also invited to occupy and rule Germany. However, having made this decision, the parties did not stipulate procedural issues and did not define the boundaries of these zones. The Soviet delegation initiated a discussion of the reparation issue, proposing two forms: removal of equipment and annual payments. Roosevelt supported Stalin, who proposed determining the total amount of reparations at 20 billion dollars, of which 50% was to be paid to the Soviet Union. The focus of the conference participants was again on the Polish question. The borders of Poland, according to the decisions of the conference, ran in the east along the “Curzon Line” with compensation for territorial losses by gains in the northwest at the expense of Germany. This secured the accession of Western Belarus and Ukraine to the USSR. The conference participants discussed a number of issues related to other European countries. Stalin agreed to Anglo-American influence in Italy and British influence in Greece. Despite the fact that London and Washington were not satisfied with the position of the Soviet Union on Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, where Moscow acted virtually independently, they were forced to agree to resolve these issues in the future through normal diplomatic channels. De facto, Eastern Europe was coming under Soviet influence. It is this result of the Yalta conference that many American researchers cannot forgive Roosevelt, although the decisions made at Yalta were the result of a compromise.

13.The entry of the USSR into the war with Japan. Strategic operations of the Red Army. End of World War II . In the spring of 1945, the redeployment of troops of the USSR and its allies began to the Far East. The forces of the United States and England were quite sufficient to defeat Japan. But the political leadership of these countries, fearing possible losses, insisted on the USSR entering the war on Dal Vos. The S Arm had the goal of destroying the striking force of the Japanese - the Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria and Korea and numbering about a million people. In accordance with its allied duty, on April 5, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of 1941 and on August 8 declared war on Japan. On August 9, a group of Soviet troops consisting of Transbaikal (commander - Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky), 1st (commander - Marshal K.A. Meretskov) and 2nd (coma - General M.A. Purkaev) Far Front, as well as the Quiet Fleet (commander - Admiral I.S. Yumashev) and Amur military flotilla (commander - counter- Admiral N.V. Antonov), numbering 1.8 million people, launched military operations. For strategic leadership of the armed struggle, on July 30, the Main Command of the Soviet troops on Da Vo was created, headed by Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. The offensive of the Soviet fronts developed quickly and successfully. During 23 days of stubborn battles on a front stretching over 5 thousand km, Soviet troops and naval forces, successfully advancing during the Manchurian, South Sahal and Kuril landing operations, liberated Northeast China, North Korea, the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands -va. Soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army also took part in the war with Japan along with Soviet troops. Soviet troops captured about 600 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, and many weapons and equipment were captured. The enemy's losses were almost twice as high as those suffered by the Soviet army. The USSR's entry into the war finally broke Japanese resistance. On August 14, its government decided to ask for surrender. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay on board the American battleship Missouri, representatives of Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. This meant the end of the Second World War. The victory of the USSR and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition over the Nazi Germany and Militia Japan in the Second World War was of world-historical significance and had a huge impact on the entire post-war development of mankind. Fatherland was its most important component. The Soviet Voore Forces defended the freedom and independence of the Motherland, participated in the liberation of the peoples of 11 European countries from fascist oppression, and expelled the Japanese occupiers from Northeast China and Korea. During the four-year armed struggle (1,418 days and nights) on the Soviet-German front, the main forces of the fascist bloc were defeated and captured: 607 divisions of the Wehrmacht and its allies. In the battles with the Soviet Armed Forces, Nazi Germany lost over 10 million people (80% of all military losses), over 75% of all military equipment. In the fierce battle with fascism, the question was about life and death of the Slavic peoples. At the cost of a colossal effort, the Russian people, in alliance with all other large and small nations of the USSR, were able to defeat the enemy. However, the cost of the victory of the Soviet people over fascism was enormous. More than 29 million people passed through the war in the ranks of the Sov Vooru Forces. The war claimed over 27 million lives of our fellow citizens, including military losses amounting to 8,668,400 people. The ratio of losses between Kra Ar and the Wehrmacht is determined as 1.3: 1. About 4 million partisans and underground fighters died behind enemy lines and in the occupied territories. About 6 million Soviet citizens found themselves in fascist captivity. The USSR lost 30% of its national wealth. The occupiers destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and towns, over 70 thousand villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 98 thousand collective farms and 2 thousand state farms, 6 thousand hospitals, 82 thousand schools, 334 universities,

