Punishment squad major game read. Million for Kara Major

On October 29, 1981, the 2nd Muslim battalion was introduced into Afghanistan, which later became legendary...

It was formed from Kazakhs, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. However, representatives of other nationalities could also be found there, but to a much lesser extent.

The battalion was commanded by Major Boris Kerimbaev, about whom our story will go.

But first things first.

So, it's 1979. The leadership of the USSR comes to the conclusion that the situation in Afghanistan is changing rapidly, which means it is necessary to introduce small military units there. To support friendly forces, of course.

In the same year, by directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the 1st Muslim battalion was created in the city of Chirchik (Tashkent region).

The personnel were mainly Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. True, Russians also served in the battalion. The number was small - only 532 people, and Major Khabibdzhan Kholbaev was appointed commander.

The battalion took an active part in the overthrow of Hafizullah Amin, the chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan. After a successful operation, the unit returned home and was disbanded.

But when it became clear that the situation in Afghanistan was going to drag on, it was decided to form a similar detachment, because past experience was considered successful.

By that time, the 177th separate GRU special forces detachment had already been created in Kapchagai, but it was preparing for combat operations in another region - on the territory of the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. However, Afghanistan posed a greater challenge and it was this unit that later became known as the 2nd Muslim Battalion.

As already mentioned, Boris Kerimbaev, who received a military education at the Tashkent Higher Command School named after. V.I. Lenin.

Boris Kerimbaev

In September 1981, the detachment passed the combat training test, and on October 29 crossed the border of the USSR for redeployment to Afghanistan.

The first location was the city of Meineme. Already on November 7, the detachment received a baptism of fire, suffering its first losses. The personnel had to retrain, adapting to new, very harsh conditions. It was in Meinem that Kerimbaev received the nickname Kara Major - that’s what he was called not only by his own fighters, but also by the Mujahideen.

In January 1982, the detachment took part in a military operation near the village of Darzob, then garrisoned there for four months, conducting reconnaissance and search raids. At the same time, the Muslim battalion provided all possible assistance to the local population and established relationships with the elders. When Kerimbaev’s battalion received the order to relocate, an interesting fact happened - the elders of Darzob wrote a letter to the head of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, asking him to leave part of Kara Mayor with them on full allowance. At the end of May, the detachment received the task of occupying the Panjshir Gorge, which had just been liberated by Soviet troops.

Fulfilling the command's order, Kara Major and his detachment entered the Panjshir Gorge and settled in the village of Rukha. It should be noted that this famous gorge was an ideal place for guerrilla warfare.

Also near it begins the famous Salang Pass. It is here that the strategically important Hairatan-Kabul highway passes. It carried military and civilian cargo from the USSR to Afghanistan. The actual owner of this gorge was the famous field commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was distinguished by his high intelligence, vast experience in guerrilla warfare and enjoyed great authority among the population. His name was the Lion of Panjshir.

Ahmad Shah swore on the Koran that he would drive the Muslim battalion out of Panjshir within a month, but was unable to fulfill his promise. Kara Major had only 500 officers and men against Ahmad Shah's small army. Among the Mujahideen, the warriors of Lev Panjshir were rightfully considered the most selective and motivated fighters.

Initially, Kara Major's detachment needed to hold the gorge for only a month. However, the 177th detachment held out for about a year. The Kerimbaevites themselves very successfully used guerrilla tactics and inflicted very noticeable blows. Enraged by these failures, Lev Panjshir promised 1 million dollars for the head of Kara Major.

Despite these circumstances, Kerimbaev’s detachment forced Masud to conclude a temporary truce with the command of the 40th Army. It is not surprising that the first condition on Masud’s part was the demand to withdraw the Muslim battalion from the Panjshir Gorge. It was carried out - the detachment was taken to the village of Gulbahor in Parvan province.

Subsequently, the unit successfully fought in all the hot spots of Afghanistan. In February 1989, the 177th GRU special forces detachment was the last to leave Afghanistan.

When the Kerimbaevites entered Afghanistan on October 29, 1981, they gave their word that after the war, 28 Panfilovites would meet every year in Alma-Ata in the park. And now it’s almost 30 years since they meet in the park...

Five future generals emerged from the ranks of this glorious military unit: Mukan Dyusekeyev, Saken Zhasuzakov, Mels Bekboev, Taalai Shaatemirov and Rinat Mereddurdyev. They formed the backbone of the armies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

Sergei Yakimansky went into construction business and became the owner of a construction company. He is famous for having built the Rukha boarding house on the southern shore of Issyk-Kul. Next year, he and his fellow soldiers intend to erect a monument there to those killed from the 177th detachment and all participants in the war in Afghanistan.

ASTANA, January 12 - Sputnik, Daniyar Dautaliev. In Almaty, the legend of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan, a veteran of the Afghan war, commander of the 177th separate special forces detachment of the main intelligence department of the USSR General Staff, retired colonel Boris Kerimbaev, is celebrating his 70th anniversary.

Kara Major

Boris Kerimbaev was born on January 12, 1948 in the Almaty region. After graduating from the Tashkent Higher Command School in 1970, he was sent to serve in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In January 1981, he was appointed commander of the 177th separate special forces detachment.

By this time, the war in Afghanistan was already in full swing. The battalion, commanded by Major Kerimbaev, was nicknamed “Muslim”, as it was formed from representatives of Asian nationalities: Kazakhs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz. It was for the command of this battalion that the nickname “Kara-major” (“Black Major”) was assigned to him for the rest of his life.

In September 1981, a special forces detachment was sent to Afghanistan. The first location of the second “Muslim” battalion was the city of Maymene in the province of Faryab.

“Having occupied all the dominant heights around the village of Rukha, correctly placing security posts, the 177th separate special forces detachment blocked all movement along the Pandshir Gorge and fettered the actions of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s formations for 9 months, despite their numerical superiority,” - this is just one episode from Kerimbaev’s military merits.

