Sophia's last failure: Golitsyn's Crimean campaigns.

In 1684, under the patronage of Pope Innocent XI, the Holy Roman Empire, the Venetian Republic and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth united into a single Holy League against the Ottoman Empire. The pretext for the anti-Ottoman coalition was the Balkan peoples who were under the protectorate of the Ottomans.

The idea of ​​liberating Christian peoples was only a pretext for an armed conflict, as a result of which the European powers hoped to divide the lands of the Danube principalities among themselves. But first it was necessary to divert the main forces of the Crimean state, which was on the side of the Porte. To do this, it was necessary to look for an ally in the north. And very soon he discovered himself in the person of the Moscow principality.

First Crimean campaign

By that time, Muscovy was inflamed with its own passions. The Sagittarius brought to power Sofya Alekseevna, an intelligent, powerful and ambitious princess, and with her her favorite, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, one of the most educated people of his time. In contrast to the boyar opposition, his views were too progressive for the Moscow principality. The prince strove for Europe. Therefore, as soon as the Kremlin heard about the creation of the Holy League, a Moscow embassy was immediately sent to the Pope, the fact of its creation testified to the desire of the ruler Sophia to join a new coalition against the Ottomans. However, the European states initially doubted the decision to accept Orthodox Muscovy into their Catholic union, and only two years later, when the need had matured to distract the main forces of the Crimean Khanate, did they deign to give it such a right.

On May 6, 1686, Muscovy signed the “Treatise on Eternal Peace” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This document obligated Moscow to involve the Cossacks of Left Bank Ukraine under the command of Hetman Ivan Samoilovich in military operations.

The hetman himself was against these actions, believing that a new war was actually breaking out “for no reason”, that peace with the Crimean Tatars was beneficial, and the Khanate “cannot be won or retained by any measures” and that an attack on Crimea would bring more harm than benefits. But the supporters of the war were determined, and no one listened to Samoilovich. He was ordered to prepare 50,000 Cossacks for war.

As historian Lev Gumilyov writes, “The West sought to attract the Russians to the war not so much with the Ottoman Empire, but with its ally the Crimean state, since the Austrians and Poles were more afraid not of the regular Ottoman army, but of the swift Crimean Tatar cavalry.”

Consequently, the Russians were assigned the role of distracting the Crimeans from the main theater of military operations. Of course, this was not what Prince Golitsyn wanted, but in order to maintain prestige, one had to agree to such conditions.

They began to prepare thoroughly for war. After all, this was the first campaign against the Crimean Khanate. For this occasion, an army of one hundred thousand was assembled, headed by the prince himself. He was not distinguished by his talents as a commander, and he did not have any special desires to fight, but ruler Sophia demanded this from him.

They set out on the campaign in May 1687. In the Poltava region, Hetman Samoilovich joined the prince.

By this time, Selim Giray Khan was on the Crimean throne. He was one of the outstanding Crimean rulers. Historians evaluate him as an intelligent, reasonable, democratic and humane person. Selim Giray was not power-hungry and more than once voluntarily tried to resign as khan. However, the Ottoman sultans, the Crimean nobility and the people called him to the Crimean throne four times.

This time, a war was being prepared with the Holy League and Selim Giray was to march at the head of his army against Austria. But as soon as the khan approached the Austrian lands, news came that an army of 100 thousand Russians and 50 thousand Cossacks under the command of boyar Vasily Golitsyn had approached the borders of the Crimean state with the goal of invading its borders.

Having hastily left Europe, Selim Giray arrived in Crimea and already on July 17, 1687, in the town of Kara-Yylga, he met with the Russian army.

Compared to the Russian army, the Crimean cavalry was small in number. But this circumstance did not bother the khan. He divided his army into three parts, led one himself, and entrusted the other two to his sons - Kalga Devlet Giray and nur-ed-din Azamat Giray.

The first and only battle lasted with intervals of several days. Thanks to the courage of Nur-ed-din, who threw his main forces into the center of the Russian army, the enemy’s ranks were upset. Crimean askers captured 30 cannons and captured about a thousand people. At the same time, the askers under the leadership of the khan blocked the Russians’ path to retreat. Two days later, Golitsyn decided to make peace with the Crimean Khan. Russian envoys were sent to the headquarters of the Crimean Khan. But the peace agreement was never concluded due to the fact that the prince ordered his troops to hastily leave the camp the night before the conclusion of a possible peace. The Russians broke out of encirclement with heavy losses. They retreated, pursued by the Crimean Tatar cavalry right up to the borders of the Hetmanate.

