Why did Soviet troops win the Battle of Kursk? The Battle of Kursk is a great turning point.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to Wehrmacht plans, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

Strengths of the parties

USSR
To slow down and complicate the enemy's offensive, the Soviet Army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines on every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same “Tigers” of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Progress of the battle

Aftermath of the battle

History is always written by the winners, exaggerating their own importance and sometimes belittling the merits of their opponents. Much has been written and said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk for all mankind. This great epic battle was another bitter lesson that took the lives of many people. And it will be a great blasphemy for future generations not to draw the right conclusions from those past events.

General situation on the eve of the General Battle

By the spring of 1943, the resulting Kursk ledge not only interfered with normal railway communication between the German army groups “Center” and “South”. Associated with him was an ambitious plan to encircle 8 Soviet armies. The Nazis have not yet accomplished anything like this, even in a more favorable period for them. According to some historians, the deliberately unrealistic plan was, rather, an act of desperation. Allegedly, Hitler was most afraid of the Allied landings in Italy, so with such measures his army tried to protect itself in the East by getting rid of the Soviets.

This point of view does not stand up to criticism. The significance of the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk lies in the fact that it was in these military theaters that crushing blows were dealt to the well-coordinated military machine of the Wehrmacht. The long-awaited initiative ended up in the hands of Soviet troops. After these great historical events, the wounded fascist beast was dangerous and snarled, but even he himself understood that he was dying.

Preparing for the big moment

One of the key aspects of the significance of the battle is the determination with which the Soviet soldiers were ready to demonstrate to the enemy that two terrible years had not been in vain for them. This does not mean that the Red Army was suddenly reborn, having solved all its old problems. There were still enough of them. This was primarily due to the low qualifications of military personnel. The staff shortage was irreplaceable. To survive, we had to come up with new approaches to solving problems.

One such example can be considered the organization of anti-tank strong points (ATOP). Previously, anti-tank guns were lined up in one line, but experience has shown that it is more effective to concentrate them in unique well-fortified islands. Each PTOPA gun had several positions for firing in all directions. Each of these strong points was located 600-800 meters from each other. If enemy tanks tried to wedge in and pass between such “islands,” they would inevitably come under cross artillery fire. And on the side the tank armor is weaker.

How this would work in a real combat situation was to be found out during the Battle of Kursk. The importance of artillery and aviation, to which the Soviet command paid the closest attention, is difficult to overestimate due to the emergence of a new factor on which Hitler placed great hopes. We are talking about the appearance of new tanks.

In the spring of 1943, Marshal of Artillery Voronov, reporting to Stalin on the state of affairs, noted that the Soviet troops did not have guns capable of effectively fighting the new enemy tanks. It was urgent to take measures to eliminate the backlog in this area, and as soon as possible. By order of the State Defense Committee, production of 57-mm anti-tank guns was resumed. There was also a frantic modernization of existing armor-piercing shells.

However, all these measures were ineffective due to lack of time and necessary materials. A new PTAB bomb has entered aviation service. Weighing only 1.5 kg, it was capable of hitting 100 mm top armor. Such “gifts for the Krauts” were loaded into a container of 48 pieces. The Il-2 attack aircraft could take 4 such containers on board.

Finally, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed in particularly important areas. They were carefully camouflaged and under orders not to fire at enemy aircraft under any circumstances.

From the measures described above, it is clear what importance Soviet soldiers attached to the Battle of Kursk. At the most difficult moment, determination to win and natural ingenuity came to the rescue. But this was not enough, and the price, as always, was huge human losses.

Progress of the battle

A lot of contradictory information and various myths created for propaganda purposes do not allow us to put a final point on this issue. History has long brought to posterity the results and significance of the Battle of Kursk. But all the new details that are revealed make us once again amazed at the courage of the soldiers who won in this hell.

The group of the “defense genius” Model began an offensive in the north of the Kursk salient. Natural conditions limited the space for maneuver. The only possible place for the Germans to appear was a front section 90 km wide. The Red Army soldiers under the command of Konev wisely used this advantage. The Ponyri railway station became a “bag of fire” into which the advanced units of the fascist troops fell.

Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of “flirting guns”. When enemy tanks appeared, they began to fire directly, thereby drawing fire onto themselves. The Germans rushed towards them at full speed to destroy them, and came under fire from other camouflaged Soviet anti-tank guns. The side armor of tanks is not as massive as the frontal armor. At a distance of 200-300 meters, Soviet guns could completely destroy armored vehicles. At the end of the 5th day, Model's attack in the north of the salient fizzled out.

The southern direction, under the command of one of the best commanders of the twentieth century, Heinrich von Manstein, had a greater chance of success. Here the space for maneuver was not limited by anything. To this we must add high training and professionalism. 2 of the 3 lines of Soviet troops were broken through. From the operational report for July 10, 1943, it followed that the retreating Soviet units were closely pursued by German troops. For this reason, there was no way to block the road leading from Teterevino to Ivanovsky settlement with anti-tank mines.

