Damansky conflict. What armed conflicts did Russia have with China?

The Daman conflict of 1969 was an armed clash between the troops of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The name of the event was given by its geographical location - the battle took place in the area of ​​Damansky Island (sometimes mistakenly called the Damansky Peninsula) on the Ussuri River, which flows 230 kilometers south of Khabarovsk. It is believed that the Daman events are the largest Soviet-Chinese conflict in modern history.

Background and causes of the conflict

After the end of the Second Opium War (1856-1860), Russia signed an extremely beneficial treaty with China, which went down in history as the Treaty of Beijing. According to official documents, the Russian border now ended on the Chinese bank of the Amur River, which meant that only the Russian side could have full use of water resources. No one thought about the ownership of the deserted Amur islands due to the small population in that territory.

In the mid-20th century, China was no longer satisfied with this situation. The first attempt to move the border ended in failure. At the end of the 1960s, the leadership of the PRC began to assert that the USSR was following the path of socialist imperialism, which means that aggravation of relations could not be avoided. According to some historians, the Soviet Union cultivated a sense of superiority over the Chinese. Military personnel, as never before, began to zealously monitor compliance with the Soviet-Chinese border.

The situation in the area of ​​Damansky Island began to heat up in the early 1960s. Chinese military and civilians constantly violated the border regime and entered foreign territory, but Soviet border guards expelled them without the use of weapons. The number of provocations grew every year. In the middle of the decade, attacks on Soviet border patrols by Chinese Red Guards became more frequent.

At the end of the 60s, scuffles between the parties ceased to resemble fights; first, firearms were used, and then military equipment. On February 7, 1969, Soviet border guards for the first time fired several single shots from machine guns in the direction of the Chinese military.

Progress of the armed conflict

On the night of March 1–2, 1969, more than 70 Chinese military personnel, armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and SKS carbines, took up a position on the high shore of Damansky Island. This group was noticed only at 10:20 am. At 10:40 a border detachment of 32 people, led by senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, arrived on the island. They demanded to leave the territory of the USSR, but the Chinese opened fire. Most of the Soviet detachment, including the commander, died.

Reinforcements arrived on Damansky Island in the person of Senior Lieutenant Vitaly Bubenin and 23 soldiers. The firefight continued for about half an hour. The heavy machine gun on Bubenin's armored personnel carrier was out of order, and the Chinese were firing from mortars. They delivered ammunition to Soviet soldiers and helped evacuate the wounded residents of the village of Nizhnemikhailovka.

After the death of the commander, junior sergeant Yuri Babansky took over the leadership of the operation. His squad was dispersed on the island, the soldiers took the fight. After 25 minutes, only 5 fighters remained alive, but they continued to fight. At approximately 13:00, the Chinese military began to retreat.

On the Chinese side, 39 people died, on the Soviet side - 31 (and another 14 were injured). At 13:20, reinforcements from the Far Eastern and Pacific border districts began to flock to the island. The Chinese were preparing a regiment of 5 thousand soldiers for the offensive.

On March 3, a demonstration took place near the Soviet embassy in Beijing. On March 4, Chinese newspapers reported that only the Soviet side was to blame for the incident on Damansky Island. On the same day, completely opposite data were published in Pravda. On March 7, a picket was held near the Chinese embassy in Moscow. Demonstrators threw dozens of vials of ink at the walls of the building.

On the morning of March 14, a group of Chinese military personnel moving towards Damansky Island was fired upon by Soviet border guards. The Chinese retreated. At 15:00 a unit of USSR army soldiers left the island. It was immediately occupied by Chinese soldiers. Several more times that day the island changed hands.

On the morning of March 15, a serious battle ensued. Soviet soldiers did not have enough weapons, and what they had was constantly out of order. The numerical superiority was also on the side of the Chinese. At 17:00, the commander of the army of the Far Eastern District, Lieutenant General O.A. Losik violated the order of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and was forced to introduce the secret Grad multiple launch rocket systems into battle. This decided the outcome of the battle.

The Chinese side in this section of the border no longer dared to undertake serious provocations and military operations.

Consequences of the conflict

During the Daman conflict of 1969, 58 people were killed or died from wounds on the Soviet side, and another 94 people were wounded. The Chinese lost from 100 to 300 people (this is still classified information).

On September 11 in Beijing, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kosygin concluded a truce, which in fact meant that Damansky Island now belongs to China. On October 20, an agreement was reached to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. Damansky Island finally became the official territory of the PRC only in 1991.

The rapid rapprochement between Russia and China involuntarily brings to mind the events of 45 years ago on Damansky Island: in 15 days of armed confrontation over a piece of land measuring 1 km2 on the Ussuri River separating the two countries, 58 Soviet border guards, including 4 officers, were killed. Then, in March 1969, only a madman could dream of a “turn to the East” and “contracts of the century” with the Chinese.

The song “Red Guards Walk and Wander Near the City of Beijing” Vladimir Vysotsky - always a visionary talent! - wrote in 1966. “...We’ve sat for a while, And now we’ll make some hooligans - Something’s quiet, really,” Mao and Liao Bian thought, “What else can you do to counteract the World atmosphere: Here we’ll show the big fig to the USA and the USSR!” In addition to the verb “counterpupit”, which has become an integral part of the vocabulary of our first person, this couplet is also notable for the mention of a certain “Liao Bian”, who, of course, is none other than Marshal Lin Biao, at that time the Minister of Defense of the PRC and the right hand Chairman Mao. By 1969, a major “Maoist fig” for the Soviet Union had finally matured.

