Finnish military company. Soviet-Finnish War

The Soviet-Finnish war remained a “closed” topic for a long time, a kind of “blank spot” (of course, not the only one) in Soviet historical science. For a long time, the course and causes of the Finnish War were kept silent. There was one official version: the policy of the Finnish government was hostile to the USSR. The documents of the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (TSGASA) remained unknown to the general public for a long time.

This was partly due to the fact that the Great Patriotic War ousted the Soviet-Finnish War from minds and research, but at the same time they tried not to deliberately resurrect it.

The Soviet-Finnish war is one of the many tragic and shameful pages of our history. Soldiers and officers “gnawed through” the Mannerheim line, freezing in summer uniforms, having neither the proper weapons nor experience of war in the harsh winter conditions of the Karelian Isthmus and the Kola Peninsula. And all this was accompanied by the arrogance of the leadership, confident that the enemy would ask for peace in 10-12 days (that is, they hoped for Blitzkrieg *).

Random nature photos

It did not add to the USSR either international prestige or military glory, but this war could teach the Soviet government a lot if it had the habit of learning from its own mistakes. The same mistakes that were made in the preparation and conduct of the Soviet-Finnish War, and which led to unjustified losses, then, with some exceptions, were repeated in the Great Patriotic War.

There are practically no complete and detailed monographs on the Soviet-Finnish War containing the most reliable and up-to-date information about it, with the exception of a few works by Finnish and other foreign historians. Although, in my opinion, they can hardly contain complete and up-to-date information, since they give a rather one-sided view, just like Soviet historians.

Most of the military operations took place on the Karelian Isthmus, in close proximity to St. Petersburg (then Leningrad).

When you are on the Karelian Isthmus, you constantly come across the foundations of Finnish houses, wells, small cemeteries, then the remains of the Mannerheim Line, with barbed wire, dugouts, caponiers (how we loved to play “war games” with them!), or at the bottom of a half-overgrown crater by chance you will come across bones and a broken helmet (although this may also be the consequences of hostilities during the Great Patriotic War), and closer to the Finnish border there are entire houses and even farmsteads that were not taken away or burned.

The war between the USSR and Finland, which lasted from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940 (104 days), received several different names: in Soviet publications it was called the “Soviet-Finnish War”, in Western publications - “Winter War”, popularly - “ Finnish War", in publications of the last 5-7 years it also received the name "Unknown".

Reasons for the outbreak of war, preparation of the parties for hostilities

According to the “Non-Aggression Pact” between the USSR and Germany, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR.

The Finnish nation is a national minority. By 1939, the population of Finland was 3.5 million people (that is, it was equal to the population of Leningrad at the same time). As you know, small nations are very concerned about their survival and preservation as a nation. "The small people can disappear, and they know it."

Probably, this can explain its withdrawal from Soviet Russia in 1918, its constant desire, even somewhat painful, from the point of view of the dominant nation, to protect its independence, the desire to be a neutral country during the Second World War.

In 1940, in one of his speeches V.M. Molotov said: “We must be realistic enough to understand that the time of small nations has passed.” These words became a death sentence for the Baltic states. Although they were said in 1940, they can fully be attributed to the factors that determined the policy of the Soviet government in the war with Finland.

Negotiations between the USSR and Finland in 1937 - 1939.

Since 1937, at the initiative of the USSR, negotiations have been held between the Soviet Union and Finland on the issue of mutual security. This proposal was rejected by the Finnish government, then the USSR invited Finland to move the border several tens of kilometers north of Leningrad and lease the Hanko Peninsula for a long term. In exchange, Finland was offered a territory in the Karelian SSR, several times larger in size than the exchange, but such an exchange would not be profitable for Finland, since the Karelian Isthmus was a well-developed territory, with the warmest climate in Finland, and the proposed territory in Karelia was practically wild , with a much harsher climate.

The Finnish government understood well that if it was not possible to reach an agreement with the USSR, war was inevitable, but it hoped for the strength of its fortifications and for the support of Western countries.

On October 12, 1939, when the Second World War was already underway, Stalin invited Finland to conclude a Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance pact, modeled on the pacts concluded with the Baltic states. According to this pact, a limited contingent of Soviet troops was to be stationed in Finland, and Finland was also offered to exchange territories, as discussed earlier, but the Finnish delegation refused to conclude such a pact and left the negotiations. From that moment on, the parties began to prepare for military action.

Reasons and goals of the USSR’s participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

For the USSR, the main danger was that Finland could be used by other states (most likely Germany) as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. The common border of Finland and the USSR is 1400 km, which at that time amounted to 1/3 of the entire northwestern border of the USSR. It is quite logical that in order to ensure the security of Leningrad it was necessary to move the border further away from it.

But, according to Yu.M. Kilin, author of an article in No. 3 of the magazine "International Affairs" for 1994, while moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus (according to negotiations in Moscow in 1939) would not have solved the problems, and the USSR would not have won anything, therefore war was inevitable.

I would still like to disagree with him, since any conflict, be it between people or countries, arises due to the reluctance or inability of the parties to agree peacefully. In this case, this war was, of course, beneficial for the USSR, since it was an opportunity to demonstrate its power and assert itself, but in the end it turned out the other way around. In the eyes of the whole world, the USSR not only did not look stronger and more invulnerable, but on the contrary, everyone saw that it was a “colossus with feet of clay”, unable to cope even with such a small army as the Finnish one.

For the USSR, the Soviet-Finnish War was one of the stages of preparation for world war, and its expected outcome, in the opinion of the military-political leadership of the country, would significantly improve the strategic position of the USSR in Northern Europe, and would also increase the military-economic potential of the state, correcting imbalances national economy, which arose as a result of the implementation of largely chaotic and ill-conceived industrialization and collectivization.