Battle of Prokhorovka

To cool down the ardor of the presumptuous Manstein, the reserves of the Steppe Front were urgently activated. But by this time only a miracle did not allow the Germans to break through the 3rd line of defense near Prokhorovka. They were greatly hampered by the threat from the flank. Being cautious, they waited for the SS Totenkopf fighters to cross to the other side and destroy the artillerymen.

At this moment, Rotmistrov’s tanks, which had been promptly warned by German aviation when approaching Prokhorovka, were assessing the future battlefield. They had to advance in a narrow corridor between the Psel River and the railway track. The task was complicated by an impassable ravine, and in order to go around it, it was necessary to line up behind each other. This made them a convenient target.

Going to certain death, they stopped the German breakthrough at the cost of incredible efforts and colossal sacrifices. Prokhorovka and its significance in the Battle of Kursk are assessed as the culmination of this general battle, after which large-scale attacks of such magnitude were not undertaken by the Germans.

Ghost of Stalingrad

The result of Operation Kutuzov, which began with an offensive to the rear of Model’s group, was the liberation of Belgorod and Orel. This good news was marked by the roar of guns in Moscow, saluting in honor of the winners. And already on August 22, 1943, Manstein, violating Hitler’s hysterical order to hold Kharkov, left the city. Thus, he completed a series of battles for the rebellious Kursk ledge.

If we talk briefly about the significance of the Battle of Kursk, then we can recall the words of the German commander Guderian. In his memoirs, he said that with the failure of Operation Citadel on the Eastern Front, the calm days disappeared. And one cannot but agree with him on this.

REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMAN TROOPS IN THE KURSK DIRECTION IN THE MEMOIRS OF THE COMMANDERS

Relevance of the topic. The Battle of Kursk, in the definition of Russian historiography, is a “radical turning point” during the Great Patriotic War. Unfortunately, at present, consideration of the Battle of Kursk comes down to dismissing the fact of a fierce battle and a difficult victory of Soviet troops over the troops of Nazi Germany.

The relevance of the research topic is due to the fact that in educational literature, when revealing the reasons for the victory of Soviet troops in the Kursk salient, the numerical superiority of the Red Army troops is highlighted as the main one. In the memoirs of the German commanders, a number of other facts are clearly visible that influenced the outcome of the battle.

This work makes an attempt to illuminate the reasons for Germany's defeat from the point of view of the German command.

Goal of the work: based on an analysis of the memoirs of German commanders, consider the reasons for the defeat of German troops at the Kursk Bulge.

To achieve this goal, it is expected to solve the following tasks:

1. 1. 1. To highlight the point of view of German military commanders on the readiness of Wehrmacht troops for the Battle of Kursk;

         Analyze the reasons for the victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk from the point of view of the German command;

Methodological basis of the study. The study used a set of scientific principles of historicism, objectivity, systematicity, and comprehensiveness, which presuppose an unbiased approach to the analysis of the problems being studied, a critical attitude to sources, and making judgments based on a comprehensive understanding of the entire set of facts. Among the specific historical methods, the historical-genetic method was used to analyze the views of representatives of the German command of the period under review.

Source base represent 2 groups of works: the first group includes the works of representatives of the German command staff and the works of historians in which the memories of Wehrmacht officers are given; the second group includes memories of the command staff of the Soviet troops.

I. The reasons for the defeat of German troops in the Kursk direction in the memoirs of German commanders.

The first, most mentioned reason that influenced the result of the Battle of Kursk is “the colossal numerical superiority of the enemy (Soviet troops - A.G.).” Liddell also declares the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, saying that “now they (the Russians - A.G.) had sufficient resources to maintain the required pace, and the Germans, after their last adventure, on the contrary, wasted their strength mediocrely...”.

This is the most common “justification” for the defeat of German troops. But the numerical superiority of the USSR was achieved only thanks to the mistake of the German command, “which lacked a correct and deep assessment of the situation and unity in plans and methods of upcoming actions.” Manstein proposed two options that were opposite to each other, one of which suggested “strike at the beginning of May,” Hitler agreed with this plan, but postponed the attack, “the delay lasted until July, and it was mainly the Russians who benefited from it.” Liddell comes to the same conclusion: “Model missed his chance by convincing Hitler to delay the start of the offensive in order to bring in more tanks. The delay gave the Russians time to prepare, which they probably would not have had enough otherwise.” But if Liddell shifts the blame for the incomplete offensive to Field Marshal Model, then Kurt von Tippelskirch considers the Fuhrer to be the main culprit for the non-offensive: “Hitler constantly postponed the dates of this long-prepared offensive, despite the opinion of the military leaders that it should either be launched in the near future, or refuse to carry it out altogether. ...Hitler wanted to use a large number of Panther tanks in this operation...” In addition, according to Tippelskirch, “Hitler could not free himself from his old desire to constantly downplay the strength of the Russians...”.

Thus, another reason, in addition to the numerical superiority of Soviet forces, is the mistakes of the German command.

