Where did the Muslim battalions of the USSR GRU fight? Places and times of deployment of special forces (1981–1989) Formation of separate special forces for entry into the territory of Afghanistan

Directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces 314/2/0061 of 04/26/1979 served as the basis for the order of the commander of the TURKVO troops 21/4/00755 of 05/04/1979 on the formation of a separate special forces detachment of 538 people in the staff of 15 OBRSPN. Which went down in the history of our Fatherland as the “Muslim Battalion”. Colonels V.V. Kolesnik, O.U. Shvets, N.N. Lavrenev were involved in its formation. and Blokhin A.P., as well as the head of intelligence of TURKVO, Colonel Dunets V.V. In order to maintain secrecy, it was decided to resettle the detachment from the brigade’s military camp, by economically repairing the abandoned camp of the engineering battalion. The commander of the 2nd detachment of the 15th OBRSpN, Major I.Yu. Stoderevsky, who was assigned to supervise the construction of the town, received under his command a company of military builders, several dozen civilian builders from all the KECH of the district, two hundred personnel from the brigade as auxiliary workers. In 2 months, the renovation of the town was completed. The recruitment of a new battalion began at a rapid pace, exclusively from individuals of Central Asian nationalities. Personnel arrived from all districts. Mainly from airborne divisions and to a lesser extent from motorized rifle units.

Command staff of the 154 Special Forces Special Forces of the first formation

Major Kholbaev Khabib Tadzhibaevich, born in 1947, was appointed commander of the detachment. Graduate of Tashkent Higher Educational Institution named after. Lenin. Since 1969, he served in the 15th OBRSpN as a group commander, SPN company commander, and deputy commander of the SPN detachment for airborne forces. Captains Sakhatov M.T. (deputy), Ashurov A.M. (chief of staff), Sattarov A.S. (political officer), Ibragimov E.N. ), Major Dzhalilov D. (deputy for logistics).

The companies were commanded by senior lieutenants: Amangeldyev K.M., Sharipov V.S., Miryusupov M.M., and Captain Kudratov I.S.. Senior Lieutenant Prouta V.M. was appointed commander of the anti-aircraft artillery group. Captain Nikonov was appointed commander of the ORNO. Deputy commander of the ZAG, ensign Neverov Yu. Separate communications and support platoons were commanded by senior lieutenant Mirsaatov Yu.M. and senior warrant officer Rakhimov A.

Combat formation of detachment units

By June 1, 1979, out of a thousand candidates submitted, the detachment was fully staffed to 532 people. In a month and a half, the detachment, completely freed from outfits, guards and extraneous work, completed a year-long combat training program. The entire detachment personnel made parachute jumps. Combat coordination of the formed units was carried out.

On July 15, the battalion underwent an inspection of combat and political training by a GRU General Staff commission. The chief of staff of TURKVO, Lieutenant General G.F. Krivosheev, was present from the district. Tactical exercises with live firing were conducted on the topics: “Capture of a mountain pass”, “Capture of a communications center”, “Capture of a separate building”, “Capture of an airfield”, “ Fight in the city."

Particular attention was paid to combat coordination at the group, company, and battalion levels. Shooting and driving tests were taken at the training grounds of general arms and tank schools. There were no limits on fuel and ammunition. The grenade launchers fired at range, for time, at noise through smoke, at minimum distances. Who is supposed to take practical tasks in mine demolition. All were tested for physical endurance during forced marches of 30 kilometers. During the entire inspection, specialist translators monitored the personnel’s assimilation of commands in Farsi and knowledge of Arabic writing. As a result, the commission assessed the results of the audit as good. There was a lull.

Soldiers began to be recruited for guard duty and for various chores. Only almost every day,” recalled detachment veteran Rashid Abdullaev, “the units, in order of priority, went to the Tuzel airfield and practiced loading armored vehicles onto airplanes. They meticulously calculated how much ammunition and material assets could be taken in the vehicles so that the planes could lift them.

Reconnaissance on the ground

By order of the head of the GRU, the detachment commander, Major Kholbaev, and the deputy commanders of the 15th brigade, Majors Gruzdev and Turbulanov, flew to Kabul to reconnoiter the presidential palace, as well as the renovated Taj Beg Palace in Duralaman, where Amin soon moved.