Ahmad Shah Massoud offered a million dollars for the head of “Kara Major”, but in the end he was forced to conclude a truce with the Soviet troops.

Shapan from the Akimat of Almaty region

At the end of 1983, Boris Kerimbaev gave up his position as commander of a special forces detachment and was sent to the Central Asian Military District. Demobilized from the army in 1992.

Hero Reward

The anniversary of the legendary officer was celebrated in a solemn atmosphere at the Army House. Representatives of the high command of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan, colleagues, active military personnel and cadets arrived to congratulate Boris Tukenovich on his 70th anniversary.

As Mukhamedzhan Talasov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of Kazakhstan, noted, Boris Kerimbaev, having gone through the crucible of the Afghan war, remains in service today and is engaged in public activities. From his students, yesterday's lieutenants and captains, a whole galaxy of generals grew up: the Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan Saken Zhasuzakov, Mukan Dyusekeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of Kyrgyzstan Mels Bekboev. Mukhamedzhan Talasov presented the hero of the day with the “El Korgany” medal of the first degree for his contribution to strengthening the defense capability and military-patriotic activities of Kazakhstan.

Representatives of the akimats of Almaty and the Almaty region also noted the merits of Boris Kerimbaev and gave him gifts. The current commander of the newly formed 177 special forces detachment in Almaty assured Boris Kerimbaev that the traditions he had established would be continued and the fighters would complete the tasks assigned to them. For the servicemen of the unit, he will be an example of courage, honor and bravery and what a real commander should be.

Khabib Khalbaev and Boris Kerimbaev

As part of the anniversary celebration, a presentation of the book “The Second Muslim Battalion. Special forces from Kazakhstan,” written by a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, reserve colonel Amangeldy Zhantasov.

Particularly touching was the meeting of Boris Kerimbaev with the commander of the first Muslim battalion, now colonel of the reserves of Uzbekistan, Habib Khalbaev, with whom they had never met until today.

“I saw a monument to the hero of the Great Patriotic War, a Kazakh son, Bauyrzhan Momyshuly. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union after the end of the war. I think, Boris Tukenovich, his service in Afghanistan, he is worthy of the title of Hero of Kazakhstan. Society needs to petition before President of Kazakhstan, during this man’s lifetime, to award him the title of Hero of the Republic of Kazakhstan. He is worthy of this title,” said Khabib Khalbaev to a storm of applause in the hall.

Boris Kerimbaev kisses the banner of the special forces detachment

"There are no bad soldiers in the army"

“You are learning the science of defending the Motherland. Remember once and for all, this must remain in your brain, since you have cast your lot in becoming officers, that there are no bad soldiers in the army, there are only “bad officers,” Kerimbaev said.

He thanked the leadership of the Almaty Combined Arms Command School, from whose graduates the special forces detachment was mainly formed.

“They needed less training to shoot and run, but I taught them reconnaissance. My main task was to lead them on operations, and the main task was to return them home alive. Yes, in 2 years, 2 months and 5 days I lost 45 people there. There is no war without the dead,” he said, asking the audience to stand and observe a minute of silence in memory of the soldiers who did not return.

The audience in the hall was shown a documentary film about the life and fate of Boris Kerimbaev.

“From the bottom of my heart, I want to thank you. Guys, take care of your health, it’s necessary, healthy you are needed everywhere, but you won’t be needed like this. Dear guys, you are all grandfathers, your grandchildren are growing up, your children are growing up. Thank you very much for being were with me, did not give up, went forward wherever I told them. You were courageous guys: soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, officers. I bow to you. Thank you," Boris Kerimbaev addressed his colleagues in conclusion.

“The most valuable thing is that when you become a commander there, in Afghanistan,

you feel a responsibility that is not easy to bear

shoulders, is, first of all, people’s lives.”

Boris Tukenovich Kerimbaev

War in Afghanistan 1979-1989 remained in history as the most controversial, incomprehensible and even unknown. Its pages are scattered and blurred, its meaning is not defined, its experience has not been studied, it has left problems that we have not yet solved, and we do not know the answers to many questions. Although there are many participants in this war in Kazakhstan, society is little informed about their fate and problems, the significance of their contribution to the military industry of Kazakhstan, etc. After all, there are military secrets, the military experience of the “Afghans,” the strategy and tactics of local wars that are necessary for the new generation of soldiers.

When will we appreciate our heroes?

Any comparison is lame, but without it it is difficult to navigate: if in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. guidelines were basically defined, heroes were recognized, its significance and experience were studied already during the war, but this did not happen in the Afghan war even after decades of its end. For example, what do we know about the famous hero of the Afghan war Boris Kerimbaev, known as “Kara Major” (in Turkic languages ​​the word “Kara” means black, formidable, great, large, etc.)?

Boris Tukenovich does not have the official title of Hero, although at one time they wanted to assign him for a successful special operation... posthumously, but the major not only survived the Afghan “meat grinder”, but also saved the lives of his soldiers. Having appeared in Afghanistan in October 1981, by the summer of 1982 the 177th separate special forces detachment (177th ooSpN) of the 15th separate special forces brigade of the GRU of the USSR General Staff had become the most reliable part of the Soviet contingent. During the time spent in Afghanistan, according to various estimates, about a thousand people passed through this so-called Muslim battalion of Kerimbaev. Of these, only 50 were killed, including four officers. Kerimbaev became the first among the commanders whose combat losses were the least.

If we look at the activities of famous commanders, then this is their talent: to smash a numerically superior enemy, protecting each of their warriors from death. Most of the Kara Major fighters died in Panjshir. But there they are

opposed by a large group of the influential field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, later the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan, and the “shuravi” (as Soviet soldiers were called in Afghanistan) - only about 500 people.