From the above it is clear that the Fuhrer placed the main emphasis in the offensive on technical power, and in particular on the new Panther tanks, but as Guderian claims, “the Panther tank, which the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (as well as A. Hitler - A.G.) had high hopes, many shortcomings inherent in each new design were discovered." Such a circumstance, although it could not radically influence the outcome of the battle, one way or another it may be another reason for the failure of the German offensive. Further, Guderian points to another possible reason for the failures: “The Eastern Front took all the forces from France and weakened the occupation units there (on the Eastern Front - A.G.) so much that they needed replenishment... It was necessary to teach people how to use technology. ..to acquaint with the experience of conducting combat operations on the Eastern Front."

Thus, we come to the conclusion that the German side was in many ways not ready to conduct offensive operations, which was naturally associated with an overestimation of its own capabilities.

But there is another reason. Lieutenant General Kurt Ditmar speaks of the highest moral qualities of Russian soldiers: “if Russians participate in hostilities, the fight becomes difficult, ruthless and uncompromising. If the Russians defend themselves, they are almost impossible to defeat, even if rivers of blood are shed.” Dietmar further adds: “By special order from Hitler, an attempt was made to instill the Russian mentality in our army. We tried to copy their mentality, and they (and obviously more successfully) our tactics.” Another German officer, Gunter Blumentritt, touches on issues no less important than morale - "the Russians, in a completely incomprehensible way, know how to get by without normal supplies." A more “vivid” description of the Russian hero is given by Panzer General Hasso-Eckart von Monteifel, who describes his impressions as follows: “Western people will never be able to imagine what the offensive of the Russian army is like. The tank vanguard is followed by a real horde on horseback. the soldier has a bag of breadcrumbs and raw vegetables on his back... They cannot be stopped, like any other army of a civilized country, by being cut off from their supply train, since there is often no supply.”

Thus, we can talk about the greatest heroism and unprecedented “Spartan” endurance of the Russian soldier, which manifested itself not only in the “Belgorod meat grinder”, but throughout all the battles and probably decided the outcome of the entire long and bloody war.

As a result, we come to the conclusion that the victory of the Soviet troops in the Kursk direction is based on a number of reasons that the German commanders themselves highlight - the first reason is the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, which E. Manstein and B.G. mention in their writings. Liddell Hart. The second reason, pointed out by E. Manstein and K. von Tippelskirch, is the numerous mistakes of the German command, and as a consequence of these mistakes, the numerical superiority of the Red Army. G. Guderian in his essay points out the unpreparedness of German troops to conduct a company in the Kursk direction, which is the third reason. But the most important reason for the German defeat, according to K. Ditmar, G. Blumentritt and H.S. von Monteifel, became a Russian soldier, with his unsurpassed moral and indestructible physical qualities, who, despite any difficulties and without sparing himself, went forward to defend his Motherland.

II. The reasons for the defeat of German troops in the Kursk direction in the memoirs of the Soviet command staff.

In the works of the German command staff, the superior numerical power of the Soviet troops was highlighted as one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Kursk salient.

A.M. mentions in his work the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the problems in recruiting the German army. Vasilevsky saying that: “The main problem for the fascist command was to make up for losses in people and weapons and create appropriate offensive groups. The total mobilization that began in January 1943 was vigorously carried out with the conscription of even 50-year-olds into the army. Nevertheless, the mobilization greatly increased battered troops on the Eastern Front, whose numbers had been increased to 4.8 million by the summer of 1943.”[A.M. Vasilevsky]. It was already mentioned above that the Eastern Front required the transfer of German military units from the Western Front, in particular from France. Alexander Mikhailovich makes the following conclusion: “Despite the measures taken and the possibility of transferring divisions from the West, where there was still no second front, the enemy was unable to make up for all its losses and bring the number of troops on the Eastern Front to the level of the autumn of 1942...” [ A.M. Vasilevsky]

The numerical superiority of the Soviet troops is indicated by Major General Zamyatin N.M., Colonel Boldyrev P.S., Colonel Vorobiev F.D., Lieutenant Colonels Artemyev N.F. and Parotkin I.V. in his work “The Battle of Kursk. A short essay. From the experience of the battles of the Patriotic War”: “... the Germans, who did not have the necessary amount of free reserves and were afraid of getting involved in a protracted, expensive battle, placed their main emphasis on a quick, lightning-fast breakthrough of our defense with powerful attacks from tank rams..." [Major General Zamyatin N.M.].

Zhukov G.K. mentions the significantly increased power of tank and mechanized corps and aviation: “In terms of the number of aviation, our Air Force already surpassed the German air force. Each front had its own air army of 700-800 aircraft” [Zhukov G.K.]

Thus, the numerical superiority of the USSR on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, in the opinion of domestic commanders, is one of the determining factors for victory in the battle.

There is no doubt that the success of most operations is the fruit not only of the heroism of the Soviet soldier, but also of the talent of domestic commanders. German commanders mention the mistakes their leadership made. In the memoirs of the Soviet generals, there is also a mention of the mistakes of German commanders, such as A.M. Vasilevskikh says the following about the miscalculations of the German command: “Having concentrated such powerful forces, the enemy was confident in the success of the offensive. However, this time the enemy overestimated the offensive capabilities of his army and underestimated the immeasurably increased combat power of the Red Army...” [A.M. Vasilevskikh]. K.K. also makes similar very laconic remarks about the German leadership. Rokossovsky "The German command, apparently, was counting on repeating an attack similar to the one it launched in the summer of 1942 from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh. However, the enemy cruelly miscalculated..." [K.K. Rokossovsky].