Telegram to the Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov

"In the period from July 11 to July 17, 1979, reconnaissance was carried out in the city of Kabul with the aim of possibly using the 15th TURKVO special forces brigade. According to the Soviet ambassador and heads of intelligence services, the greatest intensification of rebels in the periphery and the city of Kabul is expected in August. In this regard, the ambassador asks: to transfer the detachment to Kabul before August 10. The development of the implementation of transfer measures will be entrusted to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and the TURKVO commander. "

Army General Ivashutin

However, the transfer of the detachment was delayed. In mid-October, the “Muslim” battalion again began intensive combat training under the “Capture Objects” program. AKM and AKMS assault rifles, RPK machine guns and TT system pistols received from warehouses were targeted. At the end of November, another check of combat training took place, to which the authorities came from Moscow. “There were several options for transferring to Afghanistan,” said Kholbaev. “In addition to the flight, a march under our own power to Kabul was also considered.”

However, on December 4, 1979, Yu. Andropov and N. Ogarkov sent the now well-known note 312/2/0073 to the CPSU Central Committee: “Taking into account the current situation and at the request of Kh. Amin, we consider it advisable to send to Afghanistan a detachment of the GRU General headquarters with a total number of 500 people in uniforms that do not reveal their affiliation with the Armed Forces of the USSR."

First entry into Afghanistan

On the night of December 5, from the Chirchik airfield, the first group from the 3rd special forces company under the command of the deputy detachment commander, Captain M.T. Sakhatov, departed for Afghanistan on an AN-12 plane. The transfer of all battalion personnel was carried out on the night of December 9-10, from two airfields, in Chirchik and Tashkent (Tuzel), by AN-12, AN-22, and Il-76 aircraft. Each flight took 45 minutes to depart. The interval between flights was no more than two hours. The departure was carried out in three flights of seven aircraft each to Bagram airfield. To accommodate the battalion at the Bagram airbase, Captain Sakhatov’s group prepared CSS tents at the rate of one for each company and for headquarters. Subsequently, the detachment was redeployed southwest of Kabul to the Dar-ul Aman area to strengthen the security of the Taj Beg presidential palace. 12/27/1979 at 19.00 began assault on the Taj Beg Palace, the operation ended at 23.00. Quite a lot has been written about how the “Muslim battalion” stormed this palace, and those who study or are simply interested in this topic have practically no questions left.

Only one thing should be added, the losses of the personnel of the “Muslim battalion” during the fighting during the storming of the Taj Beg Palace amounted to: 7 people killed (in addition, 5 KGB officers from the operational combat groups “Grom” and “Zenith” were killed, as well as 2 soldiers from the 9th parachute company of the 345th detachment attached to the detachment (company commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Vostrotin). One soldier of the SPN detachment died on January 6, 1980, as a result of a tragic accident. During Operation "Storm 333" they were injured of varying severity 67 servicemen of the SPN detachment.On January 10, 1980, the detachment was transferred back to Chirchik.

In April 1980, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was signed on awarding 370 military personnel of the 15th Special Operations Brigade, participants in Operation Storm-333, with orders and medals of the USSR. 400 USSR KGB officers also received awards. At the end of 1981, efforts were made to increase the number of intelligence agencies. Two separate GRU special forces detachments are being introduced into Afghanistan for operations in the northern regions of the country. One of these battalions was - 154 OOSpN.

By that time, May 7, 1981, 154 OOSpN The unit's Battle Banner was awarded. The unit's holiday was determined to be April 26 (1979). Directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces 4/372 of October 21, 1981 154 OOSpN planned for introduction into the DRA on October 26, 1981.

Second deployment of 154 special forces to Afghanistan

The detachment, after reorganization, without conducting combat coordination, under the command of Major I.Yu. Stoderevsky, on the night of October 29-30, 1981, crossed the state border with Afghanistan in the Termez region.

154 OOSpN for the period of hostilities it received an open name - the 1st separate motorized rifle battalion (military unit field post 35651, call sign "Amur-35"). From October 30, 1981 to May 15, 1988 Detachment 154 took part in continuous hostilities with rebel armed forces. Destroying Mujahideen manpower through raids and ambushes, destroying enemy fortified areas (UR), front headquarters, Islamic committees, training centers, weapons and ammunition warehouses, participating in inspections of caravans and conducting aerial reconnaissance in the area of responsibility.

