Battles in the Second World War. The largest tank battles of the Second World War
World War II, Great Patriotic War. It was the most brutal and bloody war in human history.
During this massacre, more than 60 million citizens of different countries of the world died. Historian scientists have calculated that every war month, an average of 27 thousand tons of bombs and shells fell on the heads of military and civilians on both sides of the front!
Let's remember today, on Victory Day, the 10 most formidable battles of World War II.
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It was the largest air battle in history. The Germans' goal was to gain air superiority over the British Royal Air Force in order to invade the British Isles without opposition. The battle was fought exclusively by combat aircraft of the opposing sides. Germany lost 3,000 of its pilots, England - 1,800 pilots. Over 20,000 British civilians were killed. Germany's defeat in this battle is considered one of the decisive moments in World War II - it did not allow the elimination of the USSR's Western allies, which subsequently led to the opening of a second front.
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The longest long battle of World War II. During naval battles, German submarines attempted to sink Soviet and British supply ships and warships. The Allies responded in kind. Everyone understood the special significance of this battle - on the one hand, Western weapons and equipment were supplied to the Soviet Union by sea, on the other hand, Britain was supplied with everything necessary mainly by sea - the British needed up to a million tons of all kinds of materials and food in order to survive and continue the fight . The cost of the victory of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition in the Atlantic was enormous and terrible - about 50,000 of its sailors died, and the same number of German sailors lost their lives.
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This battle began after German troops, at the end of World War II, made a desperate (and, as history shows, last) attempt to turn the tide of hostilities in their favor, organizing an offensive operation against Anglo-American troops in the mountainous and wooded areas of Belgium under the code called Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine). Despite all the experience of British and American strategists, the massive German attack took the Allies by surprise. However, the offensive ultimately failed. Germany lost more than 100 thousand of its soldiers and officers killed in this operation, and the Anglo-American allies lost about 20 thousand military personnel killed.
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Marshal Zhukov wrote in his memoirs: “When people ask me what I remember most from the last war, I always answer: the battle for Moscow.” Hitler considered the capture of Moscow, the capital of the USSR and the largest Soviet city, as one of the main military and political goals of Operation Barbarossa. In German and Western military history it is known as "Operation Typhoon". This battle is divided into two periods: defensive (September 30 - December 4, 1941) and offensive, which consists of 2 stages: counteroffensive (December 5-6, 1941 - January 7-8, 1942) and the general offensive of Soviet troops (January 7-10 - April 20, 1942). The losses of the USSR were 926.2 thousand people, the losses of Germany were 581 thousand people.
LANDING OF THE ALLIES IN NORMANDY, OPENING OF THE SECOND FRONT (FROM JUNE 6, 1944 TO JULY 24, 1944)
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This battle, which became part of Operation Overlord, marked the beginning of the deployment of a strategic group of Anglo-American allied forces in Normandy (France). British, American, Canadian and French units took part in the invasion. The landing of the main forces from Allied warships was preceded by a massive bombardment of German coastal fortifications and the landing of paratroopers and gliders on the positions of selected Wehrmacht units. Allied Marines landed on five beaches. Considered one of the largest amphibious operations in history. Both sides lost more than 200 thousand of their troops.
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The last strategic offensive operation of the armed forces of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War turned out to be one of the bloodiest. It became possible as a result of a strategic breakthrough of the German front by units of the Red Army carrying out the Vistula-Oder offensive operation. It ended with complete victory over Nazi Germany and the surrender of the Wehrmacht. During the battles for Berlin, the losses of our army amounted to more than 80 thousand soldiers and officers, the Nazis lost 450 thousand of their military personnel.
The Battle of Stalingrad Six months of continuous bloodbath on the territory of a huge city. All of Stalingrad has been turned into ruins. The USSR fielded seven ground and one air armies against the Nazi invaders....
Battle of Stalingrad
Six months of continuous bloodbath on the territory of a huge city. All of Stalingrad has been turned into ruins. The USSR fielded seven ground and one air armies against the Nazi invaders. The Volga flotilla beat the enemy from the expanses of water.
The Nazis and their allies were defeated. Here Hitler felt sobered up. After this battle, the Nazis could no longer recover. Soviet troops exhausted the enemy at the cost of their own lives of many soldiers, officers and civilians.
