Total socialist war. non-documentary notes

There was an amazing war in world history, which, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, simply could not happen. The fact is that in 1977-78, countries that officially chose the path of “scientific socialism” fought among themselves. And the allies and sponsors of the warring parties were also almost exclusively “socialist” countries. Despite their best efforts, the ideologists of the CPSU Central Committee could not blame such a war on the “aggressive nature of imperialism.” Therefore, it was quickly “written off to the archives.” Due to the long history and remoteness of the region from Russia, this war is mentioned extremely rarely even now.

Meanwhile, for many people living in the territory of the former USSR, despite the past years, the names Adiss Ababa and Awassa, Barentu and Gonder, Debre-Zeyt and Jijiga, Diredawa and Kembolcha, Nokra and Harar, military numbers units 44708 and 90245, call signs of communication centers “Trostnik” and “Karat”. This publication will remind you of how events actually unfolded in a distant and forgotten war.

PREFACE

In terms of its geographical scope, the forces and means involved, the conflict fully deserves the name “total socialist war.” Nine “socialist” states took part in it to one degree or another: Somalia, Ethiopia, USSR, Cuba, South Yemen, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea and China.

How did this war break out in distant Africa?

Its causes should be sought in the clash of interests of African “socialist” princelings. It is no secret that in African countries politicians appealed to Marx and Lenin only to pave the way for personal enrichment and to receive help from the countries of the communist bloc in the fight against internal and external enemies. A classic example of such an attitude towards Marxism was presented by the Somali military dictator Mohammed Siad Barre and the Ethiopian military dictator Mengystu Haile Mariam.

Major Mangystu was part of a group of Ethiopian Army officers who were dissatisfied with slow promotions and low salaries. He took an active part in the coup that overthrew the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. Power passed into the hands of a committee called "Derg", in which Mengystu played a prominent role. Soon, strife began within the Derg, and three months later Mengystu staged another coup, putting him at the head of the power structure. The Americans did not really like such drastic moves by the dictator and they cautiously approached the major. And, moreover, they didn’t promise him anything. Mengystu, don’t be a fool, announced the path of “socialist” construction in Ethiopia and was immediately accepted with open arms in the USSR and Cuba.

Somali General Mohamed Siad Bare acted in a similar way when seizing power in 1969. Declaring himself a follower of “scientific socialism,” he obtained large-scale assistance from the USSR. Just in 1974, the USSR and Somalia entered into an agreement on friendship and cooperation. Several thousand Soviet and Cuban specialists and a lot of military equipment were sent to Somalia. In response, the USSR received the opportunity to build a number of facilities for itself in the Somali port of Berbera, including a military airfield, communications and electronic intelligence centers.

Meanwhile, in Ethiopia in 1976, Mengystu launched the “Red Terror”, and among the thousands of its victims, most were people who sincerely considered themselves Marxists. But the repressions did not spare either representatives of the former aristocracy, or clergy, or tribal leaders. The Soviet Union, turning a blind eye to the brutal extermination of the “Marxists,” supported the regime of “scientific socialism” in Ethiopia, at the decisive moment refusing to help exactly the same regime of “scientific socialism” in neighboring Somalia. After all, Ethiopia, for many strategic reasons, looked preferable to Somalia in the eyes of Moscow: its population was 9 times higher than Somalia’s, Ethiopia had two convenient ports on the Red Sea. True, Ethiopia waged a long-term war with the separatists in the province of Eritrea (and the separatists received help from the USSR during the “imperial” period!) and periodically fought with Somalia for the Ogaden desert (Harerge province), but these moments were considered unimportant, “working”.

On February 3, 1977, Mengystu Haile Mariam shot his remaining comrades in the Derg and single-handedly headed the country's leadership. The very next day after the bloody massacre, he received a congratulatory telegram from the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro. At the same time, in February 1977, Cuban generals led by Arnoldo Ochoa first appeared in Ethiopia, who arrived from Angola to study the situation and determine measures to increase the combat capability of the Ethiopian army, which could not cope with the partisans in Eritrea. On March 14, 1977, Fidel Castro arrives in Ethiopia. In close circles with Mengystu and his associates, he discusses the differences between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. It was after this meeting that Ethiopia received the full support of Cuba, and, at the suggestion of Cuba, the Soviet Union. It was decided to create a “socialist” federation uniting Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and South Yemen.

However, Mohammed Siad Barre did not want to participate in this event. The Somali dictator was a seasoned kalach who understood perfectly well that only one would remain in power in the “federation.” Therefore, instead of a “federation,” he planned to snatch away from the still weak Ethiopia the Ogaden region, where tribes of Somali origin lived, and thereby partially realize the long-nurtured idea of ​​​​creating a “Great Somalia.” General Mohammed Siad Bare planned to defeat the Ethiopian army in two or three months, believing that no one could help Ethiopia in such a short period of time. This was not the first time the two countries had clashed over the disputed territory. The previous armed clash between them occurred in 1964. Then the Ethiopian army, equipped by the Americans, prevailed over the Somali.

Ethiopia received only $35 million in economic aid and $2,786 million in military aid from the United States from 1953 to 1974.

Supplies of weapons to Ethiopia from the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the GDR began in May-June 1977. Soviet specialists and advisers are sent to Ethiopia on the basis of Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1823 of August 13, 1977. Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General P. Chaplygin, is appointed as the Chief Military Adviser.

The fact of the appointment of the Airborne Forces general as the chief military adviser is reflected in the nomenclature of arms supplies to Ethiopia. In particular, Ethiopia became one of the few countries where airborne self-propelled guns were suppliedASU-57and airborne combat vehiclesBMD.

HOW THE WAR BEGAN

Today it is not uncommon for people to blatantly, in front of eyewitnesses of events, try to replace the real story with speculation that is beneficial to certain circles. The calculation is made that eyewitnesses will die sooner or later, and the false version will remain the only one and will receive full legitimacy. War 1977-78 in the Ogaden is one of those events whose real facts are hidden under layers of misinformation and lies. On the Soviet side, “export” myths about this war were composed by the department of agitation and propaganda of the CPSU Central Committee, but inside the country this topic was simply closed and the documents were hidden in secret archive folders.

In Western countries, the version about the alleged “national liberation war” of the Ogaden peoples has become almost official. Now in Western encyclopedias and reference books, the beginning of the war is considered to be the invasion of armed units of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF, English abbreviation WSLF) from Somalia into the Ogaden.

This is not entirely true. Or rather, not at all like that. With the same success we can say that every year there is an “invasion” of Pashtun tribes into Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan, as well as the opposite effect - the Pashtuns annually “invade” from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

In reality, the “war” was discovered by the Western media in June 1977, after Ethiopia closed the consulates of the United States and other Western countries in Asmara on April 23. The American military mission was expelled from the country, and their military base ceased functioning. The military attaches of the USA, Great Britain, Germany and Egypt were asked to leave Ethiopia.

The geopolitical struggle between the USSR and the USA did not allow the Americans to ignore this fact. Therefore, the Western press, radio, television suddenly began to write, talk and show a lot of news on one topic - about WSLF. It was broadcast to the whole world what a powerful organization it is, how freedom-loving it is, what noble goals it has, and how it is successfully fighting the communist dictator Mengystu, striving to unite the long-suffering Somali people. That is, the preparation for war began, according to the well-worn scenario, with the processing of public opinion.

However, this propaganda campaign also had a main addressee – Mohamed Siad Barre. And the recipient fully understood the meaning of the message. Just in case, for complete clarity, the President of the United States of America, Mr. Jimmy Carter, on July 15, 1977, in his planned routine speech after the usual passages about human rights, suddenly announced that the United States was ready to provide military and political support to Somalia. Having received carte blanche from the United States, Mohamed Siad Barre gave the necessary order and on July 23, 1977, at 6 o'clock local time, the regular army of Somalia invaded Ethiopia. The Ogaden War began.

Somali Armed Forces

In 1977, the Somali Army (SNA - Somalia National Armies) numbered about 35,000 people and had up to 200 tanksT-34, 50 tanks T-54/55 , 60 BTR-40 and 250 BTR-152, more than 100 76 mm guns, up to 80 anti-tank guns D-48, 80 howitzers of 122 mm caliber, about 60 guns of 130 mm caliber, more than a hundred 120 mm mortars, approximately 150 anti-aircraft guns of up to 100 mm caliber. The air force consisted of approximately 66 aircraft: 10 bombers IL-28, 12 fighters MiG-21, 44 fighters MiG-17 And MiG-15. The officer corps was mainly trained in the USSR, including graduates from universities of the Ground Forces - 1169 people, Air Defense - 510 people, Air Force - 590 people, Navy - 450 people, logistics - 80 people and other universities - 267 people. From 1964 to 1977 3,911 people visited Somalia through the USSR Ministry of Defense, including 12 generals, 2,419 officers, 123 warrant officers, 405 sergeants and soldiers and 952 workers and employees of the SA and Navy. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the largest formation in the Somali army was a battalion (infantry, mechanized or tank). At the beginning of the war, 27 infantry and mechanized brigades were formed, each of which included 2-4 battalions, an artillery battery or division, an anti-tank battery, support and service units, with a total number of 1200-2000 people.

The invasion force numbered up to 23,000. They had about 150 tanksT-34 and approximately 50 T-54/55, up to 250 armored personnel carriers ( BTR-50PK, BTR-152, BTR-60PB), up to 250 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by about 40 aircraftMiG-17 And MiG-21. In addition to the regular troops of Somalia, up to 15,000 people operated in the Ogaden in the irregular armed forces of the MFZS, which did not represent a real fighting force.

Ethiopian Armed Forces

The Ethiopian army as a whole numbered about 47,000 troops, the core of the ground forces being represented by the 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions. Most of the combat-ready units were in Eritrea, where fighting with the separatists was taking place. The forces in Harerge Province (later merged into the Eastern Front) consisted of a small force of the 3rd Infantry Division and detached units totaling just over 10,000 men, supported by 45 tanks M41 And M47, 48 field artillery guns and only 10 anti-aircraft artillery guns. During the fighting, two additional companies of tanks were brought into the battle. M41 and company M47, mechanized battalion (at M113), self-propelled artillery division (battery М109А2, battery M114, battery M101). Cuban troops, whose number in Ethiopia by the summer of 1977 was about 1,200, did not participate in battles until September. The officers and non-commissioned officers of the Ethiopian army suffered greatly during the period of repression of 1974-77. Many of the professional military men fled to Europe through Somalia, simultaneously reporting to Somali intelligence about the extremely deplorable state of the armed forces of their once formidable neighbor.

THEATER OF WAR

Ethiopia is the oldest independent state in Africa. Its name comes from the Greek word "Aitopia", meaning "land of people with burnt faces." This legendary land was formerly called Abyssinia.

The southeastern part of Ethiopia is a section of the Ethiopian Highlands, where the administrative districts of Sidamo, Arsi, Bale and Harerge are located. The eastern side of the Great Rift Zone is the clear boundary of this territory, and its southern and eastern edges are located on the territory of the neighboring states of Kenya and Somalia. There are both deep canyons and mountain ranges that border the Great Rift Zone.

The southeastern part of the Ethiopian Highlands has a general slope towards the southeast, turning into the Ogaden Desert. The river flow here is directed to the Indian Ocean. The largest rivers in this part of the country are the Wabi Shebelle and tributaries of the main water artery of western Somalia, the river. Jubba. Along with permanent watercourses, there are also numerous short rivers and streams that fill with water only during the rainy season, when loose sediments are washed away. Since during such periods the winding channels of permanent rivers receive additional nutrition, large areas are flooded.

In the southeastern part of the Ethiopian Highlands, located in the zone of influence of the monsoons, the annual course of precipitation clearly distinguishes two wet periods, separated by a dry summer season. The average annual precipitation here is 500–750 mm. In the Ogaden Desert, rainfall is reduced to 250 mm per year.

On the inland plains the climate is hot (average daily temperature 27-35°C), with little precipitation. Sparse herbaceous vegetation is common here, and in the Borena and Ogaden regions there are acacia savannas. On the plateau, the soils are red earth, rocky, and subject to erosion with the formation of dust storms. When equipment moves off roads, clouds of dust rise to a height of several hundred meters during calm periods.

The main fighting area is divided into the Ahmara Mountains, which are an endless succession of deep valleys and mountain ridges that make off-road movement extremely difficult, and a plateau starting from Jijiga and extending towards Hargeisa towards the coast with a gradual decline to sea level. The Diredawa, Harar, Jijiga, Hargeisa road, along which key battles took place, runs through mountains and gorges, through passes and valleys for most of the route. Valleys are often filled with remains. Granite rocks, intricately eaten away by erosion, play the role of original anti-tank gouges, while simultaneously providing shelter for the defenders. On the plateau (average altitude 1200-1500 m), the terrain, on the contrary, favors the attacker, offering room for maneuver and providing excellent visibility. In general, the plateau favors the use of wheeled and tracked vehicles during the dry period. During the rainy season, the movement of wheeled vehicles off-road is practically impossible, and that of tracked vehicles is significantly hampered.

Ethiopia's population is over 60 million people, but is divided into more than 80 ethnic groups. Most of them belong to the Ethiopian race, which is intermediate between Caucasoid and Negroid. The main nationalities in the theater of war under consideration are the Hamitic-speaking Oromos and Somalis. The Oromo occupy the slopes of the mountains of the Ahmar range and the highlands itself, while the Somalis occupy part of the highlands and desert areas. Both peoples are partially nomadic, not recognizing official state borders.

DEFEAT OF THE ETHIOPIAN ARMY

The Somali army led the offensive in two groups: Northern and Southern. The small (two brigades) Southern group carried out an auxiliary attack in the Dolo, Gode, and Imi areas. The main blow in the direction of Hargeisa, Jijiga, Harar, and Diredawa was delivered by the Northern group.

Somali troops predominantly pushed Ethiopian units out of their positions, bypassing strongholds and intercepting supply routes. Somali commanders were not eager to storm the prepared defenses, relying more on the fire of tanks and artillery, and the maneuvering capabilities of mechanized units. This tactic brings success. Attempts to counterattack Somali units in the open field led to heavy losses in the most combat-ready tank and mechanized units of the Ethiopian army.

Ethiopia is urgently calling up about 100,000 people into the armed forces, forming several new brigades, divisions and two “revolutionary” armies. In recruiting the army, catching deserters, and increasing morale, the “kebeles” - local government bodies that arose in the period 1974-76 in all cities and towns of Ethiopia - played a big role. Women played a prominent role in these kebeles. As a result, many women appeared in the brigades and divisions of the “revolutionary” formation. They often cemented battle formations with their presence, but in critical situations they could do little to help, since they had no military training.

The overwhelming majority of the rank and file and junior commanders of the “revolutionary” army of Ethiopia possessed the most primitive military knowledge. Moreover, the rank and file of the army often lacked any desire to fight. “Revolutionary” units arriving at the front sometimes fled at the first clash with the enemy.

At the same time, the high personal fighting qualities of the Ethiopian soldier are beyond doubt: he is brave, resilient, tenacious in battle, and steadfastly endures the hardships and hardships of war. The low combat effectiveness of units and units of the Ethiopian army in the first half of the war was explained solely by organizational failures, the lack of a normal sergeant corps, bad officers, and poor combat coordination of units and units.

Soviet advisor:

“The Ethiopian army made a depressing impression. The officers were not accustomed to combat operations, and their role was unclear. For them to climb to the front line... No, what are you... The division commander did not appear at the front for ten days. There was not a single battle map. We went to the front line at night. There are no trenches. The tent is standing, the fire is smoking, some brew is gurgling. And what? When they saw Somali tanks, they simply ran. And when the artillery repelled the attack, they returned. 12 thousand people held a front of one and a half kilometers!

The Ethiopians didn’t bother themselves with combat training: they say the war will start, then we’ll get busy. They would have fought for another hundred years if it weren’t for us... After the shooting, the weapons must be cleaned and the equipment inspected. No, no. From morning to evening there is music and dancing. For two days they explained to the division commander what combat readiness was... Our motorized rifle battalion would have scattered the Somalis in a week... But their war went on as usual. Let's say that at five o'clock in the evening artillery firing begins, then one of the sides, if it wants, “advances.” And at 6 pm all war stopped.”

