Lavrenty Beria. Lavrentiy Beria - the almighty liberator of convicts from the Solovetsky camps

Chapter 23
WHY WAS LAVRENTY BERIA KILLED?

Beria was also killed twice, and if people come out in defense of Stalin more and more often, then for some reason everyone is unanimous about Beria, except Yuri Mukhin. Even Vadim Kozhinov, who has a good attitude towards Stalin, writes: “Much of what is known about Beria does not give reason to see him as a “positive” figure...”, but at the same time he does not cite any of this “much”. And, surprisingly, not only him, no one brings any real dirt on this person. All the “dogs” that are pinned on him boil down to either the fact that he is responsible for mass repressions, or to the fact that he “wanted” something. I wanted to kill the Politburo, I wanted to stage a coup, to seize power, but they didn’t allow it. At the same time, no evidence of this “wish” is given either, just some kind of telepathy... Even in 1937, under all the “wants” they put at least some, at least fictitious facts - but here there is nothing, just spells! Was this terrible man really so pure in life that not a single line of real incriminating evidence was found on him? Reading what he is accused of is such nonsense that your ears will wither! We'll get to formal accusations later, but for now we'll give the floor to the writers:

“Khrushchev says that Beria twice, first in the forties and then in the fifties (after Stalin’s death), “made maneuvers” to become the head of the party and the state. If he abandoned this intention, then purely psychological considerations probably played a role: after twenty years of tyranny in the USSR by the Georgian Stalin, another Georgian, in order to take his post, had to be Stalin twice, and even Beria had to give up before such a prospect. .. Another reason was no less compelling: the professional security officer Beria, in the eyes of the people, was not Stalin’s servant, but a sovereign accomplice, sometimes even the inspirer of Stalin’s crimes.”

The funny thing is that a person who takes up writing books about that time does not understand the most basic thing: in 1953, in the eyes of the people about whom he talks so weightily, neither “Stalin’s tyranny” nor “Stalin’s crimes” existed - they appeared only after Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress. But it's not that. Among all this rhetoric, there is a real thing: even according to Khrushchev himself, Beria “refused” the intention to become the head of the party and the state, that is, in 1953 he did not have these intentions. What then is he accused of?

“Not out of love for the people, not out of hatred for Stalin and not out of repentance for the crimes committed, but based on political calculations and personal interests in the new conditions, Beria decided to lead the movement for reforms. Staring at his dying teacher, Beria, perhaps, also did not intend to rule differently than Stalin, but the silent but menacing joy of the people at the death of the tyrant advised him: he must take advantage of the rare case in history when the executioner himself can lead the people's movement against the inheritance greatest of tyrannies. What Khrushchev did with Stalin three years later at the 20th Congress, Beria wanted to start right away. He started this by releasing the “sabotage doctors” on April 4, 1953 and himself accusing the Stalin-Beriev police system of falsification and fabrication of cases and the Inquisition.”

I don’t know what Beria “wanted” and what he “didn’t want,” but I, piercing my eyes into the tattered pages of Avtorkhanov’s “samizdat”, did not find anything in them except that Beria was “for reforms.” Moreover: as soon as he became minister for the second time, he, like the first time, immediately stopped the wave of repression. What then is he accused of?

Yuri Zhukov, historian:

“But for now the worst thing lay elsewhere. The fact is that Beria was in no hurry to use the weapons that he received thanks to the uncontrolled leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He didn't even hint who might be the next victim. I waited. Moreover, he suddenly acted as if he wanted to refute the idea of ​​himself as a vindictive and ruthless rival in the struggle for power.”

That is, having received control of the combined MGB - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Beria did not arrest anyone, did not even hint that he wanted to arrest someone, and even did something that raised doubts - does he even want to fight for power? What then is he accused of?

What happened at these training grounds? One was testing a new air defense missile, the other was preparing to test a hydrogen bomb. Considering that the United States, one after another, adopted more and more new plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR, and now not only a “retaliatory strike”, but also preventive ones, he considered that this was more important than sitting in Moscow and dividing up chairs and spheres of influence . However, he did all this, of course, not just like that and not for the benefit of the state, but solely to acquire sole leadership.

It was precisely this key to resolving all international issues that should have made Molotov, an outspoken supporter of a hard line, an unconditional ally of Beria. Transform Bulganin, who was becoming the most formidable military minister of defense in the world, into an obedient satellite of Lavrentiy Pavlovich. To attract to your side two of the five members of the narrow leadership who did not claim leadership...

What a nightmare! What a villain! What lengths a person will go to in the struggle for power - even to honestly fulfill his official duties! There is no justification for him either before the court of history or before the party court! “Alexey Ivanovich Adzhubey in his book lifted the edge of the veil of secrecy over the motives for a preemptive strike

Khrushchev. It turns out that Beria came up with a cunning move with an amnesty after Stalin’s death. It concerned large groups of prisoners. Beria was concerned that he no longer had the power to automatically extend the sentences of those who were sent to camps during the years of mass repression and served their sentences. They returned home and demanded justice. And Beria had an urgent need to send those he disliked into exile again and to detain those who remained there. It was then that they began to release criminals and repeat offenders. They immediately went back to their old ways. Discontent and instability could give Beria a chance to return to previous methods."

The horror of Beria’s amnesty is most convincingly depicted in the famous film “Cold Summer of ’53.” True, it is not entirely clear what category of released these criminal hari fit into - they are, after all, pregnant women disguised as raiders. Adzhubey lies just like his father-in-law. At the instigation of Beria, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, the following were amnestied: those sentenced to a term of up to 5 years, as well as for some official, economic, and military crimes, women with children under 10 years of age, pregnant women, minors, elderly and seriously ill prisoners. And where is the place for repeat offenders in these categories?

Beria also did a lot of bad things. He advocated for a united Germany, which would be grateful to the USSR for this, and not for a divided Germany, striving for unification and hating the force that divided it. He insisted that paperwork in the national republics be conducted not in Russian, but in the local language, and that local personnel work there, and not those sent from Moscow, and much, much more.

In general, he showed himself to be a serious and reasonable statesman, and it is completely unclear what the Politburo could have against him. Beria was absolutely not dangerous, he stopped the repressions, he had no intention of fighting for power, which even Khrushchev admitted, and he could not fight for it, because he had no allies in the party leadership, and one in the field is not a warrior. The vaunted apparatus of the MGB - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after seven years of the rule of Abakumov, Ignatiev and Kruglov, had to be reassembled piece by piece. He could not do anything seditious and did not want anything seditious.