1,130,000 people died defending Stalingrad. Germany and the countries involved in the conflict on the side of the Nazis lost 1,500,000. The battle, which lasted six months, completely ended with the defeat of the Nazi armies trying to reach the oil fields of the Caucasus.
Battle for Moscow
The defeat of fascist troops near Moscow was a real victory for the entire people. The country perceived these events as the threshold of an imminent general Victory. The troops of Nazi Germany were broken morally. The spirit of the offensive movement fell. Guderian praised the will to win of the Soviet people.
He later said that all the sacrifices were in vain. Moscow held out, destroying the victorious spirit of the Germans. A stubborn reluctance to understand the situation at the front led to huge losses on all sides. The crisis in the German troops undermined faith in Hitler and his unrivaled military genius.
The USSR lost 926,200 soldiers near Moscow. Civilian losses were not estimated. Germany and allied countries 581,900 people. Military operations lasted more than six months, from September 30, 1941 to April 20, 1942.
Battle for Kyiv
The Soviet military leaders learned a hard lesson when they handed over Kyiv to the enemy to be torn to pieces. The Wehrmacht sensed the poor preparation of the USSR armed forces. The Nazi troops began an intensive movement towards the Azov region and Donbass. As soon as Kyiv was surrendered, the Red Army soldiers, completely demoralized, began to surrender en masse.
In the battles for Kyiv, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 627,800 people. The civilian population was not counted. How much Germany lost remained unknown, since at the beginning of the war the Germans did not keep records of losses, hoping for a blitzkrieg. The fighting lasted two and a half months.
Battle of the Dnieper
The liberation of Kyiv cost great losses. Almost four million people from both sides took part in the battles for the Dnieper. The front stretches for 1,400 kilometers. The survivors of the crossing of the Dnieper recalled that 25,000 people entered the water, 3-5 thousand climbed ashore.
Everyone else remained in the water, only to emerge in a few days. A terrible picture of war. During the crossing of the Dnieper, 417,000 Red Army soldiers died, Germany lost from 400,000 to a million (according to various sources). Scary numbers. The battle for the Dnieper lasted four months.
Battle of Kursk
Although the most terrible tank battles took place in the village of Prokhorovka, the battle is called Kursk. It’s scary to see the battle of iron monsters even on the cinema screen. What was it like for the participants in the battle?
An incredible battle of enemy tank armies. The “Center” and “South” groups were destroyed. The battle lasted almost two months in 1943. The USSR lost 254,000 people, Germany lost 500,000 of its soldiers. For what?
Operation Bagration
We can say that Operation Bagration was the bloodiest in the history of mankind. The result of the operation is the complete liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. After the operation was completed, 50,000 prisoners of war were marched through the streets of Moscow.
In that battle, the losses of the Soviet Union amounted to 178,500 people, Germany lost 255,400 Wehrmacht soldiers. The battle lasted two months without breaks.
Vistula-Oder operation
The bloody battles for Poland went down in history as the rapid advance of the troops of the Soviet Union. Every day the troops advanced twenty to thirty kilometers inland. The fighting lasted only twenty days.
In the battles for Poland, losses amounted to 43,200 people. Civilian losses were not taken into account. The Nazis lost 480,000 people.
Battle of Berlin
This battle was decisive for the Victory. Soviet troops approached the lair of fascism. The assault on Berlin lasted only 22 days. The Soviet Union and allied forces lost 81,000 people. Fallen Germany, defending its city, lost 400,000. The 1st Ukrainian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts fought for Victory. Divisions of the Polish Army, and Baltic sailors.
Battle of Monte Casino
Soviet troops did not take part in the liberation of Rome. The USA and England managed to break through the Gustav Line and completely liberate the Eternal City.
The attackers lost 100,000 people in that battle, Germany only 20,000. The battle lasted four months.
Battle of Iwo Jima
The brutal battle of the US military against Japan. The small island of Iwo Jima, where the Japanese put up stubborn resistance. It was here that the American command decided to atomic bomb the country.
The battle lasted 40 days. Japan lost 22,300 people, America was missing 6,800 fighters.