Prince Vasily Golitsyn placed all the blame for the failure of the unsuccessful campaign on Ivan Samoilovich. The prince openly accused the hetman of disrupting the campaign and that the steppe along which the Russian army was advancing was allegedly burned out by the Cossacks themselves on the orders of the hetman, who did not want war with the Crimean Tatars. Without any special proceedings, Samoilovich was deprived of the hetman's mace. Golitsyn, for “betraying” the Cossacks, was kindly treated by Princess Sophia, who encouraged him that on his next campaign he would be accompanied by the new hetman, “loyal” to the royal crown, Ivan Mazepa.

Prince Golitsyn tried to do everything to entrust the command of the second campaign to the Crimean Khanate to someone else. But he fails. Sophia wanted her favorite to take revenge in a new campaign, which should bring him victory. There was only one thing left - to take all possible measures to prevent a repeat defeat.

Second Crimean Campaign

On April 6, 1689, the prince, having waited out the thaw, headed to Ukraine with a new army. Here, on the Samara River, he was joined by the Cossacks, led by the new hetman Ivan Mazepa. A few days later, the Russian army invaded the Crimean state.

The first clash with the Crimean cavalry took place on May 14 on the approaches to Or-Kapy. Golitsyn gave the order to prepare for battle. The Crimeans attacked Sheremetev's regiment, which almost immediately fled. But after a short battle the Crimeans retreated. The Russians also retreated. They moved away from Or-Kapa and set up camp in the town of Black Valley.

And already on May 16, Selim Giray and his army went out to meet the enemy. The maneuverable Crimean cavalry surrounded the Russian army. Golitsyn was in no hurry to give the order to go on the offensive, despite the fact that the governors demanded this of him. He ordered not to budge and set up defense. The infantry and all the artillery armed with firearms formed a reliable defense in the field. However, when the order was given to fire muskets and cannons, it turned out that the Russian people, who were not trained in such weapons, put more of their own on the battlefield than the Crimean askers who were watching this fuss from the sidelines. Nur-ed-din Azamat Giray was the first to enter the battle. He attacked the Cossacks, led by Emelyan Ukraintsev, Moscow Secretary of State. The Muscovite, inexperienced in military affairs, was so shy that he could not withstand the onslaught of the Crimeans. As a result, the camp’s defenses were broken through and the Crimean Tatars took 30 cannons with them as a trophy. Voivode Sheremetev was also unlucky; he was attacked by another Crimean detachment, which managed to break through and capture a convoy with firearms. Having sowed panic in the ranks of the Russian army, the Crimean cavalry ended the battle and retreated along with the captured trophies.

The next day, Prince Golitsyn ordered to remove the camp, unite the regiments into one army and then go to the Or fortress. Before they had time to move, the Crimeans unexpectedly appeared again and walked around the entire army in a circle, struck fear into the Muscovites and disappeared again. The entire next day, the Russians did not meet a single Crimean Tatar on their way. This gave them a little courage. And on May 19, with varying degrees of success, they approached Or-Kapy and set up camp within a cannon shot of the city.

Hetman Ivan Mazepa wrote to Moscow about these same events a little later: “...On the 15th day of May, in those wild fields close to the Green Valley tract, the enemies of the Basurmans Khan of Crimea and Kalga and Nur-ed-Din Sultans also Shirin Bey with his Crimean and Belogortsky hordes , with the Circassian and Yaman-Sagaidak hordes with them, they crossed our path, from the second hour of the day the battle began and strongly attacked the troops of their royal majesty [Russian troops] and pressed until the evening, and the troops of their royal majesty ... bravely and courageously With them, in a strong fight and beating many of them and wounding them, they came to the Black Valley and spent the night here.” According to Mazepa's letter the next day, May 16, the Crimeans forced the Russian army into battle. Moreover, the Crimeans, according to the eyewitness hetman, made continuous attacks on the Muscovite camp and broke through carts in different places. By evening, the Crimean askers stopped the attack. On May 17, the Russians approached Kalanchak: “... and there the enemies, the Khan, the sultans, and all the hordes, stepped in front of and surrounded the carts, harrowed the distant troops of the great sovereigns in the campaign and throughout the whole day they carried out raids and attacks...”.

Golitsyn had long ago decided that at the slightest opportunity he would retreat. He absolutely did not want to engage in battle with the Crimeans. And he saw some kind of catch in the fact that they were so easily allowed to approach the fortress. However, in order not to lose face in front of his compatriots, he hastened to send envoys to the fortress with an ultimatum, knowing in advance that the khan would never agree to his conditions.

The ultimatum amused the Khan. In response, he said that he did not want other terms of peace besides those on which he had previously made peace with the Russian tsars. Prince Golitsyn did not like this answer, and, not considering it more possible to camp in the steppe, he thought about retreating, since the army would not have lasted long without food and water.

Meanwhile, the Russian commanders hoped to attack Or-Kapy at night. But in the evening, when everyone came to the prince’s camp tent for orders, they were very surprised to learn that they would have to return tomorrow. Golitsyn did not want to explain the reasons for such a strange decision. He again sent an ultimatum to the Khan, but this time only to stall for time. And the next morning, when the khan prepared an answer, he discovered that the Russian army, without waiting for the khan’s people, began to retreat.