So what is Beria’s mystery? Why was he killed, and most importantly, why is he so hated by those at whose instigation this man was declared a fiend of hell - namely the Khrushchev Politburo? Let's say his hands are stained with blood - that's a lie, but let's say it! But the same Khrushchev has blood on his hands up to his elbows, but this does not outrage anyone. Let's say he was a pathological womanizer, raped high school girls in a perverted form - that's also a lie, but let's say it! But the rehabilitated “victim of Stalinism” Avel Enukidze raped 10-12 year old girls, and no one is hysterical about this. Let’s say he wanted to seize sole power in the country - that’s also a lie, but let’s say that too! But the other comrades ate each other like rats locked in a basement, and everyone takes it for granted, no one is offended by anyone. Why is Beria presented in the guise of a villain of all times and peoples? For what?

The answer is somewhat paradoxical: precisely because there was nothing special to blame him for. It was really necessary, but it turned out there was nothing! No real serious crimes were found against him, but it was necessary to explain why he was suddenly dealt with. And there was only one way to do this - to shout so loudly and for a long time about his pathological villainy that everyone would hear it, remember it and ultimately believe it. This is not the security guard Khrustalev, who can simply be removed, this is a noticeable face, justification is needed here.

And by the way, why was it so easy? After all, if Beria, an experienced security officer, got involved in a struggle for power, he should have understood who he was dealing with and should have been on his guard. One of the researchers of his life, Alexei Toptygin, writes: “If we take the unit of measurement of intuition, it should be called “beria.” And they took him with bare hands. How did he make such a mistake? And here, too, a somewhat paradoxical answer suggests itself: and therefore they took that he was not going to fight with anyone - there is some telepathic evidence that he “wanted”, but there is not a single evidence that he did anything in the direction of this “wanting” step. Already on March 9, in his speech at the funeral ceremony, he spoke about the “steel unity of the leadership” and did nothing to undermine this unity. Beria was determined to work normally and even before his death, he probably did not have time to understand what he did wrong?

The next, at least according to Avtorkhanov, who collected all the gossip of European boulevards, this version was voiced... by Khrushchev himself. “Khrushchev told his foreign interlocutors, especially the communists, how Beria was arrested and killed. In different versions of the story, Khrushchev’s direct physical killers of Beria are different persons, but the plot of the story remains the same...” (What follows is the story about the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, about the trap set up by Beria, about his arrest - this plot is quite well known. - E.P.). “Now,” Khrushchev said, “we were faced with a difficult, equally unpleasant dilemma: keep Beria in custody and conduct a normal investigation, or shoot him right there, and then issue a death sentence in court. Making the first decision was dangerous, because the entire KGB apparatus and KGB troops stood behind Beria, and he could easily be released. We had no legal grounds to make the second decision and immediately shoot Beria (what, could there be legal grounds for execution without trial in peacetime? - E.P.) After a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of both options, we came to the conclusion: Beria must be shot immediately, because no one will rebel because of a dead Beria.” The executor of this sentence (in the next room) in Khrushchev's stories is once General Moskalenko, another time Mikoyan, and the third time even Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev added emphatically: “Our further investigation into the Beria case fully confirmed that we shot him correctly.”

What kind of investigation was this and what kind of case was it? What was Beria accused of? He was tried under articles 58 1b (espionage, betrayal of military or state secrets, defection to the enemy), 588 (committing terrorist acts), 5811 (participation in an organization), 58"3 (active struggle against the working class under the tsarist regime or counter-revolutionary governments) and for the rape of a colossal number of women, which is what is most relished in this case. The list of charges itself shows that the case was molded according to the recipes of 1937. This topic is also discussed in detail, on many pages, by Mukhin, and I again refer everyone interested in the details to But it is already clear that since Beria was killed, then it was necessary to justify this somehow, and the investigative and judicial system (not only ours, but any) can justify anything with a certain order. Especially if the arrested person is no longer alive and he does not care at all what will be used as the basis for the sentence that has already been carried out.

But we will search in vain in these points for an answer to the most important question.

SO WHY DID THEY KILL LAVRENTY BERIA?

One thing is clear: if the party elite committed murder, in some way this person was very dangerous to them. And not with terrible plans to throw her off her beloved throne - Beria made it clear that he was not going to do this. Of course, he was potentially dangerous - but they don’t kill us for that. At least they don’t kill like that, openly and openly. The normal Soviet move in the struggle for power was worked out back in 1937 - move, remove, and then arrest and falsify the case in the usual manner. By the way, this openness and frankness also contains a mystery - after all, it was possible to wait and remove it quietly and unnoticed. It looks like the killers were in a hurry...

Khrushchev, in his revelations to foreign interlocutors, is disingenuous in some ways. He presents the decision to immediately execute Beria as a collegial verdict of all members of the Politburo. “After a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of both options, we came to the conclusion: Beria must be shot immediately”... “We!” So now we will believe that nine people, middle-aged, indecisive and rather cowardly, will rubber-stamp such a decision - to shoot without trial one of the top officials of the state. Never in their lives will these people, who have worked meekly all their lives under a strong leader, take on such responsibility! They will drown the issue in discussions and in the end, even if there are grounds, it will all end with deportation somewhere to Baku or Tyumen to the post of director of a plant - let him seize power there if he can.

So it was, and there is convincing evidence of this. Secretary of the Central Committee Malenkov, in the process of preparing the meeting of the Presidium, wrote a draft of its work. This draft has been published, and it makes it very clear what was to be discussed at this meeting. In order to prevent the possibility of abuse of power, Beria was supposed to be deprived of the post of Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, perhaps, if the discussion went in the right direction, also relieve him of the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, appointing him Minister of the Oil Industry as a last resort. That's all. There was no talk of any arrest, much less any execution without trial. And it is difficult to even imagine, with all the strain of imagination, what could have happened so that the Presidium, contrary to the prepared scenario, would impromptu make such a decision. This couldn't happen. And if it couldn’t, it means it didn’t exist. And the fact that this did not happen, that this issue was not considered at all by the Presidium, is evidenced by the fact that the draft was found in Malenkov’s archive - otherwise it would have been handed over for formalization of the decision and then destroyed.

So there was no "we". Beria was first killed, and then the Presidium was presented with a fait accompli, and he had to get out of it by covering up the killers. But who exactly?

But here it is very easy to guess. Firstly, it is easy to calculate the number two - the performer. The fact is that - and no one denies this - the army was widely involved in the events that day. In the incident with Beria, as Khrushchev himself admits, the commander of the air defense of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General Moskalenko and the chief of staff of the Air Force, Major General Batitsky, were directly involved, and Marshal Zhukov himself does not seem to refuse. But, more importantly, for some reason, apparently, to stage a fight against “Beria’s units,” troops were brought into the capital. And then a very important name comes up - a person who could ensure contact with the military and the participation of the army in the events - Defense Minister Bulganin.

It is not difficult to calculate number one. Who poured dirt on Beria the most, completely losing self-control and presenting him as a fiend of hell? Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. By the way, not only Bulganin, but also Moskalenko and Batitsky were people from his team.

Bulganin and Khrushchev - we have already met this combination somewhere. Where? Yes, at Stalin’s dacha, on that fateful Sunday, March 1, 1953.

COMPROMISING?