The most famous combat operations of the detachment, after Storm 333, were:

capture of dushman bases in Jar-Kuduk (Jawzjan province, December 1981),
capture of dushman bases in Darzab (Fariab province, January 1982),
lifting the blockade of Sancharak (Jawzjan province, April 1982).
destruction of 2 gangs in Kuli-Ishan (Samangan province, October 1982),
capture of dushman bases in the Marmol Gorge (Balkh province, March 1983). Operations in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar near Kulala, Bar-Koshmund, Bagicha, in the Goshta SD, Karera SD, Loy Termay, in the Black Mountains, near Shahidan, Mangval, Sarband, army operation "Vostok-88" and others .

Combat order of the commander 40OA 01 dated March 13, 1988. conclusion 154 OOSpN was identified by the first column from Jalalabad on May 15, 1988. 228 units of military equipment in one column completed the Jalalabad-Kabul-Puli-Khumri-Hairaton march in three days. On May 18, we crossed the state border of the USSR in the Termez region. On May 20, 1988, by rail, we completed access to the place of permanent deployment in the city of Chirchik, USSR.

The 154th separate special forces detachment was commanded by:

Major Kholbaev Khabibdzhan Tadzhibaevich from 5.1979 to 8.1981.
Major Kosteniuk Nikolai Mikhailovich from 8.1981 to 10.1981.
Major Stoderevsky Igor Yurievich from 10.1981 to 11.1983.
Major Olekseenko Vasily Ivanovich from 11.1983 to 2.1984.
Major Portnyagin Vladimir Pavlovich from 2.1984 to 11.1984.
Major Dementyev Alexey Mikhailovich from 11.1984 to 8.1985.
Major Abzalimov Ramil Karimovich from 08.1985 to 10.1986.
Major Giluch Vladislav Petrovich from 10.1986 to 11.1987.
Captain Vorobyov Vladimir Fedorovich from 11.1987 to 6.1988.
Major Kozlov Yuri Vsevolodovich from 6.1988 to 9.1990.
Major Efimenko Anatoly Nikolaevich from 9.1990 to 9.1991.
Lieutenant Colonel Svirin Valery Mikhailovich from 9.1991 to 9.1992.
Major Vorontsov Sergey Anatolyevich from 9.1992 to 12.1994.

The special forces caused significant damage to the Islamic opposition, so according to the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the special forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces destroyed 17,000 dushmans, 990 caravans and 332 warehouses, and captured 825 prisoners.

Results of reconnaissance and combat activities of the 154 Special Operations Forces as of May 1, 1983:

248 operations performed
955 rebels were killed.
452 people were captured.
566 units of small arms captured.
DShK machine guns 2 units.
Ammunition captured Ammunition - more than 100,000 pieces.
Mines - 237 pcs.
Grenades - 228 pcs.
RPG shots - 183 pcs. Electric detonators - 5200 pcs.
Detonator capsules - 8000 pcs.
Mines for 60 mm mortar - 235 pcs.
16 cavalry horses captured
12 vehicles captured. and BRDM-1
9 Islamic committees destroyed
The situation in the areas of responsibility of Jowzjan Province has been stabilized
Samangan Province
Our losses Killed - 34 people.
Missing - 1 person.

Changing the squad's deployment

June 1979 - December 1979 - Chirchik, Tashkent region, USSR;
December 1979 - January 1980 - Bagram, Kabul, Afghanistan;
February 1980 - October 1981 - Chirchik, Tashkent region, USSR;
October 1981 - July 1982 - Akcha, Jawzjan province, Afghanistan;
August 1982 - February 1984 - Aybak, Samangan province, Afghanistan;
February 1984 - May 1988 - Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan;
May 20, 1988 - May 1990 - Chirchik, Tashkent region, USSR, Uzbekistan.
June 1990-1994 - Azadbash, Bastanlyk district, Tashkent region, USSR;
December 1994 - 2000 transferred to the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan, renamed into the 28th separate reconnaissance battalion of the Armed Forces of the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan.
2000 - Disbanded.

The Soviet forces brought in to provide assistance in 1979 to “friendly” Afghanistan included one unique, well-trained special forces unit consisting exclusively of representatives of Central Asian nationalities. It was thanks to the origin of its personnel that this detachment received the name “Muslim battalion”. This battalion, unfortunately, did not last long, but managed to leave a bright mark on the history of the GRU.

