Afghan operations of the USSR. A brief history of the Afghan war in dates for schoolchildren

Afghan War 1979-1989

Afghanistan

Overthrow of H. Amin, withdrawal of Soviet troops

Opponents

Afghan Mujahideen

Foreign Mujahideen

Supported by:

Commanders

Yu. V. Tukharinov,
B. I. Tkach,
V. F. Ermakov,
L. E. Generalov,
I. N. Rodionov,
V. P. Dubynin,
V. I. Varennikov,
B.V. Gromov,
Yu. P. Maksimov,
V. A. Matrosov
Muhammad Rafi,
B. Karmal,
M. Najibullah,
Abdul-Rashid Dostum

G. Hekmatyar,
B. Rabbani,
Ahmad Shah Masood,
Ismail Khan,
Yunus Khales,
D. Haqqani,
Said Mansur,
Abdul Ali Mazari,
M. Nabi,
S. Mojaddedi,
Abdul Haq,
Amin Wardak,
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,
Syed Gailani

Strengths of the parties

USSR: 80-104 thousand military personnel
DRA: 50-130 thousand military personnel According to NVO, no more than 300 thousand.

From 25 thousand (1980) to more than 140 thousand (1988)

Military losses

USSR: 15,051 dead, 53,753 wounded, 417 missing
DRA: losses unknown

Afghan Mujahideen: 56,000-90,000 (civilians from 600 thousand to 2 million people)

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a long-term political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan (OCSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of Afghan society sympathetic to them, with political and financial support from foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, in accordance with the secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 “Towards the situation in “A””, “in order to prevent aggression from outside and strengthen the southern borders friendly regime in Afghanistan." The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from the emerging special KGB unit “Vympel” killed the current President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By Moscow's decision, the new leader of Afghanistan was a protege of the USSR, former Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague B. Karmal, whose regime received significant and diverse - military, financial and humanitarian - support from the Soviet Union.

Background

"Big game"

Afghanistan is located in the very center of Eurasia, which allows it to play an important role in relations between neighboring regions.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, a struggle for control over Afghanistan began between the Russian and British empires, called the “Great Game”. TheGreatGame).

Anglo-Afghan Wars

The British attempted to establish dominance over Afghanistan by force, sending troops from neighboring British India in January 1839. Thus began the first Anglo-Afghan war. Initially, the British were successful - they managed to overthrow the emir Dost Mohammed and put Shuja Khan on the throne. Shuja Khan's reign, however, did not last long and he was overthrown in 1842. Afghanistan concluded a peace treaty with Britain and retained its independence.

Meanwhile, the Russian Empire continued to actively move south. In the 1860-1880s, the annexation of Central Asia to Russia was basically completed.

The British, concerned about the rapid advance of Russian troops towards the borders of Afghanistan, began the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878. The stubborn struggle continued for two years and in 1880 the British were forced to leave the country, but at the same time leaving the loyal emir Abdur Rahman on the throne and thus maintaining control over the country.

In the 1880-1890s, the modern borders of Afghanistan were formed, determined by joint treaties between Russia and Britain.

Afghan independence

In 1919, Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan's independence from Great Britain. The third Anglo-Afghan war began.

The first state to recognize independence was Soviet Russia, which provided Afghanistan with significant economic and military assistance.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a backward agrarian country with a complete lack of industry, an extremely poor population, more than half of which were illiterate.

Republic of Daoud

In 1973, during the visit of the King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah to Italy, a coup d'état took place in the country. Power was seized by Zahir Shah's relative Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed the first republic in Afghanistan.

Daoud established an authoritarian dictatorship and tried to carry out reforms, but most of them ended in failure. The first republican period in Afghanistan's history is characterized by strong political instability and rivalry between pro-communist and Islamist groups. Islamists launched several uprisings, but all of them were suppressed by government troops.

Daoud's reign ended with the Saur Revolution in April 1978, as well as the execution of the president and all members of his family.

Saur revolution

On April 27, 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan, as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, proclaiming the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. Since 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan.

The further development of the situation in Afghanistan - armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of H. Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet manuals. It warily followed Amin's activities at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under H. Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which led to a drop in its already low morale and caused mass desertion and rebellion. The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, the KGB received information about Amin’s connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.

As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement with a leader more loyal to the USSR. B. Karmal was considered as such, whose candidacy was supported by KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin’s own requests for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim battalion” was sent to Bagram - a special purpose detachment of the GRU - specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. The Chief of the General Staff N. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.

According to V.I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A.N. Kosygin, and from that moment A.N. Kosygin had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage .

On December 13, 1979, the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense for Afghanistan was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S. F. Akhromeyev, which began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment was sent to Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding Soviet troops in Bagram since July 7, 1979 -transport aircraft and helicopters.

At the same time, B. Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet military personnel. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Amin, but he remained alive, and B. Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, a “Muslim battalion” was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which became part of the security brigade of Amin’s palace, which significantly facilitated preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, 2 KGB special groups also arrived in Afghanistan in mid-December.

Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan Military District, the field command of the 40th Combined Arms Army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, combat and logistics support units were prepared for entry into Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - two motorized rifle regiments, a mixed air corps directorate, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, aviation technical and airfield support units. Three more divisions were mobilized as reserves in both districts. More than 50 thousand people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up from the reserves to complete the units, and about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. This was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for transfer to Afghanistan, which was already transferred to airfields in the Turkestan Military District on December 14.

By the evening of December 23, 1979, it was reported that troops were ready to enter Afghanistan. On December 24, D. F. Ustinov signed directive No. 312/12/001, which stated:

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops.

In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed their landing by midday on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. After a skirmish with Afghan soldiers, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

Storming of Amin's Palace

On the evening of December 27, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, and Amin was killed during the assault. Government institutions in Kabul were captured by Soviet paratroopers.

On the night of December 27-28, B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram and Kabul radio broadcast an appeal from this new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the “second stage of the revolution” was proclaimed.

Main events

In July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Parachute Regiment (111 pdp) 105th Airborne Division (105 Airborne Division), the 103rd Airborne Division also arrived in Kabul, in fact, after the regular reorganization in 1979 - a separate battalion 345 OPDP. These were the first military units and units of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

From December 9 to 12, the first “Muslim battalion” arrived in Afghanistan - 154 ooSpN 15obrSpN.

On December 25, the columns of the 40th Army (40 A) Turkestan Military District cross the Afghan border along a pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and gave orders to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to provide assistance to the incoming troops.

  • January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government mutiny by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. About 100 rebels were killed during the battle; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded. At the same time, a directive from the Minister of Defense D. Ustinov appeared on the planning and commencement of military operations - raids against rebel detachments in the northern regions of Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet border, using an equally reinforced battalion and the use of firepower from the army, including the Air Force, to suppress resistance.
  • February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. When passing the tunnel by units 186 SME and 2 zrbr in the complete absence of the commandant's service, a traffic jam formed in the middle of the tunnel due to an accident. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated 2 zrbr. There are no data on Afghans who suffocated.
  • February-March - the first major operation to suppress an armed rebellion in the mountain infantry regiment in Asmara, Kunar province of OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar offensive. On February 28-29, units of the 317th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmara region entered into heavy bloody battles due to the blocking of the 3rd Parachute Battalion in the Asmara Gorge by dushmans. 33 people were killed, 40 people were injured, one soldier was missing.
  • April - The US Congress authorizes $15,000,000 in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition.