14.Culture during the Great Patriotic War . From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, all the achievements of national culture, science and technology were put into the service of victory and defense of the Motherland. The country was turning into a single combat camp. All spheres of culture had to be subordinated to the tasks of fighting the enemy. Cultural figures fought with weapons in their hands on the war fronts, worked in the front-line press and propaganda brigades. Representatives of all cultural trends made their contribution to the victory. Many of them gave their lives for their homeland, for victory. This was an unprecedented social and spiritual upsurge of the entire people. (See additional illustrative material.) The war with Nazi Germany required a restructuring of all spheres of society, including culture. At the first stage of the war, the main efforts were aimed at explaining the nature of the war and the goals of the USSR in it. Preference was given to operational forms of cultural work, such as radio, cinematography, and print. From the first days of the war, the importance of mass information, mainly radio, increased. Information Bureau reports were broadcast 18 times a day in 70 languages. Using the experience of political education during the civil war - "Windows of GROWTH", they began to publish posters "Windows of TASS". A few hours after the declaration of war, a poster of the Kukryniksys appeared (Kukryniksy is a pseudonym (based on the first syllables of their last names) of a creative team of graphic artists and painters: M.V. Kupriyanov, P.F. Krylov and N.A. Sokolov). “We will ruthlessly defeat and destroy the enemy!”, which was reproduced in newspapers in 103 cities. I.M.’s poster carried a great emotional charge. Toidze “The Motherland is Calling!”, stylistically related to the poster by D.S. Moore's Civil War "Have you volunteered?" Posters by V.B. were also extremely popular. Koretsky "Warrior of the Red Army, save!" and Kukryniksov “I Lost a Ring,” depicting Hitler, who “dropped a ring” from 22 divisions defeated at Stalingrad. Posters were an effective means of mobilizing people to fight the enemy. Since the beginning of the war, the evacuation of cultural institutions has been intensive. By November 1941, about 60 theaters in Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine and Belarus were evacuated to the eastern regions of the country. 53 universities and academic institutions, about 300 creative unions and organizations were evacuated to the Uzbek SSR alone. Kustanay houses the collections of the Historical Museum, the Museum of the Revolution, the most valuable part of the collections of the Library named after. IN AND. Lenin, Foreign Language Library and Historical Library. The treasures of the Russian Museum and the Tretyakov Gallery were taken to Perm, and the Hermitage to Sverdlovsk. The Writers' Union and the Literary Fund moved to Kazan, and the USSR Union of Artists and the Art Fund moved to Sverdlovsk. Soviet art devoted itself entirely to the cause of saving the Fatherland. Soviet poetry and song achieved an extraordinary sound during this period. The song “Holy War” by V. Lebedev-Kumach and A. Alexandrov became a true anthem of the people’s war. Songs by composers A. Aleksandrov, V. Solovyov-Sedoy, M. Blanter, A. Novikov, B. Mokrousov, M. Fradkin, T. Khrennikov and others were very popular. The battle lyrical song became one of the leading genres of literature. “Dugout”, “Evening on the roadstead”, “Nightingales”, “Dark Night” - these songs entered the golden treasury of Soviet song classics. During the war years, one of the greatest musical works of the 20th century was created. - D. Shostakovich’s 7th symphony, dedicated to the heroic defenders of Leningrad. At one time, L. Beethoven liked to repeat that music should strike fire from the courageous human heart. It was these thoughts that were embodied by D. Shostakovich in his most significant work.D. Shostakovich began writing the 7th Symphony a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War and continued to work in Leningrad, besieged by the Nazis. On the original score of the symphony, the composer’s notes “VT” are visible, meaning “air raid warning”. When it came, D. Shostakovich interrupted work on the symphony and went to drop incendiary bombs from the roof of the conservatory. The first three movements of the symphony were completed by the end of September 1941, when Leningrad was already surrounded and subjected to brutal artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. The victorious finale of the symphony was completed in December, when the fascist hordes stood on the outskirts of Moscow. “I dedicate this symphony to my hometown Leningrad, our fight against fascism, our upcoming victory” - this was the epigraph to this work. In 1942, the symphony was performed in the USA and other countries of the anti-fascist coalition. The musical art of the whole world does not know of another composition that would have received such a powerful public response. During the war years, Soviet drama created true masterpieces of theatrical art. In the initial period of the war, the plays of L. Leonov “Invasion”, K. Simonov “Russian People”, A. Korneichuk “Front”, which quickly became popular, were published. Works of domestic literature that are well-known and loved by many today also appeared, such as chapters of the novel by M. Sholokhov “They Fought for the Motherland”, “The Science of Hate”, story by V. Vasilevskaya "Rainbow". The Battle of Stalingrad is dedicated to the stories of K. Simonov “Days and Nights” and V. Grossman “The Direction of the Main Strike”. The heroism of home front workers was described in the works of M.S. Shaginyan and F.V. Gladkova. During the war, the first chapters of A. Fadeev’s novel “The Young Guard” were published. Journalism of those years is represented by articles by K. Simonov, I. Ehrenburg. Military lyrics by M. Isakovsky, S. Shchipachev, A. Tvardovsky, A. Akhmatova, A. Surkov, N. Tikhonov were created in the form of an oath, lamentation, curse, and direct appeal. O. Berggolts, B. Pasternak, M. Svetlova, K. Simonov. Thus, the images of the defenders of Leningrad were created by O. Berggolts in the “Leningrad Poem” and V. Inber in the poem “Pulkovo Meridian”. The poem by A.T. was extremely popular. Tvardovsky "Vasily Terkin", poem by M.I. Aliger "Zoya". More than a thousand writers and poets in the ranks of the active army worked as war correspondents. Ten writers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Musa Jalil, P.P. Vershigora, A. Gaidar, A. Surkov, E. Petrov, A. Bek, K. Simonov, M. Sholokhov, A. Fadeev, N. Tikhonov. The coming to power of fascism in a number of countries and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War revived the Russian patriotic theme in cinema ("Alexander Nevsky", "Suvorov", "Kutuzov"). On the basis of the evacuated film studios "Lenfilm" and "Mosfilm" in Almaty, the Central United Film Studio (CUKS) was created. During these years, film directors S. Eisenstein, V. Pudovkin, the Vasilyev brothers, F. Ermler, I. Pyryev, G. Roshal worked at the film studio. About 80% of all domestic feature films during the war years were produced at this film studio. In total, during the war years, 34 full-length films and almost 500 film magazines were created. Among them is “Secretary of the District Committee” I.A. Pyryeva, “Invasion” by A. Room, “Rainbow” by M.S. Donskoy, “Two Fighters” by L.D. Lukova, “She Defends the Motherland” F.M. Ermler, documentary film “The Defeat of German Troops near Moscow” by L. Varlamov and I. Kopalin. There were more than 150 cameramen on the front line and in partisan detachments.