Having met the demands of Soviet and Cuban advisers, the Ethiopian leadership decides to seriously train troops. In the huge Tatek military camp near the capital of Adiss Ababa, five divisions are formed, armed with Soviet equipment, and training of units begins in accordance with Soviet requirements. However, it takes time to reorganize the army, and the situation at the front is deteriorating.

The Somalis, with the help of several mechanized brigades, besieged the important administrative and military center of the city of Jijiga and, after several days of fighting, captured it on September 13. The further offensive develops along the roads to the passes through the mountain ranges. In mid-September, with a sudden attack to the north, the Somalis captured the city of Aisha and thereby cut the only railway through which cargo arrived from the port of Djibouti.

On September 29, the key Marda pass on the Jijiga-Harar road came under the control of Somali units. In October, Harar itself, the capital of the province of Harerge, came under siege. North of Harar, Somali tanks broke through to the outskirts of Diredawa (a large military and logistics base), but were pushed back by desperate counterattacks to the mountain ridge. This was the first time Cuban soldiers participated in this battle. The onset of the rainy season sharply reduced the offensive capabilities of the Somalis and the situation temporarily stabilized.

At the beginning of September 1977, Siad Barre decided on an extraordinary visit to Moscow. He tried to achieve at least a neutral attitude from the USSR towards his action in the Ogaden. But most importantly, he needed Soviet military supplies. Negotiations on this topic with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko and party ideologist M. A. Suslov led nowhere. Barre returned to Somalia empty-handed, having achieved no commitments from the USSR.

By early October 1977, Somali troops controlled up to 90% of the Ogaden territory (about 320,000 sq. km). From November 17 to November 24, 1977, the Somalis launched an assault on Harar, which was hardly recaptured by Ethiopian units with the help of advisers from the USSR and Cuba. The Ethiopians fought unsteadily, many units were a rabble of degenerate soldiers and weak-willed officers. Self-mutilators appeared in large numbers, shooting themselves in the arm or leg. The few units of the “old” imperial army were well trained, but suffered serious losses in previous battles. Not a single Ethiopian infantry brigade could withstand close combat.

Therefore several settings BM-21 "Grad" and a pair of artillery batteries controlled by Soviet and Cuban specialists were essentially the only real opponents of the Somali army at that time. In addition, the air superiority of Ethiopian (in fact, Cuban) aviation had a great influence on the course of the war.

In the conditions of the rainy period and the dominance of Ethiopian aviation, the life of the Somalis was greatly complicated by the increased distance of transporting property and ammunition: about 200 km from the Borama transshipment point and up to 300 km from the main rear base of the northern group of Hargeisa. Moreover, almost all transportation was carried out by road transport. Somalia's military transport aviation, consisting of several light aircraft, did not play any noticeable role in supply.

The Somalis had big problems with the evacuation and repair of weapons and military equipment, especially tanks and heavy field artillery guns. Military repair equipment, at the very least, coped only with simple routine repairs. To restore engines and weapons, the tanks had to be evacuated several hundred kilometers to Mogadishu. And there were only a few heavy transporters in the Somali army.

The small accumulated reserves of ammunition did not allow the Somalis to organize a powerful artillery preparation, so the shelling of the Ethiopian fortifications was usually limited to a dozen shells and mines. Great happiness for the Ethiopian army was the unintentional delay of the USSR with supplies BM-21 and ammunition for them to the Somali army. As a result, this shipment of weapons reached Ethiopia and was of great benefit in defeating the Somali enemy.

Soviet tanks performed well in the battles of the first stage of the war. T-54/55, which were superior to American M41 And M47 the Ethiopian army in all respects: firepower, security, mobility and reliability. For example, despite the relatively poor training of the crews, Somali tank crews destroyed at least 9 M41 and 14 M47 during the capture of Jijig, and the total losses of the Ethiopians in tanks by October 1977 amounted to about 50 units.

The Ethiopian side's use of tanks largely follows the African tradition: tanks fire from a place from hidden positions and retreat into the depths, coming under fire from anti-tank weapons. In an offensive or counterattack, tanks move behind the infantry, supporting them with fire from short stops and from a standing position. The interaction of tanks with artillery and infantry is limited to the simplest tasks at the level of small units. Coordinated actions of tanks, infantry and artillery at the battalion and, especially, brigade level represent an insoluble problem for both sides.

Several Somali tank and mechanized battalions, which managed to complete a full course of combat coordination under the leadership of Soviet advisers, look very advantageous against this background. It was these battalions that crushed the Ethiopian army in several battles, demonstrating the ability to advance after artillery shells exploded, attack in the flank and rear, repulse counterattacks with destructive fire from the spot, bypass resistance centers, disrupt supply routes and communication lines, and destroy rear areas and headquarters. However, the losses incurred in these battles, as well as the distance from rear and repair bases, sharply reduced the combat capabilities of the best units of the Somali army.

In November-December, both sides did not show the usual combat activity for Soviet officers. Often the front edge of the sides is out of sight of each other, and sometimes out of range of the heavy infantry weapons. In such conditions, artillery fire also becomes ineffective, since it is conducted over areas with little ammunition consumption.

By the end of 1977, the front line had an extremely dangerous outline for the Ethiopians, covering the city of Harar in a semicircle, passing near Diredawa, intercepting the railway to Aisha. The Somali side has the initiative; the Somali command can choose several options for further offensive, and all of them threaten to defeat large groups of Ethiopian troops.

MASSIVE AID TO ETHIOPIA

On November 13, 1977, Siad Barre announced the denunciation of the treaty with the USSR. All Soviet citizens were required to leave the country within a week. Electricity and water were cut off in the houses of Soviet advisers, and the village itself was cordoned off by soldiers. But warships of the Pacific Fleet entered the Somali port of Berbera. Marines landed on the shore and, under their cover, our people were evacuated. On November 20, the large landing ship of the Pacific Fleet “50 years of patronage of the Komsomol” entered the port of the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. Some of the Soviet military advisers returned to the USSR, and some immediately found themselves on the other side of the front line - in Ethiopia.

In November, a Soviet task force is sent to Ethiopia. The group is headed by the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Army General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov. It included Major General Golitsyn, Aviation Lieutenant General Dolnikov, and other generals and officers. Former military advisers in Mogadishu report on the state of the Somali army: Major General Barisov, Major General Kryukov, Lieutenant Colonel Filatov, Lieutenant Colonel Nezhinsky.

Cuban officer:

Russian advisers are like Martians for the Ethiopians. Firstly, they are “faranji” (white), and secondly, they live almost under communism. We Cubans are a different matter: among us there are many mulattoes and some blacks. Besides, not long ago we lived in the same filth and hopelessness, just like the Ethiopians. Therefore, we easily understand each other.

When the Soviet leadership finally decided on massive aid to Ethiopia, the Soviet military machine got involved. The USSR's ability to participate in conflicts in remote regions increased many times over the 1960s and 70s. This was facilitated by an increase in the number of military transport aviation, the navy in general and the navy in particular, and the strengthening of expeditionary forces in the form of airborne forces and marines. The USSR demonstrated some of the new capabilities in 1968 during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But the real demonstration of the new qualities of Soviet military power that surprised the whole world was the supply of weapons to Ethiopia.

In the last three months of 1977 alone, about 50 Soviet ships passed through the Suez Canal on their way to the port of Assab. In the Mediterranean Sea, as well as in the Red Sea, they were accompanied by ships of the Soviet Navy until their destination port. Soviet ships delivered numerous military supplies, including fighter aircraft, tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, multiple launch rocket systems, anti-aircraft missile systems, and ammunition, totaling approximately 60,000 tons.

In connection with the threat of the fall of Harar and the defeat of the Ethiopian army, the USSR-Ethiopia air bridge begins operation on November 25 (Operation Barracuda). Over 200 military transport aircraft deliver airplanes, helicopters, artillery, armored vehicles, and ammunition in a continuous stream. In just the first day of the operation, Soviet transport aviation delivered weapons and equipment to fully equip three motorized infantry divisions.

During the three weeks of operation of the “air bridge”, among other things, 48 ​​fighters were delivered MiG-21bis and reconnaissance aircraft MiG-21R, 10 transport helicopters Mi-6, 6 combat helicopters Mi-24 and presumably 18 transport and combat helicopters Mi-8.

In total, the Ethiopian ground forces received up to 600 tanks in a relatively short time (mostly T-55, and also 120 T-62), about 300 light armored vehicles ( ASU-57, BMD, BMP-1 And BRDM-2), up to 400 field artillery guns and MLRS. The total cost of supplied weapons and military equipment was estimated at about 1 billion US dollars.

Soviet specialist

In 1976, our unit in the PribVO received tanks T-64A. Previous tanks T-62 remained in the regiment for a long time, they stood in open areas in the fleet of combat vehicles. In the spring of 1977, one battalion was transferred T-62 representatives of SAVO, then in the summer another battalion. In mid-November 1977, a command was suddenly received to urgently prepare a complete tank battalion for shipment T-62. All the necessary spare parts and spare parts kits were instantly issued from the armored warehouses of the army and the district. They immediately began to form a group to accompany the equipment. They said that the group should transfer the equipment to Bulgaria, and delivery would be by sea with loading in Baltiysk and unloading in Varna. I, among about 50 other officers and warrant officers gathered from the entire division, ended up in this “escort group.”

Of course, we suspected that they were hiding something from us. Firstly, why sail around the whole of Europe to Bulgaria if it is shorter and faster by rail? Secondly, we were ordered to take personal belongings for a month, and to sail several days to Varna. Finally, the full complement of ammunition in tanks and vehicles, and the full filling of fuel and lubricants in tanks and fuel tankers, aroused suspicion. What, has the diesel fuel run out in Bulgaria? On the other hand, the battalion was not equipped with crews; it was accompanied by less than fifty people. In general, we were perplexed.

In a couple of nights, the tanks were delivered by trailers from the regiment to Baltiysk, where we boarded the ship and went to sea on December 2. The tanks were secured in the holds, the cars on the decks under tarpaulins. One hold was filled with boxes of ammunition for small arms and artillery. We were placed in cubicles of 8-12 people. At sea they announced that we were heading to Ethiopia, where we would transfer equipment to the local military. It took ten days to reach the port of Assab. After Gibraltar, the ship was continuously escorted by ships of the Soviet Navy. Along the way, we mostly slept, played preference, and sunbathed in the Mediterranean Sea. During the passage of the straits and the Suez Canal, access to the deck was prohibited. On the night of December 12-13, they unloaded at the port of Assab. Here it turned out that the equipment should be transferred to the Cubans in the Diredava area, and then we remain with the Cuban units as “technical specialists” until further notice. The tanks were transported on trailers to the town of Urso near Diredava, where a camp was set up on the outskirts.

On December 18-20, about 500 Cuban military personnel arrived by plane from Angola, including personnel of a tank battalion, which, under our leadership, began to develop T-62. The Cubans turned out to be literate guys and already on December 28 the first Cuban battalion in history T-62 was ready for combat use. At the beginning of January, most of our group left for the USSR; 11 Soviet tank crews were left in the Cuban brigade and two translators were given to us.

I note that when we were sent from the USSR, the only document we received were travel orders indicating the order number of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and the number of the military unit to which we were sent. We were not issued foreign passports; neither people nor equipment went through customs inspection and border control in Baltiysk. There were also no border or customs formalities in Ethiopia. Upon our return, we handed in our travel orders and in return, in addition to the usual travel allowances in rubles, we received currency check books, which we could “purchase” in special stores. I remember that with this money I bought a miracle of Czech technology - a Java-350 motorcycle, which became the envy of other young officers, since it was impossible to purchase it in ordinary stores.

Armament and equipment for the Ethiopian army were also supplied by the GDR (trucks, field power stations, radio stations, medical equipment, spare parts for aircraft and tanks), Czechoslovakia (tanks T-34, small arms, medical equipment, artillery ammunition), South Yemen (tanks T-34, salvo rocket systems BM-21 "Grad" with calculations), North Korea (uniforms, equipment). Ethiopia also received assistance and support in people and finances from Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization and other structures.

In December, the squadron will be relocated to Diredava airfield MiG-17F, squadron MiG-21bis, two scouts MiG-21R, squad Mi-8 Cuban Air Force. Aerodrome technical support is provided by Soviet specialists.

Later, three full-strength Cuban brigades were transferred on Soviet landing ships, cargo ships and airplanes from Angola and Cuba. One mechanized brigade (about 2,000 people) arrives from Yemen. Armored vehicles and ammunition continue to arrive on BDKs and dry cargo ships from the USSR.

Soviet advisers and specialists

Officially, the number of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia did not exceed 1,500 people. However, there is one catch: this number included only those military personnel who were sent to Ethiopia through the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense, with the exclusion of units from the lists and the issuance of foreign passports. At the same time, a large number of Soviet military personnel were sent to Ethiopia “on a business trip” by orders of the Minister of Defense and commanders-in-chief of the armed forces (Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, Navy) individually and in groups, without exclusion from the lists of units, and sometimes directly as part of units and parts.

For example, this is how Marine Corps units of the Pacific Fleet appeared in Ethiopia in the PMTO on Nokra Island (Dahlak Archipelago), tank crews and artillerymen in Harar and Arewa, aviation technicians and air defense specialists in Diredawa and Debre Zeit. According to some Western experts, there were up to 4,000 Soviet troops in Ethiopia, which is several times higher than the official figure of our advisers.

All military personnel who remained in the staff of their units were never included in the lists of “internationalist warriors” and did not have any benefits, although some of them received injuries, illnesses, and among them were killed. This scheme was tested in Syria and Angola and, apparently, the Soviet leadership liked it. As a result, in some regiments of the Soviet army several officers and warrant officers were on a “long mission”, holding regular positions. This was especially true for aviation technicians, anti-aircraft gunners, artillerymen, anti-tank crews, and, to a lesser extent, tank crews and motorized riflemen. That is why foreign experts are surprised by our official figure of one and a half thousand Soviet advisers in Ethiopia.

PREPARATION OF COUNTEROFFENSE

Preparations for a counteroffensive begin. The command of the combined group is headed by Cuban divisional general Arnoldo Ochoa. The group's headquarters included about two dozen Ethiopian, Cuban, Soviet and Yemeni generals.

One of the main problems of the Ethiopian army was poor operational and tactical training, low staff culture, and disgusting intelligence. The command did not know either the enemy’s forces, or the real state of its troops, or even the outline of the front line.

To clarify the situation, the USSR launches the Cosmos-964 optical-electronic reconnaissance satellite aimed at Ethiopia and deploys a radio reconnaissance platoon in the Harar region. The Cubans are flying dozens of reconnaissance aircraft missions into the operational depths of Somali troops. By order of General Petrov, Soviet advisers personally clarify the outline of the front line and the position of the troops on the ground. As a result of the work done at headquarters, a real picture of the situation at the front is finally emerging.

By mid-January 1978, the Ethiopian troops on the Eastern Front had 26 brigades (infantry - 6, tank - 1, people's militia brigades - 13, proletarian brigades - 6), of which 5 were guarding communications, about 230 tanks, 180 guns and mortars, 42 launchers BM-21.

Contrary to our popular belief, General Ochoa actually commanded the united group, since the main striking force - 12,000 Cuban troops, 200 tanks (tank and two mechanized brigades), 40 pilots of front-line and army aviation, was in his hands. The Cuban formations and advisors were commanded by Brigadier Generals López Cubas, Leonardo Andollo, Gustavo Chuy and Rigoberto Garcia. The tank brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Leopoldo Cintra Frias.

Cuban Expeditionary Force

The Cuban leadership adhered to the policy of exporting the revolution almost from the moment the socialist state was formed on the island. The world-famous symbol of the revolution, Ernesto Che Guevara, was sent to Latin America precisely to organize the rebel movement. What is less known is that as early as 1961, Cubans were transporting weapons to Algeria.