The first military operation in Panjshir.

  • May 11 - death of the 1st motorized rifle company of the 66th motorized rifle brigade (Jalalabad) near the village of Khara, Kunar province.
  • June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
  • August 3 - battle near the village of Shaest. In the Mashhad Gorge - the Kishim region near the city of Faizabad, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st MSD was ambushed, 48 servicemen were killed, 49 were wounded. It was one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Afghan war.
  • August 12 - Special forces of the USSR KGB “Karpaty” arrive in the country.
  • September 23 - Lieutenant General Boris Tkach was appointed commander of the 40th Army.
  • September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; death of Major General Khakhalov.
  • October 29 - introduction of the second “Muslim battalion” (177 ooSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev (“Kara Major”).
  • December - defeat of the opposition base in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province).
  • April 5 - during a military operation in western Afghanistan, Soviet troops mistakenly invaded Iranian territory. Iranian military aircraft destroyed two Soviet helicopters.
  • In May-June, the fifth Panjshir operation was carried out, during which for the first time a mass landing of troops was carried out in Afghanistan: during the first three days alone, over 4,000 airborne personnel were landed. In total, about 12,000 military personnel of various military branches took part in this confrontation. The operation took place simultaneously throughout the entire 120 km depth of the gorge. As a result of this operation, Panjshir was captured.
  • November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. As a result of a traffic jam outside the tunnel, more than 176 people died in the tunnel.
  • November 15 - meeting between Yu. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani President, during which he informed him about “ the new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need to quickly resolve the crisis" The meeting also discussed the feasibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.
  • January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen kidnapped a group of Soviet “civilian specialists” numbering 16 people.
  • February 2 - hostages abducted in Mazar-i-Sharif and kept in the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan were released, but six of them died.
  • March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation led by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez with Yu. Andropov. Andropov thanks the UN for “ understanding the problem" and assures the intermediaries that he is ready to undertake " certain steps”, but doubts that Pakistan and the United States will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
  • April - operation to defeat opposition forces in the Nijrab gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
  • May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan " set deadlines for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops».
  • July - Mujahideen attack on Khost. The attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
  • August - the intense work of D. Cordovez's mission to prepare agreements for the peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country was developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about " dialogue with the UN».
  • Winter - fighting intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad Valley (Laghman province is most often mentioned in reports). For the first time, armed opposition units remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases began directly in the country.
  • January 16 - Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft using Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.
  • April 30 - in the Khazar Gorge, during a large-scale military operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
  • October 27 - Mujahideen shoot down an Il-76 transport plane over Kabul using Strela MANPADS.
  • April 21 - Death of the Maravar company.
  • April 26 - uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in Badaber prison, located in Pakistan.
  • May 25 - Kunar operation. Battle near the village of Konyak, Pechdara gorge, Kunar province, 4th company of the 149th Guards. Motorized rifle regiment. Finding themselves surrounded by Mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries - the "Black Storks", the guardsmen of the 4th company and the forces of the 2nd battalion attached to it lost 23 dead and 28 wounded.
  • June - army operation in Panjshir.
  • Summer - a new course of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee towards a political solution to the “Afghan problem”.
  • October 16-17 - Shutul tragedy (20 dead, several dozen wounded)
  • The main task of the 40th Army is to cover the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are brought in. The creation of stronghold fortified areas began in hard-to-reach areas of the country.
  • On November 22, 1985, while carrying out a mission, an outpost of the Motorized Maneuverable Group (MMG) of the Panfilov Border Detachment of the Eastern Border District of the KGB of the USSR was ambushed. In a battle near the village of Afrij in the Zardev Gorge of Badakhshan province, 19 border guards were killed. These were the largest losses of border guards in one battle in the Afghan War of 1979-1989.
  • February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
  • April 4-20 - operation to destroy the Javara base: a major defeat for the Mujahideen. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan’s troops to break through the “security zone” around Herat.
  • May 4 - at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of B. Karmal. The plenum proclaimed the intention to solve the problems of Afghanistan through political methods.
  • June 16 - Military operation "Maneuver" - Takhar province. A long battle on Mount Yafsaj of the 783rd ORB of the 201st MSD - Jarav Gorge, in which 18 scouts were killed and 22 were wounded. This was the second tragedy of the Kunduz Intelligence Battalion.
  • July 28 - M. Gorbachev publicly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army (about 7,000 people) from Afghanistan. Later the withdrawal date will be postponed. There is debate in Moscow about whether to withdraw troops completely.
  • August - Massoud defeated a government military base in Farhar, Takhar Province.
  • August 18-26 - Military operation “Trap” under the command of Army General V.I. Varennikov. Assault on the Kokari-Sharshari fortified area in Herat province.
  • Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from 173 ooSpN 22obrSpN captures the first batch of three Stinger MANPADS in the Kandahar region.
  • October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
  • November 13 - at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: “ We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years. If we don’t change our approaches, we will fight for another 20-30 years" Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev stated: “ There is not a single military task that was set but not solved, and there was no result.<…>We control Kabul and provincial centers, but we cannot establish power in the occupied territory. We have lost the fight for the Afghan people" At the same meeting, the task was set to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
  • December - an emergency plenum of the PDPA Central Committee proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.
  • January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General V.I. Varennikov, was sent to Kabul.
  • February - Operation Strike in Kunduz province.
  • February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
  • March 8 - Mujahideen shelling of the city of Pyanj in the Tajik SSR.
  • March - Operation Thunderstorm in Ghazni province.
  • March 29, 1986 - during the fighting of the 15th brigade, when the Jalalabad battalion, with the support of the Asadabad battalion, defeated a large Mujahideen base in Karer.

Operation Circle in Kabul and Logar provinces.

  • April 9 - Mujahideen attack on a Soviet border post. When repelling the attack, 2 Soviet soldiers were killed and 20 Mujahideen were killed.
  • April 12 - the defeat of the Milov rebel base in Nangarhar province.
  • May - Operation Salvo in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.

Operation "South-87" in Kandahar province.

  • Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the state border.
  • November 23 - Operation Magistral begins to unblock the city of Khost.
  • January 7-8 - battle at height 3234.
  • April 14 - with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
  • June 24 - Opposition troops captured the center of Wardak province - the city of Maidanshahr. In September 1988, Soviet troops near Maidanshahr carried out an operation to destroy the Khurkabul base area.
  • August 10 - Mujahideen took Kunduz
  • January 23-26 - Operation Typhoon, Kunduz province. The last military operation of the SA in Afghanistan.
  • February 4 - the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
  • February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Military Contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, according to the official version, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (Termez). He stated: “There is not a single Soviet soldier left behind me.” This statement was not true, since both Soviet soldiers who were captured by the Mujahideen and border guard units who covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to USSR territory only in the afternoon of February 15 remained in Afghanistan. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out tasks to protect the Soviet-Afghan border in separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.

results

  • Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book “Limited Contingent”, expressed the following opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for the assertion that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country unhindered, fulfilled their tasks - unlike the Americans in Vietnam - and returned home in an organized manner. If we consider the armed opposition units as the main opponent of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us is that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans did only what they could.

The 40th Army faced several main tasks. First of all, we had to provide assistance to the Afghan government in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted of fighting armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent external aggression. These tasks were completed completely by the personnel of the 40th Army.