"Special weapon number 1"

However, there is a version that Lin Biao was the only person in the PRC synclite who opposed the secret directive of the CPC Central Committee of January 25, 1969 on military operations with three companies near Damansky Island “in response to Soviet provocations.” By “provocations,” Chinese propaganda meant the reluctance of Soviet border guards to allow Chinese Red Guards into Soviet territory, which was then this tiny island on the Ussuri and which China considered its own. Using weapons was strictly prohibited, violators were restrained with the help of “special weapon number 1”, a spear with a long handle, and “belly tactics” - they closed the rank and with their whole body pressed against the fanatics with Mao quote books and portraits of the leader in their hands, pushing them back one meter at a time where they came from. There were other methods, which one of the participants in those events talks about in Elena Masyuk’s interesting documentary “Hieroglyph of Friendship”: they took off their pants, turned their bare butts towards Mao’s portraits - and the Red Guards retreated in horror... During January-February, both on Damansky and on Kirkinsky - this is another island on Ussuri - Soviet and Chinese border guards more than once met in hand-to-hand combat, however, there were no casualties. But then events took a very serious turn.

On the night of March 1-2, a company of Chinese soldiers in full combat gear crossed to Damansky and secured a foothold on its western bank. At the alarm, 32 Soviet border guards went to the scene of the event, including the head of the 2nd border post “Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya” of the 57th Iman border detachment, senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov. He protested to the Chinese and was shot at point-blank range along with 6 of his comrades. Having accepted an unequal battle, the border group covering Strelnikov, led by Sergeant Rabovich, was almost completely killed - 11 out of 12 people. In total, during the battles with the Chinese on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 were injured. In an unconscious state, Corporal Pavel Akulov was captured by the Chinese and then brutally tortured. In 2001, photographs of Soviet soldiers killed at Damansky from the archives of the KGB of the USSR were declassified - the photographs testified to the abuse of the dead by the Chinese.

Everything was decided by "Grad"

A question that often arose among contemporaries of those events and later: why at the decisive moment Damansky, despite the aggressive attitude of the Chinese, was guarded as usual (there is a version that not only our intelligence warned about the inevitability of a conflict on the island of the Kremlin through secret channels , but also Lin Biao personally, which Mao allegedly later found out about); why did reinforcements arrive after the first losses, finally, why even on March 15, when fresh units of the Chinese army (24th Infantry Regiment, 2 thousand soldiers) entered the battle on Damansky after a massive shelling of Soviet positions (24th Infantry Regiment, 2 thousand soldiers), when in a supernova Soviet tank destroyed by the Chinese T-62, the head of the Iman border detachment, Colonel Leonov, was killed - why was the ban of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the entry of troops of the Far Eastern Military District into the Damansky area not lifted?

When the commander of the district, Colonel-General Oleg Losik, gave the command on the 15th to deploy the 135th Motorized Rifle Division in the battle area and iron out Chinese positions using the then-secret BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, he actually acted at his own peril and risk. The “hail” that fell on the heads of the Chinese - and the main part of the enemy’s material and technical resources and manpower was destroyed in one gulp - discouraged them from continuing the war for Damansky: Beijing did not yet have such weapons. According to Russian data, the final Chinese losses ranged from 300 to 700 people killed, but Chinese sources still do not provide exact figures.

By the way, in August 1969, the Chinese again decided to test the strength of the Soviet borders: they landed 80 of their special forces in the area of ​​Lake Zhalanashkol in Kazakhstan. But then they were met fully armed: as a result of a 65-minute battle, the group lost 21 people and was forced to retreat. But this episode, undoubtedly victorious for the USSR, went almost unnoticed. Whereas Damansky, as the personification of our army’s readiness to repel Maoist China, was talked about in the USSR for a long time, although the question of why our soldiers actually shed their blood there arose very soon.

What did they fight for...

On September 11, 1969, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Alexey Kosygin, and the head of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, at negotiations at Beijing airport - Kosygin was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh - discussed the situation around Damansky and agreed: the parties, in order to avoid escalation of the conflict and to maintain the truce, should remain employed for this moment positions. Most likely, Beijing knew in advance that Moscow was ready for such a compromise - before the start of negotiations, Chinese soldiers landed on Damansky. And so they remained in their “occupied positions”...

In 1991, as a result of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese agreement on border demarcation, Damansky was officially transferred to China. Today there is no island with that name on the map - there is Zheng-Bao-Dao (“Precious Island” - translated from Chinese), on which Chinese border guards take the oath at the new obelisk to their fallen heroes. But the lessons of those events are not only in changing the name. And it’s not even that Russia, to please China, has elevated a purely advisory principle of international law to an absolute one: taking into account the fact that the border supposedly must necessarily pass through the middle of the fairway of border rivers, hundreds of hectares of land have already been transferred to China, including cedar forests in Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories. The border, “island” dossier perfectly illustrates how patient, persistent and resourceful the Chinese dragon is in pursuing its own interests.

Yes, since 1969 too much water has flowed under the bridge in Ussuri and Amur. Yes, China and Russia have changed a lot since then. Yes, Putin and Xi Jinping are sitting next to each other at the Victory Parade on May 9 and will most likely be sitting next to each other at a similar parade in Beijing in September. But the fact is that both “Pu” and Xi with their large-scale intentions are mere mortals. And the dragon, according to legend, lives a very long time. He is practically immortal.

21-05-2015, 20:05

😆Tired of serious articles? Cheer yourself up

The beginning and development of the border confrontation between the USSR and the PRC in 1949-1969.