With the growth of the military and economic power of the socialist camp by the 1970s of the last century, the Soviet Union had significantly increased its ability to project military power into remote regions. The well-trained, disciplined Cuban army (Revolutionary Armed Forces, RAF) was perfectly suited to the role of a strike force for socialism. The target of this strategy was primarily African countries. Let us emphasize that Cuba had neither mercantile interest nor political gain here. Moreover, the Soviet Union did not push Cuba to take such actions, but, on the contrary, acted as a deterrent. But Fidel Castro was the last statesman in modern history to be a convinced idealist. He really sent troops to Africa for the triumph of the ideas of socialism.

For example, from 1975 to 1988, a contingent of Cuban troops numbering several tens of thousands of fighters (up to 58,000 people) was in Angola. Cuban units played a key role in the military defeat of the South African army, which fought in Angola. Ultimately, the Cuban victory led to the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the declaration of independence in Namibia. It was in Angola that Cuban General Ochoa and his comrades grew up as commanders.

Arnoldo Ochoa graduated from the military college in Cuba and the Soviet military academy. Frunze. He read fluently and spoke Russian fluently, although with a noticeable accent. In 1975, Ochoa was appointed commander of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Angola. In 1977, he was sent to Ethiopia to lead Cuban units in that country. Everywhere the general shows himself brilliantly, demonstrating military talent and considerable courage. This style appealed to Soviet officers and generals, who considered him the best Cuban military leader.

General Ochoa personally directed the fighting and loved to command on the front lines. He was very popular in the army and often took the initiative contrary to the orders of the Cuban leadership, that is, he waged the war almost independently. His close ties with Soviet generals (primarily Petrov, Varennikov, Kulikov and Dolinsky) became the subject of a special investigation, which Castro entrusted to the Minister of Security Abrantis.

After the announcement of “perestroika” in the USSR, a showdown quietly began in the Cuban army with generals and officers closely associated with the Soviet Union, who had enormous authority in the army and among the people due to their military merits. The initiator of this campaign was the Minister of War Raul Castro. By the way, we recalled the “frontism” of General Ochoa: in the spring of 1989, he was convicted in Cuba on trumped-up charges and shot along with a group of comrades. After the collapse of the USSR, purges in the Cuban army continued on a selective basis. Even those officers who worked closely with Soviet advisers in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia came under suspicion. Such persons came under counterintelligence surveillance. Therefore, official and personal contacts between Cuban and Soviet officers were abruptly cut off in 1989.

According to expert estimates, about 400,000 Cubans passed through Angola alone, and experts estimate the total number of Cubans who participated in foreign missions at 550-600 thousand. Including about 40,000 at different times operating in Ethiopia. In 1989, the Cuban government established the "Por la Victoria Cuba-Etiopia" medal, which is awarded to Cuban veterans of the Ogaden War. In 1993, the “Association of Fighters of the Cuban Revolution” was created in Cuba, which unites about 350,000 people: from the revolutionaries of 1959 to soldiers who fought in Angola and Ethiopia. In recent years, members of the association have been selectively allowed to publish memoirs. Several books have already been published on the war in Angola. Perhaps it will soon be Ethiopia's turn.

During November-January in Addis Ababa, Tekra, Diredawa, Urso, Dedesa, with the help of Cuban and Soviet specialists, five infantry divisions, several separate tank and mechanized brigades, and artillery divisions are completing their training.

Discipline requirements are being significantly tightened. Field tribunals impose death sentences on deserters and self-mutilators. Leaving a position without an order is considered treason. For example, on Mengystu’s personal order, the commander and political commissar of an infantry division were shot for unauthorized withdrawal. With the arrival at the front in mid-January 1978 of the first brigades that had completed a cycle of combat training, the combat capability of the Ethiopian army increased noticeably.

Soviet advisor:

“We immediately forced them to dig trenches. With a creak, but it worked. In the evening you order a trench to be dug, you come in the morning - nothing like that. He digs a tiny hole and sits. And at least their bosses would care. At first, the officers looked at us with distrust and even down on us! And how they shot! He will hide his head like an ostrich, put out his rifle and shoot anywhere. Then I cut off the long rod: I see someone shoots like I’ll drag it across the ass! And I’ll swear in Amharic again.

In general, one of our first lessons was shooting. They took all samples of small arms, cleaned them, and shot them. They gathered their leadership and asked to send an infantry squad. The Ethiopians fired from M-16, the six of us are from Kalashnikovs. And everyone got it right the first time. I squinted my eyes - the Ethiopians' jaws dropped. Of their eleven people, only two were hit. The chief of staff immediately: “Teach our soldiers to shoot like that!” And there was a sea of ​​weapons there. I always had two machine guns hanging above my bed, and a box of grenades and a grenade launcher underneath. And he carried with him TT– it was a good pistol, it fit in the hand much better than the Makarov.

We also organized military guards, reconnaissance, commandant service, forced them to dig dugouts, trenches, and firing positions. And now, as soon as the Somali artillery began to hit, the soldiers immediately dived into them. Then you pass by and they smile: “No problem, Comrade Victor!” Still would! Before us, a hundred people were killed almost every day! And when the trenches were dug, in December - March only four died from artillery shelling. The tanks were tested. The officers at first - no way! Forced. And then they liked it: 5-6 people jumped into the trench so that the tank would pass over them. Sometimes I had to drive tanks instead. There are many such roads: on one side there is a cliff, on the other there is an abyss. And somehow one tank disappeared along with the landing party. They were very afraid of such areas. Then I and two more of our tank crews sat down at the levers and led the entire column one by one..."

However, the Ethiopian military leadership places its main hope in Cuban troops and Soviet specialists. It understood that in the Ethiopian units morale remained relatively low and professional training weak. However, units such as the 3rd and 10th Infantry Divisions of the Ethiopian Army gradually became resilient and gained combat experience. They had already more or less learned how to conduct a defensive battle; they were assigned to hold independent areas during the period of concentration of forces for the offensive. But the main striking force is the Cuban mechanized and tank brigades.

Soviet advisor:

The Cubans, in contrast to the weak-willed Ethiopians, are serious, disciplined fighters. Warriors. Therefore, as usual, they were used to “plug holes” at the fronts, and always successfully (and not only in Ethiopia, remember also about Angola).

Soviet specialist:

The Cubans of “our” tank battalion were competent, but absolutely crazy guys. They shunned dirty and hard work, such as digging tank trenches and shelters, and acted boldly, but recklessly, without assessing the situation, often at random. It turned out that most of the battalion were fresh recruits almost straight from Cuba, who had no Angolan experience. When, after arriving at the front, we began to dig a shelter for ourselves, the Cubans walked nearby and chuckled. Soon the battalion was hit by mortar fire right in the concentration area. Although only a few 120-mm mines fell, their fragments shaved everything clean. In just three minutes, about a dozen corpses appeared in the battalion. This made a grave impression on the Cubans and had a sobering effect. We sat safely in the ditch dug next to the tent. From that day on, all engineering work was carried out by the Cubans strictly and with diligence.

Having honestly handed over all the equipment to the Cubans, right down to the last bolt, we discovered that no one needed it. After all, we were the only group of Soviet officers working in the Cuban troops! This has never happened anywhere else. Therefore, formally subordinate to General Petrov, in reality we did not receive any orders or instructions from anyone, acting at our own discretion and at the request of the Cuban command.

Although the Cubans treated us well, we had no way to get water or cigarettes. They had to feed themselves in their field kitchen, and other inconveniences arose due to the lack of their own “corner” and transport. We are tired of going to bow to the Cubans every time. We quickly solved our problems after the first battle with the Somalis. Repaired those abandoned by the Somalis BTR-50PK And ZIL-157 with a kung. A little later, they removed the air conditioner from the wrecked car and adapted it into an armored personnel carrier, which turned into our “main headquarters.” By the end of the business trip, our group had acquired equipment, having acquired an Italian light truck and a Japanese jeep.

The kunga carried small, scarce spare parts, as well as a supply of food and an Ethiopian cook from Jijig who had escaped from the Somalis, who perfectly prepared any dishes on a captured camp stove. This cook stayed with us after the liberation of the city, right up to our departure, giving us a final dinner, the likes of which I have never tasted in the most luxurious restaurants. As a souvenir, we left him a Toyota jeep and a kung to boot.

COUNTEROFFENSE

On January 8, 1978, an air operation begins to isolate the Harar combat area and fire at rear bases, artillery and armored vehicles of the Somalis. Cuban pilots Mig-17F And MiG-21bis demonstrate good effectiveness of strikes against Somali troops and transport convoys.

The Somalis are trying to seize the initiative on the ground and on January 22, with the help of several infantry brigades, supported by tanks and artillery, they begin the second assault on Harar. Fierce fighting broke out at the heights around the city. The main blow was made by Somali troops from the Kembolcha area to Haramay with the aim of cutting off the only road through which supplies were supplied to Harar. However, Ethiopian and Cuban units managed to stop the enemy near the highway connecting Harar with Diredawa. An artillery division of 152-mm howitzers and a battery played a major role in repelling the offensive. BM-21 "Grad".

Soviet specialist

For the Cubans, we played the role of a lifesaver for all occasions. Cuban officers know well the tactics within their positions, know how to work with people, but have little understanding of technology and, in general, anything that goes beyond the scope of their official duties. For example, the battalion commander has a very vague idea of ​​the capabilities of artillery and aviation, does not know the unit’s long-range shooting methods at all, is not familiar with the volume and frequency of maintenance, and so on. When a Soviet tankman predicts the duration of the artillery fire attack that has begun, then climbs into the tank and himself regulates the drive of the mechanism for ejecting spent cartridges, immediately warning about the need to tighten the tracks, the Cuban battalion commander’s eyes become square. The commander and chief of staff of the brigade are more relaxed about such “tricks”; they studied at academic courses in the USSR and “Russian” tankers are not a novelty for them.

We were distributed in groups of 3-4 people into battalions, some of the senior officers remained at the brigade headquarters. While the brigade was operating as a whole, we got together every evening, exchanged opinions, had dinner, and sang songs. The custom became two meals a day: morning and evening. During the day we snacked on whatever we needed on the go. They especially carefully monitored the purity of the water, since all sorts of nasty things in Ethiopia were beyond measure. Having seen a patient with amoebic dysentery in Diredava, since then I have been disinfecting water all my life using any available means.

On January 24, 1978, a joint group consisting of 35 brigades (270 tanks, including 120 T-62), with the support of 46 front-line aircraft and 162 guns, begins an offensive against Somali troops (25 brigades, 135 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 270 PA guns) from positions south of Harar. In this area, the offensive develops slowly, at a pace of 2-3 kilometers per day.

On February 2, three infantry, mechanized and tank brigades from the Urso-Diredawa area in the direction of Arewa went on the offensive on the flank of the Somali group. At the head of the offensive is an armored ram of 120 tanks T-62 Cuban tank brigade. At the same time, on the supply route in the rear of the Somali group, a landing force of about a company, with severalBMD And BRDM. The suddenness of the action, backed by a crushing tank strike and strong fire support from the air, led to the defeat of the Somali group in just two days. In this direction alone, the Somalis lost over 1 thousand people, 42 tanks, and more than 50 artillery pieces. In total, in the battles near Harar, the Somalis lost about 4,000 people killed, wounded and captured, and 57 tanks. The main striking force of the advancing troops were two mechanized and a tank brigade of the Cuban army, which led to rapid success.

Soviet specialist

In the early morning of February 2, 1977, in the Areva area, he went into a tank attack for the first time, asking to take the place of gunner in the crew of the company commander. Outwardly, everything looked like a training exercise: deployment to pre-battle formations, then to the battle line, columns of artillery explosions ahead of the advancing tanks. The difference was that through the scope I observed flashes of shots from anti-tank guns and buried enemy tanks. During the attack, enemy artillerymen covered the tanks with barrage fire, from which we quickly emerged without losses.

It rained heavily at night, so shell explosions and tank tracks did not raise dust, but visibility was average. The fumes rising from the ground were very disturbing. Everything in the sight was distorted and floating. They opened fire on the move at the flashes of anti-tank missiles with high-explosive fragmentation shells with the cap removed; the firing range was about one and a half kilometers. The well-camouflaged guns were almost invisible at first, but after several shots the camouflage came off, and the powder gases knocked out clearly visible spots on the ground near the muzzle brake. The tanks switched to rapid fire and in a few minutes crushed all the anti-tank artillery.

When the tanks approached the trenches within three to four hundred meters, the Somali infantry ran to the rear. The tanks did not pursue her; they stood in front of the trenches, waiting for their infantry, which BTR-60 far behind. The Cubans did this on purpose in order to call on the tanks artillery fire from closed firing positions, then destroy the artillery with air strikes and then launch infantry. Everything turned out as planned. There were no losses in the brigade, the tanks worked perfectly. But the external equipment was severely cut by fragments of 130-mm shells. There were practically no whole boxes of spare parts left, many Luna searchlights were damaged, several machine guns were broken DShK. Some crews did not remove the additional oil tanks before the attack; according to the law of meanness, they were also punctured. “My” company commander swore about this in Spanish and Russian, with the word “myerda” being the mildest expression.

Unable to withstand the blow, on the morning of February 3, the Somalis hastily retreated in the direction of Jijiga, where they had previously prepared defensive positions. The retreat of the Somali army to a depth of about 50 km is not very organized. There is a lot of abandoned faulty equipment on the roads, and significant difficulties arise with the supply of fuel and lubricants and food to the troops. In addition, Ethiopian aviation dominates the air, from time to time delivering sensitive blows to troop columns. On February 5, under the threat of being captured, the Somalis leave Aisha without a fight, and already on February 9, the first train with cargo arrives from Djibouti to Adis Ababa.

In the first offensive battles, tanks proved their superiority T-62, which ensured a breakthrough in the defense near Harar, destroying at least 15 tanks. Main anti-tank gun of the Somali army D-48 turned out to be ineffective against Soviet tanks. Hit the tanks T-54/55 And T-62 she could only board. Four battalions T-62 tank brigade on favorable terrain were used as a strike force. Using the advantage in weapons, T-62 destroyed Somali tanks and artillery at ranges of over 1500 meters, remaining virtually invulnerable. However, defeating dug-in infantry and hidden firing points required increased consumption of high-explosive fragmentation ammunition. The effectiveness of fire against such targets was lower than expected.

Cuban officer:

Tanks T-62- the most powerful weapon in this war. I would say that this is generally the most useful weapon of the ground forces. Their role here and now is even greater than the cavalry of our ancestors. Without these tanks, we would be stuck here for several years, like in Angola.

Note

Soviet advisor: retired colonel K., graduated from the Kharkov Guards Tank School, the Military Academy of Armored Forces. In 1977 - major, chief of staff of the regiment in SAVO. From December 1977 to December 1979 - Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Mechanized Brigade of the Ethiopian Army.

Soviet specialist: Reserve Colonel M., graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank School and the Military Academy of Armored Forces. In 1977 - lieutenant, platoon commander. From December 1977 to March 1978 - specialist with the Cuban tank brigade in Ethiopia.

Cuban officer: quotes from Cuban officers who fought as part of a Cuban tank brigade in January–March 1978 are given.

End of part 1

Major P. Goncharenko

The Armed Forces (AF) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) perform their assigned functions in the context of overcoming the consequences of the conflict with the state of Eritrea and the difficult military-political situation in the East African region, being the main guarantor of the country's security. Considering the special role of the Armed Forces in the political system of the state, the leadership of the republic is taking all necessary measures to increase their combat potential.

In accordance with the FDRE constitution, Prime Minister M. Zenawi is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and exercises overall leadership of them through the Ministry of National Defense (MHO). The competence of the Minister of Defense (K. Demex - a civilian) includes issues of general personnel policy, logistics, procurement of arms and military equipment and a number of others. Direct control of the troops is entrusted to the Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant General S. Jenus).

The armed forces of the FDRE have a two-service structure and consist of ground forces (ground forces), air forces and air defense forces (air force and air defense). During a period of threat and in wartime, irregular formations are transferred to the operational subordination of the command of the Armed Forces. In addition, territorial troops are currently being created (the headquarters was formed in 2003), to staff which military personnel who were laid off from the ranks of the Armed Forces are sent.