No one has ever set the task of winning a military victory in Afghanistan to the Limited Contingent. All the combat operations that the 40th Army had to conduct from 1980 until almost the last days of our stay in the country were either proactive or reactive. Together with government forces, we carried out military operations only to prevent attacks on our garrisons, airfields, automobile convoys and communications that were used to transport goods.

Indeed, before the start of the OKSVA withdrawal in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and had not managed to occupy a single large city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not tasked with military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was deputy chief of the operations department of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued constant goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition forces only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan leadership actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000-strong military formations (army, police, state security).

  • After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries announced a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games held in Moscow.

Humanitarian consequences

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was a flow of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a large percentage of whom remain there to this day. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The bitterness of the warring parties reached extreme limits. It is known that the Mujahideen subjected prisoners to torture, among which the “red tulip” is widely known. The weapon was used so widely that many of the villages were literally built from rockets left over from the departure of the Soviet army, residents used rockets to build houses, as ceilings, window and door beams, but statements by the US administration about the use of the 40th chemical weapons army, announced in March 1982, were never documented.

Losses of the parties

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, and several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

USSR losses

Total - 13,833 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper in August 1989. Subsequently, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to those who died from the consequences of wounds and illnesses after leaving the armed forces. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

  • Soviet Army - 14,427
  • KGB - 576
  • Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick.

According to the testimony of Vladimir Sidelnikov, a professor at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, the final figures do not take into account military personnel who died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals on the territory of the USSR.

In a study of the Afghan war conducted by officers of the General Staff under the leadership of prof. Valentin Runova, provides an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in battle, those who died from wounds and illnesses, and those killed as a result of accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

Of the approximately 400 military personnel listed as missing in action during the war, a certain number of prisoners were taken by Western journalists to Western Europe and North America. According to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of June 1989, about 30 people lived there; three people, after the statement by the USSR Prosecutor General that former prisoners would not be subject to criminal prosecution, returned to the Soviet Union. According to data from 02/15/2009 of the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers under the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth (CIS) Member States, 270 people remained on the list of missing Soviet citizens in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Number of dead Soviet generals according to press publications, it is usually four dead; sometimes the figure is 5 dead in Afghanistan.

Title, position

Circumstances

Vadim Nikolaevich Khakhalov

Major General, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Turkestan Military District

Lurkokh gorge

Died in a helicopter shot down by the Mujahideen

Pyotr Ivanovich Shkidchenko

Lieutenant General, Head of the Combat Operations Control Group under the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan

Paktia Province

Died in a helicopter shot down by ground fire. Posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (07/04/2000)

Anatoly Andreevich Dragun

Lieutenant General, Head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces

DRA, Kabul?

Died suddenly during a deployment to Afghanistan

Nikolay Vasilievich Vlasov

Major General, Advisor to the Commander of the Afghan Air Force

DRA, Shindand Province

Shot down by a hit from a MANPADS while flying on a MiG-21

Leonid Kirillovich Tsukanov

Major General, Advisor to the Artillery Commander of the Afghan Armed Forces

DRA, Kabul

Died from illness

Losses in equipment, according to official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc.

Some Soviet military personnel who fought in Afghanistan suffered from the so-called “Afghan syndrome” - post-traumatic stress disorder. Testing conducted in the early 1990s showed that at least 35-40% of participants in the war in Afghanistan were in dire need of help from professional psychologists.

Other losses

According to Pakistani authorities, in the first four months of 1987, more than 300 civilians were killed as a result of Afghan air raids on Pakistani territory.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

In works of culture and art

Fiction

  • Andrey Dyshev. Reconnaissance. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-14711-X
  • Dyshev Sergey. Lost Platoon. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-15709-3
  • Mikhail Evstafiev. Two steps from paradise. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18424-4
  • Nikolay Prokudin. Raid battalion. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18904-1
  • Sergei Skripal, Gennady Rytchenko. Doomed contingent. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-16949-0
  • Gleb Bobrov. Soldier's saga. - M.: Eksmo, 2007 - ISBN 978-5-699-20879-1
  • Alexander Prokhanov. Tree in the center of Kabul. - M.: Soviet writer, 1982. - 240 p.
  • Svetlana Alexievich. Zinc boys. - M.: Time, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-9691-0189-3
  • Frolov I. A. Walks with the flight engineer. Helicopter pilot. - M.: EKSMO, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-699-21881-3
  • Victor Nikolaev. Alive in help. Notes from an "Afghan". - M.: Soft Publishing, 2006. - ISBN 5-93876-026-7
  • Pavel Andreev. Twelve stories. "Afghan War 1979-1989", 1998-2002.
  • Alexander Segen. Lost armored personnel carrier. - M.: Armada-Press, 2001, 224 p. - ISBN 5-309-00098-4
  • Oleg Ermakov. Afghan stories. Mark of the Beast.
  • Igor Moiseenko. Firing sector. - M.Eksmo, 2008

Memoirs

  • Gromov B.V."Limited contingent." M., Ed. group “Progress”, “Culture”, 1994. 352 p. The book by the last commander of the 40th Army contains many documents revealing the reasons for the deployment of troops and describes many events of the war.
  • Lyakhovsky A. A. Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan M., Iskona, 1995, 720 pp. ISBN 5-85844-047-9 Large fragments of the text coincide with the book by B.V. Gromov.
  • Mayorov A. M. The truth about the Afghan war Testimony of the chief military adviser. M., Human Rights, 1996, ISBN 5-7712-0032-8
  • Gordienko A. N. Wars of the second half of the 20th century. Minsk., 1999 ISBN 985-437-507-2 A large section of the book is devoted to the background and course of hostilities in Afghanistan
  • Ablazov V.I."Afghanistan. The Fourth War", Kyiv, 2002; “A cloudless sky over all of Afghanistan”, Kyiv, 2005; “The long way from Afghan captivity and obscurity”, Kyiv, 2005.
  • Bondarenko I. N.“How we built in Afghanistan”, Moscow, 2009
  • Podushkov D. L. Confession to yourself (about participation in hostilities in Afghanistan). - Vyshny Volochyok, 2002. - 48 s.
  • David S. Insbee. Afghanistan. Soviet victory // Flame of the Cold War: Victories that never happened. = Cold War Hot: Alternative Decisions of the Cold War / ed. Peter Tsouros, trans. Yu.Yablokova. - M.: AST, Lux, 2004. - P. 353-398. - 480 s. - (Great Controversies). - 5000 copies. - ISBN 5-17-024051 (alternate war history)
  • Kozhukhov, M. Yu. Alien stars above Kabul - M.: Olympus: Eksmo, 2010-352 pp., ISBN 978-5-699-39744-0