Did the homeland pay tribute to its hero? Unfortunately, today our native state has practically forgotten about the legendary Grozny Major. Suffice it to say that Kara Major was recognized as a great warrior even by Ahmad Shah, who could not do anything for 8 months with his battalion in the 120 km long Panjshir Gorge. This battalion commander became famous for being called the personal enemy of the “Lion of Panjshir” Ahmad Shah, in contrast to whom Kerimbaev was called the “King of Panjshir.” Ahmad Shah even offered a million dollars for the head of this extraordinary tactician of guerrilla warfare in mountain gorges, but in the end he was forced to conclude a temporary peace treaty with the leadership of the 40th Army.

At the beginning of March 1983, having held out in Panjshir for more than 8 months, having lost 45 people killed and one soldier missing, the 177th detachment emerged from the gorge undefeated by a numerous enemy.

The military merits of Major Kara were awarded with the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of Service to the Motherland, third degree. Of course, the battalion commander deserves more. Although they say: there is honor according to merit, in life the opposite often happens - honor is not due to merit.

Recently I asked Boris Tukenovich: “How does our state treat you?” The retired colonel answered laconically: “As for all Afghans.”

Of course, this attitude towards their illustrious war veterans is surprising. At one time, we were indignant at the unfair treatment of national heroes in the USSR: Bauyrzhan Momyshuly, Rakhimzhan Koshkarbaev, etc. After gaining independence, little changed in this regard. Among those who are worthy of the title of Khalyk Kaharmany, without a doubt, the legendary Kara Major is in the first line. Of course, heroes should be honored and given honor during their lifetime, and not posthumously. When will we learn to appreciate our heroes?

Now retired colonel Boris Kerimbaev lives in a dacha near Almaty. In recent years, he has often been sick - his injuries make him aware, and instead of a quiet dacha, sometimes the veteran has to spend time in a military hospital in Almaty. And if the state would adequately celebrate the merits of Kara Major, this would be the best therapy for the war hero.

“Momyshuly Spiral” or false flight

To my question: “Is your experience of the war in Afghanistan studied in our military institutions?” he said, “I don’t know.” Judging by this answer, extensive information about the special operation in Panjshir, about the soldiers and officers who took part in it, the Kara major who led it, the experience of special forces in guerrilla warfare in mountainous conditions is not studied in military universities.

Yes, our special forces train in the mountains, and the possibility of waging war in mountainous conditions is relevant in Central Asia, for example, with the same terrorists. Why not study the ready-made survival experience of the 177th Special Forces Detachment in the same conditions?

Everyone is learning from someone else's experience. When Kara Major's detachment ousted the dushmans in one of the partisan onslaughts, in Rukh, in the house of Ahmad Shah, a curious trophy was found - a book by the famous commander of the partisan detachment in the Great Patriotic War, Sidor Kovpak. It turned out that it was for the “Lion of Panjshir” a reference manual on the tactics and strategy of guerrilla warfare. By the way, Boris Kerimbaev also mentions the need to study experience in his book “Kapchagai Battalion”: “The situation itself taught us a lot, and the experience of the Great Patriotic War, especially the partisan war, helped us.”

If the partisans of the experienced Ahmad Shah could not resist the small “Kapchagai battalion,” then it turns out that Kara Major had an unsurpassed strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare in mountainous conditions. It is unlikely that the “Lion of Panjshir” was able to guess the military secret - how was it that a handful of fighters were able to resist his numerous and heavily armed warriors for almost a year?

Again for comparison. Bauyrzhan Momyshuly was known already in the first year of the war, and with the publication of Alexander Bek’s story “Volokolamsk Highway” in 1943, the name of the senior lieutenant spread throughout the world. Bauyrzhan Momyshuly went down in the history of military science as the author of tactical maneuvers and strategies that are still studied in higher military educational institutions in many countries around the world. For example, in the Israeli Defense Forces, at the officer school, along with weapons and a siddur (prayer book), they gave out the book “Volokolamsk Highway” in Hebrew, which served as a training manual for officers.

B. Momyshuly brilliantly put into practice the tactics of fighting with small forces against an enemy many times superior in strength, which later received the name “Momyshuly’s spiral.” As B. Momyshuly explained: “I call it a spiral because all the battles of the Panfilov division near Moscow are characterized by the fact that it cut the path, jumped to the side and carried the enemy along with it, took him 10 kilometers away, then with a jerk stood in his path again , left again. With such maneuvers, the enemy’s forces are dispersed, and our units again enter the highway. This, in the real sense of the word, exhausting the enemy gave a gain in time.”

Historically, this is a war tactic used by steppe nomads. This is psychological “sabotage”, introducing split and confusion into the enemy’s camp, maneuverability, stretching out a numerous enemy with false, disorderly retreats, feigned flights, wearing him down and leading him away from the main supply base, ambushes

the path of his advance, sudden attacks by individual detachments from the flanks, an unexpected turn towards a tired enemy, etc. Essentially, this is the same guerrilla strategy.

Special forces of Kara Major: these are saboteurs and... creators

This guerrilla strategy was used by Boris Tukenovich in the mountainous areas. As the colonel said, he had to learn to navigate at night as during the day in order to move at night and use the factor of surprise; taught his fighters, like hunters, to patiently wait for hours for the enemy under the scorching sun. Like a nomad in the steppe, Kara Major, looking at the sky, could determine what the weather would be like tomorrow. He knew in the mountains all the inconspicuous caravan routes for pack animals, which served as channels for the transfer of enemy weapons and ammunition.

After all, the “Kapchagai battalion” was initially trained as a special forces detachment in Kapchagai, where the fighters were taught the basics of sabotage work behind enemy lines by reconnaissance captain Boris Kerimbaev. Daily cross-country runs of 20-30 km, thousands of push-ups, shooting, hand-to-hand combat, jumping from helicopters and airplanes, training in mine warfare, sabotage operations, etc. As a result, the soldiers under the leadership of Kara Major in combat conditions turned not just into partisans, but into universal, elusive and professional saboteurs who created chaos behind enemy lines, thus drawing off most of their forces.