Despite the fact that the Ethiopian Armed Forces are the most combat-ready and technically equipped in the region, the military leadership still believes that their combat capabilities do not fully meet the requirements of ensuring the territorial integrity of the country and internal political stability. When planning long-term development of the armed forces, its leadership is forced to rely on foreign military assistance.

In 2004, in accordance with a contract concluded with the FDRE Ministry of Defense, UK military experts conducted a comprehensive assessment of the combat potential of the Ethiopian armed forces. According to the conclusions drawn from the study, the country's military management system does not ensure the rational use of funds allocated for defense needs.

In order to optimize the costs of the military department, British experts have developed a plan for reforming the FDRE armed forces for the period until 2010. Its key point is a change in the organizational and staffing structure of the Armed Forces, which makes it possible to reduce the number of their personnel by 15-20%. The released funds are planned to be used to modernize existing weapons and military equipment and purchase new ones, which will increase the mobility and equipment of the army. The restructuring of the military education system will raise the level of training of military personnel and save funds allocated for training national military personnel abroad. The state began directly reforming the armed forces in 2005.

The main type of the country's armed forces is ground forces. They are assigned a leading role in repelling possible external aggression and ensuring internal political stability. The Army is led by the Chief of the General Staff, who is also the commander of this type of Armed Forces. The number of ground forces personnel is 180 thousand people (according to The Military Balance 2005-2006), the trained ground forces reserve (citizens fit for military service) is up to 350 thousand.

During the implementation of the program for reforming the land forces, their administrative and territorial structure changed. Five operational commands (OC) were created - Western (headquarters in Bahir Dar), Central (in Ynda-Syllas), Northern (in Mekele), North-Eastern (in Dessa) and Eastern ( in Harar). They were subordinated to infantry and mechanized divisions (the brigades included in them were reorganized into regiments), which were stationed in the OK area of ​​responsibility. It is planned that during the reorganization it will be possible to reduce the number of ground forces to 150 thousand.

IN combat strength of the ground forces 21 divisions (16 infantry, four mechanized and special purpose "Agazi"), six separate brigades (airborne, artillery, motor transport, protection of MHO facilities, government agencies and military facilities).

The ground forces are armed with: battle tanks T-54, T-55 and T-62, armored combat vehicles BMP-1, BTR-60 and BTR-152, BRDM-1 and BRDM-2, MLRS BM-21, 85- , 122- and 130-mm guns, 81-, 82- and 120-mm mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons (Table 1).

The main tactical formation of the Ethiopian Army is the division (number of personnel 7-8 thousand people). A mechanized division includes: a headquarters, four regiments (tank, mechanized, infantry and artillery), an anti-tank battalion, separate companies (communications, reconnaissance, engineer-sapper) and rear units. The infantry division has a similar structure, including a headquarters, three infantry and artillery regiments, a combat support battalion and rear units.

Recruitment of ground forces is based on the principles of voluntary recruitment and proportional representation of all nationalities inhabiting the country. Citizens called up for active military service undergo a course of initial military training (included in their service period), after which they take the oath and are sent to units. The minimum service period for privates and sergeants is seven years, for officers - ten. The age limit for military service for privates and sergeants is 45 years, junior officers - 48, senior officers - 52 years, generals - 55 years.

In Ethiopia, where more than half the population remains below the absolute poverty line ($1 a day per person), serving in the ground forces is a prestigious activity that provides sustainable income and high social status. In the Armed Forces, in particular, the salaries of officers are quite high (Table 2).

Payment of allowances(for flawless performance of duties, service on weekends and holidays, as well as compensation for renting living quarters) is not provided in the Armed Forces. At the same time, military personnel receive monthly food rations worth about $35, receive clothing allowances twice a year (daily and field uniforms), and enjoy free medical care in hospitals of the Ministry of Defense. Living quarters are provided to officers and privates and sergeants with families (upon dismissal, official living space is vacated).

The amount of pension benefits depends on military rank and length of service. Thus, the pension of a colonel who served under a contract for 25 years is about $70 a month. In case of job reduction and dismissal due to health reasons, a serviceman receives severance pay in the amount of about 50% of the official salary. In addition, upon retirement, he continues to benefit from free medical care.

The Ethiopian Ministry of Defense is not involved in the employment of military personnel discharged from military service. At the same time, local authorities at their level are gradually beginning to establish a system for their retraining in civilian professions, for which the government of the country allocates funds annually.
The issue of training personnel for the ground forces is being addressed in the following areas: development of a system of national military educational institutions; inviting foreign instructors to the country, including on a private basis; sending military personnel to study abroad.

In 2005, changes took place in the country's military education system. In the capital of the state, Addis Ababa, a command and staff college for command personnel (three-year program) and a college for training junior officers (training period one year) began work, created within the framework of the Armed Forces reform program. The cadet school was transferred from the Urso training center (330 km east of Addis Ababa) to the similar center Holetta (45 km west of the capital). The military university in Debre Zeit (50 km south of Addis Ababa), which includes military engineering and military medical colleges, as well as a school of military management, form the basis of the national military education system. In addition, junior commanders are being trained in a number of ground forces training centers (the program lasts three to six months).

The Ethiopian leadership pays great attention to the participation of units of the republic's armed forces in UN peacekeeping operations. In February 2006, classes began at the regional center for training peacekeepers (Debre Zeit), created with US assistance. They are taught by Ethiopian teachers. At the same time, the command staff of the formed units is trained by a group of American specialists. In addition, the United States supplied office and computer equipment free of charge. Soldiers and officers of the FDRE Armed Forces trained at the center will be sent on a rotational basis to UN contingents stationed in Burundi and Liberia. Subsequently, it is planned to form a battalion from Ethiopian military personnel with experience in participating in peacekeeping operations, which will be part of the East African regional peacekeeping brigade of constant readiness.

It should be emphasized that the solution to the issue training of military specialists remains one of the priority tasks for the Ethiopian military-political leadership. In the near future, most of the qualified personnel who studied in military educational institutions of the USSR will retire upon reaching the age limit. Already, the shortage of junior officers (lieutenant-captain level) in the Ethiopian Armed Forces is estimated at approximately 2 thousand people. Under these conditions, the practice of sending military personnel for training abroad is widespread.

Currently, Ethiopian military personnel are studying in military schools in China, the USA, Germany, Russia and the UK. In addition, American instructors on the territory of the republic train fighters of anti-terrorist units of the country's armed forces. It is noteworthy that all costs associated with organizing the training process and creating a training and material base were covered by the US Defense Ministry. At the same time, classes were organized with Ethiopian instructors, who in the future will themselves train members of the national armed forces.

The FDRE does not have a system for mobilization deployment of the armed forces as such. In the future, it is planned to create mobilization bodies, primarily within the framework of the formation of territorial troops. For this purpose, it is planned to form departments in local administrations to record registered personnel and persons of military age.

Recently, some positive changes have been taking place in matters of increasing the level of training of troops. The Main Directorate of Operational and Combat Training of the General Staff of the Country's Armed Forces developed training programs for units. In 2005, combat training classes were regularly held at the platoon-company level. The increased activity on this issue is largely due to the ongoing military-political tensions in relations with Eritrea. In units of the Army stationed in the border zone, events are regularly organized to coordinate units.

In 2004, a center for the professional selection of military personnel was formed within the structure of the Main Directorate of Operational and Combat Training of the General Staff. A computerized system is installed here, with the help of which testing of cadets and officers, as well as privates and non-commissioned personnel for the technical units of the ground forces is carried out. Modern software makes it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy the professional suitability of military personnel and their suitability for their positions.

The plans for the development of the armed forces provide for the creation of rapid reaction units to conduct counter-guerrilla and special operations in the country. Along with this, it was decided to radically improve the intelligence and information support of the Armed Forces. In particular, it is planned to expand the staff of the special services, increase the level of their technical equipment, organize personnel training, create intelligence centers, as well as stationary points and mobile groups of radio and electronic intelligence.

Thus, the main component of the Ethiopian Armed Forces - the ground forces - has now reached a level of development that at this stage ensures the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, as well as the implementation of the foreign policy interests of the republic in the region.

State of the Abyssinian Armed Forces

In Addis Ababa they knew about the preparations for the Italian invasion. However, the “king of kings” postponed mobilization until the last moment so as not to give reason to accuse Ethiopia of aggression. Realizing that war was inevitable, the emperor announced general mobilization in September 1935. Mobilization and concentration, due to the characteristics of the Ethiopian army, the existence of the feudal system and poor communications, was extremely slow. Thus, the concentration on the Northern Front ended only at the end of December 1935, at the very height of the war. In total, up to 500 thousand people were mobilized.

At the beginning of the war, the Ethiopian army consisted of the following units:

The elite core of the army was the Imperial Guard (Kebur Zabanga), or the First Division. The Guard was both the Emperor's personal guard and an elite infantry division, the operational reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The guard numbered about 10 thousand soldiers, including 4 cavalry squadrons. The guards were trained by Swedish, Norwegian and Belgian officers. The battalions were commanded by officers who graduated from the French military academy of Saint-Cyr. The Guard had good weapons - rifles, machine guns and mortars, and there was one company of heavy machine guns. Only the guards wore the khaki Belgian Army uniform. The remaining soldiers were dressed in white cotton uniforms and were good targets for the enemy.

Troops of provinces and tribes - up to 100 thousand people. They were staffed by volunteers and maintained by races (princes). Of these, command cadres were singled out during the formation of the state militia. There were also about 100 thousand soldier-settlers (“teklenya”). Among them was a fighting core of 30,000 “tri-regiments” who had previously served for hire in British and Italian forces in Somalia, Sudan and Libya. “Tripolki” were the combat core of the Ethiopian army and served as the personnel basis for the formation of new units. There were also a small number of Belgian advisory officers in the country.

The general militia could number up to 500 thousand people. This was the least trained part of the Abyssinian military. Many militia soldiers were armed only with bows and spears.

There was not enough equipment to arm the army. There were about 500 thousand rifles throughout the country, only 10% were modern magazine rifles, the rest were outdated systems. The army had 200-300 machine guns of various systems. The artillery was scanty: up to 50 different guns, several anti-aircraft guns of the Oerlikon system. Ammunition was limited - 150 rounds per rifle, 10 thousand per machine gun. There was practically no aviation - just a few old passenger planes. From armored vehicles - several armored vehicles and outdated tanks. The entire army had only 4 walkie-talkies, and wire communications were limited. Therefore, communication was often carried out in an archaic way - with the help of “runners” messengers, tam-tams (“talking drums”) and bonfires. For comparison, the Italian army had 6 thousand machine guns, 700 guns, 150 tankettes and 150 aircraft.

At the same time, Abyssinian warriors were traditionally distinguished by high fighting spirit and had developed military traditions. The soldiers were unpretentious, hardy, brave, and were good at using the weapons they had in their hands. They fought well in direct combat, hand-to-hand. The Abyssinians knew the theater of combat well and could organize partisan and sabotage activities in mountainous, wooded and desert areas.

Thus, the Ethiopian army was still mainly of the feudal type, was not trained in modern battle tactics, and was poorly equipped with equipment. The Ethiopian troops, despite their large numbers, were inferior to the enemy in almost all respects - unity of command, weapons and equipment, communications. There were almost no armored vehicles or aircraft. The artillery was weak, there were no food supplies and ammunition to fight a long war. Some of the troops had only archaic weapons. However, the Abyssinians were high-quality fighting material, distinguished by courage and tenacity, and were excellent at wielding personal weapons, which made them a dangerous enemy in close combat.

The Abyssinian army at the beginning of the war was divided into three main operational directions. On the Northern Front there was a group of armies numbering 150-200 thousand people under the command of the Mulugeta, Seyum, Kama, Imru, Ayelu races. The troops were supposed to cover the main communications leading from the north to the Ethiopian capital. Thus, in the north, the Abyssinians were seriously inferior to the 250 thousand enemy strike force, both in numbers and in weapons. On the Southern Front there were troops of the Desta and Nasibu races - 100-150 thousand soldiers. There were about 110 thousand Italians against them. In the central direction there were only about 10 thousand soldiers, against 17 thousand Italian soldiers. The Negus had 10 thousand guards in reserve, as well as various militias numbering up to 100 thousand people.

As a result, at the beginning of the war, Ethiopia fielded 450-500 thousand people, and could increase the number of troops through the militia, but the problem was a serious shortage of modern weapons and ammunition. At the same time, the army had many slaves, porters, pack animal leaders, rear service personnel, that is, a large number of non-combatants. As a result, the actual combat strength of the army was much less than the total number of troops. Therefore, the Abyssinian army was greatly inferior to the enemy and could not fight on equal terms with the Italians, due to a lack of weapons, supply problems and the general backwardness of the country (economic, military-technical, science, education, etc.).

The supreme commander was the Negus, under whom were various military advisers. The headquarters of the “king of kings” during various periods of the war were located in Addis Ababa, Dessier and Quoram. At the head of armies and army groups were races.

War plans

Italy. The global and domestic political situation required a blitzkrieg. A prolongation of the war could lead to external and internal problems and threaten a financial crisis. Therefore, it was planned to end the war before the beginning of the period of heavy tropical rains (from June), which made it difficult to use aviation, armored vehicles and transport.

The main target was the capital of Abyssinia - Addis Ababa. The military-political leadership hoped that after the direct defeat of the Abyssinian army and the capture of the capital, the majority of the race-princes and feudal lords would betray the emperor, but this assumption turned out to be wrong. Most races continued to resist and after the fall of the capital, they led the partisan movement.

Of the two operational directions from Eritrea to Addis Ababa, which led through Dessier and Gondar, the Italians chose Dessier, since it was easier to organize the offensive and rear. Caravan and partly wheeled routes were located here, and the mountainous terrain did not have difficult boundaries to overcome. This direction of attack by the main forces of the Italian expeditionary army was located further than Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, outside the operational influence of the British. In addition, this most convenient route from the north to the center of Abyssinia led through the richest and most densely populated agricultural regions of the country. The invasion dealt a blow to the country's economy and facilitated the supply of food to the troops. The Abyssinians were forced to either abandon the richest regions of the country or engage in a decisive battle, which is what the Italians required. This made it possible to defeat the enemy with one powerful blow and complete the main military operations. The Italians also remembered the defeat on March 1, 1896 in the area of ​​​​Adua and wanted revenge. Thus, the Italian command concentrated the main strike group of the expeditionary army on the Northern (Eritrean) front.

The southern (Somali) front was supposed to play a supporting role. The southern front was supposed to pin down as many Ethiopian troops as possible and support the offensive of the Northern Front with a strike on Harar, the second-important center of Abyssinia. Also, the southern group was supposed to operate in the capital direction, striving to connect with the main forces. Thus, the Southern Front distracted almost half of the Ethiopian army and developed an offensive against Harar and Addis Ababa.

The distance of 1200 km separating the two fronts made it difficult for Italian troops to interact, so an auxiliary Central Front was created. Italian troops from the Assab area were to develop an offensive towards Dessier. Thus, a small group of Italian troops in the central direction provided the flanks of the main fronts. As a result, the design of the Ethiopian campaign consisted of a concentric offensive in the northern, southern and partially central operational directions. The main blow was delivered in the north, from Eritrea towards the capital of Abyssinia.

Abyssinia. The Abyssinian command quite correctly identified the main operational directions and distributed troops along them. The main forces were located on the Northern Front, a strong army was in the south. On the Southern Front, where the Abyssinians planned to defend, they had some numerical advantage over the Italians. At the same time, the disunity of the Northern and Southern fronts, lack of communications, almost complete absence of vehicles, and poor organization of the rear did not allow the Abyssinian army to maneuver its forces or quickly transfer reinforcements and reserves. As an operational reserve, the emperor stationed the most selective forces - the guard - at road junctions, in the Dessier and Diredaoua regions.