In cinema

  • “Hot Summer in Kabul” (1983) - film directed by Ali Khamraev
  • “Paid for Everything” (1988) - film directed by Alexey Saltykov
  • "Rambo 3" (1988, USA)
  • “Sergeant” (1988) - a film in the film anthology “The Bridge”, dir. Stanislav Gaiduk, production: Mosfilm, Belarusfilm
  • “Scorched by Kandahar” (1989, director: Yuri Sabitov) - a Soviet Afghan officer, decommissioned due to injury, enters the fight against the mafia and, in the end, exposes the criminals at the cost of his own life
  • “Cargo 300” (1989) - film from the Sverdlovsk film studio
  • “Two steps to silence” (1991) - film directed by Yuri Tupitsky
  • “Gorge of Spirits” (1991) - film directed by Sergei Nilov
  • “Afghan Break” (1991, USSR-Italy) - a film by Vladimir Bortko about the war in Afghanistan
  • “The Leg” (1991) - film directed by Nikita Tyagunov
  • “Afghan” (1991) - film directed by Vladimir Mazur. Contrabalt
  • “Afghan-2” (1994) - continuation of the film “Afghan”
  • “Peshawar Waltz” (1994) - a film by T. Bekmambetov and G. Kayumov, in the opinion of “Afghan” veterans, one of the most poignant and truthful films about that war, dedicated to the events in Badaber
  • “Muslim” (1995) - a film by Vladimir Khotinenko about a Soviet soldier who returned home after 7 years in captivity of the Mujahideen
  • “9th Company” (2005, Russia-Ukraine-Finland) - film by Fyodor Bondarchuk
  • “The Soldier’s Star” (2006, France) - a film by French journalist Christophe de Ponfilly about the story of a Soviet prisoner of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The prototype of the main character was one of the participants in the armed uprising in the Badaber camp
  • “Charlie Wilson's War” (2007, USA) - the film is based on the true story of how, during the Afghan War, Texas Congressman Charles Wilson organized the financing of a secret CIA operation to supply weapons to the Afghan resistance forces (Operation Cyclone).
  • "The Kite Runner" (2007)
  • “Afghan War” 2009 - documentary-fiction series with elements of historical reconstruction
  • “Caravan Hunters” (2010) - a military drama based on the works of Alexander Prokhanov “Caravan Hunter” and “Muslim Wedding”.

In music

  • “Blue Berets”: Our Afghan, Afghan break, Silver plane, War is not a walk in the park, Borders
  • “Cascade”: Cuckoo, We leave at dawn, On the Bagram road, I will return, We are leaving, To the motorist warriors, Who needed this war?
  • "Contingent": Cuckoo, Prisoners, Two meters
  • “Echo of Afghanistan”: I was killed near Kandahar, Cigarette smoke
  • "Lube": For you
  • “Survival Instructions”: 1988 - Confrontation in Moscow - Afghan Syndrome
  • Igor Talkov: Ballad of an Afghan
  • Maxim Troshin: Afghanistan
  • Valery Leontyev. Afghan wind (I. Nikolaev - N. Zinoviev)
  • Alexander Rosenbaum. Monologue of the Black Tulip pilot, Caravan, In the Afghani mountains, Rain on the pass, We will return
  • Yuri Shevchuk. War is childish, don't shoot
  • Konstantin Kinchev. Tomorrow May Be Late (album “Nervous Night”, 1984)
  • Egor Letov. Afghan syndrome
  • N. Anisimov. The last monologue of the Mi-8, the song of the helicopter gunner
  • M. Bessonov. My heart aches until it hurts
  • I. Burlyaev. In memory of Afghan helicopter pilots
  • V. Verstakov. Allah Akbar
  • A. Doroshenko. Afghan
  • V. Gorsky. Afghan
  • S. Kuznetsov. An incident on the road
  • I. Morozov. Convoy Talukan-Faizabad, Midnight toast, Helicopter pilots
  • A. Smirnov. For KamAZ drivers
  • I. Baranov. An incident in battle, in the mountains near Peshawar
  • Sprint. Afghanistan
  • Nesmeyana.“A Fur Coat from Afghanistan”, “Bottle”, “Elevator of Love”
  • Collection of Afghan songs "Time has chosen us", 1988

In computer games

  • Squad Battles: Soviet-Afghan War
  • Rambo III
  • 9 Rota
  • The truth about the ninth company
  • Front line. Afghanistan 82

Goals:

  • to find out the causes, course and results of the war in Afghanistan, showing the role of Soviet internationalist soldiers in this military event;
  • draw attention to the consequences of the war for the USSR, emphasizing the heroism of our internationalist soldiers;
  • to instill in students a sense of love for the Fatherland, loyalty to duty, and patriotism;
  • promote the development of students’ skills in obtaining information from various sources, analyzing a historical source, systematizing information, and drawing conclusions.

Preparation for the lesson:

1. The student is given the advanced task “April Revolution in Afghanistan.”
2. If possible, you can use fragments of the feature film “The Ninth Company”, directed by F.S. Bondarchuk, 2005.
3. Handouts.
4. If possible, it is advisable to invite a participant in the war.
5. Map.

DURING THE CLASSES

Motivational talk:

On March 2, 2011, Russian President D.A. Medvedev signed a decree awarding M.S. Gorbachev the highest award of the Russian Federation, the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called Apostle. Historians assess the activities of the first president of the USSR differently, but one cannot deny the fact that under him our country emerged from the debilitating Afghan war. Today in class we will learn more about this event and try to answer the problematic question: “What are the consequences of the USSR’s participation in the Afghan war?”

Information block:

1. Student message: April Revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan On April 27 in Afghanistan, under the leadership of a group of officers, a top military coup was carried out, supported by the army and part of the petty bourgeoisie. The country's president, M. Daoud, was killed. Power passed into the hands of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (created in 1965). It was announced to the whole world that a socialist revolution had occurred. In terms of economic development, Afghanistan was in 108th place among 129 developing countries of the world, at the stage of feudalism with deep vestiges of tribal foundations and a communal-patriarchal way of life. The leaders of the revolution were N. Taraki and H. Amin.

2. Reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

Teacher: On September 15, PDPA leader N.M. Taraki was removed from power. On October 8, on the orders of Amin, he was killed. Opposition protests began in Afghanistan. December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Brezhnev L.I., Suslov M.A., V.V. Grishin, A.P. Kirilenko, A.Ya. Pelshe, D.F. Ustinov, K.U. Chernenko , Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, N.A. Tikhonov, B.N. Ponomarenko) single-handedly made the decision: to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. A.N. Kosygin was not present at the meeting, whose position was negative.

On December 25 at 15:00 the entry of Soviet troops began. The first dead appeared two hours later. On December 27, the storming of Amin’s palace began with special forces from the “Muslim battalion”, KGB groups “Grom”, “Zenith” and its physical elimination.

Next, the teacher invites students to get acquainted with an excerpt from the work of the famous orientalist A.E. Snesarev. “Afghanistan” and try to answer the question: What are the reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan?

“Afghanistan itself has no value. It is a mountainous country, devoid of roads, lacking technical amenities, with a scattered, precarious population; And this population, moreover, is also freedom-loving, proud, and values ​​its independence. The latter circumstance leads to the fact that even if this country can be captured, it is very difficult to keep it in your hands. Establishing an administration and establishing order will require so many resources that the country will never return these expenses; she has nothing to return from.

Therefore we must speak with all sincerity. that in the history of the hundred-year struggle between England and Russia, Afghanistan itself did not play any role, and its value was always indirect and conditional. If you think about the essence of its political value, then it mainly comes down to the fact that Afghanistan includes operational routes to India, and there is no other. This is confirmed by thousands of years of history and the conquerors of India, who always came through Afghanistan.”

“Taking into account the military-political situation in the Middle East, the latest appeal from the Afghan government was considered positively. A decision was made to introduce some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions on the part of neighboring states.”

After the discussion, a note is made in the notebook.

Reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

1) Instability in Afghanistan, which was considered a zone of Soviet influence.
2) The threat of loss of stability in the Central Asian regions of the USSR due to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
3) The desire to maintain the course taken by the Afghan regime towards building socialism.
4) Prevent American influence in Afghanistan.
5) The leaders of the USSR wanted to test the effectiveness of military equipment and the level of training of troops in a real, but local war.