And in accordance with the words of Alexander the Great, “Attack is the best form of defense,” the battalion commander and his soldiers undertook offensive actions very similar to the tactics of the nomads. They avoided open battles, preferring sabotage, raids on caravans, ambushes, false maneuvers, unexpected assaults on heights, they tried to push the Mujahideen against each other, “set them up”, etc. The eternal art of partisans - to be unnoticed, to sneak, to hide, to wait, to destroy and to leave unnoticed - was fully mastered by the “Afghans” of the 177th detachment.

In addition, Kerimbaev successfully combined the talent of a combat commander, analytical abilities and diplomatic gifts. Kara Major knew how not only to fight, but also to establish contacts with numerous opponents. After all, in that region of Afghanistan there were different forces and groups operating: some had to be fought, some had to be negotiated with, and some had to be pitted against each other.

Who are the partisans? These are military units operating deep behind enemy lines, where there are also civilians. And here the organizational, diplomatic, and economic abilities of the commander and his subordinates come into play in order to win over the local population. And on this front, Kara Major won a victory: he established trusting relationships with the elders of nearby villages, and provided all possible assistance to the local population. For example, local residents fell ill - help came in the form of Soviet military doctors. "Afghans" built schools, roads, hospitals.

Gaining the trust of the local population in a country at war is worth a lot. This is the highest assessment of the commander’s humanity and justice. As Colonel Boris Kerimbaev recalls, “war is war, but even between battles it was necessary to engage in peaceful labor. This was the case when we were engaged in restoring everything destroyed in Darzob.

Seeing this, the people began to return to the village. Every week on Thursday, the commander of the Afghan regiment and I gathered the elders, and we planned work to ensure the livelihoods of the population. The good attitude of the local population towards us was also evidenced by the fact that when I received the command to return to our previous place of deployment and we began to gather, the elders of Darzob wrote a letter to Babrak Karmal with a request to leave part of it with them at their full allowance.”

One of my questions concerned the secret of the military successes of the “Kapchagai battalion”. Boris Tukenovich’s answer to this question: “He taught, demanded from his subordinates, and he himself organized military operations in such a way as to prevent the death of his soldiers. Therefore, the detachment never rushed headlong into the unknown; there was always well-prepared intelligence information about the enemy, about his location, forces and plans, and there were local informants. Of course, this includes physical, combat, tactical, moral and other training of personnel. Yes, sometimes it was very scary - what if during the battle I, as a commander, did not have enough knowledge, skills, determination or courage and because of this the soldiers subordinate to me would die. Therefore, we planned every battle, even a small military operation, in the most careful manner.”

Without Afghan War Syndrome

As for the place of the Afghan war in the history of Kazakhstan, there are many different interpretations. Of course, they will say: the war in Afghanistan - on foreign territory - was waged by a country that no longer exists. Yes it is. But there are still soldiers and officers who fulfilled their military duty to their former homeland and lived their best years in this war, there are still military traditions, military service, the same military duty to their homeland, the military experience of the “Afghans” that needs to be studied, etc. .d. Many participants in the Afghan war still live with memories of the past - this was their life, their campaigns, the loss of friends, injuries and the meaning of their life at that time, which they did not choose.

Ernest Hemingway, who took part in many wars and was very biased in this matter, in the preface to the novel “A Farewell to Arms!” expressed his attitude towards the war in this way: “Those who fight in the war are the most wonderful people, and the closer you are to the front line, the more wonderful people you meet there; but those who start, incite and wage war are pigs who think only about economic competition and the fact that they can make money from it. “I believe that everyone who profits from the war and who helps to incite it should be shot on the very first day of hostilities by the trusted representatives of the honest citizens of their country whom they send to fight.”

Needless to say, our soldiers in Afghanistan were not of their own free will all the time on the front line, where the front line often ran everywhere, “here and now”: during the day, the “peaceful” Afghan peasant was on the field, and at night he went out on the warpath. This front line passed through every village located near the military unit; if there was contact with its inhabitants, or better yet, their trust, material, medical and other assistance from the “shuravi”, then this line was moved back to the next village.

But the main “front line” in the war was in the souls and hearts of soldiers and officers. War is always evil, but in combat conditions it is more difficult to preserve a person within oneself, the ability to value someone else’s life as one’s own; it is in war that people begin to understand male friendship, the feeling of a brotherly shoulder, the support of a commander. And the words of Kara Major are the words of a real commander and hero: “The most valuable thing is that when you become a commander there, in Afghanistan, you feel a responsibility that is not easy to carry on your shoulders - this is, first of all, the lives of people.” Although Boris Tukenovich was not much older than his subordinates, they called him “Batya” for his paternal attitude towards his soldiers, for his paternal responsibility for his children.

And, of course, the state and society must change their attitude towards this war and its participants. Now we must learn to live without the syndrome of the Afghan war and pay tribute to its participants...

When will the law on Afghans be adopted?

February 15, 2016. On the 27th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the legendary intelligence officer and hero of “Afghan” was sent a medal from Moscow.

Of course, I couldn’t help but ask the following question: what is the main problem our “Afghans” have?

Boris Tukenovich answered bitterly: “The Afghans have a lot of problems. Where to put more than 2000 disabled people? Yes, little can be changed in their lives now, but they especially need social benefits, because these are already elderly people, these are the most vulnerable segments of the population. After Afghanistan, in peacetime, people die, and sometimes their relatives have nothing to bury them with. And there are also problems with treatment - we have to negotiate privately with military hospitals in order to admit the guys for treatment.