To provide cultural services to the front, front-line brigades of artists, writers, painters and front-line theaters were created (by 1944 there were 25 of them). The first of them was the Iskra theater, made up of actors from the theater. Lenin Komsomol - volunteers of the people's militia, then front-line branches of the Maly Theater, the Theater named after. E. Vakhtangov and the Komsomol theater of GITIS. During the war years, more than 40 thousand artists visited the fronts as part of such brigades. Among them were the luminaries of the Russian stage I.M. Moskvin, A.K. Tarasova, N.K. Cherkasov, M.I. Tsarev, A.A. Yablochkina and others. During the war years, the concerts of the Leningrad Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra under the direction of E. Mravinsky, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Soviet Army under the direction of A. Alexandrov, and the Russian Folk Choir named after A. Aleksandrov enjoyed exceptional success during the war years. M. Pyatnitsky, soloists K. Shulzhenko, L. Ruslanova, A. Raikin, L. Utesov, I. Kozlovsky, S. Lemeshev and many others. etc. The 13-meter statue of a Soviet liberator warrior with a girl in his arms and a lowered sword, erected after the war in Berlin in Treptower Park (sculptor - E.V. Vuchetich), became a sculptural symbol of the war years and the memory of fallen wars. War, heroism of the Soviets people are reflected in the paintings of artists A.A. Deineki "Defense of Sevastopol", S.V. Gerasimov "Mother of the Partisan", painting by A.A. Plastov “The Fascist Flew” and others. Assessing the damage to the cultural heritage of the country, the Extraordinary State Commission to investigate the atrocities of the invaders named 430 museums out of 991 located in the occupied territory, 44 thousand palaces of culture and libraries among those plundered and destroyed. The house-museums of L.N. were looted. Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana, I.S. Turgenev in Spassky-Lutovinovo, A.S. Pushkin in Mikhailovsky, P.I. Tchaikovsky in Klin, T.G. Shevchenko in Kanev. The frescoes of the 12th century were irretrievably lost. in the St. Sophia Cathedral of Novgorod, manuscripts by P.I. Tchaikovsky, canvases by I.E. Repina, V.A. Serova, I.K. Aivazovsky, who died in Stalingrad. Ancient architectural monuments of ancient Russian cities were destroyed - Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Rzhev, Vyazma, Kyiv. Suburban architectural ensembles-palaces of St. Petersburg and architectural monastery complexes of the Moscow region were damaged. The human losses were irreparable. All this affected the development of domestic culture after the war. Thus, despite the period of totalitarianism in the history of the country preceding the Great Patriotic War, severe ideological pressure on the entire domestic culture, in the face of tragedy, the danger of foreign conquest, ideological vocabulary is leaving genuine culture and coming to the fore eternal, deep, truly national values ​​are put forward. Hence the amazing unity of the culture of those years, the desire of people to protect their Earth and its traditions.