3. Progress of hostilities

Students get acquainted with the stages of the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (the printed text is on the students’ desks)

First: December 1979-February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of security of deployment points.

Second: March 1980-April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, as, for example, in the province of Kunar in March 1983. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Third: April 1985-January 1987. The transition from active operations primarily to supporting Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. The use of motorized rifle, airborne and tank units mainly as reserves and to increase the morale and combat stability of the Afghan troops. Special forces units continued to fight to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Fourth: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national example. Active activities to strengthen the position of the Afghan leadership, providing assistance in the formation of the armed forces of the DRA. Preparation of Soviet troops for withdrawal and their complete withdrawal.

Conversation with students

– What stages stand out in the Afghan war?
– What methods did the Soviet troops use?

Students briefly record the stages of the war.

Teacher: Everyone who fulfilled their international military duty with dignity and honor has earned national respect.

Students watch an excerpt from the film “The Ninth Company” or listen to the memories of a participant in those events.

The student reads K. Savelyev’s poem “And the world is not very fair...”

And the world is not very fair:
people come home
one brings checks from the war.
the other is jaundice or typhus.
And the third in stuffy silence
squeaks with prosthetic straps
and anger rolls in its nodules. when he hears about the war...
Taking train stations into circulation.
breathing army fuel industry,
The people are not old, coming back from the war.
not very affectionate people.
...I remember the fury of shame,
when the shiny warehouse manager
sitting on a suitcase next to him,
He whispered to me: “If only I could go there...”
And motorized riflemen walked by
in sun-burnt Panama hats -
fried veterans
walked into a world broken into pieces.
We went into a world tired of tirades.
not believing other people's crying,
no longer remembering what they mean
soldier chest patches...
Accustomed to hard work,
people come home
some only bring checks,
others - conscience and trouble.
In the twenty-year spring
the conscience came - a boy and a Skoda,
grown a little in two years...
Yes, aged during the war.

4. Results of the war

Teacher:“What are the results of the Afghan war?”
During the conversation and reading the text of the textbook on pp. 392-393 (Zagladin N.V., Kozlenko S.I.

History of Russia XX - early XXI centuries) students make notes in notebooks.

– political defeat of the USSR
– withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
– OKSV did not defeat the armed opposition of the Mujahideen
- The civil war in Afghanistan has resumed.

5. Mistakes of Soviet troops in Afghanistan(discussion with students)

– discrepancy between the existing organizational structure of combined arms formations and the conditions of the theater of military operations. The military formations were too cumbersome.
– an attempt to resolve the conflict with “small forces”, insufficient number of troops.
- Soviet troops were unable to cut off supplies to the rebels from abroad.
– underestimation of the opposing side (at the initial stage)
– insufficient effective use of the latest weapons, especially high-precision ones

6. Consequences of the Afghan War

Students review loss data and draw conclusions.

The losses of the limited contingent of Soviet troops were:
total - 138,333 people, of which 1979 were officers,
combat losses - 11381 people,
Sanitary losses amounted to 53,753 people,
Of these, 38,614 were returned. 6,669 people became disabled.
417 people went missing or were captured, of which 130 people returned as of January 1, 1999.
Losses of equipment and weapons:
tanks – 147
BTR, BMP, BRDM – 1314
guns and mortars - 233, mammoth aircraft - 114, helicopters - 322.

Students write down the following:

Consequences of the Afghan War for the USSR:

– great loss of life
– large material losses
– decline in the prestige of the Soviet armed forces
– the fall of the authority of the USSR in the Muslim world
– decline in the international authority of the USSR
– strengthening the US position

Final control

1. The Afghan war has begun

2. One of the reasons for the Afghan War was:

1) maintain a bridgehead beneficial for the USSR and prevent US influence in Afghanistan
2) raise the international authority of the USSR
3) fulfill the allied duty to the countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization

3. The leaders of the Afghan revolution were:

1) M. Gaddafi
2) A. Sadat
3) N. Taraki

4. The Afghan war led to:

1) new aggravation of international tension
2) allied relations with Muslim countries
3) reduction of strategic weapons

Reflection

1. How I learned the training material

a) very good, I remembered and understood everything
b) good, but needs to be repeated
c) I didn’t understand the main questions of the topic well

2. How I worked in class

a) very active
b) actively
c) preferred not to raise his hand

Homework.§41 pp. 392-393. Write an answer to the question. Do you agree with the opinion of some historians that the Afghan War became “Soviet Vietnam” for our country?

Literature.

  1. N.V. Zagladin, S.I. Kozlenko. S.T.Minakov, Yu.A.Petrov History of Russia of the XX-XXI centuries. “Russian Word”, M., 2011.
  2. V. Andreev. Unexpected war. Voronezh, 2004.
  3. You are in my memory and in my heart, Afghanistan. Materials of the military-practical conference dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Voronezh, 2004.
  4. Encyclopedia for children Avanta. History of Russia, volume 3. Astrel Publishing House 2007.

Source: photochronograph.ru


  • skinning our soldiers on occasion, such lawless Basmachi... but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country is ready to take up arms, it is not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of this thought wars

  • The photos are colorful, lively...thank you...the complexity of the war in Afghanistan from 79-89 was still
    and the fact that the majority fought with the USSR, that is, if these were some separate gang formations of radical fanatics like the Taliban (by the way, the Taliban are also different, and very different) then this would have been half the trouble, but since any invasion of third-party states Under any pretext, even the most reliable one, it is perceived by the Islamic world as a seizure, occupation, uninvited invasion, intervention, etc., etc....then, accordingly, those who were in no way a member of any groups at all take up arms and there .., peacefully herding some sheep, for example, if you watch documentary films... 20 years later, what do the locals think about the war? In Afghanistan, it turns out that almost every 4th person shot at ours, and everyone calmly talks about it ...now all of these storytellers are civilians, they bake cakes, sell behind the counter, work as taxi drivers, etc., etc....and you would never think that 20 years ago they were evil mujahideen...for example, I always use the word mujahideen basmach or dushman got involved with some bastards terarugs
    flaying our soldiers on occasion, such lawless Basmachi... but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country
    ready to take up arms, it’s not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of this war

    Click to expand...

    Everything is correct. From the point of view of the Afghans - We, or the United States, are the invaders. Today there is a lot of talk about whether it was necessary or not to send troops to Afghanistan. I think it was necessary then. Unfortunately. And Eternal Memory to All Soldiers. They fought for their homeland.

  • By the way... there is such a documentary film, very famous in the world and sensational, and there is a reason for this... it was shot by Paul Refsdal, a Norwegian journalist... called "Taliban without a mask" where you can see the classic type of enemy... these are the so-called moderate groups whose main theme is to drive out the invader from their land (that is, patriotically minded comrades) and there are those whose main theme is everything else... that is, those who only hide behind the idea of ​​patriotism - these are usually called radicals... both of them prefer once again don't argue with each other
    but it doesn’t always work out and then wars begin between the clans. During the Afghan War, both of them united against the common enemy of the USSR, .. as ours left, a showdown between clans began... in general, the situation was predictable... then the Americans came.. and again the common enemy,
    True, there is no such unity here as during the Afghan war, there are no national heroes like Massoud... and the situation is a little different... soon Refsdal was kidnapped by radicals... he was filmed... but it cost money later... the man in white is a Helmand hillock ...or something like that...almost the most important, his family after this shelling was covered by US drones and a day later razed to the ground
    after which he probably still had all the reasons to hate Americans)

  • The topic is correct and necessary. Trembling.
    My call came just in time for the withdrawal of OKSVA from the DRA. The company commanders, foreman and platoon commander were from there. Everything is sensitive, undermined... Between the officers and ensigns, from across the river, and those who had never been there, there was an unspoken, silent and not always visible to the eye but clearly felt difference. We young men immediately sensed this and trusted them more than those who had not fought.... Without witnesses, a fighting ensign could have grounded even a major, such incidents sometimes happened to staff officers... To the credit of the officers and ensigns who fought, I will say that in two years I was among them assholes I never met, and among the staff and support sometimes rare specimens came across....... The first category was forgiven a lot, the second were paid with soldier’s hatred and, in especially favorable circumstances, with soldier’s fists. By this time the country was already rushing at full speed towards the cliff and a lot of things that were hidden for the time being and not the best in people were asked to come out....