The main problem is when will the law on participants in the war in Afghanistan be adopted? 27 years have passed since the end of this war, but the status of the “Afghans” has not yet been determined! We were equated with participants in the Second World War, but we are participants in another war. Although, I think, until this law is passed, many problems will become irrelevant. Life is changing so rapidly that the provisions of the old law have long been outdated. For example, you can no longer get medicines for free anywhere. The same applies to free prosthetics, summer cottages, etc. Yes, war was not officially declared in Afghanistan, but it happened and we fought there. Therefore, we should be considered full participants in the war - the state sent us there and we carried out the order. The position of some officials “we didn’t send you there” still exists today. It’s as if all 22 thousand veterans from Kazakhstan went there voluntarily to earn money. This attitude greatly humiliates the “Afghans” and embitters them.”

My last question: how should we view the Afghan war and its place in the soul of a battalion commander.

Colonel Boris Kerimbaev replied: “History should not be forgotten! I cannot betray the memory of my guys. Why do I celebrate February 23? I was carrying the body of a friend who had been hit by a shrapnel in the cervical artery, he died in my arms, and this happened right before February 23rd. And I understand this day as a day of remembrance, as a day of continuity of generations, in any case, we all came out of the Soviet military overcoat.

As for the place of this war in my soul, these are, of course, individual impressions, personal perceptions and memories. A person has a soul, a restless heart, and I, like any “Afghan,” cannot help but think about what happened in Afghanistan. Sleepless nights in thought, the teasing voice of conscience, thoughts about the countless victims of the Afghan war, scenes of the death of comrades... In this difficult spiritual struggle, something grows in you, moral suffering opens up the abyss of existence deeper. And you understand that your enemy on the other side of the front could turn out to be the same person as you, perhaps even morally and intellectually more developed than you, because his unfortunate, tormented people were not covered by the shield of the empire. The colossal sacrifices of his people, the daily scenes of the misfortunes of war turned him into a thinker, but not an avenger..."


And more than 30 years ago, it was at the Headquarters of the Central Asian Military District, which was located on the corner of Zhandosov Street and Pravda Avenue, that the creation of a future combat unit was planned and the range of combat missions for which it was created was calculated.
And the Initial Task, it should be noted, was quite unusual - conducting reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the territory of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China.
Yes Yes exactly. Nobody heard correctly.
By the end of the 70s, tensions between the PRC and the USSR reached their maximum. The military units stationed along the entire Soviet-Chinese border were strengthened and rearmed at an accelerated pace. A powerful group of one tank division and three motorized rifle divisions, a strategic aviation division in Chagan near Semipalatinsk, and an aviation fighter-bomber division in Taldykorgan were concentrated on the section of the Kazakh-Chinese border. On the ledge of the Dzungarian Gate, which entered the territory of the People's Republic of China like a wedge, machine-gun and artillery battalions were dug into the hills. Tactical nuclear weapons appeared in the 149th Guards Aviation Bomber Regiment in Zhetygen (formerly Nikolaevka, Almaty region). Although the Su-24 front-line bombers of this regiment, even if they wanted to, could not reach the closest NATO member, Turkey, without refueling. But getting to Urumqi is no problem. On the territory of Friendly Mongolia and in Transbaikalia in the 70-80s, a powerful Soviet group was also created from tank and motorized rifle divisions, capable, according to the calculations of the generals, if necessary, of reaching Beijing in a day's march. Everything was absolutely serious. After all, these are huge masses of military equipment and hundreds of thousands of military personnel. Just maintaining this entire armada on such a distant outskirts is costly for the state.
All these troops were going to not only restrain possible Chinese aggression - but also...
The major border conflict of 1979 between Vietnam and China showed the latter's complete unpreparedness for the Great War. At that time, the People's Liberation Army of China did not have fighting spirit, proper combat training and modern weapons. The secret plans of the Soviet General Staff are not known for certain - but at that time, military analysts calculated the possibility of creating a buffer zone between China and the USSR on the territory of the XUAR. A possible scenario was the creation of an Independent Uyghur State. In the 70s, the relationship between the indigenous Uyghur population of the XUAR and the ethnic Chinese, the Han, who moved to develop the “western territories” became extremely strained. In addition to the police, army units also participated in the suppression of numerous riots of the indigenous population.
Analysts from the Soviet General Staff, who considered that the opportune moment had arrived for a radical change in the situation with the threat from the East, were not at all embarrassed by the fact that China possessed nuclear weapons. Therefore, one of the first steps in preparation for a possible war with China was the creation of a new reconnaissance and sabotage unit that could undermine the rear infrastructure of the Chinese army in the XUAR. Since the 50s, such units in the Soviet Army were called “special purpose units.” The very fact of their existence was deeply classified. It was forbidden to talk in the press and on television about the existence of “army special forces” in the USSR. In everyday life, these units were called separate parachute units. The soldiers wore the uniform and insignia of the Airborne Forces. Although in terms of their purpose they had nothing to do with it.
What is army special forces?
In a nutshell, these are those who operate exclusively behind enemy lines.
If the Airborne Forces are intended to land in the near rear in order to break through the enemy’s defenses from the inside and help their advancing troops, and ground forces reconnaissance officers go behind enemy lines for information about the condition and location of enemy forces - army special forces are engaged in “ruining life” to the enemy in the rear. The enemy wants to bring up troops - but the bridges are blown up, bring in ammunition - and artillery warehouses are burning with a bright flame, establish contact with the troops - communication centers are blown up, hit with tactical missiles - someone has already blown up the launchers. The dams are blown up - everything is flooded with water, there is no electricity - power line supports are undermined, planes do not take off and tanks are stationary - fuel storage facilities are set on fire and trains are flying downhill...
Special forces not only undermine the defense infrastructure - they create chaos in the enemy’s rear, thereby drawing part of the enemy’s forces from the front to fight against themselves, and introduces tension into the moral and psychological situation in the enemy troops. It’s not for nothing that the military says, “two or three saboteurs can do as much as an entire division.” If someone doesn’t believe it, read the History of the Second World War. There are many examples of successful sabotage that influenced the course of events.
Where did they start, looking at the Chinese, more than 30 years ago in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR General Staff, to which the army special forces were subordinate? From the formation of the personnel of the new battalion, the detachment is essentially a battalion.
A battalion commander was appointed - reconnaissance captain Kerimbaev Boris Tukenovich, who at that time was expected to be sent to Sunny Ethiopia as a military adviser, to improve the combat readiness of our black brothers in socialism. The educational excursion to an exotic country is over. He was given an order to recruit conscripts into a new detachment. Anyone familiar with the History of the Soviet Army will be surprised by the following facts about such a set. 300 conscript soldiers of Uighur nationality were selected from among those serving in the construction battalions of the Moscow Military District.
Here are three questions for you:
1. Why are all the soldiers Uighurs? Well, they had to fight in their Historical Homeland - on the territory of the XUAR.
2. Why are the soldiers from the construction battalion - and not from special forces or paratroopers? Because in the Soviet Army, Slavs and Balts were mainly drafted into the Airborne Forces and Special Forces. The latter were taken for their above-average build - well, Soviet generals had a mania for the “grenadier-ambial” appearance of elite fighters. Although the short and puny Gurkhas in the service of Her Majesty proved the opposite - “The height and build of a Soldier is not the Most Important Thing in War.” And national minorities like the Uighurs, Dungans, Altaians, Gagauz, Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, etc. - were drafted mainly only into military construction units. Construction battalions generally consisted of 70% indigenous people from Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Pull out 1-2 Uyghurs from each motorized rifle regiment... How long does it take to travel to all the regiments throughout the Soviet Union?
3. Why in Moscow? Because in 1980 there was a large concentration of construction battalions, which were also involved in the construction of Olympic facilities.
In fact, since the late 40s, an almost mononational military formation was created in the Soviet Army for the first time. The name "Uyghur" was never used.
The issue with the selection of officers was more complicated - there was simply nowhere to take such a number of Uyghur officers in the Soviet Army. Therefore, 70% of all officers of the detachment were graduates of the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School named after Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev (AVOKU - or as the military used to jokingly call it - “School of Red Batyrs”) - Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen. Thus, the military leadership assumed that they would bypass the language barrier in communicating with the local Turkic-speaking residents of the XUAR, liberated from the “Beijing Yoke.”
Note that a year earlier, a similar special forces detachment was created to change power in Afghanistan - consisting of fighters of three nations - Turkmens, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Because all these peoples live in Afghanistan. It was called the "First Muslim Battalion". A lot has been written about him - he stormed Amin’s palace. By this analogy, the 177th special forces unit was called the “Second Muslim Battalion”.
The detachment was created in the fall of 1980. It was formed in the city of Kapchagay, on the basis of the 22nd Special Forces Brigade. Anyone who passed through Kapchagai is a military town to the west of the highway to Taldykorgan. The 35th Air Assault Brigade has been located in the military camp of that 22nd brigade for 20 years now.


