Personnel policy of the CPSU: experience and problems of the Yatskov, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich. Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Resolution of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, having heard and discussed the report of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade. Gorbachev M.S. “On perestroika and personnel policy of the party”, fully approves of the political and practical conclusions made by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee based on an analysis of the situation that developed in Soviet society in the period preceding the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee and a fundamental assessment of the progress of perestroika and the first results of the implementation of the decisions of the 27th Party Congress, as well as the tasks of the modern personnel policy of the CPSU formulated by the Politburo of the Central Committee, which must be solved by all party, state and public organizations.

The Central Committee of the CPSU notes that the time that has passed since the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee and the XXVII Congress of the CPSU has confirmed the correctness and vital necessity of the strategic course developed by the party and supported by the Soviet people to accelerate socio-economic development, the qualitative transformation of all aspects of the life of our society .

The achievements of the Soviet people on the paths of socialist construction almost 70 years after the victory of the Great October Revolution are enormous and undeniable. But these successes should not obscure the fact that at the turn of the 70s and 80s the country began to lose momentum. Difficulties and unresolved problems began to accumulate in the economic, social and spiritual spheres, and stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism appeared. Despite all the enormous work of the party, its cadres of the CPSU Central Committee, the country's leadership was unable to timely and fully assess the danger of growing negative trends and develop a clear line to overcome them. The solution to pressing socio-economic issues had a negative impact on the weakening of attention to the development of theoretical thought, the study of the dialectics of the driving forces and contradictions of developing socialism.

Serious shortcomings have accumulated in the functioning of the institutions of socialist democracy, in planning practices, and in the style and methods of management. Many party organizations were unable to maintain principled positions, did not pay the necessary attention to strict adherence to Leninist principles and norms of party life, and did not wage a decisive fight against negative phenomena, the weakening of discipline, the spread of drunkenness, theft, and bribery. The proper resistance to departmentalism, localism, and nationalist manifestations was not always given.

The Plenum notes the extremely important importance of the fact that in this situation the party found the strength and courage to take a course towards perestroika, lead it, organize work that was revolutionary in nature, aimed at decisively overcoming stagnation, at creating a reliable and effective mechanism for accelerating socio-economic development. development of the country. We simply have no other way but perestroika; we cannot retreat and have nowhere to retreat.

The ultimate goal of perestroika is the renewal of all aspects of the life of our society, giving socialism the most modern forms of social organization, and the fullest disclosure of the creative potential of the socialist system. Penetrating into the deep layers of life, unfolding along the entire front, perestroika is having an increasingly greater impact on the situation in the country and acquiring new qualitative features.

The general political result is that noticeable changes are taking place in the life of Soviet society, positive trends are gaining strength, and a new moral atmosphere is emerging. Transparency, truthfulness, intransigence towards shortcomings, and the desire to improve matters are increasingly being established as active principles. In the first year of the Five-Year Plan, the national economy exceeded the targets set by the plan in terms of key indicators, and serious groundwork was created for further movement forward.

However, not everywhere the measures taken and the work carried out correspond to the scale and severity of the accumulated problems, or are carried out with due efficiency and aggressiveness. In a number of important areas, primarily in the field of efficiency and quality, the development of science and technology, and in the social sphere, changes are taking place with great difficulty. The mechanism of inhibition of socio-economic development that has developed over many years is slowly being destroyed and losing its position, while conservatism, inertia, and outdated thinking have not yet lost their strength and influence.

The Plenum considers the most important task of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional committees, regional committees, district committees, city committees, district party committees, party, state and public organizations to further intensify the work on perestroika, to increase efforts in all its directions. Today, at the initial stage, it is very important to take a position of realism, an objective assessment of what has been done, to look at what has been achieved not only in comparison with the past, and most importantly - to proceed from the plans developed and approved by the party, to prepare every communist, every citizen for a long, intense, selfless work. This is the only correct party approach. Effective, conscientious work by everyone without exception is the key to the success of perestroika. It is necessary to persistently, step by step, without hesitation, implement the planned course, avoiding a gap between the decisions made and their practical implementation, to ensure the irreversibility of the ongoing transformations.

The success of perestroika will be decisively determined by how quickly and deeply our cadres will be imbued with understanding of the need for revolutionary changes, and how decisively, energetically and competently they will act. These goals are called upon to be served by an active, purposeful personnel policy of the party, based on Leninist principles and meeting the tasks of perestroika. It must fully reflect the peculiarities of the modern situation, the nature and tasks of the current moment, and ensure the high efficiency of all links of the Party and the state, our entire social organism. Personnel policy is a decisive means of implementing the program goals of the CPSU, a reliable tool that allows the party to exercise political leadership of society, develop and successfully implement a strategic line that meets the interests of the people, the tasks of strengthening and developing socialism.

1. The Plenum emphasizes that the condition for accelerating the socio-economic development of the country is the ever more complete disclosure and use of the enormous potential of socialism as a new social system, the improvement of its economic foundations, the comprehensive development of socialist democracy, and the deepening of self-government of the people. On this basis, only the living creativity of the working masses can truly gain scope, their real participation in solving all issues in the life of society, the human factor can manifest itself in full force.

Approving concrete steps in this direction, taken in accordance with the guidelines of the 27th Party Congress. The Plenum considers it necessary to make maximum use of the opportunities for expanding socialist democracy, developing the Soviet political system, filling the work of party, state bodies, and public organizations with real democratic content, and providing conditions for significantly increasing the influence of workers on the selection of personnel and control over their work. It is necessary to ensure that primary party organizations fully fulfill their statutory obligation to actively participate in the implementation of personnel policy.

The Plenum attaches primary importance to the development of democracy in the sphere of production, the consistent introduction of self-government into the life of work collectives, and the creation of conditions that would allow every worker to truly feel like the owner of their enterprise. This should be aimed at creating councils of labor collectives of enterprises and associations, endowing them, as well as general meetings of collectives, with decisive powers on a wide range of production, social and personnel issues.

It is considered necessary to introduce the election of managers of enterprises, production facilities, workshops, departments, sections, farms and units, foremen and foremen. Expand the practice and determine the conditions for using the competitive system for selecting and replacing managers and specialists.

In the new conditions, it becomes important to correctly understand that the election of leading workers in work collectives not only does not undermine, but, on the contrary, strengthens unity of command, increases the authority of managers and at the same time raises their responsibility for the work, creates an atmosphere of mutual exactingness and exactingness in every team. The organic combination of unity of command and participation of collectives in decision-making on the most important issues deepens and develops the principle of democratic centralism, planned leadership based on the collective.

The Plenum considers it expedient to approve as a basis the draft Law of the USSR on a state enterprise (association), with a view to subsequently submitting it for public discussion.

3. We should make fuller use of the wide opportunities for development, initiative and initiative of the working people, democratization of economic and social management that collective farms and socialist cooperation in general have at their disposal. It is important to ensure strict compliance with the provisions of the charters of collective farms and other cooperative organizations, to make changes to them that will contribute to the further development of the activity of members of cooperatives, increasing their interest in collective work and its real results for each member of the cooperative. To recommend that the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the relevant republican and local bodies take measures to widely disseminate cooperative forms of organizing public catering, consumer services and some other areas directly related to meeting the needs and meeting the interests of the Soviet people.