There is one mystery in the events that took place after Stalin's death - the fate of his papers. Stalin's archive as such does not exist - all his documents have disappeared. On March 7, some special group, as Svetlana claims, “on the orders of Beria” (but this is not a fact) removed all the furniture from Nizhnyaya Dacha. Later, the furniture was returned to the dacha, but without the papers. All documents from the Kremlin office and even from the leader’s safe also disappeared. Where they are and what happened to them is still unknown.

Naturally, it is believed that Beria, as the super-powerful chief of the special services, took possession of the archives, especially since the security was subordinate to the MGB department. Yes, but the guards were subordinate to state security while the person being protected was alive. I wonder who the Kuntsevo dacha was in charge of after Stalin’s death? Also the MGB department or, perhaps, this empty shell was managed by some government administrative and economic department? According to another version, the entire leadership of that time took part in the seizure of the archive, concerned about the liquidation of the dossiers that Stalin collected on them. Beria, naturally, was also afraid that incriminating evidence against him, located in these archives, would be made public. It’s also hard to believe - with so many accomplices, someone would certainly have let it slip after so many years.

Who knew nothing about the fate of the archive was Malenkov. Why - more on this a little later. There are two options left: either Khrushchev or Beria. If we assume that the archive fell into the hands of Khrushchev, then its fate is most likely sad. There could have been a lot of compromising evidence on Nikita Sergeevich - participation in Yezhov’s repressions alone was worth it! Neither he nor his comrades had time to look for all these “dossiers” among the mountains of papers; it was easier to burn everything in bulk. But if Beria was the first to succeed, then the situation here is completely different. He had nothing to fear from some mysterious “documents” in the Stalinist archive, which, if made public, could destroy him - there was hardly anything there for him, even if through the efforts of the entire jurisprudence of the USSR, despite the fact that it was very necessary, they couldn’t dig up material for one more or less decent sub-execution case. But he was vitally interested in compromising information on Stalin’s former associates, both for future possible opportunities and to ensure his own safety.

Indirectly, his son Sergo testifies that the archive most likely fell into the hands of Beria. After the murder of his father, he was arrested, and one day he was called in for questioning, and in the investigator’s office he saw Malenkov. This was not the first visit of the distinguished guest; he had already come once and persuaded Sergo to testify against his father, but was not persuaded. However, this time he came for something different.

“Maybe you can help with something else? - he said it somehow very humanly. -Have you heard anything about the personal archives of Joseph Vissarionovich?

“I have no idea,” I answer. - We never talked about this at home.

Well, of course... Your father also had archives, huh?

I don’t know either, I’ve never heard of it.

How have you not heard?! - here Malenkov could no longer restrain himself. - He must have archives, he must!

He was obviously very upset."

That is, not only Stalin’s archives disappeared, but also Beria’s archives, and Malenkov knew nothing about their fate. Of course, theoretically, Khrushchev could have confiscated and liquidated them, but to do it in such a way that no one would see, hear or know anything? Doubtful. Stalin's archives were all right, but Beria's archives were completely impossible to secretly destroy. And Khrushchev was not the kind of person to carry out such an operation and not spill the beans.

So, most likely, Beria took possession of Stalin’s archive. I repeat once again that it made no sense for him to destroy it, much less destroy his own archive, and there are nine chances out of ten that he hid all the papers somewhere. But where?

Chesterton wrote in one of his stories about Father Brown: “Where does a smart man hide a leaf? In the forest". Exactly. Where were the relics of the great Russian saint Alexander of Svirsky hidden? In the anatomical museum. And if you need to hide an archive, where does a smart person hide it? Naturally, in the archive!

It is only in novels that our archives are organized, systematized and catalogued. The reality looks a little different. I once had to talk with a person who had been in the archives of the Radio House. He was shocked by what he saw there, he told how he sorted through boxes of records that were not listed in any catalogs, but simply dumped in a heap - there were recordings of performances, next to which Gergiev’s vaunted productions were like a donkey next to an Arabian horse . This is one example.

Another example can be found in newspapers, which from time to time report a sensational discovery in one of the archives where they found something absolutely amazing. How are these finds made? It’s very simple: some curious trainee looks into a chest that no one has poked their nose into before, and finds it. And what about the story of the missing rare antique vases that stood peacefully in the basement of the Hermitage for decades? So the easiest way to hide an archive of any size is to dump it in some of the storage rooms of another archive, where it will lie in complete secrecy and safety until some curious intern looks into it and asks: What are these dusty bags lying in the corner? And, opening one of the bags, he picks up a paper with the inscription: “To my archive. I.St."

But still, people don’t kill for possessing incriminating evidence either. On the contrary, this becomes especially dangerous, because the possibility cannot be ruled out that in a secret safe of a faithful person there are the most important papers in an envelope with the inscription: “In case of my death. L. Beria." No, something completely extraordinary had to happen for such rather cowardly people as Khrushchev and his company to decide to kill, and even so quickly. What could it be?

The answer came by chance. Having decided to give Ignatiev’s biography in this book, I came across the following phrase: On June 25, in a note to Malenkov, Beria proposed arresting Ignatiev, but did not have time. There may be an error in the date, because on June 26 Beria himself was “arrested,” but, on the other hand, perhaps he spoke about this verbally with someone a few days before, or a secret spy in the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported to Khrushchev. It was also clear that the new People's Commissar was not going to leave the old one alone. On April 6, “for political blindness and roteness,” Ignatiev was removed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee, and on April 28, he was removed from the Central Committee. At the suggestion of Beria, the CCP was instructed to consider the issue of Ignatiev’s party responsibility. But all this was not the same, all this was not scary. And then information arrived that Beria was asking Malenkov for permission for this arrest.

For the conspirators, this was not danger, it was death! It is not difficult to guess that at Lubyanka the former head of Stalin’s security would have been cracked like a nut and squeezed like a lemon. What would have happened next is not difficult to predict if you remember how Beria kissed the hand of the dying Stalin. Not a single one of the conspirators would have met the New Year, 1954, alive; Beria, not caring about the legality for such an occasion, would have personally killed them with his boots in the Lubyanka basements.

This is what usually happens with “genius impromptu”. What to do? Remove Ignatiev? Dangerous: where is the guarantee that he doesn’t have a description of the night at Stalin’s dacha, and maybe even much more, in a safe place with a reliable person? He knew who he was dealing with. So what to do?

But this is the motive! Because of this, Beria could really have been killed, moreover, they should have been killed, and exactly the way it was done. For there was nothing to arrest him for, and because of the dead Beria, as Khrushchev rightly noted, hardly anyone would make a fuss: what’s done is done, you can’t bring back a dead man. Moreover, if you imagine everything as if he offered armed resistance during arrest. Well, then let propaganda work to present him as a monster and a supervillain, so that grateful descendants can say: “It may have been a crime, but it was not a mistake.”