The first Muslim battalion (but as history has shown, not the last), which is the 154th separate special forces detachment in the world as part of the fifteenth brigade of the Turkestan Military District, was led by Major Khabib Tadzhibaevich Khalbaev.

Initially, the unit had the following goal - to protect Nurmuhamed Taraki, the President of Afghanistan, who was trying to quickly lay the socialist foundations in his country. There were plenty of opponents to such radical changes, and therefore Taraki quite rightly feared for his life. By that time, political coups accompanied by bloodshed had become quite common in Afghanistan.

The new formation was well provided with all the necessary resources; the fighters had no restrictions or limits on funds. The detachment personnel received completely new weapons. To conduct firing training, in accordance with the Decree of the General Staff, the Turkestan Military Battalion was allocated the training grounds of two military schools: the Tashkent Combined Arms Command School and the Tank School, located in Chirchik.

Throughout July and August, the soldiers were intensively engaged in combat training. Tactical training, driving combat vehicles, and shooting were conducted daily.

The endurance of the fighters was tempered in thirty-kilometer forced marches. Thanks to extensive logistics, the personnel of the “Muslim battalion” had the opportunity to achieve a high level of training in hand-to-hand combat, shooting from all available types of weapons, as well as driving infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in extreme conditions.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, they were hastily sewing Afghan uniforms for Musbat soldiers and preparing the necessary papers. Each fighter received documents of the established type in the Afghan language. Fortunately, there was no need to come up with new names - the servicemen used their own. In Afghanistan, especially in the north of the country, many Uzbeks and Tajiks lived, and there were also Turkmens there.

Soon the battalion changed its Soviet military uniform to the uniform of the Afghan army. To make it easier to recognize each other, the squad members wrapped bandages around both hands. To make it even more realistic, the soldiers constantly trained in Afghan uniforms so that they would look worn.

When, at the end of the GRU inspection, the battalion was already preparing to be sent to Afghanistan, another coup took place in Kabul. President Taraki's closest ally, Hafizullah Amin, eliminated the previous leadership, taking over control of the country. The intensive training of the special detachment was suspended, visits from senior command personnel stopped, and life in the battalion became similar to ordinary army everyday life. But this calm did not last long; soon an order was received from Moscow to resume training. However, the purpose of learning has changed radically. Now the military personnel were no longer trained for defensive, but for assault operations against the Afghan government. This time there was no delay in sending the battalion. A list of personnel was announced, which was supposed to take off on the first flight on December 5, 1979 to prepare the camp. The rest of the battalion was to join them on 8 December.

During the flight, the servicemen of the “Muslim battalion” noticed one unusual fact: a detachment of mature military men was flying on the plane, but in soldiers’ overcoats. It was explained to the interested soldiers that a group of sappers had gone with them. Only later did it become clear that these were important bigwigs from the KGB and the GRU.

A detachment under the leadership of Uzbek Khabib Khalbaev joined the air base combat guard battalion in Bagram from the 345th separate parachute regiment, which had been stationed here since July 1979. And on December 14, another battalion of the 345th arrived.

According to the initial plan of the GRU leadership, the Muslim battalion was supposed to set out from Bagram, immediately capturing Amin’s residence, which was located in Kabul. However, at the last moment, the dictator moved to the new residence “Taj Beg”, which was a real fortress. The plans were quickly amended. The detachment was given the task of reaching Kabul on its own and appearing near the Taj Beg Palace, as if to strengthen security. On the morning of December 20, about 540 GRU special forces soldiers moved to the capital of Afghanistan.

In appearance, the detachment was very similar to an ordinary Afghan military formation, and the newly appointed President Amin was sure that the fighters had arrived to provide external security for his new residence. On the way to the palace, military personnel were stopped by patrols more than a dozen times, allowing entry only after receiving the appropriate password or permission from above. At the entrance to Kabul, the battalion was met by Afghan officers who accompanied the special detachment all the way to the presidential palace.

The first line of security for the Taj Beg was considered to be a company of personal bodyguards of Hafizullah Amin. The third was the security brigade, under the leadership of Major Jandat, Amin’s main guarantor. Our Muslim battalion was to form the second line. The palace was protected from an air strike by an anti-aircraft regiment. The total number of military personnel at the palace reached two and a half thousand people.