What is he doing??? Nostrils tear...


Somewhere in the steppes near Kapchagai...







For almost a year, former construction battalion members were taught the craft of reconnaissance saboteurs. The Afghan War was already in full swing. Events there made their own adjustments - the invasion of China was cancelled. And rightly so – fighting on two fronts is costly and politically difficult.
The plans of the General Staff changed - the 177th Special Forces began to be prepared for deployment to Afghanistan. Uighur soldiers who served for 2 years were transferred to the reserves, and Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tajiks and Slavs were recruited instead.
Without Tajiks - just like without translators from Dari and Pashto - practically not a single combat unit in Afghanistan could survive.


The soldiers decided to pose as a souvenir before being sent to Afghanistan


The squad is loaded onto a train. The commanders decided to sit down on the path. Nikolaevka station.


With a new composition, a detachment of 500 people entered Afghanistan on October 29, 1981.
And he immediately began to get used to the place. You have to live somewhere... The special forces turned into a Construction Battalion for a while...

What should a reconnaissance saboteur do in a Guerrilla War?
He is opposed by partisans. And a partisan is essentially the same saboteur. But only a poorly organized self-taught saboteur. The partisans have no communication centers, no fuel storage facilities, etc.. During the day he is a peasant, and at night he is a bandit. But even if he were a bandit three times, “One Partisan in the Field is Not a Warrior.” Somewhere there must be their caches with weapons and ammunition, somewhere there must be their headquarters with the leader who manages them, caravan routes along which weapons and food are brought to them.
But this is what special forces were already doing in Afghanistan - Ambush, Search and Destroy.
The main thing they teach in special forces is to be unnoticed, to sneak, to hide, to wait, to destroy and to leave unnoticed.
For all 3 years, the 177th special forces unit in Afghanistan was destroyed by search raids and ambushes.
For those interested, read the article by the detachment commander, Boris Kerimbaev, “Kapchagai Battalion.”
I would like to note that many officers from this detachment became generals. For example, serving in the Kazakh Army - Major General Dyusekeyev Mukan, Colonel General Zhasuzakov Saken. Served in the Turkmen army - Lieutenant General Rinat Mereddurdyev. Lieutenant General Bekboyev Mels, who served in the Kyrgyz army.


Road to Pajshir


Salang Pass


Entrance to the 4-kilometer tunnel at the Salang pass. Once, cars collided in it and in the resulting traffic jam inside the tunnel, more than a hundred people suffocated from exhaust gases.

The most difficult period of the detachment’s stay in Afghanistan was a business trip to the Panjshir Gorge.
What is Panjshir? It is a long 120-kilometer mountain gorge that connects the Afghanistan-Pakistan border with a large plain adjacent to the road leading from Kabul to the former Soviet Union. This is the Main Transport Artery of the dushmans - along it they received help in pack caravans from those who supported them. Control of Panjshir was the No. 1 headache for our troops throughout the 9 years of the war. The number of bombs and missiles dropped by our aircraft in this gorge alone during the war years exceeded a million tons. Even Dzhokhar Dudayev, who at that time commanded a strategic aviation division, was noted for dropping aerial bombs into this gorge.
The owner of Panjshir was the legendary and charismatic Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “Lion of Panjshir,” who was born there.