In Stalingrad, the course of the world took a sharp turn
In Russian military history, the battle of Stalingrad has always been considered the most outstanding and significant event of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. Modern world historiography also gives the highest assessment of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Battle of Stalingrad. “At the turn of the century, Stalingrad was recognized as the decisive battle not only of the Second World War, but of the era as a whole,” emphasizes British historian J. Roberts.
During the Great Patriotic War, there were other, no less brilliant Soviet victories, both in terms of their strategic results and the level of military art. So why does Stalingrad stand out among them? In connection with the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, I would like to reflect on this.
The interests of historical science and the development of cooperation between peoples require freeing military history from the spirit of confrontation, subordinating the research of scientists to the interests of deep, truthful and objective coverage of the history of the Second World War, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This is due to the fact that some people want to falsify the history of the Second World War, to “re-fight” the war on paper.
Much has been written about the Battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, there is no need to retell its course in detail. Historians and military officers rightly wrote that its outcome was due to the increased power of the country and the Red Army by the fall of 1942, the high level of military leadership of its command cadres, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, the unity and dedication of the entire Soviet people. It was emphasized that our strategy, operational art and tactics during this battle took a new major step forward in their development and were enriched with new provisions.
PLANS OF THE PARTIES FOR 1942
When discussing plans for the summer campaign at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) in March 1942, the General Staff (Boris Shaposhnikov) and Georgy Zhukov proposed considering the transition to strategic defense as the main method of action.
Zhukov considered it possible to take private offensive actions only in the Western Front. Semyon Timoshenko proposed, in addition, to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction. To the objections of Zhukov and Shaposhnikov regarding this proposal, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin said: “We can’t sit idly by in defense, don’t wait for the Germans to strike first! We ourselves must launch a series of pre-emptive strikes on a wide front and test the enemy’s readiness.”
As a result, it was decided to undertake a series of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, in the Lgov and Smolensk directions, in the areas of Leningrad and Demyansk.
As for the plans of the German command, at one time it was believed that its main goal was to capture Moscow by deep encircling from the south. But in reality, according to the directive of the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces Hitler No. 41 of April 5, 1942, the main goal of the German offensive in the summer of 1942 was to seize the Donbass, Caucasian oil and, by disrupting communications in the interior of the country, to deprive the USSR of the most important resources coming from these districts.
Firstly, when delivering a strike in the south, conditions were created for achieving surprise and more favorable opportunities for achieving success, because in 1942 our Supreme High Command again expected the enemy’s main attack in the Moscow direction, and the main forces and reserves were concentrated here. The German Kremlin disinformation plan was not solved either.
Secondly, when attacking in the Moscow direction, German troops would have to break through pre-prepared, defense in depth with the prospect of protracted military operations. If in 1941, near Moscow, the German Wehrmacht was unable to overcome the resistance of the Red Army, which was retreating with heavy losses, then in 1942 it was even more difficult for the Germans to count on capturing Moscow. At that time, in the south, in the Kharkov region, as a result of a major defeat of the Soviet troops, the German army was confronted by our significantly weakened forces; it was here that the most vulnerable section of the Soviet front was located.
Thirdly, when the German army delivered the main blow in the Moscow direction and even at worst captured Moscow (which was unlikely), the retention by Soviet troops of extremely economically important areas in the south created the conditions for the continuation of the war and its successful completion.
All this suggests that the strategic plans of the Nazi command basically correctly took into account the current situation. But even under this condition, the troops of Germany and its satellites would not have been able to advance so far and reach the Volga, if not for the major mistakes of the Soviet command in assessing the direction of a possible enemy attack, inconsistency and indecisiveness in choosing a method of action. On the one hand, in principle it was supposed to switch to strategic defense, on the other, a series of unprepared and unsupported offensive operations were undertaken. This led to a scattering of forces, and our army was unprepared for either defense or attack. Oddly enough, the Soviet troops again found themselves in the same uncertain position as in 1941.
And in 1942, despite the defeats of 1941, the ideological cult of the offensive doctrine continued to press so hard, the underestimation of defense, its false understanding was so deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Soviet command that it was embarrassed as something unworthy for the Red Army and was not fully resolved apply.
In the light of the plans of the parties discussed above, an important aspect is clearly clarified: the Stalingrad strategic operation was an interconnected part of the entire system of strategic actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942. In many military-historical works, the Stalingrad operation was considered in isolation from other operations carried out in the western direction. This also applies to Operation Mars of 1942, the essence of which is most distorted, especially in American historiography.