HOW MONSTERS ARE MADE

We quote. Retired colonel A. Skorokhodov recalls:

“In November 1953... one evening they called from the Camp Collection Headquarters: “Come as soon as possible, you will get acquainted with one interesting document.” The next day it snowed and there was a blizzard. Flights, and therefore training, were cancelled. I went to the camp, to the chief of staff. He opened his safe and pulled out a thin book with a soft gray cover. A list was stapled to the book. Having found my last name in it, the major put a tick next to it and handed me the book:

In the middle of the page was written large: “Indictment in the Beria case under Art. Art. Code of Criminal Procedure..." - and there was a list of articles that I, naturally, did not remember. So that's it! A state of feverish excitement took over me. Now, again, I don’t remember the whole text, but the main sections remain in my memory.

The illegal persecution and execution of the relatives of Sergo Ordzhonikidze and the endless dirty adventures of the corrupted state security marshal. Violence, drugs, deception. Use of high official position. Among his victims are students, girls, wives taken away from their husbands, and husbands shot because of their wives...

I read without interruption, without interruption or thought. First in one gulp, then more slowly, dumbfounded, not believing my eyes, re-reading certain passages. There was nothing to write down. He left the room, gave the book to the cheerful major, who winked:

Well, what is Lavrenty Pavlovich like?

“It’s like I plunged into a cesspool,” I answered.” At the same time, the mechanism for future compromise of Stalin was worked out on Beria. “Closed” information that was distributed along party lines, through closed lists. One-time reading, with a ban on making notes - so that it is impossible to return to what you read, think and compare. And, finally, a win-win emotional move, shock therapy - to throw into the then Puritan society a story about the sexual exploits of the Minister of State Security. Especially here, the raped schoolgirls looked good. After all, what remains in the memory of Lieutenant Colonel Skorokhodov after so many years? Relatives of Sergo Ordzhonikidze and sex, nothing more. The logic here is simple: even if Beria is not guilty of everything else, then for these women alone, he, the bastard, should have been shot twice. That is, to call a spade a spade, dirty gossip was launched through party channels, which instantly spread throughout the country. The task was completed, the enemy was disgraced and destroyed. And among other things, the second murder of Beria served as a rehearsal for the second murder of Stalin, which took place three years later.

P.S. By the way, about women - they didn’t tell you about the most interesting thing. Anyone who has ever been to court, leafed through a criminal case, or watched a good detective story knows very well that the case materials clearly indicate where, when and under what circumstances a crime occurs. And if it says that it happened at work, it means at work, and if at the dacha, then it means at the dacha. Moreover, lawyers, in their meticulousness, specify in which room, at what time of day, etc. So, in the case of hundreds of raped ladies, schoolgirls, etc., the prosecution witness, Beria’s former assistant Sarkisov testifies: “As a rule, such acquaintances were planned by him during his walks near his house... Women were brought to Beria’s apartment, as a rule, overnight...” And even Beria himself “showed” in court: “These women were brought to my house, I never visited them.” did not go".

So it’s impossible to make a mistake; the case materials clearly indicate: Beria’s house, Beria’s apartment. Everything would be fine, but the notorious mansion of the “corrupt marshal of state security” was a two-story house, where security and a communications center were located on the first floor, and he lived with his family on the second, occupying five rooms. And the family was like this: Beria himself, his wife, son, daughter-in-law and their two children (at the time of the arrest, the daughter-in-law was pregnant with her third child). At night, of course, they were all at home. The son in his memoirs did not say a word about his father’s sexual adventures. Moreover, Beria’s wife was not a Moscow emancipation of easy virtue, but a respectable Georgian. Anyone who knows Georgian women can imagine what will happen if the husband dares to come home with his mistress. Not otherwise, there was somewhere near the doors an exit to the fifth dimension, where the People's Commissar raped them. Because there's simply nowhere...

I think other charges, such as espionage for the British or intentions to eliminate the leaders of the party and government, can no longer be discussed...

P. P. S. From Beria’s letter to members of the Politburo, written in conclusion: “Dear comrades. They want to deal with me without trial or investigation, after 5 days of imprisonment, without a single interrogation, I beg you all that this is not allowed... Once again I beg everyone, especially the comrades who worked with Lenin and Stalin, enriched by great experience and wise in solving complex cases of Comrades Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan. In the name of the memory of Lenin and Stalin, I ask, I beg you to intervene immediately, and you will all be convinced that I am absolutely pure, honest, your faithful friend, comrade, faithful member of your party...

And so on, a mixture of despair and fear, modeled on those letters that the “oppositionists” wrote before the execution. Does anyone really think that we don’t know how to forge letters? He was not a fool, he was arrested at a Politburo meeting with the consent of those same “dear comrades”, he knew their value very well, knew where he was and what awaited him. Now look at the photograph of Beria, look carefully: will this man, even under the threat of death, lick the boots of his executioners? Isn't this extra evidence that casts doubt on the authenticity of the whole picture?

P. P. P. S. By the way, do you remember three strange letters from Vasily Stalin from prison? A statement, a letter to Khrushchev and a letter condemning the “anti-party group”, which are very similar to fakes? With the second, everything is clear right away: the lowly panegyric to Khrushchev, written by Stalin’s son in the style of the worst of the regional party newspapers, should have warmed the heart of Nikita Sergeevich and could have come in handy on occasion. You never know, publish it or leave it for history, so that posterity will know how great he was... But with the other two letters, everything is much more interesting. In terms of genre, they are a “novel within a novel.” The author of the letter seems to be talking about one thing, and then, taking advantage of some small occasion in the text, he suddenly begins to verbosely and confusingly attack Beria, so verbosely and with such hatred that one gets the feeling that the letters themselves were written for this sole purpose. So, they say, Stalin’s children also hate Beria - and they already know... And again they overdid it. The fact that Vasily could not stand Beria can be assumed - suddenly there is something there that we do not know, but to believe in his ardent love for Khrushchev and in heartfelt solidarity with the party squabble - well, no...

How Beria was killed
Mironin S.

“The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good people to do nothing.” (Edmund Burke)
ANNOTATION

The article provides a more detailed version of the historical events of 1953, claiming that Stalin was killed at best by failure to provide assistance, and Beria was killed without any trial on June 26, 1953.

INTRODUCTION

September 23, 2007 marked the 108th anniversary of the birth of the great son of the Georgian and Soviet peoples, Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria. But it was not only this generally not very significant event that forced me to take up my pen. The real reason was watching the film “Kremlin-9, Lavrentiy Beria,” which I purchased a long time ago on DVD. The authors of the film claim that they were able to completely reconstruct the day of June 26, 1953, when Beria was allegedly arrested at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

Watching the film convinced me that the film’s authors interpret many details very one-sidedly, without comprehensive evidence. I tried to superimpose on the chain of events shown in the film the version of Yu. Mukhin, E. Prudnikova and the former chief physician of the USSR Burgasov, proving that Beria was shot on June 26, 1953 during his arrest in his apartment and it turned out that the reconstruction in the film corresponds and this version, the murder version. In this article, I not only agree with the version that Beria was killed on June 26, 1953 in his apartment, but also add new details arising from Malenkov’s strange behavior after this terrible day. They prove that this version of the murder is correct. However, you can judge what I did.