From a military point of view, the acquisition of military bases in the South of Finland and 74 airfields and landing sites in Finland would make the USSR’s positions in the North-West practically invulnerable, it would be possible to save money and resources, and gain time in preparation for a big war, but in at the same time it would mean the destruction of Finnish independence.

But what does M.I. think about the reasons for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War? Semiryaga: “In the 20-30s, many incidents of various types occurred on the Soviet-Finnish border, but they were usually resolved diplomatically. Clashes of group interests based on the division of spheres of influence in Europe and the Far East by the end of the 30s created a real the threat of a global conflict and on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.

At this time, the main factor that predetermined the Soviet-Finnish conflict was the nature of the political situation in Northern Europe. For two decades after Finland gained independence as a result of the October Revolution, its relations with the USSR developed in a complex and contradictory manner. Although the Tartu Peace Treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and Finland on October 14, 1920, and the “Non-Aggression Pact” in 1932, which was later extended to 10 years."

Reasons and goals of Finland’s participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

“During the first 20 years of independence, it was believed that the USSR was the main, if not the only threat to Finland” (R. Heiskanen - Major General of Finland). "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland; the Finnish people... are forever a friend of Germany." (The first President of Finland - P. Svinhuvud)

In the Military Historical Journal No. 1-3 for 1990, there is an assumption about the following reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War: “It is difficult to agree with the attempt to place all the blame for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War on the USSR. In Russia and Finland they understood that the main culprit of the tragedy It was not our peoples or even our governments that appeared (with some reservation), but German fascism, as well as the political circles of the West, which benefited from Germany’s attack on the USSR. The territory of Finland was considered by Germany as a convenient springboard for an attack on the USSR from the North. According to English historian L. Woodward, Western countries intended, with the help of the Soviet-Finnish military conflict, to push Nazi Germany to war against the USSR." (It seems to me that a clash between two totalitarian regimes would be very beneficial for Western countries, since it would undoubtedly weaken both the USSR and Germany, which were then considered sources of aggression in Europe. The Second World War was already underway and a military conflict between the USSR and Germany could lead to dispersal Reich forces on two fronts and the weakening of its military operations against France and Great Britain.)

Preparing the parties for war

In the USSR, supporters of the forceful approach to resolving the Finnish issue were: People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army Mehlis, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov and People's Commissar of the NKVD Beria. They opposed negotiations and any preparation for war. This confidence in their abilities was given to them by the quantitative superiority of the Red Army over the Finnish (mainly in the amount of equipment), as well as the ease of introducing troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus in September 1939.

“The anti-criminal sentiments led to serious miscalculations being made in assessing Finland’s combat readiness.”

On November 10, 1939, Voroshilov was presented with the assessment data of the General Staff: “The material part of the armed forces of the Finnish Army is mainly pre-war models of the old Russian Army, partially modernized at military factories in Finland. A rise in patriotic sentiments is observed only among young people.”

The initial plan of military action was drawn up by Marshal of the USSR B. Shaposhnikov. According to this plan (highly professionally drawn up), the main military operations were to be carried out in the coastal direction of Southern Finland. But this plan was designed for a long time and required preparation for war for 2-3 years. The implementation of the “Agreement on Spheres of Influence” with Germany was required immediately.

Therefore, at the last moment before the start of hostilities, this plan was replaced by the hastily drawn up “Meretskov plan”, designed for a weak enemy. Military operations according to this plan were carried out head-on in the difficult natural conditions of Karelia and the Arctic. The main focus was on a powerful initial strike and the defeat of the Finnish Army in 2-3 weeks, but the operational concentration and deployment of equipment and troops was poorly supported by intelligence data. The commanders of the formations did not even have detailed maps of the combat areas, while Finnish intelligence determined with high accuracy the main directions of the Red Army's attacks.

By the beginning of the war, the Leningrad Military District was very weak, as it was considered secondary. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of August 15, 1935 “On the development and strengthening of areas adjacent to the borders” did not improve the situation. The condition of the roads was especially deplorable.

In preparation for the war, a Military-Economic Description of the Leningrad Military District was compiled - a document unique in its information content, containing comprehensive information about the state of the economy of the North-Western region.

On December 17, 1938, when summing up the results at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, it turned out that in the proposed territory of military operations there were no roads with stone surfaces, military airfields, the level of agriculture was extremely low (the Leningrad region, and even more so Karelia, are areas of risky agriculture, and collectivization almost destroyed what was created by the labor of previous generations).

According to Yu.M. Kilina, blitzkrieg - lightning war - was the only possible one in those conditions, and at a strictly defined time - late autumn - early winter, when the roads were most passable.

By the forties, Karelia had become the “patrimony of the NKVD” (almost a quarter of the population of the KASSR by 1939 were prisoners; the White Sea Canal and Soroklag were located on the territory of Karelia, in which more than 150 thousand people were detained), which could not but affect its economic condition.

Material and technical preparations for war were at a very low level, since it is almost impossible to make up for lost time in 20 years in a year, especially since the command flattered itself with hopes of an easy victory.

Despite the fact that preparations for the Finnish war were carried out quite actively in 1939, the expected results were not achieved, and there are several reasons for this:

Preparations for war were carried out by different departments (Army, NKVD, People's Commissariats), and this caused disunity and inconsistency in actions. The decisive role in the failure of material and technical preparations for the war with Finland was played by the factor of poor controllability of the Soviet state. There was no single center involved in preparations for war.