4. One of the key areas of democratization of public life and personnel policy is the improvement of the Soviet electoral system. It is important to rid the practice of nominating and discussing candidates for Soviet deputies from elements of formalism, to provide voters with the opportunity to express their attitude towards a larger number of candidates, and to effectively participate in the electoral process at all its stages.

5. The Plenum supports the principled statement of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KGSSU on the need to expand internal party democracy, find effective ways to revitalize the work of primary party organizations, conferences and plenums, and improve the mechanism for the formation of elected party bodies at all levels in terms of its further democratization.

6. The Plenum attaches great importance to strengthening control over the activities of cadres “from above” and especially “from below”, to the consistent implementation of Lenin’s demand that the work of the governing bodies be open to everyone, done in full view of the masses. For these purposes, regular reporting of elected and appointed officials to workday teams and the population should be ensured, with workers given the right to evaluate the activities of managers, up to and including raising the issue of releasing employees who cannot cope with their duties or have compromised themselves. It is necessary to create a clear system of control over the work of leading personnel, using for this purpose party, trade union, Komsomol conferences, sessions of Councils of People's Deputies, plenums of party, trade union and Komsomol committees, the activities of standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Supreme Councils of union and autonomous republics, local Councils people's deputies, consistently expanding the practice of deputy requests.

Recognize that it is expedient for the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to take measures to streamline the existing practice of checks and inspections at enterprises and organizations, keeping in mind that such checks help the cause and are not a tribute to formalism that distracts a large number of people from the work.

Party organizations should constantly keep under review the certification of management personnel, specialists, employees of state bodies and public organizations, considering it as an effective form of collective control over the work of personnel and stimulating the growth of their business qualifications.

7. The Plenum obliges all party committees and party organizations to take additional measures aimed at expanding publicity, developing criticism and self-criticism, especially criticism from below, to make full use of this proven weapon in order to educate personnel in the spirit of intransigence to shortcomings, healthy dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, and the eradication of any types of deviations from the norms of socialist morality. We must always proceed from the fact that the attitude towards criticism is an important indicator of the political maturity of personnel, their readiness for change, and their ability to actually carry out restructuring. There cannot be persons in the party who are beyond criticism, as well as persons who do not have the right to criticize. Any facts of suppression of criticism, as well as attempts of slanderers to denigrate honest, dedicated workers, to settle personal scores, resorting to anonymous letters and other unworthy methods must be resolutely suppressed.

8. Considering that true democracy does not exist outside the law and above the law, the Plenum attaches great importance to the development and adoption of new legislative acts, increasing the role of the Soviet court, strict adherence to the principle of independence of judges, decisive strengthening of prosecutorial supervision, improving the work of investigative bodies, all ways and means of protecting the interests of the Soviet state, ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens. The party proceeds from the fact that socialist democracy has nothing in common with permissiveness, irresponsibility, and anarchy. It is called upon to really serve the individual, the collective and society, the development of workers' initiative, the disclosure of the creative potential of the socialist system, the strengthening of legality and justice, a healthy moral atmosphere in our society. It is necessary to strengthen the legal education of leading personnel and the entire population.

9. The Plenum considers it necessary to take care of the consistent expansion of the social base of Soviet democracy, the more active participation of every citizen, veterans and youth, representatives of all segments of the population in the implementation of perestroika, in state and public life.

It is necessary to ensure that in all areas, hand in hand with proven personnel of older generations, young, promising workers work hand in hand, gain experience, gain strength, and boldly advance.

Party organizations are obliged to skillfully direct this natural process, considering it as an indispensable condition for ensuring the continuity of leadership, our political course, and overcoming inertia and stagnation. It is important that the trust of young people, the development of their independence in the organization of work, study, life, and leisure are combined with the provision of assistance and comradely criticism of mistakes. It is necessary to radically improve the work on preparing a reliable reserve of personnel for promotion.

More worthy workers and collective farmers should be recommended to party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol bodies, and for leadership positions. Encourage their education in every possible way in higher educational institutions and technical schools, carefully select and educate future leaders from them. It is necessary to more actively promote good organizers from among non-party comrades to responsible positions.

The Plenum considers the promotion of women to leadership positions at all levels of management and in all spheres of society to be fundamentally important.

10. The Plenum of the Central Committee draws attention to the need for strict and consistent implementation in work with personnel of the requirements of Lenin’s national policy, comprehensive consideration of the processes of deepening internationalization of the country’s economic and social life. In everything related to the development of national relations, one should show special sensitivity and prudence, adherence to party principles, concern for strengthening the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of our country, resolutely overcome negative phenomena in this area, give an uncompromising rebuff to any manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, Zionism and anti-Semitism, localism, dependent sentiments and national narrow-mindedness and arrogance, contrast them with consistent, seasoned internationalism.

To ensure proper representation in party, state, economic bodies, and public organizations of all nations and nationalities of the country, to ensure that the composition of leading personnel more fully reflects the national structure of the population. In order to strengthen the international training of personnel and enrich them with experience in party and state work, it is necessary to intensify the exchange of personnel between republics and regions, between local and central bodies.

In order to strengthen his power and suppress opposition to the ongoing reforms, Gorbachev spent enormous efforts on having a team of his supporters from top to bottom in the Communist Party, and then in the authorities as a whole.

Already at the April Plenum of 1985, supporters of Gorbachev became full members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee: Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee E.K. Ligachev and N.I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.M. Chebrikov; candidate member of the Politburo - Minister of Defense S. L. Sokolov. A “Gorbachev majority” is emerging in the Politburo.

In 1985-86, the bulk of the old cadres of Brezhnev’s entourage were replaced. Gorbachev's opponents were gradually removed from the Politburo: G. V. Romanov (July 1985), N. A. Tikhonov (October 1985), V. V. Grishin (February 1986), D. A. Kunaev (January 1987), G. A. Aliev (October 1987), V. I. Dolgikh (September 1988), P. N. Demichev (September 1988), M. S. Solomentsev (September 1988). To replace them, A. N. Yakovlev, B. N. Yeltsin, A. I. Lukyanov, V. A. Medvedev, and other active participants in future events were introduced into the country's leadership.

Subsequently, Yeltsin became an opponent of Gorbachev from a supporter and was expelled from the Politburo on February 18, 1988. During 1985-1986, Gorbachev renewed the composition of the Politburo by two-thirds, 60% of the secretaries of regional committees and 40% of the members of the CPSU Central Committee were replaced.

At a Politburo meeting in April 1986, Gorbachev first announced the need to hold a Plenum on personnel issues. Only there it was possible to make a fundamental decision to change personnel policy. In June 1986, at a meeting with secretaries and heads of departments of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev said: “Without a “small revolution” nothing will come of it in the party, because real power lies with the party bodies. The people will not carry around an apparatus that does nothing for perestroika.”

And so the Plenum on personnel issues took place in January 1987. Gorbachev insisted on very important changes in the CPSU.

1. For the first time, the principle of election across the entire party vertical from several candidates was adopted;

2. Party functionaries were obliged to systematically report on the work they had done to those who elected them;

3. The CPSU began to transform from a state structure into a political party;

4. Now it has become possible to promote non-partisans to leadership positions;

5. Expansion of “intra-party democracy”. This subsequently led to the formation of factions and the actual split of the CPSU;

6. Changing the functions and role of the Soviets, they were to become “genuine authorities on their territory”;

7. Conducting elections to the Soviets on an alternative basis

Alternative elections to local Soviets took place in the summer of 1987 in many electoral districts, for the first time in the history of the USSR.