Meanwhile, Golitsyn sent messengers to Moscow and to the Polish king with the message that he had defeated the Crimeans and pursued them to their borders. But in Moscow, thanks to Hetman Mazepa, they learned about the true state of affairs, and Vasily Golitsyn very soon went to Siberia. And the princess is in the Novodevichy Convent.

Gulnara Abdulaeva

Military campaigns of the Russian army under the command of V.V. Golitsyn against the Crimean Khanate as part of the Great Turkish War of 1683-1699.

Russia and the anti-Ottoman coalition

In the early 1680s, important changes took place in the system of international relations. A coalition of states emerged that opposed the Ottoman Empire. In 1683, near Vienna, the united troops inflicted a serious defeat on the Turks, but the latter put up strong resistance, not wanting to give up the positions they had conquered. The Polish-Lithuanian state, in which the processes of political decentralization intensified in the second half of the 17th century, became increasingly unable to conduct long-term military campaigns. Under these conditions, the Habsburgs - the main organizers of the coalition - began to seek the entry of the Russian state into it. Russian politicians used the current situation to achieve recognition by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the results of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667. Under pressure from the allies, she agreed to replace the truce agreement with Russia in 1686 with an agreement on “Eternal Peace” and a military alliance against the Ottoman Empire and Crimea. The issue of Kyiv, acquired by Russia for 146 thousand gold rubles, was also resolved. As a result, in 1686 the Russian state joined the Holy League.

When deciding on war, the Russians developed a program to strengthen Russia's position on the Black Sea coast. The conditions prepared in 1689 for future peace negotiations provided for the inclusion of Crimea, Azov, Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dnieper, and Ochakov into the Russian state. But it took the entire next 18th century to complete this program.

Crimean campaign of 1687

In fulfillment of their obligations to their allies, Russian troops twice, in 1687 and 1689, undertook large campaigns against the Crimea. The army was led by Princess Sophia’s closest ally V.V. Golitsyn. Very large military forces were mobilized for the campaigns - over 100 thousand people. 50 thousand Little Russian Cossacks of Hetman I.S. were also supposed to join the army. Samoilovich.

By early March 1687, troops were supposed to gather on the southern borders. On May 26, Golitsyn conducted a general review of the army, and at the beginning of June he met with Samoilovich’s detachment, after which the advance to the south continued. The Crimean Khan Selim Giray, realizing that he was inferior in numbers and weapons to the Russian army, ordered to burn out the steppe and poison or fill up the water sources. In conditions of lack of water, food, and fodder, Golitsyn was forced to decide to return to his borders. The retreat began at the end of June and ended in August. Throughout his time, the Tatars did not stop attacking Russian troops.

As a result, the Russian army did not reach Crimea, however, as a result of this campaign, the khan was unable to provide military assistance to Turkey, which was engaged in a war with Austria and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Crimean campaign of 1689

In 1689, the army under the command of Golitsyn made a second campaign against the Crimea. On May 20, the army reached Perekop, but the military leader did not dare to enter the Crimea, as he feared a lack of fresh water. Moscow clearly underestimated all the obstacles that a huge army would face in the dry, waterless steppe, and the difficulties associated with the assault on Perekop, the only narrow isthmus through which it was possible to get to the Crimea. This is the second time the army has been forced to return.

Results

The Crimean campaigns showed that Russia did not yet have sufficient forces to defeat a strong enemy. At the same time, the Crimean campaigns were the first purposeful action of Russia against the Crimean Khanate, which indicated a change in the balance of forces in this region. The campaigns also temporarily distracted the forces of the Tatars and Turks and contributed to the successes of the Allies in Europe. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command and forced it to abandon the attack on Poland and Hungary.

In the 17th century, the Crimean peninsula turned out to be one of the fragments of the old Mongol empire - the Golden Horde. Local khans staged bloody invasions of Moscow several times during the time of Ivan the Terrible. However, every year it became more and more difficult for them to resist Russia alone.

Therefore it became a vassal of Turkey. The Ottoman Empire at this time reached the peak of its development. It extended over the territory of three continents at once. War with this state was inevitable. The first rulers of the Romanov dynasty looked closely at Crimea.

Prerequisites for the hikes

In the middle of the 17th century, a struggle broke out between Russia and Poland for Left Bank Ukraine. The dispute over this important region escalated into a long war. Eventually a peace treaty was signed in 1686. According to it, Russia received vast territories together with Kiev. At the same time, the Romanovs agreed to join the so-called Holy League of European Powers against the Ottoman Empire.

It was created through the efforts of Pope Innocent XI. Most of it was made up of Catholic states. The Republic of Venice and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth joined the league. It was this alliance that Russia joined. Christian countries agreed to act together against the Muslim threat.