The construction of roads was carried out by the NKVD, and by the beginning of hostilities the strategically important road Svir - Olonets - Kondushi had not been completed, and the second track was not built on the Murmansk - Leningrad railway, which noticeably reduced its capacity. (The construction of the second track has not yet been completed!)

The Finnish War, which lasted 104 days, was very fierce. Neither the People's Commissar of Defense nor the command of the Leningrad Military District initially imagined the peculiarities and difficulties associated with the war, since there was no well-organized intelligence. The military department did not approach the preparations for the Finnish War seriously enough:

Rifle troops, artillery, aviation and tanks were clearly not enough to break through the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and defeat the Finnish Army. Due to the lack of knowledge about the theater of military operations, the command considered it possible to use heavy divisions and tank troops in all areas of combat operations. This war was fought in winter, but the troops were not sufficiently equipped, equipped, supplied and trained to conduct combat operations in winter conditions. The personnel were armed mainly with heavy weapons and there were almost no light pistols - machine guns and company 50 mm mortars, while the Finnish troops were equipped with them.

The construction of defensive structures in Finland began already in the early 30s. Many Western European countries helped in the construction of these fortifications: for example, Germany participated in the construction of a network of airfields capable of accommodating 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force; The Mannerheim line, the total depth of which reached 90 kilometers, was built with the participation of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium.

The Red Army troops were highly motorized, and the Finns had a high level of tactical and rifle training. They blocked the roads, which were the only way for the Red Army to advance (it’s not particularly convenient to advance in a tank through forests and swamps, but look at the boulders on the Karelian Isthmus, 4-5 meters in diameter!), and attacked our troops from the rear and flanks. To operate in off-road conditions, the Finnish Army had ski troops. They carried all their weapons with them on sleds and skis.

On November 1939, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border with Finland. The initial advance was quite successful, but the Finns launched highly organized sabotage and partisan activities in the immediate rear of the Red Army. The supply of the LVO troops was disrupted, tanks got stuck in the snow and in front of obstacles, and “traffic jams” of military equipment were a convenient target for shooting from the air.

The entire country (Finland) has been turned into a continuous military camp, but military measures continue to be taken: water mining is being carried out off the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, the population is being evacuated from Helsinki, armed groups march in the Finnish capital in the evenings, and a blackout is being carried out. The warlike mood is constantly fueled. There is a clear sense of decline. This can be seen from the fact that evacuated residents are returning to the cities without waiting for the “aerial bombardment”.

Mobilization costs Finland enormous amounts of money (from 30 to 60 million Finnish marks per day), workers are not paid wages everywhere, discontent among the working people is growing, the decline of the export industry and increased demand for the products of defense industry enterprises are noticeable.

The Finnish government does not want to negotiate with the USSR; anti-Soviet articles are constantly published in the press, blaming the Soviet Union for everything. The government is afraid to announce the demands of the USSR at a meeting of the Sejm without special preparation. From some sources it became known that in the Sejm, most likely, there is opposition to the government..."

The beginning of hostilities: Incident near the village of Maynila, November 1939, Pravda newspaper

According to a message from the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, on November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops located a kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila were unexpectedly shot from Finnish territory by artillery fire. Seven gun shots were fired, which resulted in the death of three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander and the injury of seven Red Army soldiers and one junior commander.

To investigate the incident, the head of the 1st department of the district headquarters, Colonel Tikhomirov, was called to the scene. The provocation caused a wave of indignation in the units located in the area of ​​​​the Finnish artillery raid."

Exchange of notes between the Soviet and Finnish governments

Note from the Soviet government regarding the provocative shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish military units

On the evening of November 26, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov received the Finnish envoy A.S. Irie-Koskinen and handed him a note from the USSR government regarding the provocative shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish military units. Accepting the note, the Finnish envoy stated that he would immediately communicate with his government and give an answer.

"Mr. Envoy!

On November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops, located a kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon by artillery fire from Finnish territory. Seven gun shots were fired, which resulted in casualties among Soviet soldiers.

The Soviet government, informing you about this, considers it necessary to emphasize that during negotiations with Mr. Tanner and Paaskivi, it pointed to the danger created by the concentration of a large number of regular Finnish troops near the border in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad.

Now, in connection with the fact of provocative artillery shelling of Soviet troops from the territory of Finland, the Soviet government is forced to state that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad not only creates a threat to the city, but also represents a hostile act towards the USSR, which has already led to an attack on Soviet troops and victims.

The Soviet government does not intend to inflate this outrageous act of attack by units of the Finnish Army, perhaps poorly controlled by the Finnish command. But it would like to ensure that such outrageous acts do not take place in the future.

In view of this, the Soviet government expresses a strong protest against what happened and invites the Finnish government to immediately withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus to 20-25 kilometers and prevent the possibility of a repetition of the provocation."

People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov.

“In connection with the alleged violation of the Finnish border, the Finnish government conducted an investigation, which established that the shots were fired not from the Finnish side, but from the Soviet side, near the village of Mainila, located 800 meters from the Finnish border.

Based on the calculation of the speed of sound propagation from seven shots, it could be concluded that the guns from which the shots were fired are located at a distance of 1.5-2 kilometers to the Southeast from the place where they exploded... Under such circumstances, it seems possible that this is an unfortunate an incident that occurred during training exercises that took place on the Soviet side and resulted in human casualties. As a result, I consider it my duty to reject the protest set out in your letter and state that the hostile act against the USSR that you are talking about was not carried out by the Finnish side.