The most important event of 1988 was the XIX All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU, held in June-July. For the first time since the 1920s, delegates expressed independent opinions, sometimes allowing themselves to criticize the actions of the party leadership, and this was broadcast on television. A decision was made on alternative elections of Soviet deputies at all levels. But at the same time, measures were outlined to preserve the role of the CPSU in the country. Now the Supreme Council was to be elected by the Congress of People's Deputies, 1500 of which were to be elected by the population. The remaining 750 people were to be elected by “public organizations,” with the largest number of deputies chosen by the CPSU.

The party conference also decided to combine the positions of the head of the party committee and the chairman of the Council at the appropriate level. The latter was elected by the population; if he was successful in the elections, he had to resign from his party post.

As the crisis in the country grew, a crisis began within the CPSU. Gorbachev had to face opposition from all sides. In addition to the traditional conservatives, the Democratic and Marxist Platforms appeared as factions; in fact, they were independent parties. Gorbachev turned out to be mediocre in economic reforms, but he was good at political intrigues, this cannot be taken away from him. However, while crushing some opponents within the party, Gorbachev constantly received new ones.

On September 30, 1988, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the largest “purge” of the Politburo since Stalin’s times took place.

In June 1990, the first congress of the Communist Party of Russia opened, the leader of which was elected I. Polozkov, who was in strong opposition to Gorbachev from a conservative position. The Communist Party of Russia opposes itself to the CPSU. This means a virtual split among the communists.

In July 1990, Boris Yeltsin and the most radical members of the democratic orientation left the CPSU. The Communist Parties of the Baltic republics declared themselves independent. The size of the CPSU in 1990 decreased from 20 to 15 million people.

The number of opponents increased faster than Gorbachev managed to crush them. In the end, his inner circle of perestroika began to rebel and express dissatisfaction. Under these conditions, the CPSU itself began to matter less and less to Gorbachev. By that time, Gorbachev's power as president of the USSR ceased to depend only on his own party. Mikhail Sergeevich began desperately trying to get support outside the CPSU, from anywhere. But this became increasingly difficult to do. The people turned away from Gorbachev, the republican and economic leadership turned away. Popular fronts in a number of republics, which were conceived as an alternative to the CPSU to support the policy of perestroika, turned into radical anti-communists and separatists.

At the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (April 24-25, 1991), the leadership of the CPSU, previously entirely supporters of Gorbachev, demanded that he restore the status of the ruling party and control over the media to the CPSU, and most importantly, either introduce a state of emergency in the country or resign from the post of President THE USSR. Gorbachev threatened to resign from the General Secretaries while retaining the post of President. This scared the top of the party. The comrades-in-arms announce a break, gather the Politburo and ask Mikhail Sergeevich to remain at the head of the party. Gorbachev persists. And then the Politburo decides by vote to withdraw from consideration Gorbachev’s proposal for his resignation from the post of General Secretary. At the same time, the ultimatum to Gorbachev is annulled. Those who presented the ultimatum will then unsuccessfully try to organize a putsch on August 19, we will return to that later.

After the failure of the putsch, Yeltsin, live at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, which was watched by the whole country, with a humiliated Gorbachev, signed a decree suspending the activities of the CPSU on the territory of the RSFSR.

On August 29, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR suspended the activities of the CPSU throughout the entire territory of the USSR. A complete ban on the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR was carried out by Yeltsin’s decree on November 6.

Formerly a communist just a year ago, Boris finished the history of his party. The subsequently formed Party of Russian Communists is a different organization, different from the CPSU.

Many former party leaders believed that the end of the USSR occurred precisely when the CPSU was banned. Because she controlled or tried to control Soviet and economic leaders until the very end.

85 Foreign policy of “new thinking” under Gorbachev.

Having come to power, M. S. Gorbachev set a course for improving relations with the United States. One of the reasons for this was the desire to reduce exorbitant military expenses (25% of the USSR state budget, in reality more, since civilian enterprises, research and educational institutions worked for the defense industry). The policy of “New Thinking” was proclaimed.

At the same time, in the first two years of Gorbachev’s rule, the foreign policy of the USSR remained quite tough. Gorbachev's first meeting with US President Ronald Reagan in the fall of 1985 ended with a non-binding Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Nuclear War.

Soviet policy in Afghanistan was subject to some adjustments, where the USSR replaced the country's leadership in May 1986. The new PDPA General Secretary Najibullah proclaimed a course for national reconciliation, the Soviet Union sought to strengthen the position of the new leadership in order to begin the withdrawal of troops.

In October 1986, a meeting between Soviet and American leaders took place in Reykjavik. For the first time, the USSR expressed its readiness to make serious concessions to its opponents.

In 1987, the Warsaw Pact countries developed a new, purely defensive military doctrine, with a unilateral reduction of weapons to the limits of “reasonable sufficiency.” Resistance to the new course was prevented by a purge in the army after the unhindered landing on May 28, 1987 of the plane of German citizen Matthias Rust on Red Square. On May 30, 1987, Army General D. T. Yazov became the new Minister of Defense.

Gorbachev formulated the main ideas of the new foreign policy course. All ideological and economic differences between the world systems of socialism and capitalism must give way to the need to protect universal human values.

Since 1987, the intensity of the confrontation between the USA and the USSR began to decline sharply; the weakening of the confrontation was achieved largely due to the compliance of the Soviet leadership on many issues. This compliance resulted from growing internal problems and Gorbachev's weakness as a state leader. Having failed everything possible in domestic politics and economics, it would be strange to achieve success in foreign policy.

In 1989, troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, ending the unnecessary war. In fact, this was the only reasonable step in Soviet foreign policy of that period. Arms reduction was necessary, but since it was accompanied by large concessions to the Americans, it cannot be considered an achievement. Partial success consisted of a very strong reduction in confrontation with the United States. But also at the expense of large unilateral concessions. It also cannot be included as an asset.

Gorbachev, through his passivity, contributed to the overthrow of socialist regimes in Europe in the second half of 1989; From the category of allies, these countries immediately moved into the category of adversaries, and they still strongly dislike Russia. The only exception is the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

A very serious mistake was that they spinelessly did not prevent the unification of Germany. After short negotiations, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, then foreign minister, agreed to the inclusion of the former GDR in NATO. As I already wrote above, it would be possible to extract huge amounts of money from Germany and the West in the form of compensation for this. They were ready to do it. Nothing was done.

Because of the new thinking in politics, interest in the USSR, personally in Gorbachev, grew all over the world, everyone learned the Russian word perestroika. The Western world appreciated the fact that the USSR ceased to pose a threat to them. On November 21, 1990, the so-called “Charter for a New Europe” was signed in Paris, proclaiming the end of half a century of confrontation between the two systems and the beginning of a new era of “democracy, peace and unity.” However, the authority of the USSR as a state was rapidly declining, and it began to be taken into account less and less.