Paying virtually no attention to the mistakes of the German side, Soviet military leaders in their memoirs talk about the “correct” decision-making by Headquarters, which, naturally, means Comrade. I.V. Stalin. Positive reviews abound about Headquarters and the Memories party by G.K. Zhukov, and in a variety of variations: “Preparing the Red Army for the summer campaign, the Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee, Headquarters and the General Staff launched colossal work in the spring of 1943. The Party mobilized the country for the decisive defeat of the enemy” [Zhukov G.K.] “The Communist Party, as always, paid a lot of attention to raising the level of party political work in the army.” [Zhukov G.K.] "Political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations directed all their efforts to increase the moral qualities and political consciousness of military personnel." [Zhukov G.K.] Against this background, his subsequent fate as a repressed marshal becomes especially surprising.

They are more restrained in their “praises” of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief K.K. Rokossovsky and N.A. Antipenko: “The Soviet command managed to timely unravel the enemy’s plans, the estimated directions of his main attacks, and even the timing of the offensive.” [Rokossovsky K.K.] “The enemy’s plan was timely understood by our Headquarters” [Antipenko N.A.]

It should also be noted that the memoirs of Soviet commanders are practically devoid of criticism of Headquarters. The only one who mentions mistakes at the initial stage of preparation is K.K. Rokossovsky "The headquarters made a gross miscalculation, overestimating its capabilities and underestimating the capabilities of the enemy." [ K.K. Rokossovsky]. But in the future he also seeks to smooth out such criticism with positive reviews.

But only thanks to competent leadership did the Soviet troops manage to create a deeply layered defense in the Kursk direction. According to Rokossovsky K.K.: “the front command already at the end of March, in its orders and directives, gave the troops specific instructions on the equipment of defensive lines.” - and further - “In three months, the front troops equipped six main defensive lines.” Such statements allow us to draw a conclusion about the high professionalism of the command and, apparently, the fruitful work of Soviet intelligence, since, as is known from German memoirs, the German command initially planned an attack for May.

A.M. Vasilevsky states the following: “No matter how much the enemy tried to keep his offensive plans secret, no matter how hard he tried to divert the attention of Soviet intelligence from the areas where his strike forces were concentrated, our intelligence managed to determine not only the general plan of the enemy for the summer period of 1943, the direction of attacks, the composition of strike forces groups and reserves, but also to establish the time of the start of the fascist offensive."[A.M. Vasilevsky].

Not a single army in the world will be able to conduct combat operations without weapons, ammunition, equipment and food. The task of our Headquarters at this stage was not only to lead the troops, but also to organize the provision of the army with everything necessary for the successful conduct of military operations.

The Soviet rear during the Great Patriotic War in general and the Battle of Kursk in particular played a huge role. In their memoirs, domestic commanders repeatedly mention the quality of his work. Assessing the work of the rear of his front on the Kursk Bulge, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky writes: “We must pay tribute to the rear of the front... who managed to organize the delivery of goods in a short time, using all means for this: automobile, horse-drawn and even water transport.” [Rokossovsky K.K.]

In his "Memoirs" G.K. Zhukov says the following: “Truly titanic work was done by the rear of the fronts, armies and formations... who, with their labor, their creative initiative, helped the troops and command of all levels to fight the enemy, defeat him and end the war with a world-historical victory.” [Zhukov G. TO.]

Thus, numerical superiority and correct leadership are the main reasons for the victory of the Soviet troops on the Arc of Fire, which runs as a red line in all the memoirs of the Soviet command staff.

But not only competent leadership brought the victory of the USSR closer; in the memoirs of German commanders there are references to the highest combat and moral qualities of the Russian soldier. Domestic military commanders also speak about the heroism of Soviet soldiers. In particular, A.M. Vasilevsky writes: “The Soviet Armed Forces became stronger organizationally. Their combat skills increased. The morale of the soldiers increased. - and further - The entire period of defensive battles, as well as the offensive operations that followed, was replete with examples of mass heroism and combat skill of our glorious warriors.” [ A.M. Vasilevsky]

The Soviet people fought for their homeland not only in the regularly active army, they brought victory by working for days at the machine; partisan detachments are a separate point in this fight, according to K.K. Rokossovsky "...we maintained constant contact with the partisan headquarters. From there we received information about the movements of enemy troops. Our aerial reconnaissance observations were double-checked and supplemented by the partisans." [K.K. Rokossovsky]. Zhukov G.K. mentions the Contribution of the partisans to the victory in the Kursk direction: “... the power of our strikes against the enemy was significantly enhanced by the actions of the partisans... the interaction between the partisans and the regular army was strengthened, which they assisted in obtaining information about the enemy, smashing him reserves, cutting communications, disrupting the transfer of troops and weapons... The influence of the partisans on the morale of the enemy troops was of great importance.” [Zhukov G.K.]