15.The international significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. Sources of victory. Results. Berlin (Potsdam Conference).

The victory over fascist Germany and its allies was achieved through the joint efforts of the states of the anti-fascist coalition, the peoples who fought against the occupiers and their accomplices. But the Soviet Union played a decisive role in this armed conflict. It was the Soviet country that was the most active and consistent fighter against the fascist invaders who sought to enslave the peoples of the whole world.

The world-historical significance of the Victory lies in the fact that it was the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who blocked the path of German fascism to world domination, bore the brunt of a war unprecedented in human history and made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies.

The victory over Nazi Germany was the result of the joint efforts of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. But the main burden of the struggle against the shock forces of world reaction fell to the lot of the Soviet Union. It was on the Soviet-German front that the most fierce and decisive battles of the Second World War took place.

The Great Patriotic War ended with a complete military-political, economic and ideological victory of the Soviet Union. This predetermined the outcome of the Second World War as a whole. The victory over fascism is an event of world-historical significance. What are the most important results of the war?

The main result of the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War is that, in the most difficult trials, the Soviet people crushed fascism - the darkest creation of the era, and defended the freedom and independence of their state. Having overthrown fascism, together with the armies of other states of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Union saved humanity from the threat of enslavement.

The victory of the Soviet people over German fascism had a huge impact on the entire further course of world history and on the solution of the fundamental social problems of our time.

