The Soviet-Finnish War led to the Soviet-Finnish War

Finland was included in the Soviet sphere of influence by secret protocols to the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. But, unlike other Baltic countries, it refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, since it ran 32 km from the “northern capital”. In exchange, the USSR offered larger and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland during the Second World War, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.

The Finnish leadership, led by Prime Minister A. Kajander and the head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor, the Finnish line of fortifications became known as the “Mannerheim Line”), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. From October 12 to November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached a dead end.

On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of ​​the Soviet border point Mainila, a provocative shelling of Soviet positions was carried out from the Soviet side, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for an attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th Division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha area, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Even further south, the 9th Army was advancing on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would have cut Finland in two. North of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim line. And finally, on the main direction 7, the army was supposed to break through the Mannerheim Line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.

On December 6-12, troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim Line, but were unable to take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.

An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and were better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of equipment. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. This is how several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the battles between December and January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe defeat was the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.

Frosts hit, snow covered the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.

Volunteers of various views went to the country - from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with weapons and food.

On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.

The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that Helsinki could fall in a few days. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became stricter. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not withdraw its demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.

Sources:

On both sides of the Karelian Front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;

Secrets and lessons of the Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. St. Petersburg, 2000.

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Human reserves

By the end of November 1939, Finland concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.

The land army cooperated and was supported by the Finnish Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were added to the army's roster of 337 thousand people as a military force:

Paramilitary formations of Shutskor and Lotta Svyard - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of manpower involved in the war on the part of Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

A 150,000-strong Anglo-French expeditionary force was also being prepared and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - beginning of March 1940 to help Finland, whose arrival only disrupted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed and had everything it needed. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 naval warships.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent it weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, and Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million cartridges.

90% of financial assistance came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavian countries.

B. Fortifications

The basis of Finland's military power was its unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its front, main and rear lines and defense nodes.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bed) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, canals) of Finland in combination with highly technical engineering structures to create a defense line capable of multi-layered fire at the advancing enemy (at different levels and from different angles) along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, rubble, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and ceilings of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. Forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three stripes of the “Mannerheim Line” there were over 1000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

The space between the fortification lines, as well as the forefield in front of the entire “Mannerheim Line”, was literally covered with continuous military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire fences, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete obstacles. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, and all roads were prepared for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were built - craters 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 minutes were set for each linear kilometer. Forest debris reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish war plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the arrival of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega Sea lake

D. Directions of combat operations and command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: on the “Mannerheim Line” itself and in its forefield stood the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Käkisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed commander-in-chief of the active army of Finland.

The Chief of Staff of Headquarters is Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is Swedish Army General Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In combat operations along the entire 1,500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, during the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

Established number of ground forces: 916 thousand people. They consist of: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal troops and engineers.

The ground forces were supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million personnel of the Red Army and Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary reinforcements during the war to replace the killed and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three D-type boats, seven Shch-type boats, six M-type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) Northern and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army commander - corps commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

The commander of the 7th Army is Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and deep-echeloned defense of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not only insufficient to break through them, but even to destroy during combat operations a deep and extremely complex fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they were unable to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally expected, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor complicating the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely harsh winter of 1939/40 with its frosts of up to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in warfare in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's actions.

Progress of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.

In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.

1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:

5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal for a breakthrough across the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a group of corps commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).

Front Commander: Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov (from December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Corps Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Corporal Commander V.D. Grendal (from March 2, 1940 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank M.P. Kovalev (from February 12, 1940).

8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and strengthened:

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period was to actively prepare the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as to prepare the command of the troops for the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day.

Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy's front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification center. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies advanced in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice could still withstand tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At this time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, still hoping that Western help would arrive in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position forced the war to continue until the last minute and led to huge losses on both the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Losses of the parties*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter,
What happened in the forties
Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly
Childishly small body.
The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew far away.
It seemed that the boy was not lying down,
And he was still running,
Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among the great cruel war,
Why, I can’t imagine, -
I feel sorry for that distant fate
Like dead, alone,
It's like I'm lying there
Broken, small, killed,
In that unknown war,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of these, 65,384 people were killed.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss of troops during the period of hostilities was 391.8 thousand people. or, in round numbers, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish Blue and White Book of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war was 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called up or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.e. 20%, while Soviet losses amount to 40% of those involved in operations or, in other words, in percentage terms 2 times higher.