As a result, from the memoirs of Russian commanders we received a number of reasons that influenced the outcome of the battle of Kursk and which ultimately turned out to be a radical turning point in the entire Great Patriotic War. Firstly, the numerical superiority of the Soviet “fighting machine”, which, secondly, became possible to achieve only thanks to the competent leadership of the rear on the part of Headquarters. In addition, thanks to intelligence, the Soviet leadership managed to create a wide network of defensive fortifications, which was another reason for the victory at this stage. Fourthly, the highest fighting qualities of the Russian soldier and the successful actions of partisan detachments.

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Guderian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999.// http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/index.html

Dietmar K. Protracted blitzkrieg. Why Germany lost the war. - M.: Yauza-Press, 2008. // http://www.e-reading-lib.org/bookreader.php/1002613/Zatyanuvshiysya_blickrig_Pochemu_Germaniya_proigrala_voynu.html

Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. IN 2 T . - M .: Olma ‐ Press , 2002.// http://www.modernlib.ru/books/zhukov_georgiy/vospominaniya_i_razmishleniya_tom_1/read/

Liddell Hart B.G. The Second World War. - M.: AST, St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 1999 // http://militera.lib.ru/h/liddel-hart/index.html

Manstein E. Lost victories. - M.: ACT; St. Petersburg Terra Fantastica, 1999. - P.540 - (Military History Library).//publicist .n 1.by /conspects / conspect _manstein .html ; Liddell Hart B.G. The Second World War. - M.: AST, St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 1999.// militera .lib .ru /h /liddel -hart /28.html

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The Battle of Kursk is a turning point during the entire Second World War, when the Soviet Troops inflicted such damage on Germany and its satellites, from which they could no longer recover and lost the strategic initiative until the end of the war. Although many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of fighting remained before the defeat of the enemy, after this battle, confidence in victory over the enemy appeared in the hearts of every Soviet citizen, private and general. In addition, the battle on the Oryol-Kursk ledge became an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and the brilliant genius of Russian commanders.

The radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad, when a large enemy group was eliminated during Operation Uranus. The battle on the Kursk salient was the final stage of a radical change. After the defeat at Kursk and Orel, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After the failure, German troops were mainly on the defensive until the end of the war, while ours mainly conducted offensive operations, liberating Europe from the Nazis.

On June 5, 1943, German troops went on the offensive in two directions: on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge. Thus began Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk itself. After the offensive onslaught of the Germans subsided, and its divisions were significantly drained of blood, the USSR command carried out a counter-offensive against the troops of Army Groups “Center” and “South”. On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was liberated, marking the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.

Background of the battle

After the victory at Stalingrad during the successful Operation Uranus, Soviet troops managed to carry out a good offensive along the entire front and push the enemy many miles to the West. But after the counter-offensive of German troops, a protrusion arose in the area of ​​Kursk and Orel, which was directed towards the West, up to 200 kilometers wide and up to 150 kilometers deep, formed by the Soviet group.

From April to June, relative calm reigned on the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany would try to take revenge. The most suitable place was considered to be the Kursk ledge, by striking at it in the direction of Orel and Kursk from the North and South, respectively, it was possible to create a cauldron on a larger scale than near Kiev and Kharkov at the beginning of the war.

Back on April 8, 1943, Marshal G.K. Zhukov. sent his report on the spring-summer military campaign, where he outlined his thoughts on Germany’s actions on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk Bulge would become the site of the enemy’s main attack. At the same time, Zhukov expressed his plan for countermeasures, which included wearing out the enemy in defensive battles, and then launching a counterattack and completely destroying him. Already on April 12, Stalin listened to General Antonov A.I., Marshal Zhukov G.K. and Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.

Representatives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters unanimously spoke out for the impossibility and futility of launching a preventive strike in the spring and summer. After all, based on the experience of past years, an offensive against large enemy groups preparing to strike does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of friendly troops. Also, the formation of forces to deliver the main attack was supposed to weaken the groupings of Soviet troops in the directions of the main attack of the Germans, which would also inevitably lead to defeat. Therefore, a decision was made to conduct a defensive operation in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, where the main attack of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the Headquarters hoped to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. This was facilitated by the creation of a powerful defensive system in this direction, in contrast to the first two years of the war.

In the spring of 1943, the word “Citadel” appeared more and more often in intercepted radio data. On April 12, intelligence put a plan code-named “Citadel” on Stalin’s desk, which was developed by the Wehrmacht General Staff, but had not yet been signed by Hitler. This plan confirmed that Germany was preparing the main attack where the Soviet command expected it. Three days later, Hitler signed the operation plan.

In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create a defense in depth in the direction of the predicted strike and create a powerful group capable of withstanding the pressure of German units and carrying out counterattacks at the climax of the battle.

Army composition, commanders

It was planned to attract forces to strike Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk-Oryol bulge Army Group Center, which was commanded Field Marshal Kluge And Army Group South, which was commanded Field Marshal Manstein.