The war imposed on the Soviet Union had socio-political consequences that were unforeseen for its organizers. The hopes of the reactionary circles of the Western powers to weaken our country were dashed. The USSR emerged from the war even stronger politically and militarily, and its international authority rose immeasurably. Governments and people listened to his voice; without his participation, essentially, not a single important problem affecting the fundamental interests of the world was solved. This was expressed, in particular, in the establishment and restoration of diplomatic relations with many states. Thus, if in 1941 26 countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, then in 1945 - already 52 states.

Victory in the war brought the USSR into the ranks of the leading powers of the post-war world and created a real basis for a new stage in international relations. First of all, this is the creation of the United Nations, joint measures to eradicate Nazism and militarism in Germany, the formation of international mechanisms for discussing post-war problems, etc.

The moral, political and spiritual unity of Soviet society was of great importance for achieving victory. By attacking the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany also bet on the fact that the Soviet multinational state would not withstand severe military tests, anti-Soviet, nationalist forces would become more active in the country, and a “fifth column” would appear.

The coordinated organizational work of the country's political and military leadership played a huge role in achieving victory. Thanks to targeted and well-coordinated work at the center and locally, the country was quickly turned into a single military camp. The program for defeating the enemy, scientifically grounded and understandable to the majority of the population, was set out already in the first documents and speeches of state leaders: the appeal of the Soviet government to the people on June 22, the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions on June 29, the speech of I. IN. Stalin on the radio July 3, 1941. They clearly defined the nature and goals of the war, and named the most important measures aimed at repelling aggression and defeating the enemy. The most important source of victory in the Great Patriotic War was the powerful potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. Victory in the Great Patriotic War showed the superiority of Soviet military science and military art, the high level of strategic leadership and combat skill of our military personnel, and the military organization as a whole.

Victory in the war was also achieved thanks to the high patriotism of Soviet soldiers, their love for their Fatherland, and loyalty to their constitutional duty. These qualities were embedded in the consciousness of military personnel in the pre-war years during a well-organized system of patriotic and military-patriotic education, which permeated all layers of Soviet society and accompanied the citizen at all stages of his life - at school, in the army, at work. Soviet losses at the fronts , according to various estimates, vary from 8.5 to 26.5 million people. The total material damage and military costs are estimated at $485 billion. 1,710 cities and towns and more than 70 thousand villages were destroyed. But the USSR defended its independence and contributed to the full or partial liberation of a number of European and Asian countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria , Yugoslavia, China and Korea. He made a huge contribution to the overall victory of the anti-fascist coalition over Germany, Italy and Japan: on the Soviet-German front, 607 Wehrmacht divisions were defeated and captured, almost 3/4 of all German military equipment was destroyed. The USSR played an important role in the post-war peace settlement; its territory expanded to include East Prussia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, the Petsamo region, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. It became one of the leading world powers and the center of an entire system of communist states on the Euro-Asian continent.

Potsdam Conference 1945, Berlin Conference, conference of heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, US President G. Truman, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, who was replaced on July 28 by the new Prime Minister K. Attlee . It took place from July 17 to August 2 at the Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam, near Berlin. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, military advisers and experts participated in the work of the PK. The decisions of the Political Committee were a development of the decisions of the Crimean Conference of 1945.

Issues related to the demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of Germany, as well as many other important aspects of the German problem, occupied a central place in the work of the PK.

The participants of the PK reached an agreement on the main directions of the general policy towards Germany, which was considered as a single economic and political whole. The Potsdam Agreements provided for the complete disarmament of Germany, the dissolution of its armed forces, the destruction of monopolies and the liquidation in Germany of all industry that could be used for: military production, the destruction of the National Socialist Party, organizations and institutions controlled by it, the prevention of all Nazi and militaristic activities or propaganda in the country. The conference participants signed a special agreement on reparations, confirming the rights of the peoples who suffered from the Germans. aggression, for compensation and determining the sources of reparation payments. An agreement was reached on the establishment of central German administrative departments (finance, transport, communications, etc.).