Our soldiers told each other all sorts of tall tales about him. Like he is Immortal and Elusive. One of the soldiers’ tales that I heard about him in 1988 in the Bagram reconnaissance battalion is “...Ahmad Shah is so cool - that his Personal Security is a platoon of Our Paratroopers who went over to his side...”. As it turned out, there was still some truth in this - Masud’s personal bodyguard was indeed our infantryman Nikolai Bystrov, who was captured and converted to Islam. This was such a Scary Place - Panjshir.
The leadership of the 40th Army decided to use the detachment not for its intended purpose, but as an ordinary mountain rifle unit to capture dominant heights.

In the background is a two-headed mountain nicknamed “The Tooth” - 4200 meters high. For comparison, this is almost the height of Nursultan Peak (Komsomol) where every summer Almaty residents climb en masse on the Alpiniad. These are the mountains the special forces had to storm.

Typically, scouts are not required to go on the attack and storm enemy fortifications. It is believed that the use of special forces as an attacking battering ram does not justify the time and money invested in its preparation. Why did the command do this? Maybe he just decided to experiment - will special forces reconnaissance officers be able to independently conduct combat operations in a modern mountain war??? The experiment gave a positive result. And even exceeded all expectations. By order of the command, the detachment not only occupied commanding heights, but also held its occupied high-mountain positions for six months.


A group on a roadstead in the highlands.

Covering a helicopter flying to evacuate a wounded person. A wounded man in a maskhalat lies on his back.


Let's say the matter is quite difficult. Try to climb the Komsomol pass at Nursultan peak and sit there for six months, almost every day, repelling the attacks of those for whom you are a pain in the ass by being there...
How they fight in the mountains - whoever rises higher with all his arsenal is the Master of All Observable Paths and Roads.
During the day, the fighters lay in the sun on bare ridges, shooting through the surrounding area. You can’t get up and warm up - those who are trying to get through from below will get shot. You can’t dig a trench in a rock unless you surround yourself with stones. You also can’t place a half-height wall of stones around you - it’s too clear a landmark for the enemy - they’ll take aim. This was such a stalemate: we ourselves are lying there, but we don’t allow others to get past. It was possible to stretch and eat only at night. During daylight hours, all movements are only by crawling. And in addition, these terrible temperature changes - this is not our Affectionate Trans-Ili Alatau - in the Hindu Kush during the day the stones become hot and you are in the steam room, and at night it gets so cold that the water in your flask freezes. By the end of the week of such combat duty, the fighters were so weakened that many were lowered down on stretchers at night - and another shift of fighters took over the position.
After Panjshir, special forces in Afghanistan were no longer used as assault rams and “guards of the passes.” During that war there were experiments on a larger scale and with worse results.
Silent Defense - that is, Passive Defense - is fraught with defeat. Therefore, Kerimbaev and his officers are betting on offensive actions. And this is how it is done in special forces. Tactics change - after the assault on heights - open battles are avoided. Pressure is being placed on raids on caravans and ambushes.


The column exits for a combat operation.

This is a Shakespearean freeze-frame - an officer looks at a pistol with a silencer and thinks “To be or Not to Be”... Just kidding...


Captured dushmans in "Zindan of Temporary Containment". In the East, everything should be Eastern.

Conflicts are provoked between the Mujahideen. How to quarrel between two gangs? Ambush one of the gangs by mining its way with captured non-Soviet mines and fire at it with captured non-Soviet weapons, while shouting something in Tajik or Uzbek. Remembering not to get carried away and destroy everyone. What might the surviving dushmans think? That it was an alien gang that was jealous that they were getting more help from Pakistan. In war, all methods are good - including falsification and disinformation.
And the “spirits” did not disdain, in competition with each other, to turn for help to the “infidels” - that is, to the Soviet military with proposals like: “...Commander, now there is a gang of Lame Jafar near such and such a village. He harassed your outposts that week. I swear to my mother - it was them!!! They set fire to your infantry fighting vehicle a week ago and are planting mines on your road - we have nothing to do with it!!! While you were driving us into a distant gorge, they stole a flock of our sheep and took away a couple of our girls. They are Bad Jackals. I’m their mother... Although I can show the exact place on the map. Hit them with howitzers - about ten kilometers. You can get it calmly...”
It is in the West that people think about the noble image of the Mujahideen as a “fighter against the Soviet yoke.”


In fact, they hated each other just as much as they hated us. They remembered all their blood grievances, the division of meager plots of land in the mountains, disputed pastures, stolen brides - but who knows how many claims mountaineers from different tribes and peoples can have against each other??? Civil strife is the Eternal Concept. Someone started a quarrel - and the descendants forgot what their ancestors were fighting about. And here everyone has weapons in their hands, like there’s a war going on - which will write off everything - but here he is a Soviet battalion commander, and he has more powerful weapons - tanks and howitzers and “grads” (and the special forces were given artillerymen and tankmen to reinforce them) - He is strong!!! You need to be friends with him, go to bow to him, come to an agreement - and “kill” your competitor and “kill” again - with the wrong hands of someone else...
“...Okay,” our battalion commander will think, “but let Lame Jafar accidentally find out from whom they give him “warm greetings”... if, of course, he survives...”
So when local informants informed our intelligence, for example, about the possible passage of a caravan with weapons, which could be ambushed - these were most often not ordinary peasants who wanted peace and tranquility (how would they know such details???) - and informers from rival gangs.
This is how Kerimbaev quarreled with all the gangs in Panjshir. He is an Eastern Man - and he acted cunningly in an Eastern way.

It dawned on Ahmad Shah Massoud that he was seriously losing control over the numerous gangs that were bogged down in the showdown and began to think about negotiations.