Regarding the statements made to Tanner and Paaskivi during their stay in Moscow, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it was mainly border troops that were stationed in close proximity to the border on the Finnish side. There were no guns with such a range that their shells would land on the other side of the border in this zone.

Although there are no specific motives for withdrawing troops from the border line, my government is nevertheless ready to begin negotiations on this issue (on the mutual withdrawal of troops).

In order to ensure that no uncertainty is left regarding the alleged incident, my Government proposes to carry out a joint investigation in accordance with the "Convention on Border Commissioners" of September 24, 1928..."

A.S. Irie-Koskinen

“The response of the Government of Finland to the note of the Soviet Government of November 26, 1939 is a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Government of Finland towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring to the extreme a crisis in the relations between both countries, namely:

Denial of the fact of shelling and an attempt to explain the incident as “training exercises” of the Soviet troops.

The refusal of the Finnish government to withdraw troops and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and Finnish troops, while this would mean the withdrawal of Soviet troops directly to the outskirts of Leningrad.

Thereby violating the terms of the “Non-Aggression Pact” concluded by the USSR and Finland in 1932.

In view of this, the Soviet government considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the “Non-Aggression Pact” concluded by the USSR and Finland and systematically violated by the Finnish government."

Soviet T-28 tank from the 91st tank battalion of the 20th heavy tank brigade, destroyed during the December battles of 1939 on the Karelian Isthmus in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 65.5. A column of Soviet trucks moves in the background. February 1940.

A captured Soviet T-28 tank repaired by the Finns is heading to the rear, January 1940.

A vehicle from the 20th Heavy Tank Brigade named after Kirov. According to information about the losses of T-28 tanks of the 20th heavy tank brigade, during the Soviet-Finnish war, the enemy captured 2 T-28 tanks. According to the characteristic features in the photo, the T-28 tank with the L-10 cannon was produced in the first half of 1939.

Finnish tank crews are moving a captured Soviet T-28 tank to the rear. A vehicle from the 20th Heavy Tank Brigade named after Kirov, January 1940.

According to information about the losses of T-28 tanks of the 20th heavy tank brigade, during the Soviet-Finnish war, the enemy captured 2 T-28 tanks. According to the characteristic features in the photo, the T-28 tank with the L-10 cannon was produced in the first half of 1939.

A Finnish tankman takes a photograph standing next to a captured Soviet T-28 tank. The car is assigned the number R-48. This vehicle is one of two Soviet T-28 tanks captured by Finnish troops in December 1939 from the 20th Heavy Tank Brigade named after Kirov. According to the characteristic features, the photo shows a T-28 tank produced in 1939 with an L-10 cannon and brackets for a handrail antenna. Varkaus, Finland, March 1940.

A burning house after the Finnish port city of Turku was bombed by Soviet aircraft in southwestern Finland on December 27, 1939.

T-28 medium tanks from the 20th heavy tank brigade before entering a combat operation. Karelian Isthmus, February 1940.

At the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, the 20th heavy tank brigade had 105 T-28 tanks.

A column of T-28 tanks from the 90th tank battalion of the 20th heavy tank brigade is moving to the attack line. Area of ​​height 65.5 on the Karelian Isthmus, February 1940.

The lead vehicle (produced in the second half of 1939) has a whip antenna, improved periscope armor and a box for smoke exhaust devices with inclined sides.

Prisoners of the Red Army captured by the Finns in the winter of 1940. Finland, January 16, 1940.

Tank T-26 drags a sleigh with troops.

Soviet commanders near the tent.

A captured wounded Red Army soldier is awaiting delivery to the hospital. Sortavala, Finland, December 1939.

A group of captured Red Army soldiers of the 44th Infantry Division. Finland, December 1939.

Red Army soldiers of the 44th Infantry Division frozen in a trench. Finland, December 1939.

Formation of soldiers and commanders of the 123rd Infantry Division on the march after the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940

The division took part in the Soviet-Finnish War, operating on the Karelian Isthmus as part of the 7th Army. She particularly distinguished herself on 02/11/1940 during the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line, for which she was awarded the Order of Lenin. 26 soldiers and division commanders received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Finnish artillerymen of a coastal battery at Cape Mustaniemi (translated from Finnish as “Black Cape”) in Lake Ladoga at the 152-mm Kane gun. 1939

antiaircraft gun

A Soviet wounded man in a hospital lies on a plaster casting table made from improvised materials. 1940

Light tank T-26 during training in overcoming anti-tank obstacles. On the wing there are fascines for overcoming ditches. According to the characteristic features, the car was produced in 1935. Karelian Isthmus, February 1940.

View of a destroyed street in Vyborg. 1940

The building in the foreground is st. Vyborgskaya, 15.

A Finnish skier carries a Schwarzlose machine gun on a sleigh.

The bodies of Soviet soldiers near the road on the Karelian Isthmus.

Two Finns near a destroyed house in the town of Rovaniemi. 1940

A Finnish skier accompanies a dog sled.

Finnish crew of the Schwarzlose machine gun in a position in the vicinity of the town of Salla. 1939

A Finnish soldier sits by a dog sled.

Four Finns on the roof of a hospital damaged as a result of a Soviet air raid. 1940

Sculpture by Finnish writer Aleksis Kivi in ​​Helsinki with an unfinished shrapnel protection box, February 1940.

Commander of the Soviet submarine S-1 Hero of the Soviet Union, captain-lieutenant Alexander Vladimirovich Tripolsky (1902-1949) at the periscope, February 1940.