The Abyssinian high command also developed the right strategy: prolonging the war by unleashing a broad guerrilla struggle and acting on enemy communications, as well as conducting mobile defense on the mountain borders. Prolonging the war was supposed to stretch the enemy’s forces, his communications, and during the beginning of the rainy season, reduce the enemy’s mobility, reduce his advantage in aviation and equipment to a minimum. Then, after the Italian army got bogged down, it was planned to launch a decisive counteroffensive with the goal of encircling and defeating the main enemy forces. This was supposed to force Italy to agree to peace negotiations (scenario of the First War with Italy).

Thus, Abyssinia had a good war plan that matched the capabilities of its army, which could not measure its strength with the Italian army, well armed and technically equipped, in a direct decisive battle. On the other hand, the fighting qualities of the Abyssinian warriors made it possible to unleash an active guerrilla and sabotage war behind enemy lines, on his communications, and to wage a small war in the mountains and forests.

However, the problem was that, under pressure from Britain and some princes who dreamed of repeating the defeat of the Italian army of 1896, they adopted a different war plan, more decisive. Negus succumbed to pressure and changed the original plan. As a result, the Abyssinian command prepared for decisive battles with large masses of troops after completing the concentration of the army, which was beneficial to the Italian army, which had complete superiority in a direct clash. It was a strategic mistake that led to fatal consequences for the army and the country.

Start of the war

On October 3, 1935, without a declaration of war, the Italian army invaded Ethiopia from Eritrea and Somalia. At the same time, Italian aircraft began bombing the city of Adua. Three Italian corps (1st, colonial and 2nd) under the command of de Beaune, which in Eritrea deployed in a narrow area of ​​10 km, crossed the border river Mareb and began to carefully move deeper into Ethiopia to Axum and Adua, from one mountain line to to another. At the same time, the Italians made extensive use of artillery, aviation and armored vehicles. The Italian command was cautious, and in order to protect itself from being outflanked and encircled, its troops were deeply echeloned. Thus, at the beginning of the campaign, the Italians acted cautiously, trying to suppress the enemy with technical power, organize the rear and prepare communications.

The Abyssinian army, led by Ras Seyouma, due to the fact that it had not yet completed mobilization and concentration, evaded the defense of strong mountain positions in the Atssum, Adua and Adigrat regions.

As a result, the Italian army, encountering only weak resistance from scattered enemy detachments, reached the Aksum, Adua, Adigrat line by October 8. Then the Italians stopped to organize the rear, prepare roads for the passage of vehicles, strengthen their positions and prepare a bridgehead for further movement. At this time, some feudal lords betrayed the country and went over to the side of the Italians. However, most of the soldiers did not follow their example, remaining loyal to their homeland.

The Italian High Command, dissatisfied with de Bono's cautious actions, demanded an accelerated pace of the offensive. Commander de Bono complied with Rome's demands and decided to make his next move, occupying the area of ​​the city of Macalle (Makale). The 1st and Eritrean (formerly colonial) corps, advancing in the Eritrean ridge zone and interacting with the flank detachment of General Mariotti, occupied the Makelle area on November 8-11, 1935. The 2nd Corps advanced cautiously on the right, but encountered opposition from local partisans. After this success, the Italian army, having significantly advanced its left wing to the south, paused again. The Italian front was extended forward in the direction of one road that connected Makalle and Adigrat, and the interaction of individual groups was difficult due to the mountainous terrain. Again there was a long break in hostilities. The Italians pulled up their rear, regrouped their forces and reinforced the Northern Front with arriving infantry divisions. On the Southern Front at this time, the battle was limited to skirmishes in the border zone.

The Abyssinian military-political leadership, completing the concentration of troops, was waiting for the delivery of weapons and ammunition purchased abroad (via Sudan and British and French Somalia). The Abyssinians also hoped to hold out until the rainy season, when the roads would become impassable and the mountain rivers in many areas would become difficult to cross. In addition, Addis Ababa hoped that prolongation of hostilities would lead to a deterioration in Italy’s international position and a renunciation of aggression. On October 7, 1935, the League of Nations recognized Italy as the aggressor. On November 11, 1935, the Council of the League of Nations decided to impose economic sanctions against Italy: the supply of weapons and certain types of strategic raw materials were prohibited. The League of Nations called for limiting the import of Italian goods and refraining from providing credits and loans to Rome. However, a number of leading countries in the world and Europe refused to establish restrictions on trade and economic relations with Italy - among them the USA, Germany, Austria and Hungary. There was no embargo imposed on the supply of oil and petroleum products to Italy. Thus, Ethiopia's hopes for the world community turned out to be ephemeral.

The Italian High Command, angered by the lack of high-profile victories and blitzkrieg, decided to change the command of the expeditionary forces. Instead of de Bono, they appointed the head of the Italian General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio. He fought as a lieutenant in the First Italo-Ethiopian War and was seriously wounded at the Battle of Adua. Badoglio ordered the troops to prepare for a further offensive. He also limited the bombing of enemy troop concentrations in order to allow the Abyssinians to complete their concentration in known areas (the agents reported this) so that the enemy could be defeated with several decisive blows. The marshal feared that the Ethiopian command, worried about air strikes, would divide the troops into small units and move on to a small, guerrilla war. The Italian army did not have the strength and capabilities to ensure complete control over such a large country as Ethiopia. Badoglio also regrouped the troops of the Northern Front and formed the 3rd Corps, which took up positions between the 1st and Eritrean Corps, using reinforcements that arrived. Then the 4th Army Corps was formed, which strengthened the right wing of the Northern Front.

Amazing country, amazing people, amazing setting. Mengistu's stubbornness and cruelty. We must reduce unnecessary costs. The country finally got rid of the usurper, but he left in the interests of the people.

In this country, I had the opportunity to carry out assignments from our leadership in 1989, that is, while already in the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. That is, I am running somewhat ahead chronologically, but I am doing this deliberately so that different, but similar sections of my service and life are arranged in one book.

I will note in passing that I had to go to the fronts in different countries of the world. There were, of course, many ordinary trips with official visits, but these trips were carried out only for the purpose of maintaining good relations, clarifying some unagreed issues, making certain proposals, etc. Such trips were not associated with the resolution of particularly important and major military-political issues. problems and especially with risks.

Ethiopia is a country that took its place in my consciousness back in the 30s, as, obviously, in each of my peers, because the people of Ethiopia fought against the Italian occupiers, defending their honor and independence, and we, naturally, They were wholeheartedly on the side of the fighting people. But then, i.e. in 1935-1936, Italy, using an agreement with France, which gave Mussolini freedom of action, and making extensive use of tanks, planes and artillery, which, of course, the Ethiopians did not have, captured this country and created a colony Italian East Africa. It included Ethiopia itself, Eritrea and Italian Somalia. It should be noted that in the League of Nations the only country - the Soviet Union - came out in favor of suppressing aggression and providing assistance to the people of Ethiopia. And Great Britain, France and the USA supplied Italy with weapons and everything necessary for waging war. By the way, in this shameful war, Mussolini even used poisonous gases.

However, the people of Ethiopia did not submit - they waged a guerrilla struggle, and already at the beginning of 1941, the Ethiopians liberated their capital Addis Ababa, and by the end of this year they completely expelled the occupiers from the country. Ethiopia is embarking on a truly democratic path of development. In the early 50s, in accordance with the decision of the UN General Assembly, Eritrea, a former colony of Italy, was annexed to Ethiopia. By the way, the Eritrean issue has its roots.

At the end of the last century, Ethiopia, weakened by civil strife, lost its ports on the Red Sea and was forced to conclude an unequal treaty with Italy, according to which the latter, in addition to the ports it captured, also ceded the northern part of Ethiopia with the city of Asmara and this area was called Eritrea, which became a colony of Italy. Since then, the spirit of separatism has continued to live among some of the population of Eritrea, although many decades have passed since the expulsion of the last Italian occupier and colonizer from these lands. In my opinion, this part of society would like Eritrea to exist on equal terms with Ethiopia, although in a single state with the latter it, of course, could prosper, since its entire economy is connected with the economic objects of the center of Ethiopia.

It should be noted that the democratic development of Ethiopia has advanced so far that it was here in 1963 that the Conference of Heads of Government of Independent African States was held, at which the Organization of African Unity was established. And the headquarters of this organization is located in Addis Ababa.

In the early 70s, bad weather struck Ethiopia - drought, followed by famine, disease, etc. The Provisional Military Administrative Council (MAAC) came to power. Democratic reforms are being carried out, including nationalization. This is aggravating the internal political situation - extremists and separatists of all stripes are raising their heads. And after this, Ethiopia is suddenly attacked by Somalia. It was a bolt from the blue. Apparently, our relevant service missed the preparation of this action. And first of all, this “blunder”, in my opinion, is explained by the fact that both Somalia and Ethiopia were on our general list of friends, and the leaders of Somalia, primarily the head of state Barre, constantly and everywhere declared their eternal love for Soviet Union.

The leaders of Somalia set themselves a goal - using the existing economic and socio-political difficulties within Ethiopia, with a short and decisive blow to seize the western part of their neighbor’s land, which jutted into Somalia at an angle. This is approximately along the line: from Lake Abbe in the north, about 150 km southwest of the city of Djibouti, and to the Woib River - along its eastern bank to the city of Dolo in the south. At a minimum, they believed that it was necessary to recapture the Haud Plateau along the line of the Fafeng River, which then flows into the Webi Shebeli River. This area is valuable not only because they are engaged in cattle breeding and agriculture, but also because of its unexplored natural resources (there are signs of wealth). If we consider this area from the perspective of administrative division, then the aggression fell on the Ogaden province.

The war began on July 23, 1977, with a surprise invasion by Somali troops. By December of the same year, they captured a significant territory of Ethiopia, advancing in different directions from 300 to 700 kilometers. In fact, they achieved the goal they set.

However, there were also deeper goals. As it turned out, the leadership of Somalia had the task of overthrowing the democratic government that existed in Ethiopia at that time. The question arises - who was interested in this? Who and why needed the overthrow of the people's democratic government in Ethiopia in 1977? Of course, not the Soviet Union. We supported this government and all its transformations in the country in every possible way, just as we supported the government in Somalia. Maybe Somalia needed this war? Of course not - any state, if its leadership is led by normal statesmen, needs to strengthen relations with its neighbors to the level of friendship. Somalia's seizure of the eastern wedge of Ethiopian territory and aggression were just a cover for the main goal - the overthrow of the government in Addis Ababa. So who needed it? Of course, the United States, and, as always, the CIA carried out its plans. Could the American administration at that time allow the Soviet Union to become more and more entrenched in Africa? Of course not.

Jimmy Carter, having defeated his main rival D. Ford in December 1976 and became President of the United States, promised the Americans to pull the country out of the pool of political and psychological humiliation into which they found themselves in connection with Nixon’s Watergate and the shameful end of the savage war in Vietnam for the United States. Therefore, Carter’s fuss over every foreign policy issue is completely understandable (although he was unable to fully use the lifeline in the form of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, which was involuntarily given to him by the Soviet Union). So Somalia turned up. Of course, with his knowledge, the US Central Intelligence Agency began to accelerate the implementation of the idea - to strangle democracy in Africa through the hands of the democrats themselves. And they have had the corresponding tactics in their arsenal for many years (judging by Angola, Namibia, Morocco, Zaire, Congo, etc.). And now it would be possible to shine here in Ethiopia.

Having received the blessing of the president and already having great influence on the leader of Somalia (at that time) Barre, the American intelligence services, under the guise of training the Armed Forces of Somalia, carried out a series of effective measures that made it possible to decisively stir up this “sleepy kingdom.” Barre himself, greedy for everything that is given to him, was not personally offended this time either.

Therefore, he zealously set about preparing for aggression. He went for it consciously and had to see its possible consequences, including in relations with the Soviet Union. However, he perfectly understood something else: if it comes to a break with the USSR, then the latter simply will not be able to take with it everything that was configured by our specialists, by our forces and, in fact, at our expense. Various industrial enterprises, residential areas, roads, defense facilities and much more. We have established diplomatic relations with this country since 1960, and from that time Soviet assistance began. And when the President of Somalia A. Shermark was assassinated in 1969 and the threat of power passing into the hands of the reaction loomed over the country, our assistance became even more effective. As you know, power was seized by the progressive part of the Somali army officers, led by the army commander, General Barre. And then all power passed to the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Barre became President of the Council. The country's leadership announced that the development of Somalia would be based on the ideology of the socialist path, and this found our full support. However, Barre betrayed his people, which was difficult to imagine at that time. But the traitor turned out to be right in his calculations - the Soviet Union, having broken off relations with this country (although the people were not guilty of anything), could not compensate for the expenses that it had made in relation to Somalia. And they were huge. After all, we have also built expensive strategic facilities such as an ultra-modern airfield with a runway for all types of aircraft (including for the future) and huge capacity, with all the elements of comprehensive support and maintenance.

And personally, I don’t understand why our diplomats and our intelligence services of that time missed Barre’s rebirth, and most importantly, did not notice the preparation for aggression? And why, from the moment of the first aggravation of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia (and by this time the Somali troops were already preparing to attack), which was expressed in the territorial claims made by Barre against Ethiopia, why even at that time did our government not act categorically enough?

As a result, the aggression was accomplished. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union, of course, supported Ethiopia, provided it with all possible assistance and condemned the aggressor Somalia. Everything was done to ensure that Ethiopia not only defended its borders, but also completely defeated all those Somali military units that invaded its territory.

During February and March 1978, Ethiopia, with the help of the USSR and other socialist countries, defeated the aggressor and defended the integrity of its state. The young head of Ethiopia's provisional military government, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was at his best. He gained enormous authority. The whole world started talking about him. He “took off”, but forgot to land in a timely manner, which ultimately also cast a shadow on his name. Of course, no situation can spoil an intelligent person, truly devoted to his people, a true patriot. However, alas, we were unfortunately dealing with a different person.

I think that I will be right if I say that our two main departments at that time - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB (which generally faded in the period 1985 to 2000) should have shown more creativity in their work. After all, it was about the fate of the people, and not just the individual. But a lot or even almost everything depends on him, so you need to work hard with him, and not flirt. We must pay tribute to the American intelligence services in relation to the top officials in the states - Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Kuchma, Nazarbayev, Landsbergis and others - they worked and work masterfully. For example, the Americans, even in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, organized a “worthy entourage” for Gorbachev in the persons of Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. As for Landsbergis (Lithuania), back in 1990 he openly introduced American advisers into the staff of power structures, who did not advise, but demanded and dictated. Naturally, in a “civilized” form. And now they demand it. They don't waste dollars. Only - under the conditions. This is how Russia is dictated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and various sorros. The IMF promises to give another loan - a handout - only if Yeltsin's reforms are continued, i.e., a pro-Western course. What kind of democracy are we talking about? This is ridiculous. Therefore, Russian rulers can indulge in demagoguery as much as they want, but they are obliged to do whatever pleases the American monster.

In the summer of 1998, I met with one close acquaintance (for certain reasons I can only mention his name - Vladimir). He shared with me his impressions of his recent trip to the USA, where he was for the first time, but for a long time. Already at the very beginning of the conversation, he literally screamed: “What kind of democracy can we talk about if you’re talking about the USA? There's no sign of her there! It was drummed into the people that they live in a democratic society. They are ringing about this all over the world. But there is no democracy there and there cannot be one under their system. Of course, Americans live much better at the expense of other peoples of the world. Their rulers will continue to strive to improve life in the United States, making other countries economically and politically dependent. Now they will finish off Russia. Then - Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the former republics of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and the Baltic states. But they also have an army of unemployed people, homeless people, terrible crime. I am disappointed. The main thing in life for them is to make money by any means. Abomination! They are now dragging us here too, into this stinking swamp.”

Naturally, I agreed with him, remembering my stay in the USA. According to my observations, Americans lack that high spirituality that is inherent in our people. Although, in principle, they have no spirituality at all. This is why the American way of life is not and will not be instilled in us. The ideology of individualism and the law of force dominate in the United States. And we are collectivists. Our Soviet spirit has found fertile soil in many countries of the world. And there true democracy began to emerge. This, of course, contradicts the interests of the United States (more precisely, the ruling circles), especially their global plans for gaining world domination.