By the time the People's Republic of China was formed, the issue of the border line between the USSR and China was not raised at the official level. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, Mutual Assistance (1950), the Soviet-Chinese border, before the start of the revision of bilateral relations, was the border of good neighborliness, where active ties were maintained between the population of the border areas, lively trade was conducted, and cultural exchange was established. Cooperation agreements were concluded in a number of border regions, including the “Agreement on the procedure for navigation along the border rivers Amur, Ussuri, Argun, Sungacha, and Lake Khanka and on the establishment of a navigation situation on these waterways” (1951), on forestry , about joint fight against forest fires in border areas, etc. Within the framework of these agreements, the actually protected border line was not questioned.
In the early 50s. The USSR handed over topographic maps to the PRC indicating the entire border line. There were no comments from the Chinese side regarding the border line. During the years when Soviet-Chinese relations were on the rise, and China’s economic development and security largely depended on the USSR, border issues were not raised at the official level.
But already from the second half of the 50s. Difficulties began to appear in relations between the USSR and the PRC. In 1957 Under the motto of the Maoist campaign “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools compete,” there was dissatisfaction with the USSR’s policy towards China, including in the form of claims to certain areas under the jurisdiction of the USSR. An interesting fact is that, in general, the positions of circles whose opinions differed from the official policy of the CCP were subject to significant criticism, but their vision of the territorial border problem was not affected.
Another evidence of the existence of differences in the border issue was the so-called “cartographic aggression”, which was carried out already in the 50s. In maps, textbooks and atlases, the borders of China include territories under the actual jurisdiction of the USSR and other countries. In the “Atlas of the Provinces of the People's Republic of China,” which was published in Beijing in 1953, an area in the Pamirs and several areas in the eastern area, including two islands near Khabarovsk, were designated as Chinese territories.
In 1956-1959. cases of border violations by Chinese citizens are becoming more frequent, but then these issues were resolved successfully at the level of local authorities. The general tone of bilateral relations remained favorable.
In the mid-50s. The USSR invited China to resolve border issues. However, due to events in Poland and Hungary, this initiative was not developed.
Until 1960, the issue of the border was no longer raised at the interstate level. However, at the moment when the issue of the Soviet-Chinese border again appeared on the agenda, relations between the two countries were no longer so smooth. In the late 50s, early 60s. A number of prerequisites arise for the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China.
China's unilateral military-political actions, carried out without consultation with the USSR, put the Soviet Union, as an ally of the PRC, in a very difficult position. Such actions primarily include the provocation against India (1959) and the incident in the Taiwan Strait (1958). During the same period, China's desire to gain a leading place in the international communist and labor movement, as well as to get rid of the tutelage of the CPSU, intensified.
In addition, starting with the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), ideological differences began to grow between the two countries. Later, on their basis, the CPC accused the CPSU of revisionism and restoration of capitalist relations. The Chinese leadership reacted negatively to the condemnation of Stalin's personality cult. Personal enmity between Khrushchev N.S. and Mao Zedong also played a role in the deterioration of bilateral relations.
Some foreign authors note the Chinese leadership's dissatisfaction with Soviet influence in Manchuria and especially in Xinjiang.
Let us recall that one of the first results of the flaring conflict between the CPSU and the CPC was the unexpected withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China in 1960. Almost simultaneously, the first episode on the border occurred, which showed the existence of disagreements between the USSR and China on the issue of the border line and the ownership of those or other areas. We are talking about an incident in 1960 when Chinese herders were grazing livestock in territory under Soviet jurisdiction, in the area of ​​the Buz-Aigyr pass in Kyrgyzstan. When the Soviet border guards arrived, the shepherds declared that they were on the territory of the People's Republic of China. It later turned out that they were acting on a directive from the authorities of their province.
On this occasion, the foreign ministries of China and the USSR sent each other several notes and made oral statements, in which for the first time since the founding of the PRC, a different understanding of the border line with the Soviet Union was revealed at the official, diplomatic level. The parties never came to an agreement, but in 1960, at a press conference in Kathmandu, Zhou Enlai, when asked about the presence of unidentified areas on the Soviet-Chinese border, answered the following: “There are minor discrepancies on the maps... it is very easy to resolve peacefully.”
However, in the autumn of 1960, Chinese citizens began systematically going to the islands on the border rivers of the Far East, which were under Soviet control, for the purpose of conducting economic activities (mowing grass, collecting brushwood). They told the Soviet border guards that they were on Chinese territory. The reaction of Soviet border guards to incidents has changed. If previously they ignored the trades of Chinese peasants in a number of territories under Soviet jurisdiction, then, starting in 1960, they tried to suppress violations. It should be noted that during the demarcation of the border in the 80-90s. most of these islands, including o. Damansky, legally transferred to the PRC.
In the current situation, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to create an interdepartmental commission consisting of specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, whose task was to select and study treaty acts on the border with the PRC. The commission identified 13 areas where there were discrepancies in the maps of the parties and 12 where the distribution of islands was not carried out.
The border line itself was not clearly marked on the ground, because Of the 141 border signs, 40 were preserved in their original form, 77 were in a destroyed state, and 24 were missing altogether. It was also noted that the description of the boundary in treaty acts is often general in nature, and many treaty maps are drawn up on a small scale at a primitive level. In general, according to the conclusion of the commission, it was noted that the entire border line with the PRC, except for the section in the Pamirs south of the Uz-Bel pass, was determined by treaties. In the case of border negotiations, the commission proposed drawing the border not along the banks of rivers, but along the line of the middle of the main fairway on navigable rivers and along the line of the middle of the river on non-navigable rivers, and not as it was indicated by the red line on the map attached to the Beijing Treaty, according to which the border ran along the Chinese coast. Fortune telling with Tarot cards, available online at gadanieonlinetaro.ru, will help you find out your fate.
Systematic violations of the protected border line by Chinese citizens in the 1960s and demonstrative conduct of economic activities were probably intended to consolidate the so-called “status status” in practice. Moreover, the statistics of violations showed that from 1960 to 1964 their number grew rapidly, and in the second half of the 60s the incidents became more acute.
Thus, in 1960 the number of violations was about 100, in 1962 there were already about 5 thousand. In 1963, more than 100 thousand Chinese civilians and military personnel took part in illegally crossing the Soviet-Chinese border.
As the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated, the exchange of notes and oral statements continued, in which the parties constantly blamed each other. The Soviet side expressed its dissatisfaction with the violation of the border by Chinese citizens; Chinese documents, as a rule, stated that Soviet border guards did not allow economic activity to be carried out where it had been carried out previously or declared that a particular area belonged to the territory of the PRC. Despite the increase in the number of incidents at the borders, the matter did not reach wide publicity. Relations between the Soviet Union and China have not yet moved from polemics to open confrontation. This is evidenced by reviews of the Chinese and Soviet central press for 1962-1963.
In 1963, the parties agreed to hold consultations to clarify the border line. They began on February 25, 1964. Negotiations were held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The Soviet delegation was headed by Colonel General P.I. Zyryanov, commander of the country's border troops. The Chinese delegation was headed by acting. Head of the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Zeng Yongquan. Negotiations continued until August 22 of the same year. During the meeting, different approaches of the parties to the problem of border settlement were revealed.
The Chinese position in the negotiations boiled down to three points, which the Chinese side invariably insisted on:

• Only contracts should serve as the basis for negotiations.
• Negotiations must consider the entire border, and not just individual sections.
• As a result of negotiations, a new agreement must be concluded with reference to existing agreements, which should be qualified as unequal.

Soviet border guards are preparing to drive out Chinese intruders. January 1969

The Chinese reacted quite sharply to tactics of this kind. They expressed bewilderment at how the historical border line was determined: “What do you mean by a historically formed border line? Do you mean the line that developed in the 16th or 19th century, or the line that developed a minute before your speech?” The head of the Chinese delegation, Zeng Yongquan, commented on it as follows: “In those areas where you have not crossed the border line defined by the treaties, you apparently will not object to acting in accordance with the treaties, but in those areas where you have crossed the boundary line defined by the treaties border line, you will insist that the issue be resolved in accordance with the “actually protected line.” In his own words, the “actually protected, historically established border line” appeared when there were not much more than 200 PRC border guards on the border between China and the USSR and the Soviet side sent troops wherever they pleased.
At the same time, the Chinese side emphasized that, while abandoning the “big register,” it must return back what was “captured” by Russia and the Soviet Union in addition to it. It sounded like this: “You should know that we do not require you to give up 1,540 thousand sq. km of Chinese territory seized by Tsarist Russia. We have shown maximum generosity and good will. Apart from this territory seized from China, you will not be able to to seize another inch of Chinese territory."
The Chinese side, moreover, insisted on recognizing the Russian-Chinese treaties that defined the border as unequal. It was indicated that these agreements were concluded during a period of China’s weakness and as a result more than 1,500 thousand square meters were rejected. km. Chinese territory in favor of Russia, including 1 million square meters. km. in Primorye and Amur region and 0.5 million sq. km. in Central Asia. Thus, according to the Aigun Treaty, 600 thousand square meters passed to Russia. km., according to Beijing 400 thousand sq. m. km., along Chuguchaksky more than 440 thousand square meters. km., in St. Petersburg more than 70 thousand sq. m. km. The Chinese side also insisted that in the 1920s. Soviet Russia renounced all unequal treaties, and since the border treaties with Russia were viewed in the PRC as unequal, the Chinese delegation more than once stated that it had the right to recognize their insignificance.
At the same time, it was stipulated that recognition of the treaties as unequal would not lead to new territorial claims. However, Soviet experts saw a trap in such a proposal. The Chinese have repeatedly emphasized that although the treaties are unequal in nature, given the nature of relations between socialist states, China will not demand the return of these lands, but is only seeking recognition of the “unequal rights” of the Russian-Chinese treaties. The problem was that China could in the future declare the Soviet Union a non-socialist state, which happened after some time, and therefore recognize the treaties as void and, thus, raise the question of ownership of 1,500 thousand square meters. km.
On the issue of the “inequality” of Russian-Chinese treaties, both delegations were repeatedly drawn into unjustified polemics, which took a lot of time and did not bring practical results. It is natural that in the end the Soviet side rejected this point.
Nevertheless, the Chinese were ready to recognize the Russian-Chinese treaties of the 19th century as the basis for negotiations. But at the same time, they argued that the Soviet Union did not comply with these agreements and was “biting into” Chinese territory.
The Chinese side insisted that the Soviet Union recognize the disputed areas and demanded that troops, including border troops, be withdrawn from there after their designation. The total area of ​​the “disputed areas” was approximately 40 thousand square meters. km., incl. 28 thousand sq. km. in the Pamirs. The total length of the “disputed” sections of the border line exceeded half the length of the border between the USSR and China and mainly ran along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Representatives of the USSR argued that we could only talk about clarifying the border line (demarcation) in some areas and did not recognize the existence of “disputed areas.”
During the negotiations, it was possible to reach a certain compromise on the eastern section of the border, 4,200 km long, but with the exception of the issue of two islands (Bolshoy Ussuriysky and Tarabarov). In April 1964, the parties exchanged topographic maps indicating their understanding of the border line and created a working group, after which they began to directly consider the border line. As a result of studying Chinese maps and comparing them with Soviet ones, it was found that there are discrepancies in drawing the border line on these maps in 22 areas, of which 17 are located on the western part of the Soviet-Chinese border (now the Central Asian republics of the former USSR) and 5 areas on eastern part of the border. These areas approximately coincided with the areas that the interdepartmental commission indicated in its note in 1960. Chinese maps indicated 3 more areas that did not appear in the commission’s materials, including a fairly large area in the area of ​​the Bedel Pass (Kyrgyzstan), as well as islands near Khabarovsk. The greatest discrepancies were identified in the Pamir section.
Based on the results of the review of the maps in Moscow, it was concluded that it was possible to hold negotiations not on individual sections, as previously assumed, but along the entire border, as the Chinese delegation insisted. This approach became possible because along most of the length of the border line there were no vital differences in the border. Along the longest line that required clarification—the river border in the Far East—the parties had the same understanding that the border had to run along the main fairway. In this regard, the delegation was given additional instructions to confirm the border line in areas where the parties understand it equally. As part of this approach, the parties were able to come to an understanding on the entire eastern section of the border, with the exception of the issue of the Kazakevichev channel.
When the Soviet delegation proposed to record the results of clarifying the border in the eastern section, leaving the issue of the Kazakevichev Channel for later, the Chinese side agreed to this option. However, the Soviet leadership showed integrity in this matter. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev insisted on the position of “either all or nothing.”
Mao’s statement, made during negotiations in the open press on a territorial register of 1.5 million square meters, also did not help achieve agreement. km.
As a result of the consultations, no agreements were reached. After their end, which never continued, border incidents resumed. Since October 1964 to March 1965 the Soviet-Chinese border was violated 36 times with the participation of 150 Chinese civilians and military personnel, and in 15 days of April 1965. the border was violated 12 times involving more than 500 Chinese civilians and military personnel. Number of violations of the Soviet-Chinese border in 1967 noted approximately 2 thousand times. At the height of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, Chinese border guards and Red Guard detachments rammed Soviet patrol ships, tried to seize patrols, and started fights with Soviet border guards.