There is a third reason why I decided to write this article. The reason is that until now, history textbooks, even those written by patriotic authors, indicate that Beria was arrested on June 26. I have been working for a long time to whiten Russian history and cleanse Russian history of myths. Here I will try to clean up another myth. I will try to do this in a calm tone.

HONORABLE CITIZEN OF THE USSR

I'll start by giving a brief track record of Lavrenty Pavlovich. He was born on September 11 (23), 1899 (according to other sources, on March 17 (29), 1899) in the village of Merkheuli, in Abkhazia, Tiflis province. He fought in the tsarist army on the Romanian front. After the end of the Civil War, he was the manager of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan and the executive secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and improving the living conditions of workers. Then service in the Cheka under the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan. In 1922 - 1926 Head of the Secret Operational Unit of the Cheka - GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia. Until 1931, he worked in various positions in the GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the TSFSR and at the same time in 4/4/1927 - 12/1930. he is the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Georgia. In 10/31/1931 - 10/17/1932. worked as 2nd secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU(b), at the same time from 11/14/1931 to 12/18/1932 he served as 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia. From 10/17/1932 to 4/23/1937. he is the 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and at the same time from December 18, 1932 - January 15, 1934 the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (Bolsheviks), and from January 15, 1934 - August 31, 1938. 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, and in 5.1937 - 31.8.1938. 1st Secretary of the Tbilisi City Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (Bolsheviks). In 22.8 - 8.12.1938. Beria - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and in 12/8/1938 - 12/29/1945. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. In 30.6.1941 - 4.9.1945. He is a member of the State Defense Committee of the USSR. In 20.8.1945 - 26.6.1953. he is the chairman of Special Committee No. 1 under the State Defense Committee - SNK - Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 7.4.1950 - 5.3.1953. he is also a member of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. After Stalin's death in 5.3.1953 - 26.6.1953. Beria - 1st Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

He holds the titles of General Commissioner of State Security and Marshal of the Soviet Union. Hero of Socialist Labor. Awarded the Order of Lenin (five times), the Red Banner of the USSR (three times), Suvorov 1st degree, the Red Banner of the Georgian SSR, the Red Banner of Labor of the Georgian SSR, the Red Banner of Labor of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Red Banner of Labor of the Armenian SSR, the Republic (Tannu-Tuva) ), Sukhbaatar" (Mongolia). On October 29, 1949, he was awarded the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree. He is the only honorary citizen of the USSR

The day of June 26 turned out to be hot. It was Friday. Many were going out of town. But storm clouds were gathering in the Kremlin. What happened on June 26? According to current and Soviet history textbooks, on this day Beria was arrested at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. However, their argument is so weak that you inevitably conclude that no one can reliably say what really happened on June 26, 1953. I note that in the USSR and especially in Georgia there were rumors for a long time that Beria was not present at the December trial.

The first to prove that Beria was killed on June 26, 1953 was Yu. Mukhin. But due to Mukhin’s inherent style of writing, not many people believed him. Meanwhile, as the same Mukhin convincingly proved in his books, and then confirmed by Prudnikova, on June 26, Beria was shot dead in his apartment during an attempt to arrest him by generals Bagritsky and the commander of the Moscow Military District Moskalenko. Beria’s son Sergo also wrote about this.

Then other evidence appeared. So, according to retired major general, former chief state sanitary doctor of the USSR, academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and the Academy of Medical and Technical Sciences, participant in the Finnish and Great Patriotic Wars Pyotr Nikolaevich Burgasov, on June 26, 1953, there was no arrest of Beria. There were no several months of investigation and subsequent execution. Lavrentiy Beria, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, was killed that day without any trial or investigation.

Since 1950, Burgasov worked in a secret group that was developing means of protecting the USSR from bacteriological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The group was then actually subordinate to Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. According to Burgasov, on the afternoon of June 26, 1953, he was at his workplace in the department. I quote. “At 12.30 I was rising from the buffet to my floor, and suddenly the Minister of Ammunition of the USSR Boris Lvovich Vannikov and Beria’s son Sergo rushed down the stairs like a bullet past me, darker than a cloud - they even almost knocked me down. It was incredible that Vannikov did not stop and ran up the stairs. And Beria's son never showed up with us during the day. Something happened. Later Vannikov returned alone, without Sergo. I was on good terms with Boris Lvovich, I wanted to find out what happened, and I went to see him office. And he sits with his head down on the table. Then he raises his head and tells me: “Our boss, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, is no more. He was shot today in his own Moscow apartment. I was just there...” And he says that Beria's son Sergo received a call from one of the military men who said that his father's house was surrounded by soldiers. Vannikov and Sergo urgently went there. There were military vehicles parked near Beria's house and armed submachine gunners were walking around the area. The captain approached Vannikov and said that he had left the house fifteen minutes ago a stretcher was brought out with a dead body covered with a raincoat. The glass in Beria's office was broken by machine gun fire. This is what Vannikov told me. And you know, on that day, June 26, 1953, there were, as they wrote later, no plenums or meetings where Beria was allegedly arrested. At the Spassky Gate, at the entrance to the Kremlin, as well as in the buildings where our rooms and Lavrenty Pavlovich’s office were located, the security did not change. The same sentries were stationed as before, and we knew them well... On the same day, June 26, I was suddenly transferred to another department at the General Staff. This is what saved me. Because later denunciations and calls to the security authorities began. And they called me, but they left me alone. And all my work colleagues were repressed. And Vannikov’s fate is unknown..."

And here are the memories of Sergo Beria. “On June 26, 1953, my father was at the dacha. I left earlier, around eight, and an hour later I was in the Kremlin. (Father’s office was located in the opposite building.) At four o’clock in the afternoon we had to report to father about the preparations for a nuclear explosion... (The following is about the preparation for the report, together with other designers, from B.L. Vannikov. - E.P. ) At about twelve o'clock an employee from Vannikov's secretariat comes up to me and invites me to the phone: Hero of the Soviet Union AmetKhan, who tested aircraft with my equipment, called twice. “Sergo,” he shouted into the phone, “I’ll tell you some terrible news, but hold on!” Your home is surrounded by troops, and your father has, in all likelihood, been killed. I have already sent the car to the Kremlin gates, get in it and go to the airfield. I’m ready to transport you somewhere before it’s too late!”
I started calling my father's secretariat. The phones were silent. They probably managed to turn them off. No one answered the phone either at the dacha or in the apartment. There was no connection everywhere... Then I turned to Vannikov. After listening to me, he also began calling, but through his own channels. That day, at my father’s suggestion, an extended meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee was scheduled... Vannikov determined that the meeting had been canceled and that something incomprehensible was happening... Boris Lvovich, so that I would not be captured alone, went with me to a city apartment located on the Garden Ring. The area was indeed cordoned off by the military, and we were not allowed into the courtyard for a long time, until Vannikov called Khrushchev again. Finally, after his permission, we were allowed through, which confirmed his involvement in what was happening. The wall on the side of my father's room was gouged by heavy machine gun bullets, the windows were broken, and the doors were knocked out. While I was desperately looking at all this, one of the guards ran up to me and said: “Sergo, someone was just taken out of the room on a stretcher covered with a tarpaulin.”