Mengistu's stubbornness and cruelty

However, this is a topic for another discussion. Well, in the 70s, the United States actively intervened in the affairs of young African states that had embarked on the path of democratic development, trying to subordinate them to its influence. But it is up to the people themselves to decide how to build their future. However, we must be honest and say frankly that at that time, undoubtedly, the people of Ethiopia needed not only material and spiritual assistance, but also purely organizational assistance - in organizing the work of the state apparatus, in strengthening the economy and, in general, the internal policy of the state. Consequently, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB, and the government as a whole, had to urgently help the head of state, Mengistu Haile Mariam. But at some stage things were lost here. And when Army General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov came to this country as the Chief Military Advisor (from 1978 to 1980), he plunged into the midst of severe contradictions. Especially in the relationship between the central government of Ethiopia and the authorities of the province of Eritrea. The separatist forces of Eritrea, taking advantage of the difficult situation in the country, which was caused by the war with Somalia, decided to secede and create an independent state. Instead of showing wisdom, a certain tact and politically removing this negativity, Mengistu decided to attack Eritrea with the forces of the Second Revolutionary Army, which was stationed in the north of the country in the Asmara region. However, the Eritreans were well prepared for such a development of events and foresaw such a difficult turn of events. The civil war began. Soon it became protracted. Instead of developing the country and improving the well-being of the people, the main forces and resources were spent on war. Although V.I. Petrov did a lot for Ethiopia, as, obviously, did representatives of other departments of the USSR (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.), he could not stop the war. And Colonel General Mikhail Aleksandrovich Tyagunov, who then came here, actually continued the established course. Being a very diligent person, he also contributed to the construction of the Ethiopian Armed Forces. But he also did not extinguish the war. And it was impossible to do this without Mengistu. But it was not easy to persuade him to such a decision.

The situation became even worse when Lieutenant General Denisov became our Chief Military Advisor. Not only was he by no means suitable for this military political-diplomatic work, but he was also ill. Moreover, the disease was clearly expressed, which aroused compassion among compatriots, and hostility among Ethiopians. Although Denisov was certainly a good person. However, it was useless to expect that after my departure he would be able to implement the planned plan of action, much less radical steps could be expected from him.

What kind of illness has overcome Denisov? In my opinion, it was some form of cerebral vascular sclerosis. Imagine this man is about 50 years old, generally well built, slightly overweight, quite talkative and sociable, and moderately active. But when we went somewhere and barely sat down, he immediately fell asleep. He literally fell asleep, putting everyone else, including me, in an awkward position. When I found myself in this situation on the first day, I thought: “The poor guy must have been doing business all night.” Indeed, this could not be ruled out. Therefore, until the end of that day, I tried to involve him in a lively conversation - in answering questions, etc., just so that he would not fall asleep. Or I told him to do something else with his assistant while I had a conversation with someone. But when all this happened again the next day, I asked his colleagues: “What’s the matter?” It was explained to me that this continues all the time and, perhaps, because of this, Denisov has zero relations with Mengistu, they actually do not meet, and they see the former Minister of Defense very rarely, since the latter avoids such meetings.

However, the apparatus of the Chief Military Adviser was normal. Our Soviet embassy also made a good impression on me. At the same time, the main problem - putting out the fire of war in Eritrea - is not only not being resolved, but the war is escalating, and hostilities have already started in Tigray province. The 3rd Army is deployed here in full force and suffers significant losses, retreating under attacks from units of the so-called Tigre People's Front. The Popular Front of the Rebels captured a large amount of military equipment, weapons, and ammunition from government troops and continued to push back the 3rd Army.

This war was unnecessary not only for the people of Ethiopia, but also for the Soviet Union. This clamp was a big burden for us. Especially after Afghanistan, in the presence of Angola and other similar countries. Internal problems caused by Gorbachev’s notorious perestroika also made themselves felt. In short, peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea would be good for everyone. Decisive changes in Mengistu's policy were required, but instead he sent telegrams to the leadership of the USSR and urgently asked for additional assistance in military equipment, and especially in ammunition.

The leadership of our country decides to send a military delegation to Ethiopia, which I was assigned to lead. The task is to understand the situation and push Mengistu towards peace.

The arrival of the Soviet military delegation was received ambiguously by various layers of Ethiopian society. Some believed that this visit would have a stabilizing effect on the situation, and the peaceful steps of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia would find their place in its policies. Others said the delegation's arrival would escalate the armed conflict and could harm ongoing negotiations between the government and the opposition. Meanwhile, a week before our departure, everything was agreed upon with Mengistu and he, perhaps taking into account the appearance of our delegation, initiated negotiations with the opposition, which, by the way, never refused them.

At the same time, the media of anti-government organizations spread rumors that the Soviet military delegation had arrived to exert “forceful pressure” on the opposition, thereby inciting anti-Soviet sentiment. In turn, the Ethiopian leadership did its best to popularize the stay of the Soviet military delegation in the country. Personally, Mengistu Haile Mariam sought to use her visit to strengthen his authority. For this purpose, the delegation was given special attention both in the center and in the troops and in the provinces.

In the course of our work, to get a complete picture of the situation in the country, I visited all three armies (two of which were in combat), reserve formations, the main Air Force base, the naval base and drove along the western coast of Krasnoye sea ​​from the port of Massaura (after visiting our sailors on the island of Dahlak) to the port of Assab, from which there is a direct road to Addis Ababa. I also needed this rather difficult trip in order to examine the ammunition depots located here (and there were many of them) and arsenals. And I really inspected them completely, and not selectively, but in full, all the main storage facilities for military equipment, weapons, military equipment and ammunition. I counted everything I could with the help of my comrades. This was very important, since the telegrams to Mengistu said that they had almost nothing, the warehouses were empty, and if they suddenly needed to give something to the troops, they would not be able to do it. But our rough calculations, as well as the data of the Chief Military Advisor, spoke of something else. In this regard, we had the idea that certain military circles of the Ethiopian army, wanting to justify their defeats in battle by the lack of weapons and ammunition, could mislead Mengistu (if this is not his own “creativity”). To put everything in its place, we took these steps.

We also toured military educational institutions.

It is interesting that in addition to the first meeting, at which I conveyed greetings to Mengistu from the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union and spoke about the purposes of the visit of our military delegation (Mengistu added his requests), and in addition to our final conversation, the head of the country invited me several more times. At these intermediate meetings, he was mainly interested in my opinion of what I saw. Perhaps my characteristics and conclusions were not so important to him as the demonstration of such contacts was required to create appropriate public opinion in the interests of Mengistu.

Our trip around the country began from the north, that is, from Asmara, where the 2nd Revolutionary Army was fighting the Eritrean separatists.

The complexity of the situation of the Ethiopian Armed Forces in general and the 2nd Army in particular was that literally two months before our arrival, Mengistu arrested and shot more than 600 officers. This mainly affected generals and colonels. Dissatisfied with the president's policies, the most progressive group of officers opposed his course, which led the country to a dead end, especially in the war with Eritrea. They believed that civil war was generally unacceptable. Using communication channels with the leadership of Eritrea, they negotiated that the war should be stopped on the condition that Eritrea, having received autonomy, remained part of Ethiopia. The country will hold early elections for a representative government, which will include deputies from Eritrea.

The officers timed their speech to coincide with the moment when Mengistu flew out of the country to one of the international forums. However, almost all of the state security agencies were Mengistu people - not only from the same tribe, but also relatives. Taking advantage of the lack of army guards, proper vigilance, and also taking advantage of the complacency of the rebels, they carried out arrests in the center (the performance was headed by the Chief of the General Staff) and in the armies, especially in the 2nd, where dissatisfaction with the president for the long-term, exhausting, unnecessary war was especially strongly. The security service sent a telegram to Mengisti about what had happened. He, interrupting his trip, urgently returned home. Having understood the situation within 24 hours, he ordered all those arrested to be shot. Something like a trial was organized based on materials from the security agencies.

This tragedy cast an even greater shadow on the already gloomy figure of the president.

In principle, Mengistu was an extraordinary person. And he did a lot of good for his people. However, the lack of control on the part of parliament and objective self-control (God did not give it) contributed to the growth of ambitions. The separation from common sense and the tendency towards the vicious principle: “Only I know, and only I am right” became more and more obvious. The degeneration of thinking and psyche became irreversible. Under these conditions, it was difficult to expect any new decisive steps from Mengistu to stabilize the internal political situation. He resorted only to force. His star was already setting.

In the 2nd Army, virtually everything was beheaded - the army itself, all divisions, brigades, regiments and even some battalions. Those who had just been appointed, who were temporarily filling someone’s position, were in a bad mood. They, of course, answered all my questions, tried to be kind, and showed me due attention. However, this was just fulfilling their official duties, not an open friendly conversation. Therefore, even though we devoted several days to the army, although we directly walked through most of its front line, met with officers and soldiers in units of the first and second echelon, at artillery firing positions and among tank crews, we still have an unambiguous conclusion about the further prospects for the development of events in this direction it was difficult to do. Still, everything was basically leaning towards the fact that the fighting had to end.

Ethiopian Armed Forces

Here are some moments from the life of this army.

The front line of the army and the enemy, i.e. the separatists, are separated by 700-800 meters or more. In such a situation, rifle and machine gun fire (with the exception of heavy machine guns) is ineffective. Therefore, on both sides, the personnel did not particularly try to take cover and move only along the trenches. But when gunfire and mortars opened fire, everyone jumped into trenches and trenches. In engineering terms, the positions were well equipped. The fire system and engineering barriers, including mines, left no doubt that if the enemy dared to attack, he would inevitably suffer heavy losses and unsuccessfully roll back. The personnel knew their tasks well. The reserves were well trained, and their actions to move to their lines were practiced. The artillerymen and mortarmen showed me from their observation posts where their lights should be located on the ground - stationary barrage and concentrated ones. The provision, in our opinion, was normal - we even had lunch in one of the units. There was more than enough ammunition of all types in the units and in the warehouses of the units and the army.

The terrain for combat operations turned out to be difficult - sharply rugged, mountainous, in some places the mountain slopes were covered with sparse forest. I imagined several options for active (offensive) actions and came to the conclusion that any of the options would only lead to large unjustified losses. During our work in some areas there was absolutely no shooting. And this forced me to ask the question: “Are you always like this?” But the officers explained: “The enemy knows that a group of Soviet officers will be with us, and therefore does not shoot.” “That’s why we don’t shoot,” the officer concluded. This surprised me even more, but also allowed me to conclude that the so-called separatists are not hostile towards the Soviet military. On the contrary, they demonstrate their readiness for peace. And when I asked: “And if you literally today or tomorrow tell them, the separatists, that you are stopping hostilities, will they do the same or will they take advantage of this and seize your positions?” All the Ethiopian officers present during this conversation unanimously stated that the enemy would immediately support this peace initiative and would not make any territorial claims; by the way, they themselves had repeatedly proposed the same thing.

We also had an interesting episode. Getting ready to go to our “base” by the end of one of the days (we stayed at a hotel in Asmara), we found ourselves on the soldiers’ name day literally at the forefront. Here the soldiers of one of the companies, under the leadership of their officer, organized simple decorations from flags, paper flowers, candy wrappers, and some boxes in one of the dugouts. Someone drew a pencil portrait of the hero of the day (he was 20 years old). On the makeshift table were some fried grains, fruits, and candies. The hero of the day in a neat soldier's uniform stood here. He was of average height, well-built, and handsome-faced Ethiopian. Curly head, olive eyes, dark skin, but the nose was straight and even slightly hooked, which smacked of Europe. For some reason I involuntarily remembered Pushkin’s ancestors. The young man smiled all the time and, constantly snapping his fingers, shouted: “Soviet, soviet...” Apparently, he wanted to demonstrate his good attitude towards his Soviet comrades.

They explained to us the reason for the holiday. We joined in the congratulations and presented the birthday boy with various badges of military glory and a wristwatch with Soviet symbols on the dial (I always carried a set of modest souvenirs with me). Everything was very warm and cordial.

I asked if this was a tradition, or if they organized such a celebration only for this soldier (I didn’t bother to say that perhaps this was connected with our stay). But they told me that they always and everywhere, including in the army, celebrate their birthday.

Well, it’s nice that this people has such a good tradition.

Having finished our work in the center and on the left flank, early one morning we went to the very right flank of the army, which abutted the Red Sea. Here we also got acquainted with the naval base, its capabilities and capabilities, as well as security. We went by boat to the island of Dahlak, where our naval material and technical base was located, which provided and serviced our ships, which solved their tasks in the Indian Ocean, during the transition from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, or vice versa. Service on the mainland is hard (Ethiopia is not Ukraine or France), but on Dahlak it is doubly hard. But how glad these people were to see their compatriots! And we did everything possible to make our sailors happy. And when the time came to leave (and there was still a long road ahead of us), we were overcome by a feeling of involuntary guilt in front of these warriors, as if we were abandoning them on an island in the Red Sea, while we ourselves were going to heavenly places.

The march of our small group in cars along the coast to the next port, Asseb, was difficult. But it was extremely useful to inspect one arsenal with weapons and two large warehouses with ammunition (the number of small warehouses was not counted). And the path actually passed through the desert, but the road was built well.

After another visit, at my request to Mengistu, we went to the 3rd Army, based in Tigre province. First, we met on the provincial border with the newly appointed Chief of the General Staff, who had previously served as commander of the Air Force. He and I got comfortable in the same car. My translator and driver were also with us. The Chief of the General Staff “reassured” me: “We will go in the first car. If bandits attack a convoy, for some reason they usually fire at the last vehicles. But cars are rarely fired upon - they hunt for weapons, ammunition, and food. And this is all on trucks.” I thought: “Like in Afghanistan,” and said out loud: “So, maybe we should have posted guards along the route? It is not desirable for anyone from my group to die.”

The Chief of the General Staff assured me that such security was installed in the most dangerous areas. However, although we covered a long distance, I did not see a single post or guarded area. And there were no attacks. I even thought that the general could, for effect, give information about the impending danger. True, we saw something else, while simultaneously talking about the state of the Ethiopian Armed Forces and the problems of the 3rd Army in particular.

In front of us ran, winding sharply, a modern, narrow highway with mountain walls, beautifully made of stone, and drainage ditches, also made of stone, which made it possible to intercept stones falling from the peaks. On the other side, a powerful parapet was also built, a little more than a meter high, but massive. It reliably protected cars from falling into the abyss if the driver lost control. The area was covered with lush vegetation. In some places monkeys hung in clusters on the trees. Suddenly, at one of the turns, the driver said loudly: “Look!” - and slowed down the car. A gorilla was sitting on the parapet - a huge male monkey of a bright red, almost red color. We caught up with her. I noticed a massive head with huge fangs, like those of a lion. This magnificent jungle dweller was looking somewhere to the side, not paying attention to the cars. The general told the driver not to stop because some of the individuals might attack. We drove past, and the owner of these places sluggishly slid off the parapet and lazily walked along the road.

We involuntarily switched the conversation from the military topic to the fauna of Ethiopia. It turns out that it is very rich and diverse - lions, leopards, elephants, hippos, buffalos, giraffes, antelopes, zebras, mountain goats, many species of monkeys and birds, including ostriches. As for gorillas, they already belong to rare species, but mainly monkeys and baboons are found in this area.

They were already waiting for us at army headquarters. Artillery fire could be clearly heard here. After listening to the situation on the map, I suggested leaving in two or three units that are currently fighting.

It turns out that the entire Tigre province, located south of Eritrea, was already in the hands of the rebels. There was no direct road connection from Addis Ababa to Asmara (i.e. the north) because the road was blocked. Everything was supplied to the 2nd Army only by sea. Moreover, the rebels descended even further south and entered the province of Wollo. And this has already created a very tangible threat to the capital.

We went to the military units in three armored personnel carriers with large-caliber automatic guns. At first, I expressed the opinion that the Shilkas could not be taken - this is an air defense weapon, and the enemy does not have aviation. But they convinced me that the ground enemy was more afraid of the Shilka than the tank. And we set off.