At the beginning of the New Thinking Policy, the USSR proposed simultaneously dissolving the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The proposal was rejected and they waited for us to dissolve the military organization unilaterally. And so in the spring of 1991, the Department of Internal Affairs and the CMEA were dissolved. Soviet troops were withdrawn from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Huge property of the Soviet troops was abandoned. No compensation was received for this. But the costs of equipping the withdrawn troops placed an exorbitant burden on the weakened economy. A small achievement of new thinking can be considered the restoration of diplomatic relations with Albania (July 30, 1990) and Israel (January 3, 1991).

As a summary, Gorbachev absolutely mediocrely failed his entire foreign policy, like everything else.

Selection, placement and training of personnel, personnel policy of the CPSU, meeting modern requirements, unswervingly implement the decisions of the party and government aimed at increasing labor efficiency and the responsibility of workers for the assigned work.

The decisions of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee regarding the party’s personnel policy indicated the need

The January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was devoted to the problems of perestroika and acceleration, which comprehensively discussed the issue of perestroika and personnel policy of the party. The main idea of ​​our strategy is to combine the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with a planned economy and bring into action the full potential of socialism 1.

At the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, it was noted that the decisive criterion for assessing personnel is their attitude to perestroika, the actual actions to implement it. In modern conditions, the moral character and competence of employees, their high professional level, and commitment to everything advanced and progressive are of great importance. The January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted significant features in personnel policy, including in research institutes and design bureaus. Development is of paramount importance

At the June (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, it was said that revolutionary changes in society have brought to the fore the contradiction between the demands of renewal, creativity, creative initiative, on the one hand, and conservatism, inertia, and selfish interests, on the other. One of the manifestations of this real contradiction is the discrepancy between the growing activity of the masses and the still tenacious bureaucratic style of activity in a variety of areas, attempts to freeze perestroika. Overcoming this contradiction requires quick and decisive measures - both in personnel policy and in the approval of new approaches and norms of party, state and public life. Personnel policy must ensure a radical improvement in the quality of management.

The January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee introduced many fundamental new things into issues of personnel policy, which cannot but be reflected in the practice of forming and training a reserve of leading personnel. At the Plenum, the need for wider promotion of non-party comrades to leadership work was pointed out. This, said M. S. Gorbachev, is a fundamental question. The political and business growth of the advanced worker, peasant, engineer, researcher, doctor, teacher, service worker, in the constant identification and promotion of talents from the people is one of the strong guarantees of the health and progress of a socialist society.

Such negative aspects in remuneration hampered personnel policy, had a negative impact on labor incentives, and reduced its efficiency. Therefore, as emphasized in the CPSU Program, it is necessary to constantly improve the wage system so that it fully complies with the principle of payment according to the quantity and quality of labor, takes into account its conditions and results, stimulates the improvement of workers' skills, labor productivity, product quality, rational use and saving all types of resources 1.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government constantly pay great attention to improving working conditions and improving personnel policy in the country. January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee outlined ways to improve the selection and placement of personnel in the context of restructuring the national economy along the path of accelerating socio-economic development, in the context of reform of national economic management.

The political urgency of the current moment is reflected in the minds of leaders as a struggle between the new and the old, when each of them is tested by action. The role of the leader’s personality in the work team is increasing enormously. Therefore, in the resolution of the January (1987) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU On Perestroika and Personnel Policy of the Party,

It can be argued that history is made by frames, but history also makes frames. This dialectical unity can be traced through the historical stages of development of our national economy. In the conditions of democratization, the party’s personnel policy needs to be seriously updated, as stated in Resolution XJX of the All-Union Conference of the CPSU On the democratization of Soviet society and reform of the political system.

Adopt the resolution of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on perestroika and personnel policy of the party for strict guidance and implementation.

A unified document flow system was used throughout the country. End-to-end, bottom-to-top planning was in effect (budgeting that even a modern large company can envy. Five-year plans in modern language correspond to strategic development plans. Methods of “project management” specific to socialism were developed; a capital investment system and procedures project reviews (feasibility studies), resource balances, network graphs, capital productivity, etc. As an analogue of modern methods of personnel management, the system of personnel policy of the CPSU operated. For example, instead of the modern concept of a key specialist, the term “nomenclature” was used. country specialist included in the nomenclature lists, his personnel history accumulated i

In the decisions of the XXVII Party Congress, resolutions of the April (1985), January (1987) Plenums of the Central Committee. The CPSU and a number of other resolutions paid great attention to improving management systems for scientific and technological progress and socio-economic development, increasing the efficiency of the country’s entire economic mechanism, and personnel policy. In this regard, economists, managers of science and production will have to revise most of the provisions on the organization and planning of development and production at all levels of management, create conditions for increasing the independence of all lower levels of PSNT, making the most effective technical, social and economic decisions.

In implementing the tasks set by the XXYII Congress of the CPSU to accelerate the socio-economic development of the country, an important role is assigned to managers and specialists at all levels of management - from foreman to minister. The resolution of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee indicates the need to seriously update personnel policy, to make it truly modern, inextricably linked with the key areas of the struggle to accelerate socio-economic development. It was recognized as necessary to introduce the election of managers of enterprises, production facilities, workshops, departments, sections, foremen and foremen.

The most important Leninist provisions on the principles of selection, placement and training of personnel were further developed in the materials of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which considered the issue of perestroika and personnel policy of the party2. Considering the great responsibility for the implementation of the party’s strategic course to accelerate socio-economic development, which falls on personnel employed in the economic sphere, the Plenum drew attention to the need to promote and educate truly competent people. smart, enterprising managers of enterprises and associations who know how to work with people and are able, in new economic conditions, to ensure access to the forefront of scientific and technological progress, a radical improvement in the quality of products, and high production efficiency.

Lisin B.K. PERSONNEL POLICY OF THE CPSU: SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS. M.: Wolters Kluwer, 2010. 336 p.

Monograph by B.K. Lisin is a fundamental political and sociological study of the main theoretical and applied problems of personnel policy and personnel work of the main subject of management of Soviet society - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

The CPSU, by virtue of its constitutional status (Article 6 of the USSR Constitution of 1978) and established political practice, had sovereign, i.e. the exclusive right to resolve personnel issues in all party, state, public, economic and other organizations. At the same time, the leadership cadres played the role of the main lever for implementing the party’s policies in all spheres of public life. Accordingly, both achievements and crisis phenomena in the development of the country are largely a consequence of the corresponding processes in working with personnel, and the study of historical experience in the development and implementation of personnel policy is the key to both understanding the history of the Soviet period and to determining the strategy for the further construction of modern Russia .

Despite the noted importance of effective work with personnel, the level of its scientific support did not at all meet the real needs. Firstly, like all Soviet social science, the study of personnel issues was assigned not only the theoretical-cognitive, instrumental and prognostic function traditional for scientific knowledge, but also the political-ideological, “protective” function. Secondly, given the special importance (and sensitivity) of this topic, the monopoly right to give a general assessment of the state of personnel work in the country was de facto assigned only to the highest leaders of the party and to a very narrow group of high-ranking functionaries responsible for its implementation and not at all interested in an objective assessment of the results of their activities. As a result, science was deprived of the opportunity to exert its guiding or at least corrective influence on personnel practice. The apogee and logical result of the deep crisis in the personnel work of the CPSU and its scientific understanding was the concentration in the highest echelons of power of people who, due to their intellectual, professional and moral qualities, were not capable of either leading the transition of the country to a new qualitative state during the years of perestroika, or of developing and implementing an effective strategies for its development in the post-Soviet period.