Russia in the Holy League

Thus, in 1683, the Great War began. The main fighting took place in Hungary and Austria without the participation of Russia. The Romanovs, for their part, began to develop a plan to attack the Crimean Khan, a vassal of the Sultan. The initiator of the campaign was Queen Sophia, who at that time was the de facto ruler of a huge country. The young princes Peter and Ivan were only formal figures who did not decide anything.

The Crimean campaigns began in 1687, when a hundred thousandth army under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn went south. He was the head and therefore was responsible for the foreign policy of the kingdom. Under his banners came not only Moscow regular regiments, but also free Cossacks from Zaporozhye and the Don. They were led by Ataman Ivan Samoilovich, with whom Russian troops united in June 1687 on the banks of the Samara River.

Great importance was attached to the campaign. Sophia wanted to consolidate her own sole power in the state with the help of military successes. The Crimean campaigns were to become one of the great achievements of her reign.

First trip

Russian troops first encountered the Tatars after crossing the Konka River (a tributary of the Dnieper). However, the opponents prepared for an attack from the north. The Tatars burned out the entire steppe in this region, which is why the horses of the Russian army simply had nothing to eat. Terrible conditions meant that in the first two days only 12 miles were left behind. So, the Crimean campaigns began with failure. The heat and dust led to Golitsyn convening a council, at which it was decided to return to his homeland.

To somehow explain his failure, the prince began to look for those responsible. At that moment, an anonymous denunciation against Samoilovich was delivered to him. The ataman was accused of being the one who set fire to the steppe and his Cossacks. Sophia became aware of the denunciation. Samoilovich found himself in disgrace and lost his mace, a symbol of his own power. A Cossack Council was convened, where they elected ataman. This figure was also supported by Vasily Golitsyn, under whose leadership the Crimean campaigns took place.

At the same time, military operations began on the right flank of the struggle between Turkey and Russia. The army under the leadership of General Grigory Kosagov successfully captured Ochakov, an important fortress on the Black Sea coast. The Turks began to worry. The reasons for the Crimean campaigns forced the queen to give an order to organize a new campaign.

Second trip

The second campaign began in February 1689. The date was not chosen by chance. Prince Golitsyn wanted to reach the peninsula by spring to avoid the summer heat and the Russian army included about 110 thousand people. Despite the plans, it moved rather slowly. The Tatar attacks were sporadic - there was no general battle.

On May 20, the Russians approached the strategically important fortress of Perekop, which stood on a narrow isthmus leading to the Crimea. A shaft was dug around it. Golitsyn did not dare to risk people and take Perekop by storm. But he explained his action by the fact that there were practically no drinking wells with fresh water in the fortress. After a bloody battle, the army could be left without a livelihood. Envoys were sent to the Crimean Khan. Negotiations dragged on. Meanwhile, the loss of horses began in the Russian army. It became clear that the Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689. will lead to nothing. Golitsyn decided to turn the army back a second time.

Thus ended the Crimean campaigns. Years of effort have not given Russia any tangible dividends. Her actions distracted Turkey, making it easier for the European allies to fight her on the Western Front.

Overthrow of Sophia

At this time in Moscow, Sophia found herself in a difficult situation. Her failures turned many boyars against her. She tried to pretend that everything was fine: she congratulated Golitsyn on his success. However, already in the summer there was a coup d'état. Supporters of young Peter overthrew the queen.

Sophia was tonsured a nun. Golitsyn ended up in exile thanks to the intercession of his cousin. Many supporters of the old government were executed. Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 led to Sophia being isolated.

Further Russian policy in the south

Later he also tried to fight with Turkey. His Azov campaigns led to tactical success. Russia has its first naval fleet. True, it was limited to the internal waters of the Sea of ​​​​Azov.

This forced Peter to pay attention to the Baltic, where Sweden ruled. Thus began the Great Northern War, which led to the construction of St. Petersburg and the transformation of Russia into an empire. At the same time, the Turks recaptured Azov. Russia returned to the southern shores only in the second half of the 18th century.