The fighting conditions were difficult. They passed on a hilly plateau, sparsely overgrown with tall thorny bushes. Pebbles compressed with sand crunch underfoot. The sun mercilessly burns everyone. There is not enough water, as always in such conditions. Everyone - both the black Ethiopians and the white advisers - became even blacker from soot, dust, and then the merciless sun.

By the time we arrived, the unit we were in had already repelled the rebel attack twice. And now there was a sluggish artillery fire.

Having understood the situation, I realized that the enemy was attacking only infantry and was supported by fire from heavy machine guns from five armored personnel carriers (except, of course, artillery and mortars, which were constantly firing). When I asked if there was any reserve nearby, I was told: a tank company of seven tanks was stationed five kilometers away and was ready for action.

Within two hours, together with the Chief of the General Staff, we prepared a counterattack, which should begin immediately as soon as the enemy launched another attack. We also prepared a squadron of attack aircraft with a flight time of 18-20 minutes.

To carry out this action, we pulled up the tankers to the last shelter. Having met with them, I presented them with Soviet Army badges, and the company commander (there were no other officers) and all the tank commanders with wristwatches and wished them success. Then we checked all connections, chose a convenient place for observation and got ready.

It turned out just fine. The enemy launched a massive fire attack - a clear sign of preparation for an attack. The Chief of the General Staff called in the air force. Our artillery opened fire on the enemy batteries. After 15 minutes, the separatists launched an attack. Our artillery carries fire along the attacking chain, and aviation carried out bombing strikes on enemy artillery. Tanks go on a counterattack. As soon as they passed our front line, the infantry rose and, covered by the armor of the tanks, also launched a counterattack. The tanks immediately opened fire with guns and machine guns.

The enemy infantry initially stopped and lay down. Then she rushed back to her position. Tanks literally on the shoulders of the retreating enemy burst into his defense, and infantry followed the tanks. And 30 minutes later we also moved to the front line of the separatists. The pursuit continued for another two kilometers. The enemy was virtually scattered.

I proposed to the Chief of the General Staff to gain a foothold on the line of captured enemy positions, create a defense here and at the same time begin negotiations with the separatists about a possible cessation of hostilities.

Arriving at the neighboring compound, I saw a completely different picture. The staffing of the units here was extremely insufficient. There are no reserves. Personnel morale is low. At the first enemy strike, they can run and thereby open the way to Addis Ababa and to the rear of those formations that hold their lines.

In this regard, we agreed with the Chief of the General Staff that he would concentrate all combat aviation in this direction; it would constantly, with maximum intensity, launch bombing strikes against the separatist troops. At the same time, at least two formations will be taken from the 1st Army, which is located in the Somali direction, that is, in the south-east of the country and urgently transferred to this direction (Tigray).

Subsequent events showed the correctness of this decision. These and other formations deployed to this direction, plus the effective actions of combat aviation, cooled the ardor of the extremists. Proposals for a ceasefire and suppression of the fratricidal civil war, made through various channels, finally stopped them and forced them to negotiate.

Finally, the 1st Army. Unlike the other two, she was in “greenhouse” conditions - no fighting, no shooting, everything was quiet and calm. Occasionally, smugglers are captured at checkpoints. When we arrived in this army, even the appearance of the officers and soldiers said that they lived as if in a completely different world. And the army commander is even in a ceremonial uniform, white gloves and with a stack.

We met and went to the army headquarters. It stood as a separate military town-park. Several one-story rooms were located in a fantastically beautiful area, completely dotted with flowering trees and ornamental shrubs, bright green lawns, intricate small forms of architecture, ostriches and peacocks walked importantly everywhere, and many parrots hung on the trees. It was a fabulous idyll.

But the lion made a special impression on us. For him, a huge niche - a cave - was carved out of the natural rock, and the entire entrance part was closed with a powerful metal lattice. The medium-sized lion, apparently still young, did not react to people. Apparently, captivity and constant onlookers broke him. I asked: “How long has he been in this prison?” The army commander said less than a year. They caught him in nets. And he proudly declared: “Only our army has a lion. That’s why our emblem is a lion with a raised paw.”

From the reports that were made at the headquarters, we understood: there are no special problems in the army, except for the fact that there is constant unrest among the Somalis. This is due to the fact that many Ethiopians have relatives living in Somalia, and if earlier there was free passage there, now everything is closed. In case of violation of the border regime, they can be shot without warning. It is known that the forbidden fruit is sweet. Closing the border only increases the desire to communicate.

As for the staffing of the army and its support, there are no problems here. The necessary supplies are available. As I parted with the army commander, I wished him further prosperity; an opportunity had arisen for rapprochement with Somalia.

Returning to the capital, our group completed all the remaining activities in our plan, including visiting the Air Force base, schools, and a number of central weapons and ammunition storage facilities. Unfortunately, in addition to good moments, there were also unpleasant ones, mainly associated with moral “dislocations”. I noticed that they were trying to show the armies that they were poorly supplied with weapons and ammunition. At the same time, they resorted to indecent methods - they transferred their property from the part where we were supposed to go to the one where we had already been. In this regard, I have ordered that the officers of the Chief Military Adviser keep an eye on the central warehouses and arsenals. This, of course, did not make us happy. But, in my opinion, the leaders of the rear of the Ethiopian army, who were engaged in such fraud, looked even worse.

In the evening, on the eve of the trip to the central warehouses, we clarified with the general - the chief of logistics of the Armed Forces (by the way, he was also the acting Minister of Defense, since after the mass execution a new one had not yet been appointed) the procedure for visiting these facilities, coordinating it simultaneously with trips to military educational institutions and other institutions (i.e., so as not to travel the same route twice).

Literally three hours later, our Chief Military Advisor reports to me that a large number of vehicles have been driven to the main ammunition depot, where I intended to go in the morning. Loading teams also arrived at another warehouse, which was not included in the list of those being inspected after our plan was clarified. The army command began to remove artillery shells and aerial bombs.

Will you allow me to stop these vile actions of the head of the rear? - the Chief Military Advisor asked me indignantly.

Why? - I said calmly. - On the contrary, let them transport everything. And your task is to find out where they are transporting.

We have already found out - to two other warehouses near Addis Ababa.

That's fine. We'll go straight there tomorrow morning. Just don't announce it yet. Bring a camera or video camera with you.

The next morning, the head of the rear arrived at breakfast. He was in a great mood. The meal passed in a good atmosphere - we talked peacefully about the history of Ethiopia, the culture, traditions and customs of the people. By the way, the general enlightened us on one interesting issue. Among the millet crops grown by farmers in this country, teff occupies the main place. It is eaten in different forms, but, unlike others, it has exceptionally high medicinal properties, helping to strengthen muscles in general and especially the muscles of the lungs and heart. The general asked us:

Do you know who is the perennial world champion and Olympic champion in long-distance running? Ethiopians! Why? But the secret is in this culture (except for the naturally formed school of sports training).

After finishing breakfast, we headed to the cars. As I walk, I say to the general:

You know, this morning we consulted and decided to make small adjustments to our plans: we will look at two ammunition depots (and I named exactly those where ammunition was transported from the central warehouse all night), and then on the way back in this direction - a military school. It turns out that the school is starting field training tomorrow, and we would like to get to know the officers and cadets within its walls.

The general's high spirits were blown away by the wind.

Then I will order that the school not go into the field for now. “It’s not a problem,” he said without much joy.

Well, why ruin plans for the educational process. Yes, and we will be put in an awkward position. After all, nothing fundamentally changes - we’ll find time to look at the central warehouse,” I said in an innocent tone.

But they are already waiting there,” the general did not give up.

Therefore, I ask you, Comrade General, send your officer there, who will convey that the visit is postponed. Let them do according to their plan. I'm sure they have a lot of work to do.

The poor general completely wilted. And not knowing what to do, he began to rummage through his pockets, taking out some papers and notepads. And then he asked:

Do you mind if I don't go and you are accompanied by my deputy?

No, of course not,” I reassured him. - I myself wanted to offer you this option. After all, you remain the minister and the president may need you at any time.

Yes Yes. He has already given me one important assignment.

We broke up. The general went to the General Staff, and we went to the warehouses. The first of these warehouses was on the outskirts of the city, so we got there quickly. And although a little time passed after parting with the general, the head of the warehouse, a lieutenant colonel, met us already at the entrance. And five minutes later, a colonel arrived - the acting chief of weapons (the chief was shot among the rebels). While meeting the warehouse manager, I noticed his tired and insufficiently tidy appearance. It was clear to me that this was the result of a sleepless, tense night. By the way, at the moment when we were approaching, several trucks with soldiers drove out from the territory of the warehouse - apparently a loading and unloading team. But we pretended not to pay attention to them.

When in any country, I always tried to avoid receiving a report (report) from an officer of the army of the country in which we were staying, with the exception of the honor guard, when this had to be done in connection with the protocol. Therefore, now the lieutenant colonel reported not to me, but to the General Staff officer assigned to our group on a permanent basis. And then we, calmly walking around the warehouse, talked with the lieutenant colonel.

How long have you been running this warehouse? - I asked him.

Already three years. Even more...

So you are not just a boss, but also an expert in your profession!

I know the warehouse well and try to maintain it at the proper level. We haven't had any incidents this year. “We have no comments,” the lieutenant colonel said proudly.

Wonderful. And you personally, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, how do you feel?

The lieutenant colonel threw me a look full of grief:

Never mind. Still alright.

Excuse me for asking this insensitive question, but the whites of your eyes are red. It seemed to me that maybe you weren’t feeling well today? Therefore, you could assign your deputy to represent the warehouse.

No no! I do it myself. I'm just a little overtired... Family circumstances.

OK then. Tell me, what types of ammunition are stored in your warehouse?

We only have artillery shells for all gun systems and mines for all mortars. In addition, there in the far corner there is an underground bunker where several tons of explosives are stored.

Are records kept? Can you report exactly how much ammunition of each type is in stock?

The lieutenant colonel began to report from memory, but when the officer of our Chief Military Advisor began to correct him, he took the logbook and reported quite competently.

But these storage facilities that we see - are they all full? - I asked.

No, many of them are half empty, you can take a look.

Let's go through everything and take a look. But it’s surprising - why do you have such mountains of ammunition literally throughout the entire warehouse?

Yes, there is no time to put everything together well... They don’t give enough soldiers for this purpose...

The storage facilities were mostly full, but some could have accommodated some more ammunition. In any case, about a quarter of what is stored outdoors could be placed under a roof. But the most interesting thing is that when we began to examine the stacks of boxes with ammunition in open areas, we discovered a large number of aircraft bombs, missiles, and rockets. To the question - why was nothing said about this during the general report? - the head of the warehouse constantly repeated the same thing: “They delivered it by mistake, but they didn’t have time to return the ammunition to the recipient yet.”

Of course, all this looked, to put it mildly, ugly. We did the shooting. And the representative of the General Staff and other Ethiopian officers were asked to draw up a report on the presence of unaccounted for ammunition in the warehouse. The Chief Military Advisor took a copy of the act for himself. The night “operation” to transport shells turned against their organizers.

Approximately the same picture was in the second warehouse. But at the military school we received complete satisfaction. The officers and cadets are in a good mood. Living and studying conditions are normal. The provision is comprehensive. The only thing we didn’t understand was why no one asked anything, although in general the personnel were sociable and easily entered into contact and conversation. Pleasant faces, white-toothed smiles.

Finally, it's time to take stock. Taking into account the assignment I received in Moscow and taking into account the situation that we met on the spot, as I imagined it, I had to solve two fundamental problems: to convince Mengistu that only through political means - through negotiations and compromises - can the the task of breaking the deadlock in the war with the opposition. This is the first one. And the second is to show Mengistu that his exorbitant requests for assistance to Ethiopia with weapons, military equipment and ammunition are not caused by the current situation and the level of equipment of the Ethiopian army today. Although, of course, something had to be highlighted additionally, but this is insignificant. But I considered the most important thing to be clear with Mengistu without diplomacy.

Therefore, during my last meeting with Mengistu, I gave him the following message:

We note that the military-political situation in Ethiopia remains difficult. But the main danger is a possible escalation, especially in Eritrea and Tigray. Our group confirms the expediency of the recommendations of the Soviet leadership on the need to find a political way to defuse the situation, the complications of which arose due to the stubborn reluctance of the Ethiopian leadership to reassess relations with the opposition and follow the path of agreements. Conducting negotiations with the Eritrean Popular Front and the Tigrean Popular Front only from a position of strength will not yield anything. On the contrary, the “disease” is driven deeper and deeper. After all, everyone can see that over the years the forces of the opposition are growing, not decreasing. But what is even more dangerous is that the country is undergoing a process of consolidation of opposition forces. At the same time, there is a tendency to intensify the process of isolation of Mengistu Haile Mariam. This is evidenced by the conspiracy of the officers. We condemn these speeches. But at the same time we emphasize that the measures taken against the conspirators will not resolve the crisis. This will only give rise to a new wave of discontent, therefore, Mengistu’s popularity will fall. And the people are tired of the protracted war. Of course, the recently appointed Chief of the General Staff, commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, army commanders, corps and division commanders will carry out the orders of their Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But relapses are possible if Mengistu does not change his course and if he does not lead the line to establish peace in the country.

I also gave detailed information (I repeated some of what was in my intermediate messages) on each army and branch of the Armed Forces. He emphasized that the most difficult situation is in the province of Tigre and the surrounding areas, that is, in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the 3rd Army. The enemy (more precisely, the Tigre People's Front) inflicted a significant defeat on the army, advanced 120 kilometers and actually completely controls the situation in this province and partially in the provinces of Wollo and Gondar. He captured a large amount of weapons and military equipment from government troops. At the same time, during his offensive, he mobilized up to one hundred thousand of the population of Tigre and Wollo. Thus, the leadership of the Tigre People's Front achieved a significant change in the balance of forces in its favor.

At the same time, government troops in the area, having suffered 70 percent losses in personnel, military equipment and supplies, retreated south to Waldia. Now measures are being taken to supply the remaining military units with reinforcements and weapons. At the same time, emergency measures are being taken to organize the defense of this area. The new Chief of the General Staff and his main forces are in the 3rd Army and, together with the officers of our Chief Military Advisor, are solving this problem.

During the report, I tried to reveal to the president the strategic significance of the line now occupied here by government troops for the fate of the country as a whole. He also painted a picture of possible options for the rebels’ actions and, accordingly, what measures should be taken to fend off these attacks by government troops.

He emphasized that in the event of another such defeat of the troops of the 3rd Army, the road to Addis Ababa with all the ensuing consequences would be open. In addition, the enemy can block the road from the country's main seaport of Assab to Addis Ababa and freely enter the areas of this port. And in the port storage facilities there is a huge amount of ammunition, weapons, military equipment, trucks, food and other material resources.

In this regard, Mengistu recommended urgently, in addition to what had already been deployed, to send several combat formations to the combat area of ​​the 3rd Army, including from the 1st Army, located on the border of Somalia. At the same time, organize the mobilization of resources in the combat area of ​​the 3rd Army, as well as in the operational boundaries of the 1st Army to replenish its strength in connection with the dispatch of significant forces to Tigray. In addition, he recommended that the state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs urgently organize the liquidation of all pockets of opposition organized in the center and in the rear of the 3rd Army. At the same time, he strengthened the thesis that these bodies are loyal to the president and are obliged to quickly and clearly carry out his orders. He also said that in Addis Ababa and adjacent provinces it is necessary to immediately create strong maneuverable reserves on the basis of military schools and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, calling for the defense of the Fatherland and the creation of people's militias.

As for the security of the Armed Forces of Ethiopia, I said, as if casually, in one phrase: “The troops, all the army and central warehouses of the country are overflowing with weapons, military equipment, ammunition and other property, so this issue should in no case be a concern for the President of Ethiopia concern and even more so fear, as the acting Minister of Defense can confirm.”