In the book under review, work with personnel is analyzed using the methods and tools of sociological science (including questionnaires, interviews, content analysis, participant observation), in contrast to the vast majority of works prepared within the framework of the history of the CPSU and party building and which are predominantly descriptive in nature. The empirical base was made up of materials from many years of sociological research by the author, the object of which were senior officials of party, state, Komsomol bodies and other spheres of activity in various regions of the country.

In the chapter “Personnel in and Behind the Scenes,” the author identified the reasons for the transformation of personnel policy from a powerful lever for managing society into a brake, and then into an obstacle to solving new problems; An in-depth analysis of the real state of work with management personnel was carried out during the period, which was first defined as developed socialism, and later called stagnant. Having defined personnel policy as “a complex mechanism of interconnected goals, motives, traditions, relationships, procedures and structures,” Lisin makes a reasonable conclusion that this mechanism needs systematic prevention and periodic updating,

modernization, which was not implemented in the analytical and practical work of party bodies at all levels over the past decades.

The foundation of the personnel policy, in the opinion of the author, could and should have been made up of numerous instructions and judgments of V.I., distinguished by clarity of presentation and theoretical depth. Lenin on almost all aspects of working with management personnel. Instead, from his entire legacy, only individual theses or “Leninist principles” were widely quoted, which, even in such a truncated form, the majority of party functionaries did not possess and did not use in their practical work. A scientific, objective analysis of the real processes occurring in the field of personnel work has not actually been carried out.

The most informative not only about major shortcomings in the work, but also about the deplorable state of scientific development of personnel issues were the results of preparations for consideration by the CPSU Central Committee of the issue of working with the reserve of leading personnel in the Zaporozhye regional party organization (1981). This study was unprecedented both in the breadth of the problems studied and in the arsenal of methods used to study them. On the one hand, the following were identified: a gap between theoretical principles and their practical implementation; formalism; low demands on persons who allow distortions in the principles of selection, placement and training of personnel; insufficient democracy in the HR procedures used. On the other hand, a range of problems have been identified that deserve special attention: the development and testing of more accurate criteria for assessing the work of managers, their personal contribution to solving the problems at hand; creation and improvement of personnel certification; solving a range of issues related to the training and advanced training of managers, including the introduction of active learning methods, etc.

Of particular interest are the materials in the chapter “Personnel Chernobyl,” which clearly reveals many of the vicissitudes of the struggle between contradictory tendencies in party politics. According to Lisin, the top party leadership (both its conservative and liberal parts) turned out to be incapable of governing the country in the context of the transition to a new development paradigm. Thus, in January 1987, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held dedicated to personnel policy, where once again a set of non-binding phrases were voiced, not supported by a clear program of action. The book recounts another episode. In August 1987, Lisin submitted an analytical note to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, which summarized not only the most pressing problems of personnel policy, but also proposed specific, well-founded measures to solve them. Nevertheless, neither the resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party on this note, nor the subsequent actions to implement it went beyond the long-trodden rut.

And finally, the book presents a detailed analysis of the results of the largest study of personnel problems of the CPSU. In April-July 1989, under the leadership of the author, a survey was conducted of 3,766 managers and employees of the management apparatus included in the nomenclature of the Alma-Ata, Vitebsk, Zaporozhye, Leningrad, Novosibirsk regional committees and the Krasnoyarsk regional party committee (the survey was repeated in 1990-1991), which showed the complete inconsistency of the party’s personnel policy with the new, perestroika conditions.

Of great interest are the pages of the book, covering the short period of the author’s work as head. Department of Personnel Management of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Economic Reform, headed by Academician L.I. Abalkin. At this final stage of perestroika, a program for staffing the transition to the market was developed, and a number of appropriate organizational, material and technical measures were taken. Unfortunately, these developments were not destined to be realized.

An important part of the book are appendices, the main part of which consists of materials from sociological studies of various aspects of personnel

war policies carried out by the author and under his leadership since 1969. They provide readers with the opportunity to both verify the validity of Lisin’s conclusions and conduct a secondary analysis of the vast empirical material themselves. The book ends with a name index, including about 300 personalities.

Our ideological opponents very often in the polemics that are imposed on us, communists, looking for "revelations" activities I.V. Stalin, refer to the words of Khrushchev. At the same time, he is being passed off as the alleged successor of V.I.’s case. Lenin, although the activities " chief corn grower"was really aimed at destroying the socialist foundations.