    89-91. St.s-t, Brest.

    I'll throw in a hazing. Found on the web.

  • 1 December 1 - Remembrance Day for reconnaissance officers of 783 ORB who died on this day in 1984 in a battle near the village of Ishanan (Kunduz province)

    – Captain Karataev A.A. – commander 2 rr
    – junior sergeant Aseev S.I. – squad leader 2 rr
    – Private Tsyganov A.V., gunner-operator 2 rr
    - Private Tukhtaev T.M., reconnaissance officer 2 rr

    Aseev Sergey Ivanovich, junior sergeant, commander of the reconnaissance department. Born on May 9, 1965 in the village of Kalinka, Skopinsky district, Ryazan region. Father - Aseev Ivan Vasilievich, mother - Aseeva Evdokia Kirillovna. In 1983 he graduated from the Moscow Metro Construction School and worked as an installer at Metrostroy. On May 3, 1984, he was drafted into the army by the Pervomaisky district military registration and enlistment office of Moscow. In the Republic of Afghanistan - since November 1984. During a combat operation on December 11, 1984, his reconnaissance company entered into battle with the enemy. During the battle, the fighters of the squad, led by Aseev, attacked the enemy and broke into his positions. Sergei died in battle. For the courage and courage shown during the performance of a combat mission, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously). He was buried in the village of Kalinka, Skopinsky district.

    TSYGANOV Alexey Vladimirovich , private, BMP gunner-operator, b. 01/25/1965 in the village. Shekshema, Sharya district, Kostroma, region. Russian. He studied at the Kolpino ship repair school.
    In Arms. The forces of the USSR were called up on November 3, 1983 by the Zhdanovsky RVK in Leningrad.
    In Rep. Afghanistan since Apr. 1984.
    Participated in 9 combat operations.
    He proved himself to be a brave and courageous warrior.
    12/11/1984 reconnaissance, the company in which he served fought with pr-com. Ts. fought fearlessly and skillfully.
    He incapacitated several rebels with machine gun fire.
    Died on the battlefield.

    He was buried in his native village.

    TUKHTAEV Tuymurod Mukhsinovich , private, rifleman, b. 02/18/1966 on ter. collective farm "Aini" Gijduvan district Bukhara, region. Uzbek SSR. Uzbek. Studied at the Samarkand Cooperative Institute.
    In Arms. The forces of the USSR were called up on 12.4.84 by the Bagishamal RMC in Samarkand.
    In Rep. Afghanistan from Sept. 1984.
    12/11/1984 during combat operations in our region. point Ishan acted in the combat formation of a reconnaissance company.
    Having blocked the village, the company began combing it, but was met with heavy fire from the rebels.
    As part of a group of three people, T. came close to the duct, from behind which the fire was coming, and used grenades to destroy the fire. point.
    During the battle, he was the first to break into the house where the rebels were and opened fire on them.
    He died in this battle.
    Load hord. Red Star (posthumously).
    Buried at home.

  • Dead:

    Deputy commander of the ORB for technical affairs, Major Anatoly Petrovich Yashchenko;
    - deputy commander of the RDR for the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant Kelekhsaev Sergey Aleksandrovich;
    - squad commander Sergeant Petrov Vasily Nikolaevich;
    - squad commander Sergeant Shilov Dmitry Yurievich;
    - senior intelligence officer junior sergeant Kapriyanidi Georgis Ivanovich;
    - senior intelligence officer junior sergeant Dancha Ivan Ivanovich;
    - radiotelegraph operator Private Nikolai Anatolyevich Sorokin.



  • And almost everything is in mountainous areas


    Kandahar Province, Kandahar, 173 OSN, 1987. Original photo
    Scouts of the 173rd separate special forces detachment on a combat exit somewhere east of Kandahar. Pashtun tents are visible in the background, and in front of the scouts in the shadows lie some suitcases and other things that cannot be identified. The scouts are wearing unloading vests (it looks like these are Chinese “chi-coms”), which could hold 6 equipped magazines for a machine gun, 4 grenades, and three additionally have a belt bandoleer underneath for ten VOG-25 grenades of a PG-25 under-barrel grenade launcher.

    From left to right: Captain Kravchenko Andrey Vasilyevich, deputy commander of the 3rd company, senior lieutenant Khamzin Anvar Gumerovich (awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star), senior sergeant of the 3rd company Sergei Zatemov, commander of the 3rd company, captain Prokopchuk Konstantin Viktorovich (died 04/21/1987, awarded two Orders of the Red Banner and the Order of the Red Star).


    Original photo
    In the photo: deputy commander of the security company, senior lieutenant Leonid Igorevich Polyakov, at the outpost of the second drilling station, which produces drinking water for the Kabul garrison, organized near the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, surrounded by the “service” dogs of the outpost - on the left is a shepherd dog brought from the USSR by someone from employees of the drilling rig, and on the right is a local mongrel, nailed to the outpost.

    Dogs were brought from the USSR by military personnel and employees of the Soviet Army, many local homeless stray dogs came to our units, becoming there for their allowance. Basically, they were companions and were used for guard duty, which they performed much better than conscripts, notifying with their barking the approach of uninvited guests. Soviet outposts were built in an open field and were often fenced only with reinforced concrete pillars with barbed wire strung on them, which was not a serious obstacle for the enemy if the guard service was poorly organized. Dogs perfectly filled these gaps in the organization of guarding outposts. After the withdrawal of troops, a huge number of dogs remained in Afghanistan.

    Kabul Province, Kabul, 1351 OBO, 1985. Original photo
    In the photo: at the outpost of the second drilling station, which produces drinking water for the Kabul garrison, organized near the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, on the left is the deputy commander of the security company, Senior Lieutenant Leonid Igorevich Polyakov, on the right is the commander of the security platoon, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Felikov.

  • The photos are colorful, lively... thank you... the difficulty of the war in Afghanistan from 79-89 was also that the majority fought with the USSR, that is, if they were some separate gang formations of radical fanatics like the Taliban (by the way, the Taliban also different, and very different) then this would be half the trouble, but since any invasion by third-party states under any pretext, even the most reliable one, is perceived by the Islamic world as capture, occupation, uninvited invasion, intervention, etc., etc.. .then, accordingly, those who were in no way a member of any groups at all took up arms, and there..., peacefully herding some sheep, for example, if you watch the documentary films... already 20 years later, what do local residents think about the war, then in Afghanistan it turns out that almost every 4th person shot at our people, and everyone calmly talks about it... now all of these storytellers are civilians, they bake flatbreads, sell behind the counter, work as taxi drivers, etc., etc.... you will never think that 20 years ago they were evil mujahideen... for example, for me, the word mujahideen basmach or dushman was always associated with some bastard terarugs
    skinning our soldiers on occasion, such lawless Basmachi... but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country is ready to take up arms, it is not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of this thought wars

    Click to expand...