First Crimean campaign

The troops advanced from different regions were supposed to gather on the southern borders of the country by March 11, 1687, but due to delays, the gathering ended later than this date, in mid-May. The main part of the army gathered on the Merle River and set out on the campaign on May 18. On May 23, she turned towards Poltava, moving to join Samoilovich's Cossacks. By May 24, the hetman's army arrived at Poltava. As planned, it consisted of about 50 thousand people, of which approximately 10 thousand were specially recruited burghers and villagers. It was decided to send the Cossacks to the vanguard of the army. After waiting for all the troops to arrive, on May 26, Prince Golitsyn conducted a general review of his army, which showed that there were 90,610 people under his command, which is not much lower than the listed number of troops. On June 2, the troops of Golitsyn and Samoilovich met at the intersection of the Hotel and Orchik rivers and, having united, continued to advance, making small transitions from one river to another. By June 22, the troops reached the Konskie Vody River. After crossing the Samarka River, it became difficult to supply the huge army - the temperature rose, wide rivers were replaced by low-water streams, forests - by small groves, but the troops continued to move. The Crimean Khan Selim I Giray was at that time on Molochny Vody; no Tatar troops were encountered on the way. Realizing that his troops were inferior to the Russian army in numbers, weapons and training, he ordered all uluses to retreat deep into the Khanate, poison or fill up water sources and burn out the steppe south of Konskie Vody. Having learned about the fire in the steppe and the devastation of lands right up to Perekop, Prince Golitsyn decided not to change the plan and continued the campaign, by June 27 reaching the Karachekrak River, where a military council was held. Despite sufficient supplies of provisions, the advance through the scorched and devastated territory had a negative impact on the condition of the army, the horses became weak, providing the troops with water, firewood and horse feed turned out to be extremely difficult, as a result of which the council decided to return the army to the Russian borders. The retreat began on June 28, the troops went northwest to the Dnieper, where the Russian command expected to find surviving sources of water and grass for horses.

To fight the Tatars, approx. 20 thousand Samoilovich Cossacks and approx. 8 thousand people governor L.R. Neplyuev, who were supposed to be united with almost 6 thousand people. General G.I. Kosagov. Messengers were sent to Moscow with the news of the end of the campaign. However, when the army retreated, it turned out that the supplies of water and grass along the retreat route were insufficient, the loss of livestock increased, and cases of illness and heat strokes became more frequent in the army. The army was able to replenish supplies and rest only on the banks of Samarka. During the retreat, rumors arose in the Russian camp about Hetman Samoilovich's involvement in the arson of the steppe, and a denunciation was sent to Moscow against him.

When the army reached Aurelie, the head of the Streletsky Prikaz, F.L. Shaklovity, arrived from Moscow and expressed support for Golitsyn’s decision to retreat. The Russian government, realizing the extreme danger of continuing the campaign in such conditions and wishing to preserve the reputation of the command of the retreating army, chose to declare the Crimean campaign a success. The Tsar's letters stated that the Crimean Khanate had been sufficiently demonstrated to have enormous military strength, which should have warned it against future attacks on Russian lands. Subsequently, in order to avoid discontent on the part of the military people, they were given cash benefits and other awards.

While Golitsyn's army was crossing to the right bank of the Dnieper, the Crimean Khan decided to take advantage of the division of the Russian army and at night attacked Kosagov's troops left on the left bank of the river. The Tatars captured part of the convoy and stole herds of horses, but their attack on the army camp was repulsed. Moreover, Neplyuev’s horse and foot soldiers arrived to help Kosagov, quickly putting the Tatars to flight and recapturing some of the captured property from them. The Tatar cavalry appeared again the next day, but did not dare to attack the Russian camp again, limiting themselves to attacks on foragers and the theft of several small herds of horses.

In response to the denunciation of Hetman Samoilovich, on August 1, a messenger arrived from Moscow with a royal decree, which ordered the election of a new hetman who would be more suitable for the Little Russian army. Instead of Samoilovich, I. S. Mazepa became hetman, but units loyal to Samoilovich opposed this and started a riot, which stopped after Neplyuev’s units arrived in the Cossack camp.

On August 13, Golitsyn’s army reached the bank of the Merla River, and on August 24 received a royal decree to stop the campaign and disband the army participating in it. At the end of the campaign, troops of 5 and 7 thousand people were left on the southern borders of the state “to protect the Great Russian and Little Russian cities.” For the next campaign in Crimea, it was decided to build fortifications on the Samarka River, for which several regiments were left there.

In the Crimean Tatar version of events as presented by historian Halim Geray, a representative of the ruling Geray dynasty, Selim Geray gave the order to burn all the grass, straw and grain that was in the way of the Russians. On July 17, the Khan’s army met the Russians near the Kara-Yylga area. The exact number of his army is unknown, but it was smaller than Golitsyn’s army. The Khan divided his army into three parts: one he led himself, and the other two were led by his sons - Kalgai Devlet Giray and Nureddin Azamat Giray. A battle began that lasted 2 days and ended with the victory of the Crimeans. 30 guns and about a thousand prisoners were captured. The Russian-Cossack army retreated and built fortifications near the town of Kuyash behind the Or fortress. The Khan's army also built fortifications along the ditch facing the Russians, preparing for the decisive battle. The Russian-Cossack army, suffering from thirst, was unable to continue the battle, and peace negotiations began. By morning, the Crimeans discovered that the army of Russians and Cossacks had fled and they began pursuit. Near the Donuzly-Oba area, the Russian-Cossack troops were overtaken by the Crimeans and suffered losses. The main reason for the defeat was the exhaustion of the Russian troops due to the fall of the steppe, but despite this, the goal of the campaign was fulfilled, namely: to distract the Crimean Khanate from the war with the Holy League. The retreat of the Russian army, which began in June, before the clashes he described, is not reported in Geray’s work; attention is focused on the actions of Khan Selim Geray, other Gerays and their troops, but it is noted that the Russians did not have “provisions, fodder and water.”