Note:

* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and in journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and decrease in Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryagi, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later, - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Pharmacists in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while data from Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

Baryshnikov V.N. From a cool world to a winter war: Finland’s eastern policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state univ. - St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.

Winter War 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ross. acad. Sciences, Institute of General Sciences. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Rep. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehviläinen. - 381s.

["Winter War" 1939-1940]: Selection of materials //Motherland. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons of a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- P. 29-31

Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: according to doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541 p. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Name. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [transl. from English V. D. Kaydalova]. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla: , 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: pp. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Materials used from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Materials used from the book: Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

The Finnish War lasted 105 days. During this time, over one hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were wounded or dangerously frostbitten. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor and whether the losses were unjustified.

A look back

It is impossible to understand the reasons for that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Before gaining independence, the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.

The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860 - its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known war - until 1901, Finns were not drafted into the Russian army. The population of the principality increases from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.

After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the “whites” won; chasing the “reds”, the hot guys crossed the old border, and the First Soviet-Finnish War began (1918-1920). Bleeded Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, chose to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.

It is difficult to say how historically fair this verdict turned out to be; The Vyborg province inherited by Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the time of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps also as a sign of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Seimas to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.

The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.

Geography is a sentence

Look at the map. It's 1939, and Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea routes will be blocked by another Axis member, Japan.

Thus, the only potentially protected channel for export, for which the Soviet Union receives the gold it desperately needs to complete industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, remains only the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round ice-free harbors in the USSR. The only railway to which, suddenly, in some places passes through rugged deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was laid, back under the Tsar, no one could have imagined that the Finns and Russians would fight on opposite sides barricades). Moreover, at a distance of a three-day journey from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

But that’s another half of the geographic troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is within the radius of one forced march of a potential enemy. A metropolis, whose streets have never been hit by an enemy shell before, can be shelled from heavy guns from the very first day of a possible war. Baltic Fleet ships are losing their only base. And there are no natural defensive lines, right up to the Neva.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was undergoing intense discussions about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of ​​Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of ​​​​attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

Negotiation

Stalin was anything but a fool. If to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, so it should be. Another question is that the goal cannot necessarily be achieved only by military means. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of ’39, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guard” - not out of revenge for an old defeat, no, in politics following emotions leads to imminent death - and to test what the Red Army is capable of in a battle with a real enemy, small in number, but trained by the European military school; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us...

But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a person of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki had been neither shaky nor slow; in the fall of 1939 they were moved to Moscow. In exchange for the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as the Soviet press transparently hinted, at the suggestion of “Western partners”) and on November 13 they left for home. There are two weeks left until the Winter War.

On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; According to the Soviet side, about a dozen soldiers and commanders were killed and wounded. Whether the Maynila incident was a deliberate provocation (as evidenced, for example, by the absence of a named list of victims), or whether one of the thousands of armed men, tensely standing for long days opposite the same armed enemy, finally lost their nerve - in any case , this incident was the reason for the outbreak of hostilities.

The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible “Mannerheim Line”, and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but for a long time they did not like to remember all this. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was severe.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were crisis relations between the USSR and Finland. For a number of years, the Soviet-Finnish war, alas, was not brilliant and did not bring glory to Russian weapons. Now let’s look at the actions of the two sides, which, unfortunately, could not agree.

It was alarming in these last days of November 1939 in Finland: the war continued in Western Europe, there was unrest on the border with the Soviet Union, the population was being evacuated from large cities, the newspapers stubbornly repeated the evil intentions of their eastern neighbor. Part of the population believed these rumors, others hoped that the war would bypass Finland.

But the morning that came on November 30, 1939, made everything clear. The coastal defense guns of Kronstadt, which opened fire on the territory of Finland at 8 o'clock, marked the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War.

The conflict was brewing gradually. Over the two decades between

There was mutual distrust between the USSR and Finland. If Finland was afraid of possible great power aspirations on the part of Stalin, whose actions as a dictator were often unpredictable, then the Soviet leadership, not without reason, was concerned about Helsinki’s major connections with London, Paris and Berlin. That is why, to ensure the security of Leningrad, during the negotiations that took place from February 1937 to November 1939, the Soviet Union offered Finland various options. Due to the fact that the Finnish government did not consider it possible to accept these proposals, the Soviet leadership took the initiative to resolve the controversial issue by force, with the help of weapons.