Such a misconception (to put it mildly) can easily be explained logically, because, to our great regret, Khrushchev had a CPSU party card in his pocket. Moreover, he became the leader of the Soviet Union shortly after the death of I.V. Stalin. After such counterarguments, it is very difficult for us to conduct a debate, because it is difficult for an ignorant person to explain the difference, for example, between Wahhabism and traditional Islam or a militant monastic order and traditional Catholicism. So it is here. Although today history itself gives us a hint in strengthening the revelations of the activities and words of the hidden Trotskyist and anti-Marxist, which Khrushchev actually was. And the best confirmation of this is
what Yeltsin and Putin they were once members of the CPSU, just like him. We all remember how Yeltsin made a dizzying career in the CPSU, and eventually ended up in the chair of the President of Russia. So Khrushchev, cleverly hiding behind his party card, with the help of intrigues found himself at the helm of the state - the USSR, which the West respected and feared. And meanly so with your own
accomplices Suslov and Kosygin began to methodically destroy the socialist model of the country's development under sweet calls to build communism, the coming of which the disguised degenerates and scoundrels themselves feared. And the contours of the prospect of building a communist society became more and more tangible under Stalin. After the Soviet Union overcame devastation and famine and the emergence of European countries that declared their commitment to building socialism in their country, the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, rushed at an accelerated pace to finally build socialism in our country. In the book "140 conversations with Molotov" Fedora Chueva very interesting facts about Stalin’s life are given: “When Marshal Golovanov and I were sitting at the table at Molotov’s dacha, Alexander Evgenievich said: “If Stalin had lived another ten years, world capitalism would have come to an end. I remember there was an argument in front of him about who was better: Churchill or Roosevelt? “It’s the same thing,” said Stalin, “Churchill, Roosevelt, Nasser, Nehru. Not one of them will give money to the workers.”. Same Molotov testifies: “Before the first post-war session of the Supreme Council, Marshal Vasilevsky I asked Stalin how he imagined communism. “I believe,” said Stalin, “the initial phase or first stage of communism will practically begin when we begin to distribute bread to the population for free.” What was someone like, it seems Voronov, an astonished question was asked: "Comrade Stalin, why - bread for free, this is impossible
business!" Stalin led us to the window: "What's there?" - "River, Comrade Stalin." - "Water?" - "Water." - "Why is there no queue for water? You see, you never thought that we might have such a situation in our state with regard to bread." He walked around and around and said: "You know what, if there are no international complications, and by that I mean only war, I think that this will come in 1960." And so that anyone would have doubts then, God forbid! The country was destroyed, people lived poorly, were starving, and we had a huge gold reserve accumulated, and there was so much platinum that it was not shown on world market, for fear of depreciation!(Recorded 12/02/1971 .)".
Was this the step that the counter-revolution was afraid of? If bread really became free in the Soviet Union (And free distribution of bread will certainly be in the foreseeable future
would become a reality, because Stalin never spoke rash words!), then such an act of Soviet power would mark the country’s transition to the point of no return to capitalist orders, i.e. the final victory of socialism. The Soviet people would have really felt the prototype of communism, which would have knocked the ground out from under petty-bourgeois sentiments. This act
would become a huge stimulus to the avalanche-like growth of revolutionary actions throughout the world. But, alas, Stalin's heart stopped beating on March 5, 1953. The Soviet people did not wait for the free distribution of bread in 1960. Instead of this in 1991 the USSR and the socialist system itself were destroyed . The beginning of all these destructive
processes are rightly associated with the name of Khrushchev. Did Nikita Sergeevich want the destruction of the USSR? Most likely no. Did he have any idea about the consequences that the years of his reign led to? Perhaps yes. In the late USSR there was one joke: “Armenian Radio was asked a question:
- How many rulers were there in the USSR?
- Vladimir the Wise, Joseph the Terrible, Nikita Balabolka, Lenka the Fabulist and Teddy Bear!” How subtly everything was noticed by popular rumor! And it explains so much. How ridiculous are Khrushchev’s pathetic attempts to appear “ great politician", especially in comparison with Stalin. This is what Nikita Sergeevich was forced to admit in his
report on " cult of personality»: "Stalin is one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, strength and will had a great influence on the cadres and on the work of the party". What about Khrushchev? He just had obvious problems with knowledge (or rather, the complete lack thereof) of Marxism, and not everything was fine with logical thinking. At the same time, Khrushchev’s groveling, resourcefulness, and vindictiveness would be enough for ten. Khrushchev has many references to Lenin's words. But these theses are often pulled out and inserted into the texts at random. This strengthens the assertion about the poor theoretical training of the leader of the CPSU since the mid-50s. Let us remember how often Stalin demanded that communists constantly engage in self-improvement. Here it is at work "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR", written September 28, 1952(six months before his death!), he says: “Some comrades deny the objective nature of the laws of science, especially the laws of political economy under socialism. They deny that the laws of political economy reflect the laws of processes occurring independently of the will of people. They believe that in view of the special role given by history to the Soviet state, the Soviet state and its leaders can abolish the existing laws of political economy, can “form” new laws, “create” new laws. These comrades are deeply mistaken. They apparently confuse the laws of science, which reflect objective processes in nature or society, occurring independently of the will of people, with those laws that are issued by governments, created by the will of people and have only legal force. But they cannot be mixed in any way. Marxism understands the laws of science, whether we are talking about the laws of natural science or the laws of political economy, as a reflection of objective processes occurring independently of the will of people. People can discover these laws, know them, study them, take them into account in their actions, use them in the interests of society, but they cannot change or abolish them. Moreover, they cannot form or create new laws of science... The fact is that to us, as the guiding core, everyone
Every year thousands of new young cadres come up, they are eager to help us, they are eager to show themselves, but they do not have a sufficient Marxist education, they do not know many truths that are well known to us and are forced to wander in the dark. They are stunned by the colossal achievements of the Soviet government, they are dizzy by the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system, and they begin to imagine that the Soviet government “can do anything,” that it “doesn’t care about anything,” that it can destroy the laws of science and form new laws. How should we deal with these comrades? How to educate them in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism? I think that the systematic repetition of the so-called “social” truths, their patient explanation is one of the best means of the Marxist education of these comrades.”.
A Khrushchev he didn’t want, or maybe he wasn’t given the opportunity at all, to understand Marxism as a science. Moreover, not knowing the laws of social development, he began to subordinate the country's economy
own invented laws. Moreover, Khrushchev in practice, in a camouflaged form, implemented Trotsky’s theoretical calculations. This was expressed in the fact that the Khrushchev team, having come to power, immediately abandoned the Stalinist model of state and economic management, violated the decisions of the 19th Congress of the CPSU to update the leadership, and distorted the very principle of Stalinist management.