I will give indirect evidence of Baibakov, which Mukhin extracted from him. I quote Mukhin. “I called the last surviving member of the then Central Committee N.K. Baibakov. During a conversation on technical issues, I asked him if he remembered the July 1953 Plenum of the Central Committee. When Nikolai Konstantinovich remembered him (he is 90 years old), I unexpectedly asked a question to him: “Did you know at the Plenum that Beria had already been killed?” He quickly replied: “No, I didn’t know anything at the time,” but then, after a hesitation, said: “But the fact is that he was killed.”

There is other evidence. As the Duel newspaper writes, “St. Petersburg journalist Elena Prudnikova wrote a book in which, step by step, based on eyewitness accounts and copies of previously secret documents, it is quite convincingly proven that the “personal file” of the enemy of the people Lavrentiy Beria was probably falsified. And in the bunker of the Moscow Military District headquarters, where the arrested Beria was kept, most likely, his double was kept - a common practice of political regimes of those years. Evidence? The dissimilarity of the signatures on the confession documents with the early, real signatures of Beria. There are no photographs of the arrested man in full face and in profile, as it should be in prison, but there is only an early , a "younger" photo, clearly taken from Beria's family album. There are not even fingerprints of the arrested person - that's what's really strange! And for some reason, Beria was not kept in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where everyone knew him by sight, but in the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. Finally , there is evidence of people who simply did not recognize “a man similar to Beria”, sentenced to death for crimes against the Motherland."

And when was Beria supposedly arrested? Zhukov, Moskalenko and Sergo Beria name the same period of time: between 12 and 13 pm as the time of Beria’s arrest and murder. Let's see if this is true.

Before studying the circumstances of the events of June 26, 1953, we need to understand what happened the day before.

First, about whether Beria had motives for killing Stalin. Stalin constantly threw Beria into the most critical areas of work. In 1938-1939, Beria stopped the repressive machine that had gotten out of control, Beria ensured the calm of the country's rear during the war, Beria worked with foreign intelligence and was the most informed leader in the country, and after the war even more informed than Stalin.

When, at the time of Stalin’s death, the agriculture of the USSR found itself in a deep crisis and famine almost occurred due to the flight of peasants and a decrease in the number of men as a result of the war, Malenkov was entrusted with raising agriculture. But the worst thing for mechanized agriculture was the shortage of oil. That's why Stalin threw Beria into oil exploration. New fields were discovered and after the war a rapid increase in oil production began. When the United States developed the atomic bomb and the USSR faced the threat of atomic bombing, Stalin threw Beria into the atomic project and the development of launch vehicles. Even the construction of the new building of Moscow State University was supervised by Beria.

In history textbooks, the reason for Beria's arrest is stated to be the assumption that he was preparing a coup d'etat and wanted to arrest other members of the Presidium. But did he need this?

After Stalin's death, Beria became the de facto shadow head of state. This is evidenced by his numerous initiatives, which, as a rule, were supported by the Presidium. He had no need to become a formal sole leader, just as there was no need for Stalin to occupy the formal post of leader of the USSR in 1934-1941. He was Molotov, Stalin was one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, but in fact it was Stalin who by 1938 became the sovereign leader of the country.

In the newsreel footage included in the documentary "Kremlin-9" and depicting the order in which the leaders of the USSR rise to the podium on May 1, 1953, Malenkov is first, Beria second, and then Molotov. In this order, they take their places on the podium and only then Khrushchev passes and takes a place to the right of Malenkov.

The fact that Beria did not plan any coup is evidenced by this fact. As V. Kozhinov writes, a careful researcher of the situation around Beria in 1953, K. A. Stolyarov, established from documents that a day or two before the arrest, Lavrenty Pavlovich agreed with his mistress, actress M., that she will come to him together with a “beautiful girlfriend”, and, as the researcher wittily and at the same time convincingly summarizes, “it is difficult to admit that a person who literally the other day intended to carry out a coup d’etat ... is having fun with random women, while he should be conducting the conspirators and trace every step of the opponents."

One more fact. Late in the evening of June 25, Beria and Malenkov had a long and peaceful conversation. Beria took Malenkov to the latter’s apartment on Granovsky Street. According to the driver’s recollections, they got out of the car and talked peacefully for another 10 minutes. Then Malenkov went up to his home, and Beria left. It’s hard to believe that people could talk like that, one of whom is preparing to stab the other in the back. Therefore, knowing Malenkov’s character, there is no reason to think that Malenkov suspected the night before what would happen on June 26.

According to the author of the film, Pimenov, Beria went to his dacha. No evidence is provided for this assertion. In fact, most likely Beria went to his apartment. It was later after the conversation with Malenkov.

As Prudnikova writes, if a conspiracy in the security forces actually existed, then the members of the Presidium would not have gone to the theater on June 27, 1953, but sat in a safe place under guard! But they went to listen to the opera “The Decembrists,” which means they were not afraid of anything. They were not afraid because there was no danger - the opponent was killed.

When you read the minutes of the meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee from July 2-7, 1953, where former comrades-in-arms denounced Beria, you are amazed at the pettiness of their accusations and the wretchedness of the accusers’ arguments. There is not a single fact that suggests a conspiracy. So, no facts have been found about Beria’s alleged conspiracy.

Arrest of Beria

There are several versions of how Beria’s arrest took place, some of them published, in which very high-ranking people explain how it was carried out and what an (important!) role they personally played. Zhukov himself defined this action as a “risky operation,” and I was wrong when I called one of the chapters of this book “Marshal Zhukov’s last operation,” referring to the arrest of the Doenitz government. So she wasn't the last. Indeed, the arrest of Beria for Zhukov personally was both more difficult and dangerous than the arrest of Doenitz. If Beria had found out about the preparation of such a “surprise,” he would have arranged inevitably deadly super-surprises for all its organizers. He had unlimited possibilities for this! But this time, and perhaps this was the only case in Beria’s entire bloody biography, the information let him down. He did not know or suspect what awaited him at the upcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers.

What and how happened then was told to me during conversations (some recorded on tape) by Marshal Moskalenko, former candidate member of the Presidium Shipilov D.G., Malenkov’s assistant - Sukhanov D.N., head of the political department of the MAO Colonel Zub. And I also have two published versions of Zhukov’s story. Since these options do not coincide, let's figure out together what happened in reality.