The main point is that the main, decisive strategic operation in the fall and winter of 1942–1943 was not the operations in the southwest, but the offensive operations carried out in the western strategic direction. The basis for this conclusion is the fact that less forces and resources were allocated to solve problems in the south than in the western direction. But in reality this is not entirely true, because the southern strategic direction must be taken as a whole, and not just the troops at Stalingrad, including the troops in the North Caucasus and the troops in the Voronezh direction, which were practically directed towards the southern direction. In addition, we must take into account the fact that the offensive actions of our troops in the west did not allow the German command to transfer forces to the south. Our main strategic reserves were located southeast of Moscow and could be transferred to the south.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON THE APPROACHES TO STALINGRAD
The second group of questions relates to the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and arises from the need for a more objective, critical assessment of defensive battles and operations on the approaches to Stalingrad. During this period there were the most omissions and shortcomings in the actions of our command and troops. Military theoretical thought has yet to clarify how our army, in catastrophically difficult conditions, managed to restore the almost completely destroyed strategic front in the southwestern direction in the summer of 1942. It is known that only from July 17 to September 30, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, 33 brigades, including 24 tank brigades, to strengthen the Stalingrad direction.
At the same time, the Soviet command did not plan or task the troops to stop the advancing enemy only after retreating to the Volga. It repeatedly demanded that the enemy be stopped at a number of lines even on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Why did this not succeed, despite the large number of reserves, the courage and massive heroism of officers and soldiers, and the skillful actions of a number of formations and units? There were, of course, many cases of confusion and panic, especially after heavy defeats and heavy losses of our troops in May-June 1942. For a psychological change to occur in the troops, a serious shake-up was needed. And in this regard, Order No. 227 of the People’s Commissar of Defense played a generally positive role, giving a sharp and truthful assessment of the situation and imbued with the main requirement - “Not a step back!” It was a very harsh and extremely tough document, but forced and necessary in the conditions that prevailed at that time.
Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus chose captivity over suicide.
The main reason for the failure of a number of defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad was that in organizing strategic defense the Soviet command repeated the mistakes of 1941.
After each major breakthrough of the German army, instead of a sober assessment of the situation and making a decision to defend at one or another advantageous line, where the retreating troops would fight and pull up fresh formations from the depths in advance, orders were given to hold the occupied lines at all costs, even when this was impossible . Reserve formations and incoming reinforcements were sent into battle on the move, as a rule, to launch poorly prepared counterattacks and counterstrikes. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity to beat them piecemeal, and the Soviet troops were deprived of the opportunity to properly gain a foothold and organize defense on new lines.
The nervous reaction to each retreat further aggravated the already difficult, complex situation and doomed the troops to new retreats.
It should also be recognized that the German troops carried out offensive operations quite skillfully, widely maneuvering and massively using tank and motorized formations in open, tank-accessible terrain. Having encountered resistance in one area or another, they quickly changed the direction of their attacks, trying to reach the flank and rear of the Soviet troops, whose maneuverability was much lower.
The setting of unrealistic tasks, the appointment of dates for the start of hostilities and operations without taking into account the minimum necessary time for preparation for their implementation made themselves felt during many counterattacks and counterstrikes during defensive operations. For example, on September 3, 1942, in connection with the difficult situation on the Stalingrad front, Stalin sent a telegram to a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters: “Demand that the commander of the troops stationed north and north-west of Stalingrad immediately strike the enemy and come to the aid of the Stalingraders.”
There were many such telegrams and demands. It is not difficult for a person who knows even a little about military affairs to understand their absurdity: how can troops, without minimal training and organization, take and “strike” and go on the offensive. The activity of the defense was of great importance for wearing down the enemy, disrupting and delaying his offensive actions. But counterattacks could have been more effective with more thorough preparation and material support.
During the defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad, air defense was extremely weak, and therefore it was necessary to operate in conditions of significant superiority of enemy aviation, which made maneuvering troops especially difficult.