Contrary to this version, as noted by both pre-revolutionary and modern researchers, before the decision to retreat, Russian troops did not meet a single Tatar on their way; Advance across the scorched steppe stopped only due to fires spreading across it and a lack of provisions, long before any clashes with the enemy. The clashes themselves were in the nature of minor skirmishes, and the Khan’s attack on Russian troops in mid-July was quickly repulsed by them and led the Tatars to flee, although they managed to capture part of the convoy.

In the report of the book. V.V. Golitsyn’s campaign is presented as successful, the absence of any significant battles and the Tatars’ avoidance of battle, characteristic of both Crimean campaigns, is noted: “... the khan and the Tatars attacked... the military people of the offensive came into fear and horror, and put aside their usual insolence , he himself did not appear anywhere and his Tatar yurts... did not appear anywhere and did not give battle.” According to Golitsyn, the Khan’s army, avoiding a collision, went beyond Perekop, the Russian troops vainly hoped to meet the enemy, after which, exhausted by the heat, dust, fires, depletion of supplies and feed for horses, they decided to leave the steppe.

On the right flank, the Turkish vassal, the Budjak Horde, was defeated. General Grigory Kosagov took the Ochakov fortress and some other fortresses and went to the Black Sea, where he began building fortresses. Western European newspapers wrote enthusiastically about Kosagov's successes, and the Turks, fearing an attack by Constantinople, gathered armies and navies towards him.

Second Crimean Campaign

Results

The Crimean campaigns were of great international importance, were able to temporarily divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars and greatly contributed to the military successes of Russia's European allies in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, the end of Turkish expansion in Europe, as well as the collapse of the alliance between the Crimean Khanate concluded in 1683 in Adrianople , France and Imre Tekeli, who became a Turkish citizen. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command, forcing it to abandon the offensive on Poland and Hungary and transfer significant forces to the east, which facilitated the League's fight against the Turks. However, despite the significant superiority in strength, the campaign of the huge army ended in its exodus; no significant clashes occurred between the warring parties, and the Crimean Khanate was not defeated. As a result, the actions of the Russian army were criticized by historians and some contemporaries. So, in 1701, the famous Russian publicist I. T. Pososhkov, who had no personal connection to both campaigns and relied on what he heard about them, accused the troops of being “fearful,” considering it dishonorable that a huge army did not provide assistance to those defeated by the Tatar cavalry regiment of Duma clerk E.I. Ukraintsev.

Discussing the reasons for the failure of the campaign, historian A. G. Brickner, noted that during the campaign, clashes between both sides were in the nature of only minor skirmishes, without reaching a real battle, and the main opponents of the Russian army were not so much the Tatars themselves, whose number was small , how hot the steppe climate is and the problems of providing for a huge army in the steppe, aggravated by diseases that engulfed the army, a steppe fire that left horses without food, and the indecisiveness of the command.

Prince Golitsyn himself reported on the catastrophic “lack of water and lack of food” during the campaign across the hot steppe, saying that “the horses died under the outfit, the people became weak,” there were no sources of food for the horses, and the water sources were poisoned, while the khan’s troops they set Perekop Posads and the settlements surrounding them on fire and never showed up for the decisive battle. In this situation, although the army was ready to “serve and shed their blood,” they considered it wise to retreat rather than continue their actions. The Tatar Murza, who came to the Russian camp several times with an offer of peace, was refused on the grounds “that that peace would be disgusting to the Polish Union.”

As a result, Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved. According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the government of Princess Sofia Alekseevna. Sophia herself wrote to Golitsyn in 1689, believing the reports of his successes to be true:

My light, Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And again, hello, having defeated the Hagarians by the grace of God and the Most Holy Theotokos and with your reason and happiness! May God grant you to continue to defeat your enemies!

There is an opinion that the failure of the Crimean campaigns is greatly exaggerated after Peter I lost half of his entire army in the second Azov campaign, although he only received access to the inland Sea of ​​Azov. As N.I. Pavlenko noted, the Crimean campaigns were not useless, since their main goals - fulfilling obligations to the League and pinning down enemy forces - were achieved, which was of great diplomatic importance in Russia's relations with the anti-Ottoman coalition.


(map from the article ""
"Sytin's Military Encyclopedia")

Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the larger European Great Turkish War.