    If only the Americans had not poured money, weapons, instructors into this war... the complexity would have been much less...
    And if Russia now put in 10% of the efforts spent by the United States, the Americans would be pouring out of Avgan....

  • Nangarhar Province, Jalalabad, 66 Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1985.
    The company has the command of the 9th company.
    From left to right – platoon commander Lt. Loskutov (?), commander of the 9th company Lt. Lt. Aliskerov A., platoon commander Lt. Voronkin S.V., platoon commander Lt. Nazarov (?).

    In the camp of the Afghan opposition, at Pakistani bases, with the participation of American and Pakistani advisers, they developed a plan: to take the border town of Khost, create an alternative government there to Kabul, with all the ensuing consequences.

    Our command conceived Operation "Highway" with the goal of unblocking the Gardez-Khost highway and restoring the food supply to the city's population.

    A gang of dushmans is moving from Pakistan to Afghan territory.

    The Afghan dushmans strongly resembled the Central Asian Basmachi of the 20s and 30s.
    During the operation, which took place from November 23, 1987 to January 10, 1988, the road was unblocked. On December 30, the first convoy with food arrived in Khost. Checkpoints were set up at key heights along the highway.

    However, the Dushman thugs and their American and Pakistani patrons did not accept this situation, and sent their best forces to eliminate the checkpoints, and the Dushman special detachment “Black Stork” was sent to the height 3234 occupied by the 9th company of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment "

    According to legend, this detachment consisted of criminals who had to atone for their guilt before Allah with the blood of infidels. In fact, these were Pakistani special forces dressed in Dushman rags, who, due to their ethnicity, spoke Pashto. That day they wore black uniforms with rectangular black, yellow and red stripes on the sleeves.

    At half past four on the day of January 7, 1988, the dushmans began shelling height 3234. Corporal Fkdotov was killed during the shelling. The rocket was fired from the branch it was under. Under cover of fire from recoilless rifles, mortars and rocket launchers, the bandits approached our positions at a distance of 220 meters. With the onset of dusk, under the cover of massive fire, the dushmans rushed to attack from two directions.

    After 50 minutes the attack was repulsed. The dushmans could not get closer than 60 meters to the main positions. 10-15 dushmans were killed, about 30 were wounded. Junior sergeant Vyacheslav Alexandrov died during the attack.

    The fire of the dushmans was concentrated on the position of Alexandrov, who fired from a Utes heavy machine gun.

    Vyacheslav gave the order to his fighters Obyedkov and Kopyrin to take cover behind the position, while he continued to fire and repelled three enemy attacks.

    Slava Alexandrov shortly before the battle.

    The second assault began at 17.35. The dushmans concentrated their efforts where the Utyos machine gun they had just destroyed stood. But this assault was repulsed.

    During this assault, machine gunner Andrei Melnikov took the brunt of the attack. For a long time, Andrei Melnikov managed to repel numerous enemy attacks with targeted fire and frequent changes of positions. When Andrei ran out of ammunition, the wounded paratrooper managed to throw a grenade into the thick of the militants, but he himself died from an enemy mine exploding. The fragment, having pierced the Komsomol card, a photograph of his wife and daughter, went straight into the heart.

    From the memoirs of the sergeant of the 2nd platoon of the 9th company S. Yu. Borisov, made by him immediately after the battle at height 3234 (based on the book by Yuri Mikhailovich Lapshin - deputy commander of the 345th RPD in 1987-89, “Afghan Diary”).
    “All the attacks of the dushmans were well organized. Other platoons of the company came to our aid, replenished our supply of ammunition. There was a lull, or rather the shooting calmed down. But a strong wind rose, it became very cold. I went down under the rock, where the comrades who had just arrived were .
    At this time, the worst and most terrible attack began. It was light from the explosions of “granikov” (grenades from RPG-7). The Dushmans fired heavily from three directions. They calculated our positions and fired concentrated fire from grenade launchers at the place where Melnikov was with a machine gun. The spirits fired five or six grenades there. He came running down already dead. He fell dead without saying a word. From the very beginning of the battle, he fired from a machine gun, both from our direction and from the one where he received his mortal wound.

    Jr. I ordered Sergeant Peredelsky V.V. to carry all the grenades upstairs, to the stone where all our comrades were. After which he took a grenade and rushed there. Having encouraged the guys to hold on, he himself began to fire.
    The spirits have already approached 20-25 meters. We fired at them almost point-blank. But we didn’t even suspect that they would crawl even closer to a distance of 5-6 meters and from there they would start throwing grenades at us. We simply could not shoot through this pothole, near which there were two thick trees. At that moment we no longer had grenades. I stood next to A. Tsvetkov and the grenade that exploded under us was fatal for him. I was wounded in the arm and leg.
    There were many wounded, they were lying there, and we could do nothing to help them. There were four of us left: me, Vladimir Shchigolev, Viktor Peredelsky and Pavel Trutnev, then Zurab Menteshashvili came running to help. We already had two magazines left for each of us, and not a single grenade. There was even no one to equip the stores. At this most terrible moment, our reconnaissance platoon came to our aid, and we began to pull out the wounded. Private Igor Tikhonenko covered our right flank for all 10 hours and conducted targeted fire from a machine gun. Perhaps, thanks to him and Andrei Melnikov, the “spirits” were not able to get around us on the right side. Only at four o'clock did the spirits realize that they could not take this hill. Having taken their wounded and dead, they began to retreat.
    On the battlefield we later found a grenade launcher, shots for it in different places, and three hand grenades without rings. Apparently, when they tore the rings, the checks remained in the heat. Perhaps these three grenades were literally not enough for the rebels to crush our resistance.
    There was a lot of blood everywhere, apparently they had heavy losses. All the trees and stones were riddled with holes; no living space was visible. The shanks from the "grain" were sticking out in the trees.
    I have not yet written about “The Cliff,” which the “spirits” literally turned into a piece of scrap metal with bullets and shrapnel. We fired from it until the very last minute. One can only guess how many enemy there were. According to our estimates, no less than two or three hundred."

    In total, from eight in the evening to three in the morning, the dushmans went to attack the heights nine times.

    Our artillery provided significant assistance to the defenders, the fire of which was directed under Dushman’s bullets by artillery spotter Senior Lieutenant Ivan Babenko, who was in the positions of the 9th company.

    At a critical moment, the reconnaissance platoon of Senior Lieutenant Alexei Smirnov arrived and delivered ammunition, which made it possible to launch a counterattack and finally decided the outcome of the battle.

    Alexey Smirnov, a graduate of the RVVDKU, led a group of reconnaissance officers that came to the aid of Viktor Gagarin’s platoon.

    The Mujahideen realized that they would not be able to take this mountain. Having taken the wounded and dead, they began to retreat. Pakistani helicopters were waiting for them in a nearby gorge. However, just as they were about to take off, the Tornadoes hit them, and most of the squad was destroyed.

    In the 9th company, six paratroopers were killed, twenty-eight were injured, nine of them seriously. Junior Sergeant Alexandrov and Private Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

    The photo shows the awards ceremony for the soldiers of the 9th company.