If at the beginning of the war the inexperience of personnel was also reflected, then after heavy losses in 1941 and the spring of 1942, the problem of personnel was even more acute, although there were many commanders who managed to harden themselves and gain combat experience. There were many mistakes, omissions and even cases of criminal irresponsibility on the part of the commanders of fronts, armies, commanders of formations and units. Taken together, they also seriously complicated the situation, but were not as decisive as the miscalculations made by the Supreme Command Headquarters. Not to mention the fact that the too frequent change of commanders and commanders (in July–August 1942 alone, three commanders of the Stalingrad Front were replaced) did not allow them to get used to the situation.
The stability of the troops was negatively affected by fear of encirclement. Political distrust and repression against military personnel, who were surrounded during the retreats in 1941 and the spring of 1942, played a detrimental role in this regard. And after the war, officers who were surrounded were not accepted to study at military academies. It seemed to the military-political authorities and the heads of the NKVD that such an attitude towards the “encircled” could increase the resilience of the troops. But it was the other way around - fear of encirclement reduced the tenacity of the troops in defense. It did not take into account that, as a rule, the most staunchly defending troops were surrounded, often as a result of the retreat of their neighbors. It was this most selfless part of the military that was persecuted. No one was held accountable for this wild and criminal incompetence.
FEATURES OF THE STALINGRAD OFFENSIVE OPERATION
From the experience of the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943), when the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts carried out a counteroffensive, important conclusions and lessons emerge regarding the preparation and conduct of offensive operations to encircle and destroy the enemy.
The strategic plan of this counteroffensive was to encircle and destroy the group of fascist Germans with concentrated attacks from the Southwestern (Nikolai Vatutin), Don (Konstantin Rokossovsky) fronts from the north and the Stalingrad Front (Andrei Eremenko) from the area south of Stalingrad in the general direction of Kalach troops and their satellites (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian troops) east of Stalingrad. Long-range aviation and the Volga Flotilla also took part in the operation.
Various points of view are expressed as to who came up with the initial idea of a counteroffensive to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces. Khrushchev, Eremenko, and many others claimed this. Objectively speaking, this idea in general, as many participants in the war recall, was literally “in the air,” because the very configuration of the front already suggested the need to strike the flanks of the enemy group under the command of Friedrich Paulus.
But the main, most difficult task was how to concretize and implement this idea, taking into account the current situation, how to collect and timely concentrate the necessary forces and means and organize their actions, where specifically to direct attacks and with what tasks. It can be considered an established fact that the main idea of this plan, of course, belongs to the Supreme Command Headquarters, and first of all to Georgy Zhukov, Alexander Vasilevsky and the General Staff. Another thing is that it was born on the basis of proposals, meetings and conversations with generals and front officers.
In general, it must be said that the level of military art of command cadres and staffs, the combat skill of all personnel during the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was significantly higher than in all previous offensive operations. Many methods of preparing and conducting combat operations, having appeared here for the first time (not always in finished form), were then used with great success in the operations of 1943–1945.
At Stalingrad, the massive use of forces and means in the directions chosen for the offensive was carried out with great success, although not yet to the same extent as in the operations of 1944–1945. Thus, on the Southwestern Front, in a breakthrough area of 22 km (9% of the entire width of the strip), 9 out of 18 rifle divisions were concentrated; on the Stalingrad front on a sector of 40 km (9%) of 12 divisions - 8; in addition, 80% of all tanks and up to 85% of artillery were concentrated in these areas. However, the artillery density was only 56 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area, while in subsequent operations it was 200–250 or more. In general, secrecy of preparation and suddenness of the transition to the offensive were achieved.
Essentially, for the first time during the war, not only was careful planning of operations carried out, but also the required amount of painstaking work was carried out on the ground with commanders of all levels in preparing combat operations, organizing interaction, combat, logistics and technical support. Reconnaissance managed, although incompletely, to reveal the enemy’s fire system, which made it possible to carry out a more reliable fire defeat than was the case in previous offensive operations.
For the first time, artillery and air attacks were used in full, although the methods of artillery preparation and attack support were not yet sufficiently worked out.
For the first time, before an offensive on a wide front, in the zones of all armies, reconnaissance in force was carried out by forward units in order to clarify the location of the front line and the enemy’s fire system. But in the zones of some armies it was carried out two to three days, and in the 21st and 57th armies - five days before the start of the offensive, which under other circumstances could reveal the beginning of the offensive, and the obtained data on the enemy’s fire system could become significantly outdated .