The fighting in the first period of the war was unfavorable for the Soviet side. The calculation of quickly achieving the goal with small forces was not crowned with success. Finnish troops, relying on the fortified Mannerheim Line, using a variety of tactics and skillfully using terrain conditions, forced the Soviet command to concentrate larger forces and in February 1940 launch a general offensive, which led to victory and the conclusion of peace on March 12, 1940.

The war lasted 105 days and was difficult for both sides. Soviet war fighters, following the orders of the command, showed massive heroism in the difficult conditions of a snowy, off-road winter. During the war, both Finland and the Soviet Union achieved their goals not only through military operations, but also through political means, which, as it turned out, not only did not weaken mutual intolerance, but, on the contrary, exacerbated it.

The political nature of the Soviet-Finnish War did not fit into the usual classification, limited by the ethical framework of the concepts of “just” and “unjust” war. It was unnecessary for both sides and not righteous mainly on our part. In this regard, one cannot but agree with the statements of such prominent Finnish statesmen as Presidents J. Paasikivi and U. Kekkonen that Finland’s fault was its intransigence during the pre-war negotiations with the Soviet Union, and the latter’s fault was that it did not use to the end political methods. Gave priority to a military solution to the dispute.

The unlawful actions of the Soviet leadership consist in the fact that Soviet troops, who crossed the border without declaring war on a broad front, violated the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1920 and the non-aggression treaty of 1932, extended in 1934. The Soviet government also violated its own convention concluded with neighboring states in July 1933. Finland also joined this document at that time. It defined the concept of aggression and clearly stated that no considerations of a political, military, economic or any other nature could justify or justify threats, blockades or attacks on another participating State.

By signing the title of the document, the Soviet government did not allow that Finland itself could commit aggression against its great neighbor. She feared only that her territory could be used by third countries for anti-Soviet purposes. But since such a condition was not stipulated in these documents, it follows that the contracting countries did not recognize its possibility and they had to respect the letter and spirit of these agreements.

Of course, Finland's one-sided rapprochement with Western countries and especially with Germany burdened Soviet-Finnish relations. The post-war President of Finland U. Kekkonen considered this cooperation a logical consequence of foreign policy aspirations for the first decade of Finnish independence. The common starting point of these aspirations, as was believed in Helsinki, was the threat from the east. Therefore, Finland sought to provide support to other countries in crisis situations. She carefully guarded the image of an “outpost of the West” and avoided a bilateral settlement of controversial issues with her eastern neighbor.

Due to these circumstances, the Soviet government accepted the possibility of a military conflict with Finland since the spring of 1936. It was then that the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the resettlement of the civilian population

(we were talking about 3,400 farms) from the Karelian Isthmus for the construction of training grounds and other military facilities here. During 1938, the General Staff at least three times raised the issue of transferring the forest area on the Karelian Isthmus to the military department for defense construction. On September 13, 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov specifically addressed the Chairman of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov with a proposal to intensify these works. However, at the same time diplomatic measures were taken to prevent military clashes. Thus, in February 1937, the first visit to Moscow by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland since its independence, R. Hopsti, took place. Reports of his conversations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov said that

“within the framework of existing Soviet-Finnish agreements there is an opportunity

to uninterruptedly develop and strengthen friendly good neighborly relations between both states and that both governments strive and will strive for this.”

But a year passed, and in April 1938 the Soviet government considered

timely offer to the Finnish government to negotiate

regarding the joint development of measures to strengthen security

sea ​​and land approaches to Leningrad and the borders of Finland and

concluding a mutual assistance agreement for this purpose. Negotiation,

continued for several months, were unsuccessful. Finland

rejected this offer.

Soon for informal negotiations on behalf of the Soviet

government arrived in Helsinki B.E. Matte. He brought it on principle

new Soviet proposal, which was as follows: Finland cedes

to the Soviet Union a certain territory on the Karelian Isthmus,

receiving in return a large Soviet territory and financial compensation

expenses for the resettlement of Finnish citizens of the ceded territory. Answer

the Finnish side was negative with the same justification - sovereignty and

neutrality of Finland.