The GRU soldiers were placed in a separate unfinished building, located four hundred meters from the residence. The building did not even have glass on the windows; instead, the soldiers pulled blankets over them. The final stage of preparation for the operation began. Every night, our soldiers fired flares on the nearby hills, and the engines of combat vehicles were started in the pits. The commander of the Afghan guard showed dissatisfaction with such actions, but they explained to him that a planned training was underway related to the specifics of possible combat operations. Of course, everything was done in order to lull the vigilance of the guards when the detachment actually went on the assault.

Colonel Kolesnik, who drew up the operation plan, later talked about this: “I brought the plan I signed and worked out on the map to Ivanov and Magomedov (respectively the chief adviser to the KGB of the USSR and the chief military adviser to the Ministry of Defense). They approved the plan verbally, but did not want to sign. It was clear that while we were thinking about how to complete the task set by management, these cunning people were deciding how to avoid responsibility in case of failure. Then I wrote on the plan in their presence: “The plan was approved orally. They refused to sign." I set the date and time and went to my battalion...”

Participating in the operation to storm the palace from our side were: groups “Grom” and “Zenith” (24 and 30 people, respectively, commanders Major Romanov and Major Semenov), a Muslim battalion (530 people, led by Major Khalbaev), the ninth company of the 345th regiment (87 people, commander Starley Vostrotin), anti-tank platoon (27 people under the leadership of Starley Savostyanov). The operation was led by Colonel Kolesnik, and his deputy was Major General Drozdov, head of the KGB’s illegal intelligence service.

The time of the assault was postponed, as information was received that the Afghans were beginning to guess about everything. On December 26, the soldiers were allowed to make a camp bath. Everyone was given fresh linen and new vests. Khalbaev received orders to cover the KGB special forces and suppress any groups trying to break into the territory of the residence. The main task of capturing the palace was assigned to the fighters of the Zenit and Grom groups.

At about 7 o’clock in the morning on December 27, 1979, at the prearranged signal “Storm 333,” the KGB assault brigades began to climb the mountain along the only serpentine road. At this time, Khalbaev’s people captured important positions and firing points near the palace, and removed the sentries. A separate group managed to neutralize the leadership of the infantry battalion. About twenty minutes after the start of the attack, “Grom” and “Zenith” in combat vehicles, having overcome external security posts, burst into the square in front of the palace. The doors to the troop compartments opened and the soldiers poured out. Some of them managed to break into the first floor of the Taj Beg. A fierce battle began with the personal guard of the self-proclaimed president, most of whom consisted of his relatives.

Units of the Muslim battalion, together with a company of paratroopers, formed an outer ring of defense, repelling attacks by the security brigade. Two platoons of GRU special forces captured the barracks of the tank and first infantry battalions, and tanks fell into their hands. It was then discovered that the tank guns and machine guns had no breech blocks. This was the work of our military advisers, who, under the pretext of repairs, removed the mechanisms in advance.

In the palace, the Afghans fought with the tenacity of the doomed. Hurricane fire from the windows pinned the special forces to the ground, and the attack fizzled out. This was a turning point; it was urgent to raise people and lead them forward to help those who were already fighting in the palace. Under the leadership of officers Boyarinov, Karpukhin and Kozlov, the fighters rushed into the attack. At these moments, Soviet soldiers suffered the greatest losses. In an attempt to reach the windows and doors of the palace, many soldiers were wounded. Only a small group rushed inside. There was a fierce battle going on in the building itself. The special forces acted decisively and desperately. If no one came out of the premises with their hands raised, then grenades immediately flew through the broken doors. However, there were too few Soviet soldiers to eliminate Amin. In total, about two dozen people were in the palace, and many were injured. After hesitating briefly, Colonel Boyarinov ran out of the front entrance and began calling for help from the Muslim battalion. Of course, the enemy also noticed him. A stray bullet, ricocheting off the bulletproof vest, pierced the colonel's neck. Boyarinov was fifty-seven years old. Of course, he could not participate in the assault; his official position and age allowed him to direct the battle from headquarters. However, this was a real officer of the Russian army - his subordinates were going into battle, and he had to be next to them. Coordinating the actions of groups, he also acted as a simple attack aircraft.