The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank divisions, 8 assault gun divisions, 2 tank brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the considered elite SS tank divisions “Das Reich”, “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” were pulled up for a strike in the direction of Kursk.

Thus, the group consisted of 900 thousand personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2 thousand aircraft that were part of two Luftwaffe air fleets.

One of the key trump cards in the hands of Germany was to be the use of heavy Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand assault guns. It was precisely because the new tanks did not have time to reach the front and were in the process of being finalized that the start of the operation was constantly postponed. Also in service with the Wehrmacht were obsolete Pz.Kpfw tanks. I, Pz.Kpfw. I I, Pz.Kpfw. I I I, having undergone some modification.

The main blow was to be delivered by the 2nd and 9th Armies, the 9th Tank Army of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Model, as well as Task Force Kempf, the tank 4th Army and the 24th Corps of the group armies "South", which were entrusted to command by General Hoth.

In defensive battles, the USSR involved three fronts: Voronezh, Stepnoy, and Central.

The Central Front was commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky. The task of the front was to defend the northern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front, the command of which was entrusted to Army General N.F. Vatutin, had to defend the southern front. Colonel General I.S. Konev was appointed commander of the Steppe Front, the USSR reserve during the battle. In total, about 1.3 million people, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 20,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft were involved in the Kursk salient area. Data may differ from some sources.

Weapons (tanks)

During the preparation of the Citadel plan, the German command did not look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht troops during the operation on the Kursk Bulge was to be carried out by tanks: light, heavy and medium. To strengthen the strike forces before the start of the operation, several hundred of the latest Panther and Tiger tanks were delivered to the front.

Medium tank "Panther" was developed by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to the German classification it was considered severe. For the first time he took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. After the battles in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, it began to be actively used by the Wehrmacht in other directions. It is considered the best German tank in World War II, even despite a number of shortcomings.

"Tiger I"- heavy tanks of the German armed forces during the Second World War. At long combat distances it was invulnerable to fire from Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the German treasury spent 1 million Reichsmarks on the creation of one combat unit.

Panzerkampfwagen III until 1943 it was the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht. Captured combat units were used by Soviet troops, and self-propelled guns were created on their basis.

Panzerkampfwagen II produced from 1934 to 1943. Since 1938, it has been used in armed conflicts, but it turned out to be weaker than similar types of equipment from the enemy, not only in terms of armor, but even in terms of weapons. In 1942, it was completely withdrawn from the Wehrmacht tank units, however, it remained in service and was used by assault groups.

The light tank Panzerkampfwagen I - the brainchild of Krupp and Daimler Benz, discontinued in 1937, was produced in the amount of 1,574 units.

In the Soviet army, the most massive tank of the Second World War had to withstand the onslaught of the German armored armada. Medium tank T-34 had many modifications, one of which, the T-34-85, is in service with some countries to this day.

Progress of the battle

There was a calm on the fronts. Stalin had doubts about the accuracy of the calculations of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters. Also, the thought of competent disinformation did not leave him until the last moment. However, at 23.20 on July 4 and 02.20 on July 5, the artillery of two Soviet fronts launched a massive attack on the supposed enemy positions. In addition, bombers and attack aircraft of two air armies carried out an air raid on enemy positions in the area of ​​​​Kharkov and Belgorod. However, this did not bring much results. According to German reports, only communication lines were damaged. Losses in manpower and equipment were not serious.

Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful artillery barrage, significant Wehrmacht forces went on the offensive. However, unexpectedly they received a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers and minefields with a high frequency of mining. Due to significant damage to communications, the Germans were unable to achieve clear interaction between units, which led to disagreements in actions: the infantry was often left without tank support. On the northern front, the attack was aimed at Olkhovatka. After minor success and serious losses, the Germans launched an attack on Ponyri. But even there it was not possible to break into the Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in service.

* After the Germans went on the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and said with joy in his voice that the offensive had begun. Perplexed, Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Battle of Kursk will not go anywhere.

The 4th Panzer Corps, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Kempf Army Group, which were part of the 4th Army, were tasked with defeating the Russians in the South. Here events unfolded more successfully than in the North, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th Tank Corps suffered heavy losses in the attack on Cherkassk, without moving significantly forward.

The defense of Cherkassy is one of the brightest pages of the Battle of Kursk, which for some reason is practically not remembered. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was more successful. He was given the task of reaching the Prokhorovka area, where, on an advantageous terrain in a tactical battle, he would give battle to the Soviet reserve. Thanks to the presence of companies consisting of heavy Tigers, the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions managed to quickly make a hole in the defenses of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive lines and sent the 5th Stalingrad Tank Corps to carry out this task. In fact, Soviet tank crews received orders to occupy a line already captured by the Germans, but threats of court martial and execution forced them to go on the offensive. Having struck Das Reich head-on, the 5th Stk failed and was driven back. The Das Reich tanks went on the attack, trying to encircle the corps forces. They partially succeeded, but thanks to the commanders of the units who found themselves outside the ring, communications were not cut. However, during these battles, Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is undeniably the largest loss of Soviet troops in a single day. Thus, already on July 6, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, after mutual artillery barrage and massive airstrikes, 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rotmistrov and 700 tanks from the 2nd SS Tank Corps collided in a counter battle. The battle lasted all day. The initiative passed from hand to hand. The opponents suffered colossal losses. The entire battlefield was covered with thick smoke from fires. However, victory remained with us; the enemy was forced to retreat.