Kerimbaev and Main Intelligence Directorate officers from army headquarters met with him three times. The negotiations were difficult - Ahmad Shah Massoud wanted to maintain authority in the eyes of his subordinates. “You are a warrior, and I am a warrior. We will negotiate like true warriors,” said the “Lion of Panjshir.” In the fall of 1982, a truce agreement was concluded. And in January 1983, Ahmad Shah announced that he would stop hostilities for two years, if only the special forces were withdrawn from the gorge. By the way, he will keep his word for exactly one year.
On March 8, 1983, after holding out in Panjshir for nine months, losing 45 people killed and one soldier missing (carried away by the flow of a mountain river), the 177th detachment left the gorge. In total, the 177th detachment will lose 155 people in three years. That is, he lost every sixth person who passed through its ranks.
Neither before nor after the 2nd Muslim Battalion, none of the remaining 8 detachments and a separate special forces company of the 40th Army were sent to Panjshir for permanent deployment. After them, the special forces flew to Panjshir only for short raids - as tourists. They will fly in by helicopter, run through the mountains, fight, and fly back. And to be there all the time? Sorry - there are not enough Kerimbayevs for everyone!!! What was required here was not just a Combat Commander who waves a saber left and right - but also an Analyst-Diplomat who knows how to establish contacts with the enemy. In a guerrilla war you cannot kill all your enemies - you have to negotiate with someone and push heads together.

In War there is always an Example of Courage. The 177th special forces unit had its own “Maresyev” - senior lieutenant Ayubaev Zhumabek had his foot torn off by a mine.

In the background, placing his hand on his comrade’s shoulder is Ayubaev Zhumabek. In the photo below - with his wife before being sent to Afghanistan.

The young officer decided not to accept his disability and return to the Armed Forces. With a prosthetic leg and a machine gun on his shoulders, he made a 25-kilometer forced march under the incredulous gaze of members of the military medical commission and earned the right to return to duty. Few people knew that after that forced march, Zhumabek’s leg was shortened by another two and a half centimeters... It rubbed against the prosthesis...


After battle. The captain standing in the center is the future lieutenant general of the Kyrgyz army. Starley, who is on the right of him, is holding a machine gun by the fore-end - is now a major general in the Kazakh army. Standing nearby are the “greens” - soldiers of the Afghan army.

Officers at a halt for a traveling samovar. I am aware that a samovar is not allowed in the army. But with him everything is so homely...

Battalion commander Kerimbaev scolds the senior lieutenant for riding a bicycle “What kind of childish antics??? What example are you showing to your subordinates???” - He looks guilty. Then this senior leader will become a lieutenant general of the Turkmen army.



What do the military do in their free time from war? That's right - they take pictures, play football and pose with local landmarks.


Battalion commander Kerimbaev is wearing boxing gloves.


When else will you be able to ride on such a cart???


Well, well... Where is the donkey's accelerator???


Aren't they similar to the anarchists of the Civil War??? Especially the one in the vest with machine gun belts on his chest???
Don’t be surprised - in Afghanistan, commanders in small garrisons were absolutely liberal with regard to the statutory requirements - and did not force them to strictly follow the army principle - “Even if it’s ugly, the main thing is that it’s uniform!!!” Therefore, fighters - soldiers and officers - in combat units dressed in what they considered necessary and what was at hand. Some went on the raid in sneakers, some in boots, some in boots. Some have a tunic on their torso, some a sweater, some a maskhalat. In the photo of the battalion commander, where he scolds the senior leader for his bicycle, the headdress is also out of shape. He should have a Panama hat - not a cap. If you watched “9th Company” carefully, these “Indian outfits” are shown quite reliably there.


After the football match

During the entire time the detachment was in Afghanistan, there were many similar examples of courage. But in the memory of the veterans of the detachment there is also a striking case of Cowardice or Cowardice. At the height of the 6th Pajshir Operation, when the detachment had to conduct heavy combat operations with the gangs of Ahmad Shah-Masud, the battalion commander received an order from Moscow to promote 10 group commanders (a group in special forces is usually called a platoon) to the positions of company commanders in airborne units 40 th Army. The reason for such an unexpected promotion turned out to be simple and unusual.
An unheard of thing - the mother of one of the officers wrote a letter to the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow with a complaint that her son had “stayed too long” as a platoon commander - and that it was time for him to be promoted - which was actually true. It is not clear what they were guided by in Moscow - but battalion commander Kerimbaev received an order to appoint 10 candidates for promotion and send them (rotation) to other units. The reality in the War is that in the midst of hostilities, when every day officers and their subordinates go on raids and ambushes, when over months of joint service within the military collective the fighters have become accustomed to each other - any personnel changes affect combat coherence and morale. psychological situation. While the new commander, who arrived to replace the departed one, gets to know all his subordinates and gets up to speed with events, while he gains combat experience...
Replacing a commander in Afghanistan was always considered a difficult period for the unit. And here there is not one - but ten substitutions at once...
It is not surprising that out of 10 candidates, 9 flatly refused to leave their home battalion, thereby delaying their own careers. People had the Concept of Consciousness, Responsibility and Combat Partnership. The battalion commander did not comply with the order from Moscow - and, strangely enough, they understood it...
Only one agreed - the same senior lieutenant whose mother wrote the letter to Moscow. He became a company commander in an airborne unit, where survival conditions were an order of magnitude higher than in the 177th detachment in the Pajshir Gorge. And in general, the higher the officer’s position, the greater his chances of surviving the war. We won't mention his name. He is now a fairly well-known personality in veteran circles. At one time, he flatly refused to serve in the Kazakh Army and spoke extremely negatively about it in his speeches. There is a black sheep in the family.
Unlike many other commanders of units of the 40th Army, Boris Tukenovich paid more attention to good relations with the local population. When the question of relocating the detachment arose, the elders of the local villages turned to the command of the 40th Army with a proposal to provide food to the 177th detachment - if only they would leave it in place. Civilians appreciated the detachment's contribution to clearing the area of ​​Mujahideen gangs.