The funny thing is that there have been attempts in this direction before. So, immediately after the war, even under Stalin, in July 1948, Khrushchev proposed selling agricultural equipment to collective farms, plowing the peasants’ gardens (their personal half-hectare) right up to the porches, and the remains of livestock in private farmsteads "nationalize", impose additional taxes on collective farmers. For similar "revolutionary" innovation, Khrushchev received a pat on his bald head and a flattering " resolutions": "Our little Karl Marx!"in the presence of the other members of the Politburo. Stalin had to write specifically for the wretched and weak-minded in his last works on economics, talking about" would-be Marxists", who think that perhaps they should, " take power and go to the expropriation of small and medium-sized producers in the countryside and socialize their means of production". "... Marxists cannot take this senseless and criminal path, because such a path would undermine any possibility of victory of the proletarian revolution, would throw the peasantry for a long time into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat". Khrushchev was authoritatively told - “quiet down!” But Khrushchev did not calm down. A few years later, in March 1951 he is again, already in the newspaper" Is it true"published an article about" consolidation of collective farms", for which he again received a slap in the face from Stalin. The second time he was told: " Shut up, you fool!"After this, Khrushchev, in a loyal impulse, tore himself apart" refute" in the same newspaper and wrote to Stalin: “Dear Comrade Stalin! Deeply experiencing the mistake I made, I’m thinking about how best to correct it. I decided to ask you to allow me to correct this mistake myself. I am ready to appear in print and criticize my article... analyze its erroneous provisions in detail. If this is allowed to me , I will try to think through these issues well and prepare an article criticizing my mistakes, I ask you to look at the article in the Central Committee before publication. I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to help me correct the mistake I made and thereby, as far as possible, reduce the damage that I caused to the party with my incorrect speech. N. Khrushchev". And such behavior of self-flagellation was characteristic throughout the entire post-October period of the party’s history for Trotskyists of all stripes.
But Stalin died, Beria was killed - and Khrushchev, who, by the way, in the first place should have been judged as one of the main culprits of the repressions, let loose and began to destroy everything he could get his hands on, and he started with agriculture. However, it was precisely this development of events that the counter-revolution was counting on when supporting Khrushchev. By the way, much later in 1991 at the Soviet-American symposium, our democrats began to squeal about " Japanese economic miracle", a Japanese billionaire gave them an excellent rebuke Heroshi Takawama :“You are not talking about the main thing. About your leading role in the world. In 1939, you Russians were smart, and we Japanese were fools. And in 1955 we grew wiser, and you turned into five-year-old children. Our entire economic system almost completely copied from yours, with the only difference that we have capitalism, private producers, and we have never achieved growth of more than 15%, while you, with public ownership of the means of production, reached 30% or more. your slogans from the Stalin era are hanging". You really couldn't say it better. ( ) But, nevertheless, we will continue.
To begin with, it is worth quoting the words of Khrushchev: “In recent years, when we have freed ourselves from the vicious practice of the cult of personality and outlined a number of measures in the field of domestic and foreign policy, everyone can see how activity is literally growing before our eyes, the creative initiative of the broad masses of workers is developing, how this is beginning to have a beneficial effect on the results of our economic and cultural construction. » N.S. Khrushcheva "On the cult of personality and its consequences" was heard by the delegates XX Congress at the morning closed meeting February 25, 1956) This is how Khrushchev wanted things to turn out. But what was the reality? Fraserism and ringing rhetoric inherent in the Trotskyists became the hallmark of the Khrushchev era. What are they worth? " Kuzka's mother"and the click of a heel on the pulpit shocked the entire world community?!
Having started after the death of Stalin the so-called “the fight against the cult of personality”, the leadership of the CPSU threw the newborn child out of the bath along with the bathwater. Believing in
magical power of party decisions, the Khrushchevites forgot the Marxist truth that social development is determined by objective laws that do not depend on the mind and will of people. And the effectiveness of human actions and political decisions depends on the extent to which people have mastered these laws. A politician becomes free only when he has learned these laws, for it has long been known that freedom is a recognized necessity. Stalin was a Marxist. He understood this perfectly, which is why he spoke prophetically in a conversation with Mao Tse Tung December 16, 1949 of the year “socialism is a science... that has... general laws and if you just move away from them, the construction of socialism is doomed to inevitable failure”. This is what happened in the USSR and in China itself. Nevertheless, we remember how Stalin carefully, locally and experimentally tested the benefits or harms of a new economic undertaking. Only based on these results were they implemented (or rejected) throughout the country. Khrushchev " swords drawn"I quickly implemented my ideas: 1953.09.03 "On measures for the further development of agriculture of the USSR". Elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev(September 3-7)
1953.09.21 "On measures for the further development of livestock farming in the country and the reduction of standards for mandatory supplies of livestock products to the state by farms of collective farmers, workers and employees", "On measures to further improve the operation of machine and tractor stations", "On measures to increase the production and procurement of potatoes and vegetables on collective and state farms in 1953-1955.".
1953.10.10 The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution "On expanding the production of industrial consumer goods and improving their quality."
1953.10.12 The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted resolutions "On expanding the production of food products and improving their quality", "On measures for the further development of Soviet trade". These decrees were aimed at strengthening commodity-money relations, which were in direct opposition to the economic demands of socialism.
1954.01.25 The CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution " On serious shortcomings in the work of the party and state apparatus". Was killed Beria. The communists who were adherents of Comrade were dispersed. Stalin. This resolution consolidated the redistribution of power in favor of Khrushchev’s group.
1954.02.19 "On the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR". We only experienced the disastrous consequences of this decree
after the collapse of the USSR.
1954.02.23 The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place. Resolution adopted "On the further increase in grain production in the country and on the development of virgin and fallow lands" (February 23 - March 2 ). This decree marked the start of the development of virgin lands. The prematureness of this resolution is proven by the fact that the country at that time was in the stage of under-recovery of the entire national economy of the USSR after the Patriotic War. ( )
1954.03.27 . The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution "On increasing grain production in 1954-1955 due to the development of virgin and fallow lands".
1955.01.25 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Resolution adopted "On increasing the production of livestock products"(January 25-31).
1955.03.09 "On changing agricultural planning practices"After a good harvest on virgin lands in 1956, which produced half of the grain harvested in the country, Khrushchev embarked on the path of adventurous administrative economic reforms and campaigns aimed at obtaining quick and significant results. In 1957 they put forward the slogan " Catch up and surpass America in the production of meat and dairy products in two to three years", which had no real prerequisites for its implementation and led to complete failure. This decision put more than 60% of the total livestock under the knife, despite the fact that by the 50s the country had not yet managed to restore the pre-war livestock. If we also remember that Stalin, summing up the results of the Second Five-Year Plan, said that we still lag behind the developed countries of the world in livestock farming, then this adventure of Khrushchev cost the country too dearly. The USSR was never able to recover from such bungling. The program of forced corn cultivation, which was introduced in areas known to be unsuitable for this, failed. The consolidation of collective farms and their purchase of equipment from liquidated machine and tractor stations led to a reduction in agricultural equipment and had a detrimental effect on the entire agriculture of the country. The welfare of collective farmers was hit hard by the fight against
homestead farms and restrictions on the sale of feed for personal livestock. In truth: " Make a fool pray to God, he’ll bruise his forehead!”. The fool never calmed down.
1956.02.03 About assignment K. E. Voroshilov title of Hero of Socialist Labor". Khrushchev thus began to recruit to his side " offended and deprived x" under Stalin. Voroshilov was awarded two weeks before the start of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This " gave"Khrushchev has the right to demand that
Voroshilov said: all the truth"about Stalin's actions near Tsaritsyn.
1956.06.30 Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee " On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences"Khrushchev condemned Stalin, accusing him of mass extermination of people and erroneous policies that almost ended with the liquidation of the USSR in the war with Nazi Germany. The result of this report was unrest in the countries of the Eastern bloc - Poland (October 1956) and Hungary (October and November 1956). These events undermined Khrushchev's position, especially after it became clear in December 1956 that the implementation of the five-year plan was being disrupted due to insufficient capital investment.
1956.08.27 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On cash tax from citizens who have livestock in cities”.
1957.01.31 January 31 - February 3- An All-Union meeting on the production of hybrid corn seeds was held in Odessa.
1957.04.08 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR " On awarding the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Hero of Socialist Labor N. S. Khrushchev, with the Order of Lenin and the second gold medal "Hammer and Sickle" for outstanding services in the development and implementation of measures for the development of virgin and fallow lands". This is after a year ago, from the high rostrum of the 20th Congress, Khrushchev screamed about the inadmissibility of the cult of personality and how Stalin was engaged in exalting his own person.
1957.04.19 The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution "On government loans placed by subscription among the working people of the Soviet Union". Here
the real result of bungling in economic policy.
1957.05.21 A meeting of agricultural workers from the northwestern regions of the RSFSR took place in Leningrad. In his speech, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev set on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government the task of catching up with the United States in the production of meat, butter and milk per capita in the coming years. Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers 1957. and plenum of the CPSU Central Committee 1958. dealt a blow to Stalin's policy of gradually overcoming commodity-money relations between city and countryside. Instead of mandatory supplies of agricultural products, a procurement system was introduced. In 1956 State machine and tractor stations (MTS) were transferred to self-financing, and then completely liquidated. The sale of equipment to collective farms began. In other words, Khrushchev and Co. deliberately gave the means of production the status of a commodity, which, during the act of purchase and sale, passed from the status of public property to the status of private property, and this is already the basic basis of capitalist economic development. Although many high-ranking party members who adopted this criminal resolution knew how Stalin responded in the work “ Economic problems of socialism in the USSR” to the proposal of some economists “ sell to collective farms the main instruments of production concentrated in machine and tractor stations" “Basic
means of agricultural production: cars, MTS, land... are not sold to collective farms.” Stalin's rightness was confirmed by life itself.
1957.06.22 June 22-29- The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place. The plenum discussed the issue of the anti-party group G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich, V. M. Molotov . The Plenum removed from the membership of the Presidium of the Central Committee and from the members of the CPSU Central Committee Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov , removed from the post of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and removed from the list of candidates for membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee and from the membership of the Central Committee D. T. Shepilova . The Plenum elected the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Let us recall that Khrushchev literally shed " crocodile"tears over Stalin's alleged reprisal against" loyal Leninists"in his notorious Report "On the cult of personality" at the XX Party Congress. Less than a year had passed before the reprisal against those undesirables immediately began. This was the payment to those who at one time betrayed Stalin’s cause.
1957.07.04 The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution "On the abolition of mandatory supplies of agricultural products to the state by the farms of collective farmers, workers and employees". This resolution was already an open attack of capitalism on socialist foundations.
1957.07.31 The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution "On the development of housing construction in the USSR".
1957.09.11 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR " On streamlining the matter of assigning names of state and public figures to territories, regions, districts, as well as cities and other settlements, enterprises, collective farms, institutions and organizations". Once again we see another contradiction between the words from the report on the cult of personality and the adopted documents.
1957.12.18 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the abolition of the tax on bachelors, single and small-family citizens of the USSR, from workers, employees and other citizens with children, as well as from single women without children”.
1959.05.16 Awarded the International Lenin Prize " For strengthening peace between nations" outstanding public and government figure N. S. Khrushchev . But what about the cult of personality?
1959.10.17 Workers' rallies dedicated to the results of the historical mission began in the USSR N. S. Khrushcheva in USA. But what about the cult of personality?
1960.01.15 N. S. Khrushchev was awarded an anniversary medal and diploma of the World Peace Council in connection with the 10th anniversary of the peace movement. But what about the cult of personality?
1962.05.17 The Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution to increase purchase (delivery) prices for cattle, pigs, sheep, poultry, animal butter and cream and retail prices for meat, meat products and animal butter.
1962.05.17 The Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution to reduce state retail prices for sugar, viscose, staple fabrics and products made from them. Because of his
In an effort to appear more majestic than Stalin, Khrushchev decided to prove that he was the best business executive: “In recent years, when we have freed ourselves from the vicious practice of the cult of personality and outlined a number of measures in the field of domestic and foreign policy, everyone can see how activity is literally growing before our eyes, the creative initiative of the broad masses of workers is developing, how this is beginning to have a beneficial effect on the results of our economic and cultural construction...Now in agriculture we have begun to gradually get out of the difficult situation. The speeches of the delegates to the 20th Party Congress make each of us happy, when many delegates say that there are all conditions to fulfill the tasks of the sixth five-year plan for the production of basic livestock products not in five years, but in 2-3 years. We are confident in the successful implementation of the tasks of the new five-year plan". (Report of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushcheva "About the cult of personality and its consequences"was heard by the delegates of the XX Congress at the morning closed meeting February 25, 1956)
In 1962 It was announced that the price of meat would increase by 30 percent and that of butter by 25 percent. This " stopgap measure"was explained by the need to reduce "scissors" between purchase and retail prices. On the same day Novocherkassk electric locomotive plant, operating prices were reduced to 30 percent. The boorish attitude of local authorities towards people, combined with a decrease in living standards, caused strikes and mass peaceful demonstrations of workers and students, against whom troops were used, shooting dozens of people. It was not the murderers who were punished, but the participants in the events, over whom show trials were held, ending in death sentences. IN 1963 as a result of crop failure and lack of reserves in the country, the USSR purchased about 13 million tons of bread Abroad. Dissatisfaction with the fact that Russia has turned from an exporter of bread into an importer was openly expressed in queues.
1962.06.01 The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted the resolution " About individual and cooperative construction».
1962.06.01 Published an Appeal from the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to all working men and women, collective farmers and collective farmers, workers and workers of state farms, the Soviet
intelligentsia, to the entire Soviet people, in connection with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the increase from June 1, 1962, purchasing prices for livestock and poultry and increasing retail prices for meat and butter.
1962.09.22 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR " On postponing the deadline for exempting workers and employees from payroll taxes" This is the price to pay for populist, ill-considered decisions made to satisfy one’s own morbid ambition. And to pay for this " crazy“The Soviet people had to do politics.
1962.11.24 Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: “ On the transformation of the State Economic Council of the USSR into the State Planning Committee of the USSR"; “On the formation of the National Economic Council of the USSR" Stalin often recalled Lenin's words that the strength of capitalism lies “in the power of small-scale production... and small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale”. This brilliant discovery of Lenin did not become a methodological tool in economic policy either for Khrushchev or for all subsequent general secretaries. And it ultimately led to a social tragedy. Khrushchev's Central Committee did a lot to transfer the socialist economy onto petty-bourgeois tracks. Refused Lenin's warning: “Communism requires and presupposes the greatest centralization of large-scale production throughout the country. Therefore, the all-Russian center must certainly be given the right to directly subjugate all enterprises in a given industry... To take away the right from the all-Russian center to directly subjugate all enterprises in a given industry in all parts of the country... would be regional anarcho-syndicalism, not communism.”. (PSS, vol. 36, p. 392) In the USSR, the liquidation of sectoral ministries and the decentralization of the national economic management system began. Economic councils appeared.
1962.11.27 The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution “On the formation of the Committee of Party and State Control of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR”.
1963.03.17 A letter from N. S. Khrushchev to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the creation of dairy and vegetable farms around large cities and industrial centers was published.
1964.02.10 February 10-15 - the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, adopting a resolution "On the intensification of agricultural production based on the widespread use of fertilizers, the development of irrigation, comprehensive mechanization and the introduction of scientific achievements and best practices for a rapid increase in agricultural production" and the resolution" On the struggle of the CPSU for the unity of the international communist movement".
1964.04.16 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR " On awarding N. S. Khrushchev the title of Hero of the Soviet Union"in connection with the 70th anniversary of his birth. But what about the cult of personality?
1964.09.17 The Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution " On approval of the Regulations on the National Economy Council of the economic region».
1964.10.14 The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee granted the request N. S. Khrushcheva on his release from his duties as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR due to his advanced age and deteriorating health. The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhneva .
1964.10.15 Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR satisfied the request of N. S. Khrushchev to relieve him of his duties Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR due to his advanced age and deteriorating health. Appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin .


The height of cynicism and stupidity for a Marxist can be considered the fact that Khrushchev announced in 1961 at the XXII Congress of the CPSU that by 1980 communism will be built in the USSR - “The current generation of Soviet people will live under communism!” This looks quite ridiculous, because socialism had not yet been built in the USSR during Stalin’s lifetime, and here is such a loud statement in the style of Trotsky. At that time, the majority of people in the socialist bloc (together with China, more than 1 billion people) were enthusiastic about this statement, which was adventurous, populist and divorced from the theory of Marxism.
What is the unforgettable Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev remembered in history? for the common man?
Most likely, three points. This is your Report "About the cult of personality...", corn and "Khrushchev". It seems that the massive construction of apartments under Khrushchev was a boon for
Soviet people. But is it really possible to compare? Stalinists" And " Khrushchev buildings"?! Of course not. And in this approach to construction in the USSR lies a very real confrontation between Leninism and Trotskyism. In the first case, everything is best for the Soviet person, and in the second - “ barracks communism». ( )
Outside the brackets of researchers of Khrushchev’s activities, two points remained practically unexamined:
1. Departure for the United States for permanent residence of his son, Sergei.
2 . A sharp reduction in the USSR's gold reserves, left behind by Stalin after his death.
So the question arises - aren’t these two circumstances related to each other? Moreover, if we consider it in the light of Khrushchev’s reprisal against those who worked side by side with Stalin and knew the true state of affairs with the USSR’s gold reserves. Behind the external chatter about building communism, Khrushchev and Co.* began to destroy the socialist foundations of the development of society. Therefore, the attempt to far-fetch the assertion that Khrushchev is supposedly the successor of the work of Lenin and Stalin does not stand up to criticism.