According to some Chinese data, from October 15, 1964 to March 15, 1969, the number of border conflicts amounted to 4,189 cases. At the same time, border violations on the Chinese side were, as a rule, provocative and well-organized. Chinese leaders openly spoke about the possibility of military action. The Chinese press continued to criticize the Soviet leadership. The entire domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was attacked, which was defined as a policy of revisionism, hegemonism and social-imperialism, and was placed on a par with American imperialism. Any actions of the USSR in the international arena, covered in the Chinese press, were subjected to a series of harsh attacks and were considered hostile to the PRC.
Tensions also intensified because a number of islands on the Ussuri River, located on the Chinese side of the main channel, were under the actual control of Soviet border troops, and the Chinese side, asserting their belonging to the PRC, indicated its presence on them by demonstrably conducting economic activities and the presence of its own people there. border patrols. The Soviet side quite often motivated its presence on the Chinese side of the fairway by the presence of a “red line” on the map of the Beijing Boundary Treaty of 1860, where it marked the line of the border and on river sections and ran along the Chinese bank. In addition, until a formal agreement was reached and delimitation was made, the USSR continued to extend its jurisdiction to the “historically established and actually protected” border line
In general, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, relations between the two states acquired a character rarely encountered before in the practice of international relations. Provocations against the USSR occurred not only on the border. There were illegal detentions of Soviet civil courts "Svirsk" and "Komsomolets of Ukraine", provocations of Chinese citizens on Red Square and at the American embassy in Moscow, as well as at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
In comparison with the 50s, two significant features of the situation on the border in the 60s. became, firstly, military construction, and secondly, continuous incidents.
The peak of confrontation was 1969. Beginning on March 2, clashes took place between Soviet border guards and Chinese military personnel on the Ussuri River on Damansky Island (Zhenbaodao). Before this, clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards also took place, however, they rarely went beyond hand-to-hand combat and did not lead to casualties. But during the fighting on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 people were injured. From the Chinese side, approximately 300 people took part in this action. There was the use of artillery and mortars, as well as heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Chinese military also suffered heavy losses. The fighting continued on March 14-15. Only after the Soviet side used the Grad multiple launch rocket systems, which covered Chinese territory over 20 square meters. km. in depth and caused serious losses to the Chinese armed forces clashes on the island. Damansky stopped. To the notes of protest and the Statement of the Soviet government, the leadership of the PRC responded in the usual style, that the USSR must recognize the unequal nature of the treaties defining the border between the USSR and the PRC and called the USSR an aggressor that “encroached” on Chinese territory. Participants in the fighting on the Chinese side were viewed as heroes in their homeland.
It should be noted that formally the Chinese side had good reasons to claim Fr. Damansky (Zhenbaodao) and a number of other islands, because they were on the Chinese side of the main fairway, which, according to international law, is accepted as the border line on border rivers. However, the Chinese side knew that this and other islands had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR for many years. The Chinese side also knew that the Soviet Union, in principle, did not object to the transfer of these islands to China. As further negotiations showed, the issue of ownership of the islands was resolved, and in the conditions of confrontation, the actions of the PRC in relation to these islands were aimed at aggravating the situation and could be considered provocative, which indicates that the initiator of the bloodshed was the Chinese side.
Regarding events on the island. Damansky there is a version that they were deliberately provoked by the Chinese armed forces on the orders of Lin Biao, in order to strengthen his position at the 1st Congress and increase the role of the PLA in Chinese politics.
On March 29, the Soviet government made a statement in a harsh tone, in which it proposed resuming negotiations that began in 1964. In this document, the PRC leadership was asked to refrain from actions on the border that could cause complications, and to resolve differences that had arisen in a calm atmosphere. In conclusion, it was noted that “attempts to talk with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet people, in the language of weapons will meet with firm resistance.” At the IX Congress of the CPC, in his speech, Marshal Lin Biao said that the proposals of the Soviet government of March 29 would be considered and a response would be given to them. At the same time, it was said that “Our party and government (CCP) have always advocated and advocate for resolving these issues through diplomatic channels through negotiations in order to resolve them on a fair and rational basis.” On April 11, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs again sent a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in which it was proposed to resume consultations between plenipotentiary representatives of the governments of the People's Republic of China and the USSR "in ... the very near future." The response was received in May 1969. It again contained allegations that Fr. Damansky (Zhenbao Dao) is Chinese territory, and the incidents in Ussuri were deliberately provoked by the Soviet side. At the same time, it was confirmed that the PRC opposes the use of military force, and it was proposed to agree on the place and date of negotiations through diplomatic channels. These Soviet and Chinese statements indicated that both sides were trying to present themselves as victims of aggression and absolve themselves of responsibility for the bloodshed.
Despite the formal readiness to resume the negotiation process and reduce the level of tension, incidents at the border did not stop until the end of the summer of 1969, and speeches at party meetings and in the press of both countries sounded increasingly harsh. During July and the first half of August, there were more than 488 cases of border violations and armed incidents involving 2.5 thousand Chinese citizens. On July 8, Chinese border guards attacked Soviet rivermen on the island. Goldinsky. On August 13, in the Kazakh SSR in the Semipalatinsk region in the area of ​​Lake Zhalanashkol, the largest armed incident since the March events occurred with casualties on both sides. Only after this the parties managed to agree on a meeting at a sufficiently high level.
On September 11, 1969, the head of the Soviet government, A.N. Kosygin, visited the PRC and met with the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. The result of the “meeting at the airport” was an agreement on further negotiations on the border, starting from October 19, 1969, as well as on the implementation of a number of measures in order to normalize the situation on the border. During the conversation, which lasted 3.5 hours, issues were also discussed about the exchange of ambassadors (instead of chargé d'affaires), the intensification of trade relations and the normalization of interstate relations.
The heads of government also agreed that any threat of the use of force should be excluded during the negotiations.
As a result, Soviet border guards were instructed to guard the borders on rivers up to the middle of the fairway. They were also charged with maintaining normal relations with the border troops and the PRC authorities; consider all border issues through consultations in a spirit of goodwill and taking into account the mutual interests of the population of the border areas of both countries in the field of economic activities.
Despite the fact that the situation on the border has stabilized, no significant progress has been achieved in relations between the two states, and border settlement issues remain open.