After the fighters of the Muslim battalion came to the aid of the KGB special forces, the fate of the palace defenders was sealed. Amin's bodyguards, about one hundred and fifty soldiers and officers of the personal guard, steadfastly resisted, not wanting to surrender. Our military personnel were saved from heavy losses by the fact that the Afghans were mainly armed with German MP-5s, which did not penetrate the body armor of Soviet soldiers.

According to the story of Amin’s captured assistant, it became clear about the last moments of the dictator’s life. In the first minutes of the battle, the “master” ordered our military advisers to be notified of the attack on the palace. He shouted: “We need Russian help!” When the adjutant rightly remarked: “That’s how the Russians shoot!”, the president lost his temper, grabbed an ashtray and threw it in the face of his subordinate, yelling: “You’re lying, this can’t be!” Then he tried to call himself. But there was no connection. In the end, Amin said dejectedly: “That’s right, I suspected it...”.

When the shooting stopped and the smoke in the palace cleared, the body of Hafizullah Amin was found near the bar counter. What actually caused his death remained unclear, either our bullet or a grenade fragment. A version was also expressed that Amin was shot by his own people. At this point the operation was officially completed.

All the wounded, including Afghans, received medical care. The civilians were taken under guard to the battalion's location, and all the killed defenders of the palace were buried in one place not far from the Taj Beck. Prisoners dug graves for them. Babrak Karmal flew in specially to identify Hafizullah Amina. Soon, Kabul radio stations broadcast a message that, by decision of the military tribunal, Hafizullah Amin was sentenced to death. Later, Babrak Karmal’s taped words to the people of Afghanistan were heard. He said that “... the system of torture of Amin and his associates - executioners, murderers and usurpers of tens of thousands of my compatriots was broken...”.

During the short but fierce battle, Afghan losses amounted to about 350 people killed. Approximately 1,700 people were captured. Our soldiers lost eleven people: five paratroopers, including Colonel Boyarinov, and six soldiers of the Muslim battalion. Colonel Kuznechenkov, a military doctor who happened to be in the palace, also died. Thirty-eight people suffered injuries of varying severity. The president's two young sons were killed in the shootout, but Amina's widow and her wounded daughter survived. At first they were kept under guard in a special room at the battalion headquarters, and then were handed over to government representatives. The fate of the remaining defenders of the president turned out to be tragic: many of them were soon shot, others died in prison. This outcome of events was apparently facilitated by the reputation of Amin, who even by Eastern standards was considered a cruel and bloody dictator. According to tradition, a stain of shame also automatically fell on those around him.

After Amin was eliminated, a plane from Moscow immediately took off for Bagram. There, under the supervision of KGB workers, was the new head of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal. When the Tu-134 was already descending, the lights at the entire airfield suddenly went out. The plane landed only with the help of onboard headlights. The aircraft crew threw out a braking parachute, but the plane rolled almost to the edge of the runway. As it later turned out, the head of the airbase was an ardent supporter of Amin and, suspecting something was wrong when a strange plane was landing, turned off the lighting, hoping to cause a plane crash. But the high skill of the pilots made it possible to avoid tragedy.

Much later, interesting facts about the operation began to emerge. Firstly, it turned out that during the entire assault there was no communication with the command post. No one could clearly explain the reason for the absence. An attempt to immediately report on the liquidation of the president was also unsuccessful. Secondly, only a couple of years later, at a meeting of participants in those December events, it became known what the delay in reporting the death of the president could have resulted in. It turned out that the military leaders had developed a backup plan to destroy Amin and his associates. A little later than the assault brigades, the Vitebsk division, which did not know about the earlier actions of the KGB and the “Muslim battalion,” received the task of capturing the presidential palace. If the message about achieving the goal had not arrived in a timely manner, the Belarusians could have launched a new assault attempt. And then it is unknown how many participants in the first offensive would have been killed out of ignorance, in the confusion that arose. It is possible that this is exactly the outcome of events - to remove more witnesses - and was planned.