At the conference, a system of quadripartite occupation of Germany was finally agreed upon, which was supposed to serve its demilitarization and democratization; it was envisaged that during the occupation, supreme power in Germany would be exercised by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, each in its own zone of occupation; on matters affecting Germany as a whole, they were to act jointly as members of the Control Council.

The Potsdam Agreement defined a new Polish-German border along the Oder-West Neisse line, the establishment of which was reinforced by the PK decision to evict the German population remaining in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The PK confirmed the transfer of Koenigsberg (since 1946 - Kaliningrad) and the adjacent region to the Soviet Union. She established the Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA), entrusting it with preparing a peace settlement with Germany and its former allies.

At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, the conference discussed the fate of the German fleet and decided to divide the entire German surface, naval and merchant fleet equally between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. At the suggestion of Great Britain, it was decided to sink most of the German submarine fleet, and divide the rest equally.

The Soviet government proposed to extend the competence of the Austrian provisional government to the entire country, that is, also to those areas of Austria that were occupied by the troops of the Western powers. As a result of the negotiations, it was decided to study this issue after the entry of US and British troops into Vienna.

The three governments confirmed at the P.C. their intention to bring the main war criminals to trial at the International Military Tribunal. The participants of the PK expressed their opinions on some other issues of international life: the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Black Sea Straits, the attitude of the United Nations towards the Franco regime in Spain, etc.

Another old entry of mine made it to the top after 4 whole years. Today, of course, I would correct some of the statements from that time. But, alas, there is absolutely no time.

gusev_a_v in the Soviet-Finnish War. Losses Part 2

The Soviet-Finnish War and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through minefields, in dense rows and holding hands. Every Russian person who recognizes the incomparability of losses must at the same time admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

I’ll quote Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim again:
« It happened that in the battles of early December, Russians marched singing in tight ranks - and even holding hands - into Finnish minefields, not paying attention to explosions and accurate fire from the defenders.”

Can you imagine these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures cited by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24,923 Finns killed and dying from wounds. Russians, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why feel sorry for these Russians?

Finnish soldier in a coffin...

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book “The Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940.” with reference to Nikita Khrushchev they give the following data:

“Of the total number of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR’s losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1000 aircraft, 2300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with “meat”.

Finnish military cemetery...

Mannerheim writes about the reasons for the defeat as follows:
“In the final stages of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower.”

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such scanty losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and have written about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in “The Great Slandered War” states:
« Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded. The primary source of this figure is a translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä published in the newspaper “Abroad” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish publication “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost more than 23,000 people killed in the “winter war”; more than 43,000 people were injured. 25,243 people were killed in the bombings, including on merchant ships.”

The last figure - 25,243 killed in bombings - is questionable. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to familiarize myself with the Finnish original of Seppälä’s article.”

Mannerheim, as you know, assessed the losses from the bombing:
“More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice that number were wounded.”

The largest figures for Finnish losses are given by Military Historical Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official data, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.”

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
According to Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 prisoners

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book “Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Loss." The number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet includes even those with whom their relatives broke off contact in 1939-1940.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers counted these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.

Red Army soldiers examine captured Boffors anti-tank guns

Who and how counted the Finnish losses is absolutely unclear. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the armed forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war Finland was experiencing a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even minor losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the Vanquished,” Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irreversible loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to Aritz's calculations, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 grew by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, something that had never happened in any country, not even Germany.”

Funeral of Finnish skiers

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. On Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses during the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
A total of 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish website http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died between 1939 and 1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not add up.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR” claims that ardent Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army losses. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as the Shutskor, were not included in the general loss statistics. And they had a lot of paramilitary forces.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

"Fighters" of the "Lotta" formations

Be that as it may, two explanations arise:
First, if the Finnish data about their losses is correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they “raised their paws” without suffering almost any losses.
The second is that if we assume that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply vastly underestimated their own losses.