On this day, on the Northern front, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The very next day, the German defenses were broken through, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to liberate Oryol. The Oryol operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, was called “Kutuzov” in the plans of the General Staff.

Operation Rumyantsev was supposed to defeat German forces in the area of ​​​​Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front launched an offensive. By August 5, Belgorod was liberated. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated by Soviet troops on the third attempt, which marked the end of Operation Rumyantsev and with it the Battle of Kursk.

* On August 5, the first fireworks display during the entire War was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the Nazi invaders.

Losses of the parties

Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Battle of Kursk are not precisely known. To date, the data differ radically. In 1943, the Germans lost more than 500 thousand people killed and wounded in the battle of the Kursk salient. 1000-1500 enemy tanks were destroyed by Soviet soldiers. And Soviet aces and air defense forces destroyed 1,696 aircraft.

As for the USSR, irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned and out of action due to technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the skies over Kursk and Orel.

Results, significance

Guderian and Manstein in their memoirs say that the Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the War on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops inflicted major losses on the Germans, who lost their strategic advantage forever. In addition, the armored power of the Nazis could no longer be restored to its previous scale. The days of Hitler's Germany were numbered. The victory at the Kursk Bulge became an excellent help for raising the morale of soldiers on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.

Russian Military Glory Day

The day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is a day of remembrance of all those who, in July-August 1943, during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations of “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” on the Kursk ledge, managed to break the back of a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale celebrations are expected in 2013 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Arc of Fire.

Video about the Kursk Bulge, key moments of the battle, we definitely recommend watching:

The Battle of Kursk (July 5-August 23, 1943) is a historical event that is often given ambiguous characteristics. There is an opinion that only at the cost of huge losses did the Soviet army manage to stop the enemy. However, this is a simplified view. The turning point at the Kursk Bulge became possible due to a number of factors.

Decisive moment

For the German government, the offensive Operation Citadel was of extreme importance. Total mobilization was carried out throughout the country; a huge amount of manpower and equipment was pulled into the area of ​​the operation.

The High Command meticulously developed a plan of action for the troops: the movement of each unit was literally planned hourly and square meters. Only the offensive! The operation did not provide any other options. By order of Hitler, it was necessary to defeat the main forces of the Red Army and quickly deal with its scattered and demoralized remnants.

In the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions, about 900 thousand soldiers. Technical support was also powerful: three tank divisions (2,758 tanks), about 10 thousand self-propelled artillery units (SPG) and 2,050 aircraft. In addition, about 10 thousand anti-tank guns and mortars were delivered to the Kursk area.

The Soviet army was numerically superior to the Germans in all types of weapons and in terms of human resources. At eight defensive lines there were at least 1 million 300 thousand soldiers (about 600 thousand in reserve), 3444 tanks, 19 thousand guns and mortars, 2172 aircraft. However, the General Staff was well aware that the technical equipment of the army was outdated, which practically negated the numerical superiority. The ultimate success in the battle depended on whether it would be possible to “cut off” the tank pincers of the German army, which was advancing from two sides.

They didn’t lose, but retreated

German General Erich von Manstein never ceased to boast that the Wehrmacht under his command destroyed 1,800 Soviet tanks, while German losses were several times less. German historians went even further, calculating that the German army left no more than 10% of its personnel on the fields of the Kursk Bulge, and irrecoverable losses in tanks and self-propelled guns did not exceed 300 units.

A reasonable question arises: why, in this situation, did the Wehrmacht not only not surround the Soviet troops, but also take flight? German historiography has an answer to this. Recently, the German magazine Welt published an article that “irrefutably proved” that the Wehrmacht won at Kursk, since the losses of personnel and equipment of the Red Army were several times greater. And if not for the Allied landing in Sicily, which forced Hitler to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front, Germany would have completely defeated the Russians.

Likewise, Manstein, one of the main characters in the Battle of Kursk, while admitting defeat, nevertheless emphasized in his justification that the Russians managed to crush the German army only thanks to their mass and at the cost of monstrous losses.

Intelligence service

No matter how much the Germans overestimated their achievements, the Soviet leadership approached the events on the Kursk Bulge fully armed. Since the beginning of 1943, our intelligence regularly reported on the upcoming Operation Citadel and, in general terms, revealed Hitler’s plans. On April 12, Stalin was familiarized with the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel,” which Hitler signed only three days later.

There are several versions regarding the sources of information. One of them is called John Cairncross, an English codebreaker, a member of the “Cambridge Five” who collaborated with Soviet intelligence.