I cite only the “nodal”, fundamentally important points.

DISCRETIONS

Moskalenko Kirill Stepanovich talks about the same period of time and events.

“At 9 o’clock in the morning (June 25, 1953 ed.) N.S. Khrushchev called me on the Kremlin telephone exchange, he asked:

Are there people in your circle who are close to you and who are devoted to our party as much as you are devoted to it?.. After this, Khrushchev told me to take these people with me and come with them to the Kremlin to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade. Malenkov, to the office where Stalin I.V. used to work (Next, Khrushchev hinted in code to take weapons with them).

Soon after this, there was a call from the Minister of Defense, Marshal Bulganin, who said that Khrushchev called him and suggested that I first come to him, that is, to Bulganin... With my group, I arrived at the Minister of Defense. Comrade Bulganin received me alone. (What about Zhukov and Bulganin - after all, they went to the Kremlin together? - approx. V.K.).

“He (Bulganin) said that Khrushchev called him, so I called you. Beria needs to be arrested... How many people do you have? I answered: there are five people with me... To which he replied, “... very few people... Who do you think can still be involved, but without delay? I answered - your deputy marshal Vasilevsky. For some reason, he immediately rejected this candidacy... Then I suggested taking Zhukov. He agreed, but that Zhukov was unarmed.”

(Thus, Moskalenko includes Zhukov in his group, but even then somewhere in the background and without weapons).

From the story of Moskalenko K.S.

“And so at about 11.00 on the day of June 26 (and Khrushchev’s call was on June 25), at the suggestion of N.A. Bulganin, we got into his car and drove to the Kremlin... Following us in another car came Zhukov G.K., L. Brezhnev. I. and others. Bulganin led us all into the waiting room at Malenkov’s office, then left us and went to Malenkov’s office.

A few minutes later, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov and Molotov came out to us... They informed us that there would now be a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and then, according to an agreed signal transmitted through Malenkov’s assistant - Sukhanov, we need to enter the office and arrest Beria.

Moskalenko K. S. tells.

“About an hour later, that is, at 13.00 on June 26, 1953, a prearranged signal followed, and we, five armed men, the sixth, Comrade Zhukov, quickly entered the office where the meeting was taking place. Comrade Malenkov announced: “In the name of Soviet law, arrest Beria.” Everyone drew their weapons, I pointed them directly at Beria and ordered him to raise his hands up. At this time, Zhukov searched Beria, after which we took him to the rest room of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and all the members of the Presidium and candidate members remained to hold the meeting, and Zhukov also remained there ... "

In general, it is obvious that either the military leaders themselves are each “pulling the blanket on themselves,” or the litreographers tried to help them in this. The differences in the stories are large and fundamental, right up to the decisive moment - who arrested Beria? They also describe their further actions differently. I will not bore readers with continued analysis of their stories.

I tried to get to the bottom of the truth in conversations with participants in those events, but they each saw everything with their own eyes. The story of Dmitry Nikolaevich Sukhanov seemed to me the most objective.

I visited his apartment and we talked more than once on various issues. Once he asked to clarify the events regarding the arrest of Beria. Sukhanov worked as Malenkov’s assistant for eighteen years. He is an exceptionally pedantic person with a phenomenal memory. You can trust him.

At the very beginning of the story, Sukhanov simply shocked me with the message that “there were two conspiracies.” The first was prepared by Beria for June 26, intending, with the help of his guards assigned to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, to arrest all of them after watching the play at the Bolshoi Theater (a decision was made about this collective viewing) and after the theater to take everyone to the Lubyanka, and then present them corresponding charges against them. And Beria seizes all power in the country. Khrushchev and Bulganin knew and supported his intention! - with whom Beria had a very trusting relationship.

Information about Beria’s plan reached Malenkov. He called Khrushchev and Bulganin to his office (he did not speak on the phone for fear of eavesdropping) and directly told them that he knew about Beria’s conspiracy and their participation in it. Khrushchev and Bulganin thought that now they would not leave Malenkov’s office, but that they would be taken out by the guards who were prepared in the reception area. But Malenkov, in the troubled time after Stalin’s death, did not want to complicate the situation in the party leadership. The main thing was to neutralize Beria. And he told Khrushchev and Bulganin that they could atone for their guilt before the party and save their lives only by actively participating in the arrest of Beria. Both swore to be loyal to the party. After this, and as if to test his loyalty, Malenkov instructed Bulganin to transport the military personnel selected by Zhukov to the Kremlin in his car, since they did not have passes. Bulganin is an order from Ma. lsnkova fulfilled.

Zhukov and other generals entered my office, which is located opposite, across the reception room from Malenkov’s office, where the meeting was taking place.

The meeting began at 14.00 on June 26, 1953. The military waited for the agreed signal. Malenkov usually called me into his office with this call. We waited for more than an hour. And then two calls rang.

And in Malenkov’s office the following happened. Unexpectedly, Malenkov proposed changing the agenda of the meeting and considering the issue of Beria, who wanted to carry out a coup.

Who is for the arrest of Beria?

Molotov attacked Malenkov with accusations of arbitrariness. It was at this moment that Malenkov pressed the call button. And the military, led by Zhukov, entered. When the military entered, Beria sat with his head down and did not see who was entering. He did not know that Malenkov pressed the call button. Beria thought that the military was coming in to act according to his plan, which was also scheduled for June 26. But as soon as I saw Zhukov, I immediately understood everything.

Malenkov repeated the proposal to arrest Beria. Now, under the military, everyone voted yes. Malenkov ordered Zhukov to arrest Beria, which the marshal did, lifting Beria from his chair and wrapping his hands behind his back.

Before taking Beria to the rest room so that his guards, who were waiting in the reception area, would not find out anything, Zhukov asked Malenkov: “Perhaps we should also arrest the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee who were in cahoots with Beria? Malenkov did not accept Marshal Zhukov’s offer; he did not want to be accused of dictatorship. This was a major political miscalculation by Malenkov, for which he later paid. And Marshal G.K. Zhukov found an enemy in the person of N.S. Khrushchev.

Soon after Beria’s arrest, Malenkov was informed that in Beria’s office, on his desk, during a search, a sheet of blue paper was found on which the word “Alarm!” was written three times in red pencil. During the investigation, Beria admitted that this was a warning to Khrushchev and Bulganin about the failure of the conspiracy. If Beria had stopped by his office before the meeting, he would have been saved, and everything could have ended in great blood. On the Council of Ministers letterhead with the agenda, Beria’s hand also wrote “Alarm!” three times. Apparently he wanted to somehow hand over this sheet to the guards, but he failed. This form was brought to me.

All the things confiscated from Beria during his arrest - pince-nez, belt, tie, briefcase - were brought to my room. I agreed with General Shatalov that he would order the preparation of a detachment of officers loyal to the Motherland to replace the MGB guards in the premises of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The general called from my office. I ordered the Central Committee garage to send five ZIS-110 vehicles with government license plates and signals to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District so that they would be allowed through without inspection. These cars brought 30 officers who replaced the internal security of the GB, after which Beria could be taken out and taken out. In one of the cars, Moskalenko and four other generals took Beria to the garrison guardhouse.