All recommendations were accepted with gratitude. At the same time, we agreed with Mengistu that the Soviet military advisers, literally now, together with the General Staff officers remaining in Addis Ababa, would prepare telegrams and directives and immediately go to those bodies and organizations on which the direct execution of the president’s orders would depend.

However, before saying goodbye to Mengistu, I tried to carefully, in a delicate manner, express to him one more important thought, in my opinion. I believed that in these conditions it was necessary to turn to the people for help and support. However, if Mengistu does this today, not only will there be no support, but there may be a backlash. Therefore, I said: “In conditions when the fate of the country is being decided, it is necessary for the people of Ethiopia to take an active part in this. Therefore, it would be nice if the most powerful and authoritative public organization appealed to the people and the president of the country with an appeal to mobilize all forces to save the Fatherland. At the same time, oblige all government agencies to provide all possible support to this appeal, and mobilize all media to bring this historical document to the people.”

At first I thought that Mengistu did not accept this proposal. Usually, when he didn’t accept offers, he simply let them pass silently, without comment. However, when someone stepped on his “sore spot” with his proposal, as was the case with the idea of ​​​​organizing negotiations on equal terms with the Eritrean separatists, he exploded: “You understand - these are bandits! How do you even negotiate with them?!” However, in this case, he not only calmly accepted my advice, but also perked up, agreeing that this would be an important measure.

Mengistu also eagerly accepted our proposal to create the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. I told him how it was done in Afghanistan. He emphasized that it would be advisable for our Chief Military Advisor or his chief of staff to be present at all meetings of Headquarters. This could ensure efficiency in resolving many issues. At the same time, Mengistu asked not to reduce the number of military advisers.

When saying goodbye, I told the President of Ethiopia that the Soviet Union was and remains a faithful and sincere friend of the Ethiopian revolution, the people of Ethiopia, is deeply interested in normalizing the military-political situation in the country and will fully support the peace initiatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia aimed at unblocking the Eritrean and Tigrean problems through political means.

Flying from this country to my home in Moscow, I, like my colleagues, took with me anxious feelings about the future fate of this people, although all our proposals were not accepted formally and were translated into practical solutions. For example, a directive was signed on the creation of a technical support service for the Armed Forces, which determined the structure of this service, functions, tasks and regulations. In particular, special attention was paid to the maintenance of armored vehicles and vehicles. Previously, a soldier would drive a tank or car until it stalled. As soon as it stalls, he throws it away and demands that they give him a new one. Now this soldier, together with repairmen, will carry out preventive maintenance so that the car does not stall.

It was taken into account that it was necessary to immediately release ahead of schedule a group of military pilots who were trained in the Soviet Union. Currently, there are only 65 crews for 126 combat aircraft and helicopters (many pilots have been arrested on suspicion).

Other logistical requests were also taken into account. Of course, we need help. But the appetite was already radically (60-70 percent) moderated.

However, all this, in our opinion, was not the most important thing. The main thing is that bold political steps are needed to really resolve the problems of northern Ethiopia peacefully (Eritrea and Tigray). But can Mengistu decide to do this? Will he have enough courage and wisdom to take the necessary steps for the well-being of the people (even if this infringes on personal prestige)? Will he continue to act as agreed?

The results of the visit to Ethiopia by the delegation of the USSR Ministry of Defense were officially reported in a letter by the Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov, to the CPSU Central Committee on September 1, 1989. But for us, that is, for me and the entire military delegation, the issue was not closed. We were obliged, while solving our main tasks in terms of functional responsibilities, to simultaneously monitor (according to the plan) what and how was being done in Ethiopia (as in other similar countries). In particular, the personnel issue regarding our advisory apparatus was far from being resolved simply. On the one hand, the vast majority of the officers of the advisory apparatus, starting with the Chief Military Advisor, had to be replaced, since they worked together and for a long time with those who were shot. Simply from a purely moral standpoint, it was undesirable to leave them further in this country. At the same time, the extremely difficult military-political situation not only did not allow most of the advisers to be replaced, but even to be touched at all.

And yet we began to carry out replacements. Among the first was the Chief Military Advisor, General Demin. And because a new chief of the General Staff of the Ethiopian army had already been appointed, and because the appointment of a new defense minister was expected, and because the general’s health, of course, did not allow him to work in this climatically difficult country.

The country finally got rid of the usurper

But only about three months passed after our return, when suddenly a sensation - Mengistu left Ethiopia and flew on his plane to one of the African countries. Of course, he could not go to Somalia or Sudan for political reasons. It is unlikely that he would fly to Saudi Arabia, North or South Yemen (the latter two states were also uneasy, and Saudi Arabia sympathized with the Eritreans). Therefore, Kenya was the only neighbor left. Or it was any other country on the African continent up to and including Zaire. But television only showed the moment Mengistu boarded the plane and his departure.

Now it didn't matter at all. It is important that the main thing has happened - the one who maintained tension in the country, distanced himself from his position and voluntarily left the state where he was actually a dictator. Thus, all the shackles that held back the peaceful resolution of problems in Ethiopia and the end of the civil war were removed.

Mengistu's action was assessed differently. Some said he was running away from inevitable retribution for the damage he had caused in recent years. Others said he had no other choice. I believe that, without discarding the first two versions (they were quite probable to a certain extent), it is advisable to look at this step from the standpoint of the interests of the people and the state. Of course, who wants to die ingloriously?! Especially if he has just turned forty. No one. And even more so in Mengistu’s situation. But not everyone will decide to take such a step - leaving the throne in order to stabilize the situation in the country. At the same time, the resignation from the post of head of state was not carried out in conditions of chaos and anarchy, as, for example, Kerensky or Yeltsin did in their time. Mengistu left his post in an environment of strong power and a clearly organized and managed state system. To me, his step reminds me a little of Najibullah’s attempt in Afghanistan, where only the betrayal of Foreign Minister Vakil disrupted Najibullah’s flight to India.

Mengistu is a realist and pragmatic politician. He was firmly convinced that he could not come to an agreement with the separatists, and there was only one reason - they did not fulfill his conditions. At the same time, the people were tired of the war and were ready to do anything if only peace would come. And the Soviet Union in these conditions supported the sentiments of the people. Therefore, based on all the circumstances, Mengistu decides to completely resign as head of state. Was this the right step? Without a doubt. But given the morals and customs of Africa, after leaving the highest post, Mengistu could not remain in his native Ethiopia. And he leaves his homeland - maybe until better times for him, or maybe for good.

But, probably, descendants will remember for a long time that in the fall of 1993, Boris Yeltsin, dismissed from the post of president by the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, did not leave his post. Instead, he shot the popularly elected Supreme Council and thousands of unarmed people from tanks. Personal power turned out to be more valuable than human destinies and the peace of the entire country.

And the fact that in December 1999 Yeltsin transferred power to Putin is by no means a wise, much less a democratic step, but fear. Fear of the outcome that was already hanging over him.

These are the parallels that suggest themselves.

Well, the head of Ethiopia, Mengistu, made the decision to leave himself. Of course, we cannot exclude the influence of all accompanying circumstances on his decision, including, perhaps, our military delegation playing a certain role.

In any case, a wise step was taken - primarily in the name of the people.

The current version of the page has not yet been verified

The current version of the page has not yet been verified by experienced participants and may differ significantly from the version verified on October 6, 2018; checks are required.

Ethiopian Armed Forces- military organization of the Republic of Ethiopia, designed to protect the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of the state. Consist of ground forces and air forces.

In the middle of the 19th century, as a result of feudal fragmentation and internecine clashes, the power of the Emperor of Ethiopia became nominal, and a real threat arose of the country becoming a colony of European states.

In 1867, British troops invaded Ethiopia; during the fighting against the British in 1868, the Ethiopian army was defeated in the Battle of Magdala, but the British were unable to gain a foothold in the country. However, when leaving, the British left part of the weapons to one of the contenders for the throne - Kase, the ruler of the Principality of Tigre, who in July 1871 defeated his rival at the Battle of Adua and on January 21, 1872 - was crowned under the name of Emperor John (Yohannis) IV. However, in subsequent years, the rulers of the principalities of Shoa and Gojam bore the title of Negus and had their own armies.

In the 1870s and 1880s, Ethiopia fought wars with Egypt and the Mahdist Sudan (which were facilitated by European advisers to the Egyptian government), but by the early 1880s it faced an increasing threat from European powers carrying out the colonial division of Africa: already in In 1882, Italian troops captured the port of Assab.

In 1884, the Ethiopian Emperor Yohannis IV, the British Rear Admiral Hewitt and the representative of Egypt signed a treaty, according to which the Emperor of Ethiopia committed himself to facilitate the withdrawal of the Egyptian Khedive’s troops from Kassala, Amediba, Sankhita besieged by the Mahdists through the territory of Ethiopia to the port of Massawa, receiving the right to freely import any goods into the territory of Ethiopia through this port, including weapons and ammunition.

In February 1885, the Italians captured Massawa, and then a number of points on the Red Sea coast between Massawa and Beilul. Representatives of Ethiopia demanded that the Italians stop further advances into northern Ethiopia, but the Italians ignored this demand.

In 1886, the Emperor of Abyssinia ordered the customs service to confiscate weapons from anyone who decided to enter the capital with weapons without permission (this allowed the number of guns to be slightly increased by the imperial troops).

In January 1887, in the battle of Dogali, the Ethiopians defeated an Italian detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel de Christoforis (4 companies of soldiers, a detachment of 50 native warriors and 2 mitrailleuses), as a result, the Italians were forced to retreat, withdraw their garrisons from the villages of Uya and Arafali and begin construction fortifications The Italian advance to the borders of Ethiopia was suspended until December 1887. In addition, the victory caused enthusiasm among the Ethiopian population.

At the same time, the country's leadership was concerned about the technical superiority of the troops of European states and made efforts to strengthen the army and acquire weapons.

On March 9, 1889, Ethiopian troops were defeated by the Mahdists, and Ethiopian Emperor Yohannis IV died in battle.

Subsequently, under the command of Emperor Menelik II, the Ethiopian army suppressed feudal separatism in Gojam, Amhara, Tigray and occupied Harar.

The creation of the first regular army units began during the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895-1896. by order of Emperor Menelik II.

Before the start of the war, the Ethiopian army received 30 thousand Berdan rifles, 5 million cartridges and 5 thousand sabers from the Russian Empire. In addition, a Red Cross volunteer detachment was formed on its own initiative and sent to Ethiopia.

At the end of January 1896, the Ethiopian army received 40 thousand rifles and several cannons from the Russian Empire.

In 1897, the first telephone line from Harar to Addis Ababa was built (this increased the speed of transmission of important messages, although many government officials still preferred to send written messages by couriers as they did not trust telephone communications).

By the beginning of 1898, the basis of the Ethiopian army was infantry, but in addition to infantry formations there were cavalry units on horses and camels, and the Woldi race had at its disposal 7-8 thousand infantrymen mounted on mules (moving on horseback, but fighting on foot). The army was armed with rifles of several different systems (the most common system was Gra-Kropachek and Henry-Martini repeating rifles, Italian Wetterli, Winchester, etc. rifles), smooth-bore guns and edged weapons; military leaders and nobles had a number of revolvers of various systems. The carryable ammunition of ordinary soldiers was 36 - 50 pieces. cartridges carried in a homemade belt bandoleer. The total number of artillery pieces was estimated at 70 - 100 pieces, while the basis of the artillery park was 70 pieces. captured Italian mountain guns.

In 1906, the European powers entered into an agreement according to which Ethiopia was prohibited from selling weapons in excess of 500 rifles per year, but even under these conditions, the emperor managed to continue rearmament of the army - rifles of various systems (French "gra" and "lebel", German “Mauser”, Austrian “Manlicher”, Italian “Dotto” and “Wetterli”...) were purchased in small quantities and quietly transported across the border. In 1912, the emperor managed to purchase several thousand captured three-line rifles from Japan and equip weapons workshops, cartridge and gunpowder factories in the capital.

In 1919, several Russian White emigrants (Colonel F.E. Konovalov and several other White Guard officers) entered service in the Ethiopian army.

In September 1928, an armed uprising by a group of conspirators took place in Addis Ababa, which was quickly suppressed by troops.

In 1929, a Belgian military mission (10 instructors) arrived in Ethiopia. They trained soldiers of the imperial guard and the regular army. In addition, several Ethiopian commanders were trained in France, at the military school of Saint-Cyr.

Also, in 1929, an air force was created: 2 French pilots were invited and 4 French-made Potez biplanes were purchased (in total, 15 aircraft of various types were purchased between 1929 and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935).

In August 1930, Ethiopia, Great Britain, France and Italy signed a new agreement regarding the supply of arms and ammunition to Ethiopia, according to which Great Britain, France and Italy recognized the right of the Ethiopian government to purchase arms and ammunition, but reserved the right to refuse transit of purchased Ethiopia will allow military cargo through its territory “if Ethiopia’s position poses a threat to peace and society.”

In 1933, Ethiopia managed to acquire a number of Belgian-made 7.92 mm Mauser rifles (carbines FN Model 24 and short rifles FN Model 30) .

In 1934, Ethiopia managed to acquire 3 thousand rifles, 59 machine guns and 48 thousand cartridges.

In January 1935, a Swedish military mission (5 officers) arrived in Ethiopia and a military school was created in Holeta with a six-month training period for cadets - in total, 138 people were trained there before the start of the war.

In addition, in 1935, at a time of complications in relations between Germany and Italy, Ethiopia managed to obtain a loan from Germany in the amount of 350 thousand Reichsmarks, for which 10 thousand 7.92-mm German Mauser rifles model 1933 were purchased. 10 million rounds of ammunition, several guns and a significant amount of military property and equipment. Another small batch of weapons was purchased from Japan, which sold Ethiopia a batch of “Berdanok” (trophies of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905).

With the exception of the Imperial Guard, only 50 thousand people (who had previously served in the Italian colonial forces) had military training. There was no centralized supply system (the militia had to come to recruiting stations with a supply of food and subsequently provide themselves with food), mules were used as transport.

After the outbreak of the war in December 1935, about 2 thousand African soldiers from the Italian colonial troops went over to the side of Ethiopia, some of them brought weapons with them. In addition, there were other sources of replenishment of weapons:

The war stimulated the development of the military art of the Ethiopian army: if at the beginning of the war the Ethiopians went on the attack screaming and howling, then by the beginning of 1936 silent attacks became increasingly widespread, and the camouflage skills of military personnel improved significantly.

During the fighting against Italian troops, the Ethiopian army suffered heavy losses; on May 5, 1936, Italian troops occupied the capital of the country, and later occupied the territory of Ethiopia, which on June 1, 1936 was included in the colony of “Italian East Africa”.

However, resistance did not stop. Separate units and detachments from the Ethiopian army continued to conduct military operations in the occupied territory of Ethiopia until April 1937.

Guerrilla warfare in the occupied territory of Ethiopia continued until 1941. In January 1941, British troops launched an offensive from Sudan and entered Ethiopia. Subsequently, with support from Ethiopian troops, they continued the offensive; on April 6, 1941, Ethiopian troops occupied Addis Ababa; by the end of 1941, Italian forces were expelled from the territory of Ethiopia (however, British troops remained in the country).

In the summer of 1948, the Ethiopian government entered into an agreement with Sweden to purchase 20 tankettes. Later, in 1953-1970. Ethiopia received military aid worth $140 million from the United States.

In the mid-1950s, the Ethiopian armed forces numbered about 20 thousand people and were recruited on a voluntary basis. The armed forces included:

On August 14, 1960, an armed clash took place on the border of Ethiopia and Somalia.

On December 13-17, 1960, a group of officers of the imperial guard attempted a coup d'etat (during the absence of Emperor Haile Selassie in the country, they declared Crown Prince Asf Wossen emperor and tried to seize power in the capital), but this coup attempt ended in failure, the forces of the conspirators were suppressed by the army divisions. The Provisional Military Administrative Council declared mobilization, and the National Revolutionary Operations Command was created in August 1977. The USSR and Cuba provided assistance to Ethiopia. Somali army units were driven out of Ethiopia and by March 15, 1978 the war ended; troops were withdrawn in 2009