At Stalingrad, for the first time during a major offensive operation, new infantry combat formations were used in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense Order No. 306 - with a single-echelon formation of not only subunits, units, but also formations. This formation reduced troop losses and made it possible to more fully use infantry firepower. But at the same time, the absence of second echelons made it difficult to build up efforts in a timely manner to develop the offensive in depth. This was one of the reasons why the first echelon rifle divisions failed to break through the enemy’s defenses; already at a depth of 3–4 km, tank corps had to be brought into battle, which, given the prevailing situation at that time, was a necessary measure. The experience of these and subsequent offensive operations has shown that in regiments and divisions, when possible, it is imperative to create second echelons.
The volume of material and technical support for troops has increased significantly. At the start of the counteroffensive, 8 million artillery shells and mines were concentrated on three fronts. For example: in 1914, the entire Russian army had 7 million shells.
But if we compare it with the needs of fire destruction, the November offensive operations of 1942 were relatively insufficiently supplied with ammunition - on average 1.7–3.7 rounds of ammunition; Southwestern Front - 3.4; Donskoy – 1.7; Stalingrad - 2. For example, in the Belarusian or Vistula-Oder operations, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was up to 4.5 rounds of ammunition.
Regarding the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, associated with the actions of troops to destroy the encircled enemy group and develop an offensive on the external front, two questions arise on which different opinions are expressed.
Firstly, some historians and military experts believe that a serious flaw in the Soviet counter-offensive operation at Stalingrad is the fact that a large gap formed between the encirclement of the enemy group and its destruction, while the classical position of military art states that the encirclement and destruction of the enemy must be a single a continuous process, which was subsequently achieved in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev and some other operations. But what was accomplished at Stalingrad was a great achievement for that time, especially if we remember that in the offensive near Moscow, near Demyansk and in other areas it was not even possible to encircle the enemy, and near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, Soviet troops encircling the enemy They themselves were surrounded and defeated.
During the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, on the one hand, all necessary measures were not taken to dismember and destroy the enemy during his encirclement, although it is necessary to take into account the large size of the territory in which the encircled enemy was located and the high density of his groups. On the other hand, the presence of large enemy forces on the external front, trying to relieve the encircled 6th Army of Paulus, did not make it possible to concentrate sufficient forces to quickly eliminate the enemy troops encircled at Stalingrad.
In Stalingrad there was a battle for every house.
The Supreme High Command headquarters belatedly made a decision to unite the control of all troops engaged in destroying the encircled group in the hands of one front. It was only in mid-December 1942 that a directive was received to transfer all troops deployed at Stalingrad to the Don Front.
Secondly, how legitimate was the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky to defeat Erich Manstein’s group in the Kotelnikovsky direction. As you know, initially the 2nd Guards Army was intended to operate as part of the Southwestern Front, then, as the situation changed, it was decided to transfer it to the Don Front to participate in the destruction of the encircled enemy group. But with the appearance of the enemy Army Group “Don” in the Kotelnikovsky direction under the command of Manstein, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, at the request of General Eremenko, made a new decision - to transfer the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front for operations in the Kotelnikovsky direction. This proposal was supported by Vasilevsky, who was at the command post of the Don Front at that time. Rokossovsky continued to insist on the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Don Front in order to speed up the destruction of the encircled enemy group. Nikolai Voronov also opposed the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front. After the war, he called this decision a “terrible miscalculation” by the Supreme Command Headquarters.
But a careful analysis of the situation at that time, with the use of enemy documents that became known to us after the war, shows that the decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to send the 2nd Guards Army to defeat Manstein was apparently more expedient. There was no guarantee that with the inclusion of the 2nd Guards Army in the Don Front it would be possible to quickly deal with the encircled group of Paulus. Subsequent events confirmed how difficult the task was to destroy 22 enemy divisions, numbering up to 250 thousand people. There was a large, insufficiently justified risk that a breakthrough by Manstein’s group and a strike towards it by Paulus’s army could lead to the release of the encircled enemy group and the disruption of the further offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts.
ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD FOR THE PROGRESS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
In world historiography there is no common understanding of the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for the course and outcome of the Second World War. After the end of the war, statements appeared in Western literature that it was not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the victory of the Allied forces at El Alamein that was the most significant turning point in the course of World War II. Of course, for the sake of objectivity, we must admit that at El Alamein the allies won a major victory, which made a significant contribution to the defeat of the common enemy. But still, the battle of El Alamein cannot be compared with the Battle of Stalingrad.
If we talk about the military-strategic side of the matter, the Battle of Stalingrad took place over a vast territory, almost 100 thousand square meters. km, and the operation near El Alamein was on a relatively narrow African coast.
At Stalingrad, at certain stages of the battle, more than 2.1 million people, over 26 thousand guns and mortars, 2.1 thousand tanks and over 2.5 thousand combat aircraft took part on both sides. The German command attracted 1 million 11 thousand people, 10,290 guns, 675 tanks and 1,216 aircraft for the battles of Stalingrad. While at El Alamein, Rommel's African Corps had only 80 thousand people, 540 tanks, 1200 guns and 350 aircraft.
The battle of Stalingrad lasted 200 days and nights (from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and the battle of El Alamein lasted 11 days (from October 23 to November 4, 1942), not to mention the incomparability of the tension and bitterness of the two these battles. If at El Alamein the fascist bloc lost 55 thousand people, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand guns, then at Stalingrad the losses of Germany and its satellites were 10–15 times greater. About 144 thousand people were taken prisoner. A 330,000-strong group of troops was destroyed. The losses of the Soviet troops were also very large - irretrievable losses amounted to 478,741 people. Many of the soldiers' lives could have been saved. But still our sacrifices were not in vain.
The military-political significance of the events that took place is incomparable. The Battle of Stalingrad took place in the main European theater of war, where the fate of the war was decided. The El Alamein operation took place in North Africa in a secondary theater of operations; its influence on the course of events could be indirect. The attention of the whole world was then focused not on El Alamein, but on Stalingrad.
The victory at Stalingrad had a huge impact on the liberation movement of peoples around the world. A powerful wave of national liberation movement swept through all countries that fell under the yoke of Nazism.
In turn, major defeats and huge losses of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad sharply worsened the military-political and economic situation of Germany and put it in front of a deep crisis. The damage to enemy tanks and vehicles in the Battle of Stalingrad was equal, for example, to six months of their production by German factories, to four months for guns, and to two months for mortars and small arms. And in order to make up for such large losses, the German military industry was forced to work at extremely high voltage. The crisis in human resources has sharply worsened.
The disaster on the Volga left its noticeable imprint on the morale of the Wehrmacht. In the German army, the number of cases of desertion and disobedience to commanders increased, and military crimes became more frequent. After Stalingrad, the number of death sentences handed down by Nazi justice to German military personnel increased significantly. German soldiers began to conduct combat operations with less persistence and began to fear attacks from the flanks and encirclement. Oppositional sentiments against Hitler emerged among some politicians and representatives of senior officers.
The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad shocked the fascist military bloc, had a depressing effect on Germany's satellites, and caused panic and insoluble contradictions in their camp. The ruling figures of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, in order to save themselves from the impending catastrophe, began to look for excuses to leave the war and ignored Hitler’s orders to send troops to the Soviet-German front. Since 1943, not only individual soldiers and officers, but also entire units and units of the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies surrendered to the Red Army. The relationship between the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies worsened.
The crushing defeat of the fascist hordes at Stalingrad had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey. They abandoned their intentions to go to war against the USSR.
Under the influence of the successes achieved by the Red Army at Stalingrad and in subsequent operations of the winter campaign of 1942–1943, Germany’s isolation in the international arena increased and at the same time the international authority of the USSR increased. In 1942–1943, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Austria, Canada, Holland, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, and resumed previously interrupted diplomatic ties with Luxembourg, Mexico and Uruguay. Relations with the London-based governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland improved. On the territory of the USSR, the formation of military units and formations of a number of countries of the anti-Hitler coalition began - the French aviation squadron "Normandie", the 1st Czechoslovak infantry brigade, the 1st Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko. All of them were subsequently involved in the fight against Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front.
All this suggests that it was the battle of Stalingrad, and not the operation of El Alamein, that broke the back of the Wehrmacht and marked the beginning of a radical change in World War II in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. More precisely, Stalingrad predetermined this radical change.