First Crimean campaign[ | ]

The troops advanced from different regions were supposed to gather on the southern borders of the country by March 11, 1687, but due to delays, the gathering ended later than this date, in mid-May. The main part of the army gathered on the Merle River and set out on the campaign on May 18. On May 23, she turned towards Poltava, moving to join Samoilovich's Cossacks. By May 24, the hetman's army arrived at Poltava. As planned, it consisted of about 50 thousand people, of which approximately 10 thousand were specially recruited burghers and villagers. It was decided to send the Cossacks to the vanguard of the army. After waiting for all the troops to arrive, on May 26, Prince Golitsyn conducted a general review of his army, which showed that there were 90,610 people under his command, which is not much lower than the listed number of troops. On June 2, the troops of Golitsyn and Samoilovich met at the intersection of the Hotel and Orchik rivers and, having united, continued to advance, making small transitions from one river to another. By June 22, the troops reached the Konskie Vody River. After crossing the Samarka River, it became difficult to supply the huge army - the temperature rose, wide rivers were replaced by low-water streams, forests - by small groves, but the troops continued to move. The Crimean Khan Selim I Giray was at that time on Molochny Vody; no Tatar troops were encountered on the way. Realizing that his troops were inferior to the Russian army in numbers, weapons and training, he ordered all uluses to retreat deep into the Khanate, poison or fill up water sources and burn out the steppe south of Konskie Vody. Having learned about the fire in the steppe and the devastation of lands right up to Perekop, Prince Golitsyn decided not to change the plan and continued the campaign, by June 27 reaching the Karachekrak River, where a military council was held. Despite sufficient supplies of provisions, the advance through the scorched and devastated territory had a negative impact on the condition of the army, the horses became weak, providing the troops with water, firewood and horse feed turned out to be extremely difficult, as a result of which the council decided to return the army to the Russian borders. The retreat began on June 28, the troops went northwest to the Dnieper, where the Russian command expected to find surviving sources of water and grass for horses.

To fight the Tatars, approx. 20 thousand Samoilovich Cossacks and approx. 8 thousand people governor L.R. Neplyuev, who were supposed to be united with almost 6 thousand people. General G.I. Kosagov. Messengers were sent to Moscow with the news of the end of the campaign. However, when the army retreated, it turned out that the supplies of water and grass along the retreat route were insufficient, the loss of livestock increased, and cases of illness and heat strokes became more frequent in the army. The army was able to replenish supplies and rest only on the banks of Samarka. During the retreat, rumors arose in the Russian camp about Hetman Samoilovich's involvement in the arson of the steppe, and a denunciation was sent to Moscow against him.

When the army reached Aurelie, the head of the Streletsky Prikaz, F.L. Shaklovity, arrived from Moscow and expressed support for Golitsyn’s decision to retreat. The Russian government, realizing the extreme danger of continuing the campaign in such conditions and wishing to preserve the reputation of the command of the retreating army, chose to declare the Crimean campaign a success. The Tsar's letters stated that the Crimean Khanate had been sufficiently demonstrated to have enormous military strength, which should have warned it against future attacks on Russian lands. Subsequently, in order to avoid discontent on the part of the military people, they were given cash benefits and other awards.

While Golitsyn's army was crossing to the right bank of the Dnieper, the Crimean Khan decided to take advantage of the division of the Russian army and at night attacked Kosagov's troops left on the left bank of the river. The Tatars captured part of the convoy and stole herds of horses, but their attack on the army camp was repulsed. Moreover, Neplyuev’s horse and foot soldiers arrived to help Kosagov, quickly putting the Tatars to flight and recapturing some of the captured property from them. The Tatar cavalry appeared again the next day, but did not dare to attack the Russian camp again, limiting themselves to attacks on foragers and the theft of several small herds of horses.

In response to the denunciation of Hetman Samoilovich, on August 1, a messenger arrived from Moscow with a royal decree, which ordered the election of a new hetman who would be more suitable for the Little Russian army. Instead of Samoilovich, I. S. Mazepa became hetman, but units loyal to Samoilovich opposed this and started a riot, which stopped after Neplyuev’s units arrived in the Cossack camp.

On August 13, Golitsyn’s army reached the bank of the Merla River, and on August 24 received a royal decree to stop the campaign and disband the army participating in it. At the end of the campaign, troops of 5 and 7 thousand people were left on the southern borders of the state “to protect the Great Russian and Little Russian cities.” For the next campaign in Crimea, it was decided to build fortifications on the Samarka River, for which several regiments were left there.