Soviet submarine S-1 at the pier in the port of Libau. 1940

The commander of the Finnish Army of the Karelian Isthmus (Kannaksen Armeija), Lieutenant General Hugo Viktor Österman (1892-1975, sits at the table) and Chief of Staff Major General Kustaa Tapola (Kustaa Anders Tapola, 1895 - 1971) at the headquarters. 1939.

The Army of the Karelian Isthmus is a formation of Finnish troops located on the Karelian Isthmus during the Soviet-Finnish War and consisting of the II Corps (4 divisions and a cavalry brigade) and the III Corps (2 divisions).

Hugo Osterman in the Finnish army served as chief inspector of infantry (1928-1933) and commander-in-chief (1933-1939). After the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line, he was removed from his post as commander of the Karelian Isthmus Army (February 10, 1940) and returned to work as an inspector of the Finnish army. Since February 1944 - representative of the Finnish army at Wehrmacht headquarters. Resigned in December 1945. From 1946 to 1960 - managing director of one of the Finnish energy companies.

Kustaa Anders Tapola later commanded the 5th Division of the Finnish Army (1942-1944), and was chief of staff of the VI Corps (1944). Resigned in 1955.

President of Finland Kyösti Kallio (1873-1940) with a coaxial 7.62 mm anti-aircraft machine gun ITKK 31 VKT 1939.

A Finnish hospital ward after a Soviet air raid. 1940

Finnish fire brigade during training in Helsinki, autumn 1939.

Talvisota. 10/28/1939. Palokunnan uusia laitteita Helsingissä.

Finnish pilots and aircraft technicians at the French-made Morand-Saulnier fighter MS.406. Finland, Hollola, 1940.

Soon after the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, the French government transferred 30 Moran-Saulnier MS.406 fighters to the Finns. The photo shows one of these fighters from 1/LLv-28. The aircraft still wears the standard French summer camouflage pattern.

Finnish soldiers carry a wounded comrade on a dog sled. 1940

View of a Helsinki street after a Soviet air raid. November 30, 1939.

A house in the center of Helsinki, damaged after a Soviet air raid. November 30, 1939.

Finnish orderlies carry a stretcher with a wounded man near a field hospital tent. 1940

Finnish soldiers dismantle captured Soviet military equipment. 1940

Two Soviet soldiers with a Maxim machine gun in the forest on the Mannerheim Line. 1940

Captured Red Army soldiers enter the house under the escort of Finnish soldiers.

Three Finnish skiers on the march. 1940

Finnish doctors load a stretcher with a wounded person into an ambulance bus manufactured by AUTOKORI OY (on a Volvo LV83/84 chassis). 1940

A Soviet prisoner captured by the Finns sits on a box. 1939

Finnish doctors treat a wounded knee in a field hospital. 1940

Soviet SB-2 bombers over Helsinki during one of the air raids on the city carried out on the first day of the Soviet-Finnish war. November 30, 1939.

Finnish skiers with reindeer and drags at a rest during the retreat. 1940

A burning house in the Finnish city of Vaasa after a Soviet air raid. 1939

Finnish soldiers raise the frozen body of a Soviet officer. 1940

Three Corners Park (Kolmikulman puisto) in Helsinki with dug open slits to provide shelter for the population in the event of an air raid. On the right side of the park you can see a sculpture of the goddess “Diana”. In this regard, the second name of the park is “Diana Park” (“Dianapuisto”). October 24, 1939.

Sandbags cover the windows of a house on Sofiankatu (Sofia Street) in Helsinki. Senate Square and Helsinki Cathedral are visible in the background. Autumn 1939.

Helsinki, lokakuussa 1939.

Squadron commander of the 7th Fighter Aviation Regiment Fyodor Ivanovich Shinkarenko (1913-1994, third from right) with his comrades at the I-16 (type 10) at the airfield. December 23, 1939.

In the photo from left to right: junior lieutenant B. S. Kulbatsky, lieutenant P. A. Pokryshev, captain M. M. Kidalinsky, senior lieutenant F. I. Shinkarenko and junior lieutenant M. V. Borisov.

Finnish soldiers bring a horse into a railway carriage, October-November 1939.

According to the characteristic features in the photo, the T-28 tank with the L-10 cannon was produced in the first half of 1939. This vehicle is one of two Soviet T-28 tanks captured by Finnish troops in December 1939 from the 20th Heavy Tank Brigade named after Kirov. The car has the number R-48. The swastika insignia began to be applied to Finnish tanks in January 1941.

A Finnish soldier looks at the captured Red Army soldiers changing clothes.


Captured Red Army soldiers at the door of a Finnish house after changing clothes (in the previous photo).

Technicians and pilots of the 13th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force. Below: aircraft technicians - Fedorov and B. Lisichkin, second row: pilots - Gennady Dmitrievich Tsokolaev, Anatoly Ivanovich Kuznetsov, D. Sharov. Kingisepp, Kotly airfield, 1939-1940.

The crew of the T-26 light tank before the battle.

Nurses care for wounded Finnish soldiers.

Three Finnish skiers on vacation in the woods.

Captured Finnish dugout. .

Red Army soldiers at the grave of a comrade.

Artillery crew at the 203-mm B-4 gun.

The command staff of the headquarters battery.

An artillery crew at their gun at a firing position near the village of Muola.

Finnish fortification.

Destroyed Finnish bunker with an armored dome.

Destroyed Finnish fortifications of UR Mutoranta.

Red Army soldiers near GAZ AA trucks.