Americans, recalling the Cuban Missile Crisis, call it the most dangerous moment in the Cold War, when the world was on the brink of disaster. Despite some tense moments, Washington and Moscow managed to resolve the crisis, but only after the death of US Air Force pilot Major Rudolph Anderson Jr.

Seven years later, in March 1969, a unit of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers attacked a Soviet border post on Damansky Island, killing dozens and wounding many more. Because of this incident, Russia and China were on the brink of war, which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. But after two weeks of clashes, the conflict subsided.

What if the brief 1969 conflict between China and the Soviet Union had escalated into war?

Story

The incident on Damansky Island, where the ambush was set up and the main fighting took place, became a low point in Soviet-Chinese relations. Even ten years earlier, Beijing and Moscow stood shoulder to shoulder as the main stronghold of the communist world. But fighting over issues of ideology, leadership and resources created sharp divisions between the allies, with global repercussions. The split intensified territorial disputes that had existed since tsarist times. Along the long, poorly defined border there were many gray areas that were claimed by both China and the USSR.

Context

It's time for Americans to understand: China is not the USSR

Why won't China become the next USSR?

If China falls apart like the USSR

Immediately after this conflict, the USSR and China began preparing for war. The Red Army transferred its forces and assets to the Far East, and the PLA carried out full mobilization. In 1969, the Soviets had a huge technical advantage over China. But Beijing created the largest army in the world, and much of it was concentrated near the Sino-Soviet border. In contrast, the Red Army concentrated the bulk of its forces and resources in Eastern Europe, where they could prepare for conflict with NATO. Therefore, at the moment of the clash, the Chinese may well have had a superiority in conventional forces along most of the border.

However, Chinese superiority in manpower did not mean that the PLA would be able to carry out a prolonged invasion of Soviet territory. The Chinese did not have the logistics and airpower to capture and hold large swathes of Soviet territory. Moreover, the long Sino-Soviet border gave the Soviets plenty of opportunities to respond. Since a NATO offensive was unlikely, the Soviets could move significant forces and assets east from Europe to attack Xinjiang and other border areas.

The most important area of ​​possible attack was Manchuria, where the Red Army launched a devastating and lightning-fast offensive at the end of World War II. Despite the large numerical superiority, the PLA in 1969 had no more hope of stopping such an offensive than the Kwantung Army in 1945. And the loss of Manchuria would be a colossal blow to China's economic power and political legitimacy. In any case, Soviet aviation would very quickly incapacitate the Chinese Air Force and subject cities, communications centers and military bases on Chinese territory to powerful air strikes.

After capturing Manchuria in 1945, the Soviets plundered Japanese industry and left. They could have played out the same scenario in 1969, but only if the Chinese leadership had looked reality in the eye. With the excesses of the Cultural Revolution very much in the past and rival factions still competing in ideological radicalism, Moscow would have difficulty finding a constructive partner for peace negotiations. The Soviet offensive, if developed, would be very similar to the Japanese offensive in 1937, although without the naval superiority of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In anticipation of such attacks, the PLA could withdraw into the interior, leaving behind scorched earth.

Nuclear weapon?

China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, theoretically giving Beijing a nuclear deterrent. However, the systems for delivering such charges to the target left much to be desired. Liquid-fuel rockets did not inspire much confidence in terms of reliability; they required several hours to prepare, and they could remain on the launch pad for a strictly limited time. Moreover, at that time, Chinese missiles did not have enough launch range to strike key Soviet targets located in European Russia. Chinese bomber aircraft, represented by a few Tu-4 (Soviet copy of the American B-29) and N-6 (copy of the Soviet Tu-16), did not have much chance of overcoming the modern air defense system of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, for their part, were close to achieving nuclear parity with the United States. The USSR had a modern and advanced arsenal of operational-tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, capable of easily destroying Chinese nuclear deterrent forces, military formations and major cities. Listening sensitively to world public opinion, the Soviet leadership would not have dared to launch a full-scale nuclear attack on China (American and Chinese propaganda in this case would have frolic with all its might). But limited strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities, as well as strikes with tactical weapons against deployed formations of Chinese troops, could seem quite reasonable and appropriate. Much would depend on how the Chinese reacted to defeats on the battlefield. If the Chinese leadership had decided to act in a "hit or miss" manner and use its nuclear forces to forestall a decisive and victorious Soviet move, it could well have received a preemptive strike from the Soviets. And since Moscow considered China to be completely insane, it could well have decided to destroy Chinese nuclear forces before they created problems for it.