In the Crimean Tatar version of events as presented by historian Halim Geray, a representative of the ruling Geray dynasty, Selim Geray gave the order to burn all the grass, straw and grain that was in the way of the Russians. On July 17, the Khan’s army met the Russians near the Kara-Yylga area. The exact number of his army is unknown, but it was smaller than Golitsyn’s army. The Khan divided his army into three parts: one he led himself, and the other two were led by his sons - Kalgai Devlet Giray and Nureddin Azamat Giray. A battle began that lasted 2 days and ended with the victory of the Crimeans. 30 guns and about a thousand prisoners were captured. The Russian-Cossack army retreated and built fortifications near the town of Kuyash behind the Or fortress. The Khan's army also built fortifications along the ditch facing the Russians, preparing for the decisive battle. The Russian-Cossack army, suffering from thirst, was unable to continue the battle, and peace negotiations began. By morning, the Crimeans discovered that the army of Russians and Cossacks had fled and they began pursuit. Near the Donuzly-Oba area, the Russian-Cossack troops were overtaken by the Crimeans and suffered losses. The main reason for the defeat was the exhaustion of the Russian troops due to the fall of the steppe, but despite this, the goal of the campaign was fulfilled, namely: to distract the Crimean Khanate from the war with the Holy League. The retreat of the Russian army, which began in June, before the clashes he described, is not reported in Geray’s work; attention is focused on the actions of Khan Selim Geray, other Gerays and their troops, but it is noted that the Russians did not have “provisions, fodder and water.”

Contrary to this version, as noted by both pre-revolutionary and modern researchers, before the decision to retreat, Russian troops did not meet a single Tatar on their way; Advance across the scorched steppe stopped only due to fires spreading across it and a lack of provisions, long before any clashes with the enemy. The clashes themselves were in the nature of minor skirmishes, and the Khan’s attack on Russian troops in mid-July was quickly repulsed by them and led the Tatars to flee, although they managed to capture part of the convoy.

In the report of the book. V.V. Golitsyn’s campaign is presented as successful, the absence of any significant battles and the Tatars’ avoidance of battle, characteristic of both Crimean campaigns, is noted: “... the khan and the Tatars attacked... the military people of the offensive came into fear and horror, and put aside their usual insolence , he himself did not appear anywhere and his Tatar yurts... did not appear anywhere and did not give battle.” According to Golitsyn, the Khan’s army, avoiding a collision, went beyond Perekop, the Russian troops vainly hoped to meet the enemy, after which, exhausted by the heat, dust, fires, depletion of supplies and feed for horses, they decided to leave the steppe.

The unsuccessful campaign of V.V. Golitsyn against the Crimean Khanate. The artist depicts the return of the army along the bank of the Samara River. Miniature from the 1st half manuscript. 18th century "History of Peter I", op. P. Krekshina. Collection of A. Baryatinsky. State Historical Museum.

On the right flank, the Turkish vassal, the Budjak Horde, was defeated. General Grigory Kosagov took the Ochakov fortress and some other fortresses and went to the Black Sea, where he began building fortresses. Western European newspapers wrote enthusiastically about Kosagov's successes, and the Turks, fearing an attack by Constantinople, gathered armies and navies towards him.

Second Crimean Campaign[ | ]

Results [ | ]

The Crimean campaigns were of great international importance, were able to temporarily divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars and greatly contributed to the military successes of Russia's European allies in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, the end of Turkish expansion in Europe, as well as the collapse of the alliance between the Crimean Khanate concluded in 1683 in Adrianople , France and Imre Tekeli, who became a Turkish citizen. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command, forcing it to abandon the offensive on Poland and Hungary and transfer significant forces to the east, which facilitated the League's fight against the Turks. However, despite the significant superiority in strength, the campaign of the huge army ended in its exodus; no significant clashes occurred between the warring parties, and the Crimean Khanate was not defeated. As a result, the actions of the Russian army were criticized by historians and some contemporaries. So, in 1701, the famous Russian publicist I. T. Pososhkov, who had no personal connection to both campaigns and relied on what he heard about them, accused the troops of being “fearful,” considering it dishonorable that a huge army did not provide assistance to those defeated by the Tatar cavalry regiment of Duma clerk E.I. Ukraintsev.

Discussing the reasons for the failure of the campaign, historian A. G. Brickner, noted that during the campaign, clashes between both sides were in the nature of only minor skirmishes, without reaching a real battle, and the main opponents of the Russian army were not so much the Tatars themselves, whose number was small , how hot the steppe climate is and the problems of providing for a huge army in the steppe, aggravated by diseases that engulfed the army, a steppe fire that left horses without food, and the indecisiveness of the command.

Prince Golitsyn himself reported on the catastrophic “lack of water and lack of food” during the campaign across the hot steppe, saying that “the horses died under the outfit, the people became weak,” there were no sources of food for the horses, and the water sources were poisoned, while the khan’s troops they set Perekop Posads and the settlements surrounding them on fire and never showed up for the decisive battle. In this situation, although the army was ready to “serve and shed their blood,” they considered it wise to retreat rather than continue their actions. The Tatar Murza, who came to the Russian camp several times with an offer of peace, was refused on the grounds “that that peace would be disgusting to the Polish Union.”

As a result, Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved. According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the princess’s government