Finnish soldiers and officers near the captured Soviet flamethrower tank XT-26.
Finnish soldiers and officers near the captured Soviet chemical (flame-throwing) tank XT-26. January 17, 1940.
On December 20, 1939, the advanced units of the 44th Division, reinforced by the 312th Separate Tank Battalion, entered the Raata Road and began to advance in the direction of Suomussalmi to the rescue of the encircled 163rd Infantry Division. On a road 3.5 meters wide, the column stretched for 20 km; on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, its main forces were surrounded.
For the defeat of the division, its commander Vinogradov and chief of staff Volkov were court-martialed and shot in front of the line.

A camouflaged Dutch-made Finnish fighter Fokker D.XXI from Lentolaivue-24 (24th Squadron) at Utti airfield on the second day of the Soviet-Finnish war. December 1, 1939.
The photo was taken before all D.XXI squadrons were re-equipped with ski chassis.

A destroyed Soviet truck and a dead horse from a destroyed column of the 44th Infantry Division. Finland, January 17, 1940.
On December 20, 1939, the advanced units of the 44th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 312th separate tank battalion, entered the Raata road and began to advance in the direction of Suomussalmi to the rescue of the encircled 163rd Infantry Division. On a road 3.5 meters wide, the column stretched for 20 km; on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, its main forces were surrounded.
For the defeat of the division, its commander Vinogradov and chief of staff Volkov were court-martialed and shot in front of the line.
The photo shows a burnt Soviet GAZ-AA truck.

A Finnish soldier reads a newspaper while standing next to captured Soviet 122mm howitzers of the 1910/30 model after the defeat of a column of the 44th Infantry Division. January 17, 1940.
On December 20, 1939, the advanced units of the 44th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 312th separate tank battalion, entered the Raata road and began to advance in the direction of Suomussalmi to the rescue of the encircled 163rd Infantry Division. On a road 3.5 meters wide, the column stretched for 20 km; on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, its main forces were surrounded.
For the defeat of the division, its commander Vinogradov and chief of staff Volkov were handed over to

A Finnish soldier is observing from a trench. 1939

The Soviet light tank T-26 is moving towards the battlefield. On the wing there are fascines for overcoming ditches. According to the characteristic features, the car was produced in 1939. Karelian Isthmus, February 1940.

A Finnish air defense soldier, dressed in winter insulated camouflage, looks at the sky through a rangefinder. December 28, 1939.

Finnish soldier next to a captured Soviet medium tank T-28, winter 1939-40.
This is one of the T-28 tanks captured by Finnish troops that belonged to the 20th heavy tank brigade named after Kirov.
The first tank was captured on December 17, 1939, near the road to Lähda, after it fell into a deep Finnish trench and got stuck. The crew's attempts to pull the tank out were unsuccessful, after which the crew abandoned the tank. Five of the nine tankers were killed by Finnish soldiers, and the rest were captured. The second vehicle was captured on February 6, 1940 in the same area.
According to the characteristic features in the picture, the T-28 tank with the L-10 cannon was produced in the first half of 1939.

The Soviet light tank T-26 is crossing over a bridge built by sappers. Karelian Isthmus, December 1939.

A whip antenna is installed on the roof of the tower, and mounts for a handrail antenna are visible on the sides of the tower. According to the characteristic features, the car was produced in 1936.

A Finnish soldier and a woman near a building damaged as a result of a Soviet air raid. 1940

A Finnish soldier stands at the entrance to a bunker on the Mannerheim Line. 1939

Finnish soldiers near a damaged T-26 tank with a mine trawl.

A Finnish photojournalist examines film near the remains of a broken Soviet column. 1940

Finns near a damaged Soviet heavy tank SMK.

Finnish tank crews next to Vickers Mk tanks. E, summer 1939.
The picture shows Vickers Mk. tanks purchased in England for the Finnish army. E model B. These modifications of tanks in service with Finland were armed with 37 mm SA-17 cannons and 8 mm Hotchkiss machine guns taken from Renault FT-17 tanks.
At the end of 1939, these weapons were removed and returned to the Renault tanks, and 37-mm Bofors guns of the 1936 model were installed in their place.

A Finnish soldier walks past Soviet trucks of a defeated column of Soviet troops, January 1940.

Finnish soldiers examine a captured Soviet 7.62-mm M4 anti-aircraft machine gun, model 1931, on a GAZ-AA truck chassis, January 1940.

Residents of Helsinki inspect a car destroyed during a Soviet air raid. 1939

Finnish artillerymen next to a 37 mm Bofors anti-tank gun (37 PstK/36 Bofors). These artillery pieces were purchased in England for the Finnish army. 1939

Finnish soldiers inspect Soviet BT-5 light tanks from a broken column in the Oulu area. January 1, 1940.

View of a broken Soviet convoy near the Finnish village of Suomussalmi, January-February 1940.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) with the I-16 fighter. 1940
Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin was drafted into the Red Army in 1935, and in 1937 he graduated from the 2nd military pilot school in the city of Borisoglebsk. Participant in the battles near Lake Khasan. Since January 1940, he participated in the Soviet-Finnish War, made 60 combat missions as part of the 7th Fighter Aviation Regiment, and shot down three Finnish aircraft. For the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command, courage, bravery and heroism shown in the fight against the White Finns, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 21, 1940, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
Did not return from a combat mission on July 26, 1941.

Soviet light tank T-26 in a ravine near the Kollaanjoki River. December 17, 1939.
Before the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, the Kollasjoki River was on Finnish territory. Currently in the Suoyarvi region of Karelia.

Employees of the Finnish paramilitary organization Security Corps (Suojeluskunta) clearing debris in Helsinki after a Soviet air raid, November 30, 1939.

Correspondent Pekka Tiilikainen interviews Finnish soldiers at the front during the Soviet-Finnish War.