US reaction

The United States responded to these clashes with caution and concern. The border conflict convinced Washington that the Sino-Soviet split remained intact. However, officials differed in their assessments of the likelihood of a larger conflict and its consequences. The Soviets, through various official and unofficial channels, tried to ascertain the US attitude towards China. Allegedly, the United States reacted negatively to a Soviet probe in 1969 in an attempt to propose joint strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities. But even if Washington did not want to burn China in a nuclear flame, it is unlikely to take any serious action to protect Beijing from Moscow's wrath.

Ten years earlier, Dwight Eisenhower laid out the biggest obstacles in the Soviet Union's war against China: what to do after victory. The Soviets had neither the ability nor the desire to rule another continent-sized territory, especially when there might be massive resistance from a disgruntled population. And the United States, courting the “legitimate” government in Formosa (Taiwan), would happily support various forces of resistance to the Soviet occupation. Had Beijing survived the war, the United States might well have let Chiang Kai-shek off the leash in an attempt to wrest some of its territory from mainland China and bring it under Western rule.

The most likely outcome of such a war could be a short-term success of China, after which the USSR would strike a quick and crushing retaliatory blow against it. Beijing would then fall into an even tighter embrace of the United States, and perhaps it was for this reason that the Soviets decided not to risk it.

Robert Farley is a frequent contributor to The National Interest. He is the author of The Battleship Book. Farley teaches at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His areas of expertise include military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs.

Russia is making a “turn to the East.” China today is considered one of our main strategic partners. However, the two great powers did not always get along peacefully with each other. There were also conflicts, sometimes having the status of local wars.

In the middle of the 17th century, when the Russians found themselves at the borders of China, power in this country was seized by the Manchu imperial Qing dynasty, which did not recognize the annexation of the Amur lands to Russia. The dynasty considered them their ancestral possessions, although before that they had practically not participated in their economic development in any way.

In 1649, a series of so-called Qing border conflicts began.

Siege of Kumarsky fort

One of the major Russian-Chinese clashes of that period. It was preceded by the battle on the Songhua River in 1654, where about 400 Cossacks under the command of the serviceman Onufriy Stepanov (comrade and successor of the famous Russian explorer and warrior Erofei Khabarov) met the Manchu army under the command of Mingandali. According to Stepanov’s report, he was opposed by an army of 3,000 Chinese and Manchus, not including the Duchers and Daurs allied with them.

Despite the clear superiority of the enemy, Stepanov's Cossacks emerged victorious from the battle. However, the surviving Manchus went ashore and dug in. The Cossacks attacked them, but, having suffered losses, were forced to retreat down the river.
Fearing an attack, Stepanov began to restore the abandoned Kumarsky prison. And as it turned out, not in vain.

On March 13, 1655, a Manchu army of 10,000 soldiers besieged the fort. Its defenders successfully repelled several attacks from a much superior enemy. On April 3, 1655, the Manchus were forced to lift the siege due to food shortages. When leaving, the Manchus destroyed all the Cossack boats.

Siege of the Verkhnezeya fort. One to twenty

Russia, realizing that sooner or later the conflict would take armed forms, began strengthening its Far Eastern borders. In the first year of the formal reign of Tsar Peter the Great at that time (1682), a separate Albazin voivodeship was formed. Its center was the town of Albazin - the first Russian settlement on the Amur.

Voivode Alexei Tolbuzin was sent with a detachment of servicemen to defend Albazin.

In November 1682, the Chinese military leader Lantan with a small cavalry detachment visited Albazin, where he explained his appearance by deer hunting. The Russians and Manchus exchanged gifts. In fact, the purpose of the “hunt” was reconnaissance. As a result, Lantan compiled a report in which he assessed the wooden fortifications of Albazin as weak. The Emperor of China “gave the go-ahead” for a military expedition against Russia.

Already in the next 1683, Lantan, who appeared on the Amur with advanced forces, surrounded near the mouth of the Zeya River with his flotilla and forced the surrender of the plows of the Russian detachment of Grigory Mylnik, numbering 70 people, traveling from Albazin to the forts and winter quarters located on the banks of the Zeya River (a tributary of the Amur ).

The Russians, left without reinforcements and food, were forced to leave the Dolon and Selemdzha forts without a fight. In the Verkhnezeysky fort, 20 Russian Cossacks defended against 400 Manchus for almost a year until February 1684. And they were forced to surrender mainly due to extreme exhaustion from hunger.

Defense of Albazin

At the beginning of the summer of 1685, the Qing army of 5 thousand people, not counting the cavalry, approached Albazin on the ships of the river flotilla. According to other sources, there were about 15 thousand people in the Chinese army. Among other things, the attackers had 150 guns. At that time, 826 servicemen, industrial people and arable peasants gathered in Albazin, who formed the garrison of the defenders of the fortress. There were about 450 “professional military” people.

The Russians did not have a single gun in their arsenal (according to other sources, 3 guns). The Manchu demand was conveyed to the fortress: to immediately leave the Amur under threat of death.

On June 10, the Qing flotilla appeared near Albazin. She managed to capture 40 residents of surrounding villages on rafts, who were in a hurry to take refuge behind the fortress walls. When the attackers opened gunfire, it turned out that the log fortifications of Albazin, designed to protect against native arrows, were easily penetrated by cannonballs. According to eyewitnesses, there were cases when one cannonball flew right through the city, breaking through both the northern and southern walls. As a result of fires that broke out in Albazin, grain barns and a church with a bell tower burned down. About 100 people were killed and wounded.

On June 16, early in the morning, the Chinese began their assault. It lasted almost the whole day. The defenders of Albazin fought stubbornly, preventing the Manchus from overcoming the ditch and rampart surrounding the fortress and climbing onto the dilapidated fortifications. Only at 10 o'clock in the evening did the Manchus retreat to their camp.