The main figure and decisive force in the arrest of Beria was Marshal Zhukov, voting with him a second time, no one even dared to abstain, everyone was in favor. I thanked Sukhanov for his detailed story and frankly said that I had not heard such an option for Khrushchev and Bulganin before the arrest of Beria. Sukhanov, a serious man, never smiled during the conversation and, responding to my last remark, said firmly:

Did you ask me to tell you how it was? I have fulfilled your request.

One side fact confirming Zhukov’s active participation in this operation was told by the assistant military commandant of the city of Moscow, Colonel Gavrilov:

On June 25, Marshal Zhukov unexpectedly arrived at the garrison guardhouse, without a prior telephone call. He walked around the guardhouse. He ordered me to open all the cells and go out into the corridor as a prisoner. When the punished people left, the marshal loudly announced:

Amnesty for you!

A loud “Hurray”, probably for the first time in history, thundered in the guardhouse.

The marshal ordered me:

Send everyone to their units.

I wondered what was going on? Having cleared the room of people, Zhukov, accompanied by me, walked around and examined all the cells. He paused in one, looked around it and, seeing a protruding steam heating pipe under the ceiling, said as if to himself:

It won’t fit, he might hang himself...

We moved to another cell. He examined her carefully. I touched the grille.

This one should be whitewashed and tidied up overnight. Arrestees should not be accepted into the guardhouse. So that everything is free. You must not go anywhere until special permission.

And he left, leaving me completely bewildered. And the next day, late in the evening, several cars rushed by. General Moskalenko and several other generals emerged from the first. Between them stood a hunched man in civilian clothes. He was taken to the cell that Zhukov ordered to be prepared.

I wondered who this important arrested person was? At first I didn’t recognize him, maybe because I didn’t have the usual pince-nez in front of my eyes.

Moskalenko told me:

You are free, we will guard you inside ourselves. You will provide external security. Our additional security will arrive soon.

Then I realized - they brought Beria! The next day, Beria was transferred to the bomb shelter of the headquarters of the Moscow district, where during the day and night they equipped a special cell and locks for his detention.

And now, to complete the picture, I will give quotes from Zhukov’s own notes, which were confiscated from his apartment after his death. This entry is located among the marshal’s other papers in the archive called “Stalin’s Apartment.” I read these notes and transcribed their contents onto tape. I am not citing them in full, since they will take up a lot of space, but only those facts that need to be clarified or refuted in two versions, published under the name of Zhukov, I have given them above.

“- Bulganin called me and said, please come to me quickly, otherwise I’m in a hurry to the Kremlin.

I quickly went down from the fourth floor to the second and went into Bulganin’s office.

He told me:

Call Moskalenko, Nedelin, Batitsky, and a couple of other people whom you deem necessary and immediately come with them to Malenkov’s reception room. Thirty minutes later, with a group of generals, I was in Malenkov’s reception room. I was immediately called to Malenkov’s office, where, in addition to Malenkov, there were Molotov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin. After greeting, Malenkov said:

We called you to entrust you with one important matter. Recently, Beria has been carrying out suspicious work among his people, directed against a group of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Considering that Beria had become a dangerous person for the party and the state, we decided to arrest him and neutralize the entire NKVD system. We decided to entrust the arrest of Beria to you personally.

We have no doubt that you will be able to pull it off, especially since Beria personally caused a lot of trouble for you! How, you have no doubts about this?

I answered:

What doubts can there be? The order will be carried out.

Keep in mind that Beria is a dexterous and quite strong man, and he is apparently armed.

Of course, I’m not an expert on arrests, I didn’t have the opportunity to do this, but my hand won’t tremble. Just tell me where and when he should be arrested?

After two calls you need to enter the office and arrest Beria. Is everything clear?

I said:

We went to the room where we should wait for calls. Beria arrived. The meeting has begun. The meeting goes on for an hour or two, and still there are no conditional calls.

I was already beginning to worry whether Beria had arrested those who wanted to arrest him?

At this time, a pre-arranged bell rang. Leaving two armed officers at the outer door of Malenkov's office, we entered the office. As agreed, the generals took up their pistols, and I quickly approached Beria and said loudly to him:

Beria, stand up! You are under arrest!

At the same time, taking him by the hands, he lifted him from the chair and searched all his pockets; there was no weapon. His briefcase was immediately thrown (out of fear that there might be a weapon there. - V.K) to the middle of the table. Beria turned terribly pale and began to babble something. Two generals took him by the hands and led him into the back room of Malenkov’s office, where a thorough search was carried out and unauthorized items were confiscated. At 11 o'clock at night, Beria was secretly transferred from the Kremlin to a military prison (guardhouse), and a day later he was transferred to the premises of the Moscow Military District command post and entrusted with the protection of the same group of generals who arrested him.

Subsequently, I did not take part either in the security, or in the investigation, or in the trial. After the trial, Beria was shot by the same people who guarded him. During the execution, Beria behaved very poorly, like the very last coward, cried hysterically, knelt down and finally soiled himself all over. In a word, he lived disgustingly and died even more disgustingly.”

And this man was a marshal twice: once as the General Commissioner of State Security, which is equivalent to the rank of marshal, and the second time the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was officially awarded to him by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on July 9, 1945.

I think there is no need for comments on this personal statement by Zhukov; readers themselves can compare all the texts cited and determine where the truth is.

The investigation into the case of Beria and his closest associates Merkulov V.N., Dekanozov V.G., Kabulov B.Z., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Ya., Vlodzimirsky L.E. was conducted by the Prosecutor General for six months USSR Roman Andreevich Rudenko and the commander of the Moscow Military District, Army General Moskalenko Kirill Semenovich. The investigation was carried out How said Moskalenko, “day and night.” More than 40 volumes were compiled from interrogation protocols and documents attached to them exposing the criminals.

(I got acquainted with these volumes. The most skilled detective could not have come up with anything more terrible!)

Beria and his accomplices were tried in the office of the commander of the Moscow District, General Moskalenko. The MVO headquarters building was guarded by a reconnaissance battalion for all six months. In every arch and gate there were tanks and armored personnel carriers on constant combat duty. There was a fear that people from the KGB loyal to Beria might carry out an attack and try to save their boss.

Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev was appointed chairman of the special judicial presence. The court hearing of the Special Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR was held behind closed doors and lasted from December 16 to December 23, 1953. Immediately after the verdict was pronounced, Beria was shot in the same room where he was kept before the trial, and his corpse was burned in the crematorium.

After some time, it became known that the “closed” court session was not closed to everyone. Moskalenko’s office was equipped with special equipment, and members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee could listen to the proceedings of the trial all six days without leaving their offices.