Finnish war correspondent Pekka Tiilikainen interviews soldiers at the front.

The Finnish engineering unit is sent to construct anti-tank barriers on the Karelian Isthmus (a section of one of the defense lines of the Mannerheim Line), autumn 1939.
In the foreground on the supply is a granite block that will be installed as an anti-tank bump.

Rows of Finnish granite anti-tank gouges on the Karelian Isthmus (a section of one of the defense lines of the Mannerheim Line) in the fall of 1939.

In the foreground, on stands, are two granite blocks, prepared for installation.

Evacuation of Finnish children from the city of Viipuri (currently the city of Vyborg in the Leningrad region) to the central regions of the country. Autumn 1939.

Red Army commanders examine a captured Finnish Vickers Mk.E tank (model F Vickers Mk.E), March 1940.
The vehicle was part of the 4th armored company, which was founded on October 12, 1939.
There is a blue stripe on the tank's turret - the original version of the identification marks of Finnish armored vehicles.

The crew of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at Finnish fortifications. December 2, 1939.

Finnish tankman next to a captured Soviet artillery tractor A-20 "Komsomolets" in Varkaus, March 1940.
Registration number R-437. An early vehicle built in 1937 with a faceted rifle mount. The Central Armored Vehicle Repair Workshop (Panssarikeskuskorjaamo) was located in Varkaus.
On captured T-20 tractors (about 200 units were captured), the Finns cut the front end of the fenders at an angle. Probably in order to reduce the possibility of its deformation on obstacles. Two tractors with similar modifications are now in Finland, in the Suomenlinna War Museum in Helsinki and the Armor Museum in Parola.

Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, junior lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) discharges a mine.
Pavel Usov is the first Hero of the Soviet Union from the military personnel of the pontoon units. He was awarded the title of Hero for crossing his troops across the Taipalen-Joki River on December 6, 1939 - on a pontoon in three trips he transported an infantry landing force, which made it possible to capture a bridgehead.
He died on November 25, 1942 near the village of Khlepen, Kalinin Region, while performing a mission.

A unit of Finnish skiers moves on the ice of a frozen lake.

Finnish fighter of French production Morand-Saulnier MS.406 takes off from Hollola airfield. The photo was taken on the last day of the Soviet-Finnish war - 03/13/1940.

The fighter is still wearing the standard French camouflage pattern.

The armed conflict between the Soviet state and Finland is increasingly viewed by contemporaries as one of the components of the Second World War. Let's try to isolate the true causes of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.
The origins of this war lie in the very system of international relations that had developed by 1939. At that time, war, the destruction and violence it brought, were considered an extreme, but completely acceptable method of achieving geopolitical goals and protecting the interests of the state. Large countries were building up their armaments, small states were looking for allies and entered into agreements with them for assistance in case of war.

Soviet-Finnish relations from the very beginning could not be called friendly. Finnish nationalists wanted to return Soviet Karelia to the control of their country. And the activities of the Comintern, directly financed by the CPSU (b), were aimed at the speedy establishment of the power of the proletariat throughout the globe. It is most convenient to start the next campaign to overthrow bourgeois governments from neighboring states. This fact should already make the rulers of Finland worry.

Another exacerbation began in 1938. The Soviet Union predicted the imminent outbreak of war with Germany. And to prepare for this event, it was necessary to strengthen the western borders of the state. The city of Leningrad, which was the cradle of the October Revolution, was a large industrial center in those years. The loss of the former capital during the first days of hostilities would have been a serious blow for the USSR. Therefore, the Finnish leadership received a proposal to lease their Hanko Peninsula to create military bases there.

The permanent deployment of the armed forces of the USSR on the territory of a neighboring state was fraught with a violent change of power to “workers and peasants”. The Finns well remembered the events of the twenties, when Bolshevik activists tried to create a Soviet republic and annex Finland to the USSR. The activities of the Communist Party were banned in this country. Therefore, the Finnish government could not agree to such a proposal.

In addition, in the Finnish territories designated for transfer there was the famous Mannerheim defensive line, which was considered insurmountable. If it is voluntarily handed over to a potential enemy, then nothing will be able to restrain the Soviet troops from advancing forward. A similar trick had already been performed in Czechoslovakia by the Germans in 1939, so the Finnish leadership was clearly aware of the consequences of such a step.

On the other hand, Stalin had no compelling reason to believe that Finland's neutrality would remain unshakable during the upcoming big war. The political elites of capitalist countries generally saw the USSR as a threat to the stability of European states.
In short, the parties in 1939 could not and, perhaps, did not want to come to an agreement. The Soviet Union needed guarantees and a buffer zone in front of its territory. Finland needed to maintain its neutrality in order to be able to quickly change its foreign policy and lean towards the favorite in the approaching big war.

Another reason for a military solution to the current situation seems to be a test of strength in a real war. Finnish fortifications were stormed in the harsh winter of 1939-1940, which was a difficult test for both military personnel and equipment.

Part of the community of historians cite the desire for the “Sovietization” of Finland as one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war. However, such assumptions are not confirmed by facts. In March 1940, the Finnish defensive fortifications fell, and the imminent defeat in the conflict became obvious. Without waiting for help from the Western allies, the government sent a delegation to Moscow to conclude a peace agreement.

For some reason, the Soviet leadership turned out to be extremely accommodating. Instead of quickly ending the war with the complete defeat of the enemy and the annexation of its territory to the Soviet Union, as was done, for example, with Belarus, a peace treaty was signed. By the way, this agreement also took into account the interests of the Finnish side, for example, the demilitarization of the Åland Islands. Probably in 1940 the USSR focused on preparing for war with Germany.