Lantan gave the order to prepare a new assault. The Chinese filled the fortress moat with brushwood. The Russians were running out of gunpowder supplies, so they could not drive away the enemy by shooting. Fearing that they were preparing to burn the defenders of the fortress along with it, Alexei Tolbuzin turned to Lantan with a proposal to withdraw the garrison and residents from Albazin to the city of Nerchinsk. The Qing command, fearing stubborn resistance and heavy casualties, agreed. The Manchus believed that Nerchinsk was also located on Manchu lands, and demanded that the Russians withdraw to Yakutsk. However, Tolbuzin managed to insist on a retreat to Nerchinsk.

Albazin, rising from the ashes. Second siege

Already in August 1685, Tolbuzin with an army of 514 servicemen and 155 fishermen and peasants returned to the city that was burned and abandoned by the Chinese. By winter, Albazin was rebuilt. Moreover, the fortress was built more thoroughly taking into account the previous siege.

In the spring of 1686, the Chinese tried to capture both the revived Albazin and Nerchinsk. In July, an enemy army of five thousand with forty guns again approached Albazin. The Chinese, who had previously destroyed the surrounding villages in order to deprive the besieged of food supply, sent several previously captured Russian prisoners to Albazin with a demand to surrender. At the assembled circle, the Albazinians made a general decision: “United for one, head to head, and we won’t go back without an order.”

Active hostilities began in July 1686. Already at the very beginning of the siege, Tolbuzin was killed by the Chinese core. Afanasy Beyton took command of the Russian troops. Thanks to heroism and good military organization, Russian losses were approximately 8 times less than those of the Chinese. In September and October, the defenders of Albazin managed to repel two powerful assaults. In the winter of 1686/1687, both the Chinese and Russians began to suffer from famine and scurvy. By December there were no more than 150 defenders of Albazin left. At the same time, losses in battles did not exceed 100 people. But more than 500 died of scurvy. Manchu losses exceeded 2.5 thousand people killed and killed. However, reinforcements constantly approached them. However, the Chinese, who did not know how many defenders remained in the fortress and feared large losses, negotiated and soon lifted the siege.

Thus, the defenders of Albazin held out for almost a year and, in fact, morally defeated their many times superior enemy. True, in August 1689 Albazin was abandoned by the Russians. This was a consequence of the signing of the Nerchinsk Treaty on the Russian-Chinese border between Moscow and Beijing.

Testing the Red Army's strength

The conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway can also be classified as a border conflict. The road itself and the territory around it, according to the agreement between Soviet Russia and China from 1924, were considered joint property. The road even had its own flag, “compiled” from the Chinese five-color flag at the top and the Soviet red flag at the bottom. In the West, the conflict was explained by the fact that the Chinese were not satisfied that in the second half of the 1920s the CER was bringing in less and less profit, becoming unprofitable precisely because of the position of Soviet Russia.

In the USSR, the reasons for the clashes were explained by the fact that the ruler of Manchuria (through whose territory the CER passed, and which at that time was de facto independent of China) Zhang Xueliang was instigated by “Western imperialists” and white emigrants who settled in the border Chinese-Manchu cities, eager to check How strong is the Red Army?

Traditionally, for Russian-Chinese conflicts, the army of the “Celestial Empire” was much more numerous. The Manchus sent more than 300 thousand soldiers to fight Soviet Russia. While on our side, only 16 thousand military personnel took part in the hostilities. True, they were better armed. In particular, the Soviet side actively used airplanes. It was they who contributed to the success of the Sungari offensive operation.

As a result of an air raid on October 12, 1929, 5 of the 11 Chinese ships were destroyed and the rest retreated upstream. After this, troops were landed from the ships of the Far Eastern military flotilla. With the support of artillery, the Red Army captured the Chinese city of Lahasusa. Moreover, the tactics of the Soviet troops were such that, having defeated the enemy, they soon retreated to Soviet territory. This was the case during the Fugda operation that began on October 30. At the mouth of the Songhua River, 8 ships of the Far Eastern military flotilla with a landing force finished off the ships of the Chinese Songhua flotilla located here, then two regiments of the 2nd Infantry Division occupied the city of Fujin (Fugdin), which they held until November 2, 1929, and then returned to Soviet territory.

Military operations that continued until November 19 convinced the enemy of the moral and military-technical superiority of the Soviet troops. According to some estimates, the Chinese lost about 2 thousand people killed and more than 8 thousand wounded during the battles. While the losses of the Red Army amounted to 281 people.

It is characteristic that the Soviet side showed great humanity towards the prisoners and carried out ideological work with them, convincing them that “the Russian and the Chinese are brothers forever.” As a result, more than a thousand prisoners of war asked to remain in the USSR.

The Manchurian side quickly asked for peace, and on December 22, 1929, an agreement was signed, according to which the CER continued to be jointly operated by the USSR and China on the same terms.

Conflict on Damansky. On the brink of a big war

In the series of Russian-Chinese clashes, this was far from the largest, but perhaps the most significant in its geopolitical and historical consequences. Never before have two major world powers been so close to a full-scale war, the consequences of which could have been catastrophic for both sides. And only a decisive rebuff from the Soviet side convinced the Chinese that it was not worth laying claim to the “northern territories”.

Fighting near Lake Zhalanashkol

A few months after the conflict on Damansky, the Chinese once again (the last time at the moment) tried to test the strength of their “northern neighbor” by force of arms. On August 13, 1969, at 5:30 a.m., a total of about 150 Chinese troops invaded Soviet territory in the area of ​​the Kazakh Lake Zhalanashkol.

Until the last moment, Soviet border guards tried to avoid hostilities and enter into negotiations. The Chinese did not react. They took up defensive positions on the Kamennaya hill and began to dig in. Border guards of the Rodnikovaya and Zhalanashkol outposts, with the support of 5 armored personnel carriers, attacked the hill. Within a few hours the height was recaptured. On the Soviet side, 2 border guards were killed. The Chinese lost 19 people.

Less than a month after this conflict, on September 11, 1969 in Beijing, Alexey Kosygin and Zhou Enlai agreed on measures to end the fighting on the Russian-Chinese border. From that moment on, tension in relations between our countries began to decrease.