And here’s what Colonel Kolesnik said: “In the evening of the day after the assault, all the leaders of this operation were almost killed by a machine-gun fire from one Soviet soldier. Returning from a banquet organized to celebrate the successful completion of the operation, in Amin’s Mercedes we were fired upon near the General Staff building, which was guarded by paratroopers. Lieutenant Colonel Shvets was the first to notice strange flashes on the asphalt road and understood what they meant. He slipped out of the car, swearing at the sentries with choice obscenities. This worked better than the password. We called the chief of guard. The lieutenant who showed up first got hit in the ear, and only then listened to the end of the procedure for using weapons by the sentries at the posts. When we examined the car, we found several bullet holes in the hood. Any higher and neither me nor Kozlov would have been alive. At the end, General Drozdov quietly said to the lieutenant: “Son, thank you for not teaching your soldier to shoot.”

The unique Muslim unit created under the auspices of the GRU was withdrawn from Afghanistan almost immediately after the storming of the palace. All equipment was transferred to the Vitebsk division. The servicemen were left with only personal weapons and on January 2, 1980, two An-22s in full force were sent to Tashkent. For the successful conduct of the special operation, the fighters of the “Muslim battalion” were awarded orders and medals: seven people received the Order of Lenin, ten people received the Order of the Red Banner, forty-five received the Order of the Red Star, forty-six fighters were awarded the medal “For Courage”, and the rest received the medal "For military merits." Colonel Kolesnik became a Hero of the Soviet Union, and was soon awarded the rank of general.

The battalion temporarily ceased to exist, the servicemen were transferred to the reserve, and all officers were scattered to various garrisons for further service. After the reorganization, by October 1981 there was no one in it who took part in the storming of the palace.

Many events related to the coup in Afghanistan were presented by the Soviet press in a completely different light. According to the initial media version, President Amin was arrested. And only then, by a fair court, he was sentenced to death. A film about this was shot in advance and prepared for showing after the death of the dictator. The participation of Soviet special forces and the actual death of the self-proclaimed president were not mentioned anywhere.

After the assassination of Hafizullah Amin, units of the 40th Army continued to enter Afghanistan, occupying cities, villages and the main centers of the country. Industrial and administrative facilities, highways, airfields, and mountain passes were taken under control. At first, no one intended to fight, hoping only to convince others of the seriousness of their intentions. As a last resort, solve all the problems with little loss, without assuming the future scale of hostilities. The point of view of the General Staff was that only a demonstration of powerful military force, missile units, tanks, and artillery was enough. This will strike terror into the hearts of the opposition, forcing them to surrender or simply flee. In fact, the appearance of strangers in an Islamic country that has the experience of countless wars, a country where the bulk of the population knows how to handle weapons from early childhood, inflamed the already ongoing civil war, giving it the meaning of jihad.

Despite the fact that the operation to eliminate the president was carried out successfully, Western countries were quick to identify this fact as evidence of the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and called the subsequent leaders of Afghanistan (Karmal and Najibullah) puppet leaders.

On October 30, 1981, at two o’clock in the morning, the 154th separate special forces detachment, previously called the “Muslim battalion,” crossed the state border of the USSR and rushed to the place of future deployment. This is how the second arrival of “musbat” took place on Afghan soil. The new unit commander, Major Igor Stoderevsky, served with him until the very end of the war.

On December 27, 1979 at 19.00, the Muslim battalion of the USSR GRU took part in the assault on the Taj Beg Palace, where Amin is located. Jesy Howe called Operation Storm 333 fantastic, considering that 700 Soviet troops, mostly fighters from the “Muslim battalion,” defeated more than two thousand Amin’s guards, located in a building specially prepared for defense. Platoon commander Tursunkulov explained the task of detachment 154 this way: “They brought the KGB men to the entrance, ordered his own to lie down in a circle and cover the attacking soldiers with fire.”

However, it soon became clear that the KGB assault groups could not break the resistance of the Afghans. Then Colonel Boyarinov called the Musbat for help.
“We went ahead, destroying all living things that came our way,” recalls Shukhrat Mirzaev, a participant in the assault. - Those who resisted were killed on the spot. Those who surrendered were not touched. The first floor was cleared. We occupy the second one. Like a piston, we are squeezing Amin’s men onto the third floor and into the attic spaces. Everywhere there are many corpses of Afghan military and civilians.”
Later, studying the experience of this assault, military experts noted the high quality of Soviet body armor, which did not penetrate the bullets of the German MP-5 submachine guns in service with the Afghans.