The formal reason for the start of the war of 1939-1940 was the artillery shelling of the positions of Soviet troops near the Finnish border. Which, naturally, the Finns were accused of. For this reason, Finland was asked to withdraw troops 25 kilometers in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. When the Finns refused, the outbreak of war became inevitable.

This was followed by a short but bloody war, which ended in 1940 with the victory of the Soviet side.

The Soviet-Finnish War and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through minefields, in dense rows and holding hands. Every Russian person who recognizes the incomparability of losses must at the same time admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

I’ll quote Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim again:
« It happened that in the battles of early December, Russians marched singing in tight ranks - and even holding hands - into Finnish minefields, not paying attention to explosions and accurate fire from the defenders.”

Can you imagine these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures cited by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24,923 Finns killed and dying from wounds. Russians, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why feel sorry for these Russians?

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book “The Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940.” with reference to Nikita Khrushchev they give the following data:

“Of the total number of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR’s losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1000 aircraft, 2300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with “meat”.
Mannerheim writes about the reasons for the defeat as follows:
“In the final stages of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower.”

Stop!

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such scanty losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and have written about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in “The Great Slandered War” states:
« Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded. The primary source of this figure is a translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä published in the newspaper “Abroad” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish publication “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost more than 23,000 people killed in the “winter war”; more than 43,000 people were injured. 25,243 people were killed in the bombings, including on merchant ships.”

The last figure - 25,243 killed in bombings - is questionable. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to familiarize myself with the Finnish original of Seppälä’s article.”

Mannerheim, as you know, assessed the losses from the bombing:
“More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice that number were wounded.”

The largest figures for Finnish losses are given by Military Historical Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official data, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.”

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
According to Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 prisoners

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book “Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Loss." The number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet includes even those with whom their relatives broke off contact in 1939-1940.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers counted these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Who and how counted the Finnish losses is absolutely unclear. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the armed forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war Finland was experiencing a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even minor losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the Vanquished,” Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to Aritz's calculations, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 grew by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, something that had never happened in any country, not even Germany.”

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. On Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses during the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
A total of 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish website http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died between 1939 and 1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not add up.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR” claims that ardent Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army losses. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as the Shutskor, were not included in the general loss statistics. And they had many paramilitary forces.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

Be that as it may, two explanations arise:
First, if the Finnish data about their losses is correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they “raised their paws” without suffering almost any losses.
Secondly, if we assume that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply vastly underestimated their own losses.

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–40 (another name is Winter War) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The formal cause of hostilities was the so-called Mainila incident - artillery shelling from Finnish territory of Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which, according to the Soviet side, occurred on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.

The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. As a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on taking measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the original Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.

Despite the fact that a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Finland and the USSR in 1932, relations between the two countries were quite tense. In Finland they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), might give its territory to another unfriendly country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city of the USSR, Leningrad, was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.

During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland moves into the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve the exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of several islands and parts of the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories being given to it (not least because of its reluctance to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see. And ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to armament of the demilitarized Åland Islands.

The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the USSR's proposal on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.

Negotiations dragged on and reached a dead end. The parties began to prepare for war.

On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to begin preparations for military operations. Newspaper article "Is it true" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intends to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.

There was less than a month left before the Maynila incident, which served as a formal reason for the war.

Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not happen at all, but there were only unsubstantiated statements by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. There are no documents confirming this or that version. Finland proposed a joint investigation into the incident, but the Soviet side harshly rejected the proposal.

Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "The People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and headed by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, the "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, it did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.

The Soviet Union planned to launch military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army was able to make maximum use of its advantage in manpower and its overwhelming advantage in technology. According to the timeframe, the operation should have taken place within a period of two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on stabilizing the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold off the enemy for up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated Finland's strength, while Finland relied too much on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.

As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland there was a general mobilization. The USSR decided to confine itself to parts of the Leningrad Military District, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.

As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies attacked Finland. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in Karelia, and the 14th Army in the Arctic.

The most favorable situation for the USSR developed at the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defense to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to advance successfully, but was also stopped, with part of its forces being surrounded and forced to withdraw. The heaviest and bloodiest battles took place in the sector of the 7th Army, which was advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army had to storm the Mannerheim Line.

As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely meager information about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. Underestimating the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, the Red Army units with losses were able to overcome only the support zone of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were also unsuccessful. By the end of December it became obvious that attempts at an offensive in this style were pointless. There was relative calm at the front.

Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant reinforcement of troops, saturation of them with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods of combating defensive structures were developed, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches and to raise morale (see. ).

The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military District Military Council Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.

Finland at this moment also carried out measures to increase the combat effectiveness of its own troops. Both new equipment and weapons captured in battles and those supplied from abroad entered service, and units received the necessary reinforcements.

Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.

At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.

The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th Army near Suomussalmi. Since mid-December, the 44th Division had been advancing to help the encircled 163rd Division. In the period from January 3 to January 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting and a rapidly changing situation, the division command incorrectly assessed the current situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind the heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division were still able to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the line.

It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns tried to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were unsuccessful and were repulsed.

On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of Finnish defense and brought tank formations into the breach. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.

On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.

In parallel with the fighting, there were battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was concluded.

As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus and the large cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, and part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga became an internal lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between Western countries and the USSR has reached a critical point.

Recommended reading:
1. Irincheev Bair. Stalin's Forgotten Front. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown wars of the 20th century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b.: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter War. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939–1940. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. “Winter War”: working on mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army to summarize the experience of the Finnish campaign / Responsible. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.

Tatiana Vorontsova