In this situation, Finland took defensive measures. Was

military construction was intensified, exercises were held in which

Present was the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General F.

Halder, the troops received new types of weapons and military equipment.

Obviously, it was these measures that gave rise to second-rank army commander K.A.

Meretskov, who in March 1939 was appointed commander of the troops

Leningrad Military District, assert that Finnish troops from the very

began supposedly had an offensive mission on the Karelian Isthmus with

the goal was to wear down the Soviet troops and then strike at Leningrad.

France and Germany, busy with the war, could not provide support

Finland, another round of Soviet-Finnish negotiations has begun. They

took place in Moscow. As before, the Finnish delegation was headed by

Paasikivi, but at the second stage the minister was included in the delegation

Finance Gunner. There were rumors in Helsinki at that time that the Social Democrat

Ganner had known Stalin since pre-revolutionary times in

Helsinki and even once rendered him a proper favor.

During the negotiations, Stalin and Molotov withdrew their previous proposal

about leasing islands in the Gulf of Finland, but they suggested that the Finns postpone

border several tens of kilometers from Leningrad and rent for

creation of a naval base on the Haiko Peninsula, giving Finland half the size

large territory in Soviet Karelia.

non-aggression and the recall of their diplomatic representatives from Finland.

When the war began, Finland turned to the League of Nations asking for

support. The League of Nations, in turn, called on the USSR to end the military

actions, but received the answer that the Soviet country is not conducting any

war with Finland.

organizations. Many countries have raised funds for Finland or

provided loans, in particular from the United States and Sweden. Most weapons

delivered by Great Britain and France, but the equipment was mostly

outdated. The most valuable contribution was from Sweden: 80 thousand rifles, 85

anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns and 112 field guns.

The Germans also expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the USSR. The war caused

a significant blow to Germany's vital supplies of timber and nickel

from Finland. The strong sympathy of Western countries made it possible

intervention in the war between northern Norway and Sweden, which would entail

means the elimination of the import of iron ore into Germany from Norway. But even

Faced with such difficulties, the Germans complied with the terms of the pact.

The Soviet-Finnish War and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through minefields, in dense rows and holding hands. Every Russian person who recognizes the incomparability of losses must at the same time admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

I’ll quote Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim again:
« It happened that in the battles of early December, Russians marched singing in tight ranks - and even holding hands - into Finnish minefields, not paying attention to explosions and accurate fire from the defenders.”

Can you imagine these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures cited by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24,923 Finns killed and dying from wounds. Russians, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why feel sorry for these Russians?

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book “The Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940.” with reference to Nikita Khrushchev they give the following data:

“Of the total number of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR’s losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1000 aircraft, 2300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with “meat”.
Mannerheim writes about the reasons for the defeat as follows:
“In the final stages of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower.”

Stop!

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such scanty losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and have written about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in “The Great Slandered War” states:
« Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded. The primary source of this figure is a translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä published in the newspaper “Abroad” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish publication “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost more than 23,000 people killed in the “winter war”; more than 43,000 people were injured. 25,243 people were killed in the bombings, including on merchant ships.”

The last figure - 25,243 killed in bombings - is questionable. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to familiarize myself with the Finnish original of Seppälä’s article.”

Mannerheim, as you know, assessed the losses from the bombing:
“More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice that number were wounded.”

The largest figures for Finnish losses are given by Military Historical Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official data, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.”

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
According to Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 prisoners

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book “Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Loss." The number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet includes even those with whom their relatives broke off contact in 1939-1940.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers counted these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Who and how counted the Finnish losses is absolutely unclear. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the armed forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war Finland was experiencing a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even minor losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the Vanquished,” Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to Aritz's calculations, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 grew by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, something that had never happened in any country, not even Germany.”

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. On Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses during the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
A total of 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish website http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died between 1939 and 1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not add up.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR” claims that ardent Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army losses. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as the Shutskor, were not included in the general loss statistics. And they had many paramilitary forces.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

Be that as it may, two explanations arise:
First, if the Finnish data about their losses is correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they “raised their paws” without suffering almost any losses.
Secondly, if we assume that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply vastly underestimated their own losses.