Former intelligence officer Lieutenant General Vadim Kirpichenko writes that “John Cairncross at the end of April, more than two months before the start of the Battle of Kursk, transmitted information to Moscow that the German offensive would begin in early July. This was the decipherment of a telegram to Berlin from German Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, who was preparing a German offensive south of Kursk, in the Belgorod region.”

According to Kirpichenko, the telegram indicated exactly what forces the Germans would use in the offensive, which units would move from Orel and which from Belgorod, and what equipment would be deployed. The location of German field airfields was also reflected there.

In his memoirs, Georgy Zhukov claimed that he predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge as early as April 8, relying on intelligence data.

Defense in depth

On the eve of the German offensive operation, Soviet troops created a powerful defense system in depth in the Kursk direction. The command decided to conduct a defensive battle with counterattacks against enemy forces at critical moments.

The sappers had to work hard to mine almost the entire front-line zone. The reports stated that the average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

Tanks

Without a doubt, tanks played one of the decisive roles in the Battle of Kursk. Soviet losses in equipment are recognized as greater than German ones, however, German military leaders, unlike historians, cite impressive figures for their own losses. Thus, according to General Walter Wenck, by July 7, 1943, the German 3rd Panzer Division alone had lost over 67% of its tanks. Total losses in various military units reached 70-80%. It was for these reasons, according to reports from the German command, that the Wehrmacht was forced to slow down its advance.

After the defeat at the Kursk Bulge, where tanks from the Ural factories and the German concern Krupp collided, the head of the German company, Alfred Krupp, was called to headquarters. Hitler shouted in rage: “Your tanks are worse than the Russians, we lost the battle of Kursk because of you! You are the main culprit of our failures!”

The Fuhrer was wrong. Ruhr steel was not inferior in quality to Ural steel, and in some ways it was better. Moreover, even in the third year of the war, German tank forces were superior to the Soviet ones in their tactical and technical training. A particularly noticeable advantage was expected with the release of the Tigers and Panthers.

But in reality everything turned out differently. 144 Tigers (or 7.6% of the total number of German tanks) took part in the battles near Kursk, but in a month and a half of fighting the Germans irretrievably lost 73 such vehicles. Soviet tank crews found holes in the seemingly invulnerable latest technology. In addition, they made full use of the speed and maneuverability of the T-34, and also used ambush tactics, which neutralized the qualitative superiority of the German tank forces.

In the largest tank battle in history - the Battle of Prokhorovka - about 5 thousand units of equipment were involved on both sides. The Germans' losses, according to Soviet data, amounted to 80 tanks, ours - up to 180 vehicles. No one managed to win a clear victory at Prokhorovka. But the Soviet tankers were able to stop the enemy, albeit at the cost of great blood. This made it possible for the Soviet command to strengthen its positions, raise reserves and prepare for an offensive.

Aviation

Historians cite the inability of the Luftwaffe to gain air supremacy as another important reason why the German attack failed. During the defensive operation, Soviet pilots destroyed about 1.5 thousand German aircraft, while they themselves lost about 460 aircraft.

In air battles over the Kursk Bulge, the enemy experienced the full power of Soviet attack and bomber aircraft for almost the first time since the beginning of the war. The air barrier turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle for German aircraft, not only because of the quantitative superiority of equipment, but also due to the dedication that Soviet pilots demonstrated in every combat sortie.

Tactics

The success of the defensive operation near Kursk was due to the fact that the Soviet command had an idea of ​​the Wehrmacht’s plans and was able to accurately determine the time and place of the enemy’s main attacks. The General Staff concentrated its main forces in the areas of proposed military operations, which made it possible not only to successfully defend itself, but also to conduct a counter-offensive as necessary. The Battle of Kursk can be called one of the most successful defensive operations during the Great Patriotic War.

The defensive lines, designed primarily to repel massive tank attacks, were unparalleled in depth, engineering equipment of positions and zones, and density of forces and assets. The German attack literally got bogged down in the echeloned redoubts built along its path.

Not succumbing to the temptation to go on the offensive earlier than the situation required, the Soviet command waited until the extreme point when the defense had already begun to crack. And instead of sending reinforcements to the defensive lines, the General Staff, unexpectedly for the German military, organized two offensive operations (“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”), which resulted in a breakthrough of the front and the final defeat of the enemy.

Predetermined outcome

Despite the fact that the Battle of Kursk is recognized as a turning point in both the Great Patriotic War and World War II, many historians say that Germany’s defeat was a foregone conclusion earlier - near Moscow and Stalingrad. This point of view is also expressed by some German researchers.

For example, the publicist Berthold Seewald writes that “The Battle of Kursk confirmed what had long determined the course of hostilities: the Third Reich could no longer oppose Soviet productivity. In essence, nothing has changed either since the defeat near Moscow or since the Battle of Stalingrad.”

Historian Karl-Heinz Friser, recognized as the best German expert on the analysis of Operation Citadel, came to the following conclusion: “Although from an objective point of view the failure of the German army was obvious for a long time, now it became clear to ordinary infantrymen in the trenches at the forefront that the war can't win anymore. In this regard, Kursk can still be considered as a kind of milestone, after which the perception of defeat acquired a different character.”