    Film "9th Company"
    Many facts in it were distorted. So, the events in the film take place in 1989, and not in 1988, as it actually happened. Also, the losses of the Soviet army in this battle according to the film are almost 100%, while in reality 6 out of 39 people died. The most serious distortion of facts (ALMOST CRIMINAL) is that in the film the paratroopers were “forgotten” at the height and took the battle alone, without any command or support.
    Another distortion is that the battle took place in the highlands, in the snow, and not in the sand, as in the film. The editor-in-chief of the magazine "Combat Brotherhood", a veteran of the War in Afghanistan, Nikolai Starodymov criticized Bondarchuk's film, saying that "the film showed a situation not just that was not there - which in principle could not have happened."

    After the battle, two fighters received the title of "Heroes of the Soviet Union" posthumously.
    This is junior sergeant Vyacheslav Alexandrov and private Andrei Melnikov (in the first photo).
    Eternal glory to the dead...

  • The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

    The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the Afghan leadership as a formal basis.

    The limited contingent (OKSV) was directly drawn into the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became its active participant.

    This conflict involved the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.

    December 25, 1979 The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka Shindand Kandahar, Termez Kunduz Kabul, Khorog Faizabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.

    The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and maintenance units, divisions - 4, separate brigades - 5, separate regiments - 4, combat aviation regiments - 4, helicopter regiments - 3, pipeline brigade - 1, material support brigade 1 and some other units and institutions.

    The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

    1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various facilities.

    2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

    3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

    4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

    April 14, 1988 With the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

    In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Afghanistan began May 15, 1988.

    February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

    Losses:

    According to updated data, in total in the war the Soviet Army lost 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured.

    The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

    The introduction of units and units of the Soviet army and their participation in the civil war in Afghanistan between armed opposition groups and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The civil war began to unfold in Afghanistan as a consequence of the transformations carried out by the pro-communist government of the country, which came to power after the April Revolution of 1978. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, guided by the article on mutual obligations to ensure the territorial integrity of the friendship treaty with the DRA, decided to send troops to Afghanistan. It was assumed that the troops of the 40th Army would provide protection to the country's most important strategic and industrial facilities.

    Photographer A. Solomonov. Soviet armored vehicles and Afghan women with children on one of the mountain roads to Jalalabad. Afghanistan. June 12, 1988. RIA Novosti

    Four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, a pipeline brigade and separate units of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR were introduced into Afghanistan along with support and service units. Soviet troops guarded roads, gas fields, power plants, ensured the functioning of airfields, and transport of military and economic cargo. However, support for government troops in combat operations against armed opposition groups further aggravated the situation and led to an escalation of armed resistance to the ruling regime.

    Photographer A. Solomonov. Soviet internationalist soldiers return to their homeland. Road through the Salang Pass, Afghanistan. May 16, 1988. RIA Novosti


    The actions of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be divided into four main stages. At the 1st stage (December 1979 - February 1980) the introduction of troops, deployment to garrisons and organization of security of deployment points and various objects were carried out.

    Photographer A. Solomonov. Soviet soldiers conduct engineering reconnaissance of roads. Afghanistan. 1980s RIA News

    The 2nd stage (March 1980 - April 1985) was characterized by the conduct of active combat operations, including the implementation of large-scale operations using many types and branches of the armed forces together with government forces of the DRA. At the same time, work was carried out to reorganize, strengthen and supply the DRA armed forces with everything necessary.

    Operator unknown. Afghan Mujahideen fire at a tank column of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from a mountain gun. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

    At the 3rd stage (May 1985 - December 1986) there was a transition from active combat operations primarily to reconnaissance and fire support for the actions of government troops. Soviet motorized rifle, airborne and tank formations acted as a reserve and a kind of “support” for the combat stability of the DRA troops. A more active role was assigned to special forces units conducting special counterinsurgency combat operations. The provision of assistance in supplying the armed forces of the DRA and assistance to the civilian population did not stop.

    Cameramen G. Gavrilov, S. Gusev. Cargo 200. Sealing a container with the body of a deceased Soviet soldier before being sent to his homeland. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

    During the last, 4th, stage (January 1987 - February 15, 1989), the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops was carried out.

    Cameramen V. Dobronitsky, I. Filatov. A column of Soviet armored vehicles moves through an Afghan village. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

    In total, from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, 620 thousand military personnel served as part of a limited contingent of DRA troops (in the Soviet army - 525.2 thousand conscripts and 62.9 thousand officers), in units of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - 95 thousand people . At the same time, 21 thousand people worked as civilian employees in Afghanistan. During their stay in the DRA, the irretrievable human losses of the Soviet armed forces amounted to (together with border and internal troops) 15,051 people. 417 military personnel went missing and were captured, of which 130 returned to their homeland.

    Cameraman R. Romm. Column of Soviet armored vehicles. Afghanistan. 1988. RGAKFD

    Sanitary losses amounted to 469,685 people, including wounded, shell-shocked, injured - 53,753 people (11.44 percent); sick - 415,932 people (88.56 percent). Losses in weapons and military equipment amounted to: aircraft - 118; helicopters - 333; tanks - 147; BMP, BMD, armored personnel carrier - 1,314; guns and mortars - 433; radio stations, command and staff vehicles - 1,138; engineering vehicles - 510; flatbed vehicles and fuel tankers - 1,369.

    Cameraman S. Ter-Avanesov. Paratroopers reconnaissance unit. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

    During their stay in Afghanistan, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 86 military personnel. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals of the USSR.

    Photographer A. Solomonov. A checkpoint of a limited contingent of Soviet troops protecting the Kabul airfield from Mujahideen attacks. Afghanistan. July 24, 1988. RIA Novosti

    Cameramen G. Gavrilov, S. Gusev. Soviet helicopters in the air. In the foreground is a Mi-24 fire support helicopter, in the background is a Mi-6. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

    Photographer A. Solomonov. Mi-24 fire support helicopters at Kabul airfield. Afghanistan. June 16, 1988. RIA Novosti

    Photographer A. Solomonov. A checkpoint of a limited contingent of Soviet troops guarding a mountain road. Afghanistan. May 15, 1988. RIA Novosti

    Cameramen V. Dobronitsky, I. Filatov. Meeting before a combat mission. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

    Cameramen V. Dobronitsky, I. Filatov. Carrying shells to the firing position. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

    Photographer A. Solomonov. Artillerymen of the 40th Army suppress enemy firing points in the Paghman area. Suburb of Kabul. Afghanistan. September 1, 1988. RIA Novosti

    Cameramen A. Zaitsev, S. Ulyanov. Withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. A column of Soviet armored vehicles passes along the bridge over the river. Panj. Tajikistan. 1988. RGAKFD

    Cameraman R. Romm. Military parade of Soviet units on the occasion of their return from Afghanistan. Afghanistan. 1988. RGAKFD

    Cameramen E. Akkuratov, M. Levenberg, A. Lomtev, I. Filatov. Withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov with the last armored personnel carrier on the bridge over the river. Panj. Tajikistan. February 15, 1989. RGAKFD

    Cameramen A. Zaitsev, S. Ulyanov. Soviet border guards at a border pillar on the border of the USSR and Afghanistan. Termez. Uzbekistan. 1988. RGAKFD

    Photos are borrowed from the publication: Military Chronicle of Russia in Photographs. 1850s - 2000s: Album. - M.: Golden-Bi, 2009.